# Chapter Outline

#### 1. Introduction and Literature Review

- Research question
- Relation to existing literature on rebel cohesion
- Contribution to broader debates
- Normative and policy importance of explaining multi-rebel conflicts
- Overview of dissertation

#### 2. Theoretical Framework

- Dissident network membership
- Dissident preferences
- Network ties and collective action
- Hypotheses
- External support and the dissident network
- Hypotheses

# 3. Research Design

- Spatial-temporal domain
- Description of ICEWS data
- Justification of network approach
- Network construction
- Modeling strategy

## 4. Network Structure and Violent Mobilization

- Hypotheses 1-4
- Panel models with number of active groups as DV
- Stochastic actor models with nodes as unit of analysis
- Discussion

## 5. External Networks and Spillover

- Hypotheses 5-8
- Panel models with dissident network attributes as DV
- Robustness: parallel temporal networks model
- Discussion

### 6. Qualitative Case Studies

- Objectives:
  - Determine whether proposed causal mechanism is responsible for cases that fit the theory
  - Explore discrepant, potentially falsifying cases
  - Expand temporal domain
  - Relax assumption that social ties collapse to a single dimension
- Criteria:
  - For testing the causal mechanism, cases should be consistent with the hypotheses (i.e. low network density/modularity, with a relatively large number of rebel groups)
  - Discrepant cases should have independent variables consistent with the hypotheses, but low values on the dependent variable (i.e. low network density/modularity, with a relatively large number of rebel groups)
- Candidate 1: One or more Burmese secessionist movements
  - Many internally divided movements, with varying dimensions of division religion, communist/anti-communist, control of drug trade
    - \* Shared government opponent, colonial history, etc. would allow for controlled comparisons of these dimensions
  - Some cases with strong connection to outside states
  - Variation in number of violent groups both across cases and over time
  - Temporal domain: 1948-present
- Candidate 2: one or more non-secessionist cases
  - Cases that fit the theory low density/modularity and high numbers of violent groups
- Candidate 3: one or more discrepant cases
  - Cases that do not fit the theory low density/modularity, yet low numbers of violent groups
  - Assess whether these falsify the theory, or whether additional variables moderate influence of causal variables

#### 7. Conclusion

- Summary of findings
- Explain implications for existing literature

- Policy implicationsDirections for future research