HEADQUARTERS
377TH AIR BASE WING (AFMC)

KUMMSC Emergency Response Plan
KAFB OPLAN 91-11
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico 87117
April 2014

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS 377TH AIR BASE WING (AFMC)

APR 0 4 2014

MEMORANDUM FOR SEE DISTRIBUTION

FROM: 377 ABW/CC
2000 Wyoming Blvd. SE
Kirtland AFB NM 87117

SUBJECT: Letter of Transmittal – Summary of Revisions to Kirtland Underground Munitions Maintenance and Storage Complex (KUMMSC) Emergency Response Plan.

1. Attached is the April 2014 KUMMSC Emergency Response Plan. This plan has been significantly revised and should be reviewed in its entirety. Changed paragraphs are marked with a vertical bar (|) in the left margin. The most significant deletions from the previous plan include, but not limited to, Annex H, *Insider Threat*, in its entirety and Annex F to Appendix 4, *377 AMDS/SGPB Response to Medical Emergency*. Insider threat is a hostile event, not an emergency response and is addressed by SFG plans and procedures. Bioenvironmental Engineering response is not required for a simple medical emergency not involving an asset.

2. Tasked Air Force organizations will ensure individuals designated to provide support are aware of their responsibilities described in this plan. Affected organizations will brief their staff and key personnel annually on provisions of this plan.

3. The office of primary responsibility for this plan is the 377 ABW Plans and Programs Office (377 ABW/XP), DSN 263-5286/Commercial (505) 853-5286.

TOM D. MILLER, Colonel, USAF
Commander

Attachment
KAFB OPlan 91-11, April 2014

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Kirtland AFB, New Mexico 87117
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KIRTLAND AFB OPLAN 91-11
Security Instructions/Changes

1. PLAN CLASSIFICATION: The long title of this plan is the Kirtland Underground Munitions Maintenance and Storage Complex (KUMMSC) Emergency Response Plan. The short title is the KUMMSC Emergency Response Plan. Title is UNCLASSIFIED.

2. The classification of this document is DoD Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information (DoD UCNI) in its entirety based on the compilation of sensitive operations information. The information contained herein will be disseminated only to those agencies and personnel whose official duties specifically require knowledge of this plan, including those units and agencies required to develop supporting plans. Annex cannot be duplicated unless permission is obtained from 377 ABW/XP.

3. (FOUO) This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18 USC, Sections 793 and 794. The transmission or revelation of information contained herein, in any manner, to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

4. (FOUO) Classified reference documents are maintained at 377 ABW/XP.

5. (FOUO) Access to this plan will be based on individual organizational needs.

6. (FOUO) Reproduction of this plan in whole or in part is prohibited except as required to prepare supporting plans.

7. OPERATIONS SECURITY (OPSEC): OPSEC is a process of identifying, analyzing and controlling critical information indicating friendly actions associated with military operations and other activities in an effort to reduce the vulnerability to Air Force missions from successful adversary intelligence collection and exploitation. OPSEC applies to all activities that prepare, sustain, or employ forces during all phases of operations. During planning and operations phases, leaders must determine the balance between OPSEC measures, public safety, and operational needs.

8. OPSEC PROCESS. Leaders at all levels are responsible for ensuring OPSEC is integrated into all plans/planning efforts, contingency response/recovery operations, exercises, and activities to increase mission effectiveness. This is best accomplished by adhering to the following OPSEC Process. For more information regarding implementation of the OPSEC process, refer to AFI 10-701, *OPSEC*, and KAFB Plan 10-701, *OPSEC*.

9. IDENTIFY CRITICAL INFORMATION (CI): Units will identify CI, indicators of the CI, and develop countermeasures to protect CI from inadvertent release. CI in relation to this plan includes, but is not limited to, the following:

9.1. Special assets, intelligence, and security matters.

9.2. Specific information/characteristics of assets, to include illustrations, photos, and inventories.

9.3. Specific capabilities/limitations of equipment/weapons/personnel.

9.4. Lessons learned from past operations and programs.

9.5. Detailed unit mission information.

9.6. Communication capabilities within or supporting maintenance and storage activities.

9.7. Detailed contingency response and recovery plans, operations, and procedures.

9.8. Information on remediation efforts.

9.9. Checklists/Technical Orders/handbooks for specific operational procedures.

9.10. Nuclear weapon related material (NWRM) processes.

9.11. Nuclear college material involving stockpile/security/weapon design information.

9.12. Manpower, work schedules, PRP status information.

9.13. Any information relating to special weapons accidents, incidents, and/or safety deficiencies.

9.14. Information regarding REFLEX DELTA, SAAM, PNAF, and/or PL1 security, support, scheduling, and planning.

9.15. Response Task Force plans, capabilities, procedures, and limitations.

9.16. Details of security upgrades, deficiencies, vulnerabilities, and/or limitations.

9.17. Locations and details of security related systems, sensors, junctions, components, and designs.

9.18. Duress words and/or Sign/Countersign.

9.19. Security/law enforcement patrol schedules, rosters, postures, configurations.

9.20. Information regarding security response, tactics, and follow-on procedures.

9.21. Number of posts, weapons, vehicles available, and response times to alarms/incidents.

9.22. Details of physical security plans, systems, and/or components.

9.23. Status of personnel, equipment, weapons, ammunitions and vehicles.

9.24. Weapon line numbers associated with EOD capabilities.

9.25. Counterintelligence plans, procedures, tactics, and techniques.

9.26. Response plans, procedures, capabilities, limitations, and vulnerabilities.

9.27. Exercise/Inspection plans and schedules.

9.28. Training, exercise, inspection and/or operational reports identifying shortfalls, vulnerabilities, weaknesses, etc.

9.29. Emergency/contingency plans and associated checklists.

9.30. Status and availability of medical supplies.

9.31. Command, control, and communications procedures

9.32. Specific impacts of contingency events and recovery actions, i.e. natural disasters, power failures, bomb threats, etc.

9.33. Personally Identifiable Information (PII)

9.34. Building maps, blue prints, and diagrams of mission essential, sensitive, or critical facilities or infrastructure

9.35. Access/Entry codes, procedures, and/or lists

9.36. Details regarding search and rescue and medical evacuation operations

9.37. Radio Frequencies and call signs

9.38. Details regarding explosive site plans and activities

9.39. Manpower, work schedules, unit strength status/information

9.40. Status of firefighting assets

9.41. Maps/schematics of installation utilities and communications systems

9.42. Pre-placement plan for specialized vehicles prior to and during operations

9.43. Emergency response procedures, i.e. routes, set-up locations, hold lines, etc.

10. ANALYZE THREATS: Analyze (along with intelligence and counterintelligence analysts) the threat to identified CI. The threat analysis will identify adversaries in relation to the operation, their goals, what they already know, their capability to collect OPSEC indicators and derive critical information, and their potential courses of action.

10.1. Refer to the Nuclear Security Threat Capabilities Assessment (NSTCA) for a detailed threat assessment supporting KUMMSC operations.

11. ANALYZE VULNERABILITIES: Determine what the vulnerabilities are to the CI (or indicators) that can be exploited by adversarial collection agents. OPSEC Indicators in relation to this plan include, but is not limited to, the following:

11.1. Document Markings (FOUO, Privacy Act, DoD UCNI, etc.)

11.2. Improperly discarded CI.

11.3. CI Left unsecured.

11.4. Unprotected computer files containing CI.

11.5. Unprotected email containing CI.

11.6. Unsecure communications.

11.7. Public release of information, e.g. news articles, reports, and/or event notifications.

11.8. Open Source, Social Media, internet-based information spillage, i.e. Facebook, identify theft, privacy and site security violations.

11.9. Massing of personnel.

11.10. Prepositioning of equipment/vehicles, buses, forklifts, tractor trailers, Dash 60s, light-alls, etc.

11.11. Use of specialized equipment/vehicles, buses, forklifts, tractor trailers, Dash 60s, light-alls, etc.

11.12. Increase in communications traffic, i.e. email, telephone, radio.

11.13. Activity in areas at unusual times, i.e. night, weekends, etc.

11.14. Activation of control centers or known contingency areas, i.e. EOC, Alt KCP, ICC, DCC.

11.15. Increase in vehicle/personnel traffic at key locations, KCP, EOC, DCC, KUMMSC, CDC, etc.

11.16. Signs and publicly available maps designating specialized units, facilities, missions.

11.17. Increase traffic at base gates during non-standard times.

11.18. Change in entry procedures at base gates or facilities.

11.19. Change in security posture, manning, equipment, armament, etc.

11.20. Activation of emergency and/or contingency response assets, fire trucks, ambulances, SF vehicles, etc.

11.21. Presence/arrival of specialized aircraft not indigenous to KAFB, e.g. RTF arrival, bed-down.

11.22. Predictable timing/routes/locations for sensitive operations/activities, i.e. emergency response.

11.23. Delivery of high-value or specialized equipment/supplies.

11.24. Implementation of access control to facilities outside the norm.

11.25. Increase in purchases and/or requests for specialized materials, equipment, etc.

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12. ASSESS RISK: Analyze and assess what level of risk that can be tolerated should the CI be exploited or countered. Implementation of appropriate countermeasures identified in paragraph 9, and others, based on situational needs and requirements, will reduce the risk level of acceptable.

13. APPLY COUNTERMEASURES: Prepare and implement appropriate countermeasures (protective measures) that will eliminate or reduce the risk to an acceptable level. OPSEC Countermeasures in relation to this plan includes, but is not limited to, the following:

13.1. Mark documents properly and protect accordingly

13.2. Shred docs when no longer needed

13.3. Access/distribute CI on a need to know basis

13.4. Secure CI in locked drawer/safe, as appropriate

13.5. Encrypt files and email containing CI

13.6. Training (OPSEC Awareness, CUI Protection Requirements, Unit TTPs)

13.7. Activity Security Checklist or End-of-Day Checks

13.8. Use of Coversheets, e.g. FOUO, Privacy Act, etc.

13.9. Report Suspicious Activity

13.10. Facility/work-center entry/access control

13.11. Random ID checks

13.12. Access credential authenticators

13.13. Challenge unknown personnel in work areas

13.14. Secure credentials when not in use

13.15. Report loss of credentials and/or deactivate access

13.16. Report lost, missing, or stolen sensitive documents

13.17. Do not discuss CI in open or public areas

13.18. Do not discuss CI over an unsecure line

13.19. Transmit/share sensitive information via SIPR

13.20. Information review process prior to public release

13.21. Change combinations, passwords, codes frequently

13.22. Periodically change routines

13.23. Security Clearance Process

13.24. PRP Program Management

13.25. Periodic OPSEC Effectiveness Assessments

13.26. Information Protection, COMSEC, COMPUSEC, TMAP, EMSEC, and IA program management and requirements

13.27. Periodically preposition personnel, vehicles, equipment outside of routine timelines

13.28. Use of alarms/intrusion detection equipment

13.29. Use of remote surveillance and assessment equipment, e.g. video cameras

13.30. Signature modification/Deception in Support of OPSEC (DISO)

13.31. Counter-surveillance Techniques

13.32. Foreign national awareness, tracking, and control techniques

13.33. Vary response procedures, e.g. routes, set-up locations, hold-lines, etc.

14. CHANGES:

CHANGE NUMBER	DATE	DATE POSTED	POSTED BY

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15. RECORD OF REVIEW:

REVIEWED BY	DATE	REMARKS

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1. REFERENCES:

KAFB References	
1.	KAFB Plan 10-2, *Installation Emergency Management Plan (IEMP)*
2.	Medical Contingency Response Plan (MCRP)
3.	377th Civil Engineer Contingency Response Plan (CRP)
4.	KAFB IDP 31-101, *Integrated Defense Plan (IDP)*
5.	KAFB Plan 10-245, *Anti-Terrorism (AT) Plan*
6.	KAFB Plan 91-01, *Nuclear Surety Plan*
Air Force References and Publications	
1.	AFPD 10-25, *Comprehensive Emergency Management Program*
2.	AFPD 90-8, *Environment, Safety & Occupational Health Management and Risk Management*
3.	AFI 10-206, *Operational Reporting*
4.	AFI 10-701, *Operations Security*
5.	AFI 10-208, *Continuity of Operations (COOP) Program*
6.	AFI 10-2501, *Emergency Management (EM) Program Planning and Operations*
7.	AFI 31-101, *Integrated Defense Plan*
8.	AFI 31-301, *Air Base Defense*
9.	AFI 32-3001, *Explosives Ordnance Disposal Program*
10.	AFI 35-101, *Public Affairs Policies and Procedures*
11.	AFI 41-106, *Medical Readiness Program Management*
12.	AFI 48-145, *Occupational and Environmental Health Program*
13.	AFI 91-101, *Air Force Nuclear Weapons Surety Program*
14.	AFI 91-116, *Safety Rules for Long-Term Storage and Maintenance Operations for Nuclear Weapons*
15.	AFI 91-204, *Safety Investigations and Reports*
16.	AFMAN 10-3902, *Nuclear Weapons Personnel Reliability Program (PRP)*
17.	AFMAN 91-201, *Explosives Safety Standards*
18.	AFMAN 91-221, *Weapons Safety Investigations and Reports*
19.	AFTTP 3-42.32, *Home Station Medical Response to Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, or High Explosive (CBRN) Events*
20.	T.O. 11N-20-7 (S), *Nuclear Safety Criteria*
21.	T.O. 11N-20-11 (C), *General Firefighting Guidance*
22.	HQ AFCESA, Protective Actions for a Hazardous Materials Release: A USAF Protective Actions Planning Guide for Individuals and Facility Managers
Department of Defense (DoD) Level References	
1.	DoD 5210.41-M (S), *Nuclear Weapons Security Manual*
2.	DoD 3150.8-M, *Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Procedures (NARP)*
3.	National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction
4.	National Incident Management System
Other Reference Materials	
1.	NORAD Command Instruction 10-22, *Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Warning and Reporting System*
2.	AFMC, AFNWC and 377 ABW supplements to above references, as applicable

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BASIC PLAN

2. PURPOSE: This summary gives the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center (AFNWC) a brief overview of the major aspects of emergency response to an unplanned event in the Kirtland Underground Munitions Maintenance and Storage Complex (KUMMSC). It is based on military unique design of the complex and criticality of incident/accident scenarios.

