

**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR  
INFORMATION**

**BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER**  
**377 TH WEAPONS SYSTEM SECURITY SQUADRON (WSSS)**  
**KIRTLAND AIR FORCE BASE (AFGSC)**

**WSSS SOP 31-101, Volume 3**  
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**Security Forces**

**Prime Nuclear Airlift Force/Convoy Security**



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This 377 WSSS Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) implements AFI 31-101, *Air Force Installation Security Program*, AFMAN 31-108, *Air Force Nuclear Weapons Security Manual*, AFI 13-526 Vol 1, *Prime Nuclear Airlift Force Operations*, and establishes guidance governing the authority, procedures, responsibilities, duties, guidance, standards, tasks and requirements for all flight operations. This SOP establishes procedures and requirements regarding convoy operations and logistics movements planning, training, posting and equipment requirements for Protection Level 1 (PL 1) missions. This publication does not apply to Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) Units or to the Air National Guard (ANG). Refer recommended changes and questions about this publication to the Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) using AF Form 847, *Recommendation for Change of Publication*; route AF Forms 847 from the field through the appropriate functional's chain of command. Ensure that all records created as a result of processes prescribed in this publication are maintained in accordance with Air Force Manual (AFMAN) 33-363, *Management of Records*, and disposed of in accordance with Air Force Records Information Management System (AFRIMS) Records Disposition Schedule (RDS) located at <https://www.my.af.mil/afrims/afrims/afrims/rims.cfm>. See Attachment 1 for a Glossary of References and Supporting Information. The use of the name or mark of any specific manufacturer, commercial product, commodity, or service in this publication does not imply endorsement by the Air Force.

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## CHAPTER 1

### CONVOY/PRIME NUCLEAR AIRLIFT FORCE (PNAF) PLANNING AND RESPONSIBILITIES

#### 1.1. 377 WSSS/S3 (Operations) will:

**1.1.1. (DCNI)** Have overall responsibility in planning all convoy and PNAF operations and will allow as much lead-time as possible to preclude confusion caused by last minute changes.

**1.1.2. (FOUO)** Coordinate with the 377th Security Forces Squadron (SFS) Military Working Dog (MWD) Kennel Master for Explosive Detector Dog (EDD) support.

**1.1.3. (FOUO)** Submit approval request to 377 WSSS/CC for Advanced Designated Marksman (ADM) teams or Designated Marksman (DM) positions, if requesting the use of Old Crow.

**1.1.4.** Initiate the posting roster and assign positions based on available flight personnel and backfill with 377 WSSS, 377th Security Forces Group (SFG), 377 SFS staff personnel and the 377th Security Support Squadron (SSPTS) as needed (e.g., special weapons, traffic control points (TCPs)). Make copies of the duty roster and distribute as necessary, ensuring the 377 SSPTS Armory and Site Security Control Center (SSCC) receive copies.

**1.1.5.** Schedule a training day prior to mission execution.

**1.1.6. (DCNI)** Schedule multi-agency rehearsals within 48 hours of scheduled PNAF missions. **NOTE:** At a minimum, rehearsals will be attended by: Convoy Commander, Senior Security Representative, Area Supervisor, Fire Department, MUNS Supervision, on-scene coordinator and Transit Alert Representative.

#### 1.2. Convoy Commander (CC) will:

**1.2.1. (FOUO)** Receive the set-up message from the 898 Munitions Squadron (MUNS), complete the security portion of the message and forward it back to MUNS for coordination to the Courier, 4AS.

**1.2.1.1. (FOUO)** Develop a unique, mission specific duress code for the PNAF mission.

**1.2.1.2. (DCNI)** Coordinate with the Munitions Accountability Safety Officer (MASO), if there are any changes to the security portion of the set-up message.

**1.2.2. (DCNI)** Prepare and brief the Security Forces (SF) portion of the Kirtland Command Post (KCP)/Crisis Action Team (CAT) PNAF brief.

**1.2.3.** Work hand-in-hand with the Logistical Support Area (LSA) Supervisor on all planning aspects of the mission.

**1.2.4.** Coordinate with 377 WSSS/S4V and 377 SSPTS for vehicle support.

**1.2.5.** Ensure the convoy-briefing and Special Security Instructions (SSIs) are updated. Ensure SSIs are posted for mission execution.

**1.2.6. (DCNI)** Coordinate with 377 SSPTS Combat Arms Training and Maintenance (CATM) to ensure sufficient numbers of assigned personnel are qualified with special weapons (M240/M249/M203/Mk19/M24/M107/M870).

**1.2.7. (DCNI)** Ensure physical security measures are prepped for mission; coordinate with MUNS to forecast the need for Mk-19 ammunition. **Note:** MUNS requires a 10 day advanced notification/request to draw required ammunition.

**1.2.8.** Coordinate with the 377 SFG/Personnel Reliability Assurance Program (PRAP) section to ensure required participants are PRP/AUOF certified.

**1.2.9. (DCNI)** Coordinate with the 377 WSSS Nuclear Surety Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) to ensure required participants are trained in nuclear surety.

**1.2.10.** Notify all participants of any mission changes.

**1.2.11.** Ensure all personnel assigned convoy duties report with all required equipment.

**1.3. Logistical Support Area (LSA) Supervisor will:**

**1.3.1. (DCNI)** Work hand-in-hand with the Convoy CC on all planning aspects of the mission.

**1.3.2. (DCNI)** Ensure physical security measures are prepped for mission (ie., ropes, stanchions and restricted area signs) at Pad 5. Maintain and replace as needed. Coordinate with 377 WSSS/S3 to initiate work orders effecting Pad 5.

**1.3.3.** Ensure Special Security Instructions (SSIs) are updated.

**1.3.4.** Notify all logistics movement participants of any mission changes.

**1.3.5.** Ensure all personnel assigned PNAF duties report with all required equipment.

**1.4. Watchdog ( FAA Liaison) will:**

**1.4.1.** Coordinate with Sunport/FAA to de-conflict security concerns and act as a liaison between Sunport/FAA and the 377 WSSS.

