

KIRTLAND AIR FORCE BASE INTEGRATED DEFENSE PLAN



**377TH AIR BASE WING
KIRTLAND AIR FORCE BASE NM
87117-5607
14 March 2017**

Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
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MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION
(SEE ATTACHMENT 1)

FROM: 377 ABW/CC
2000 Wyoming Blvd.
SE Kirtland AFB NM 87117

SUBJECT: Letter of Transmittal for Kirtland Air Force Base (KAFB) Integrated Defense Plan 31-101.

1. Attached is the KAFB IDP 31-101 IC #3. This plan supersedes KAFB IDP 31-101, dated 9 March 2016. Changed paragraphs are marked with a vertical bar (|) in the left margin. In the Summary of Changes, blue font denotes information that has been added or changed.
2. Revisions: This plan has been revised with a GM in accordance with AFI 31-101, *Integrated Defense*.
3. This plan is effective upon receipt and implemented as directed by the 377 ABW/CC or designated representative. It applies to all organizations at KAFB. Each organization is responsible for preparing supporting documents, such as operating instructions (OIs) or checklists, to ensure accomplishment of the stated mission.
4. Forward all recommendations for changes to the 377th Security Forces Squadron, Plans and Programs Section (377 SFS/S5P). All recommendations must include the date and applicable reference(s) within the original document.
5. The Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) for this plan is the 377 SFS/S5P, 1351 First Street SE, KAFB, NM 87116, (505) 846-3926 or DSN 246-3926.

See AF FM 673
ERIC H. FROEHLICH, Colonel, USAF
Commander

Attachments:

KAFB IDP 31-101

PLAN CLASSIFICATION, CONTROL, AND RECORD OF CHANGES

1. The long title of this plan is KAFB Integrated Defense Plan. The short title is KAFB IDP 31-101.
2. The classification of this document is For Official Use Only (FOUO)/DOD Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information (DOD UCNI) in its entirety based on the compilation of sensitive operational information. The information contained herein will be disseminated only to those agencies and personnel whose official duties specifically require knowledge of this plan, including those units and agencies required to develop supporting plans. Annex B cannot be duplicated unless permission is obtained from 377 SFS/S5P or Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) Detachment 814. Appendix 10 to Annex C cannot be duplicated unless permission is obtained from 377 SFS/S5P. Annex Z of this plan is classified DOD UCNI and should be separated from this document when disseminating to agencies that do not require knowledge of its contents.
3. This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States. The transmission or revelation of information contained herein, in any manner, to an unauthorized person is prohibited by the Espionage Laws, Title 18 USC.
4. Classified reference documents are maintained at 377 SFS/S2, 377 WSSS and Air Force Office of Special Investigations AFOSI Detachment 814.
5. Reproduction of this plan in whole or in part is prohibited, except as required to prepare supporting plans.
6. OPERATIONS SECURITY (OPSEC): OPSEC is a process of identifying critical information and subsequently mitigating the impact of adversary efforts to collect this information. We will apply principles of OPSEC to ensure the minimum risk to our operations. OPSEC applies to all activities that prepare, sustain, or employ forces during all phases of operations. During planning and operations phases, leaders must determine the balance between OPSEC measures, public safety, and operational needs.
7. OPSEC PROCESS: Leaders at all levels are responsible for ensuring OPSEC is integrated into all plans/planning efforts, contingency response/recovery operations, exercises, and activities to increase mission effectiveness. For more information regarding implementation of the OPSEC process, refer to AFI 10-701, *Operations Security (OPSEC)*, and KAFB Plan 10-701, *OPSEC*.
8. IDENTIFY CRITICAL INFORMATION (CI): Units will identify CI, indicators of CI, and develop countermeasures to protect CI from inadvertent release. CI in relation to this Annex includes, but is not limited to, the following:

- 8.1. Special assets, intelligence, and security matters.

- 8.2. Specific capabilities/limitations of equipment/weapons/personnel.
- 8.3. Lessons learned from past operations and programs.
- 8.4. Detailed unit mission information.
- 8.5. Information on National Defense Area (NDA) operations.
- 8.6. Detailed contingency response and recovery plans, operations, and procedures.
- 8.7. Information on remediation efforts.
- 8.8. Information on Weapons Recovery Center operations.
9. ANALYZE THREATS: Analyze (along with intelligence and counterintelligence analysts) the threat to identified CI. The threat analysis will identify adversaries in relation to the operation, their goals, what they already know, and their capability to collect OPSEC indicators, derive critical information, and their potential courses of action (COAs).
10. ANALYZE VULNERABILITIES: Determine what the vulnerabilities are to the CI (or indicators) that can be exploited by adversarial collection agents.
11. ASSESS RISK: Analyze and assess what level of risk can be tolerated should the CI be exploited or countered.
12. APPLY COUNTERMEASURES: Prepare and implement the appropriate countermeasures that will eliminate or reduce the risk to an acceptable level.
13. SUMMARY OF CHANGES:

Enclosure 3 to Tab A to Appendix 1 to Annex Z To KAFB IDP 31-101 Pages 381-382:

3.2. **(CHANGED)** (DCNI) EXECUTION: A portion of KUMMSC is designated as a permanent restricted area on KAFB. The restricted/limited area begins at turnstile 3, door 6, door 7, and vehicle gate 5 for entry, and turnstile 5 and vehicle gate 6 for exit.