3. RESPONSIBILITIES: This Plan delineates specific actions 377th Air Base Wing (377 ABW) organizations and AFOSI Detachment 116 must take to preserve mission capability, maximize safety, and ensure security.

4. CONDITIONS FOR EXECUTION: Nuclear surety is a continuous program to ensure 377 ABW and associate unit compliance with the four Department of Defense (DoD) Nuclear Weapon System Safety Standards. Well developed emergency response plans are critical toward this end.

5. OPERATIONS TO BE CONDUCTED:

5.1. Fire (Annex A).

5.2. Explosives Detonation (Annex B).

5.3. Tritium Release (Annex C).

5.4. Dropped Explosives (Annex D).

5.5. Hazardous Material (HAZMAT) Spill (Annex E).

5.6. Medical Emergency (Annex F).

5.7. Power Loss (Annex G).

5.8. Public Affairs (Annex H).

6. ASSUMPTIONS:

6.1. Blast Containment Management System (BCMS) will function as designed.

6.2. 377th Weapons System Security Squadron (377 WSSS) will maintain an "on-site" 15/5 Security Response Force.

6.3. Strict accountability of personnel entering and exiting KUMMSC will be enforced.

7. COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS: All operations will be conducted under 377 ABW command and control relationships.

8. EXECUTION:

8.1. This plan outlines emergency actions and responses for personnel assigned to KUMMSC and emergency first responders such as Security Forces and Fire Department, and follow-on support by Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), Bioenvironmental Engineering, AFOSI Detachment 116, and 377th Medical Group (377 MDG). The goal of personnel involved in an incident/accident at KUMMSC is to preserve mission capability

of KUMMSC and, consistent with operational requirements, ensure maximum safety to assigned personnel and the public at large.

8.2. KUMMSC emergency response is scenario driven, based on unplanned events such as fire, explosives detonation, tritium release, dropped explosive item, medical emergency, and power loss.

8.3. 898th Munitions Squadron Munitions Control, (MUNS Control) and (898 MUNS/MXWKA) are the focal points for all emergency response actions within KUMMSC. 377 WSSS/Site Security Control Center (SSCC) shares in this responsibility, but only from a security standpoint. MUNS Control and SSCC will develop checklists that permit rapid transition, based on severity, in case of multiple event scenarios.

9. FACILITY DESCRIPTION: KUMMSC is compartmentalized into an “A and B side” storage area, each with independent storage cells and maintenance bay to support each side. An Administration Section, Support Section, Armory, and Mechanical rooms make up the front area of the complex. A five-bay loading dock services the complex.

10. SECURITY:

10.1. Security remains critical during emergency response situations; however, the preservation of assets, the complex, and life may require deviating from normal security procedures. Any unnecessary delay to emergency responders for fires in the vicinity of explosives increases the likelihood of a subsequent catastrophic event.

10.2. Emergency responders will be granted access upon successful "sign/countersign" demonstration. Pre-notification requirements are identified in each annex.

10.3. Albuquerque Ambulance Service (AAS) will report to the Entry Control Point (ECP) or other location as directed by the Incident Commander (IC). AAS will be accompanied by the Field Response Team (FRT), Fire Department (FD) or, as a last resort, Security Forces Squadron (SFS) patrol beyond the ECP to the Casualty Collection Point (CCP), Contamination Control Station (CCS), or as determined by the IC. If the patient(s) cannot be searched by SF when leaving the limited area, a SFS patrol will accompany the ambulance to the treatment facility to conduct the search and accomplish the AF Form 1109.

10.4. In some scenarios, the AFOSI must be contacted.

11. TRAINING:

11.1. Quality training and strict operating discipline is critical to the implementation of this plan.

11.2. Personnel shall be trained to understand the benefits of maintaining blast zone integrity; all blast doors associated with an internal maintenance operation shall be closed.

11.3. All 898 MUNS and 377 WSSS personnel assigned to KUMMSC must receive initial hands-on fire extinguisher training; they are the front-line Firefighting Response Force.

11.4. Pull fire alarm only during an actual fire. For all other emergencies, personnel will contact MUNS Control by most direct method. Do not pull fire alarm for a tritium release.

11.5. Bay Chiefs must be trained on resetting the fire alarm pull stations, in the event of it being pulled in response to a tritium release; the air handlers must remain on.

12. EVACUATION:

12.1. Upon evacuation order from MUNS Control, 377 WSSS will immediately evacuate all non-essential personnel from the Administration and Support areas of KUMMSC. The 2,500' evacuation zone delineated in T.O. 11N-20-11(C), *General Firefighting Guidance* does not apply; KUMMSC by structural design will contain fragmentation from an explosives detonation.

12.2. Non-essential personnel will evacuate to the Squadron Operations Building cafeteria.

12.3. Once all non-essential personnel from KUMMSC, Squadron Operations Building, and Vehicle Barn are gathered in the cafeteria, the senior person will conduct a head count and establish accountability of all personnel. All personnel will remain there until the event is terminated or the order to release is given.

12.4. If possible, personnel in affected two-person control zones will separate themselves from the incident/accident by at least one blast door; shelter-in-place in adjacent inter-locks pending extraction by Fire Department Rescue Team. These personnel may require decontamination.

13. CONTAMINATION CONTROL:

13.1. Through strict zone control processes described in Section 4, potential contamination to the complex and personnel will be isolated to the zone(s) where the incident/accident occurred. If an explosives detonation has occurred, opening blast doors to the affected zone must be approved by 377 ABW Commander (377 ABW/CC), or 377 ABW Vice Commander (377 ABW/CV) prior to inserting EOD and Firefighting/Rescue Teams.

13.2. The Fire Department will be responsible for establishing and providing gross-decontamination (DECON) for potentially contaminated personnel.

13.3. A Contamination Control Station (CCS) will be set up by the Emergency Management Staff and Emergency Management Support Team (EMST) and prepare to process personnel at a point inside the ECP, as close as possible to the incident, as determined by IC and Bioenvironmental.

13.4. If the situation dictates and contamination is suspected, emergency responders and exposed personnel inside the accident zone will require gross expedient decontamination. Casualties should be monitored and decontaminated to the extent injuries allow; however, urgent medical treatment has priority and exceptions may be necessary. Initially, the Fire Department will perform gross or expedient decontamination of victims, firefighters, and emergency responders. Gross or expedient decontamination can be used to remove personnel from the hazard zone and also allows firefighters and other responders to remove their protective equipment which reduces the heat burden and need for bottle air. After the initial response is completed and the recovery operations begin, the CCS will be established and all personnel (EOD, Radiation Surveillance Teams, Recovery Teams, etc) will enter and exit the contaminated area through the CCS. The CCS will be established as close to the affected area as possible in order to facilitate control over entry and exit from the hazards area/radiological control area. The Contamination Control Line (CCL) is the outer boundary of the CCS and initially extends 100 meters beyond the known or suspected contamination to provide a measure of safety. The inner boundary of the CCS is the hot line. The hot line will typically be established at the point where readings reach twice background but location may be adjusted due to required space or if directed by the Incident Commander (IC).

Equipment and vehicles determined to be contaminated will be left in the hazards zone (inside the hot line) pending disposition instructions from higher headquarters.

14. DISASTER CORDON/ECP:

14.1. Initial cordon ECP for major response events at KUMMSC will be either Highball 2 or Highball 4. These are established locations with communication hook-ups and adequate parking areas for IC, Mobile Emergency Operations Center (MEOC), etc.

14.2. The IC will, based on weather conditions, determine the cordon ECP and establish a safe route for follow-on response forces.

14.3. 377 WSSS will establish security at the cordon ECP and maintain strict accountability of all personnel entering/exiting the cordon.

14.4. 377 ABW Command Post (KCP) and/or Crisis Action Team (CAT) will issue shelter-in-place orders to personnel in out-lying facilities that may be impacted by an event at KUMMSC.

14.5. IC will advise EOC and KCP/CAT of any proposed cordon changes.

15. POST EVENT CONSIDERATIONS:

15.1. CAT Director will assess the situation with Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Director and consider follow-on actions that may be required, for example:

15.1.1. BEE survey of complex to determine air quality before resumption of operations

15.1.2. Mishap/criminal investigation.

15.1.3. PRP implications

15.1.4. Medical evaluations

15.1.5. Public interest

KIRTLAND AFB OPLAN 91-11
ANNEX A, FIRE RESPONSE

1. GENERAL: The purpose of this annex is to outline the responsibilities of base activities in support of a fire response to KUMMSC. The objective is to deal with the event immediately; extinguishing the fire is the utmost priority. Failure to quickly contain a fire could lead to catastrophic mission impacts: potential loss of the facility and assets.

2. To implement this OPLAN, tasked units will develop unit specific checklists. All checklists must be coordinated through 377 ABW Weapons Safety (377 ABW/SEW).

3. MUNS Control is the focal point for all emergency response actions within KUMMSC.

4. 377 WSSS/SSCC shares in responsibility but only from a security standpoint.

5. The following appendices delineate unit responsibilities:

Appendix 1 - 898 MUNS Fire Response
Appendix 2 - 377 WSSS Fire Response
Appendix 3 - 377 MSG/CEF Fire Response
Appendix 4 - 377 MSG/CED Fire Response
Appendix 5 - 377 AMDS/SGPB Fire Response
Appendix 6 - 377 MDG Fire Response
Appendix 7 - 377 ABW/CP Fire Response

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX A: 898 MUNS FIRE RESPONSE

1. GENERAL: MUNS Control is the focal point for all emergency response actions within KUMMSC.

2. PROCEDURES:

2.1. Upon fire alarm annunciation, or when notified by runner or telephone, MUNS Control will:

2.1.1. Immediately perform hard command via AECS to close all blast isolation valves.

2.1.2. Notify SSCC of alarm indication and location.

2.1.3. Notify FACC/ KCP/898 MUNS/CC, or acting commander of alarm indication and location. Validate line number(s) and associated hazards; relay number of personnel involved, and extent of injuries, if known.

2.1.4. Issue evacuation order to administration and support sections, if required.

2.1.5. In concert with SSCC, open doors B2 and B4 and KUMMSC vehicle entry barriers**.** Ensure two-person control area doors (B7 & B14) remain closed pending Fire Department arrival. If fire location is in a zone behind B7 or B14, open interlock doors to expedite access for responding firefighters, leaving the primary door that is isolating the fire closed until the Fire Department has arrived and is ready to proceed to the location of the fire. If event is within maintenance bay, paragraph 3.2, will be followed.

2.1.6. Request 898 MUNS representative report to MUNS Control to fill out hazard worksheet and prepare to meet and brief the initial Fire Department Response Team at the loading dock; after the briefing, the representative will evacuate to Squadron Operations Building cafeteria and report to senior person on scene. If the fire is in Brandt Hall or the loading dock, the Rep will meet with Fire Department in a safe location outside the affected area.

2.1.7. Establish and maintain lines of communication with IC and KCP; provide situational updates as applicable until termination of the incident/accident.

2.1.8. Maintain isolation of affected zone; contact FM personnel to restore remainder of BCMS zones to original state.

2.1.9. Run appropriate emergency action checklists as required.

3. 898 MUNS PERSONNEL WILL:

3.1. Upon outbreak of smoke/fire, pull fire alarm and immediately notify MUNS Control by fastest means available.

3.2. Fight fire with all available means to prevent spreading and explosives involvement. If efforts to contain the fire are unsuccessful, evacuate all personnel to the adjacent inter-lock zone and await extraction by Fire Department Rescue Team. In concert with SSCC, open all applicable blast doors to facilitate immediate personnel evacuation of affected zones.

3.3. Provide Self-Aid/Buddy-Care (SABC) to injured personnel until extracted by Fire Department Rescue Team. As soon as personnel have evacuated the affected zone, close the blast door for that zone.

3.3. Senior person(s) in administration and support sections will take charge and maintain good order and discipline.

3.4. All non-essential personnel will immediately evacuate the administration and support sections, secure/control classified material, and leave all personal items behind. If the fire is on the loading dock, personnel behind doors B2 and B4 will shelter-in-place pending Fire Department extraction. If the fire is in Brandt Hall, B-5 or B-6 will be opened to facilitate evacuation from the affected area and then immediately closed. Personnel will shelter in-place until evacuated by the Fire Department or receive an order to release.

3.5. Non-essential personnel will evacuate to the Squadron Operations Building cafeteria.

3.6. Once all non-essential personnel from KUMMSC, Squadron Operations Building, and Vehicle Barn are gathered in the cafeteria, the senior person will conduct a head count and establish accountability of all personnel. All personnel will remain there until the event is terminated or the order to release is given.

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APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX A: 377 WSSS FIRE RESPONSE

1. GENERAL: 377 WSSS/SSCC directs security response for all emergencies involving KUMMSC. This permits rapid evacuation of non-essential personnel and rapid insertion of firefighters.

2. PROCEDURES: Upon receipt of fire alarm activation notification from MUNS Control, WSSS will:

2.1. Initiate and up-channel a report through KCP.

2.2. Dispatch patrols as necessary to establish the cordon and prepare to receive Fire Department personnel.

2.3. Form the Initial Back-up Force (IBF).

2.4. Fight fire with all available means to prevent spreading and explosives involvement.

2.5. Provide SABC to injured personnel until extracted by Fire Department Rescue Team.

2.6. In concert with MUNS Control, open doors B2 and B4, and KUMMSC Entry gates; ensure two-person control area doors (B7 & B14) remain closed pending Fire Department arrival.