**1.5. 377 WSSS/VCO will:**

**1.5.1.** Ensure required vehicles are accounted for and mission ready NLT 48 hours in advance. Required vehicles include 16 UAHMMWVs, two 2500/F250 trucks, two Raptors/ATVs, and one bus.

**1.5.2.** Inspect all vehicles being used for the mission one week prior and again 48 hours in advance to the mission. Document the inspections on AF Form 4431, *Vehicle Assessment Inspection*. **Note:** If 377 WSSS/VCO is unavailable, an appropriate representative will be requested.

**1.5.3.** Vehicles with a failed inspection within 48 hours of a mission will require verbal permission from the 377 SFG/CC or CD to be used for the mission. If permission is not granted the vehicle must be turned into the 377 LRS. If a vehicle fails an inspection prior to the 48 hours, the 377 LRS will be notified and vehicles that will not be fixed in time for the mission will have to receive written permission from the 377 SFG/CC or CD for use for the mission.

## CHAPTER 2

### CONVOY AND PNAF POSTING

**2.1. (DCNI) Cobra Posting.** Cobra units serve as the main convoy movement element during all logistics operations. The posting and equipment requirements for all Cobra units can be found in ENCLOSURE 1 TO APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX C TO KAFB IDP 31-101.

**2.2. (DCNI) Mustang Posting.** Mustang units serve as direct security around the LSA for all PNAF and convoy logistics operations to include supervision and entry control. The posting and equipment requirements for all Mustang units can be found in ENCLOSURE 1 TO APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX C TO KAFB IDP 31-101.

**2.3. (DCNI) Mongoose Posting.** Mongoose units serve as the Response Force (RF) during LSA operations and the Backup Force (BF) during convoy movements. The posting and equipment requirements for all Mongoose units can be found in ENCLOSURE 1 TO APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX C TO KAFB IDP 31-101.

**2.4. (DCNI) Viper Posting.** Viper units serve as the Convoy RF, the LSA BF and as the recon element for the convoy. The posting and equipment requirements for all Viper units can be found in ENCLOSURE 1 TO APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX C TO KAFB IDP 31-101.

**2.5. (DCNI) Pelican Posting.** Pelican units serve as route observers, early warning and counter-sniper elements. These units monitor all avenues of approach during PNAF/convoy operations. ADM teams or DM are desired on all Pelican posts, but will be posted, as a minimum, on Pelican 1 and 3. ADM/DM Pelican units should be posted with one (1) M24/or one (1) M107, one (1) M4, associated support equipment, laser range finder, binoculars, NVGs and in some cases an unmarked 4x4 SF vehicle. Further posting and equipment requirements for all Pelican units can be found in ENCLOSURE 1 TO APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX C TO KAFB IDP 31-101.

**2.6. (DCNI) Raptor Posting.** Raptor units serve as the primary route sweep teams and route observers during LSA operations and convoy movement. The posting and equipment requirements for all Raptor units can be found in ENCLOSURE 1 TO APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX C TO KAFB IDP 31-101.

**2.7. (DCNI) Tango Posting.** Tango units serve as TCPs during convoy movements. The posting and equipment requirements for all Tango units can be found in ENCLOSURE 1 TO APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX C TO KAFB IDP 31-101.

**2.8. (DCNI) Kilo Posting.** Kilo units are MWD teams consisting of a certified Explosive Detector Dog (EDD) and handler. EDD teams are responsible for LSA sweeps and sweeps on the Primary and Alternate Routes. The posting and equipment requirements for all Kilo units can be found in ENCLOSURE 1 TO APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX C TO KAFB IDP 31-101.

**2.9. (DCNI) Sunport Liaison Posting.** The Sunport unit serves as the liaison for the Albuquerque Sunport International Airport. The Liaison will conduct a joint sweep of the active runways and taxiways with Sunport Airport Operations personnel. The equipment requirement for this post is a radio.

**2.10. (DCNI) Watchdog Posting.** The Watchdog unit serves as the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Liaison, providing observation of the runways and taxiways from the FAA Tower. The equipment requirement for this post is a radio with headset for discrete monitoring of SF frequencies and binoculars.

**2.11. (DCNI) Skywatch Posting.** The Skywatch units serve as route observers and early warning posts. The towers can be posted wherever the Convoy Commander deems necessary, however the current locations are within Zia Park and at the Southwest intersection of Hardin Blvd and Wyoming Blvd. These units monitor avenues of approach during PNAF/convoy operations. The posting and equipment requirements for all Skywatch units can be found in ENCLOSURE 1 TO APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX C TO KAFB IDP 31-101. Additional equipment requirements for this post are NVGs and binoculars.



## CHAPTER 3

### PRE-MISSION TRAINING DAY & REHEARSALS

**3.1. Pre-Mission Training Day.** Tasks required for the mission should include the following items:

**3.1.1. (DCNI)** On the training day, specific tasks will be assigned by the Convoy CC and LSA Supervisor to assigned members. Tasks include but are not limited to, night vision/laser aiming device function checks, bag drags and equipment checks.

**3.1.2. (DCNI)** Pre-mission battle drills should be performed by all personnel assigned to the mission. This may include “Force on Force” exercises with Opposition Force (OPFOR) personnel. Drills should focus on individual and team tactics, convoy route dry-runs/rehearsals (on primary and alternate routes), cross-load of SF vehicles, convoy vehicle breakdown, short and long halts, emergency response operations and recapture/recovery exercises. Ultimately, the training performed will be at the discretion of the Convoy CC, LSA Supervisor or higher authority.

**3.1.3. (DCNI)** During the pre-mission training day, additional tasks and training may be conducted as directed by the Convoy CC, LSA Supervisor or higher authority.

### 3.2 Multi-Agency Rehearsals.

**3.2.1. (DCNI)** The time, date and location for PNAF rehearsals will be briefed at the KCP CAT PNAF briefing. Multi-agency rehearsals must be conducted within 48 hours of a PNAF mission. As a minimum, rehearsals will include key leadership from multifunctional areas.

**3.2.2. (DCNI)** Prior to rehearsal start, the LSA Supervisor or Convoy CC will take accountability to ensure multifunctional agencies are present for the rehearsals and report discrepancies to 377 WSSS/S3. **Note:** At a minimum, rehearsals will be attended by: Convoy Commander, Senior Security Representative, Area Supervisor, Fire Department, MUNS Supervision, on-scene coordinator and Transit Alert Representative.

