GEOGRAPHIC THOUGHT

A PRAXIS PERSPECTIVE

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Social justice in the age of identity politics

Redistribution, recognition, and participation*

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In today's world, claims for social justice seem increasingly to divide into two types. First, and most familiar, are redistributive claims, which seek a more just distribution of resources and goods. Examples include claims for redistribution from the North to the South, from the rich to the poor, and (not so long ago) from the owners to the workers. To be sure, the recent resurgence of free-market thinking has put proponents of egalitarian redistribution on the defensive. Nevertheless, egalitarian redistributive claims have supplied the paradigm case for most theorizing about social justice for the past 150 years.

Today, however, we increasingly encounter a second type of social-justice claim in the "politics of recognition." Here the goal, in its most plausible form, is a difference-friendly world, where assimilation to majority or dominant cultural norms is no longer the price of equal respect. Examples include claims for the recognition of the distinctive perspectives of ethnic, "racial," and sexual minorities, as well as of gender difference. This type of claim has recently attracted the interest of political philosophers, moreover, some of whom are seeking to develop a new paradigm of justice that puts recognition at its center.

In general, then, we are confronted with a new constellation. The discourse of social justice, once centered on distribution, is now increasingly divided between claims for redistribution, on the one hand, and claims for recognition, on the other. Increasingly, too, recognition claims tend to predominate. The demise of communism, the surge of free-market ideology, the rise of "identity polities" in both its fundamentalist and progressive forms—all these developments have conspired to de-center, if not to extinguish, claims for egalitarian redistribution.

In this new constellation, the two kinds of justice claims are often dissociated from one another—both practically and intellectually. Within social movements such as feminism, for example, activist tendencies that look to redistribution as the remedy for male domination are increasingly dissociated from tendencies that look instead to recognition of gender difference. And the same is true of their counterparts in the US academy, where feminist social theorizing and feminist cultural theorizing maintain an uneasy arm's-length co-existence. The feminist case exemplifies a more general tendency in the United States (and elsewhere) to decouple the cultural politics of difference from the social politics of equality.

In some cases, moreover, the dissociation has become a polarization. Some proponents of redistribution reject the politics of recognition outright, casting claims for the recognition of difference as "false consciousness," a hindrance to the pursuit of social justice. Conversely, some proponents of recognition approve the relative eclipse of the politics of redistribution, construing the latter as an outmoded materialism, simultaneously blind to and complicit with

many injustices. In such cases, we are effectively presented with what is constructed as an either/or choice: redistribution or recognition? Class politics or identity politics? Multiculturalism or social democracy?

These, I maintain, are false antitheses. It is my general thesis that justice today requires *both* redistribution *and* recognition. Neither alone is sufficient. As soon as one embraces this thesis, however, the question of how to combine them becomes paramount. I contend that the emancipatory aspects of the two paradigms need to be integrated in a single, comprehensive framework. Theoretically, the task is to devise a two-dimensional conception of justice that can accommodate both defensible claims for social equality and defensible claims for the recognition of difference. Practically, the task is to devise a programmatic political orientation that integrates the best of the politics of redistribution with the best of the politics of recognition.

My argument proceeds in four steps. In the first section below, I outline the key points of contrast between the two political paradigms, as they are presently understood. Then, in the second section, I problematize their current dissociation from one another by introducing a case of injustice that cannot be redressed by either one of them alone, but that requires their integration. Finally, I consider some normative philosophical questions (in the third section) and some social-theoretical questions (fourth section) that arise when we contemplate integrating redistribution and recognition in a single comprehensive framework.

REDISTRIBUTION OR RECOGNITION? ANATOMY OF A FALSE ANTITHESIS

I begin with some denotative definitions. The paradigm of redistribution, as I shall understand it, encompasses not only class-centered orientations, such as New Deal liberalism, social-democracy, and socialism, but also those forms of feminism and anti-racism that look to socio-economic transformation or reform as the remedy for gender and racial-ethnic injustice. Thus, it is broader than class politics in the conventional sense. The paradigm of recognition, in contrast, encompasses not only movements aiming to revalue unjustly devalued identities—for example, cultural feminism, black cultural nationalism, and gay identity politics—but also deconstructive tendencies, such as queer politics, critical "race" politics, and deconstructive feminism, which reject the "essentialism" of traditional identity politics. Thus, it is broader than identity politics in the conventional sense.

With these definitions, I mean to contest one widespread misunderstanding of these matters. It is often assumed that the politics of redistribution means class politics, while the politics of recognition means "identity politics," which in turn means the politics of sexuality, gender, and "race." This view is erroneous and misleading. For one thing, it treats recognition-oriented currents within the feminist, anti-heterosexist, and anti-racist movements as the whole story, rendering invisible alternative currents dedicated to righting gender-specific, "race"-specific, and sex-specific forms of economic injustice that traditional class movements ignored. For another, it forecloses the recognition dimensions of class struggles. Finally, it reduces what is actually a plurality of different kinds of recognition claims (including universalist claims and deconstructive claims) to a single type, namely, claims for the affirmation of difference.

For all these reasons, the definitions I have proposed here are far preferable. They take account of the complexity of contemporary politics by treating redistribution and recognition as *dimensions of justice that can cut across all social movements.*

Understood in this way, the paradigm of redistribution and the paradigm of recognition can be contrasted in four key respects. First, the two paradigms assume different conceptions of injustice. The redistribution paradigm focuses on injustices it defines as socio-economic and presumes to be rooted in the political economy. Examples include exploitation, economic marginalization, and deprivation. The recognition paradigm, in contrast, targets injustices it understands as cultural, which it presumes to be rooted in social patterns of representation, interpretation, and communication. Examples include cultural domination, non-recognition, and disrespect.

Second, the two paradigms propose different sorts of remedies for injustice. In the redistribution paradigm, the remedy for injustice is political-economic restructuring. This might involve redistributing income, reorganizing the division of labor, or transforming other basic economic structures. (Although these various remedies differ importantly from one another, I mean to refer to the whole group of them by the generic term "redistribution.") In the paradigm of recognition, in contrast, the remedy for injustice is cultural or symbolic

change. This could involve upwardly revaluing disrespected identities, positively valorizing cultural diversity, or the wholesale transformation of societal patterns of representation, interpretation, and communication in ways that would change everyone's social identity. (Although these remedies, too, differ importantly from one another, I refer once again to the whole group of them by the generic term "recognition.")

Third, the two paradigms assume different conceptions of the collectivities who suffer injustice. In the redistribution paradigm, the collective subjects of injustice are classes or class-like collectivities, which are defined economically by a distinctive relation to the market or the means of production. The classic case in the Marxian variant is the exploited working class, whose members must sell their labor power in order to receive the means of subsistence. But the conception can cover other cases as well. Also included are racialized groups of immigrants or ethnic minorities that can be economically defined, whether as a pool of low-paid menial laborers or as an "underclass" largely excluded from regular waged work, deemed "superfluous" and unworthy of exploitation. When the notion of the economy is broadened to encompass unwaged labor, moreover, women become visible as a collective subject of economic injustice, as the gender burdened with the lion's share of unwaged carework and consequently disadvantaged in employment and disempowered in relations with men. Also included, finally, are the complexly defined groupings that result when we theorize the political economy in terms of the intersection of class, "race," and gender.

In the recognition paradigm, in contrast, the victims of injustice are more like Weberian status groups than Marxian classes. Defined not by the relations of production, but rather by the relations of recognition, they are distinguished by the lesser esteem, honor, and prestige they enjoy relative to other groups in society. The classic case in the Weberian paradigm is the low-status ethnic group, whom dominant patterns of cultural value mark as different and less worthy. But the conception can cover other cases as well. In the current constellation, it has been extended to gays and lesbians, who suffer pervasive effects of institutionalized stigma; to racialized groups, who are marked as different and lesser; and to women, who are trivialized, sexually objectified, and disrespected in myriad ways. It is also being extended, finally, to encompass the complexly defined groupings that result when we theorize the relations of recognition in terms of "race," gender, and sexuality simultaneously as intersecting cultural codes.

