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Justice and Identity: Changing Perspectives on What Is Fair

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Most research on justice has aimed to describe abstract, depersonalized models that could apply to anyone. However, much of this research has involved identity, if only implicitly. We argue that justice needs to be contextualized to take into account the powerful effects of identity in determining when justice matters. The complexity and fluidity of identity need to be considered to understand when, why, and how strongly people care about justice, and how people choose among competing models of justice. We review existing research on distributive, procedural, and inclusionary justice and describe their connection to identity. We illustrate the intersection of justice and identity in environmental issues, a context in which these constructs have significant implications for individual, community, and planetary well-being. We conclude with 4 points to stimulate further research on the intersections of identity and justice.

A majority of research and theory on justice has aimed for the abstract, with a goal of describing models for fair distributions and treatment that could apply regardless of whose outcomes were being decided. Rawls (1971) famously tried to remove the impact of individual differences by placing people behind the "veil of ignorance," which emphasizes the distinction between a justice motive and a motive based on self-interest (cf. Miller & Ratner, 1996). However, one may act in a principled way and still have those principles strongly rooted in one's own background and experiences. Individual and group differences in perspective highlight important contextual differences that focus people's interests and attention; that is, where you sit is where you stand. These differences are not only cognitively perceived but also felt at the visceral level. Justice-based evaluations can spark emotional reactions, not only because of their implications for well-being, but also because of their implications for identity (Miller, 2001). Lerner (2001) has criticized the neglect of emotion in abstract theories of justice. Thus, a universal but a contextual and dispassionate justice presents only a limited understanding of how people react to events in their personal and social lives.

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Justice theories, although abstract, are not as general or comprehensive as the laws of physics. Instead, like many social science theories, they are midrange theories with contingent explanatory power. The trajectory of justice research illustrates the gradual exploration of these contingencies. A focus on the "what" of distributive justice, questioning the conditions under which distributions of resources were considered fair (e.g., Deutsch, 1975), led to a consideration of the "how" of procedural justice, explicating processes through which decisions were made (Leventhal, 1980; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Thibaut & Walker, 1975). Increasingly, justice literature is exploring the "who" of inclusion in the scope of justice (Opotow, 1990, 2001), evoking questions of individual and group identity. We argue here that identity not only influences whether or not justice is seen as relevant, but also which model of justice is salient.

Identity has multiple, fluid, and evaluative connotations. Justice research, although increasingly attentive to identity, has tended to describe it narrowly rather than in its full breadth and complexity. Identity, as it is lived and experienced, includes diverse individual and social identities (Roccas & Brewer, 2002). We propose that justice research can intersect with identity in ways that are more fully cognizant of the richness of both justice and identity scholarship.

Our fascination with this compound topic was stimulated by our interest in the meaning of justice in environment contexts (see Opotow & Clayton, 1994). In these contexts, "what" and "how" matter greatly, as they do in other contexts. But questions of "who"—identity and

inclusion—have the capacity to spark incendiary debates concerning, for example, whether the future should be sacrificed for the sake of the present, and whether rights should be extended to nonhuman entities. Environmental conflicts can not only delegitimize some individuals or groups of stakeholders, but also invoke a moral logic about who and what counts that can stretch previously inviolable moral boundaries (Opotow, 1996). Viewing natural elements—species, habitats, or commons—as having standing in our moral community not only challenges core moral beliefs, but it also challenges individual and group identities. How people see themselves can depend on how they relate to the natural world (Clayton & Opotow, 2003). Thus, questions of identity are arguably more prominent and influential in environmental contexts than in others, as society considers the difficult and poignant trade-offs needed to act fairly in environmental issues.

Taking identity seriously raises larger justice issues as they play out in specific contexts: Whose perspective on justice is being considered? What is their status in relation to others in the situation? What other entities are being excluded from the realm of moral consideration? Not only does identity have implications for activating particular contingencies of justice, but the reverse can also be true: The sense that a particular process or outcome is just or unjust conveys information about the identities, particularly the status, of those involved (Boeckmann & Feather, 2001; Huo & Sawahata, 2001; Smith, Tyler, & Daubenmier, 2001). This article discusses intersections of identity and justice in justice research and examines how these intersections play out in environmental contexts. We argue that taking identity into account can yield justice theories with greater explanatory power because they can address the complex issues that give our personal and social lives a sense of connection, urgency, and meaning. Because both justice and identity are complex, diffuse constructs, we begin with definitions.

Identity

Although identity can be simply defined as "the distinguishing character or personality of an individual" (Webster's new collegiate dictionary, 1979, p. 563), it is a construct with broad meaning. It has social as well as individual elements and has meaning at the intrapsychic, interpersonal, intergroup, and international levels. It is a dynamic construct that undergoes change at various stages of one's life and in different historical eras (Erikson, 1986).

Traditionally, identity is linked with self-concept and self-reflection, and includes beliefs about who we are as well as who we hope to be. It is, in part, a way of locating oneself in the world (Baumeister, 1997; James, 1892/1984). It describes who we are like and unlike, to whom we are connected, and from whom we are separate. It is also laced with an evaluative element, describing who is worthy and who is worthless, that can motivate biased perceptions and interpretations in an attempt to bolster one's sense of self-worth. We form a sense of ourselves based in part on the feedback we receive about ourselves from others (Cooley, 1902; Mead, 1934), resulting in an identity that can be self-generated as well as imposed from the outside. One may choose to identify as a runner or an environmentalist, or one may be identified by others as a runner or as an environmentalist. Although conceptually distinct, these aspects of identity feed into and affect each other. For example, we are more likely to self-identify as environmentalists if we are so identified by others.

