

Tactical Assault Guide

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**TACTICAL ASSAULT GUIDE FOR
HOSTILE CONTINGENCY/RECAPTURE
OPERATIONS INVOLVING THE KIRTLAND UNDERGROUND MUNITIONS
MAINTENANCE & STORAGE COMPLEX (KUMMSC), CONVOYS, PRIME
NUCLEAR AIRLIFT FORCE MISSIONS (PNAFS), OFF-BASE RECOVERY
OPERATIONS AND UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS (UAS)**



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(42 U.S.C. 2168).

COMMANDER'S INTENT

(DCNI) The commander's intent for this Tactical Assault Guide (TAG) is to standardize the conceptual response and tactical deployment of 377th Security Forces Group (377 SFG) personnel during contingency and recapture operations involving Protection Level 1 (PL 1) resources. The guide outlines procedures and principles for operations involving the defense and recapture/recovery of the Kirtland Underground Munitions Maintenance and Storage Complex (KUMMSC), On-Base Convoys, Prime Nuclear Airlift Force Missions (PNAFs), Off-Base Recovery Operations and Unmanned Aerial Systems. The guidance herein is derived from Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense, U.S. Air Force, HQ AFGSC and locally established Security Forces guidance and is to be used as a guide by all personnel assigned to the 377 SFG. All security forces personnel should be trained on and knowledgeable of this material. Procedures and associated figures outlined in this guide are not intended to be all-encompassing. Every situation will require different tactics as determined by the Security Forces Incident Commander (IC). This guide provides a general knowledge baseline to be used and understood by all personnel. Leaders at all levels will utilize experience and METT-TC (mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations) to mold these general guidelines to counter the specific threats and situations they are faced with.

(DCNI) Recapture - Actions taken to regain custody of a U.S. nuclear resource(s) **within the boundaries** of a storage or operational site, convoy, facility or military installation where it has been seized by a hostile force or unauthorized person(s).

(DCNI) If unauthorized personnel have gained access to a PL 1 asset or positive control comes into question, immediately initiate any actions required to regain positive control of the resource(s). Those actions may or may not include use of the tactics described in this guide. All personnel, regardless of friendly force strength, will immediately converge upon the resource(s). Permissions to proceed with recapture operations are not required. Responding forces will ensure that any unauthorized persons who have gained access to a PL 1 asset(s) are immediately subjected to sufficient firepower to preclude their ability to cause theft, unauthorized destruction or detonation.

CHAPTER 1

General Concepts and Responsibilities

1.1. (DCNI) The Nuclear Weapon Security Standards (NWSS) directs the denial of unauthorized access to nuclear weapons; preventing loss of custody of a nuclear weapon; and preventing, to the maximum extent possible, radiological contamination caused by unauthorized acts.

1.1.1. (DCNI) The central and overriding objective for nuclear weapon security shall be the DENIAL of unauthorized access. Should unauthorized access be gained, commanders will take any and all lawful actions necessary to immediately regain control of nuclear weapons.

1.2. (DCNI) While engaging adversary forces, the presence of hostages **SHALL NOT** deter the taking of decisive action to prevent unauthorized access to a PL 1 resource(s). SF IC shall take any and all lawful actions, to include the use of deadly force, to defeat enemy forces. The senior security forces member on scene has tactical control and will immediately employ security forces. **NOTE:** For Convoy/PNAF operations the Convoy Commander (CCC) or the Logistics Support Aircraft (LSA) Supervisor will maintain tactical command and control. For KUMMSC operations the Area Supervisor (AS), Flight Chief (FC) or Flight Commander (FCC) maintains tactical command and control.

1.2.1. Incidental or collateral damage inflicted while engaging adversary forces is unfortunate, but may sometimes be necessary or unavoidable. IC shall take steps to avoid incidental collateral damage, but defeating enemy forces attempting unauthorized access to a PL 1 resource will remain the primary mission and highest priority. IC must weigh the alternatives and tradeoffs when deciding upon a course of action.

1.3. Common to all situations involving hostilities toward PL 1 resources:

1.3.1. (DCNI) All posts and patrols will immediately initiate FPCON Delta and Covered Wagon procedures as required. Battle Staff will convene at the KUMMSC Armory during duty hours and the Alternate 377 SFS/BDOC during non-duty hours. (see Attachment 1 for information)

1.3.2. Individual post/patrols will immediately don all alert gear and prepare to engage adversary forces. Listen for inputs from the ICC and follow directions as they are given. Applicable posts/patrols will assume final denial positions. All posts and patrols will attempt to keep the radio net clear and available for use by the ICC. Transmit only those radio messages vital to the success of the fight.

1.3.3. WSSS Flight Commander and Flight Chief, Convoy Commander, Convoy Response Force Leader, and LSA Supervisor are the Flight's most senior leaders and will respond to assume command and control of the situation as soon as

reasonably possible. In the absence of these leadership positions and commensurate with DoD instructions, tactical command and control will default to the senior on duty SF representative.

1.3.3.1. ICC will immediately move into a position that will facilitate optimal situational awareness and command/control capability. They will remain close enough to the fight to effectively command forces, but far enough away to maintain survivability. ICCs should not be directly engaged with enemy forces as this will degrade their capability to effectively manage the fight. ICs will direct Response Forces (RF), Initial Backup Forces (IBF) and subsequent Follow on Backup Forces (FBFs) as they become available and will have control over the radio net.

1.3.4. Ranking members of the RF and/or Area Supervisor (AS) will assume initial duties as the ICC until properly relieved by higher authority. ICCs will dispatch Response Forces to terminate hostile elements or, at a minimum, establish final denial fire between hostile elements and PL 1 resources. In order to prevent a hostile element from gaining access to a PL 1 asset, final denial fire should always be established.