It follows, and this is the fourth point, that the two approaches assume different understandings of group differences. The redistribution paradigm treats such differences as unjust differentials that should be abolished. The recognition paradigm, in contrast, treats differences either as cultural variations that should be celebrated or as discursively constructed hierarchical oppositions that should be deconstructed.

Increasingly, as I noted at the outset, redistribution and recognition are posed as mutually exclusive alternatives. Some proponents of the former, such as Richard Rorty (1998) and Todd Gitlin (1995), insist that identity politics is a counterproductive diversion from the real economic issues, one that balkanizes groups and rejects universalist moral norms. They claim, in effect, that "it's the economy, stupid." Conversely, some proponents of the politics of recognition, such as Charles Taylor (1994), insist that a difference-blind politics of redistribution can reinforce injustice by falsely universalizing dominant group norms, requiring subordinate groups to assimilate to them, and misrecognizing the latters' distinctiveness. They claim, in effect, that "it's the culture, stupid."

This, however, is a false antithesis.

EXPLOITED CLASSES, DESPISED SEXUALITIES, AND BIVALENT CATEGORIES: A CRITIQUE OF JUSTICE TRUNCATED

To see why, imagine a conceptual spectrum of different kinds of social differentiations. At one extreme are differentiations that fit the paradigm of redistribution. At the other extreme are differentiations that fit the paradigm of recognition. In between are cases that prove difficult because they fit both paradigms of justice simultaneously.[1]

Consider, first, the redistribution end of the spectrum. At this end let us posit an ideal-typical social differentiation rooted in the economic structure, as opposed to the status order, of society. By definition, any structural injustices attaching to this differentiation will be traceable ultimately to the political economy. The root of the injustice, as well as its core, will be socio-economic maldistribution, while any attendant

cultural injustices will derive ultimately from that economic root. At bottom, therefore, the remedy required to redress the injustice will be redistribution, as opposed to recognition.

An example that appears to approximate this ideal type is class differentiation, as understood in orthodox, economistic Marxism. In this conception, class is an artifact of an unjust political economy, which creates, and exploits, a proletariat. The core injustice is exploitation, an especially deep form of maldistribution in which the proletariat's own energies are turned against it, usurped to sustain a social system that disproportionately burdens it and benefits others. To be sure, its members also suffer serious cultural injustices, the "hidden (and not so hidden) injuries of class" (Sennett and Cobb, 1973). But far from being rooted directly in an autonomously unjust status order, these derive from the political economy, as ideologies of class inferiority proliferate to justify exploitation. The remedy for the injustice, consequently, is redistribution, not recognition. The last thing the proletariat needs is recognition of its difference. On the contrary, the only way to remedy the injustice is to restructure the political economy in such a way as to put the proletariat out of business as a distinctive group.

Now consider the other end of the conceptual spectrum. At this end let us posit an ideal-typical social differentiation that fits the paradigm of recognition. A differentiation of this type is rooted in the status order, as opposed to the economic structure, of society. Thus, any structural injustices implicated here will be traceable ultimately to the reigning patterns of cultural value. The root of the injustice, as well as its core, will be cultural misrecognition, while any attendant economic injustices will derive ultimately from that root. The remedy required to redress the injustice will be recognition, as opposed to redistribution.

An example that appears to approximate this ideal type is sexual differentiation, understood through the prism of the Weberian conception of status. In this conception, the social differentiation between heterosexuals and homosexuals is not grounded in the political economy, as homosexuals are distributed throughout the entire class structure of capitalist society, occupy no distinctive position in the division of labor, and do not constitute an exploited class. The differentiation is rooted, rather, in the status order of society, as cultural patterns of meaning and value constitute heterosexuality as natural and normative, while simultaneously constituting homosexuality as perverse and despised. When such heteronormative meanings are pervasively institutionalized, for example in law, state policy, social practices, and interaction, gays and lesbians become a *despised sexuality*. As a result, they suffer sexually specific forms of *status subordination*, including shaming and assault, exclusion from the rights and privileges of marriage and parenthood, curbs on their rights of expression and association, and denial of full legal rights and equal protections. These harms are injustices of misrecognition. To be sure, gays and lesbians also suffer serious economic injustices: they can be summarily dismissed from civilian employment and military service, are denied a broad range of family-based social-welfare benefits, and face major tax and inheritance liabilities. But far from being rooted directly in the economic structure of society, these injustices derive instead from the status order, as the institutionalization of heterosexist norms produces a category of despised persons who incur economic disadvantages as a by-product. The remedy for the injustice, accordingly, is recognition, not redistribution. Overcoming homophobia and heterosexism requires changing the sexual status order, dismantling the cultural value patterns (as well as their legal and practical expressions) that deny equal respect to gays and lesbians. Change these relations of recognition, and the maldistribution will disappear.

Matters are thus fairly straightforward at the two extremes of our conceptual spectrum. When we deal with groups that approach the ideal type of the exploited working class, we face distributive injustices requiring redistributive remedies. What is needed is a politics of redistribution. When we deal with groups that approach the ideal type of the despised sexuality, in contrast, we face injustices of misrecognition. What is needed *here* is a politics of recognition.

Matters become murkier, however, once we move away from these extremes. When we posit a type of social differentiation located in the middle of the conceptual spectrum, we encounter a hybrid form that combines features of the exploited class with features of the despised sexuality. I call such differentiations "bivalent." Rooted at once in the economic structure and the status order of society, they may entrench injustices that are traceable to both political economy and culture simultaneously. Bivalently oppressed groups, accordingly, suffer both maldistribution and misrecognition *in forms where neither of these injustices is an indirect effect of the other, but where both are primary*

and co-original. In their case, neither the politics of redistribution alone nor the politics of recognition alone will suffice. Bivalently oppressed groups need both.

Gender, I contend, is a bivalent social differentiation. Neither simply a class, nor simply a status group, it is a hybrid category with roots in both culture and political economy. From the economic perspective, gender structures the fundamental division between paid "productive" labor and unpaid "reproductive" and domestic labor, as well as the divisions within paid labor between higher-paid, male-dominated, manufacturing, and professional occupations and lower-paid, female-dominated, "pink collar," and domestic service occupations. The result is an economic structure that generates gender-specific modes of exploitation, economic marginalization, and deprivation. Here, gender appears as a class-like differentiation. And gender injustice appears as a species of maldistribution that cries out for redistributive redress.

From the perspective of the status order, however, gender encompasses elements that are more like sexuality than class and that bring it squarely within the problematic of recognition. Gender codes pervasive patterns of cultural interpretation and evaluation, which are central to the status order as a whole. As a result, not just women, but all low-status groups, risk being feminized and thereby demeaned. Thus, a major feature of gender injustice is androcentrism: a pattern of culture value that privileges traits associated with masculinity, while pervasively devaluing things coded as "feminine"—paradigmatically, but not only, women. Institutionalized in law, state policies, social practices, and interaction, this value pattern saddles women with gender-specific forms of *status subordination*, including sexual assault and domestic violence; trivializing, objectifying, and demeaning stereotypical depictions in the media; harassment and disparagement in everyday life; and denial of full legal rights and equal protections. These harms are injustices of recognition. They cannot be remedied by redistribution alone but require additional independent remedies of recognition.

Gender, in sum, is a "bivalent" social differentiation. It encompasses a class-like aspect that brings it within the ambit of redistribution, while also including a status aspect that brings it simultaneously within the ambit of recognition. Redressing gender injustice, therefore, requires changing both the economic structure and the status order of society.

The bivalent character of gender wreaks havoc on the idea of an either/or choice between the paradigm of redistribution and the paradigm of recognition. That construction assumes that the collective subjects of injustice are either classes or status groups, but not both; that the injustice they suffer is either maldistribution or misrecognition, but not both; that the group differences at issue are either unjust differentials or unjustly devalued cultural variations, but not both; that the remedy for injustice is either redistribution or recognition, but not both.