**3.2.3. (DCNI)** Rehearsals will consist of PNAF contingency operations (i.e., denial, recapture/recovery, emergency entry, Broken Arrow, overt attack).

**3.2.4. (DCNI)** Power Point presentations and table-tops alone do not meet the intent for a rehearsal. Rehearsals can start with a Power Point/table-top but must progress to Pad 5 or convoy route for an actual walk/run through.

## CHAPTER 4

### MISSION DAY RESPONSIBILITIES

#### 4.1. Convoy CC will:

4.1.1. Determine the show time for convoy personnel.

4.1.2. (FOUO) Ensure all SF convoy vehicles are sanitized for signs of tampering or explosives. Once sanitized, an armed SF member must stay with the vehicles.

4.1.3. (DCNI) Ensure SSIs are posted and step codes, assigned to that mission, are identified for mission execution.

4.1.3.1. Ensure the Convoy EC has a mission day EAL with original wet signatures.

4.1.4. Conduct a convoy briefing prior to the aircraft arrival for an inbound mission or prior to convoy roll time for an outbound mission.

4.1.4.1. (DCNI) Ensure all personnel assigned to the movement (convoy and PNAF) are in attendance, to include MUNS Technical Advisor (TA), SF leadership and on duty FCC/FC.

4.1.5. (DCNI) Ensure prior to any movement requiring loading dock operations, the MUNS Technical Advisor (TA) briefs the MUNS Nuclear Surety/Safety briefing to the convoy personnel and PNAF personnel.

4.1.5.1. (DCNI) The briefing includes Command Disablement Procedures (CDS), minimum safe cordon (withdrawal distance), weapons effects on the resources and the name of the Sole Vouching Authority (SVA) during loading dock operations.

#### 4.2. LSA Supervisor will:

4.2.1. Determine the show time for PNAF personnel.

4.2.2. Ensure SSIs are posted for mission execution.

4.2.3. Ensure all PNAF personnel attend the convoy briefing.

**4.3. PNAF EC will:**

- 4.3.1. (DCNI)** Verify the mission day EALs with original wet signatures are in the PNAF EC SSI and Convoy EC SSI and coordinate with 377 WSSS/S5 if they are not present.
- 4.3.2.** Contact SSCC to verify the PRP/AUOF status of all personnel on the EAL.
- 4.3.3.** Brief the LSA Supervisor when the above actions are complete.
- 4.3.4.** Ensure all required equipment is accounted for. (e.g. ECP signs, tables, bins, trans friskers, ropes, stanchions, mirror )
- 4.3.5. (DCNI)** Verify the RAB of all personnel attending mission brief for security clearance and correct open area on RAB for Pad 5 operations.

## CHAPTER 5

### TYPE I INBOUND PNAF/CONVOY OPERATIONS

#### 5.1. Responsibilities.

##### 5.1.1. Sunport Liaison will:

**5.1.1.1.** Contact Sunport Airport Operations personnel to coordinate a joint sweep of the active runways and taxiways.

**5.1.1.2. (FOUO)** Conduct a joint sweep within 30 minutes of aircraft arrival.

**5.1.1.3.** Notify SSCC of anything out of the ordinary or unusual in or around the runways and/or taxiways that would affect the landing of the incoming aircraft.

##### 5.1.2. Watchdog will:

**5.1.2.1. (DCNI)** Maintain observation over all avenues of approach to the airfield, Pad 5, convoy route and surrounding areas and report suspicious activity to the SSCC.

**5.1.2.2. (DCNI)** Coordinate between FAA and mission forces and relay pertinent, releasable details affecting operations.

**5.1.2.3. (DCNI)** Maintain contact with the Terminal Radar Approach Control center to attempt to get updates when the aircraft is one (1) hour, 45 minutes, 30 minutes, 15 minutes, 10 minutes and 5 minutes from landing.

**5.1.2.4. (DCNI)** Relay aircraft arrival delays and estimated time of arrival to SSCC.

**5.1.2.5. (FOUO)** Monitor convoy movement and Pad 5 operations from initiation to termination. In case of recovery operation, coordinate with FAA for Fire Department to have heavy equipment block taxiways and runways, as needed.

**5.1.2.6. (FOUO)** Report hostilities to FAA so that they can re-route taxiing aircraft and re-route/delay commercial aircraft arrival to Albuquerque International Sunport.

**5.1.2.7. (DCNI)** Monitor aircraft flying over the convoy route and Pad 5. Inform SSCC of all aircraft flying routes within the vicinity of the operation.

**5.1.3. LSA Supervisor will:**

**5.1.3.1. (DCNI)** Ensure Type I security is in place 30 minutes prior to aircraft arrival. Type I security will include:

**5.1.3.1.1. (DCNI)** Three Close Boundary Sentries (CBS) consisting of Mustang units.

**5.1.3.1.2. (DCNI)** A two-person Internal Security Response Team (ISRT) consisting of Mustang units.

**5.1.3.1.3. (DCNI)** A two-person External Security Response Team (ESRT) consisting of Mustang units.

**5.1.3.1.4. (DCNI)** A 15-person Response Force (RF) consisting of all Mongoose units and a 15-person Back-up Force (BF) comprised of all Viper units.

**5.1.3.1.5. (DCNI)** A two-person entry control (EC) team consisting of an EC and assistant EC (Mustang units)

**5.1.3.1.6. (DCNI)** An Area Supervisor (AS). (Mustang unit)

**5.1.3.2. (FOUO)** Ensure sweeps of Pad 5 and the surrounding area are accomplished for unauthorized personnel and devices.

**5.1.3.2.1. (FOUO)** Ensure all defensive fighting positions, AGE equipment, conex areas and GOV parking areas in close proximity of Pad 5 are swept, and all personnel identified/ authorized for operations.

**5.1.3.2.2. (FOUO)** When available, use an EDD team in assisting with the sweeps. The EDD team should be in front of the main sweep element.