3.1.1. **(ADDED)** (FOUO) Unescorted Vehicle Entry Requirements: All vehicles/passengers requesting access to the topside Controlled Area or the KUMMSC Restricted Area must utilize their Restricted Area Badge and request access through the north vehicle barrier/V1AA terminal. If proceeding to the Restricted Area, they will turn left towards the east side vehicle barrier/V2. Once at that location, they will be met by the Internal Security Response Team/S-5 to verify the need for entry and ensure they have a valid restricted area badge with open area 8. Once verification is complete, they will swipe their badge and enter their pin at the V2 terminal to request access through the Entry Controller. All vehicles driving down the tunnel will proceed

through each vehicle boundary gate one at a time. The entry controller must ensure the previous boundary is closed prior to opening the next.

3.1.1.1. **(ADDED)** (FOUO) For day to day operations, when there are no personnel being escorted, the driver is the only authorized person allowed to drive down the tunnel. All passengers must exit and process into the facility as pedestrians through D1.

3.2.2. **(ADDED)** (FOUO) Escorted Entry Vehicle Requirements: On occasion, KUMMSC will have contractors that must be escorted into the facility. Often times, these personnel have specialized vehicles that can only be operated by the escortee. During these situations, the escort and the escortee/s are authorized to drive down the entry tunnel and proceed to the search area between V4 and V5. Once in the search area the escort and escortee/s will be processed into the restricted/limited area at D6.

3.2.2.1. **(ADDED)** (FOUO) The Entry Controller must verify their status against a validated EAL and ensure they receive the escort briefing prior to granting entry into the restricted/limited area.

14. RECORD OF CHANGES:

CHANGE NO.	CHANGE DATE	DATE ENTERED	POSTED BY
#1	9 March 2016	9 March 2016	Mr. Hoffman
#2	6 April 2017	6 April 2017	Mr. Hoffman
#3	14 March 2017	14 March 2017	Mr. Hoffman

KAFB IDP 31-101
PLAN SUMMARY

1. (FOUO) PURPOSE: The 377th Air Base Wing (377 ABW) KAFB Integrated Defense Plan (IDP) is implemented when conditions or situations exist or are expected, which require additional measures and/or personnel to the Integrated Defense (ID) configuration. The plan identifies objectives to be sought by 377 ABW personnel in response to situations involving a defensive reaction. This plan serves as the basis for developing and executing security procedures for the protection of United States Air Force (USAF) Protection Level (PL) resources. It applies to both day-to-day operations and when there is a threat to the installation, requiring implementation of higher Force Protection Conditions (FPCONs). It also identifies events which require contingency actions to be implemented. In addition, this plan tasks KAFB agencies which range from increased surveillance over PL resources to supplying equipment and services to Security Forces not normally needed during normal security operations.

2. CONDITIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION:

2.1. (FOUO) Politico-Military Situation. Annexes C, K and Z to this plan outline actions to be taken during FPCONs and installation security contingencies. The installation commander will initiate the appropriate FPCON level based on the threat posed against the installation and its resources, or a Force Protection Condition Alerting Message (FPCAM) will be received directing implementation of a specific FPCON. Contingency actions will be implemented to cover an event requiring increased security measures.

2.2. (FOUO) Statement. This plan supplies the 377 ABW, 58th Special Operation Wing (58 SOW), 150th New Mexico Air National Guard (NMANG) Special Operations Wing (SOW) and other associate unit decision makers with a detailed review of security and support actions in the event of a threat to the base and its resources. Normally, on-duty Security Forces are capable of reacting to aggressive action against USAF PL resources on immediate notice. Additional ID forces may be assembled from on-duty or recalled off-duty security personnel when conditions dictate.

3. OPERATIONS TO BE CONDUCTED:

3.1. (FOUO) Force Requirements. Additional security personnel are not required to be deployed to KAFB in order to implement this plan. ID forces consisting of on duty Security Forces and Support Forces personnel in the Kirtland Underground Munitions Maintenance and Storage Complex (KUMMSC). Initial Back-up Force (IBF) consists of posted flightline Security Forces units. All on-duty Law Enforcement (LE) personnel, and all on-duty overhead personnel assigned to the 377 SFG are available for Follow-on Back-up forces (FBF). Subsequent FBFs will be formed by recalled off-duty Security Forces personnel. Owner/user personnel of PL resources may be required to arm under certain circumstances to protect their areas (i.e. 898 MUNS and 377 MXG personnel).