For the sake of clarity, we distinguish between individual and group identity, although we note that there is no clear dividing line between them. Individual identity often includes assessments of one's traits and abilities: "I am a nice person; I am a runner." It also includes a description of one's role in relation to others: mother, teacher, employee. Work on independent versus interdependent self-construals provides an interesting and relevant discussion of the ways in which individual and group identities overlap and of individual differences in the tendency to stress one or the other (see, e.g., Kitayama & Markus, 1995; Singelis, 1994.) It is important to note that where one stands in relation to another has implications for status and power; not all roles are equally valued. Identity not only defines, but also facilitates, certain interactions and power relationships. Because of these power differences, justice is not always transitive: fair ways for person A to treat person B are not necessarily fair ways for person B to treat person A (e.g., boss–subordinate or doctor–patient relationships).

Identity is not only defined locally, from within oneself and one's immediate contacts. Identity is also defined by such culturally-constructed markers as gender, ethnicity, nationality, and class, which impose meaning about who one is. These characteristics straddle the line between personal and social. Social identity, the part of self-concept derived from group membership, not only influences one's sense of self but also groups people with shared characteristics, who may then define themselves, as well as be defined by others, as belonging to a particular group (Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). These group memberships affect interactions and affiliations. A group identity emerges from a sense of belonging, attachment, or involvement with a group based on shared values, motivations, characteristics, or experiences that can become fodder for identity politics (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Minow, 1997). Like personal identities, these group identities evoke assessments of value, status, and power.

Restricting identity to intrapsychic, interpersonal, and intergroup relationships seems to miss important sources of connection, self-definition, and—crucially—behavioral motivation. Scholars are beginning to examine aspects of identity that are expressed in a sense of involvement or attachment to the natural environment (cf. Clayton, 2003; Clayton & Opotow, 2003; Thomashow, 1995; Weigert, 1997). An environmental identity can be discussed at a variety of levels, from an individual's connection to nature (Clayton, 2003), which can be deliberately nurtured through training and experience (Thomashow, 1995), to group interactions (e.g., between environmentalists, ranchers, property owners, etc.) that take place in the context of larger environmental issues (Opotow & Brook, 2003; Zavestoski, 2003). Environmental identity is similar, in this way, to an ethnic or gender-based identity, which can include a very personal sense of what gender (for example) means to the individual, as well as more social implications for group interactions and alliances. Like ethnic and gender identities, an environmental identity may have behavioral implications, but this will not be true in all situations and contexts.

These levels of identity are not mutually exclusive. Identity can be experienced as simultaneously individual, group, and environmental, "as an abiding sense of the self and of the relationship of the self to the world" (Northrup, 1989, p. 55). The individual self is nested in interpersonal relationships and groups; these relationships and groups are, in turn, nested in communities, organizations, and cultures; and they are all encompassed in a perception of the world as a system that is not only politically and culturally, but also ecologically, diverse.

Minow (1997) argued that identity becomes more salient when it is fluid, such as when individuals or groups undergo geographical or social change and experience psychological and political shifts in their understanding of who they are and their entitlement to social resources. This is evident in the evolving nature of ethnic identity. Although ethnicity is conventionally viewed as a relatively enduring and stable attribute of both individual and group identity, Nagel (1994) argued that it "is not simply an historical legacy of migration or conquest, but is constantly undergoing redefinition and reconstruction" (p. 153). She described ethnic boundaries as negotiated rather than biological, shaped by external forces such as migration, resource competition, and political access. Similarly, an environmental identity is affected by social, political, economic, and ecological forces that combine to make it significant to us in new ways.

Identity, thus, needs to be understood as a complex and multidimensional construct with motivational and behavioral implications. The type and level of identity experienced will be affected by immediate relationship concerns within a situation as well as by historical changes, both of which redefine the meaning of identities and alter their relative salience.

Justice

Justice can be defined as an abstract system of beliefs and standards prescribing appropriate relationships between people and their fates. Justice moderates the relation between individuals and the societies to which they belong by encouraging people to regulate their own behavior rather than be constrained by others (e.g., Wenz, 1988). It is operationalized through law and legal procedures, as well as less formally in shared norms (e.g., reciprocity) and values (e.g., equality). Although justice is intuitively felt to be objective, is in fact a malleable and fluid construct. In both its formal, codified manifestation and as informal mores, justice is a human product: Each culture constructs its own norms by altering what was handed down to it. Individuals and social groups vary not only in the way in which they define justice, but also in the degree to which they prioritize it over alternative values such as expedience, practicality, or financial growth. The sense of justice as a mandate may motivate consistent behavior, but it also inspires justifications, as individuals attempt to interpret their behavior after the fact to make it appear consistent with the cultural consensus on what is just. It is when we recognize the contingent nature of justice that the impact of identity becomes apparent, and it is here that justice becomes slippery, unstable, and controversial.

Within justice theory, alternative types or models have been identified. The most central distinction has been between procedural and distributive justice.

Distributive justice addresses the contingency, "what," and concerns the distribution of such socially-valued goods and resources as love and caring, services, goods, money, information, and status (Foa & Foa, 1974). Distributive justice research investigates the applicability of a diverse set of norms that people use to allocate these social goods and resources. Three distributive norms that have been the focus of empirical attention are equity (also called proportionality), equality, and need (Deutsch, 1975).