1.3.4.1. (FOUO) A RF is in place during normal operations. The RF has the responsibility of immediately responding to incidents with appropriately armed and equipped personnel. RF response time will be immediate and never exceed 5 minutes.

1.3.5. (FOUO) Initial Backup Force (IBF) leaders have the responsibility of immediately responding to hostilities with appropriately armed and equipped personnel upon dispatch. The location of the actual deployment will be determined by the IC and IBF Leader. IBF Response times will never exceed 30 minutes.

1.3.5.1. Upon notification of hostilities, immediately rally IBF forces with armored vehicle response capability, if available, and start moving toward the threat.
NOTE: Do not let the availability of armored vehicles deter response to any denial or recapture/recovery operation involving PL 1 resources. While en-route, seek direction from the IC with respect to approach direction and IBF actions on objective. If no specific direction is transmitted from on-scene forces, immediately proceed to the fight and link up with friendly forces. Remain alert and prepare for enemy contact while in route to the scene.

1.3.6. (FOUO) Once the IBF has rallied and is dispatched, the Security Forces Group (SFG) will immediately begin forming Follow-on Backup Forces (FBFs). The FBFs may deploy as a whole, or in tactical increments. FBFs should not be split into teams smaller than four person fire teams (FT) unless specifically aligned as a two-person Designated Marksman (DM) or Advanced Designated Marksmen (ADM) teams. FBFs shall continue to be formed and deployed until the situation is neutralized

1.3.7. (DCNI) Site Security Control Center (377 WSSS/SSCC) controllers will close all blast doors as required and engage the B1-4 “terrorist push button” as required. Additionally, make initial notifications to group and unit leadership and ensure the Base Defense Operations Center (377 SFS/BDOC) is notified to close all installation gates. 377 WSSS/SSCC will also notify the Kirtland Command Post and implement all applicable checklists (Covered Wagon, FPCON Delta etc.).

1.3.8. (FOUO) Upon notification from 377 WSSS/SSCC, 377 SFS/BDOC will initiate a dormitory klaxon recall and establish a recall/posting area with the first available SF NCO. If not armed with an M-4, 377th Security Forces Squadron (SFS) patrolmen will return to the Armory, as directed by the 377 SFS/BDOC, to retrieve an M-4.

1.3.9. (FOUO) Upon notification, SFG and SFS staff personnel will immediately proceed as directed to either the LE Armory Bldg# 20221(primary arming point), Combat Arms facility Bldg# 706 (alternate arming point) with at a minimum helmet, ballistic vest, gas mask, eye protection, flashlight and substantial footwear.

1.3.10. (FOUO) The SFS Marshaller or posting NCO will identify Fire Team (FT) leaders and assign individual personnel to a FT. Depending upon armored vehicle availability, the first FBF should have armored vehicles available for response (located within the SF Quad). At a minimum, ensure all personnel have substantial footwear (no slippers), a helmet, ballistic vest, eye protection, flashlight, and a weapon/basic ammunition load. Once formed and ready for dispatch, FT will sweep vehicles and respond at the direction of the SF IC. If no specific direction/rally point is transmitted from on-scene forces or SFS Marshaller, immediately contact 377 WSSS/SSCC for situation and location for link up with friendly forces.

1.3.11. (DCNI) For situational awareness purposes, Sandia National Labs Protection Force (Pro Force) personnel also operate in the vicinity of KUMMSC but should not be considered a significant combat-ready force. They operate in marked Tahoe/Suburban-style vehicles as single man patrols and are lightly armed.

1.3.12. (FOUO) Per the KAFB Local Integrated Response Plan (LIRP) dated July 2013, upon request from the ABW/CC, the 58th Special Operations Wing (58 SOW) is tasked with air support during real world situations. 58 SOW will divert available aircraft to provide observation, surveillance and transport of friendly forces to the incident scene. 58 SOW will also provide an air operations liaison to the Installation Control Center.

1.3.13. (FOUO) For major accidents and incidents involving PL 1 resources, the FBI is the lead Federal Agency and will have investigative authority of all criminal/terrorist activity unless otherwise directed by the POTUS or Secretary of Defense.

1.3.14. For off base recovery actions the civil law enforcement agencies identified in the Integrated Defense Plan (IDP) will be used to establish off-base roadblocks, provide blocking forces and/or otherwise assist, when available, IAW appropriate support agreements.

1.3.15. Friendly forces **WILL** pursue hostile suspects who have PL 1 resources in their custody, with the concurrence of the ABW/CC, until recapture or recovery has been accomplished regardless of location on or off base. Deadly force is authorized at all times and in all places when attempting recapture/recovery of PL 1 resources.

1.3.16. (DCNI) Following a recapture/recovery incident and/or if unauthorized access to a weapon system has occurred, a nuclear weapon is considered an Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) and while security is required, establishment of an exclusion area is not required. In the event a nuclear weapon is deemed an IND, a two person concept team is not required (as outlined in CJCSI 3261.01C, *Recapture and Recovery of Nuclear Weapons*). However, SF will continue to control entry (two personnel) to the affected area and allow access to competent authority (i.e. FBI or EOD) as required. INDs should not be moved until rendered safe by appropriate authority; however if a situation arises where theft becomes imminent, first attempt CDS (Command Disablement System). Only under extreme circumstances, where no other options exist, will the request to move the IND be made to prevent theft.

1.3.17. (DCNI) For all DoE shipments: If DoE has custody of an asset and an attack/incident occurs, they will remain in tactical control of that asset and we will ensure KUMMSC is defended and provide assistance as needed. Once transfer is complete on the loading dock and 898 MUNS has custody of an asset, the 377 WSSS will remain in tactical control of that asset during an attack/incident and DoE will provide assistance as needed.