**5.1.3.2.3. (FOUO)** As the pad and surrounding areas are swept, post SF/CBSs to ensure the integrity of the area.

**5.1.3.3. (DCNI)** Ensure BF, Mongoose units, and Pelican units are in-place and designated patrols are ready to shadow the aircraft to Pad 5 upon landing. In order to delay/deny high-speed avenues of approach to the aircraft, at least one (1) fire team will shadow the aircraft during taxi..

**5.1.3.4. (FOUO)** Ensure TCPs are posted and control traffic along avenues of approach during aircraft taxi.

**5.1.3.5. (DCNI)** Upon aircraft arrival at Pad 5, identify the Courier via the PNAF set-up message.

**5.1.3.5.1.** Confirm the Date Time Group (DTG) of the setup message.

**5.1.3.5.2.** Provide the security briefing to the Courier (see Attachment 3).

**5.1.3.5.3.** Ensure all EALs are properly authenticated by SF and the Courier.

**5.1.3.5.4.** Request the Courier to identify and brief the EC on personnel who are authorized as escort officials.

**5.1.3.6. (FOUO)** Issue the Courier a SF radio to facilitate communication.

**5.1.4. EC will:**

**5.1.4.1. (FOUO)** Ensure the mission/inspector EALs are properly authenticated by the Courier and any SF member E-5 or above.

**5.1.4.2.** Ensure the Courier identifies personnel on the EAL who are authorized as escort officials. **Note:** The Courier may choose not to identify anyone as having escort authority.

**5.1.4.3.** Verify all personnel requesting entry into the area by checking their Restricted Area Badge (RAB) or government issued credentials against the properly authenticated EAL. **Note:** All credentials must contain the individual's photograph.

**5.1.4.4.** For inspector entry, compare the individual's homestation AF Form 1199, *Restricted Area Badge* (RAB), Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) credentials or appropriate government credentials against the EAL. All personnel who are escorted into limited/exclusion area will be logged in/out on an AF Form 1109, *Visitor Register Log*.

**5.1.4.4.1. (FOUO)** DTRA Identification Badge. The badge is white and contains the following information on the front of the badge: the acronym "DTRA" and "Defense Threat Reduction Agency" spelled out at the top; a number; the bearer's photograph to the right of the number; and the bearer's name at the bottom. The badge number is on the back of the badge in the lower right-hand corner.

**5.1.4.5.** Ensure the AEC inspects/transfrisks all individuals and hand-carried items for contraband/prohibited items prior to entry and upon leaving the area.

**5.1.4.6. (DCNI)** Ensure the Sole Vouching Authority (SVA)--almost always the Courier--vouches for all personnel prior to allowing entry to the area.

**5.1.4.7.** Whenever possible, to expedite entry and reduce exposure, pre-screen personnel requesting entry into the area.

**5.1.4.7.1.** Pre-screening consists of verifying the individual RAB or government issued credentials against the EAL and searching all hand-carried items/transfrisk individuals.

**5.1.4.7.2.** Screened personnel will be placed into an entrapment area under surveillance of a SF member.

**5.1.4.7.3.** Notify the Courier of the number of personnel who have been pre-screened to enter the area.

**5.1.4.7.4.** Allow entry to pre-screened personnel only after the Courier and LSA Supervisor authenticate the EALs.

**5.1.4.8.** Keep an accurate count of all personnel inside the area to include the Courier and aircrew.

**5.1.4.9.** Log all escorted personnel on the AF Form 1109, *Visitor Register Log*.

**5.1.4.10. (FOUO)** Witness the physical transfer of the CDS card after weapons transfer and be made aware of its location.

**5.1.5. Convoy CC will:**

**5.1.5.1. (FOUO)** Direct the initiation of route sweeps (primary and alternate) prior to completion of download operations.

**5.1.5.2.** Ensure TCPs are posted prior to route sweeps.

**5.1.5.3. (DCNI)** Direct the initiation of KUMMSC underground sweeps.

**5.1.5.4. (DCNI)** When notification of sweeps are complete, request permission to initiate convoy through the Special Airlift Assignment Mission (SAAM) Coordinator to the Wing Commander.

**5.1.5.5. (DCNI)** Prior to departing Pad 5, authenticate the composition of the convoy with SSCC. Include the number of personnel and vehicles in the convoy.

**5.1.5.6. (DCNI)** Approximately 400 meters from the KUMMSC Topside Controlled Area, request the lowering of appropriate vehicle barriers via special functions.

**5.1.5.7. (DCNI)** Authenticate with SSCC the number of vehicles and personnel that will be entering the KUMMSC Limited Area (loading dock).

## **5.2. RF and BF Configurations.**

### **5.2.1. RF Configurations.**

**5.2.1.1. (DCNI)** The RF for loading dock operations in support of a Type I PNAF will consist of Scorpion-1, Scorpion-2, Scorpion-3, Scorpion-4, Scorpion-5, Cerberus-4 and Viper-3.

**5.2.1.2. (DCNI)** The RF for Type I PNAF operations will consist of Mongoose-1, Mongoose-2, Mongoose-3 and Mongoose-4.

**5.2.1.3. (DCNI)** The RF for Type I Convoy operations will consist of Viper-1, Viper-2, Viper-3 and Viper-4.

### **5.2.2. BF Configurations.**

**5.2.2.1. (DCNI)** The BF for Type I PNAF operations will consist of Viper-1, Viper-2, Viper-3 and Viper-4.

**5.2.2.2. (DCNI)** The BF Type I Convoy operations will consist of Mongoose-1, Mongoose-2, Mongoose-3 and Mongoose-4.



## CHAPTER 6

### TYPE I OUTBOUND PNAF/CONVOY OPERATIONS

#### 6.1. Responsibilities.

##### 6.1.1. Sunport Liaison will:

**6.1.1.1. (FOUO)** Contact Sunport Airport Operations personnel to coordinate a joint sweep of the active runways and taxiways.

**6.1.1.2. (DCNI)** Conduct a joint sweep within 30 minutes prior to aircraft departure.

**6.1.1.3.** Notify SSCC of anything out of the ordinary or unusual in or around the runways and/or taxiways that would affect the take-off of the departing aircraft.