Procedural justice addresses the contingency, "how," and concerns the procedures and processes deemed fair and appropriate (Thibaut & Walker, 1975). Procedural justice has been described by six elements: consistency, impartiality, decision quality, correctability, voice, and ethicality (Leventhal, 1980). Some theorists distinguish between procedural justice (the fairness of decision-making processes) and interactional justice (the quality of treatment by authorities); however, Tyler and Blader (2000) argued that interactional justice is best conceived as a component of procedural justice.

Practically speaking, it can be difficult to distinguish cleanly between procedure and distribution. This is true because engagement in procedure is itself a social good, as participation in decision making is itself a resource (cf. Klein & Azzi, 2001). Also, procedure can occur in an ad hoc way, intermingled with distribution, and distributions do not uniformly occur after a procedural phase. Thus, the distinction between these two models of justice is often relative rather than absolute.

Two other dimensions of justice are crucial when considering identity. Inclusion in the scope of justice, addressing the contingency, "who," concerns who is inside or outside our psychological boundary for justice, called the *scope of justice* (or *moral community*). Moral considerations guide our behavior with individuals and groups included in our scope of justice (Deutsch, 1975). Moral inclusion means we apply considerations of fairness to them, see them as entitled to a share of community resources, and are willing to incur sacrifices to help them. Moral exclusion means that these positive orientations and obligations are absent and instead harm-doing can seem appropriate; those excluded can then be perceived as eligible targets for exploitation and violence (Opotow, 1990, 1993).

Finally, procedural, distributive, and inclusionary justice are often examined at either the individual or the group level of analysis. Brickman and his colleagues (Brickman, Folger, Goode, & Schul, 1981) took this wider view of justice in their theory of microjustice and macrojustice. In doing so, they introduced another important point of contact between identity and justice. They defined microjustice as concerned with "the fairness of rewards to individual recipients" and macrojustice as concerned with "the aggregate fairness of reward in a society" (p. 173). They noted that people are concerned with both types of justice, but that the two may come into conflict.

Intersections of Identity and Justice

Identity affects why people care about justice. If justice is a system of rules endorsed by a society, people are motivated to adhere to this system to preserve their individual and group identities, which entwine with a sense of rectitude (i.e., self-respect and the respect of others). Identity also affects the operational definition of justice by determining whose justice matters, and for whom justice is relevant. In turn, our perceptions of justice and just treatment can influence the identity attributed to the recipient of that treatment, be it ourselves or another.

Several researchers describe justice as resulting from and residing at the intersection of self and society. Roy Baumeister (1998) identified three key aspects of self-experience: having reflexive consciousness, having interpersonal relationships with others, and performing such executive functions as making choices and decisions and taking responsibility. The executive functions affect interpersonal relationships, how a person is perceived by others, and how one comes to see oneself—as a good, moral person, or an immoral one. Ultimately, this can lead to self-regulation or self-justifications. Where Baumeister focused on the use of justice reasoning to affirm the morality of the self, Linda Skitka developed a model (not inconsistent with Baumeister's) that highlights the use of justice to express and define oneself. Skitka's Value Protection Model of justice reasoning (2002; this issue) suggested that justice essentially serves to protect identity and self-definitional needs in the face of opposing societal demands. People affirm their sense of self by endorsing moral mandates consistent with their personal values. Moral mandates are the selective expression of moral values that are central to people's sense of identity.

In this issue, Skitka has further developed her thinking on the relation between justice and identity with the Accessible Identity Model. Like us, she focuses on the variability in both salience and definitions of justice and looks to variations in identity to account for it. Her conceptualization of identity is different from ours, although not incompatible. Skitka considers the implications of the three traditional components of the self identified by William James as material, social, and personal (or spiritual); her focus is primarily on the individual's perceptions of fairness to himself or herself, depending on which aspects of self are most salient. Our focus in this article is on identity as perhaps a more social construct, something that can be considered at different levels of inclusiveness. This is important for us as we concentrate on how broadly self-relevance is defined and how widely principles of justice are applied. However, we agree with Skitka that, to understand a person's justice reasoning, we must understand which of the many possible identities are currently activated.

In the sections that follow, we discuss how identity and justice intersect in four contingencies of justice: distributive justice, procedural justice, inclusion in the scope of justice, and microjustice and macrojustice.

Distributive Justice

Michael Wenzel (2000) has stated, "In four decades of social psychological research on distributive justice, the relationship between justice and identity has been more or less neglected" (p. 157). The statement itself illustrates that this is changing. Without specifically naming identity as important, distributive justice researchers have long been cognizant of its significance in research on factors fostering disparate outcomes. However, previous theories have focused on specific aspects of identity without developing a more general argument about the significance of identity. We briefly

review research showing the ways in which identity influences perceptions of distributive justice.

Individual identity. One's role in a situation may affect perceptions of, and standards concerning, justice. Research suggests that perception of the fairness of a distribution is affected by whether one is directly affected. Mikula, Athenstaedt, Heschgl, and Heimgartner (1998), for example, asked close friend dyads and married, cohabiting, or romantically involved couples to describe and evaluate negative interpersonal incidents and found that the same incidents were evaluated as less fair by the recipient of the treatment than by the actor; this was particularly true for women.