1.3.18. (FOUO) If a DoE trailer is on the loading dock and it contains a PL 1 asset, 377 WSSS/SSCC will initiate the security systems via the Remote Control Unit (RCU) if the loading dock comes under attack or an adversary gains access to the loading dock.

1.3.19. (DCNI) For all DoE shipments, the on-duty Flight Chief and/or Flight Commander will meet with the Tactical Convoy Commander at the Golf Course parking area to ensure unity of force and command and control. For inbound/outbound movements, 30 minutes prior to arrival/departure, ensure flightline patrols are mobile in armored vehicles, when available. Refer to APPENDIX 3 to ANNEX Z, DOE SAFEGUARDS TRANSPORTER / SAFE HAVEN of the KAFB IDP 31-101 for further directions.

CHAPTER 2

KUMMSC Defense & Recapture/Recovery Protocols

(DCNI) This chapter outlines basic tactical maneuvers that can be used to defend resources within KUMMSC. The following tactics and associated figures should not be considered the only response options to use against threats. These baseline tactics can be molded by an ICC at any level to suit the tactical situation.

2.1. (DCNI) KUMMSC Defense. The ICC should position base of fire elements to physically occupy entry/exit tunnels, or at a minimum, be able to dominate the entry/exit tunnels through direct weapons fire. **NOTE:** **If RTES is operational ensure responding forces de-conflict with the RTES operators to ensure there is not an incident of fratricide.**

2.2. Overarching Tactics. The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the adversary and are broken down into six major movements: The acronym **AFCIA-R** will facilitate decision making processes and aid in the application of decisive steps for AFGSC Security Forces personnel performing duties in support of nuclear weapons. **NOTE:** **While the application of the AFCIA-R process is an AFGSC wide standard, every tactical situation will determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to include actions, are used only as examples of how to apply the concept and are not authoritative in nature as specific actions upon contact.**

2.2.1. AFCIA-R

2.2.1.1. (DCNI) **Assess:** Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force has achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear resources. The assessment phase is pivotal when determining what level of force to direct toward an adversary. Factors to assist assessment include; available terrain/concealment, camera systems (RVA), available helicopter units (with FLIR capability) and early detection via alarm indications (received by 377 WSSS/SSCC).

2.2.1.2. (FOUO) **Final Denial:** The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining unauthorized access to nuclear weapons. Final denial fire is typically placed at storage structure entrances, identified avenues of approach, or at any weapon system access point. Final denial will be achieved by using weapon fire and may be used at any point during an attack. To the greatest extent possible, all forces should coordinate final denial fire to achieve interlocking and overlapping fields of fire.

2.2.1.3. **Control:** The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in the defined battle-space. Suppressive fire directly on or in the vicinity of the enemy to disrupt hostile actions/advancement meets this intent. Suppressive fire can also be achieved through employment of a coordinated weapons mixture and creation of physical barriers to prevent an adversary from continuing advancement toward the resource.

2.2.1.4. (FOUO) **Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD)**: Those actions, proportional to the threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in order to prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a nuclear weapon. ISD can be achieved through use of smoke, CS gas, stun grenade, weapon fire, or any other possible means to disrupt the adversary's actions.

2.2.1.5. (FOUO) **Assault**: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile persons in the area surrounding the nuclear weapon. Violence of action, coordinated efforts, and sound tactics on the part of the security force (SF, maintenance, helicopter integration, etc.) are paramount in this mission set.

2.2.1.6. (DCNI) **Restore Government Control**: Physically regain possession of resources and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum of two personnel are positioned to control entry to the affected area (as determined by the on-scene commander). **NOTE: The KUMMSC environment may require special considerations during a recapture scenario.**

2.3. (DCNI) For KUMMSC contingencies, patrols DO NOT have to physically occupy the entry and exit tunnel, especially when receiving hostile fire. Patrols must provide the proper weapons employment and visual assessment over the area. This can be done from outside the topside controlled area, if necessary.

2.3.1. (FOUO) If their positions have not been overrun or otherwise defeated, downstairs (Cerberus) units will assume final denial positions and prepare to repel adversary forces. If possible, units should take positions behind ballistic barriers and engage enemy forces from behind cover.

2.4. (DCNI) If measures taken to defeat enemy forces topside were not effective and adversary forces are present within underground areas of KUMMSC, remaining topside Response Force (RF) units will rally at either the entry or exit tunnel ramp. In conjunction with the SF IC, the ranking topside RF member will determine how an immediate loading dock assault will be conducted. If an adversary force has not seized control of a resource(s), the following should be taken into consideration during a loading dock assault:

2.4.1. Security status of any PL 1 resource(s) including the status of the loading dock.

2.4.2. Size of the friendly force vs. size of the enemy force. Intel gathered from the CCTV cameras is critical in tactical planning. **NOTE: This does not deter from immediately employing ISD.**

2.4.3. Weapons and equipment compositions of the friendly force.

2.4.4. Armored vehicle capability or availability.

2.4.5. Proximity of the IBF/additional friendly forces.

2.4.6. (FOUO) The route taken by the enemy force to occupy the loading dock (entry

or exit tunnel) and the most favorable direction (entry or exit tunnel) should be used for counterattack into the loading dock. **NOTE: RF units will not wait to rally and will immediately respond to the loading dock and an assault will be executed if an adversary force has seized custody of a resource(s), or if positive custody cannot be verified. Permission to proceed with recapture operations is not required.**

2.4.7. (FOUO) After weighing the above tactical considerations, leaders will make the determination to execute loading dock assault. **NOTE: If at any point during the planning and prep for a loading dock assault, the security status of PL 1 resource(s) falls into question, all planning and prep actions will cease and an immediate loading dock assault will be executed, regardless of friendly force strength. Permissions to proceed with recapture operations are not required. Responding forces will ensure that any unauthorized persons who have gained access to a PL 1 resource(s) are immediately subjected to sufficient firepower to preclude their ability to cause theft, unauthorized destruction or detonation.**

2.4.8. (FOUO) At a bare minimum, remaining topside RF members will move into positions to employ ISD if needed. ISD efforts will involve any and all weapons systems at the disposal of friendly forces to include small arms fire, 40mm HE, smoke and/or CS gas/stun grenades. The intent of ISD is to disrupt the enemy, thereby delaying their progress.