##### 6.1.2. Watchdog will:

**6.1.2.1. (DCNI)** Maintain observation over the airfield, Pad-5, convoy route and surrounding areas and report suspicious activity to the SSCC.

**6.1.2.2. (DCNI)** Coordinate between FAA and mission forces and relay pertinent, releasable details affecting operations.

**6.1.2.3. (DCNI)** Monitor convoy movement and Pad 5 operations from initiation to termination. In case of recovery operation, coordinate with FAA for Fire Department and heavy equipment to block taxiways and runways as needed.

**6.1.2.4. (DCNI)** Report hostilities to FAA so that they can reroute taxing aircraft and reroute/delay commercial aircraft arrival to Albuquerque International Sunport.

**6.1.2.5. (DCNI)** Monitor aircraft flying over the convoy route and Pad 5. Inform SSCC of all aircraft flying routes within the vicinity of the operation.

##### 6.1.3. LSA Supervisor will:

**6.1.3.1. (DCNI)** Ensure Type I security is in place prior to the arrival of the aircrew. Type I security will include:

**6.1.3.1.1. (DCNI)** Three Close Boundary Sentries (CBS) consisting of Mustang Units.

**6.1.3.1.2. (DCNI)** A two-person Internal Security Response Team (ISRT) consisting of Mustang Units.

**6.1.3.1.3. (DCNI)** A two-person External Security Response Team (ESRT) consisting of Mustang units.

**6.1.3.1.4. (DCNI)** A 15-person Response Force (RF) consisting of all Mongoose units and Back-up Force (BF) consisting of all Viper units.

**6.1.3.1.5. (DCNI)** A two-person Entry Controller (EC) and Assistant Entry Controller (AEC) consisting of Mustang units.

**6.1.3.1.6. (DCNI)** An Area Supervisor (AS). (Mustang unit)

**6.1.3.2. (DCNI)** Ensure sweeps are conducted of Pad 5 and the surrounding areas for unauthorized personnel and devices.

**6.1.3.2.1. (DCNI)** Ensure all defensive fighting positions, AGE equipment, conex areas and GOV parking area are swept.

**6.1.3.2.2. (DCNI)** When available, use a MWD EDD team in assisting with the sweeps. The MWD team should be in front of the main sweep element.

**6.1.3.2.3. (DCNI)** As the pad and surrounding areas are swept, post SF/CBSs to ensure the integrity of the area.

**6.1.3.3. (DCNI)** Upon aircrew arrival, identify the Courier against the aircrew orders.

**6.1.3.4. (DCNI)** Conduct a sweep of the exterior and interior of the aircraft along with the Courier and an MWD EDD team to sanitize prior to arrival of assets.

**6.1.3.4.1. (DCNI)** Prior to opening doors and hatches, verify the integrity and imprinted number of all aircraft seals with the Courier and SSCC if aircraft was sanitized prior to mission.

**6.1.3.5. (DCNI)** Ensure the MWD EDD team searches all aircrew luggage prior to entering the area.

**6.1.3.6. (DCNI)** Once aircraft has been swept, proceed to the Entry Control Point (ECP) with the Courier.

**6.1.3.6.1. (DCNI)** Identify the Courier via the PNAF set-up message.

**6.1.3.6.2. (DCNI)** Confirm the Date Time Group (DTG) of the setup message.

**6.1.3.6.3. (DCNI)** Provide the security briefing to the Courier (see Attachment 3).

**6.1.3.6.4.** Ensure all EALs are properly authenticated.

**6.1.3.6.5. (DCNI)** Request the Courier to identify and brief the EC on personnel who are authorized as escort officials. **Note:** The Courier may choose not to identify anyone as having escort authority.

**6.1.3.7. (DCNI)** Ensure BF, Coyote, and Pelican units are in-place and designated patrols are ready to shadow the aircraft during taxi. In order to delay/deny high-speed avenues of approach to the aircraft, at least one (1) fire team will shadow the aircraft during taxi to its parking location.

**6.1.3.8. (DCNI)** Ensure TCPs are posted and control traffic along avenues of approach during aircraft taxi.

**6.1.3.9. (FOUO)** Retrieve any issued radios from the Courier.

**6.1.3.10. (DCNI)** Keep Type I security in-place for 30 minutes after aircraft departure.

#### **6.1.4. EC will:**

**6.1.4.1.** Upon aircrew arrival, along with the LSA Supervisor, identify the courier and all aircrew against the aircrew orders.

**6.1.4.2.** Inspect all aircrew and hand-carried items (EDD team will search luggage) for contraband/prohibited items prior to entry into the area to conduct aircraft sweeps or prep the aircraft.

**6.1.4.3.** After aircraft sweeps are complete and all aircrew are in the area proceed to the ECP.

**6.1.4.4.** Ensure the mission EAL is properly authenticated by the Courier and any SF member E-5 or above.

**6.1.4.5. (FOUO)** Ensure the Courier identifies personnel on the EAL who are authorized as escort officials. **Note:** The Courier may choose not to identify anyone as having escort authority.

**6.1.4.6.** Verify all personnel requesting entry into the area by checking their Restricted Area Badge (RAB) or government issued credentials against the authenticated EAL. **Note:** All credentials must contain the individual's photograph.

**6.1.4.7.** For inspector entry, compare the individual's homestation AF Form 1199, *Restricted Area Badge* (RAB)/Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) credentials or appropriate government credentials against the EAL. All personnel who are escorted into limited/exclusion area will be logged in/out on an AF Form 1109, *Visitor Register Log*.

**6.1.4.8.** Ensure the AEC inspects/transfrisks all individuals and hand-carried items for contraband/prohibited items prior to entering and upon leaving the area.

**6.1.4.9. (DCNI)** Ensure the Sole Vouching Authority (SVA)--almost always the Courier--vouches for all personnel prior to allowing entry to the area.

**6.1.4.10.** Whenever possible, to expedite entry and reduce exposure, pre-screen personnel requesting entry in to the area.

**6.1.4.10.1.** Pre-screening consists of verifying the individual RAB or government issued credentials against the EAL and searching all hand-carried items and inspect/transfrisk individuals.