One of the things that can be affected by one's role in a situation is reference point. Referent Cognitions Theory (e.g., Folger, 1986), which posits that reactions to injustice depend on counterfactual thoughts, may account for some of the effects of identity on perceptions of injustice. Self-serving and self-centered biases are likely to affect the alternatives to a situation that come to mind. One's identity and role in a situation will influence the alternatives that are considered and thus the extent to which justice is perceived as having been done. Relative deprivation research, for example, yielded the finding that women were content with relatively lower pay than men because they made within-group comparisons to other women rather than cross-group comparisons to male colleagues (e.g., Crosby, 1982, 1984). This example also illustrates the overlap between individual and group identities: although the members of Crosby's sample were not necessarily identifying themselves with women as a group, their choice of a comparison standard was based on their individual identities as women.

Lerner (e.g., Desmarais & Lerner, 1994; Lerner, 1974, 1981) suggested that choice of a distributive rule is fundamentally affected by one's relationship to others: that schemas are cued by the perception of a relationship as one of identity (the other's welfare is as important as one's own), unit (mutual independence—one cares about the other's welfare but each person tends to look out for himself or herself), or nonunit (the welfare of the other is irrelevant). Deutsch (1975, 1985) made a similar distinction, stating that the choice of a distributive principle is based on one's interaction context and goals. In both cases, a close relationship in which one wishes to promote the well-being of another is likely to result in the use of the need principle in distributing resources, a friendly social relationship in which one's goal is interpersonal harmony results in the use of the equality principle, and an economic or disinterested relationship in which productivity is the goal will prompt use of the equity principle.

The type of distributive justice principle used to allocate resources in a relationship can signal the type of relationship that is perceived to exist. If strict reciprocity of input and outcome is maintained, the relationship is probably economic, whereas use of a need-based rule implies that the relationship is concerned with personal well-being (cf. Mills & Clark, 1982). Too great a concern for strict reciprocity may lead to a perception that the relationship is not valued. Clark and Mills (1979) found that people who had, or wanted, an intimate relationship with another reacted negatively when that other carefully paid them back for benefits they gave. Similarly, when people read about two students, one of whom had ordered a small amount of food and one of whom had ordered a large amount of food, they assumed the students were closer friends and liked each other more if they split the check evenly than if they divided it equitably (Greenberg, 1983).

The difficulty in putting relational considerations aside when aiming to be just was shown in a laboratory study by McPherson Frantz and Janoff–Bulman (2000). They had college students respond to scenarios of interpersonal conflict and manipulated the degree of preference for one of the participants in the conflict. When the students liked one participant more than the other, they were less evenhanded in their perspective taking. Strikingly, this was even more true when they were instructed to be fair and unbiased.

Group identity. Cultural differences have been found to be influential in affecting perceptions of distributive justice. Miller (1997), for example, has found differences between Hindu Indians and North Americans in justice judgments, with Hindu Indians placing more emphasis on interpersonal responsibilities as well as paying more attention to the effects of the situational context (see also Baron & Miller, 2000). Researchers attempting to define the underlying dimension that can differentiate justice preferences between countries have identified individualism–collectivism as an important dimension. Briefly, individualism conceives of oneself as independent and prioritizes personal goals and values, whereas collectivism conceives of the self as interdependent and prioritizes collective goals and values. Murphy–Berman and Berman (2002) found that in the more collectivist culture of Indonesia students rated a distribution of resources based on need as fairer than one based on merit, whereas students in the more competitive and individualistic culture of Hong Kong rated a distribution based on merit as more fair. Morris and Leung (2000) reviewed a large number of studies on cross-cultural differences in justice preference and concluded that interactional goals may be the best immediate predictor of a preference for one type of distribution over another, but that cultures may differ in how these interactional goals are cued by the immediate social context. Differences in distributive justice associated with cultural identity may be reducible to differences associated with the way in which in-

dividuals define themselves and their relationships with others.

When identities are constructed at a group rather than an individual level, the distributive norm that is chosen may be the one that most strongly benefits or legitimates that group. Wenzel (2002) has shown that, given a choice of dimensions on which to base a distribution of rewards, people who identified strongly with an in-group were more likely to choose the dimension that was prototypical of that group. What is perceived as fair, or the extent to which certain dimensions of justice-related behavior are attended to, can depend on the extent to which one identifies with a group. Azzi (1992; Klein & Azzi, 2001) has demonstrated that preference for a proportional or egalitarian distribution rule for the allocation of power can be affected by whether one is a member of a majority or a minority group. Klein and Azzi noted that both relational and instrumental goals may contribute to this pattern of results and conclude, "norms and standards can only be defined in relation to the identities that are at stake in a specific social context" (p. 42).

In sum, perception of distributive justice and choice of a distributive justice principle can be affected by the aspects of the situation that are most salient, by the goals one has for the situation, and by a desire to benefit oneself or group—all of which are consequences of identity. It may be that a general framework will be able to integrate the different models of distributive justice by clearly acknowledging the dynamics generated by the identities of those involved.

Procedural Justice

Although procedural justice may be viewed as a proxy for establishing a just outcome (Thibaut & Walker, 1975), procedures have psychological meaning in their own right when they confer a sense of dignity, respect, and voice (Lind & Tyler, 1988). Consistent with this, people can be more willing to accept negative outcomes when they view procedures that lead to these outcomes as fair, respectful, and allowing voice (Tyler & Lind, 1990). Fair treatment is important at least in part because it conveys information about a person's status within the group. The quality of treatment gives people the most direct feedback about their status within the group, although the quality of decision making also affects group identity by providing individuals with information that may affect the opinion they hold of their group. Tyler (e.g., Tyler & Blader, 2000) has argued that concern for one's social identity is the main motivation for concern with procedural justice.

