LINUX SECURE BOOT WITH TPM AND FDE

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
ABOUT ME

- I work at SEPTA (Philadelphia area public transit)
- My previous experience: Linux sysadmin,
 Windows sysadmin, network engineer
- My current role: Security engineer
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LINUX BOOT SECURITY

- Things I Will Talk About
 - Secure Boot Architecture on x64
 - Secure Boot setup on Kali Linux
 - Trusted Platform Module (TPM) for LUKS key storage



SAFETY TIPS

- You can brick your computer or lock yourself out while setting up Secure Boot.
- If you dual-boot with Windows, have a copy of your BitLocker recovery password.
 - manage-bde -protectors -get C:
- Secure Boot Platform Keys (PK) allow full control of your computer's boot process.
 Losing them can brick your computer.



KALI (AND DEBIAN) DEFAULT BOOT SETUP

EFI System
Partition (ESP):
FAT32

/boot

Root and other filesystems

Disk

KALI (AND DEBIAN) DEFAULT BOOT SETUP

Bootloader (GRUB)

Kernel

Initrd


Bootloader config and resources

EFI System
Partition (ESP)

/boot

Disk

BOOT PROCESS



EXAMPLE SYSTEM BOOT SETUP

EFI System Partition (ESP): FAT32


/boot (ext4)

LUKS encrypted container with LVM and single root partition

Disk

ATTACKS AGAINST DEFAULT BOOT SETUP

- ESP is always unencrypted
 - Tamper with bootloader.
- /boot is unencrypted
 - Tamper with kernel and initrd.
 - Tampered with bootloader configuration files.



SECURE BOOT ARCHITECTURE X64

Platform Key (PK)

Key Exchange Keys (KEK)


db (signing keys)

dbx (blocked keys)

SECURE BOOT ARCHITECTURE X64



SECURE BOOT PROCESS



SECURE BOOT OPTIONS

- Use default keys from Microsoft
 - Pros
 - No need to change keys enrolled in UEFI
 - Compatible with dual-booting Windows
 - Cons
 - Susceptible to supply chain attacks


- Use your own generated keys
 - Pros
 - Not susceptible to supply chain attacks
 - Complete control over which bootloaders are authorized
 - Cons
 - Responsibility to properly manage keys

SECURE BOOT OPTIONS

- Secure Boot with MS keys
 - Uses shim bootloader EFI binary that is signed with Microsoft keys
 - shim introduces a new key store called Machine Owner Keys (MOK)
 - shim accepts bootloaders signed with MOKs
 - shim defaults to using GRUB

- Secure boot with custom keys
 - Generate new PK and KEK
 - Enroll PK and KEK in UEFI
 - Generate custom signing key and enroll into db
 - Directly sign GRUB (or other bootloader) with custom signing key

SECURE BOOT PROCESS WITH MS KEYS



GRUB AND KERNEL WITH SECURE BOOT

- GRUB restrictions
 - All GRUB modules must be contained in GRUB EFI image.
 - All files loaded from disk must be signed by GRUB GPG key.
 - Requires Secure Boot Advanced Targeting (SBAT).
- Kernel lockdown mode
 - All kernel modules must be signed.
 - Hibernation is disabled.



- Install shim-signed and other prerequisite packages
 - shim-signed
 - sbsigntool
 - build-essential
 - dkms
 - linux-headers for current kernel
 - efivar

```
(thedave® zomgtest)-[~]

$ sudo apt install shim-signed sbsigntool build-essential dkms linux-headers-$(uname -r) efivar
Reading package lists ... Done
Building dependency tree ... Done
Reading state information ... Done
shim-signed is already the newest version (1.40+15.7-1).
sbsigntool is already the newest version (0.9,4-3.1).
build-essential is already the newest version (12.10).
dkms is already the newest version (3.0.11-3).
linux-headers-6.5.0-kali2-amd64 is already the newest version (6.5.3-1kali2).
efivar is already the newest version (37-6).
```

- Install shim to ESP
 - cd /usr/lib/shim
 - cp shimx64.efi.signed
 /boot/efi/EFI/kali/BOOTx64.EFI
 - cp mmx64.efi.signed
 /boot/efi/EFI/kali/mmx64.efi
 - efibootmgr --unicode --disk /dev/nvme0n1
 --part 1 --create --label kali-signed -loader /EFI/kali/B00Tx64.efi

```
- (thedave@zomgtest)-[/usr/lib/shim]
$ sudo cp shimx64.efi.signed /boot/efi/EFI/kali/B00Tx64.EFI
- (thedave@zomgtest)-[/usr/lib/shim]
$ sudo cp mmx64.efi.signed /boot/efi/EFI/kali/mmx64.efi
- (thedave@zomgtest)-[/usr/lib/shim]
$ sudo efibootmgr --unicode --disk /dev/nvme0n1 --part 1 --create --label kali-signed --loader /EFI/kali/B00Tx64.efi
```