2.4.9. Coordinate with 377 WSSS/SSCC or the ECP as needed to initiate special functions to expose enemy forces to ISD. Coordinate with 377 SFS/BDOC to ensure all available barriers at the installation ECPs are deployed to prevent the enemy escaping in vehicles via base gates.

2.5. (DCNI) The highest ranking on-scene IBF member should immediately rally IBF forces with armored vehicle response capability and start moving toward KUMMSC. While en-route, seek direction from the IC with respect to approach direction and IBF actions on the objective. If no specific direction is transmitted from on-scene forces, immediately proceed to High Ball 2 and link up with any friendly forces and make contact with the IC or 377 WSSS/SSCC to execute a counterattack on the loading dock.

2.5.1. (DCNI) While en-route to KUMMSC, ensure all personnel are extremely vigilant and are on the lookout for potential ambush or IED-style tactics. Consider KUMMSC avenues of approach and potential enemy departure routes. Remain alert and prepare for enemy contact while en-route. **NOTE: Posting NCO should vary responding patrols direction of travel (ie: Muns Hall Rd, Main route, etc.).**

2.6. Assaulting the Loading Dock.

2.6.1. Leaders will coordinate with 377 WSSS/SSCC or ECP via radio/phone on adversary strength and location prior to assault. Intel gathered from the CCTV cameras is critical for tactical planning. Camera unavailability will not deter maintaining forward tactical momentum to retake the loading dock. Based on available information, leaders will select either the entry or exit tunnel (most

advantageous) as a base for the assault. Closely coordinate with 377 WSSS/SSCC or ECP for initiation of special door functions as needed.

2.6.2. (FOUO) If external control over the vehicle barriers is lost, the barriers can be manually operated. Specific directions on manual barrier operations are located within all patrol SSIs. To manually lower, go to hydraulic control box and remove the lock from the Hydraulic Panel Box located adjacent to the Pop Up barrier using the key on Guardian-1/2, Scorpion-1/2 or Coyote-1's key rings.

2.6.3. (FOUO) If available, a minimum of one armored vehicle should be positioned to assault downstairs. Figures 2.0 – 2.1 depict ways a one or two-vehicle assault can be employed; additional vehicles can and should be incorporated into an assault (if available). Armored vehicles should lead the assault with M240/249 turret gunners providing a heavy volume of suppressive fire. If armored vehicles cannot be used on the assault, do not delay from proceeding down on foot. As time permits, turret gunners should link individual belts of ammunition into one long ammunition belt prior to initiating the assault.


2.6.4. When the assault force is in place and ready to proceed downstairs, the assault leader should update assault force members on all available information (to include the status of the resource(s), quickly describe the key points of the assault plan then give the order to assault.

2.6.5. (FOUO) Prior to moving down the tunnel, the assault force leader should soften the target utilizing direct M203/M240/M249 fire down into the tunnel/loading dock area to ensure a tactical advantage, unless Cerberus units are still engaged in the fight. **NOTE: If RTES is operational, ensure the assault force communicates with RTES operators to ensure there are not any incidents of fratricide.**



2.6.6. Dismounted forces should stack up behind the armored vehicles for cover while proceeding down into the loading dock (see Figures 2.0. and 2.1. below). Vehicle operators must be cognizant of their speed and should not leave dismounted forces behind and exposed while proceeding down the entry/exit tunnels.

2.6.7. All forces should be cognizant not to transmit their LMRs closer than 10 feet to any asset. If LMRs are inadvertently transmitted within 10 feet of an asset ensure proper reporting to 377 ABW Safety (SEW) as soon as possible.


(DCNI) Figure 2.0.




As the vehicle enters the loading dock the gunner should be placing high volumes of fire into the adversary. As the first two members entering the loading dock they should button hook and clear out behind the bi-fold doors and the RTES platforms while the second two members assume duties as front security as depicted below.



(DCNI) Figure 2.1.



For a two vehicle assault: the vehicles should offset with one covering the low side of the loading dock and the other vehicle covering the high side of the loading dock while the sweep teams move forward. Upon entering the loading dock ensure the first two members through conduct a button hook and clear behind the bi-fold doors and the RTES platforms as shown in Figure 2.0. above.




2.6.8. (FOUO) If friendly forces are engaged by adversaries as they move down the tunnel or into the loading dock, immediately achieve firepower superiority over the enemy.

NOTE: The loading dock assault may be modified if hostilities were terminated, or otherwise pinned down by Cerberus units. Careful coordination and communication will be key in preventing needless friendly fire casualties. Refer to 2.6.5 for RTES considerations.

2.6.9. Consider opening the opposing loading dock door as a ruse tactic immediately prior to the actual assault (**do not lower the vehicle barrier**; ensure the opposing tunnel is covered from the topside to preclude any hostile forces from escaping on foot). Initiation of special functions (i.e. entry/exit ramp vehicle door/barrier configurations) should be the tactical decision of the IC based on situation.

2.6.10. When entering through V-8 with armored vehicles (if available) they should lead the way into the loading dock. After passing the threshold of the loading dock, the first vehicle driver should move over toward the north wall to allow room for a second vehicle. Ideally, the vehicles are slightly offset side-by-side rather than one in front of the other (see Figure 2.2. below). If the first vehicle is rendered inoperative, subsequent vehicles should have room to drive around and keep moving forward. If/when engaged by the enemy, turret gunners should initiate and maintain a steady rate of fire to help establish a foothold into the loading dock.