Much of the research on procedural justice discusses but does not elaborate the concept of identity. Yet much of this research takes place in, or makes reference to, organizational settings and focuses on treatment by authorities. Identity in these settings involves a relationship in which power is very much an issue, as subordinates are concerned about the way in which they are viewed and treated by superiors. Research has begun to investigate the extent to which procedural justice concerns vary in settings or relationships that have differing norms about relationships and attitudes toward power (e.g., Smith et al., 2001).

Individual identity. If one is not concerned about one's relationship with a particular group or institution, one is less likely to be concerned about procedural justice. Holbrook and Kulik (2001), surveying 119 bank loan applicants, found that reactions to bank loan decisions among those who had a long-term relationship with the bank were more affected by the opportunity for voice and less affected by outcome favorability than those who had no ongoing relationship with the bank. There were no differences in reactions to interpersonal treatment, which affected both groups of customers.

Bobocel and Holmvall (2002) hypothesized that the extent to which people tend to define themselves in terms of their relationship with others, an "interdependent" self-construal, would affect their responses to procedural injustice. They tested this among 118 college students and found, as predicted, that people high in interdependence were more positively affected by being treated sensitively than were those low in interdependence, if the relevant self-concept had been primed. Similarly, Van Prooijen, Van den Bos, & Wilke (2002) found that people were more affected by assessments of procedural justice when status was salient. People also are more strongly affected by procedural justice differences when their identification with the group is high, and when they are from the same culture as those with whom they are interacting. The overall picture suggests that in conditions when one's identity within the group is highlighted, either by internal motivations or by external cues, procedural justice is more important.

Group identity. Procedural justice may be less important in cultures that emphasize and legitimate a high degree of difference between those in power and those in less powerful positions. In studies conducted in the United States, Germany, Mexico, Hong Kong, and the People's Republic of China, Brockner et al. (2001) found that treatment of employees conveying a lower status within the group is not perceived negatively in cultures that legitimate this status.

Identity influences attention to different aspects of justice. Different experiences associated with identity—for example, personal or vicarious experiences of sexism—may lead to differences in expectations or priorities which explain the focus on different aspects of justice. People who do not identify with a particular group are likely to have more instrumental than rela-

tional concerns, whereas those more identified with the group are likely to place more emphasis on how they are treated by representatives of that group (e.g., Huo, Smith, Tyler, & Lind, 1996).

A group identity is likely to affect perceptions of justice as well as how important those perceptions are. Hegtvedt and Johnson (2000) argued that identification with a group may increase the perceived legitimacy of that group. Justice is assessed through social comparisons regarding not only outcomes but also the extent to which existing rules and procedures are perceived as fair. If one's fellow group members endorse a particular rule or distribution, one is more likely to assume that the rule or distribution is a legitimate one. Consistent with this hypothesis, Lamertz (2002) surveyed employees of a telecommunications company that had been downsizing for several years, and found that employees' perceptions of procedural and interactional (as they defined the term) fairness were significantly associated with the interactional fairness perceptions of their closest peer contact at the organization. In other words, if one's fellow group members believe the situation to be fair, one is likely to assume they are right.

Procedural justice researchers have highlighted the implications of just treatment for identity. A number of organizational studies have found that employees show more "organizational citizenship behaviors"—that is, discretionary behaviors that contribute to the effectiveness of the organization as a whole—when they feel they have been treated fairly by their supervisors (Tepper, Lockhart, & Hoobler, 2001; Williams, Pitre, & Zainuba, 2002). On the flip side, unfair treatment by supervisors has been shown to lower self-esteem among people with a high level of group involvement or identification (Smith, Tyler, Huo, Ortiz, & Lind, 1998). However, perceived injustice can positively affect identity as well. Discriminatory treatment toward one's group may increase identification with that group, and if one feels oneself to be a valued member of the in-group, one may devote more energy to advancing the welfare of that group. Branscombe, Spears, Ellemers, and Doosje (2002) experimentally manipulated intergroup standing and intragroup respect to see how they would affect working to benefit oneself or one's group, and found that if people were respected rather than disrespected members of their group, not only did they work more to benefit their group when it was devalued relative to another group, but they worked more on behalf of the group than on behalf of themselves.

In sum, identity concerns clearly affect the experience of procedural justice: whether one wants to be a member of a particular group affects one's concern for, and attention to, fair treatment; one's identification with a group affects one's assumption that it is fair; and one's experience of fair or unfair treatment affects the extent to which one perceives oneself as a group member. However, further research in this area is needed to adequately test assumptions about identity and to fully define the aspects of identity (especially with regard to power) that are relevant.

Inclusion in the Scope of Justice

Identity is central to research on inclusion in and exclusion from the scope of justice. Those seen as outside the scope of justice (i.e., they are morally excluded) can be perceived as eligible targets of exploitation and violence. Moral exclusion not only concerns the identity and the moral standing of others, but it also seeks to protect one's own identity as an upstanding and moral person. As described by Baumeister (1998) and others, self-protective cognitions can yield unflattering comparisons that bolster oneself at the expense of others and provide moral justifications for disparate psychological and material outcomes.