2.7. Validate with MUNS Control that no blast monitor has activated.

2.8. Evacuate all non-essential personnel from administration and support sections, if required. If the fire is on the loading dock, personnel behind doors B2 and B4 will shelter-in-place pending their extraction by Fire Department personnel. If the fire is in Brandt Hall, B-5 or B-6 will be opened to facilitate evacuation from the affected area and immediately closed. Personnel will shelter in-place until evacuated by the Fire Department or receive an order to release. The KUMMSC Entry Controller will conduct accountability of all personnel in KUMMSC through badge count and post pull procedures.

2.9. Receive pre-notification from the FD of the number of responding vehicles and personnel that will enter the limited area.

2.10. Validate sign/countersign and number of responding personnel prior to them entering the controlled area of KUMMSC.

2.11. Maintain accountability of number of personnel and vehicles entering the KUMMSC Controlled Area.

2.12. If fire location is in a zone behind doors B7 or B14, open interlock doors to expedite access for responding firefighters, leaving the primary door that is isolating the fire closed until the Fire Department has arrived and is ready to proceed to the location of the fire.

2.13. Notify KCP that doors to two-person zones are being opened.

2.14. Upon Fire Department arrival at loading dock, stand ready to open door isolating the fire to permit rapid insertion of Firefighting Team.

2.15. Upon termination of the fire response, enforce two-person concept and secure the scene for mishap/accident investigation.

2.16. Upon termination of the fire response, inspect response vehicles and account for all responders prior to departure from the KUMMSC Controlled Area.

2.17. If investigation indicates hostile activity/actions, initiate Covered Wagon and notify AFOSI.

KIRTLAND AFB OPLAN 91-11
APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX A: 377 MSG/CEF FIRE RESPONSE

1. GENERAL: Fire response to KUMMSC must be immediate by well trained teams knowledgeable of the complex. Pre-fire plans must be maintained to depict current status of all Fire Zones in the complex. Entry control procedures designed for rapid insertion of Firefighting Teams must be solidified with 377 WSSS.

2. PROCEDURES:

2.1. Upon fire alarm annunciation and/or notification by MUNS Control, the FACC will:

2.1.1. Dispatch Firefighting Teams according to KUMMSC response checklist.

2.1.2. Notify responding teams to implement pre-fire plan for applicable affected zone.

2.1.3. Notify responding teams of line number(s) involved, if any; associated hazards; and number of personnel in affected zone.

2.1.4. Notify SSCC location of ECP, Highball 2 or 4, as identified by IC.

2.1.5. Contact SSCC and provide the number of vehicles and personnel responding to the limited area.

2.2. IC will identify safe route and ECP depending on wind direction.

3. FIRST RESPONDERS WILL:

3.1. Provide sign/countersign to process into the KUMMSC Controlled Area via V1AA. If under duress, intentionally misauthenticate.

3.2. Contact 898 MUNS representative upon arrival at loading dock and receive status update. If the fire is located in Brandt Hall or loading dock, meet the MUNS Rep at a safe location outside the facility.

3.3. Notify MUNS Control when Firefighting/Rescue Team is ready to enter affected zone.

3.4. Insert Firefighting/Rescue Team immediately according to pre-fire plan for affected zone.

3.5. Provide lifesaving steps/triage of injured personnel. If Advanced Lifesaving Skills (ALS) are required to treat patients, beyond the capabilities of first responders, notify the IC.

3.6. Establish DECON station and perform DECON of personnel and release to medical personnel.

3.7. Upon termination of fire response and when contamination is suspected, emergency responders and exposed personnel inside the accident zone will process through a Contamination Control Station before processing through the cordon ECP. The Fire Department will perform gross-decontamination of emergency responders, exposed personnel and any injured personnel that may require medical treatment. The IC will ensure appropriate medical examination of responders is conducted based on presence of contamination and availability of resources. Vehicles identified as contaminated by the IC will be held within the hot zone pending disposition instructions from higher headquarters. If there was no contamination suspected or found, all personnel and vehicles will process through the ECP.

3.8. To avoid security violations, ensure Response Teams depart the ECP in the same vehicle/personnel configuration as they entered.

4. COMMAND AND CONTROL: The Incident Commander will do the following:

4.1. Establish command and control of first responders.

4.2. Set up at Highball 2 or 4, depending on wind direction.

4.3. As necessary, request CAT/EOC be established.

4.4. Accept command and control of the event upon arrival and request applicable follow-on support agencies via KCP and EOC.

4.5. Maintain communications with KCP and EOC.

KIRTLAND AFB OPLAN 91-11
APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX A: 377 MSG/CED (EOD) FIRE RESPONSE

1. GENERAL: EOD supports IC by performing render safe procedures for weapons/explosives.

2. PROCEDURES: Upon recall, EOD personnel will report as directed to the IC at the designated ECP. As directed by the IC, personnel will:

2.1. Insert teams to conduct initial damage assessment. Insertion route will be determined by the IC to ensure EOD teams process into and out through the EMST Contamination Control Station, if applicable.

2.2. Perform weapons/explosives render safe procedures.

2.3. Support follow-on response force as applicable.

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KIRTLAND AFB OPLAN 91-11
APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX A: 377 AMDS/SGPB (BEEs) FIRE RESPONSE

1. GENERAL: The Base Bioenvironmental Engineer provides on-site radiological survey support to the IC. Bioenvironmental will not be required unless contamination is suspected.

2. PROCEDURES: Upon recall, Bioenvironmental personnel will report as directed to IC at designated ECP. As directed by the IC, personnel will:

2.1. Conduct radiation monitoring of surface areas and airborne contamination topside KUMMSC and surrounding downrange areas.

2.2. Assist 377 MSG/CEX Emergency Management (EM) Team in selecting a location to establish the Contamination Control Station (CCS).

2.3. Select locations to operate air samplers.

2.4. Provide recommendations to responding medical personnel for biological monitoring, if needed.

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KIRTLAND AFB OPLAN 91-11
APPENDIX 6 TO ANNEX A: 377 MDG FIRE RESPONSE

1. GENERAL: The 377 MDG and/or Albuquerque Ambulance will provide on-scene, accident-related emergency medical treatment, and establish processes to treat locally.

2. PROCEDURES: Upon recall, report to IC at designated ECP; as directed by IC:

2.1. Field Response Team(s) (FRT) perform casualty triage and stabilization in the Cold Zone, after gross decontamination.

2.2. Establish priority for transport to a medical facility.

2.3. Transfer casualties to Albuquerque Ambulance at the Scene Treatment Area/CCP.

2.4. If applicable, coordinate with Wing Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) and advise medical facility of potentially contaminated casualties and measures that can be taken to prevent its spread.

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KIRTLAND AFB OPLAN 91-11
APPENDIX 7 TO ANNEX A: 377 ABW/CP FIRE RESPONSE

1. GENERAL: KCP is the focal point for up-channel reporting of OPREP-3 reportable events related to KUMMSC.

2. PROCEDURES: Upon notification of fire in KUMMSC, KCP will:

2.1. Immediately notify the 377 ABW/CC/CV of alarm indication and location, line number(s) involved, and number of personnel affected. Also contact AFOSI Detachment 116.

2.2. Run appropriate emergency action checklists.

2.3. Draft required up-channel reports for 377 ABW/CC/CV release.

2.4. Maintain communication with Air Force Service Watch Cell via Jabber.

2.5. Continue to support CAT and EOC until termination of the incident/accident.

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KIRTLAND AFB OPLAN 91-11
ANNEX B: EXPLOSIVES DETONATION

1. GENERAL: The purpose of this annex is to outline the responsibilities of base activities responding and/or reacting to an explosives detonation in KUMMSC. Blast door to affected zone will be opened only when authorized by 377 ABW/CC/CV; an explosives detonation will be treated as a potential contamination event.

2. To implement this OPLAN, tasked units will develop unit specific checklists. All checklists must be coordinated through 377 ABW/SEW.

3. MUNS Control is the focal point for all emergency response actions within KUMMSC.

4. 377 WSSS/SSCC shares in responsibility, but only from a security standpoint.

5. The following appendices delineate unit responsibilities:

Appendix 1 - 898 MUNS Response to Explosives Detonation
Appendix 2 - 377 WSSS Response to Explosives Detonation
Appendix 3 - 377 MSG/CEF Response to Explosives Detonation
Appendix 4 - 377 MSG/CED Response to Explosives Detonation
Appendix 5 - 377 AMDS/SGPB Response to Explosives Detonation
Appendix 6 - 377 MDG Response to Explosives Detonation
Appendix 7 - 377 ABW/CP Response to Explosives Detonation

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KIRTLAND AFB OPLAN 91-11
APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX B: 898 MUNS RESPONSE TO EXPLOSIVES DETONATION

1. GENERAL: MUNS Control is the focal point for all emergency response actions within KUMMSC.

2. PROCEDURES: Upon blast sensor annunciation, MUNS Control will:

2.1. Immediately validate BCMS has functioned as designed. Ensure all blast isolation valves have closed and the complex is "buttoned-up"--all blast doors are closed and air handlers shut down. Blast isolation valves are designed to close automatically when overpressure exceeds 1.0 PSI; the explosive event may, or may not result in fire alarm or RAD monitor activation. First responders will treat an explosive detonation as a potential contamination control event.

2.2. Notify SSCC of explosives event and location; validate all blast doors are closed and there are no RAD monitor annunciations in unaffected zones of the complex.

2.3. Notify all personnel in the complex via intercom to shelter-in-place and stand by for further guidance.

2.4. Notify FACC, KCP, and 898 MUNS/CC of explosives event and location, line number(s) involved, associated hazards, number of personnel involved, extent of injuries if known, and "button-up" status of the complex.

2.5. Run appropriate emergency action checklists as required.

2.6. If the explosives event is in the loading dock or Brandt Hall; personnel in the inner complex will shelter-in-place pending extraction by Fire Department Rescue Team. Maintain isolation of all blast zones; personnel will shelter-in-place until 377 ABW/CC/CV authorizes venting and/or opening of doors and insertion of EOD/Firefighting/Rescue Teams. Venting affected zone must occur as quickly as possible to prevent incipient failure of the door seals and ventilation system. Filters integral to the BCMS will capture particulate matter during venting, significantly reducing potential for contamination release outside the complex.

2.7. Establish and maintain lines of communication with IC and KCP; provide situational updates as applicable until termination of the incident/accident.

2.8. Upon authorization from 377 ABW/CC, initiate hard command to ventilate affected zone to equalize pressure; maintain isolation of all other blast zones.

2.9. After ventilation of the affected zone, complete hard command to re-close blast isolation valve.

2.10. Request 898 MUNS representative report to MUNS Control to fill out hazard worksheet and prepare to meet and brief initial response team at Brandt Hall; after briefing, the Rep will evacuate to Squadron Operations Building cafeteria and report to senior person on scene.

2.11. If the affected zone is behind B-7 or B-14 issue evacuation order to administration and support sections.

2.12. In concert with SSCC, open doors B2 and B4 and KUMMSC vehicle barriers; ensure all other blast doors and blast isolation valves remain closed, pending EOD and Firefighting/Rescue Team insertion.

2.13. Upon all clear from IC that evacuation path is not “hot,” in concert with SSCC, open doors B5 and B6 and proceed with evacuation of non-essential personnel.

2.14. After evacuation is complete, in concert with SSCC, close B-5 and B-6.

2.15. Upon 377 ABW/CC approval, in concert with SSCC, open only the blast doors required to facilitate EOD/Fire Rescue Team insertion into the affected zone.

2.16. EOD/Fire Rescue Teams will process through inner-lock zones. To reduce contamination footprint inside the facility, inner-lock zone integrity will be maintained prior to opening blast door to affected zone.

2.17. After EOD has conducted render-safe operations and Fire Department/Rescue Teams have extracted casualties, secure the blast zone.

2.18. Maintain isolation of all blast zones, pending arrival of DOE ARG and RTF.

3. 898 MUNS PERSONNEL WILL:

3.1. Upon notification from MUNS Control of an explosives detonation, shelter-in-place and await further guidance.

3.2. Senior person(s) in administration and support sections will take charge and maintain good order and discipline.

3.3. If not incapacitated, personnel in the affected zone will provide self aid buddy care (SABC) to injured personnel until extracted by Fire Department Rescue Team.

3.4. When directed by MUNS Control, all non-essential personnel will immediately evacuate the administration and support sections; secure/control classified material, but leave all personal items behind.

3.5. Non-essential personnel will evacuate to the Squadron Operations Building cafeteria.

3.6. Once all non-essential personnel from KUMMSC, Squadron Operations Building, and Vehicle Barn are gathered in the cafeteria, the senior person will conduct a head count and establish accountability of all personnel. All personnel will remain there until the event is terminated or the order to release is given.

KIRTLAND AFB OPLAN 91-11
APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX B: 377 WSSS RESPONSE TO EXPLOSIVES DETONATION

1. GENERAL: 377 WSSS/SSCC directs security response for all emergencies involving KUMMSC. A 15/5 Response Force is posted in support of KUMMSC operations. This permits rapid evacuation of non-essential personnel, and rapid insertion of firefighters.

2. PROCEDURES: Upon receipt of blast sensor annunciation from MUNS Control, 377 WSSS will:

2.1. Initiate and up-channel a report to KCP.

2.2. Dispatch patrols as necessary to establish the cordon and prepare to receive Fire Department first responders.

2.3. If investigation indicates hostile activity/actions, initiate Covered Wagon.

2.4. Form the Initial Back-up Force (IBF).

2.5. In concert with MUNS Control, ensure the complex is locked down and buttoned up. Maintain isolation of all blast zones; personnel will shelter-in-place until 377 ABW/CC/CV authorizes venting and/or opening of doors and insertion of EOD/Firefighting/Rescue Teams.

2.6. In concert with MUNS Control, open doors B2 and B4, and KUMMSC entry gate; ensure all other blast doors and blast isolation valves remain closed pending EOD/Firefighting/Rescue Team insertion.

2.7. In concert with MUNS Control, upon all clear that evacuation path is not "hot," open doors B5 and B6 and evacuate all non-essential personnel from administration and support sections. If the explosive detonation is on the loading dock or in Brandt Hall, personnel in the inner complex will shelter-in-place, pending Fire Department extraction.