Gender, we can now see, explodes this whole series of false antitheses. Here we have a category that is a compound of both status and class, that implicates injustices of both maldistribution and misrecognition, whose distinctiveness is compounded of both economic differentials and culturally constructed distinctions. Gender injustice can only be remedied, therefore, by an approach that encompasses both a politics of redistribution and a politics of recognition.

Gender, moreover, is not unusual in this regard. "Race", too, is a bivalent social differentiation, a compound of status and class. Rooted simultaneously in the economic structure and the status order of capitalist society, racism's injustices include both maldistribution and misrecognition. Yet neither dimension of racism is wholly an indirect effect of the other. Thus, overcoming racism requires both redistribution and recognition. Neither alone will suffice.

Class, too, is probably best understood as bivalent for practical purposes. To be sure, the ultimate cause of class injustice is the economic structure of capitalist society.[2] But the resulting harms include misrecognition as well as maldistribution (Thompson, 1963). And cultural harms that originated as byproducts of economic structure may have since developed a life of their own. Left unattended, moreover, class misrecognition may impede the capacity to mobilize against maldistribution. Thus, a politics of class recognition may be needed to get a politics of redistribution off the ground.[3]

Sexuality, too, is for practical purposes bivalent. To be sure, the ultimate cause of heterosexist injustice is the heteronormative value pattern that is institutionalized in the status order of contemporary society.[4] But the resulting harms include maldistribution as well as misrecognition. And economic harms that originate as byproducts of the status order have an undeniable weight of their own. Left unattended, moreover, they may impede the capacity to mobilize against mis-

recognition. Thus, a politics of sexual redistribution may be needed to get a politics of recognition off the ground.

For practical purposes, then, virtually all real-world axes of oppression are bivalent. Virtually all implicate both maldistribution and misrecognition in forms where each of those injustices has some independent weight, whatever its ultimate roots. To be sure, not all axes of oppression are bivalent in the same way, nor to the same degree. Some axes of oppression, such as class, tilt more heavily toward the distribution end of the spectrum; others, such as sexuality, incline more to the recognition end; while still others, such as gender and "race," cluster closer to the center. Nevertheless, in virtually every case, the harms at issue comprise both maldistribution and misrecognition in forms where neither of those injustices can be redressed entirely indirectly but where each requires some practical attention. As a practical matter, therefore, overcoming injustice in virtually every case requires both redistribution and recognition.

The need for this sort of two-pronged approach becomes more pressing, moreover, as soon as we cease considering such axes of injustice singly and begin instead to consider them together as mutually intersecting. After all, gender, "race," sexuality, and class are not neatly cordoned off from one another. Rather, all these axes of injustice intersect one another in ways that affect everyone's interests and identities. Thus, anyone who is both gay and working class will need both redistribution and recognition. Seen this way, moreover, virtually every individual who suffers injustice needs to integrate those two kinds of claims. And so, furthermore, will anyone who cares about social justice, regardless of their own personal social location.

In general, then, one should roundly reject the construction of redistribution and recognition as mutually exclusive alternatives. The goal should be, rather, to develop an integrated approach that can encompass, and harmonize, both dimensions of social justice.

NORMATIVE-PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES: FOR A TWO-DIMENSIONAL THEORY OF JUSTICE

Integrating redistribution and recognition in a single comprehensive paradigm is no simple matter, however. To contemplate such a project is to be plunged immediately into deep and difficult problems spanning several major fields of inquiry. In moral philosophy, for example, the task is to devise an overarching conception of justice that can accommodate both defensible claims for social equality and defensible claims for the recognition of difference. In social theory, by contrast, the task is to devise an account of our contemporary social formation that can accommodate not only the differentiation of class from status, economy from culture, but also their mutual imbrication. In political theory, meanwhile, the task is to envision a set of institutional arrangements and associated policy reforms that can remedy both maldistribution and misrecognition, while minimizing the mutual interferences likely to arise when the two sorts of redress are sought simultaneously. In practical politics, finally, the task is to foster democratic engagement across current divides in order to build a broad-based programmatic orientation that integrates the best of the politics of redistribution with the best of the politics of recognition.

This, of course, is far too much to take on here. In the present section, I limit myself to some of the moral-theoretical dimensions of this project. (In the next, I turn to some issues in social theory.) I shall consider three normative philosophical questions that arise when we contemplate integrating redistribution and recognition in a single comprehensive account of social justice: First, is recognition really a matter of justice, or is it a matter of self-realization? Second, do distributive justice and recognition constitute two distinct, *sui generis*, normative paradigms, or can either of them be subsumed within the other? And third, does justice require the recognition of what is distinctive about individuals or groups, or is recognition of our common humanity sufficient? (I defer to a later occasion discussion of a fourth crucial question: How can we distinguish justified from unjustified claims for recognition?)

On the first question, two major theorists, Charles Taylor and Axel Honneth, understand recognition as a matter of self-realization. Unlike them, however, I propose to treat it as an issue of justice. Thus, one should not answer the question "What's wrong with misrecognition?" by reference to a thick theory of the good, as Taylor (1994) does. Nor should one follow Honneth (1995) and appeal to a "formal conception of ethical life" premised on an account of the "intersubjective conditions" for an "undistorted

practical relation-to-self." One should say, rather, that it is unjust that some individuals and groups are denied the status of full partners in social interaction simply as a consequence of institutionalized patterns of cultural value in whose construction they have not equally participated and which disparage their distinctive characteristics or the distinctive characteristics assigned to them.

This account offers several advantages. First, it permits one to justify claims for recognition as morally binding under modern conditions of value pluralism.[5] Under these conditions, there is no single conception of self-realization or the good that is universally shared, nor any that can be established as authoritative. Thus, any attempt to justify claims for recognition that appeals to an account of self-realization or the good must necessarily be sectarian. No approach of this sort can establish such claims as normatively binding on those who do not share the theorist's conception of ethical value.

Unlike such approaches, I propose an account that is deontological and non-sectarian. Embracing the modern view that it is up to individuals and groups to define for themselves what counts as a good life and to devise for themselves an approach to pursuing it, within limits that ensure a like liberty for others, it appeals to a conception of justice that can be accepted by people with divergent conceptions of the good. What makes misrecognition morally wrong, in my view, is that it denies some individuals and groups the possibility of participating on a par with others in social interaction. The norm of *participatory parity* invoked here is non-sectarian in the required sense. It can justify claims for recognition as normatively binding on all who agree to abide by fair terms of interaction under conditions of value pluralism.

Treating recognition as a matter of justice has a second advantage as well. It conceives misrecognition as *status subordination* whose locus is social relations, not individual psychology. To be misrecognized, on this view, is not simply to be thought ill of, looked down on, or devalued in others' conscious attitudes or mental beliefs. It is rather to be denied the status of a full partner in social interaction and prevented from participating as a peer in social life as a consequence of *institutionalized* patterns of cultural value that constitute one as comparatively unworthy of respect or esteem. When such patterns of disrespect and disesteem are institutionalized, they impede parity of participation, just as surely as do distributive inequities.

Eschewing psychologization, then, the justice approach escapes difficulties that plague rival approaches. When misrecognition is identified with internal distortions in the structure of self-consciousness of the oppressed, it is but a short step to blaming the victim, as one seems to add insult to injury. Conversely, when misrecognition is equated with prejudice in the minds of the oppressors, overcoming it seems to require policing their beliefs, an approach that is authoritarian. On the justice view, in contrast, misrecognition is a matter of externally manifest and publicly verifiable impediments to some people's standing as full members of society. And such arrangements are morally indefensible whether or not they distort the subjectivity of the oppressed.