(DCNI) Figure 2.2.



2.6.11. After passing the threshold of the loading dock, dismounted assaulters should get on line and clear the loading dock using the armored vehicles as cover when possible.

2.6.12. (FOUO) If 377 WSSS/SSCC reports via CCTV that enemy forces have taken up defensive positions behind the mobile bunkers in the loading dock, immediate suppressive fire from turret machine guns must be applied. Leaders should optimally place assaulters armed with M203s in a position to allow rapid engagement with 40mm HE grenades. Destroy/eliminate these positions as soon as possible while advancing into the loading dock.

2.7. (FOUO) Dismounted assaulters should split into two teams; one team should move onto the upper loading dock as a flanking/maneuver element, get on-line, and sweep forward in a position slightly behind the vehicle advance. The second team should remain on the low side of the loading dock, get on-line, and sweep forward.

2.8. (FOUO) If B1/2 are closed and secure, move forward through the loading dock and eliminate threats as they are encountered (if B1-4 have been breached and the enemy is attempting to gain access through blast doors leading into the exclusion area, flow forces into Brandt Hall for ISD and remaining forces continue moving forward to clear the remainder of the loading dock of all threats.) Once all threats on the loading dock are terminated the assault will continue into Brandt Hall and further if necessary to defeat the enemy.

2.9. (FOUO) Once the loading dock has been cleared of all hostile threats, dismounted forces will conduct detailed secondary sweeps of the loading dock and affected areas. This search should be slow and methodical. Dismounted forces should search all areas susceptible to emplacement of additional threats. Search the utility closet area and above it for explosive devices or hidden adversaries, inside loading dock closures with one person pulling and the other aiming their weapon/light inside, and grates for explosive devices or hidden adversaries. **NOTE: Use Military Working Dog (MWD) team(s) if available to**

assist in secondary Sweeps when no explosive devices were detected during the initial sweep. If an explosive device is detected during the initial sweep of the loading dock, continue to clear the loading dock of all hostile threats until the team arrives at the opposite end of the loading dock. **NOTE: An explosive device located during the initial sweep will not stop personnel from completing the initial sweep of the loading dock and eliminating all hostile threats.** Once the initial sweep of the loading dock is completed, post the necessary security on the resource and evacuate the remaining personnel via the quickest route as to prevent unnecessary exposure to the explosive device. Use security cameras within the loading dock to determine if any other remaining threats exist within the loading dock until the explosive device is disarmed by EOD. **NOTE: Without the secondary sweep, EOD personnel might request a security escort when examining the explosive device.** Once the explosive device is neutralized, a secondary sweep of the loading dock and affected areas will be accomplished. All forces should be cognizant not to transmit their LMRs near an explosive device.

2.10. If B1-4 have been breached by hostile forces, the vast majority of the assault force should move directly into the facility. Friendly forces should rapidly move as far into the facility as penetrated by hostile forces (see Figure 2.3. below). **NOTE: SF patrols should use basic room clearing procedures based on METT-TC while conducting sweeps throughout the facility.**


2.10.1. Mounted assaulters along with a few dismounted assaulters should secure the B1/2 area and provide final denial or secure any exposed assets with TPC.

2.10.2. (FOUO) All remaining assaulters should advance into Brandt Hall eliminating threats as they are encountered. Gunners can be directed to soften target areas by firing rounds into Brandt Hall. Pay particular attention to the mobile bunkers in Brandt Hall. If enemy forces have occupied those positions and are using our bunkers, apply additional M203 fire at those bunkers from a safe arming distance (outside B1-4).

2.10.3. Immediately assault in and secure Brandt Hall and any unsecured blast doors. Establish rear security in either Brandt Hall or B1-4 as the sweep/assault team continues forward.

2.10.4. Establish a strong foothold in Brandt Hall with additional reinforcement and emphasis on B7 and B14. If possible, move the ballistic barriers from the loading dock and place them in positions in front of B7 and B14.


(DCNI) Figure 2.3.



2.10.5. While maintaining a foothold in Brandt Hall, sweep and clear the B5/6 administrative hallways one at a time, starting with B5 (see figure 2.4. below). If ample assault forces are available, actions to clear both hallways simultaneously can be executed at the discretion of the IC. Eliminate threats as they are encountered. If friendly casualties render the assault force incapable of completely sweeping/clearing all administrative areas, **DO NOT** redirect forces from the B7/14 foothold to augment/replace these forces. Maintain the B7/14 foothold and await augmentation from FBFs.

2.10.6. If hostile forces have gained access to the two-person areas behind B7/14/15, all assault forces will immediately move directly to the affected area and use all means available to eliminate hostiles. **NOTE:** Assault forces should be aware of the effects of their weapons on the resources in those areas.

(DCNI) Figure 2.4.



2.11. After all hostile threats have been eliminated, conduct ammunition, casualties and equipment (ACE) checks, consolidate and redistribute ammunition, retain 360° security and begin re-securing the facility from inside-out. **NOTE: Upon termination of hostilities behind B7/14/15, purge the area, remove all friendly/hostile casualties to Casualty Collection Point (CCP) from the two-person area, post final denial or TPC (if required) and await instruction from the ICC.**

2.12. Conduct methodical and detailed checks of all areas looking for hidden adversaries, improvised explosive devices and other stay-behind threats. **NOTE: Use MWD team(s) if available to assist in secondary sweeps.**

2.13. (FOUO) Secure surviving hostiles, conduct a search and remove individuals from the limited/exclusion areas as soon as possible. Maintain custody of any surviving hostiles until they can be turned over to appropriate federal authorities. All hostile suspects that are captured uninjured should be secured, searched and transported under SFS armed guard to the 377 SFS/BDOC for detention, processing and interview by AFOSI and/or FBI. All injured, hostile suspects should be secured and searched prior to being transported, under armed SFS escort, to a Medical Treatment Facilities (MTF) for treatment. 377 SFG personnel, AFOSI or FBI agents should post on the injured suspect at all times while at the hospital.