2.8. Receive pre-notification from the FD of the number of responding vehicles and personnel that will enter the limited area.

2.9. Validate sign/countersign and number of responding personnel prior to allowing entry into the KUMMSC Controlled Area.

2.10. Maintain accountability of number of personnel/vehicles entering the KUMMSC Controlled Area.

2.11. Upon 377 ABW/CC/CV approval, in concert with MUNS Control, open only the blast doors required to facilitate EOD/Firefighting/Rescue Team insertion into the affected zone.

2.12. EOD/Firefighting/Rescue Teams will process through inner-lock zones. To reduce contamination footprint inside the facility, inner-lock zone integrity will be maintained prior to opening blast door to affected zone.

2.13. Upon EOD render-safe procedures and Fire Department/Rescue extraction of casualties, enforce two-person rule and secure the scene for ARG/RTF, and mishap/accident investigation.

2.14. Notify AFOSI Detachment 116.

2.15. Upon termination of the EOD/fire response, search response vehicles and account for all responders prior to departure from the KUMMSC Controlled Area.

KIRTLAND AFB OPLAN 91-11
APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX B: 377 MSG/CEF RESPONSE TO EXPLOSIVES DETONATION

1. GENERAL: Fire response to KUMMSC must be immediate by well-trained teams knowledgeable of the complex. Pre-fire plans must be maintained to depict current status of all Fire Zones in the complex. Entry control procedures designed for rapid insertion of Firefighting Teams must be solidified with 377 WSSS. The explosive event may, or may not, result in fire alarm activation. First Responders will treat an explosive detonation as a potential contamination control event. Approval from 377 ABW/CC/CV is required prior to insertion of EOD/Firefighting/Rescue Team into affected zone.

2. PROCEDURES: Upon fire alarm annunciation and/or notification of explosives detonation by MUNS Control, the FACC will:

2.1. Dispatch Firefighting Teams according to KUMMSC response checklist.

2.2. Notify responding teams to implement pre-fire plan for applicable affected zone.

2.3. Notify responding teams of explosives event and location, line number(s) involved, associated hazards, number of personnel involved, and status of the BCMS.

2.4. Notify SSCC to establish security at ECP, Highball 2 or 4, as identified by IC.

2.5. IC will identify safe route at ECP, Highball 2 or 4, depending on wind direction .

2.6. Contact SSCC and provide the number of vehicles and personnel responding to the limited area.

3. FIRST RESPONDERS WILL:

3.1. Provide sign/countersign to process into the KUMMSC Controlled Area via V1AA.

3.2. If under duress, intentionally misauthenticate. If the explosive detonation is on the loading dock or in Brandt Hall, personnel in the inner complex will shelter-in-place, pending EOD render-safe procedures and Fire Department extraction.

3.3. Insert Firefighting and Rescue Team only after consulting with EOD.

3.4. If the affected zone is behind B7-14, confirm no RAD reading for Brandt Hall and relay to IC that it is safe to evacuate all non-essential personnel from administration and support sections.

3.5. Upon opening of B5 and B6, contact 898 MUNS representative and receive status update.

3.6. Notify MUNS Control when Firefighting/Rescue Team is ready to enter affected zone.

3.7. Upon 377 ABW/CC/CV approval, insert Firefighting/Rescue Team immediately according to pre-fire plan for affected zone.

3.8. Notify MUNS Control when affected zone is safe. To reduce contamination footprint inside the facility, inner-lock zone integrity will be maintained prior to opening blast door to affected zone.

3.9. Establish an Expedient DECON (Gross Decontamination) station.

3.10. Provide lifesaving steps/triage of injured personnel. If Advanced Lifesaving Skills (ALS) are required to treat patients, beyond the capabilities of first responders, notify the IC, FRT, and AAS.

3.11. Upon termination of emergency response and when contamination is suspected, emergency responders and exposed personnel inside the accident zone will process through a Contamination Control Station before processing through the ECP. The Fire Department will perform gross-decontamination of emergency responders, exposed personnel and any injured personnel that may require medical treatment. The IC will ensure appropriate medical examination of responders is conducted based on presence of contamination and availability of resources. Vehicles identified as contaminated by the IC will be held within the hot zone pending disposition instructions from higher headquarters. If there was no contamination suspected or found, all personnel and vehicles will process through the ECP.

3.12. To avoid security violations, ensure response teams depart the ECP in the same vehicle/personnel configuration as they entered.

4. COMMAND AND CONTROL: The incident commander will do the following:

4.1. Establish command and control of first responders.

4.2. Set up at Highball 2 or 4, depending on wind direction.

4.3. As necessary, request CAT/EOC be established.

4.4. Accept command and control of the event upon arrival and request applicable follow-on support agencies via KCP and EOC.

4.5. Maintain communications with KCP and EOC.

4.6. Maintain command and control of the event until arrival of DOE ARG and RTF.

KIRTLAND AFB OPLAN 91-11
APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX B: 377 MSG/CED (EOD) RESPONSE TO EXPLOSIVES DETONATION

1. GENERAL: EOD supports IC by performing render safe procedures for weapons/explosives.

2. PROCEDURES: Upon recall, report as directed to the IC at designated ECP; as directed by IC, EOD personnel will:

2.1. Conduct initial damage assessment. Insertion route will be determined by the IC to ensure EOD teams process into and out through the EMST Contamination Control Station, if applicable.

2.2. Perform weapons/explosives render safe procedures.

2.3. Support follow-on DOE ARG and RTF, as applicable.

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KIRTLAND AFB OPLAN 91-11
APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX B: 377 AMDS/SGPB RESPONSE TO EXPLOSIVES DETONATION

1. GENERAL: The base bioenvironmental engineer provides on-site radiological survey support to the IC.

2. PROCEDURES: Upon recall, report as directed to the IC at the designated ECP; as directed by IC, bioenvironmental personnel will:

2.1. Conduct radiation monitoring of surface areas and airborne contamination topside KUMMSC and surrounding downrange areas.

2.2. Select locations to set and operate air samplers.

2.3. Provide recommendations to responding medical personnel for biological monitoring if needed.

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KIRTLAND AFB OPLAN 91-11
APPENDIX 6 TO ANNEX B: 377 MDG RESPONSE TO EXPLOSIVES DETONATION

1. GENERAL: The 377 MDG and/or Albuquerque Ambulance will provide on-scene, accident-related emergency medical treatment, and establish processes to treat locally.

2. PROCEDURES: Upon recall, report to IC at designated ECP; as directed by IC:

2.1. Field Treatment Team(s) (FRT) perform casualty triage and stabilization in the Cold Zone, after gross decontamination.

2.2. Establish priority for transport to a medical facility.

2.3. If applicable:

2.3.1. Transfer casualties to Albuquerque Ambulance at the Scene Treatment Area/CCP.

2.3.2. If applicable, coordinate with Wing Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) and advise medical facility of potentially contaminated casualties and measures that can be taken to prevent its spread.

2.3.3. 377 MDG will attempt to keep response vehicles from entering the warm or hot zone.

2.3.4. Respond into KUMMSC if directed by the IC and no contamination is present.

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KIRTLAND AFB OPLAN 91-11
APPENDIX 7 TO ANNEX B: 377 ABW/CP RESPONSE TO EXPLOSIVES DETONATION

1. GENERAL: KCP is the focal point for up-channel reporting of OPREP-3 reportable events related to KUMMSC.

2. PROCEDURES: Upon notification of fire in KUMMSC, KCP will:

2.1. Immediately notify the 377 ABW/CC/CV of alarm indication and location, line number(s) involved, and number of personnel affected. Also contact AFOSI Detachment 116.

2.2. Run appropriate emergency action checklists.

2.3. Draft required up-channel reports for 377 ABW/CC/CV release.

2.4. Maintain communication with Air Force Service Watch Cell via Jabber.

2.5. Continue to support Crisis Action Team (CAT) and EOC until termination of the incident/accident.

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KIRTLAND AFB OPLAN 91-11
ANNEX C: TRITIUM RELEASE

1. GENERAL. The purpose of this annex is to outline the responsibilities of base activities responding and/or reacting to a tritium release in KUMMSC. The affected zone must be evacuated and ventilated immediately to prevent long-term contamination; **do not pull fire alarm**--air handlers must remain on.

2. To implement this OPLAN, tasked units will develop unit specific checklists. All checklists must be coordinated through 377 ABW/SEW.

3. MUNS Control is the focal point for all emergency response actions within KUMMSC.

4. 377 WSSS/SSCC shares in responsibility, but only from a security standpoint.

5. The following appendices delineate unit responsibilities:

Appendix 1 - 898 MUNS Response to Tritium Release
Appendix 2 - 377 WSSS Response to Tritium Release
Appendix 3 - 377 MSG/CEF Response to Tritium Release
Appendix 4 - 377 MSG/CED Response to Tritium Release
Appendix 5 - 377 AMDS/SGPB Response to Tritium Release
Appendix 6 - 377 MDG Response to Tritium Release
Appendix 7 - 377 ABW/CP Response to Tritium Release

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KIRTLAND AFB OPLAN 91-11
APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX C: 898 MUNS RESPONSE TO TRITIUM RELEASE

1. GENERAL: MUNS Control is the focal point for all emergency response actions within KUMMSC.

2. PROCEDURES: When notified by runner or telephone, MUNS Control will:

2.1. Immediately validate all air handlers are operating.

2.2. Notify SSCC of tritium release and location.

2.3. Validate event with bay chief/SNCO and extent of personnel injuries, if any. If fire alarm was inadvertently pulled, instruct the Maintenance Bay Chief to reset the alarm (must be trained by Chugach Fire Alarm Technician).

2.4. In concert with SSCC, open all applicable blast doors to facilitate immediate personnel evacuation of affected zone. As soon as personnel have evacuated the affected zone, close the blast door for that zone and continue to ventilate.

2.5. Issue evacuation order for the complex. All personnel evacuated from affected zone will hold in-place inside the adjacent interlock at Fire Zone 5 behind B7 or B14 pending DECON by Fire Department Response Team and medical transport to hospital.

2.6. Run appropriate emergency action checklists as required.

2.7. Notify FACC/KCP/898 MUNS/CC of event and location, line number(s) involved, associated hazards, number of personnel involved, and personnel evacuation order.

2.8. Request 898 MUNS representative report to MUNS Control to fill out hazard worksheet and prepare to meet and brief initial response team at loading dock. After the briefing, the Rep will evacuate to Squadron Operations Building cafeteria and report to senior leader on scene.

2.9. Establish and maintain line of communication with IC and KCP; provide situational updates as applicable until termination of the incident/accident.

2.10. Maintain isolation of the complex from the affected zone.

3. 898 MUNS PERSONNEL WILL:

3.1. Upon suspected tritium release detection, immediately notify MUNS Control and request applicable blast doors are opened to facilitate evacuation. If fire alarm is inadvertently pulled, immediately reset the alarm.

3.2. When blast door opens, the senior person in charge at the affected zone will evacuate all personnel to the adjacent interlock at Fire Zone 5, pending Fire Department extraction.

3.3. If personnel in the affected zone are incapacitated, available personnel will provide SABC until extracted by Fire Department Rescue Team.

3.4. When directed by MUNS Control, all non-essential personnel will immediately evacuate the administration and support sections; secure/control classified material, but leave all personal items behind.

3.5. Non-essential personnel will evacuate to the Squadron Operations Building cafeteria.

3.6. Once all non-essential personnel from KUMMSC, Squadron Operations Building, and Vehicle Barn are gathered in the cafeteria, the senior person will conduct head count and establish accountability of all personnel. All personnel will remain there until the event is terminated or the order to release is given.

3.7. If event occurs in Brandt Hall or the loading dock, all personnel will shelter in-place until extracted by Fire Department personnel.

KIRTLAND AFB OPLAN 91-11
APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX C: 377 WSSS RESPONSE TO TRITIUM RELEASE

1. GENERAL: 377 WSSS/SSCC directs security response for all emergencies involving KUMMSC. A 15/5 Response Force is posted in support of KUMMSC operations. This permits rapid evacuation of non-essential personnel and rapid insertion of Firefighters.

2. PROCEDURES: Upon notification of potential tritium release from MUNS Control, 377 WSSS will:

2.1. Initiate and up-channel a report through KCP.

2.2. Dispatch patrols as necessary to establish the cordon and prepare to receive Fire Department First Responders.

2.3. If investigation indicates hostile activity/actions, initiate Covered Wagon. Notify AFOSI Detachment 116.

2.4. Form the IBF.

2.5. Receive pre-notification from the FD of the number of responding vehicles and personnel that will enter the limited area.

2.6. In concert with MUNS Control, open applicable blast door to facilitate the immediate evacuation of personnel from the affected zone. All personnel evacuated from affected zone will hold in place inside the B7 or B14 interlock at Fire Zone 5 pending DECON by Fire Department Response Team and medical transportation to a hospital. If the event occurs in Brandt Hall or loading dock, all personnel will shelter in-place and await Fire Department extraction and DECON.

2.7. Evacuate all non-essential personnel from the complex.

2.8. Validate sign/countersign and number of responding personnel prior to allowing entry into the KUMMSC Controlled Area.

2.9. Maintain accountability of number of personnel and vehicles entering the KUMMSC Controlled Area.

2.10. Upon EOD render-safe procedures and Fire Department/Rescue extraction of casualties enforce two-person concept and secure the scene for follow on response force and mishap/accident investigation.

2.11. Upon termination of the EOD/fire response, inspect response vehicles and account for all responders prior to departure from the KUMMSC Controlled Area.

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KIRTLAND AFB OPLAN 91-11
APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX C: 377 MSG/CEF RESPONSE TO TRITIUM RELEASE

1. GENERAL: Emergency response to KUMMSC must be immediate by well-trained teams knowledgeable of the complex. Pre-fire plans must be maintained to depict current status of all Fire Zones in the complex. Entry control procedures designed for rapid insertion of Firefighting/Rescue Teams must be solidified with 377 WSSS. The tritium event should not result in fire alarm annunciation.