Individual identity. When we perceive others as similar to us, we are more likely to include them in the scope of justice, but only in low conflict contexts. In high conflict, similarity is likely to foster moral exclusion (Opotow, 1995). Inclusion in the scope of justice also depends, in part, on one's feelings toward the agents or targets of exclusion (Singer, 1998). In addition, harsh social circumstances, destructive conflict, and seeing others as unconnected to oneself can foster moral exclusion and weaken arousal to another person's distress and suffering (Bandura, 1990; Deutsch, 1990). People seen as deviant, dangerous, or posing a physical or financial threat can also be seen as deserving less than full procedural protection (Boeckmann & Tyler, 1997). Changes to personal identity resulting from severe accidents, debilitating illnesses, or the acquisition of a stigmatizing identity can change a person's moral status. As an extreme example, a once-competent individual in a vegetative state can be seen as outside the scope of justice and therefore eligible for euthanasia, medical research, or organ harvesting (Soifer, 1996).

Group identity. People are concerned about the symbolic and social meaning of similarity and difference. Entitlement is judged from and depends on one's evaluation of a target's social category (Wenzel, 2000). What is viewed as fair and unfair differs for groups that are inside or outside one's scope of justice. In organizations, for example, people with a wider scope of justice are more supportive of ethnically-based employment selection criteria (Singer, 1996), and employees are more likely to see layoffs as unfair if layoff victims are within their scope of justice (Brockner, 1990). Conflict can motivate people to rate their own group more positively than other groups, to view their own group's values as good and the values of other groups as bad or

false, and, in destructive intergroup conflict, to make unflattering comparisons denigrating members of other groups (Brewer & Brown, 1998). Thus, moral exclusion can make it seem fair that one's own group is better off (has more resources, etc.) than other groups.

The perception that someone has been treated unfairly may lead to the assumption that they fall outside the scope of justice. Research on the "Belief in a Just World" (Lerner, 1980) has shown that, in some circumstances (in particular, when unable to remedy an injustice), we are likely to derogate the victim of an injustice: victimization implies less worth (Hafer, 2000; Lerner & Simmons, 1966). These evaluations may extend beyond the individual victim. Viewing an allocation as just may induce an evaluation of all those directly affected by the allocation; it may justify the allocation and differentiate between those who were benefited and those who were disadvantaged (Wenzel, 2002). These judgments can have an additive effect that rationalizes bias and patterns of inequality in society (Mackie & Smith, 1998). When certain ascribed identities permit a complete disregard for justice, or the experience of injustice implies a less valued identity, the profound connections between justice and identity are evident.

Levels of Justice

Individual and collective identities. The distinction between individual and group identity, repeatedly made earlier, is fundamentally embodied in the distinction between microjustice and macrojustice. The fact that different perceptions of justice result from a different level of focus was apparent in early work on the personal and group discrimination discrepancy. Crosby and many others (Crosby, 1982, 1984; Taylor, Wright, Moghaddam, & Lalonde, 1990) have uncovered evidence that people might consider a particular distribution of outcomes to be fair for themselves personally, but not for their group as a whole. Thus, one might feel that justice does or does not exist depending on whether one's focus is on the individual or collective.

Brickman et al. (1981) introduced the distinction between microjustice, or a focus on individual entities, and macrojustice, or a focus on the collective. This is not just the distinction between individual and group. In conflicts between groups, groups may become the individual entities and a concern for the outcomes of particular groups may be no different, in justice terms, than a focus on the outcomes of individuals. The distinction between microjustice and macrojustice is probably best thought of as a continuum ranging from a solely self-centered focus on individual deserving and rights through an awareness of, and concern about, a larger group's entitlements and well-being to a concern, finally, with the distribution of outcomes and standards of treatment throughout a system.

A focus on microjustice or macrojustice reflects the salience of different identities: when one is identifying oneself as a unique individual, microjustice is more relevant, but when one is identified as part of a collective, the overall sense of justice in that collective is more important. Supporting this, women, social science majors, and Democrats (all of whom tend to be more oriented toward human relationships and interdependence than their counterparts) have been found to be more oriented toward macrojustice in comparison to men, natural science majors, and Republicans (Brickman et al., 1981). A number of studies have shown that increased group identification increases cooperative behavior and concern with group-level outcomes (Brewer & Kramer, 1986; Kramer & Brewer, 1984). DeCremer and Van Vugt (1999) found that either dispositional or situationally-induced group identification increased cooperative behavior in a social dilemma. Similarly, Van Vugt (2001) showed that structural incentives promoting conservation behavior mattered less when community identification was high. His interpretation of this finding was that when community identification was strong, motivation for behavior that enhanced the well-being of the collective was already so high that additional incentives were redundant.

Because everyone is both an individual and a member of collectives, everyone cares about both microjustice and macrojustice. Identity is relevant in focusing one's priorities when trade-offs between competing standards of justice are required. The natural environment provides a compelling context within which to examine these trade-offs and ways in which they are affected by identity. For example, in an environmental context, concern for the fairness of one's own outcomes, such as how one's land will be affected by environmental regulations, and concern for the well-being of a particular group, such as ranchers, are both microjustice. More pluralistic concern for fairness, such as recognition of interdependence and concern about the fate of all parties (i.e., ranchers and other human and nonhuman stakeholders), is macrojustice.

Identity, Justice, and the Natural Environment

Identity emerges in novel and important ways in environmental issues. Justice is important to consider as we examine preferences for distributions and procedures that allocate environmental costs and benefits. Environmental contexts also provoke us to examine and justify our standards for moral inclusion and the level of justice we deem relevant. Perceptions of justice are an important determinant of reactions to environmental policies (Kals, 1996; Kals & Russell, 2001) and of the resolution of environmental conflict (Lofstedt, 1996). The environment is also a productive context for understanding how the public thinks about justice, as evi-

denced by the frequency with which the term "justice" is coupled with "environmental" in the popular press. A search of the Lexis–Nexis database for major English language newspapers in 2002 showed that "justice" was coupled with "environment" more often than it was with "workplace" or "legal system."