**6.1.4.10.2. (FOUO)** Screened personnel will be put into an entrapment area under surveillance of a SF member.

**6.1.4.10.3. (FOUO)** Notify the Courier of the number of personnel that have been pre-screened to enter the area.

**6.1.4.10.4. (FOUO)** Allow entry to pre-screened personnel only after the Courier and LSA Supervisor authenticate the EAL.

**6.1.4.11. (FOUO)** Keep an accurate count of all personnel inside the area to include the Courier and aircrew.

**6.1.4.12.** Log all escorted personnel on the AF Form 1109, *Visitor Register Log*.

**6.1.4.13. (DCNI)** Approximately 400 meters from convoy arrival, receive and authenticate the number of vehicles and personnel entering the limited/exclusion area with the Convoy CC.

**6.1.4.14. (DCNI)** Upon proper authentication, do not delay the convoy transporting nuclear resources to the aircraft from entering the area.

**6.1.4.15. (DCNI)** Witness the physical transfer of the CDS card after weapons transfer and be made aware of its location.

**6.1.5. Convoy CC will:**

**6.1.5.1. (DCNI)** Direct the initiation of KUMMSC underground sweeps prior to loading dock operations.

**6.1.5.2. (DCNI)** Direct the initiation of route sweeps (primary and alternate) as necessary to not delay the convoy.

**6.1.5.3. (DCNI)** Ensure TCPs are posted prior to route sweeps.

**6.1.5.4. (DCNI)** Upon notification of sweep completions, request permission to initiate convoy through the SAAM Coordinator to the Wing Commander.

**6.1.5.5. (DCNI)** When initiating the movement, authenticate the composition of the convoy with SSCC. Include the number of personnel and vehicles in the convoy.

**6.1.5.6. (DCNI)** Approximately 400 meters from the LSA ECP, authenticate the number of vehicles and personnel entering the limited/exclusion area with the EC.

**6.2. RF AND BF CONFIGURATIONS.**

**6.2.1. RF Configurations.**

**6.2.1.1. (DCNI)** The RF for loading dock operations in support of a Type I PNAF will consist of Scorpion-1, Scorpion-2, Scorpion-3, Scorpion-4, Scorpion-5, Cerberus-4 and Viper-3.

**6.2.1.2. (DCNI)** The RF for Type I PNAF operations will consist of Mongoose-1, Mongoose-2, Mongoose-3 and Mongoose-4.

**6.2.1.3. (DCNI)** The RF for Type I Convoy operations will consist of Viper-1, Viper-2, Viper-3 and Viper-4.

**6.2.2. BF Configurations.**

**6.2.2.1. (DCNI)** The BF for Type I PNAF operations will consist of Viper-1, Viper-2, Viper-3 and Viper-4.

**6.2.2.2. (DCNI)** The BF Type I Convoy operations will consist of Mongoose-1, Mongoose-2, Mongoose-3 and Mongoose-4.

## CHAPTER 7

### CONTINGENCY RESPONSE PROCEDURES

#### 7.1. Convoy Short Halt Procedures.

**7.1.1. (FOUO)** A short halt of the convoy may be necessary for assessing the tactical environment or a minor mechanical problem with the tow vehicle(s). If the Convoy CC conducts a short halt, convoy units will:

**7.1.1.1.** Ensure 360 degree security around the tow vehicle(s).

**7.1.1.2. (DCNI)** Ensure the MUNS personnel establish two-person concept and provide security for the trailer(s), provide internal final denial capability and conduct command disablement actions, if needed.

**7.1.1.3. (FOUO)** As soon as possible, continue convoy operations. If the issue cannot be resolved within 30 minutes, conduct long halt procedures.

#### 7.2. Convoy Long Halt Procedures.

**7.2.1. (FOUO)** A long halt of the convoy may be necessary for a major mechanical problem with the tow vehicle(s) or a required emergency response (i.e. fire on tow vehicle).

**7.2.1.1. (DCNI) Convoy CC will:**

**7.2.1.1.1.** Ensure 360 degree security around the tow vehicle(s).

**7.2.1.1.2.** Establish a temporary exclusion area.

**7.2.1.1.3.** Establish an ECP and post an EC to control entry and enforce the two-person concept at all times.

**7.2.1.1.4. (DCNI)** Ensure the MUNS personnel establish two-person concept and close quarters security on the trailer(s), provide internal final denial capability and conduct command disablement actions, if needed.

**7.2.1.1.5. (DCNI)** Ensure the MUNS TA serves as the SVA.

**7.2.1.1.6.** Ensure all emergency response vehicles, personnel and equipment leaving the exclusion area are searched. **Note:** Refer to KAFB 31-101, *Integrated Defense Plan* for Emergency Response Procedures.

**7.2.1.2. EC will:**

**7.2.1.2.1.** Verify all personnel requesting entry into the area by checking their RAB or government issued credentials against the authenticated EAL. **Note:** All credentials must contain the individual's photograph.

**7.2.1.2.2.** For inspector entry, compare the individual's homestation AF Form 1199, RAB, DTRA credentials or appropriate government credentials against the EAL. All personnel who are escorted into limited/exclusion area will be logged in/out on an AF Form 1109, *Visitor Register Log*.

**7.2.1.2.3.** Inspect all individuals and hand-carried items for contraband/prohibited items prior to entering and upon leaving the exclusion area.

**7.2.1.2.4.** Ensure the SVA vouches for all personnel prior to allowing entry to the area.

**7.2.1.2.5. (FOUO)** Use appropriate sign/countersign to allow entry for all emergency responders. **Note:** Refer to KAFB 31-101, *Integrated Defense Plan* for Emergency Response Procedures.

**7.2.1.2.6.** Keep an accurate count of all personnel inside the exclusion area.

**7.2.1.2.7.** Log all escorted personnel and emergency responders (upon exit) on the AF Form 1109, *Visitor Register Log*.

**7.3. Convoy SF Vehicle Breakdown.**

**7.3.1. Convoy CC will:**

**7.3.1.1. (FOUO)** Direct the disabled vehicle be moved out of the way for cross-load into available armored vehicle supplied by 377 WSSS/S4V.