Finally, the justice account of recognition avoids the view that everyone has an equal right to social esteem. That view is patently untenable, of course, because it renders meaningless the notion of esteem. Yet it seems to follow from at least one prominent account of recognition in terms of the self-realization.[6] The account of recognition proposed here, in contrast, entails no such *reductio ad absurdum*. What it *does* entail is that everyone has an equal right to pursue social esteem under fair conditions of equal opportunity. And such conditions do not obtain when, for example, institutionalized patterns of interpretation pervasively downgrade femininity, "non-whiteness," homosexuality, and everything culturally associated with them. When that is the case, women and/or people of color and/or gays and lesbians face obstacles in the quest for esteem that are not encountered by others. And everyone, including straight white men, faces further obstacles if they opt to pursue projects and cultivate traits that are culturally coded as feminine, homosexual, or "non-white."

For all these reasons, recognition is better viewed as a matter of justice than as a matter of self-realization. But what follows for the theory of justice?

Does it follow, turning now to the second question, that distribution and recognition constitute two distinct, *sui generis* conceptions of justice? Or can either of them be reduced to the other? The question of reduction must be considered from two different sides. From one side, the issue is whether standard theories of distributive justice can adequately subsume problems of recognition. In my view, the answer is no. To be sure, many distributive theorists appreciate the importance of status over and above the allocation of resources and seek to accommodate it in their accounts.[7] But the

results are not wholly satisfactory. Most such theorists assume a reductive economistic-cum-legalistic view of status, supposing that a just distribution of resources and rights is sufficient to preclude misrecognition. In fact, however, as we saw, not all misrecognition is a byproduct of maldistribution, nor of maldistribution plus legal discrimination. Witness the case of the African-American Wall Street banker who cannot get a taxi to pick him up. To handle such cases, a theory of justice must reach beyond the distribution of rights and goods to examine patterns of cultural value. It must consider whether institutionalized patterns of interpretation and valuation impede parity of participation in social life.[8]

What, then, of the other side of the question? Can existing theories of recognition adequately subsume problems of distribution? Here, too, I contend the answer is no. To be sure, some theorists of recognition appreciate the importance of economic equality and seek to accommodate it in their accounts.[9] But once again the results are not wholly satisfactory. Such theorists tend to assume a reductive culturalist view of distribution. Supposing that economic inequalities are rooted in a cultural order that privileges some kinds of labor over others, they assume that changing that cultural order is sufficient to preclude maldistribution (Honneth, 1995). In fact, however, as we saw, and as I shall argue more extensively later, not all maldistribution is a byproduct of misrecognition. Witness the case of the skilled white male industrial worker who becomes unemployed due to a factory closing as a result of a speculative corporate merger. In that case, the injustice of maldistribution has little to do with misrecognition. It is rather a consequence of imperatives intrinsic to an order of specialized economic relations whose *raison d'être* is the accumulation of profits. To handle such cases, a theory of justice must reach beyond cultural value patterns to examine the structure of capitalism. It must consider whether economic mechanisms that are relatively decoupled from cultural value patterns and that operate in a relatively impersonal way can impede parity of participation in social life.

In general, then, neither distribution theorists nor recognition theorists have so far succeeded in adequately subsuming the concerns of the other.[10] Thus, instead of endorsing either one of their paradigms to the exclusion of the other, I propose to develop what I shall call a two-dimensional conception of justice. Such a conception treats distribution and recognition as distinct perspectives on, and dimensions of, justice. Without reducing either one of them to the other, it encompasses both dimensions within a broader, overarching framework.

The normative core of my conception, which I have mentioned several times, is the notion of *parity of participation*.[11] According to this norm, justice requires social arrangements that permit all (adult) members of society to interact with one another as peers. For participatory parity to be possible, I claim, it is necessary but not sufficient to establish standard forms of formal legal equality. Over and above that requirement, at least two additional conditions must be satisfied.[12] First, the distribution of material resources must be such as to ensure participants' independence and "voice." This I call the "objective" precondition of participatory parity. It precludes forms and levels of material inequality and economic dependence that impede parity of participation. Precluded, therefore, are social arrangements that institutionalize deprivation, exploitation, and gross disparities in wealth, income, and leisure time, thereby denying some people the means and opportunities to interact with others as peers.[13]

In contrast, the second additional condition for participatory parity I call "intersubjective." It requires that institutionalized cultural patterns of interpretation and evaluation express equal respect for all participants and ensure equal opportunity for achieving social esteem. This condition precludes cultural patterns that systematically depreciate some categories of people and the qualities associated with them. Precluded, therefore, are institutionalized value schemata that deny some people the status of full partners in interaction—whether by burdening them with excessive ascribed "difference" from others or by failing to acknowledge their distinctiveness.

Both the objective precondition and the intersubjective precondition are necessary for participatory parity. Neither alone is sufficient. The objective condition brings into focus concerns traditionally associated with the theory of distributive justice, especially concerns pertaining to the economic structure of society and to economically defined class differentials. The intersubjective precondition brings into focus concerns recently highlighted in the philosophy of recognition, especially concerns pertaining to the status order of society and to culturally defined hierarchies of status. Thus, a two-dimensional conception of justice oriented to the norm of participatory

parity encompasses both redistribution and recognition, without reducing either one to the other.

This brings us to the third question: Does justice require the recognition of what is distinctive about individuals or groups, over and above the recognition of our common humanity? Here it is important to note that participatory parity is a universalist norm in two senses. First, it encompasses all (adult) partners to interaction. And second, it presupposes the equal moral worth of human beings. But moral universalism in these senses still leaves open the question whether recognition of individual or group distinctiveness could be required by justice as one element among others of the intersubjective condition for participatory parity.

This question cannot be answered, I contend, by an *a priori* account of the kinds of recognition that everyone always needs. It needs rather to be approached in the spirit of pragmatism as informed by the insights of a critical social theory. From this perspective, recognition is a remedy for injustice, not a generic human need. Thus, the form(s) of recognition justice requires in any given case depend(s) on the form(s) of misrecognition to be redressed. In cases where misrecognition involves denying the common humanity of some participants, the remedy is universalist recognition. Where, in contrast, misrecognition involves denying some participants' distinctiveness, the remedy could be recognition of difference.[14] In every case, the remedy should be tailored to the harm.

This pragmatist approach overcomes the liabilities of two other views that are mirror opposites and hence equally decontextualized. First, it avoids the view, espoused by some distributive theorists, that justice requires limiting public recognition to those capacities all humans share. That approach dogmatically forecloses recognition of what distinguishes people from one another, without considering whether the latter might be needed in some cases to overcome obstacles to participatory parity. Second, the pragmatist approach avoids the opposite view, also decontextualized, that everyone always needs their distinctiveness recognized (Taylor, 1994; Honneth, 1995). Favored by recognition theorists, this anthropological view cannot explain why it is that not all, but only some, social differences generate claims for recognition, nor why only some of those that do, but not others, are morally justified. More specifically, it cannot explain why dominant groups, such as men and heterosexuals, usually shun recognition of their (gender and sexual) distinctiveness, claiming not specificity but universality. By contrast, the approach proposed here sees claims for the recognition of difference pragmatically and contextually—as remedial responses to specific harms. Putting questions of justice at the center, it appreciates that the recognition needs of subordinate groups differ from those of dominant groups; and that only those claims that promote participatory parity are morally justified.

For the pragmatist, accordingly, everything depends on precisely what currently misrecognized people need in order to be able to participate as peers in social life. And there is no reason to assume that all of them need the same thing in every context. In some cases, they may need to be unburdened of excessive ascribed or constructed distinctiveness. In other cases, they may need to have hitherto underacknowledged distinctiveness taken into account. In still other cases, they may need to shift the focus onto dominant or advantaged groups, outing the latter's distinctiveness, which has been falsely parading as universality. Alternatively, they may need to deconstruct the very terms in which attributed differences are currently elaborated. Finally, they may need all of the above, or several of the above, in combination with one another and in combination with redistribution. Which people need which kind(s) of recognition in which contexts depends on the nature of the obstacles they face with regard to participatory parity. That, however, cannot be determined by abstract philosophical argument. It can only be determined with the aid of a critical social theory, a theory that is normatively oriented, empirically informed, and guided by the practical intent of overcoming injustice.