2. PROCEDURES: Upon notification of tritium release by 898 MUNS Control, the FACC will:

2.1. Dispatch emergency response teams according to KUMMSC response checklist.

2.2. Notify responding teams to implement HAZMAT plan for applicable affected zone.

2.3. Notify responding teams of event and location, line number(s) involved, associated hazards, and number of personnel involved.

2.4. Notify SSCC to establish security at ECP, Highball 2 or 4, as identified by IC. IC will identify safe route and ECP, Highball 2 or 4 depending on wind direction.

2.5. If a fire alarm is inadvertently pulled, MUNS personnel will immediately reset the alarm to allow air handlers to remain on.

3. FIRST RESPONDERS WILL:

3.1. Contact SSCC and provide the number of vehicles and personnel responding to the limited area.

3.2. Provide sign/countersign to process into the KUMMSC Controlled Area via V1AA.

3.3. If under duress, intentionally misauthenticate.

3.4. Upon arrival at loading dock, contact 898 MUNS representative and receive status update.

3.5. Notify MUNS Control via land line when Firefighting/Rescue Team is ready to enter affected zone.

3.6. If required, insert rescue team to extract incapacitated personnel. Potentially contaminated personnel will hold in place, in the adjacent interlock at Fire Zone 5 pending extraction and DECON; if possible, non-exposed personnel will evacuate the complex and shelter-in-place at Squadron Operations Building cafeteria.

3.7. The IC will establish a gross-decontamination station and perform decontamination of personnel and release to medical personnel at the triage area if the response involves suspected contamination.

3.8. Upon termination of emergency response, first responders and exposed personnel inside the accident zone will process through a Contamination Control Station before processing through the ECP. The Fire Department will perform gross-decontamination of emergency responders, exposed personnel and any injured personnel that may require medical treatment. The IC will ensure appropriate medical examination of responders is conducted based on presence of contamination and availability of resources. Vehicles identified as contaminated by the IC will be held within the hot zone pending disposition instructions from higher headquarters. If there was no contamination suspected or found, all personnel and vehicles will process through the ECP.

3.9. To avoid security violations, ensure response teams depart the ECP in the same vehicle/personnel configuration as they entered.

4. COMMAND AND CONTROL: The incident commander will do the following:

4.1. Establish command and control of first responders.

4.2. Set up at Highball 2 or 4, depending on wind direction.

4.3. As necessary, request CAT/EOC to be established.

4.4. Accept command and control of the event upon arrival, and request applicable follow-on support agencies via KCP and EOC.

4.5. Maintain communications with KCP and EOC.

4.6. Maintain command and control of the event until termination, or arrival of DOE ARG and RTF, as applicable.

KIRTLAND AFB OPLAN 91-11
APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX C: 377 MSG/CED (EOD) RESPONSE TO TRITIUM RELEASE

1. GENERAL: EOD supports the IC by performing render safe procedures for weapons/explosives.

2. PROCEDURES: Upon recall, report as directed to the IC at designated ECP; as directed by IC, EOD personnel will:

2.1. Insert teams to conduct initial damage assessment. Insertion route will be determined by the IC to ensure EOD teams process into and out through the EMST Contamination Control Station, if applicable.

2.2. Perform weapons/explosives render safe procedures.

2.3. As applicable, support follow-on DOE ARG and RTF.

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KIRTLAND AFB OPLAN 91-11
APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX C: 377 AMDS/SGPB RESPONSE TO TRITIUM RELEASE

1. GENERAL: The Base Bioenvironmental Engineer provides on-site radiological survey support to the IC. Bioenvironmental Engineering does not have tritium detection equipment or the sampling package needed to send to the lab.

2. PROCEDURES: Upon recall report to IC at designated ECP; as directed by IC:

2.1. Assist 377 MSG/CEX Readiness Team with the selection of a location to establish the Contamination Control Station (CCS).

2.2. Provide recommendations to responding medical personnel for biological monitoring if needed.

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KIRTLAND AFB OPLAN 91-11
APPENDIX 6 TO ANNEX C: 377 MDG RESPONSE TO TRITIUM RELEASE

1. GENERAL: The 377 MDG and/or Albuquerque Ambulance will provide on-scene, accident-related emergency medical treatment, and establish processes to treat locally.

2. PROCEDURES: Upon recall, report to IC at designated ECP; as directed by IC:

2.1. Field Treatment Team(s) (FRT) perform casualty triage and stabilization in the Cold Zone, after gross decontamination.

2.2. Establish priority for transport to a medical facility.

2.3. If applicable:

2.3.1. Transfer casualties to Albuquerque Ambulance at the Scene Treatment Area/CCP.

2.3.2. Coordinate with Wing Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) and advise medical facility of potentially contaminated casualties and measures that can be taken to prevent its spread.

2.3.3. 377 MDG will attempt to keep response vehicles from entering the warm or hot zone.

2.3.4. Respond into KUMMSC if directed by the IC and no contamination is present.

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KIRTLAND AFB OPLAN 91-11
APPENDIX 7 TO ANNEX C: 377 ABW/CP RESPONSE TO TRITIUM RELEASE

1. GENERAL: KCP is the focal point for up-channel reporting of OPREP-3 reportable events related to KUMMSC.

2. PROCEDURES: Upon notification of fire in KUMMSC, KCP will:

2.1. Immediately notify the 377 ABW/CC/CV of alarm indication and location, line number(s) involved, and number of personnel affected. Also contact AFOSI Detachment 116.

2.2. Run appropriate emergency action checklists.

2.3. Draft required up-channel reports for 377 ABW/CC/CV release.

2.4. Maintain communication with Air Force Service Watch Cell via Jabber.

2.5. Continue to support Crisis Action Team (CAT) and EOC until termination of the incident/accident.

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KIRTLAND AFB OPLAN 91-11
ANNEX D: DROPPED EXPLOSIVES

1. GENERAL. The purpose of this annex is to outline the responsibilities of base activities responding and/or reacting to dropped explosives in KUMMSC. Response procedures are generic in nature. Dropped explosive requirements are Technical Order (T.O.) specific. Not every scenario will require an emergency response. Fire alarm will not be pulled unless there is evidence of smoke or subsequent energetic reaction (sparks, detonation, etc).

2. To implement this OPLAN, tasked units will develop unit specific checklists. All checklists must be coordinated through 377 ABW/SEW.

3. MUNS Control is the focal point for all emergency response actions within KUMMSC.

4. 377 WSSS/SSCC shares in responsibility, but only from a security standpoint.

5. The following appendices delineate unit responsibilities:

Appendix 1 - 898 MUNS Response to Dropped Explosives
Appendix 2 - 377 WSSS Response to Dropped Explosives
Appendix 3 - 377 MSG/CEF Response to Dropped Explosives
Appendix 4 - 377 MSG/CED Response to Dropped Explosives
Appendix 5 - 377 AMDS/SGPB Response to Dropped Explosives
Appendix 6 - 377 MDG Response to Dropped Explosives
Appendix 7 - 377 ABW/CP Response to Dropped Explosives

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KIRTLAND AFB OPLAN 91-11
APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX D: 898 MUNS RESPONSE TO DROPPED EXPLOSIVES

1. GENERAL: MUNS Control is the focal point for all emergency response actions within KUMMSC.

2. PROCEDURES: Upon notification of dropped explosives, either by runner or telephone, MUNS Control will:

2.1. Immediately perform hard command via AECS to close all blast isolation valves.

2.2. Notify SSCC of dropped explosives and location.

2.3. Validate event with Maintenance Bay Chief, extent of personnel injuries, if any, and confirm no subsequent event has occurred.

2.4. In concert with SSCC, open applicable blast doors to facilitate immediate evacuation of personnel from affected zone into adjacent inter-lock zone.

2.5. In concert with SSCC, open doors B2 and B4 and KUMMSC entry gate.

2.6. Issue evacuation order to administration and support sections.

2.7. Run appropriate emergency action checklists as required.

2.8. Notify FACC, KCP, and 898 MUNS/CC of event and location, line number(s) involved, associated hazards, number of personnel involved, and extent of injuries, if any.

2.9. Request 898 MUNS representative report to MUNS Control to fill out hazard worksheet, and prepare to meet and brief the initial response team at loading dock. After briefing and if evacuation of KUMMSC has been ordered, the representative will evacuate to the Squadron Operations Building cafeteria and report to the senior leader on scene.

2.10. Establish and maintain line of communication with IC and KCP; provide situational updates as applicable until termination of the incident/accident.

2.11. Maintain isolation of the affected zone pending EOD survey and subsequent Safety Mishap investigation. Contact FM personnel to restore remainder of BCMS zones to original state.

2.12. If the event is in Brandt Hall or on the loading dock, issue shelter-in-place order to administration and support sections. Close all blast doors surrounding the incident after facilitating the evacuation of personnel from the affected area. Request the 898 MUNS representative report to the Squadron Operations Building to fill out the hazard worksheet and brief the initial response team.

3. 898 MUNS PERSONNEL WILL:

3.1. Upon dropped explosives event, immediately position workers as far away from device as possible; observe for smoke. If smoke is observed, pull fire alarm and fight fire with all available means to prevent spreading; if explosives device is engulfed with flames, evacuate immediately.

3.2. Notify MUNS Control and request blast doors are opened to facilitate evacuation.

3.3. When blast doors open, the senior person in charge at the affected zone will evacuate all personnel to the adjacent inter-lock zone and await Fire Department extraction. If the incident occurs in the loading dock, personnel will evacuate to outside V5 or V6, whichever is safer. Blast doors will be closed after personnel evacuation.

3.4. If personnel in the affected zone are incapacitated, available personnel will provide SABC until extracted by Fire Department Rescue Team.

3.5. When directed by MUNS Control, all non-essential personnel will immediately evacuate the administration and support sections; secure/control classified material, but leave all personal items behind.

3.6. Senior person(s) in administration area and support sections will take charge and maintain good order and discipline.

3.7. Non-essential personnel will evacuate to the Squadron Operations Building cafeteria.

3.8. Once all non-essential personnel from KUMMSC, Squadron Operations Building, and Vehicle Barn are gathered in the cafeteria, the senior person will conduct a head count and establish accountability of all personnel. All personnel will remain there until the event is terminated or the order to release is given.

KIRTLAND AFB OPLAN 91-11
APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX D: 377 WSSS RESPONSE TO DROPPED EXPLOSIVES

1. GENERAL: 377 WSSS/SSCC directs security response for all emergencies involving KUMMSC. A 15/5 Response Force is posted in support of KUMMSC operations. This permits rapid evacuation of non-essential personnel and rapid insertion of first responders.

2. PROCEDURES: Upon receipt of dropped explosives notification from MUNS Control, WSSS will:

2.1. Initiate and up-channel a report through KCP.

2.2. Dispatch patrols as necessary to establish the cordon and prepare to receive Fire Department First Responders.

2.3. If investigation indicates hostile activity/actions, initiate Covered Wagon. Notify AFOSI Detachment 116.

2.4. Form the IBF.

2.5. Receive pre-notification from the FD of the number of responding vehicles and personnel that will enter the limited area.

2.6. In concert with MUNS Control, open all applicable blast doors to facilitate immediate personnel evacuation of affected zone and, if required, all non-essential personnel from KUMMSC. Personnel evacuated from affected zone will hold in place in adjacent inter-lock zone, pending Fire Department extraction. If the incident occurs in Brandt Hall, personnel may evacuate to the loading dock or behind B5 or B6, whichever is safest. For incidents occurring in the loading dock area, personnel will evacuate to outside V5 or V6, whichever is safest.

2.7. Validate sign/countersign and number of responding personnel prior to allowing entry into the KUMMSC Controlled Area.

2.8. Maintain accountability of number of personnel and vehicles entering the KUMMSC Controlled Area.

2.9. Upon EOD render-safe procedures and Fire Department/Rescue extraction of casualties enforce two-person concept and secure the scene for potential follow-on response and subsequent Safety Mishap Investigation.

2.10. Upon termination of the EOD/Fire Department response, search response vehicles and account for all responders prior to departure from the KUMMSC Controlled Area.

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KIRTLAND AFB OPLAN 91-11
APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX D: 377 MSG/CEF RESPONSE TO DROPPED EXPLOSIVES

1. GENERAL: Emergency response to KUMMSC must be immediate by well-trained teams knowledgeable of the complex. Pre-fire plans must be maintained to depict current status of all Fire Zones in the complex. Entry control procedures designed for rapid insertion of Firefighting/Rescue Teams must be solidified with 377 WSSS. The dropped explosives event may not trigger a fire alarm annunciation.

2. PROCEDURES: Upon notification of dropped explosives by 898 MUNS Control, the FACC will:

2.1. Dispatch emergency response teams according to KUMMSC response checklist.

2.2. Notify responding teams of event and location, line number(s) involved, associated hazards, and number of personnel involved.

2.3. Notify SSCC to establish security at ECP, Highball 2 or 4, as identified by IC. IC will identify safe route and ECP, Highball 2 or 4 depending on wind direction.

3. FIRST RESPONDERS WILL:

3.1. Contact SSCC and provide the number of vehicles and personnel responding to the limited area.

3.2. Provide sign/countersign to process into the KUMMSC Controlled Area via V1AA.

3.3. If under duress, intentionally misauthenticate.

3.4. Upon arrival at loading dock, contact 898 MUNS representative and receive status update. If the incident occurred in the loading dock, the MUNS representative will be in the Squadron Operations Building cafeteria.

3.5. Notify MUNS Control when Firefighting/Rescue Team is ready to enter affected zone.

3.6. If required, insert rescue team to extract incapacitated personnel.

3.7. Notify MUNS Control when affected zone is safe.

3.8. If required, establish DECON station.

3.9. If required, provide lifesaving steps/triage of injured personnel. If Advanced Lifesaving Skills (ALS) are required to treat patients, beyond the capabilities of first responders, notify the IC, FRT, and AAS.