- Create and enroll MOK keys
 - openssl req -newkey rsa:4096 -nodes
 -keyout /usr/lib/mok/\$(uname -n).key
 -new -x509 -sha256 -days 3650 -subj
 "/CN=\$(uname -n)-mok" -out
 /usr/lib/mok/\$(uname -n).crt
 - openssl x509 -outform DER -in
 /usr/lib/mok/\$(uname -n).crt -out
 /usr/lib/mok/\$(uname -n).cer
 - mokutil --import
 /usr/lib/mok/\$(uname -n).cer

```
____(root⊕zomgtest)-[/usr/lib/mok]
_# openssl x509 -outform DER -in /usr/lib/mok/$(uname -n).crt -out /usr/lib/mok/$(uname -n).cer
```

- Very enrolled MOK key
 - mokutil --list-enrolled

```
(thedave@ zomgtest)-[~]
$ sudo mokutil —list-enrolled
[sudo] password for thedave:
[key 1]
SHAI Fingerprint: 53:61:0c:f8:1f:bd:7e:0c:eb:67:91:3c:9e:f3:e7:94:a9:63:3e:cb
Certificate:
Data:
Version: 3 (0*2)
Serial Number:
ed:54:a1:d5:af:87:48:94:8d:9f:89:32:ee:9c:7c:34
Signature Algoritnm: simu25fwithRSAEncryption
Issuer: CN-Debian Secure Boot CA
Validity
Not Before: Aug 9 18:09:18 2016 GMT
Not After: Aug 9 18:09:18 2046 GMT
Subject: CN-Debian Secure Boot CA
Subject Public Key Info:
```

- Sign kernel with MOK key
 - sbsign --key /usr/lib/mok/\$(uname -n).key
 --cert /usr/lib/mok/\$(uname -n).crt -output /boot/vmlinuz-6.3.0-kali1-amd64
 /boot/vmlinuz-6.3.0-kali1-amd64
- Sign kernel modules with MOK key
 - cd /usr/lib/modules/\$(uname -r)
 - sudo find . -name *.ko -exec
 /usr/lib/modules/\$(uname r)/source/scripts/sign-file sha256
 /usr/lib/mok/\$(uname -n).key
 /usr/lib/mok/\$(uname -n).cer {} \;
- Rebuild initramfs
 - sudo update-initramfs -u

```
—(root©zomgtest)=[/usr/lib/mok]
-# Sbsign -hey /usr/lib/mok/$(uname -n).key --cert /usr/lib/mok/$(uname -n).crt --output /boot/vmlinuz-6.3.0-kali1-amd
4 /boot/vmlinuz-6.3.0-kali1-amd64
```

```
__(root⊗zomgtest)-[/usr/lib/modules/6.5.0-kali2-amd64]
_# update-initramfs -u
update-initramfs: Generating /boot/initrd.img-6.5.0-kali2-amd64
```

Create SBAT file

echo "sbat,1,SBAT
Version,sbat,1,https://github.com/rhboot/
shim/blob/main/SBAT.md\ngrub,3,Free
Software
Foundation,grub,2.06,https://www.gnu.org/
software/grub/\ngrub.ubuntu,1,Ubuntu,grub
2,2.062ubuntu14.1,https://www.ubuntu.com/" >
/usr/share/grub/sbat.csv

—(root@zomgtest)-[/boot] # echo "sbat,1,SBAT Version,sbat,1,https://github.com/rhboot/shim/blob/main/SBAT.md\ngrub,3,Free Software Foundation,g ub,2.06,https://www.gnu.org/software/grub/\ngrub.ubuntu,1,Ubuntu,grub2,2.06-2ubuntu14.1,https://www.ubuntu.com/" > /usr share/grub/sbat.csv

- Create GRUB GPG key
 - sudo gpg --gen-key
 - sudo gpg --export
 FD1CF31A6A31C1429D1D2B00D931CCE4607E
 B176 | sudo tee /usr/lib/mok/\$(uname -n).asc > /dev/null

```
___(root⊛zomgtest)-[/usr/lib/modules/6.5.0-kali2-amd64]
# gpg --gen-key
```

—(root@zomgtest)-[/usr/lib/modules/6.5.0-kali2-amd64] -# sudo gpg --export FD1CF31A6A31C1429D1D2B00D931CCE4607EB176 | sudo tee /usr/lib/mok/\$(uname -n).asc > /dev/null

- Sign GRUB modules and other files
 - cd /usr/lib/grub/x86_64-efi
 - sudo find . -name "*.mod" -exec gpg --detach-sign {}
 \:
 - sudo find . -name "*.lst" -exec gpg --detach-sign {}
 \;
 - sudo find . -name "*.img" -exec gpg --detach-sign {}
 \;
 - cd /boot/grub
 - sudo find . -type f -exec gpg --detach-sign {} \;
 - cd /boot
 - find . -name "vmlinuz*" -exec gpg --detach-sign {} \;
 - find . -name "initrd*" -exec gpg --detach-sign {} \;