SOCIAL-THEORETICAL ISSUES: AN ARGUMENT FOR "PERSPECTIVAL DUALISM"

This brings us to the social-theoretical issues that arise when we try to encompass redistribution and recognition in a single framework. Here, the principal task is to theorize the relations between class and status, and between maldistribution and misrecognition, in contemporary society. An adequate approach must allow for the full complexity of these relations. It must account *both for the differentiation of class and status and for the causal interactions between them*. It must accommodate, as well, *both the mutual irreducibility of*

maldistribution and misrecognition and their practical entwinement with one another. Such an account must, moreover, be historical. Sensitive to shifts in social structure and political culture, it must identify the distinctive dynamics and conflict tendencies of the present conjuncture. Attentive both to national specificities and to transnational forces and frames, it must explain why today's grammar of social conflict takes the form that it does: why, that is, struggles for recognition have recently become so salient; why egalitarian redistribution struggles, hitherto central to social life, have lately receded to the margins; and why, finally, the two kinds of claims for social justice have become decoupled and antagonistically counterposed.[15]

First, however, some conceptual clarifications. The terms class and status, as I use them here, denote socially entrenched orders of domination. To say that a society has a class structure, accordingly, is to say that it institutionalizes mechanisms of distribution that systematically deny some of its members the means and opportunities they need in order to participate on a par with others in social life. To say, likewise, that a society has a status hierarchy is to say that it institutionalizes patterns of cultural value that pervasively deny some of its members the recognition they need in order to be full, participating partners in interaction. The existence of either a class structure or a status hierarchy constitutes an obstacle to parity of participation and thus an injustice.

In what follows, then, I assume an internal conceptual relation between class and status, on the one hand, and domination and injustice, on the other. I do not, however, present a full theory of class or status. Deferring that task to another occasion, I assume only that both orders of domination emerged historically with developments in social organization, as did the conceptual distinction between them and the possibility of their mutual divergence. I assume, too, that a society's class structure becomes distinguishable from its status order only when its mechanisms of economic distribution become differentiated from social arenas in which institutionalized patterns of cultural value regulate interaction in a relatively direct and unmediated way. Thus, only with the emergence of a specialized order of economic relations can the question arise, whether the society's class structure diverges from its status hierarchy or whether, alternatively, they coincide. Only then, likewise, can the question become politically salient whether the status hierarchy and/or the class structure are unjust.

What follows from this approach for our understanding of the categories economy and culture? Both of these terms, as I use them here, denote social processes and social relations.[16] Both, moreover, must be grasped historically. As I just noted, specifically economic processes and relations became differentiated from unmediatedly value-regulated processes and relations only with historical shifts in the structure of societies. Only with the rise of capitalism did highly autonomous economic institutions emerge, making possible the modern ideas of "the economic" and "the cultural," as well as the distinction between them.[17] To be sure, these ideas can be applied retrospectively to precapitalist societies—provided one situates one's usage historically and explicitly notes the anachronism. But this only serves to underline the key point: Far from being ontological or anthropological, economy and culture are *historically emergent categories of social theory*. What counts as economic and as cultural depends on the type of society in question. So, as well, does the relation between the economic and the cultural.

An analogous point holds for maldistribution and misrecognition. It is not the case that the former denotes a species of material harm and the latter one of immaterial injury. On the contrary, status injuries can be just as material as distributive injustices—witness gay-bashing, gang rape, and genocide.[18] Far from being ontological, this distinction, too, is historical. Distribution and recognition correspond to historically specific social-structural differentiations, paradigmatically those associated with modern capitalism. *Historically emergent normative categories*, they became distinguishable dimensions of justice only with the differentiation of class from status and of the economic from the cultural. Only, in other words, with the relative uncoupling of specialized economic mechanisms of distribution from broader patterns of cultural value did the distinction between maldistribution and misrecognition become thinkable. And only then could the question of the relation between them arise. To be sure, these categories too can be applied retrospectively, provided one is sufficiently self-aware. But the point, once again, is to historicize. The relations between maldistribution and misrecognition vary according to the social formation under consideration. It remains an empirical question in any given case whether and to what extent they coincide.

In every case, the level of differentiation is crucial. In some societies, conceivable or actual, economy and culture are not institutionally differentiated. Consider, for example, an ideal-typical pre-state society of the sort described in the classical anthropological literature, while bracketing the question of ethnographic accuracy.[19] In such a society, the master idiom of social relations is kinship. Kinship organizes not only marriage and sexual relations, but also the labor process and the distribution of goods; relations of authority, reciprocity, and obligation; and symbolic hierarchies of status and prestige. Of course, it could well be the case that such a society has never existed in pure form. Still, we can imagine a world in which neither distinctively economic institutions nor distinctively cultural institutions exist. A single order of social relations secures (what we would call) both the economic integration and the cultural integration of the society. Class structure and status order are accordingly fused. Because kinship constitutes the overarching principle of distribution, kinship status dictates class position. In the absence of any quasi-autonomous economic institutions, status injuries translate immediately into (what we would consider to be) distributive injustices. Misrecognition directly entails maldistribution.

This ideal-type of a fully kin-governed society represents an extreme case of non-differentiation, one in which cultural patterns of value dictate the order of economic domination. It is usefully contrasted with the opposite extreme of a fully marketized society, in which economic structure dictates cultural value. In such a society, the master determining instance is the market. Markets organize not only the labor process and the distribution of goods, but also marriage and sexual relations; political relations of authority, reciprocity, and obligation; and symbolic hierarchies of status and prestige. Granted, such a society has never existed, and it is doubtful that one ever could.[20] For heuristic purposes, however, we can imagine a world in which a single order of social relations secures not only the economic integration but also the cultural integration of society. Here, too, as in the fully kin-governed society, class structure and status order are effectively fused. But the determinations run in the opposite direction. Because the market constitutes the sole and all-pervasive mechanism of valuation, market position dictates social status. In the absence of any quasi-autonomous cultural value patterns, distributive injustices translate immediately into status injuries. Maldistribution directly entails misrecognition.

As mirror-opposites of each other, these two imagined societies share a common feature: the absence of any meaningful differentiation of the economy from the larger culture.[21] In both of them, accordingly (what we would call), class and status map perfectly onto each other. So, as well, do (what we would call) maldistribution and misrecognition, which convert fully and without remainder into one another. As a result, one can understand both these societies reasonably well by attending exclusively to a single dimension of social life. For the fully kin-governed society, one can read off the economic dimension of domination directly from the cultural; one can infer class directly from status and maldistribution directly from misrecognition. For the fully marketized society, conversely, one can read off the cultural dimension of domination directly from the economic; one can infer status directly from class, and misrecognition directly from maldistribution. For understanding the forms of domination proper to the fully kin-governed society, therefore, culturalism is a perfectly appropriate social theory.[22] If, in contrast, one is seeking to understand the fully marketized society, one could hardly improve on economism.[23]

When we turn to other types of societies, however, such simple and elegant approaches no longer suffice. They are patently inappropriate for the actually existing capitalist society that we currently inhabit and seek to understand. In this society, a specialized set of economic institutions has been differentiated from the larger social field. The paradigm institutions are markets, which operate by instrumentalizing the cultural value patterns that regulate some other orders of social relations in a fairly direct and unmediated way. Filtering meanings and values through an individual-interest-maximizing grid, markets decontextualize and rework cultural patterns. As the latter are pressed into the service of an individualizing logic, they are disembedded, instrumentalized, and resignified. The result is a specialized zone in which cultural values, though neither simply suspended nor wholly dissolved, do not regulate social interaction in a direct and unmediated way. Rather, they impact it indirectly, through the mediation of the "cash nexus."