3.10. If required, perform DECON of personnel/casualties and release to medical personnel when they arrive.

3.11. Upon termination of emergency response and when contamination is suspected, first responders and exposed personnel inside the accident zone will process through a Contamination Control Station before processing through the ECP. The Fire Department will perform gross-decontamination of emergency responders, exposed personnel and any injured personnel that may require medical treatment. The IC will ensure appropriate medical examination of responders is conducted based on presence of contamination and availability of resources. Vehicles identified as contaminated by the IC will be held within the hot zone pending disposition instructions from higher headquarters. If there was no contamination suspected or found, all personnel and vehicles will process through the ECP.

3.12. To avoid security violations, ensure response teams depart the ECP in the same vehicle/personnel configuration as they entered.

4. COMMAND AND CONTROL. The incident commander will do the following:

4.1. Establish command and control of first responders.

4.2. Set up at Highball 2 or 4, depending on wind direction.

4.3. Request EOD.

4.4. Accept command and control of the event upon arrival and request applicable follow-on support agencies via KCP and EOC.

4.5. As necessary, request CAT/EOC be activated.

4.6. Maintain communications with KCP and EOC.

4.7. Maintain command and control of the event until termination, or arrival of DOE ARG, and RTF, as applicable.

KIRTLAND AFB OPLAN 91-11
APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX D: 377 MSG/CED (EOD) RESPONSE TO DROPPED EXPLOSIVES

1. GENERAL: EOD supports the IC by performing render safe procedures for weapons/explosives.

2. PROCEDURES: Upon recall, report as directed to the IC at designated ECP; as directed by IC, EOD personnel will:

2.1. Insert teams to conduct initial damage assessment. Insertion route will be determined by the IC to ensure EOD teams process into and out through the EMST Contamination Control Station, if applicable.

2.2. Perform weapons/explosives render safe procedures.

2.3. As applicable, support follow-on DOE ARG and RTF.

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KIRTLAND AFB OPLAN 91-11
APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX D: 377 AMDS/SGPB RESPONSE TO DROPPED EXPLOSIVES

1. GENERAL: The Base Bioenvironmental Engineer provides on-site radiological survey support to the IC. Bioenvironmental will not be required unless contamination is suspected.

2. PROCEDURES: Upon recall, report to the IC at the designated ECP; as directed by IC, bioenvironmental personnel will:

2.1. Conduct radiation monitoring of surface areas and airborne contamination topside KUMMSC and surrounding downrange areas.

2.2. Select locations to set and operate air samplers.

2.3. Provide recommendations to responding medical personnel for biological monitoring if needed.

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KIRTLAND AFB OPLAN 91-11
APPENDIX 6 TO ANNEX D: 377 MDG RESPONSE TO DROPPED EXPLOSIVES

1. GENERAL: The 377 MDG and/or Albuquerque Ambulance will provide on-scene, accident-related emergency medical treatment, and establish processes to treat locally.

2. PROCEDURES: Upon recall, report to IC at designated ECP; as directed by IC:

2.1. Field Treatment Team(s) (FRT) perform casualty triage and stabilization in the Cold Zone, after gross decontamination.

2.2. Establish priority for transport to a medical facility.

2.3. If applicable:

2.3.1. Transfer casualties to Albuquerque Ambulance at the Scene Treatment Area/CCP.

2.3.2. Coordinate with Wing Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) and advise medical facility of potentially contaminated casualties and measures that can be taken to prevent its spread.

2.3.3. 377 MDG will attempt to keep response vehicles from entering the warm or hot zone.

2.3.4. Respond into KUMMSC if directed by the IC and no contamination is present.

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KIRTLAND AFB OPLAN 91-11
APPENDIX 7 TO ANNEX D: 377 ABW/CP RESPONSE TO DROPPED EXPLOSIVES

1. GENERAL: KCP is the focal point for up-channel reporting of OPREP-3 reportable events related to KUMMSC.

2. PROCEDURES: Upon notification of fire in KUMMSC, KCP will:

2.1. Immediately notify the 377 ABW/CC/CV of alarm indication and location, line number(s) involved, and number of personnel affected. Also contact AFOSI Detachment 116.

2.2. Run appropriate emergency action checklists.

2.3. Draft required up-channel reports for 377 ABW/CC/CV release.

2.4. Maintain communication with Air Force Service Watch Cell via Jabber.

2.5. Continue to support Crisis Action Team (CAT) and EOC until termination of the incident/accident.

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KIRTLAND AFB OPLAN 91-11
ANNEX E: HAZARDOUS MATERIAL (HAZMAT)/SPILL RESPONSE

1. GENERAL. The purpose of this annex is to outline the responsibilities of base activities responding and/or reacting to a HAZMAT spill in KUMMSC. Fire alarm will not be pulled unless there is evidence of smoke or subsequent energetic reaction (sparks, detonation, etc.).

2. To implement this OPLAN, tasked units will develop unit specific checklists. All checklists must be coordinated through 377 ABW/SEW.

3. MUNS Control is the focal point for all emergency response actions within KUMMSC.

4. 377 WSSS/SSCC shares in responsibility, but only from a security standpoint.

5. The following appendices delineate unit responsibilities:

Appendix 1 - 898 MUNS HAZMAT Spill Response
Appendix 2 - 377 WSSS HAZMAT Spill Response
Appendix 3 - 377 MSG/CEF HAZMAT Spill Response
Appendix 4 - 377 MSG/CED HAZMAT Spill Response
Appendix 5 - 377 AMDS/SGPB HAZMAT Spill Response
Appendix 6 - 377 MDG HAZMAT Spill Response
Appendix 7 - 377 ABW/CP HAZMAT Spill Response

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KIRTLAND AFB OPLAN 91-11
APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX E: 898 MUNS HAZMAT SPILL RESPONSE

1. GENERAL: MUNS Control is the focal point for all emergency response actions within KUMMSC.

2. PROCEDURES: Upon notification of HAZMAT spill MUNS Control will:

2.1. Immediately perform facility button-up command via BCMS to close all incoming/outgoing air, water, and outgoing sewage.

2.2. Notify SSCC of HAZMAT spill and location.

2.3. Validate event with senior person, extent of personnel injuries, and confirm no subsequent event has occurred.

2.4. In concert with SSCC, open applicable blast doors to facilitate immediate evacuation of personnel from affected zone into adjacent inter-lock zone. As soon as personnel have evacuated the affected zone close the blast door for that zone. All personnel evacuated from affected zone will hold in place in the adjacent inter-lock zone pending DECON by Fire Department Response Team and medical transport to hospital; personnel will process through interlocks to maintain zone integrity.

2.5. If event is in Brandt Hall or on the loading dock, issue shelter-in-place order to administration and support sections.

2.6. In concert with SSCC, open doors B2 and B4 and KUMMSC vehicle barriers.

2.7. If required, issue evacuation order to administration and support sections.

2.8. Run appropriate emergency action checklists as required.

2.9. Notify FACC, KCP, 898 MUNS/CC of event and location, line number(s) involved, associated hazards, number of personnel involved, and extent of injuries, if any.

2.10. Request 898 MUNS representative report to MUNS Control to fill out hazard worksheet and prepare to meet and brief the initial response team at the loading dock. After briefing, the representative will evacuate to the Squadron Operations Building cafeteria and report to senior leader on scene. If the spill occurred in the loading dock area, a representative will meet the Fire Department in the Squadron Operations Building.

2.11. Establish and maintain line of communication with IC and KCP; provide situational updates as applicable until termination of the incident/accident.

2.12. Maintain isolation of the affected zone pending HAZMAT response team clean-up and subsequent Safety Mishap Investigation.

3. 898 MUNS PERSONNEL WILL:

3.1. Upon HAZMAT spill event, immediately lay down absorbent material to contain the spill.

3.2. Position workers as far away from spill and observe for smoke. If smoke is observed, pull fire alarm and fight fire with all available means to prevent spreading; if explosives become engulfed with flames, evacuate immediately.

3.3. Notify MUNS Control and request blast doors are opened to facilitate evacuation.

3.4. When blast doors open, the senior person in charge at the affected zone will evacuate all personnel into the adjacent inter-lock zone and await Fire Department extraction.

3.5. If personnel in the affected zone are incapacitated, available personnel will provide SABC until extracted by Fire Department Rescue Team.

3.6. When directed by MUNS Control, all non-essential personnel will immediately evacuate the administration and support sections; secure/control classified material, but leave all personal items behind.

3.7. Non-essential personnel will evacuate to the Squadron Operations Building cafeteria.

3.8. Once all non-essential personnel from KUMMSC, Squadron Operations Building, and Vehicle Barn are gathered in the cafeteria, the senior person will conduct a head count and establish accountability of all personnel. All personnel will remain there until the event is terminated or the order to release is given.

3.9. If the event occurs in Brandt Hall or the loading dock, all personnel will shelter in-place until extracted by Fire Department or the all-clear is issued.

KIRTLAND AFB OPLAN 91-11
APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX E: 377 WSSS HAZMAT SPILL RESPONSE

1. GENERAL: 377 WSSS/SSCC directs security response for all emergencies involving KUMMSC. A 15/5 Response Force is posted in support of KUMMSC operations. This permits rapid evacuation of non-essential personnel and rapid insertion of Firefighters.

2. PROCEDURES: Upon receipt of HAZMAT spill notification from MUNS Control, WSSS will:

2.1. Initiate and up-channel a report through KCP.

2.2. Dispatch patrols as necessary to establish the cordon and prepare to receive Fire Department personnel.

2.3. If investigation indicates hostile activity/actions, initiate Covered Wagon.

2.4. Form the IBF.

2.5. Evacuate all non-essential personnel from the complex. If the event occurs in Brandt Hall or the loading dock area, personnel will shelter in-place.

2.6. Receive pre-notification from the FD of the number of responding vehicles and personnel that will enter the limited area.

2.7. In concert with MUNS Control, open all applicable blast doors to facilitate the immediate evacuation of personnel from the affected zone. As soon as personnel have evacuated the affected zone close the blast door for that zone. All personnel evacuated from affected zone will hold in place in the adjacent inter-lock zone pending DECON by Fire Department Response Team and medical transport to hospital; personnel will process through interlocks to maintain zone integrity.

2.8. Validate sign/countersign and number of responding personnel prior to allowing entry of personnel into the KUMMSC Controlled Area.

2.9. Maintain accountability of number of personnel and vehicles entering the KUMMSC Controlled Area.

2.10. Upon Fire Department/HAZMAT Response Team clean-up enforce two-person concept and secure the scene for subsequent Safety Mishap Investigation.

2.11. Upon termination of the HAZMAT spill response, inspect response vehicles and account for all responders prior to departure from the KUMMSC Controlled Area.

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KIRTLAND AFB OPLAN 91-11
APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX E: 377 MSG/CEF HAZMAT SPILL RESPONSE

1. GENERAL: Emergency response to KUMMSC must be immediate by well-trained teams knowledgeable of the complex. Pre-fire plans must be maintained to depict current status of all Fire Zones in the complex. Entry control procedures designed for rapid insertion of Firefighting/Rescue Teams must be solidified with 377 WSSS.

2. PROCEDURES: Upon notification of HAZMAT spill by 898 MUNS Control, the FACC will:

2.1. Dispatch emergency response teams according to KUMMSC response checklist.

2.2. Notify responding teams to implement HAZMAT plan for applicable affected zone.

2.3. Notify responding teams of event and location, line number(s) involved, associated hazards, and number of personnel involved.

2.4. Notify SSCC to establish security at ECP, Highball 2 or 4, as identified by IC. IC will identify safe route and ECP, Highball 2 or 4 depending on wind direction.

2.5. Contact SSCC and provide the number of vehicles and personnel responding to the limited area.

3. FIRST RESPONDERS WILL:

3.1. Provide sign/countersign to process into the KUMMSC Controlled Area via V1AA.

3.2. If under duress, intentionally misauthenticate.

3.3. Upon arrival at the loading dock, receive status update from the 898 MUNS representative. If spill occurred in the loading dock area, the MUNS representative will be in the squadron operations administration building.

3.4. Insert HAZMAT Team to contain/mitigate spill.

3.5. If required, insert rescue team to extract incapacitated personnel. Potentially contaminated personnel will assemble at loading dock for DECON. Non-exposed personnel will evacuate the complex and shelter-in-place at Squadron Operations Building cafeteria.

3.6. Establish DECON station.

3.7. Provide lifesaving steps/triage of injured personnel. If Advanced Lifesaving Skills (ALS) are required to treat patients, beyond the capabilities of first responders, notify the IC.

3.8. Perform DECON of personnel/casualties and release to medical personnel when they arrive.

3.9. Request further hazmat spill waste clean-up support through KCP.

3.10. Upon termination of emergency response and when contamination is suspected, first responders and exposed personnel inside the accident zone will process through a Contamination Control Station before processing through the ECP. The IC will ensure appropriate medical examination of responders is conducted based on presence of contamination and availability of resources. The Fire Department will perform gross-

decontamination of emergency responders, exposed personnel and any injured personnel and release to medical personnel when they arrive. Vehicles identified as contaminated by the IC will be held within the hot zone, pending disposition instructions from higher headquarters. If there was no contamination suspected or found, all personnel and vehicles will process through the ECP.

3.11. To avoid security violations, ensure response teams depart the ECP in the same vehicle/personnel configuration as they entered.

4. COMMAND AND CONTROL: The incident commander will do the following:

4.1. Establish command and control of first responders.

4.2. Set up at Highball 2 or 4, depending on wind direction.

4.3. As necessary, request CAT/EOC be established.

4.4. Accept command and control of the event upon arrival, and request applicable follow-on support agencies via KCP and EOC.