CHAPTER 3

Convoy/PNAF Defense and Recapture/Recovery Protocols

(DCNI) This chapter outlines basic tactical maneuvers that can be used to defend resources during Convoy/PNAF missions. The following tactics and associated figures should not be considered the only response against threats. These baseline tactics can be modified by the IC at any level to suit the tactical situation.

3.1. Overarching Tactics. The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the adversary and are broken down into six major movements: The acronym **AFCIA-R** will facilitate decision making processes and aid in the application of decisive steps for AFGSC Security Forces personnel performing duties in support of nuclear weapons. **NOTE: While the application of the AFCIA-R process is an AFGSC wide standard, every tactical situation will determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to include actions, are used only as examples of how to apply the concept and are not authoritative in nature as specific actions upon contact.**

3.1.1. AFCIA-R

3.1.1.1. (DCNI) **Assess:** Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force has achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear resources. The assessment phase is pivotal when determining what level of force to direct toward an adversary. Factors to assist assessment include; available terrain/concealment, camera systems (RVA), available helicopter units (with FLIR capability) and early detection via alarm indications (received by 377 WSSS/SSCC).

3.1.1.2. (FOUO) **Final Denial:** The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining unauthorized access to nuclear weapons. Final denial fire is typically placed at storage structure entrances, identified avenues of approach, or at any weapon system access point. Final denial will be achieved by using weapon fire and may be used at any point during an attack. To the greatest extent possible, all forces should coordinate final denial fire to achieve interlocking and overlapping fields of fire.

3.1.1.3. **Control:** The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in the defined battle-space. Suppressive fire directly on or in the vicinity of the enemy to disrupt hostile actions/advancement meets this intent. Suppressive fire can also be achieved through employment of a coordinated weapons mixture and creation of physical barriers to prevent an adversary from continuing advancement toward the resource.

3.1.1.4. (FOUO) **Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD):** Those actions, proportional to the threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in order to prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or

detonation of a nuclear weapon. ISD can be achieved through use of smoke, CS gas, stun grenade, weapon fire, or any other possible means to disrupt the adversary's actions.

3.1.1.5. **Assault:** Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile persons in the area surrounding the nuclear weapon. Violence of action, coordinated efforts, and sound tactics on the part of the security force (SF, maintenance, helicopter integration, etc.) are paramount in this mission set.

3.1.1.6. (DCNI) **Restore Government Control:** Physically regain possession of resources and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum of two personnel are positioned to control entry to the affected area (as determined by the on-scene commander). **NOTE: 1 The Convoy and Pad 5 environments may require special considerations during a recapture scenario. NOTE: 2** Every SF Airman should be knowledgeable with these movements as they could potentially find themselves as the ranking person managing the fight. Every Defender should be able to recognize the progression of the fight and be able to join/lead the fight at any moment.

3.1.2. Establishment of the Final Denial Fire: Initial priorities should include establishment of final denial fire between hostile elements and the PL 1 resource(s).

3.1.2.1. The objective of final denial fire is to terminate enemy forces before access to PL1 resource can be achieved or, at a minimum, halt/delay the enemy advance through effective application of ISD.

3.1.2.2. Within reason, try to keep final denial elements on line and perpendicular with the enemy advance. **Firepower superiority is key to the final denial fire** in order to coordinate magazine, belt and barrel changes and ensure a continuous rate of fire is maintained by the final denial element.

3.1.2.3. Establish Assault Elements. After a final denial has been established, identify additional forces to perform assault actions on the enemy force. Ideally, IBF will become available and arrive on scene to fulfill this function.

3.1.2.4. If the attacking force is small and the IBF has yet to arrive, the IC can break off members of the RF from the final denial element to perform assault actions. If breaking off RF members will degrade final denial effectiveness and allow the enemy to re-gain tactical momentum, provide ISD and take actions to immediately assault enemy forces.

3.1.2.5. Based on the tactical situation, the assault element should be mutually supported by the ISD/final denial fire to eliminate threat and reassume security.

3.1.2.6. As the assault elements get into an on-line position, they should engage hostile forces from the enemy's flank and await an order to assault to and through the hostile force.

3.1.3. Assaulting the Hostile Force. Close coordination between ICC and the assault element is essential as the assault progresses. The base of fire leaders must closely manage fire control orders as assaulting elements move through their fields of fire.

3.1.3.1. Once established, the assaulting element should notify the ICC, and immediately initiate an on-line assault. The ICC should closely monitor the assault's progress and deliver shift fire commands and other fire control measures as needed. Assaulting elements should move under covering fire provided from the final denial position and assault the enemy from a direction that affords the enemy no cover. Weapons fire originating from the final denial element and weapons fire from the assaulting element should place the enemy in crossfire thus leaving the enemy little or no cover/concealment.

3.1.3.2. At some point in the assault, the final denial fire should completely cease as the assault elements move in front of them. The assault elements should focus on completely eliminating hostilities. Any surviving hostile personnel should be apprehended and/or given medical aid as needed.

3.1.4. Once there is a break in hostilities, or hostilities have ceased, conduct A.C.E. (Ammo, Casualty and Equipment) checks, consolidate and redistribute ammunition, retain 360° security and maintain vigilance.