Markets have always existed, of course, but their scope, autonomy, and influence attained a qualitatively new level with the development of modern capitalism. In capitalist society, these value-instrumentalizing institutions directly organize a significant portion of the labor process (the waged portion), the distribution of

most products and goods (commodities), and the investment of most social surplus (profit). They do not, however, *directly* organize marriage, sexuality, and the family; relations of political authority and legal obligation; and symbolic hierarchies of status and prestige. Rather, each of these social orders retains distinctive institutional forms and normative orientations; each also remains connected to, and informed by, the general culture; some of them, finally, are regulated by institutionalized patterns of cultural value in a relatively direct and unmediated way.

Thus, in capitalist society, relations between economy and culture are complex. Neither devoid of culture, nor directly subordinated to it, capitalist markets stand in a highly mediated relation to institutionalized patterns of cultural value. They work through the latter, while also working over them, sometimes helping to transform them in the process. Thoroughly permeated by significations and norms, yet possessed of a logic of their own, capitalist economic institutions are neither wholly constrained by, nor fully in control of, value patterns.

To be sure, capitalist market processes heavily influence non-market relations. But their influence is indirect. In principle and, to a lesser degree, in practice, non-marketized arenas have some autonomy *vis-à-vis* the market, as well as *vis-à-vis* one another. It remains an empirical question exactly how far in each case market influence actually penetrates—and a normative question how far it should. The reverse is, by contrast, fairly clear: in capitalist societies, market processes generally have considerable autonomy *vis-à-vis* politics, although the precise extent varies according to the régime. In its Western European heyday, Keynesian social democracy sought with some success to use "politics to tame markets" within state borders. In the current climate of post-Keynesian, neoliberal, globalizing capitalism, the market's scope, autonomy, and influence are sharply increasing.

The key point here is that capitalist society is structurally differentiated. The institutionalization of specialized economic relations permits the partial uncoupling of economic distribution from structures of prestige. As markets instrumentalize value patterns that remain constitutive for non-marketized relations, a gap arises between status and class. The class structure ceases perfectly to mirror the status order, even as each of them influences the other. Because the market does not constitute the sole and all-pervasive mechanism of valuation, market position does not dictate social status. Partially cultural value patterns prevent distributive injustices from converting fully and without remainder into status injuries. Maldistribution does not directly entail misrecognition, although it may well contribute to the latter. Conversely, because no single status principle such as kinship constitutes the sole and all-pervasive principle of distribution, status does not dictate class position. Relatively autonomous economic institutions prevent status injuries from converting fully without remainder into distributive injustices. Misrecognition does not directly entail maldistribution, although it, too, may contribute to the latter.

In capitalist society, accordingly, class and status do not perfectly mirror each other, their interaction and mutual influence notwithstanding. Nor, likewise, do maldistribution and misrecognition convert fully and without remainder into one another, despite interaction and even entwinement. As a result, one cannot understand this society by attending exclusively to a single dimension of social life. One cannot read off the economic dimension of domination directly from the cultural, nor the cultural directly from the economic. Likewise, one cannot infer class directly from status, nor status directly from class. Finally, one cannot deduce maldistribution directly from misrecognition, nor misrecognition directly from maldistribution. It follows that neither culturalism nor economism suffices for understanding capitalist society. Instead, one needs an approach that can accommodate differentiation, divergence, and interaction at every level.

What sort of social theory can handle this task? What approach can theorize both the differentiation of status from class and the causal interactions between them? What kind of theory can accommodate the complex relations between maldistribution and misrecognition in contemporary society, grasping at once their conceptual irreducibility, empirical divergence, and practical entwinement? And what approach can do all this *without reinforcing the current dissociation of the politics of recognition from the politics of redistribution*? If neither economism nor culturalism is up to the task, what alternative approaches are possible?

Two possibilities present themselves, both of them species of dualism.[24] The first approach I call "substantive dualism." It treats redistribution and recognition as two different "spheres of justice," pertaining to two different societal domains. The former pertains to the economic domain of society, the relations of production. The latter pertains to the cultural domain, the relations of recognition. When we consider

economic matters, such as the structure of labor markets, we should assume the standpoint of distributive justice, attending to the impact of economic structures and institutions on the relative economic position of social actors. When, in contrast, we consider cultural matters, such as the representation of female sexuality on MTV, we should assume the standpoint of recognition, attending to the impact of institutionalized patterns of interpretation and value on the status and relative standing of social actors.

Substantive dualism may be preferable to economism and culturalism, but it is nevertheless inadequate—both conceptually and politically. Conceptually, it erects a dichotomy that opposes economy to culture and treats them as two separate spheres. It thereby mistakes the differentiations of capitalist society for institutional divisions that are impermeable and sharply bounded. In fact, these differentiations mark orders of social relations that can overlap one another institutionally and are more or less permeable in different régimes. As just noted, the economy is not a culture-free zone, but a culture-instrumentalizing and -resignifying one. Thus, what presents itself as "the economy" is always already permeated with cultural interpretations and norms—witness the distinctions between "working" and "caregiving," "men's jobs" and "women's jobs," which are so fundamental to historical capitalism. In these cases, gender meanings and norms have been appropriated from the larger culture and bent to capitalist purposes, with major consequences for both distribution and recognition. Likewise, what presents itself as "the cultural sphere" is deeply permeated by "the bottom line"—witness global mass entertainment, the art market, and transnational advertising, all fundamental to contemporary culture. Once again, the consequences are significant for both distribution and recognition. *Contra* substantive dualism, then, nominally economic matters usually affect not only the economic position but also the status and identities of social actors. Likewise, nominally cultural matters affect not only status but also economic position. In neither case, therefore, are we dealing with separate spheres.[25]

Practically, moreover, substantive dualism fails to challenge the current dissociation of cultural politics from social politics. On the contrary, it reinforces that dissociation. Casting the economy and the culture as impermeable, sharply bounded separate spheres, it assigns the politics of redistribution to the former and the politics of recognition to the latter. The result is effectively to constitute two separate political tasks requiring two separate political struggles. Decoupling cultural injustices from economic injustices, cultural struggles from social struggles, it reproduces the very dissociation we are seeking to overcome. Substantive dualism is not a solution to, but a symptom of, our problem. It reflects, but does not critically interrogate, the institutional differentiations of modern capitalism.

A genuinely critical perspective, in contrast, cannot take the appearance of separate spheres at face value. Rather, it must probe beneath appearances to reveal the hidden connections between distribution and recognition. It must make visible, and *criticizable*, both the cultural subtexts of nominally economic processes and the economic subtexts of nominally cultural practices. Treating *every* practice as simultaneously economic and cultural, albeit not necessarily in equal proportions, it must assess each of them from two different perspectives. It must assume both the standpoint of distribution and the standpoint of recognition, without reducing either one of these perspectives to the other.

Such an approach I call "perspectival dualism." Here redistribution and recognition do not correspond to two substantive societal domains, economy and culture. Rather, they constitute two analytical perspectives that can be assumed with respect to any domain. These perspectives can be deployed critically, moreover, against the ideological grain. One can use the recognition perspective to identify the cultural dimensions of what are usually viewed as redistributive economic policies. By focusing on the production and circulation of interpretations and norms in welfare programs, for example, one can assess the effects of institutionalized maldistribution on the identities and social status of single mothers.[26] Conversely, one can use the redistribution perspective to bring into focus the economic dimensions of what are usually viewed as issues of recognition. By focusing on the high "transaction costs" of living in the closet, for example, one can assess the effects of heterosexist misrecognition on the economic position of gays and lesbians.[27] With perspectival dualism, then, one can assess the justice of any social practice, regardless of where it is institutionally located, from either or both of two analytically distinct normative vantage points, asking: Does the practice in question work to ensure both the objective and intersubjective conditions of participatory parity? Or does it, rather, undermine them?

The advantages of this approach should be clear. Unlike economism and culturalism, perspectival dualism permits us to consider both distribution and recognition, without reducing either one of them to the other. Unlike substantive dualism, moreover, it does not reinforce their dissociation. Because it avoids dichotomizing economy and culture, it allows us to grasp their imbrication and the crossover effects of each. And because, finally, it avoids reducing classes to statuses or vice versa, it permits us to examine the causal interactions between those two orders of domination. Understood perspectivally, then, the distinction between redistribution and recognition does not simply reproduce the ideological dissociations of our time. Rather, it provides an indispensable conceptual tool for interrogating, working through, and eventually overcoming those dissociations.