4.5. Maintain communications with KCP and EOC.

4.6. Maintain command and control of the event until termination, or arrival of DOE ARG and RTF, as applicable.

KIRTLAND AFB OPLAN 91-11
APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX E: 377 MSG/CED (EOD) HAZMAT SPILL RESPONSE

1. GENERAL: EOD supports the IC by performing render safe procedures for weapons/explosives.

2. PROCEDURES: Upon recall, report as directed to the IC at designated ECP; as directed by IC, EOD personnel will:

2.1. Insert teams to conduct initial damage assessment. Insertion route will be determined by the IC to ensure EOD teams process into and out through the EMST Contamination Control Station, if applicable.

2.2. Perform weapons/explosives render safe procedures.

2.3. As applicable, support follow-on DOE ARG and RTF.

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KIRTLAND AFB OPLAN 91-11
APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX E: 377 AMDS/SGPB HAZMAT SPILL RESPONSE

1. GENERAL: The Base Bioenvironmental Engineer provides on-site radiological survey support to the IC.

2. PROCEDURES: Upon recall, report to the IC at the designated ECP; as directed by IC, bioenvironmental personnel will, if needed:

2.1. Assist the Fire Department HAZMAT Team in identifying HAZMAT substances and advise the IC on personal protective equipment and decontamination methods.

2.2. Provide recommendations to responding medical personnel if needed.

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KIRTLAND AFB OPLAN 91-11
APPENDIX 6 TO ANNEX E: 377 MDG HAZMAT SPILL RESPONSE

1. GENERAL: The 377 MDG and/or Albuquerque Ambulance will provide on-scene, accident-related emergency medical treatment, and establish processes to treat locally.

2. PROCEDURES: Upon recall, report to IC at designated ECP; as directed by IC:

2.1. Field Treatment Team(s) perform casualty triage and stabilization in the Cold Zone, after gross decontamination.

2.2. Establish priority for transport to a medical facility.

2.3. If applicable:

2.3.1. Transfer casualties to Albuquerque Ambulance at the Scene Treatment Area.

2.3.2. Coordinate with Wing Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) and advise medical facility of potentially contaminated casualties and measures that can be taken to prevent its spread.

2.3.3. 377 MDG will attempt to keep response vehicles from entering the warm or hot zone.

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KIRTLAND AFB OPLAN 91-11
APPENDIX 7 TO ANNEX E: 377 ABW/CP HAZMAT SPILL RESPONSE

1. GENERAL: KCP is the focal point for up-channel reporting of OPREP-3 reportable events related to KUMMSC.

2. PROCEDURES: Upon notification of a HAZMAT spill in KUMMSC, KCP will:

2.1. Immediately notify the 377 ABW/CC/CV of alarm indication and location, line number(s) involved, and number of personnel affected. Also contact AFOSI Detachment 116.

2.2. Run appropriate emergency action checklists.

2.3. Draft required up-channel reports for 377 ABW/CC/CV release.

2.4. Maintain communication with Air Force Service Watch Cell via Jabber.

2.5. Continue to support Crisis Action Team (CAT) and EOC until termination of the incident/accident.

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KIRTLAND AFB OPLAN 91-11
ANNEX F: MEDICAL EMERGENCY

1. GENERAL. The purpose of this annex is to outline the responsibilities of base activities responding and/or reacting to a medical emergency in KUMMSC. Fire alarm will not be pulled unless there is evidence of smoke or subsequent energetic reaction**.**

2. To implement this OPLAN, tasked units will develop unit specific checklists. All checklists must be coordinated through 377 ABW/SEW.

3. MUNS Control is the focal point for all emergency response actions within KUMMSC.

4. 377 WSSS/SSCC shares in responsibility but only from a security standpoint.

5. Not all medical emergencies at KUMMSC will require all of the procedures and responses outline in this annex. IC discretion will be used for less severe circumstances (i.e. possible broken bone incident not involving an asset).

6. The following appendices delineate unit responsibilities:

Appendix 1 - 898 MUNS Response to Medical Emergency
Appendix 2 - 377 WSSS Response to Medical Emergency
Appendix 3 - 377 MSG/CEF Response to Medical Emergency
Appendix 4 - 377 MDG Response to Medical Emergency
Appendix 5 - 377 ABW/CP Response to Medical Emergency

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KIRTLAND AFB OPLAN 91-11
APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX F: 898 MUNS RESPONSE TO MEDICAL EMERGENCY

1. GENERAL: 898 MUNS Munitions Control is the focal point for all emergency response actions within KUMMSC.

2. PROCEDURES: Upon notification of medical emergency MUNS Control will:

2.1. Validate the event with the senior person on scene, extent of personnel injuries, and confirm no subsequent event has occurred.

2.2. Immediately notify FACC of medical emergency and location, number of personnel involved, extent of injuries, and any associated hazards.

2.3. Notify SSCC of medical emergency and location.

2.4. Notify FACC/KCP/898 MUNS/CC of medical emergency and location, number of personnel involved, extent of injuries, and any associated hazards.

2.5. In concert with SSCC, open applicable blast doors to facilitate immediate insertion of Fire Department Rescue Team, if required. As soon as the injured personnel have been extracted, close the blast door for that zone. Uninjured personnel will process through interlocks as normal to maintain zone integrity.

2.6. Request 898 MUNS representative report to MUNS Control to fill out hazard worksheet and prepare to meet and brief initial response team at the loading dock.

2.7. Establish and maintain line of communication with IC and KCP; provide situational updates as applicable until termination of the incident/accident.

2.8. Maintain isolation of the affected zone pending Safety Mishap Investigation.

3. 898 MUNS PERSONNEL WILL:

3.1. Notify MUNS Control of medical emergency by fastest means available. Relay the extent of injuries and if weapons are involved.

3.2. Provide SABC until extracted by Fire Department Rescue Team. Evacuation of KUMMSC will not occur unless there are subsequent events such as fire alarm.

3.3. If evacuation is required, non-essential personnel will evacuate to the Squadron Operations Building cafeteria.

3.4. Once all non-essential personnel from KUMMSC, Squadron Operations Building, and Vehicle Barn are gathered in the cafeteria, the senior person will conduct a head count and establish accountability of all personnel. All personnel will remain there until the event is terminated or the order to release is given.

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KIRTLAND AFB OPLAN 91-11
APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX F: 377 WSSS RESPONSE TO MEDICAL EMERGENCY

1. GENERAL: 377 WSSS/SSCC directs security response for all emergencies involving KUMMSC. A 15/5 Response Force is posted in support of KUMMSC operations. This permits rapid evacuation of non-essential personnel and rapid insertion of firefighters. Evacuation of KUMMSC will not occur unless there are subsequent events such as fire alarm.

2. PROCEDURES: Upon receipt of medical emergency notification from MUNS Control, WSSS will:

2.1. Initiate and up-channel a report through KCP.

2.2. Dispatch patrols as necessary to establish the cordon and prepare to receive Fire Department personnel.

2.3. Notify SFS BDOC of the medical response. Ensure a SFS patrol escorts AAS from the installation entry point to the ECP.

2.4. If investigation indicates hostile activity/actions, initiate Covered Wagon.

2.5. Form the IBF.

2.6. Validate there are no other energetic events.

2.7. Receive pre-notification from the FD of the number of responding vehicles and personnel that will enter the limited area.

2.8. In concert with MUNS Control, open all applicable blast doors to facilitate immediate insertion of Fire Department Rescue Team, if required. As soon as injured personnel have been extracted, close the blast door for that zone. Uninjured personnel will process through interlocks as normal to maintain zone integrity.

2.9. Validate sign/countersign and number of responding personnel prior to allowing entry into the KUMMSC Controlled Area.

2.10. Maintain accountability of number of personnel and vehicles entering the KUMMSC Controlled Area.

2.11. Upon Fire Department Rescue Team extraction of injured personnel, enforce two-person concept and secure the scene for subsequent Safety Mishap Investigation.

2.12. Upon termination of the medical emergency, search response vehicles and account for all responders prior to departure from the KUMMSC Controlled Area.

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KIRTLAND AFB OPLAN 91-11
APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX F: 377 MSG/CEF RESPONSE TO MEDICAL EMERGENCY

1. GENERAL: Emergency response to KUMMSC must be immediate by well-trained teams knowledgeable of the complex. Pre-fire plans must be maintained to depict current status of all Fire Zones in the complex. Entry control procedures designed for rapid insertion of firefighting/rescue teams must be solidified with 377 WSSS.

2. PROCEDURES: Upon notification of medical emergency by 898 MUNS Control, the FACC will:

2.1. Dispatch emergency response teams according to KUMMSC response checklist.

2.2. Notify responding teams of event and location, number of personnel involved, extent of injuries, and any associated hazards. Evacuation of KUMMSC will not occur unless there are subsequent events such as a fire alarm.

2.3. Notify SSCC to establish security at the ECP, as identified by IC. If required, IC will identify a safe route, Highball 2 or 4, and ECP. For a medical emergency without further event the ECP will typically be set up at V1AA.

2.4. Contact SSCC and provide the number of vehicles and personnel responding to the limited area.

3. FIRST RESPONDERS WILL:

3.1. Provide sign/countersign to process into the KUMMSC Controlled Area via V1AA.

3.2. If under duress, intentionally misauthenticate.

3.3. Upon arrival at loading dock, receive status update from 898 MUNS representative.

3.4. Insert rescue team to provide life saving steps/triage of injured personnel. If Advanced Lifesaving Skills (ALS) are required to treat patients, beyond the capabilities of first responders, notify the IC.

3.5. Extract casualties to the CCP, as established by the IC. In the event of a mass casualty situation, use any vehicle of opportunity necessary to extract injured personnel.

3.6. If applicable:

3.6.1. Establish DECON station.

3.6.2. Perform DECON of personnel/casualties.

3.6.3. Upon termination of emergency response, all personnel will process through a Contamination Control Station before processing through the ECP. Vehicles identified as contaminated by the IC will be held within the hot zone pending disposition instructions from higher headquarters.

3.7. Release injured personnel to medical personnel at the CCP.

3.8. To avoid security violations, ensure response teams depart the ECP in the same vehicle/personnel configuration as they entered.

4. COMMAND AND CONTROL: The incident commander will do the following:

4.1. Establish command and control of first responders.

4.2. Set up at the ECP.

4.3. As necessary, request CAT/EOC be established.

4.4. Accept command and control of the event upon arrival, and request applicable follow-on support agencies via KCP and EOC.

4.5. Maintain communications with KCP and EOC, if established.

4.6. Maintain command and control of the event until termination, or arrival of DOE ARG and RTF, as applicable.

4.7. If the CCP is located within the KUMMSC topside controlled area ensure the FRT, FD, or as a last resort the SFS patrol accompanies AAS for patient transfer and transportation within the area.

4.8. Direct the FRT into KUMMSC, if required.

4.9. If Advanced Lifesaving Skills (ALS) are required to treat patients, beyond the capabilities of first responders and FRT, request permission from the Installation Commander to have AAS or Albuquerque Fire Department enter KUMMSC. If entry is authorized, ensure the MXG or FD Security Manager is recalled to accomplish non-disclosure agreements with all applicable personnel after patient transportation is completed. If the patient(s) being transported by AAS cannot be searched by SF when leaving the limited area, a SFS patrol will accompany the ambulance to the treatment facility to conduct the search and accomplish the AF Form 1109.

KIRTLAND AFB OPLAN 91-11
APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX F: 377 MDG RESPONSE TO MEDICAL EMERGENCY

1. GENERAL: The 377 MDG and/or Albuquerque Ambulance will provide on-scene, accident-related emergency medical treatment, and establish processes to treat locally.

2. PROCEDURES: Upon recall, report to the IC at the designated ECP; as directed by IC, medical personnel will:

2.1. Insert FRT to promptly treat/triage casualties. Typically this will occur at the CCP; however, FRT may insert into KUMMSC if directed by the IC.

2.2. Recall additional FRT if situation requires or directed by the IC.

2.3. Establish priority for transport to a medical facility.

2.4. Accompany AAS into the KUMMSC topside controlled area and remain with them until departure through V1AB.

2.5. Transfer casualties to Albuquerque Ambulance at the Scene Treatment Area/CCP.

2.6. Ensure AAS is appropriately briefed if casualties are potentially or actually contaminated. Patient and ambulance crew will receive additional DECON at the VA Hospital or University of New Mexico Hospital. The ambulance and crew will need to be removed from service until appropriate DECON procedures are completed.

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KIRTLAND AFB OPLAN 91-11
APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX F: 377 ABW/CP RESPONSE TO MEDICAL EMERGENCY

1. GENERAL: KCP is the focal point for up-channel reporting of OPREP-3 reportable events related to KUMMSC.

2. PROCEDURES: Upon notification of a medical response in KUMMSC, KCP will:

2.1. Immediately notify the 377 ABW/CC/CV of location, number of personnel affected, and line number(s) involved, if applicable.

2.2. Run appropriate emergency action checklists.

2.3. Draft required up-channel reports for 377 ABW/CC/CV release, as required.

2.4. Maintain communication with Air Force Service Watch Cell via Jabber.

2.5. Continue to support Crisis Action Team (CAT) and EOC until termination of the incident/accident.

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KIRTLAND AFB OPLAN 91-11
ANNEX G: UNPLANNED POWER LOSS IN KUMMSC

1. GENERAL. The purpose of this annex is to outline the responsibilities of base activities responding and/or reacting to an unplanned power loss in KUMMSC. Complete power failure in KUMMSC involves the loss of multiple redundant power systems.

2. To implement this plan, tasked units will develop unit specific checklists. All checklists must be coordinated through 377 ABW/SEW.

3. MUNS Control is the focal point for all emergency response actions within KUMMSC.

4. 377 WSSS/SSCC shares in responsibility but only from a security standpoint.

5. Not all unplanned power outages will require all of the procedures and responses outline in this annex. Checklists and local procedures will be developed for less severe circumstances (i.e. commercial power failure caused by a confirmed lightning strike off site and KUMMSC uninterrupted power supply and backup power systems function as designed).