In considering how identity intersects with justice in environmental conflicts, it is worth bearing in mind three characteristics of such conflicts (Opotow & Weiss, 2000).

Scale. Environmental conflicts can be small and local or large and complex. When small, they can spill over, just as damming a river affects downstream users. When large, they can involve large numbers of people (often millions). Because of the number and diversity of stakeholders, environmental conflicts concerning forests, air, water, and so forth, are often played out as representation disputes debating identity, particularly who should serve as valid spokespersons for specific positions and interests.

Commons. Local, regional, and global environmental conflicts concern shared resources (e.g., public land, a watershed, air quality, land use) and harms (e.g., pollution). Hardin (1968) has described how shared space lends itself to environmental tragedy when the costs of overutilization accrue at the macrolevel but not the microlevel.

Knowledge. Environmental conflicts often invoke scientific and technical data; however, knowledge gleaned from experience (by resource users such as loggers or farmers) is also relevant. In environmental conflicts, data and knowledge are invoked to advocate for position, with disputing parties rarely appreciating the validity and reliability of each others' expertise. This not only fuels conflict, but can also create two classes of stakeholders, some more privileged by knowledge of science or regulatory mechanisms than others. Different levels of knowledge have great relevance for perceptions of procedural and distributive justice, as resources and processes familiar to one group may be invisible or incomprehensible to another.

In environmental contexts, the use of procedural and distributive justice principles intersects with identity issues, including relationships and power, just as in other contexts. But these three distinctive aspects of environmental conflicts have particular significance in affecting the scope of justice and the use of a microjustice or macrojustice perspective.

Environment and Inclusion

Conflicts and issues concerning the natural environment inevitably bring up questions of identity and inclusion—who is a relevant and deserving party to the dispute? The scale of the possible consequences, which can affect the entire planet, challenges our perception of whose outcomes are relevant in this moral calculus. Should the natural environment, other species, or future generations have moral standing? The environmental justice movement has been linked to the civil rights movement in the way that both seek to expand the community whose outcomes merit consideration (Torres, 2002). The principal concern of environmental justice advocates has been with disenfranchised human populations, such as the poor and ethnic minority groups, whose disproportionately greater exposure to environmental costs and lesser access to environmental benefits has been extensively documented (Bullard, 1994). The environmental debate not only encompasses these human concerns, but extends to even broader questions about the rights of nature (Leopold, 1949; Stone, 1974).

Clayton (e.g., 2000) has examined the weight people assign to different justice principles in considering environmental conflicts. Her results suggest that many people are prepared to consider the intrinsic claims of nature to just treatment, particularly among those who scored high on an Environmental Identity scale (Clayton, 2003). Other researchers have attempted to explore the ways in which children think about nature to examine whether, and how, nature has moral standing. Perhaps the most extensive explorations have been carried out by Kahn and his colleagues (e.g., Kahn, 1999, 2003). They have conducted cross-cultural research, in settings from the Houston inner city to a rural community in the Amazon jungle, and have consistently found evidence that nature is viewed as an object of moral concern.

Opotow's research on moral exclusion in environmental contexts has examined the conditions under which "who counts?" is likely to include species, habitats, and commons. In an experimental study on species protection, research participants considered the extension of fairness and protective measures to an animal described as endangered (Opotow, 1993). In low conflict, participants expressed concern with fairness, rights, and protection of the animal; their expressed concern extended beyond human well-being and exhibited a planetary identity and pluralistic concerns. In a high conflict context, participants had a more self-protective, instrumental, and anthropocentric orientation; they were less concerned with fairness for or protection of the animal and had a narrower, human identity.

Although environmental conflicts concern physical resources, much energy and acrimony concerns identity as each side questions the legitimacy of other stakeholders. In rangeland disputes, one side described opposing sides as uninformed and hypocritical because their self-professed inclusionary orientation toward nature was selective and self-serving (Opotow & Brook, 2003). In conflicts over the interstate transmission of ozone (a byproduct of combustion producing smog),

unflattering between-group comparisons bolstered each side's sense of moral righteousness at the expense of others. Identifying opponents as "pinhead bureaucrats," "eco-freaks," or "foot-dragging big businesses," is an effort by parties to exclude stakeholders from deliberations whose position or interests oppose their own. In arguing their case, stakeholders not only delegitimized others and their assessment of harms, but they also sought self-exoneration, identifying themselves as blameless and "clean" to minimize their own contributions to smog (Opotow & Weiss, 2000).

Levels of Justice in Environmental Contexts

Environmental issues concern common resources and consequences for the entire ecosystem. As such, they seem to require consideration of macrojustice principles. Environmental conflicts often do involve the conflict between microjustice and macrojustice. Clayton (1994, 1996, 1998, 2000) has conducted a series of studies to investigate the connection between macrolevel thinking and support for the natural environment. In one questionnaire study (Clayton, 1996), people rated responsibility to other species as a very important justice principle to use when resolving environmental conflicts, and gave lower importance ratings to more traditional principles of distributive justice such as merit. In another study, arguments based on appeals to responsibility were more successful when used in a pro-environmental cause rather than when arguing against environmental protections (Clayton, 1994). Consistently, Clayton's results suggest that macrojustice principles are more salient in environmental contexts than in other contexts, and therefore more effective than microjustice principles in arguing environmental positions. In fact, research on environmental identity has found that it is significantly positively correlated with a collectivist perspective and negatively correlated with an individualistic perspective (Clayton, 2003).