Create skeleton GRUB config

```
# Initial skeleton config to bootstrap grub
# Enforce checking signatures on all loaded files
set check_signatures=enforce
export check_signatures
insmod part_gpt
insmod ext2
set root='hd0,gpt2'
if [ x$feature_platform_search_hint = xy ]; then
    search --no-floppy --fs-uuid --set=root --hint-bios=hd0,gpt2 --hint-efi=hd0,gpt2 --hint-baremetal=ahci0,gpt2 6d7c5735-63c3-4a53-888e-4461904e6239
else
    search --no-floppy --fs-uuid --set=root 6d7c5735-63c3-4a53-888e-4461904e6239fi
configfile /grub/grub.cfg
```

- Build GRUB standalone image
 - GRUB MODULES="acpi all_video boot btrfs cat chain configfile echo efifwsetup efinet ext2-fat font gettext gfxmenu gfxterm gfxterm_background gzio halt help hfsplus iso9660 jpeg keystatus loadenv loopback linux ls lsefi lsefimmap lsefisystab lssal memdisk minicmd normal ntfs part_apple part_msdos part_gpt password_pbkdf2 png probe reboot regexp search search fs_uuid search_fs_file search_label sleep smbios squash4 test true video xfs zfs zfscrypt zfsinfo cpuid linuxefi play tpm cryptodisk gcry_arcfour gcry_blowfish gcry_camellia gcry_cast5 gcry_crc gcry_des gcry_dfaa gcry_md4 gcry_md5 gcry_rfc2268 gcry_rijndael gcry_md160 gcry_rsa gcry_seed gcry_serpent gcry_sha1 gcry_sha256 gcry_sha512 gcry_tiger gcry_twofish gcry_whirlpool luks lvm efi_uga efi_gop crypto disk diskfilter pcidump setpci lspci"
 - GRUB DIR="/usr/lib/grub/x86 64-efi"
 - GRUB_PUB_KEY="/usr/lib/mok/\$(uname -n).asc"
 - GRUB_SBAT="/usr/share/grub/sbat.csv"
 - GRUB_OUTPUT="/root/grubx64.efi"
 - GRUB_INIT_CONFIG="/boot/grub/grub-initial.cfg"
 - grub-mkstandalone --directory "\$GRUB_DIR" --format x86_64-efi --modules
 "\$GRUB_MODULES" --pubkey "\$GRUB_PUB_KEY" --sbat "\$GRUB_SBAT" --output
 "\$GRUB_OUTPUT" "boot/grub/grub.cfg=\$GRUB_INIT_CONFIG"

```
GRUB_MODULES="acp! all_video boot btrfs cat chain configifile echo efifwsetup efinet ext2 fat font gettext gfxmenu gf xterm gfxterm gf
```

- Copy GRUB standalone image to ESP
 - cp /root/grubx64.efi /boot/efi/EFI/kali
- Sign GRUB standalone image
 - sbsign --key /usr/lib/mok/\$(uname -n).key
 --cert /usr/lib/mok/\$(uname -n).crt -output /boot/efi/EFI/kali/grubx64.efi
 /boot/efi/EFI/kali/grubx64.efi

- THAT'S IT!
- REBOOT!



- Generate keys
 - PK
 - KEK
 - db signing
- Enroll keys in UEFI
 - Varies by UEFI manufacturer
- Other steps are the same as when using MS keys
 - No shim
 - Sign GRUB and kernel



- Other options when using custom keys
 - Ditch GRUB and use another bootloader
 - Systemd-boot
 - rEFInd
 - Create monolithic image with Linux kernel and initrd in single EFI binary



TPM AND LUKS

- TPM can store keys for decrypting LUKS partition
- TPM measures boot environment
 - Measurements stored in Platform Configuration Registers (PCR)
 - Key released only when PCRs match values used when key was sealed
 - PCR0: Core System Firmware executable code
 - PCR2: extended or pluggable executable code
 - PCR4: hash value of bootloader
 - PCR7: Secure Boot state

TPM

Key storage

PCRs

CPU

RAM

CPU Registers

TPM AND LUKS

- Sealing LUKS key with TPM PCR state stores the key in TPM encrypted with the value of PCR registers.
- If PCR values change, the TPM will not decrypt the LUKS key
- If anything in the boot chain changes, you have to use your LUKS password and then reseal the LUKS key.

TPM measurements pass

- Key sent to LUKS
- LUKS unlocks disk

TPM measurements fail

- Key not sent to LUKS
- LUKS prompts for passphrase

REFERENCES

References

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- https://wiki.debian.org/SecureBoot
- https://ruderich.org/simon/notes/secure-boot-with-grub-and-signed-linux-and-initrd
- https://blastrock.github.io/fde-tpm-sb.html
- https://www.rodsbooks.com/efi-bootloaders/secureboot.html
- https://pawitp.medium.com/full-disk-encryption-on-arch-linux-backed-by-tpm-2-0-c0892cab9704

QUESTIONS?

Questions?