6. The following appendices delineate unit responsibilities:

Appendix 1 - 898 MUNS Response to Unplanned Power Loss
Appendix 2 - 377 WSSS Response to Unplanned Power Loss
Appendix 3 - 377 MSG/CE Response to Unplanned Power Loss
Appendix 4 - 377 MSG/CEF Response to Unplanned Power Loss
Appendix 5 - 377 ABW/CP Response to Unplanned Power Loss

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KIRTLAND AFB OPLAN 91-11
APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX G: 898 MUNS RESPONSE TO UNPLANNED POWER LOSS

1. GENERAL: MUNS Control is the focal point for all emergency response actions within KUMMSC.

2. PROCEDURES: If an unplanned power loss occurs, MUNS Control will:

2.1. Validate situation with SSCC; all doors in the complex automatically close upon loss of power.

2.2. Run appropriate emergency action checklists as required.

2.3. If loss of communication also occurred, contact KCP via handheld radio, if possible. Relay power loss situation and status of the complex. Catastrophic power loss could indicate a hazardous condition within the Uninterrupted Power Supply (UPS) or battery rooms. If communications with KCP cannot be established, request SSCC assistance.

2.4. In concert with SSCC, dispatch runner(s) to investigate UPS and battery rooms and check for obvious damage (fire, explosion, etc).

2.5. Provide status update to KCP, through SSCC if necessary.

2.6. Contact Civil Engineering Power Production via the CE Service Call desk 6-8222 and request Emergency Power Production and Electrical Utility personnel respond.

2.7. If power cannot be restored within 30 minutes, in concert with SSCC, request permission from 377 ABW/CC to begin manually pumping open applicable doors to facilitate non-essential personnel evacuation of the complex.

2.8. If possible, establish and maintain line of communication with IC and KCP. Provide situational updates as applicable until termination of the incident/accident.

2.9. After termination of the event and power is restored, contact FM personnel to reset BCMS to correct operating status.

3. 898 MUNS PERSONNEL WILL:

3.1. Upon power failure, terminate all maintenance operations; ensure assets are in safe configuration before maintenance is terminated.

3.2. Senior person in each applicable zone will assemble personnel in one location and prepare to manually pump open doors if power is not restored, if applicable.

3.3. When authorized, manually pump open doors and evacuate non-essential personnel from the complex, secure/control classified material, and leave all personal items behind. Two-person teams are considered essential and will not initially evacuate.

3.4. Non-essential personnel will evacuate to the Squadron Operations Building cafeteria.

3.5. Once all non-essential personnel from KUMMSC, Squadron Operations Building, and Vehicle Barn are gathered in the cafeteria, the senior person will conduct a head count and establish accountability of all personnel. All personnel will remain there until the event is terminated or the order to release is given.

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KIRTLAND AFB OPLAN 91-11
APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX G: 377 WSSS TO UNPLANNED POWER LOSS

1. GENERAL: 377 WSSS/SSCC directs security response for all emergencies involving KUMMSC. A 15/5 Response Force is posted in support of KUMMSC operations. This facilitates evacuation of non-essential personnel, and insertion of firefighters, if required.

2. PROCEDURES: If an unplanned power loss occurs, 377 WSSS will:

2.1. In concert with MUNS Control, dispatch runner(s) to investigate UPS and battery rooms and check for obvious damage (fire, explosion, etc). If a fire exists, immediately start firefighting actions with chemical extinguishers.

2.2. Initiate an up-channel report to KCP. In case of catastrophic power failure, contact BDOC via portable radio to assume control of the radio net and make all notifications.

2.3. In concert with MUNS Control, validate the status of the complex and request authorization for manually pumping of the doors to facilitate evacuation.

2.4. If investigation indicates hostile activity/actions, initiate Covered Wagon.

2.5. Dispatch patrols as required for the situation and at the direction of the on duty Flight Chief/Commander.

2.5.1. Establish a cordon and ECP at the direction of the IC if fire occurred. Prepare to receive first responders.

2.5.2. Dispatch ECP or loading dock forces to manually open V5 – V3 and topside forces to open V2 if Fire Department response into KUMMSC is required. If fire response is required, dispatch forces to begin manual pumping of B2 and B4. Fire Department personnel will assume manual door operations upon arrival in the loading dock.

2.5.3. If commercial power to the facility was lost and battery/UPS systems operate properly, follow associated checklists for sweeps, generator operation, and notifications.

2.6. Form the IBF. Dispatch the IBF to reinforce KUMMSC security and recall additional BFs at the direction of the Flight Chief/Commander or higher authority.

2.7. Receive pre-notification from the FD of the number of responding vehicles and personnel that will enter the limited area.

2.8. Validate sign/countersign and number of responding personnel prior to allowing entry into the KUMMSC Controlled Area, if applicable.

2.9. Maintain accountability of number of personnel and vehicles entering the KUMMSC Controlled Area.

2.10. Upon Fire Department termination of the event, enforce two-person concept and secure the complex for CE fault isolation survey and subsequent Safety Mishap Investigation.

2.11. Upon termination of the event, search response vehicles and account for all responders prior to departure from the KUMMSC Controlled Area.

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KIRTLAND AFB OPLAN 91-11
APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX G: 377 MSG/CE RESPONSE TO UNPLANNED POWER LOSS

1. GENERAL: Civil Engineering Emergency Service Call is the point of contact for all emergency response actions and power restorations within KUMMSC.

2. PROCEDURES: If an unplanned power loss occurs, 377 MSG/CE will:

2.1. Initiate emergency notifications procedures for emergency response:

2.1.1. Electrical Distribution stand by and Supervisor

2.1.2. Power Production stand by and Supervisor

2.2.3. Electric Shop standby by and Supervisor

2.2.4. Operations Manager or Deputy

2.2. If power loss is restored within the response time, the system should automatically restore commercial power. Keep response crews informed of change of status.

3. 377 MSG/CE PERSONNEL WILL:

3.1. The Electrical Distribution stand by technician in concert with Emergency Power Production Crews and Electricians will investigate issues that may contribute to the power disruption and take appropriate actions.

3.1.1. Power production shall ensure primary emergency power systems are on line and supporting KUMMSC.

3.1.2. Electrical Distribution technicians shall investigate infrastructure failures that may be contributing to the power loss; if necessary, contact commercial power provider for updates on power supplies to the base.

3.1.3. In the event primary emergency power systems are inoperable, initiate secondary power feeds utilizing the MEP 9 secondary power systems utilizing the procedures in the “Emergency Power Systems Procedures” Manual. Secondary emergency power procedures are a complex series of procedures performed jointly by KUMMSC electrical maintenance technicians, interior electrical technicians and power production personnel.

3.2. Provide status update to KCP.

3.2.1. If possible, establish and maintain line of communication with IC, SSCC, MUNS Control and KCP; provide situational updates as applicable until termination of the event.

3.2.2. Proceed with identification of failure node and pursue restoration of commercial power until complete. Provide notifications and time lines for restoration.

3.2.3. Once the failure node/s has been identified, a complex series of procedures may be necessary and performed jointly by Electrical Distribution technicians, KUMMSC Electrical Maintenance technicians, Interior electrical technicians and Power Production personnel.

3.3. After restoration of commercial power and termination of the event notify IC, SSCC, MUNS Control and KCP; provide updates on causes and influencing factors that may have contributed to the emergency.

KIRTLAND AFB OPLAN 91-11
APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX G: 377 MSG/CEF RESPONSE TO UNPLANNED POWER LOSS

1. GENERAL: Emergency response to KUMMSC must be immediate by well-trained teams knowledgeable of the complex. Pre-fire plans must be maintained to depict current status of all Fire Zones in the complex. Entry control procedures designed for insertion of Firefighting/Rescue Teams must be solidified with 377 WSSS. Responders must be knowledgeable of procedures for manually pumping open blast doors.

2. PROCEDURES:

2.1. Upon notification of unplanned power loss by MUNS Control, the FACC will:

2.1.1. Dispatch emergency response teams according to KUMMSC response checklist.

2.1.2. Notify responding teams of event and location, associated hazards, number of personnel involved if known, and extent of injuries, if any.

2.1.3. Notify SSCC to establish an ECP and cordon if required by IC. If catastrophic power failure has occurred, make notifications to BDOC.

2.2. IC will identify safe route and ECP location.

2.3. Contact SSCC and provide the number of vehicles and personnel responding to the limited area.

3. FIRST RESPONDERS WILL:

3.1. Provide sign/countersign to process into the KUMMSC Controlled Area via V1AA.

3.2. If under duress, intentionally misauthenticate.

3.3. Upon arrival at loading dock, attempt to establish communication with MUNS Control and/or SSCC and begin manually pumping open B1and B3 to facilitate evacuation, if authorized, or B2 and B4 for firefighting team insertion.

3.4. Insert Firefighting/Rescue Team to inspect the facility and extract personnel if necessary.

3.5. Provide lifesaving steps/triage of any injured or emotional personnel and release to medical personnel when they arrive.

3.6. Upon termination of emergency response, to avoid security violations, ensure response teams depart the ECP in the same vehicle/personnel configuration as they entered.

4. COMMAND AND CONTROL: The incident commander will do the following:

4.1. Establish command and control of first responders.

4.2. Set up at established ECP.

4.3. As necessary, request CAT/EOC be established.

4.4. Accept command and control of the event upon arrival, and request applicable follow-on support agencies via KCP and EOC.

4.5. Maintain communications with KCP and EOC.

4.6. Maintain command and control of the event until termination.

KIRTLAND AFB OPLAN 91-11
APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX G: 377 ABW/CP RESPONSE TO UNPLANNED POWER LOSS

1. GENERAL: KCP is the focal point for up-channel reporting of OPREP-3 reportable events related to KUMMSC.

2. PROCEDURES: Upon notification of an unplanned power loss in KUMMSC, KCP will:

2.1. Immediately notify the 377 ABW/CC/CV of facility status, associated hazards, and number of personnel affected if known.

2.2. Run appropriate emergency action checklists.

2.3. Draft required up-channel reports for 377 ABW/CC/CV release.

2.4. Maintain communication with Air Force Service Watch Cell via Jabber.

2.5. Continue to support Crisis Action Team (CAT) and EOC, if formed, and IC until termination of the incident/accident.

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KIRTLAND AFB OPLAN 91-11
ANNEX H, PUBLIC AFFAIRS

1. GENERAL: The purpose of this Annex is to outline the responsibilities of the 377th Air Base Wing Public Affairs (PA) office in response to an emergency situation involving KUMMSC. PA serves as the focal point for releasing all information during any emergency response involving KUMMSC. Refer to AFI 35-104, *Public Affairs Media Operations* and other applicable guidance regarding release of information during a nuclear incident/accident.

2. Upon notification of an emergency response to KUMMSC, PA will perform the following procedures:

2.1. Provide a representative to the Crisis Action Team, if activated.

2.2. Send a representative to the Emergency Operations Center, if requested.

2.3. Dependent upon the situation, place the Media Center on standby status.

2.4. As required, review/implement emergency response checklists items.

2.5. If applicable, notify higher headquarters.

3. After assessing the incident/accident, the PA will:

3.1. Compile/distribute a news release to local media; disseminate a Kirtland All Personnel E-Mail, update the Straight Talk Line, and make arrangements, if necessary, to post the FPCON change on the marquee(s), as well as social media venues (public Web site, Facebook and Twitter).

3.2. Advise the commander of PA guidance on release of information concerning a nuclear incident.

3.3. If applicable, recall all PA personnel serving with other on-base Air Force organizations.

3.4. If appropriate, notify local and state officials, as well as the congressional delegation. If warranted, establish the Joint Information Center.

4. OASD/PA retains initial PA responsibility for nuclear-related accidents and significant incidents. The presence of nuclear weapons or radioactive nuclear weapon components at any specified location must not be confirmed or denied, except for the following:

4.1. Exception for Public Safety. Confirmation of nuclear weapons or radioactive nuclear weapon components may be made by the on-scene commander. The deputy director of operations of the National Military Command Center also may invoke this exception to policy before the OSC arrives, based on available information and coordination with the Air Force Chief of Staff or designee. Notification is required if the public is or may be in danger of radiation exposure or any other danger posed by the nuclear weapon or radioactive nuclear weapon component. Make confirmation promptly when protective action or evacuation of civilians may be required. These actions may include releasing statements to news media to expedite public safety procedures. Advise SAF/PA and OASD/PA as soon as practicable when confirmation is made directly by the OSC or the deputy director of operations of the NMCC.

4.2. Exception to Prevent Public Alarm. To reduce or prevent widespread public alarm, the OSC may issue an official statement of reassurance to the public that confirms or denies the presence of nuclear weapons or radioactive nuclear weapon components. Before the OSC arrives, the deputy director of operations of the

NMCC may invoke this exception to policy with available information and in coordination with the Air Force Chief of Staff, or designee. An official confirmation should be accompanied by appropriate assurances, such as that the chance of injury from high explosive detonation or potential exposure to radiation is highly unlikely. The confirmation also may state that use of explosive ordnance disposal teams and evacuation of military personnel is only a protective measure to limit the number of personnel at the accident site. A denial should characterize the accident or incident as a non-nuclear event. Notify SAF/PA and OASD/PA in advance if practical, or as soon as practicable thereafter if this exception to policy is initiated to enable OASD/PA and SAF/PA to continue initial PA responsibilities and ensure release of timely, accurate information at the national level.

KIRTLAND AFB OPLAN 91-11
ANNEX Z, DISTIBUTION

ORGANIZATION	COPIES
377 ABW/CC	1
/CV	1
/CP	1
/IG	1
/SE	1
/XP	1
/PA	1
377 MDG/CC	1
377 AMDS/SGPB	1
377 MSG/CC	1
/CD	1
/CE	1
/CEX	1
/CED	1
/CEF	1
377 SFG/CC	1
377 WSSS/CC	1
377 SFS/CC	1
377 MXG/CC	1
/CD	1
/QA	1
898 MUNS/CC	1
/MXM	1
/MXMC	1
/MXMF	1
AFOSI Det 116/CC	1