**7.3.1.2. (FOUO)** Reposition forces, as needed, ensure security requirements are maintained and keep convoy moving.

**7.4. Attack on the Convoy.**

**7.4.1. Convoy CC will:**

**7.4.1.1. (DCNI)** Immediately take all measures to protect resources commensurate with Nuclear Weapons Security Standards. Immediate actions may include increasing the speed of the convoy to rapidly escape hostile fire.

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**7.4.1.2. (DCNI)** If needed, direct disablement actions prior to the PL 1 resources falling in to enemy hands. If the resource(s) fall into enemy hands, all recapture/recovery actions will be immediate and swift and IAW the 377 SFG Tactical Assault Guide.

## **7.5. PNAF Emergency Response.**

### **7.5.1. LSA Supervisor will:**

**7.5.1.1.** Assist the SAAM Coordinator in assisting in the evacuation of non-essential personnel.

**7.5.1.2. (FOUO)** If necessary, ensure the EC/CBS uses appropriate sign/countersign to allow entry for all emergency responders and passes # of personnel to EC.

**7.5.1.3.** If necessary, relocate the ECP to facilitate the emergency response.

**7.5.1.4. (FOUO)** Ensure all emergency response vehicles and equipment leaving the limited/exclusion area are searched. **Note:** Refer to KAFB 31-101, *Integrated Defense Plan* for Emergency Response Procedures.

### **7.5.2. EC will:**

**7.5.2.1. (FOUO)** Use appropriate sign/countersign to allow entry for all emergency responders. **Note:** Refer to KAFB 31-101, *Integrated Defense Plan* for Emergency Response Procedures.

**7.5.2.2.** Keep an accurate count and observation of all emergency response personnel who entered the area.

**7.5.2.3.** Log all escorted personnel and emergency responders (upon exit) on the AF Form 1109, *Visitor Register Log*.

**7.5.2.4.** Ensure all emergency responding personnel/vehicles are searched upon exiting the limited/exclusion area. Unless responding to another known emergency, at which point a SF patrol will follow the emergency responding personnel to their destination and then accomplish searches and log personnel on AF FM 1109, *Visitor Register Log*.

## **7.6. Attack on the PNAF.**

### **7.6.1. LSA Supervisor will:**

**7.6.1.1. (DCNI)** Immediately take all measures to protect resources commensurate with Nuclear Weapons Security Standards.

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**7.6.1.2. (DCNI)** If the resource(s) fall into enemy hands, all recapture/recovery actions will be immediate and swift and IAW with the 377 SFG Tactical Assault Guide.

**7.7. Defensive Fighting Positions.**

**7.7.1. LSA Supervisor will:**

**7.7.1.1. (DCNI)** Ensure Close Bound Sentries head to nearest DFP and start providing final denial fire during an attack on the PNAF.

**7.7.1.2. (DCNI)** In the event hostiles gain access to DFPs, RF members (or any additional responders) will use whatever means available to neutralize all threats.

## CHAPTER 8

### NON-SCHEDULED PNAF AIRCRAFT ARRIVAL

**8.1. Responsibilities.** The primary responsibility of SF is to form a RF as rapidly as possible. However, this will not be used as a reason to delay the aircraft from landing.

#### **8.1.1. SSSC will:**

**8.1.1.1.** Notify the 377 WSSS Commander, S3, S3O, MUNS Control, Base Defense Operations Center, 377 WSSS/S4A, 377 SFG/S4V, 377 WSSS/S4V and branch superintendents.

**8.1.1.2.** Coordinate with KCP to determine what problems the aircraft is having.

**8.1.1.3.** Ensure Pad 5 is not occupied by another aircraft. If so, contact the KCP and request an alternate parking location.

**8.1.1.4. (FOUO)** Dispatch flightline patrols to initiate sweeps of Pad 5 and adjacent areas (or alternate parking location). These patrols will be used to establish initial security until another RF can be established.

**8.1.1.5. (FOUO)** Request two (2) EDD teams to assist with sweeps of the aircraft parking area.

**8.1.1.6. (FOUO)** If aircraft is arriving from overseas, notify US Customs and US Department of Agriculture at the Albuquerque International Airport or US Customs trained personnel.

#### **8.1.2. The On-Duty FCC/FC will:**

**8.1.2.1. (FOUO)** Respond to Pad 5 (or alternate parking location) and use available personnel to establish Type I security. Organize initial security using posted patrols.

**8.1.2.2. (FOUO)** Use Flightline patrols to secure and monitor the aircraft while on the runway or taxiway, maintaining a response capability to the aircraft.

**8.1.2.3. (FOUO)** Follow procedures in 5.1.3. and 5.1.4. of this SOP.

## 8.2. Divert Operations.

**8.2.1. (DCNI)** In the event KAFB is designated a divert base for a PNAF mission, multi-agency rehearsals will be conducted 48 hours out and annotated in the blotter. **NOTE:** At a minimum, rehearsals will be attended by: Convoy Commander, Senior Security Representative, Area Supervisor, Fire Department, MUNS Supervision, on-scene coordinator and Transit Alert Representative.

**8.2.2. (FOUO)** If KAFB is not a designated divert location, an aircraft will not land unless experiencing a real world emergency.

JAMES K. MEIER, Lt Col, USAF  
Commander

# ATTACHMENT 1

## GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION

### *References*

DoD S5210.41M\_AFMAN 31-108 V1/V2/V3 *Nuclear Weapons Security Manual*, 7 March 2013, AFGSCSUP 21 February 2014

KAFB Integrated Defense Plan 31-101, 13 October 2015

### *Prescribed Forms*

No forms are prescribed by this publication

### *Adopted Forms*

AF Form 1199, *Restricted Area Badge*

AF Form 1109s, *Visitor Registration Log*

### *Abbreviations and Acronyms*

**377 SFG** - 377th Security Forces Group

**377 SFS** - 377th Security Forces Squadron

**377 SSPTS**- 377th Security Support Squadron

**377 WSSS** - 377th Weapons Systems Security Squadron

**898 MUNS** - 898th Munitions Squadron

**AEC** - Assistant Entry Controller

**AECS** - Advanced Entry Control System

**AFGSC**- Air Force Global Strike Command

**AFI** - Air Force Instruction

**AUOF** – Arming and Use of Force

**BF** - Backup Force

**BDOC** - Base Defense Operations Center

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**CATM** - Combat Arms Training and Maintenance