3.1.4.1. (FOUO) Maintain custody of any surviving hostiles until they can be turned over to appropriate authorities. All hostile suspects that are captured uninjured should be secured, searched and transported under armed SFS guard to the 377 SFS/BDOC for detention, processing and to be interviewed by AFOSI and/or FBI. All injured hostile suspects should be secured and searched prior to transporting under armed guard by SFS patrol for treatment at a Medical Treatment Facility (MTF). 377 SFS, Air Force AFOSI, or FBI agents should post on the injured suspect(s) at all times while at the hospital until released to the custody of appropriate authorities (FBI, AFOSI, etc.).

3.2. (DCNI) Convoy Defense. Establish final denial fire between the enemy advance and the resource. Attempt to drive the tow vehicle out of the ambush kill zone and/or return the resource to a more secure location (i.e., KUMMSC or Pad 5) under cover from the base of fire. Maintain final denial between hostile elements and the resource.

3.2.1. (DCNI) If the convoy is forced to halt, immediately establish 360° security on the resource(s) and ensure someone maintains final denial capability on the exposed resource(s). All available units should converge upon the adversary force with the intent to eliminate the threat and maintain/reassume security of PL 1 resource(s).

3.2.2. (FOUO) Prior to falling into enemy hands, disable the tow vehicle by puncturing the tires, disposing of the keys, disconnecting the trailer from the tractor, disabling the engine wires or any other means.

Figure 3.1.2. Final Denial (Refer back to 3.1.2)




Figure 3.1.2a Final Denial (Refer back to 3.1.2)

Convoy comes under attack. Cobra 1-4 and Raptor 1-2. Provide final denial capabilities to prevent the hostilities from reaching the resource.




Figure 3.1.2b Final Denial (Refer back to 3.1.2)

Convoy comes under attack. Cobra 1-4 and Raptor 1-2. Provide final denial capabilities to prevent the hostilities from reaching the resource.






Figure 3.1.3. Assaulting the Hostile Force (Refer back to Section 3.1.3)


(Hostile forces gain access to the resource and all friendly forces are incapacitated.)

**Figure 3.1.3a. Assaulting the Hostile Force (Refer back to Section 3.1.3)**

(Once established, the assaulting element should notify the ICC, and immediately initiate an on-line assault. The ICC should closely monitor the assault's progress and deliver shift fire commands and other fire control measures as needed.)

**Figure 3.1.3b. Assaulting the Hostile Force (Refer back to Section 3.1.3)**

(Assaulting elements should move under covering fire provided from the final denial position and assault the enemy from a direction that affords the enemy no cover. Weapons fire originating from the final denial element and weapons fire from the assaulting element should place the enemy in crossfire thus leaving the enemy little or no cover/concealment. At some point in the assault, the final denial fire should completely cease as the assault elements move in front of them. The assault elements should focus on completely eliminating hostilities. Any surviving hostile personnel should be apprehended and/or given medical aid as needed.)



*****Once there is a break in hostilities, or hostilities have ceased, conduct A.C.E. (Ammo, Casualty and Equipment) checks, consolidate and redistribute ammunition, retain 360° security and maintain vigilance.**

3.3. DCNI) PNAF Defense. For static or taxiing aircraft, establish a final denial between the aircraft and hostile elements. If adversary forces have gained access to the interior of the aircraft, immediately execute recapture/recovery operations which should include employment of fire to soften the target before initiating the assault.

3.3.1. (FOUO) If hostile forces gain control of a static aircraft, posted pad units should converge on the aircraft, attempt to disable steering controls and engage the APU Engine Foaming Switch. RF units will assault and breach the aircraft through the troop door and crew entrance door. Once inside, units will clear the aircraft of all hostilities and attempt to shut down engines (if running).

3.3.2. (FOUO) If a hostile force gains control of a taxiing aircraft, the security trail vehicle will attempt to block aircraft departure by employing delay techniques, if possible. Under no circumstances will the plane be allowed to take off while under hostile control. If necessary, crash into the front landing gear. **NOTE: All means necessary will be used to render the aircraft incapable of departing, to include the use of weapons fire. Consider using fire trucks and heavy equipment to block taxiways and runways to prevent unauthorized take off.**

CHAPTER 4

Off-Base Recovery Operations

Assumptions: Hostile forces have engaged/defeated most SF patrols, have seized custody of a PL 1 resource(s), and have removed it from the confines of Kirtland AFB. Or, DoE convoy personnel have been defeated to some extent, hostile forces have seized control of a PL 1 resource(s) and SFG personnel have been tasked with aiding in recovery operations.

(DCNI) Recovery - Actions taken to locate, if necessary, and to regain custody of a U.S. nuclear resource(s) **outside the boundaries** of a storage or operational site, convoy, facility, or military installation, from where it has been lost, removed or seized by a hostile force or unauthorized person(s).

4.1. General Information.

4.1.1. If positive control/custody of a PL 1 resource(s) is lost, the responsible commander alerts, activates and deploys all capable resources to recover the resource(s). These notifications should be up-channeled immediately by the IC.

4.1.2. Security Forces must begin recapture efforts **immediately**, without the added delay of requesting and receiving permission from an installation authority such as the installation commander.

4.1.3. Forces assigned to recovery operations will, with concurrence of the ABW/CC, pursue seized PL 1 resource(s) off a military installation when still engaged with the adversaries in possession of the resource(s) until custody is regained or until relieved by the coordinating agency.

4.1.3.1. (FOUO) The FBI is the coordinating agency unless otherwise directed by the POTUS. For the purposes of releasing information to FBI Special Agents under these circumstances, their presentation of valid credentials suffices to verify that the bearer holds a Top Secret security clearance (a condition of employment for FBI agents).