Perspectival dualism offers another advantage as well. Of all the approaches considered here, it alone allows us to conceptualize some practical difficulties that can arise in the course of political struggles for redistribution and recognition. Conceiving the economic and the cultural as differentiated but interpenetrating social orders, perspectival dualism appreciates that neither claims for redistribution nor claims for recognition can be contained within a separate sphere. On the contrary, they impinge on one another in ways that may give rise to unintended effects.

Consider, first, that redistribution impinges on recognition. Virtually any claim for redistribution will have some recognition effects, whether intended or unintended. Proposals to redistribute income through social welfare, for example, have an irreducible expressive dimension,[28] they convey interpretations of the meaning and value of different activities, for example "childrearing" versus "wage-earning," while also constituting and ranking different subject positions, for example "welfare mothers" versus "tax payers" (Fraser, 1993). Thus, redistributive claims invariably affect the status and social identities of social actors. These effects must be thematized and scrutinized, lest one end up fueling misrecognition in the course of remedying maldistribution.

The classic example, once again, is "welfare." Means-tested benefits aimed specifically at the poor are the most directly redistributive form of social welfare. Yet such benefits tend to stigmatize recipients, casting them as deviants and scroungers and invidiously distinguishing them from "wage-earners" and "tax-payers" who "pay their own way." Welfare programs of this type "target" the poor—not only for material aid but also for public hostility. The end result is often to add the insult of misrecognition to the injury of deprivation. Redistributive policies have misrecognition effects when background patterns of cultural value skew the meaning of economic reforms, when, for example, a pervasive cultural devaluation of female caregiving inflects Aid to Families with Dependent Children as "getting something for nothing."[29] In this context, welfare reform cannot succeed unless it is joined with struggles for cultural change aimed at revaluing caregiving and the feminine associations that code it.[30] In short, no redistribution without recognition.

Consider, next, the converse dynamic, whereby recognition impinges on distribution. Virtually any claim for recognition will have some distributive effects, whether intended or unintended. Proposals to redress androcentric evaluative patterns, for example, have economic implications, which work sometimes to the detriment of the intended beneficiaries. For example, campaigns to suppress prostitution and pornography for the sake of enhancing women's status may have negative effects on the economic position of sex workers, while no-fault divorce reforms, which appeared to dovetail with feminist efforts to enhance women's status, may have had at least short-term negative effects on the economic position of some divorced women, although their extent has apparently been exaggerated and is currently in dispute (Weitzman, 1985). Thus, recognition claims can affect economic position, above and beyond their effects on status. These effects, too, must be scrutinized, lest one end up fueling maldistribution in the course of trying to remedy misrecognition. Recognition claims, moreover, are liable to the charge of being "merely symbolic."[31] When pursued in contexts marked by gross disparities in economic position, reforms aimed at recognizing distinctiveness tend to devolve into empty gestures; like the sort of recognition that would put women on a pedestal, they mock, rather than redress, serious harms. In such contexts, recognition reforms cannot succeed unless they are joined with struggles for redistribution. In short, no recognition without redistribution.

The need, in all cases, is to think integratively, as in the example of comparable worth. Here a claim to redistribute income between men and women is expressly integrated with a claim to change gender-coded patterns of cultural value. The underlying

premise is that gender injustices of distribution and recognition are so complexly intertwined that neither can be redressed entirely independently of the other. Thus, efforts to reduce the gender wage gap cannot fully succeed if, remaining wholly "economic," they fail to challenge the gender meanings that code low-paying service occupations as "women's work," largely devoid of intelligence and skill. Likewise, efforts to revalue female-coded traits such as interpersonal sensitivity and nurturance cannot succeed if, remaining wholly "cultural," they fail to challenge the structural economic conditions that connect those traits with dependency and powerlessness. Only an approach that redresses the cultural devaluation of the "feminine" precisely *within* the economy (and elsewhere) can deliver serious redistribution and genuine recognition.

CONCLUSION

Let me conclude by recapitulating my overall argument. I have argued that to pose an either/or choice between the politics of redistribution and the politics of recognition is to posit a false antithesis. On the contrary, justice today requires both. Thus, I have argued for a comprehensive framework that encompasses both redistribution and recognition so as to challenge injustice on both fronts.

I then examined two sets of issues that arise once we contemplate devising such a framework. On the plane of moral theory, I argued for a single, two-dimensional conception of justice that encompasses both redistribution and recognition, without reducing either one of them to the other. And I proposed the notion of *parity of participation* as its normative core. On the plane of social theory, I argued for a perspectival dualism of redistribution and recognition. This approach alone, I contended, can accommodate both the differentiation of class from status in capitalist society and also their causal interaction. And it alone can alert us to potential practical tensions between claims for redistribution and claims for recognition.

Perspectival dualism in social theory complements participatory parity in moral theory. Taken together, these two notions constitute a portion of the conceptual resources one needs to begin answering what I take to be the key political question of our day: How can we develop a coherent programmatic perspective that integrates redistribution and recognition? How can we develop a framework that integrates what remains cogent and unsurpassable in the socialist vision with what is defensible and compelling in the apparently "postsocialist" vision of multiculturalism?

If we fail to ask this question, if we cling instead to false antitheses and misleading either/or dichotomies, we will miss the chance to envision social arrangements that can redress both economic and cultural injustices. Only by looking to integrative approaches that unite redistribution and recognition can we meet the requirements of justice for all.

NOTES

* Portions of this chapter are adapted and excerpted from my Tanner Lecture on Human Values, delivered at Stanford University, 30 April to 2 May, 1996. The text of the Lecture appears in *The Tanner Lectures on Human Values*, volume 9, ed. Grethe B. Peterson (The University of Utah Press, 1998: 1–67). I am grateful to the Tanner Foundation for Human Values for permission to adapt and reprint this material. I thank Elizabeth Anderson and Axel Honneth for their thoughtful responses to the Tanner Lecture, and Rainer Forst, Theodore Koditschek, Eli Zaretsky, and especially Erik Olin Wright for helpful comments on earlier drafts.

1 The following discussion revises a subsection of my essay "From redistribution to recognition?" (Fraser, 1995: 68–93), reprinted in Fraser (1997a).

2 It is true that pre-existing status distinctions, for example between lords and commoners, shaped the emergence of the capitalist system. Nevertheless, it was only the creation of a differentiated economic order with a relatively autonomous life of its own that gave rise to the distinction between capitalists and workers.

3 I am grateful to Erik Olin Wright (personal communication, 1997) for several of the formulations in this paragraph.

4 In capitalist society, the regulation of sexuality is relatively decoupled from the economic structure, which comprises an order of economic relations that is differentiated from kinship and oriented to the expansion of surplus value. In the current "post-Fordist" phase of capitalism, moreover, sexuality increasingly finds its locus in the relatively new, late-modern sphere of "personal life," where intimate relations that can no longer be identified with the family are lived as disconnected from the imperatives of production and reproduction. Today, accordingly, the heteronormative regulation of sexuality is increasingly

removed from, and not necessarily functional for, the capitalist economic order. As a result, the economic harms of heterosexism do not derive in any straightforward way from the economic structure. They are rooted, rather, in the heterosexist status order, which is increasingly out of phase with the economy. For a fuller argument, see Fraser (1997c). For the counterargument, see Butler (1997).

5 I am grateful to Rainer Forst for help in formulating this point.

6 On Axel Honneth's account, social esteem is among the "intersubjective conditions for undistorted identity formation," which morality is supposed to protect. It follows that everyone is morally entitled to social esteem. See Honneth (1995).