**CDS** – Command Disable System

**DCA** – Discrete Controlled Area

**DCNI** - Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information

**DTRA** - Defense Threat Reduction Agency

**EAL** - Entry Authority List

**EC** - Entry Controller

**ECP** - Entry Control Point

**EDD** - Explosive Detection Dog

**ESRT** - External Security Response Team

**FAA** - Federal Aviation Administration

**FC** - Flight Chief

**FCC** - Flight Commander

**GOV** - Government Owned Vehicle

**IDP** - Integrated Defense Plan

**KAFB** - Kirtland Air Force Base

**KCP** - Kirtland Command Post

**KUMMSC** - Kirtland Underground Munitions Maintenance and Storage Complex

**LSA** - Logistical Support Area

**MAJCOM** - Major Command

**MWD** - Military Working Dog

**OPR** - Office of Primary Responsibility

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**PL (1, 2, 3, or 4)** - Protection Level (1, 2, 3, or 4)

**PNAF** – Prime Nuclear Airlift Force

**PRP** - Personnel Reliability Program

**PRAP** – Personnel Reliability Assurance Program

**RA** - Restricted Area

**RAB** - Restricted Area Badge

**RF** - Response Force

**S3**- Operations Officer

**S3O**- Operations Superintendent

**SAAM** - Special Airlift Assignment Mission

**SF** - Security Forces

**SRT** - Security Response Team

**SSCC** - Site Security Control Center

**SSI** - Special Security Instruction

**SVA** - Sole Vouching Authority

**TA** - Technical Advisor

**TCP** - Traffic Control Point

**ATTACHMENT 2****SECURITY ACKNOWLEDGMENT LETTER**

Date

REPLY TO ATTN OF: Senior On-Duty Security Force Official

SUBJECT: Security Acknowledgment Letter

TO: Courier Officer (Check only one paragraph.)

( ) 1. I understand the nature of the cargo aboard aircraft number\_\_\_\_\_ and will provide security that meets the requirements of DOD Directive 5210.41-M-(C); (Air Force: AFI 31-101; Army: AR 50-5; Navy; OPNAVENST C5510.83 (C)). No one, except the aircrew on the attached orders, will be allowed to enter the aircraft unless there is an emergency that endangers the aircraft or personnel. Allow emergency personnel immediate entry and notify the aircraft commander or Courier officer immediately. The restricted area around the aircraft is a no-lone zone when the aircrew is not present. Seal#\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Name, Rank, Duty Title, and Signature) (Organization) (Time and Date)

( ) 2. I will provide at least one full-time guard for aircraft number\_\_\_\_\_. No one except the aircrew on the attached orders will be allowed to enter the aircraft, unless there is an emergency that endangers the aircraft or personnel. Allow emergency personnel immediate entry and notify the aircraft commander or Courier officer immediately. The aircraft interior (is) (is not) a no lone zone. Seal#\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Name, Rank, Duty Title, and Signature) (Organization) (Time and Date)

( ) 3. I will provide at least one full-time guard for aircraft number\_\_\_\_\_. Persons on the attached list(s) may be allowed into the aircraft. Anyone not on the list(s) will be escorted by someone who is listed, except in an emergency. The escort official must remain with the person being escorted. Seal#\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Name, Rank, Duty Title, and Signature) (Organization) (Time and Date)

( ) 4. I will provide frequent checks by security forces for aircraft number\_\_\_\_\_. Persons on the attached list(s) may be allowed into the aircraft. Anyone not on the list(s) will be escorted by someone who is listed, except in an emergency. The escort official must remain with the person being escorted and ensure the aircraft is resealed according to AFR 31-101. Seal#\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Name, Rank, Duty Title, and Signature) (Organization) (Time and Date)

( ) 5. This aircraft is a protection level III resource. I will provide frequent checks by security forces for aircraft number\_\_\_\_\_. Seal#\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Name, Rank, Duty Title, and Signature) (Organization) (Time and Date)

**ATTACHMENT 3**

**PNAF COURIER BRIEFING**

**1. ID the Courier against the set up message via his/her CAC or RAB** ☐

**2. Verify DTG of the Security Briefing Worksheet and Local Threat Assessment** ☐

**3. Mission Specific Threat Assessment** ☐  
(Verify any changes from original security message)

Local Vulnerabilities \_\_\_\_\_

FPCON \_\_\_\_\_

Threat Level \_\_\_\_\_

**4. Local Security Posture/Locations of Posted Sentries/RF Type 1 Security** ☐

- a. Dedicated A/C security personnel: EC, AEC, 3 CBS
- b. Dedicated RF: 15 personnel with immediate response capability
- c. BF: 15 personnel with 15 minute response capability
- d. Follow on BF: 15 personnel with an immediate response capability not to exceed 30 minutes.
- e. LSA Supervisor

**5. PNAF specific Duress Word** ☐

**6. Location of all mission associated Firefighting Equipment** ☐

**7. ERC** ☐

**8. Aircrew preferred Visual Duress Signal** ☐  
(i.e., Full Flaps Down etc.)



**9. ID Key Personnel**

☐

LSA Supervisor  
Entry Controllers  
CBS  
Senior SF representative  
MASO  
SAAM Coordinator  
Tow Vehicle Personnel

**10. Phone Locations/Numbers to Control Centers**

☐

KCP\_\_\_\_\_

SSCC\_\_\_\_\_

BDOC\_\_\_\_\_

Radio Frequencies: Primary\_\_\_\_\_Alternate\_\_\_\_\_

**11. Pertinent Weather Info**

☐

High\_\_\_\_\_

Low \_\_\_\_\_

Wind Speed/Directions\_\_\_\_\_/\_\_\_\_\_

**12. EVAC Points/Actions**

☐

(A/C Courier is responsible for accounting for his Aircrew and briefing LSA supervisor once at the Evac point)

**13. Any Security Concerns at this time?**

☐

**14. LSA Supervisor and Courier Authenticate all EALs and Crew Orders**

☐

- Would you like to identify anyone as having Escort Authority?
- Is there anyone on the crew orders who is not present for this mission?