4.1.4. Pursuit forces must use all means at their disposal to maintain contact with and pursue the adversary force in possession of the resource(s). Local civil law enforcement officials provide assistance in this phase of the operation. Responding forces will ensure that adversaries in possession of a PL 1 resource(s) are immediately subjected to sufficient firepower hindering their ability to cause destruction or detonation.

4.1.5. 377 WSSS/SSCC will contact SFG/S4 or LRS/Vehicle Operations if responding forces require additional vehicles. Pursuit via privately owned vehicles should be considered as a last resort.

4.1.6. The 58 SOW should provide helicopter support for aerial observation of adversary forces or transportation of friendly forces to the incident scene IAW the LIRP. The 58 SOW may require long prep time and may not be immediately available. For additional information, see the KAFB Local Integrated Response Plan (LIRP).

4.1.7. Commanders shall take any and all actions, to include the use of deadly force, to immediately regain custody and control of the resource(s). Refer to LIRP/IDP/RTF concepts for further actions.

CHAPTER 5

Unmanned Aerial Systems Protocols

(DCNI) This chapter outlines basic tactical maneuvers that can be used to defend resources against Unmanned Aerial Systems (UASs). The following tactics should not be considered the only response options to use against threats. These baseline tactics can be molded by an IC at any level to suit the tactical situation.

ASSUMPTIONS: Security Forces response to an unidentified unmanned aerial system landing, attempting landing, hovering or flying over/near areas NOT authorized by the Wing Commander under regulations located in the Kirtland Integrated Defense Plan (IDP).

5.1. Official use on KAFB

5.1.1. Official use of unmanned aerial systems is authorized on KAFB within the guidelines set by the Kirtland Integrated Defense Plan (IDP).

5.2. Recreational use on KAFB

5.2.1. Recreational use of unmanned aerial systems is NOT authorized on KAFB within the guidelines set by the Kirtland Integrated Defense Plan (IDP).

5.2.1.1. If operated within the confines of KAB, Security Forces will approach the individual(s) operating the UAS and instruct operator to land UAS. If the UAS has any recording devices, confiscate film/captured data via AF Form 52. Operator will be detained and apprehended if UAS is operating within any Defended Area labeled in Kirtland Integrated Defense Plan (IDP).

5.3. Suspicious Activity

5.3.1. (DCNI) An unidentified UAS that has been spotted landing, attempting to land, hovering or flying over Kirtland AFB with an unknown intent/purpose is considered suspicious. In these cases, Security Forces will keep a safe distance away and, using a DRONE report, notify 377 WSSS/SSCC of last known location, direction of travel, altitude (from the ground), size, shape, color, activity, and any distinguishing features. Security Forces may attempt to halt UAS operations via DroneBuster. If UAS operation is halted attempt capture with Skynet. Ensure safe backdrop and landing area prior to use of Skynet rounds.

5.3.1.1. (DCNI) In the event UAS is identified within a designated Defended Area the above process will be implemented.

5.3.2. (DCNI) Security Forces will up-channel security incidents affecting Kirtland AFB. If determined hostile, upgrade to Covered Wagon and initiate FPCON Delta measures. Further notifications will be made to the appropriate agencies as listed and directed by the KAFB IDP.

5.3.2.1. (DCNI) Security Forces will up-channel a Covered Wagon report for all UAS incidents involving Covered Defended Areas.

ATTACHMENT 1

(DCNI) The Battle Staff will form in the event of hostilities affecting KUMMSC that require staff support and guidance. The Battle Staff consists of the 377 WSSS/CC, SFM, S1 representative, S3 representative and an S4 representative to conduct various functions. The Battle Staff will assemble inside the KUMMSC Arming Area during duty hours and will assemble inside the Alternate Base Defense Operations Center (Bldg #20452) during non-duty hours. If responding to Alternate 377 SFS/BDOC, the first responding Battle Staff member will report to 377 SFS/BDOC (Bldg #20220) to retrieve the Alternate 377 SFS/BDOC facility key. Upon activation of the Battle Staff, they will receive updates from 377 WSSS/SSCC and 377 SFS/BDOC on current actions and locations of hostilities or events. They will coordinate with the KCP and ensure notifications/reports are up- channeled as soon as tactically feasible to include the Proper Incident Report (Security Incident/Covered Wagon) and Pinnacle reporting.

The following is a list of duties and responsibilities of the individual Battle Staff functions:

CC:

- Overall leadership and guidance

SFM:

- (DCNI) If at the KUMMSC Armory: Act as the Marshaller and direct all actions at the arming point
- (DCNI) Upon completion of posting, provide direction/support to fight from KUMMSC Armory or if Marshal duties have been delegated
- If at 377 SFS/BDOC: Assist with updates and coordinate with AFOSI, obtain information in relation to incident and CCIR (Commanders Critical Intelligence Requirements)
- Ensure S1 & First Sergeant are notified to initiate accountability/dorm checks

S1:

- Representative will maintain personnel accountability reporting.
- At completion of posting, begin accountability of forces and obtain current manpower/PRP numbers
- Aid in the creation of personnel rosters
- Compile causality reports (DIM)

S3:

- Operations Officer (Ops Superintendent in absence of Operations Officer) will respond to the area or Incident Command Post (ICP) for on scene leadership direction

S3O:

- Gather/process/relay information to CC with info obtained from on scene patrols/377 WSSS/SSCC/377 SFS/BDOC
- Ensure reports are up-channeled and checklist discipline is maintained
- Ensure accurate plotting of cordon(s)
- Ensure proper coordination with supporting agencies: CAT/EOC/LRS/Fire/EOD/MDG

S4:

- Coordinate all standby vehicles to include buses and additional transportation through LRS to ensure necessary vehicle support is available
- Ensure weapons/ammo/equipment are available as needed; coordinate re-supply as appropriate
- Ensure additional requirements for sustainment if necessary (water, equipment, etc.)