7 John Rawls, for example, at times conceives "primary goods" such as income and jobs as "social bases of self-respect," while also speaking of self-respect itself as an especially important primary good whose distribution is a matter of justice. Ronald Dworkin, likewise, defends the idea of "equality of resources" as the distributive expression of the "equal moral worth of persons." Amartya Sen, finally, considers both a "sense of self" and the capacity "to appear in public without shame" as relevant to the 'capability to function," hence as falling within the scope of an account of justice that enjoins the equal distribution of basic capabilities. See Rawls (1971: §67 and §82; 1993: 82, 181 and 318ff), Dworkin (1981), and Sen (1985).

8 The outstanding exception of a theorist who has sought to encompass issues of culture within a distributive framework is Will Kymlicka. Kymlicka proposes to treat access to an "intact cultural structure" as a primary good to be fairly distributed. This approach was tailored for multinational polities, such as the Canadian, as opposed to polyethnic polities, such as the United States. It becomes problematic, however, in cases where mobilized claimants for recognition do not divide neatly (or even not so neatly) into groups with distinct and relatively bounded cultures. It also has difficulty dealing with cases in which claims for recognition do not take the form of demands for (some level of) sovereignty but aim rather at parity of participation within a polity that is crosscut by multiple, intersecting lines of difference and inequality. For the argument that an intact cultural structure is a primary good, see Kymlicka (1989). For the distinction between multinational and polyethnic politics, see Kymlicka (1996).

9 See especially Honneth (1995).

10 To be sure, this could conceivably change. Nothing I have said rules out *a priori* that someone could successfully extend the distributive paradigm to encompass issues of culture. Nor that someone could successfully extend the recognition paradigm to encompass the structure of capitalism, although that seems more unlikely to me. In either case, it will be necessary to meet several essential requirements simultaneously: first, one must avoid hypostatizing culture and cultural differences; second, one must respect the need for non-sectarian, deontological moral justification under modern conditions of value pluralism; third, one must allow for the differentiated character of capitalist society, in which status and class can diverge; fourth, one must avoid overly Unitarian or Durkheimian views of cultural integration that posit a single pattern of cultural values that is shared by all and that pervades all institutions and social practices. Each of these issues is discussed in my contribution to Fraser and Honneth (2000).

11 Since I coined this phrase in 1995, the term "parity" has come to play a central role in feminist politics in France. There, it signifies the demand that women occupy a full 50 percent of seats in parliament and other representative bodies. "Parity" in France, accordingly, means strict numerical gender equality in political representation. For me, in contrast, "parity" means the condition of being a *peer*, of being on a *par* with others, of standing on an equal footing. I leave the question open exactly to what degree or level of equality is necessary to ensure such parity. In my formulation, moreover, the moral requirement is that members of society be ensured the *possibility* of parity, if and when they choose to participate in a given activity or interaction. There is no requirement that everyone actually participate in any such activity.

12 I say "*at least* two additional conditions must be satisfied" in order to allow for the possibility of more than two. I have in mind specifically a possible third class of obstacles to participatory parity that could be called "political," as opposed to economic or cultural. Such obstacles would include decision-making procedures that systematically marginalize some people even in the absence of maldistribution and misrecognition: for example, single-district winner-take-all electoral rules that deny voice to quasi-permanent minorities. (For an insightful account of this example, see Guinier (1994).) The possibility of a third class of "political" obstacles to participatory parity adds a further Weberian twist to my use of the class/status distinction. Weber's own distinction was tripartite not bipartite: "class, status, and

party." I do not develop it here, however. Here I confine myself to maldistribution and misrecognition, while leaving the analysis of "political" obstacles to participatory parity character for another occasion.

13 It is an open question how much economic inequality is consistent with parity of participation. Some such inequality is inevitable and unobjectionable. But there is a threshold at which resource disparities become so gross as to impede participatory parity. Where exactly that threshold lies is a matter for further investigation.

14 I say the remedy *could* be recognition of difference, not that it must be. Elsewhere I discuss alternative remedies for the sort of misrecognition that involves denying distinctiveness. See my contribution to Fraser and Honneth (2000).

15 In this brief essay, I lack the space to consider these questions of contemporary historical sociology. See, however, my contributions in Fraser and Honneth (2000).

16 As I use it, the distinction between economy and culture is social-theoretical, not ontological or metaphysical. Thus, I do not treat the economic as an extra-discursive realm of brute materiality any more than I treat the cultural as an immaterial realm of disembodied ideality. For a reading of my work that mistakes economy and culture for ontological categories, see Butler (1997). For a critique of this misinterpretation, see Fraser (1997c).

17 This is not to deny the prior existence of other, premodern understandings of "economy," such as Aristotle's.

18 To be sure, misrecognition harms are rooted in cultural patterns of interpretation and evaluation. But this does not mean, *contra* Judith Butler (1997), that they are "merely cultural." On the contrary, the norms, significations, and constructions of personhood that impede women, racialized peoples, and/or gays and lesbians from parity of participation in social life are materially instantiated—in institutions and social practices, in social action and embodied ethereal realm, they are material in their existence and effects. For a rejoinder to Butler, see Fraser (1997c).

19 For example, Marcel Mauss, *The Gift*, and Claude Levi-Strauss, *The Elementary Structures of Kinship*.

20 For an argument against the possibility of a fully marketized society, see Polanyi (1957).

21 It is conceivable that our hypothetical fully marketized society could contain formal institutional differentiations, including, for example, a legal system, a political system, and a family structure. But these differentiations would not be meaningful. *Ex hypothesi*, institutions and arenas that were extra-market *de jure* would be *de facto* market-governed.

22 By culturalism, I mean a monistic social theory that holds that political economy is reducible to culture and that class is reducible to status. As I read him, Axel Honneth subscribes to such a theory. See Honneth (1995).

23 By economism, I mean a monistic social theory that holds that culture is reducible to political economy and that status is reducible to class. Karl Marx is often (mis)read as subscribing to such a theory.

24 In what follows, I leave aside a third possibility, which I call "deconstructive anti-dualism." Rejecting the economy/culture distinction as "dichotomizing," this approach seeks to deconstruct it altogether. The claim is that culture and economy are so deeply interconnected that it doesn't make sense to distinguish them. A related claim is that contemporary capitalist society is so monolithically systematic that a struggle against one aspect of it necessarily threatens the whole; hence, it is illegitimate, unnecessary, and counterproductive to distinguish maldistribution from misrecognition. In my view, deconstructive anti-dualism is deeply misguided. For one thing, simply to stipulate that all injustices, and all claims to remedy them, are simultaneously economic and cultural evacuates the actually existing divergence of status from class. For another, treating capitalism as a monolithic system of perfectly interlocking oppressions evacuates its actual complexity and differentiation. For two rather different versions of deconstructive anti-dualism, see Young (1997) and Butler (1997). For detailed rebuttals, see Fraser (1997b, 1997c).

25 For more detailed criticism of an influential example of substantive dualism, see "What's critical about critical theory? The case of Habermas and gender," in Fraser (1989).

26 See "Women, welfare, and the politics of need interpretation" and "Struggle over needs," both in Fraser (1989); also, Fraser and Gordon (1994), reprinted in Fraser (1997a).

27 Jeffrey Escoffier has discussed these issues insightfully in "The political economy of the closet: toward an economic history of gay and lesbian life before Stonewall", in Escoffier (1998: 65–78).

28 This formulation was suggested to me by Elizabeth Anderson in her comments on my Tanner Lecture, presented at Stanford University, 30 April to 2 May, 1996.

29 Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) is the major means-tested welfare programme in the United States. Claimed overwhelmingly by solo-mother families living below the poverty line, AFDC became a lightning

rod for racist and sexist anti-welfare sentiments in the 1990s. In 1997, it was "reformed" in such a way as to eliminate the federal entitlement that had guaranteed (some, inadequate) income support to the poor.

30 This formulation, too, was suggested to me by Elizabeth Anderson's comments on my Tanner Lecture, presented at Stanford University, 30 April to 2 May, 1996.

31 I am grateful to Steven Lukes for insisting on this point in conversation.

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