In comparison, those opposed to environmental policies and programs seem to focus on a more individual-level justice. Opotow and Clayton (1998) surveyed material from anti-environmental organizations and found that three justice principles predominated. First, property rights—the right of the individual landowner to control the use of his or her land—were paramount. Second, regulations were described as unfairly imposed by government (the collective) and work to the detriment of the powerless average American (the individual). Third, market mechanisms—the quintessential form of microjustice—were described as the fairest way to protect the environment. In sum, the types of justice described by these anti-environmental groups reflect a focus on the welfare of the individual rather than the collective.

Contextualizing Justice by Examining Identity

People want to do what is fair in environmental conflicts, but, as we have described, procedural, distributive, and inclusionary justice standards are tied to identity. In environmental conflicts, we starkly see that multiple relevant identities experienced by individuals and groups lead to situations in which different constituencies not only have different concerns, but sometimes use arguments that are not even meaningful to the other parties (Opotow & Brook, 2003). This intersection of identity and justice has real implications for behavior that will affect planetary well-being.

We conclude with some summary points concerning the intersection of justice and identity in an environmental context and take a larger view that ties these points to their implications for future research on justice.

Justice is both abstract and concrete. Justice research has aimed for the universal, and it is true that the search for abstract principles enhances generalizability. However, a particularized justice has more explanatory power. A universal, abstract justice aspires to rigid principles that cannot fully capture the complexity with which identity intersects with justice. Consider the following example: A landowner, strapped for cash, is offered $75,000 for her land. She accepts this offer, although the land could easily fetch twice the price. Multiple interests are at stake here, any of which may be considered by the landowner or by others evaluating the situation—the landowner and those who depend on her, those who might use or develop the land, the larger public, and future generations. Broadening the scope of justice still further, we might ask how changes in land use will affect resident and migratory species or the habitat itself due to changes in water use or environmental degradation.

This brief vignette asks the interwoven justice and identity question: What is fair for whom? An understanding of core justice principles of distribution, procedure, and inclusion offers insight into this situation and allows for generalizations to other conflicts. However, only a recognition of the impact of identity on justice allows us to ask who counts—both individuals and groups—and how concern for their well-being will be reflected in specific individuals' preferences for procedure and outcomes. Research applying justice to social issues should acknowledge the identities of those involved as participants perceive them, and address the impact of those identities on how justice is operationalized.

Identity is complex. In *Identity and the Natural Environment* (Clayton & Opotow, 2003), we presented research that considers the environment in light of identity, and identity in light of environmental issues. Envi-

ronmental identity is experienced at a number of levels, including the individual and the group. When group identities are prominent, group alliances and interests, and intergroup conflicts, are salient. In contrast, when group influences on identity are less prominent, individuals may think of their relation to nature as a direct one, unmediated by shared perceptions in social groups. We suspect that different levels of identity lead to different ways of thinking about justice. When a group identity mediates one's relation to nature, it may mean that attunement to desired processes or outcomes is specific rather than abstract, focused on saving a particular species, habitat, or ecosystem. When an individual relation to nature is unmediated by group identity, it may imply that the rights of nature are considered in the abstract, without a corresponding set of personal or collective responsibility to nature. This distinction among different levels of environmental identity suggests a set of provocative hypotheses for future justice research in analogous social contexts in which individual and group identity can have differing implications for justice.

Identity makes conflicts emotional. Identity is what imbues conflict with personal relevance and emotion (Miller, 2001). The environmental realm illustrates that conflicts are not only cognitive, but deeply felt and sometimes incendiary. They yield exclusionary thinking and even violent acts. In threatening one's well-being (through environmental toxins), livelihood (e.g., logging or ranching), and place identity (e.g., as a landowner), environmental conflicts involve core beliefs about who we are and what we deserve. Recognition of the personalized nature of environmental conflicts is necessary if we hope to understand them, and ultimately to resolve them. This suggests the importance of research on justice and identity that probes the influence of affect.

Identity provides a lens to examine change. Through the lens of identity, pressing justice issues and the impact of social changes come into focus, and through the lens of justice, identity takes on deeper significance. A recognition and consideration of the fluidity of identity allows us to be cognizant of the ways in which justice may be contingent on changing circumstances. Identity and justice, examined jointly, offer us a vision that can help us identify and understand the competing conceptions of justice in current social issues, including the difficult environmental issues facing humankind today. Recognizing that identities change in meaning and significance in response to changing social circumstances, researchers should explore the consequences of social change on perspectives about what is fair.

In sum, this article has argued that justice needs to be contextualized, particularly regarding sensitivity to identities and their meaning, because identity intersects with justice in fundamental ways. We began by defining these complex constructs and reviewing existing research that illustrates the significance of identity for justice. We then described the intersection of justice and identity in environmental issues and conflicts. We did so for two reasons: first, identity issues are particularly salient, complex, and dynamic in environmental contexts; second, environmental issues are particularly pressing. Our environmental examples illustrate the complexity, emotional intensity, and malleability of how people view justice; this illustrates, in addition, the importance of understanding people's perceptions of what is fair. Future research that clearly recognizes the multiple layers of identity and defines the way in which identities are evoked in a particular context will provide more comprehensive and hence more useful perspectives on the significance of justice in people's response to events in their lives.

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