3.2. Deployment. Security Forces are posted in accordance with (IAW) requirements established by AFI 31-101, DOD 5210.41M/AFMAN 31-108 and Priority Posting charts outlined in Appendix 2 to Annex C.

3.3. (FOUO) Employment. ID strategy is based on the nine desired effects: Anticipate, Deter, Detect, Assess, Warn, Defeat, Delay, Defend and Recover. Ideally, defense forces receive adequate intelligence to anticipate any and all threats. As this is unlikely, attaining subsequent ID *Desired Effects* is necessary. For instance, it would be preferred to deter a threat, but if that does not succeed, the next ideal effect would be to detect the threat. Once the threat is detected, assessment by forces occurs. Friendly forces are then warned of the threat and actions are taken to defeat the threat. If the threat cannot be defeated, it must be delayed until the arrival of follow-on forces. If not possible, defensive measures must be taken to mitigate the effects of the threat. Recovery actions are then implemented to consolidate and reorganize friendly forces and restore operations.

3.4. Supporting Plans. Supporting plans are referenced below and in applicable Annexes. Tasked unit commanders are responsible for ensuring supporting unit directives are published, as necessary.

- a. KAFB OPLAN 10-245, Antiterrorism (AT) Program
- b. KAFB Installation Emergency Management Plan (IEMP) 10-2
- c. KAFB Plan 91-11, KUMMSC Emergency Response Plan
- d. KAFB Annex to FBI Local Integrated Response Plan (LIRP)
- e. KAFB Disease Containment Plan (DCP) 10-2604
- f. 377 MSG/CE Civil Engineer Contingency Response Plan (CE CRP)
- g. 377 SFG Tactical Assault Guide (TAG)
- h. KAFB Plan 91-01, Nuclear Surety Plan

4. KEY ASSUMPTIONS:

4.1. The nature of PL resources and their potential value to a hostile force could result in an attack against them. The stringent security measures employed for the protection of PL resources are a deterrent to hostile operations but do not completely eliminate the possibility of hostile actions.

4.2. (FOUO) The actions of dissident groups from the Albuquerque area protesting activities near or on KAFB could disrupt normal operations of the base and possibly increase the threat to PL resources. These groups could accost military personnel/civilian employees or resort to violence directed against the base and base entry points or they may enact passive measures. Actual trespass is possible and would increase the Security Forces workload for normal security and contingency operations.

4.3. There is the possibility that an attack could be launched without prior warning. Surveillance by an enemy force with knowledge of ID force methods would allow the enemy force the ability to target USAF resources at the onset of the hostile situation.

4.4. (FOUO) Rapid reinforcement of on-duty Security Forces may be subject to a substantial delay due to time and distance factors. The hostile force could have knowledge of this and make every effort to achieve their mission prior to recalled personnel arriving.

5. OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS: None.

6. TIME TO COMMENCE EFFECTIVE OPERATIONS: Operations outlined in this plan will be implemented when directed by the 377th Air Base Wing Commander (377 ABW/CC) or competent authority, or when a threat is suspected or an attack occurs. Each contingency operation will identify additional manpower and time constraints, if applicable.

7. (FOUO) COMMAND RELATIONSHIP: The 377 ABW/CC is responsible for implementation of this plan. The 377 ABW/CC has delegated this authority to the 377th Security Forces Group Commander (377 SFG/CC). The 377 SFG/CC is hereby appointed the Defense Force Commander (DFC). The DFC serves as the 377 ABW/CC's primary advisor for ID. This authority is further delegated to the on-duty Flight Commander (FCC) and Flight Chief (FC) for normal security operations and implementation of contingency operations. The 377 ABW/CC requires the commander of the tasked units and supporting units to ensure this plan is utilized for both normal and expanded/contingency security operations. Command succession is contained in the Basic Plan. This plan is directive in nature for assigned and associate units on KAFB. The DFC is delegated the authority to sign letters of transmittal after 377 ABW/CC approval of the plan or changes thereto. **NOTE:** Henceforth, throughout this document the 377 SFG/CC will be referred to as the DFC.

8. (FOUO) LOGISTICAL APPRAISAL: The 377th Maintenance Group Commander (377 MXG/CC), 898th Munitions Squadron Commander (898 MUNS/CC), 377th Mission Support Group Commander (377 MSG/CC), 377 MSG Communications Division (377 MSG/SC), 377th Force Support Squadron Civilian Leader (377 FSS/CL), 377 MSG Civil Engineer Division (377 MSG/CE), and 377th Medical Group Commander (377 MDG/CC) will provide logistical support to the security operations contained within this plan. Associate units required to provide such support will be identified in specific annexes, appendices, exhibits, tabs, or enclosures of this plan.

9. PERSONNEL APPRAISAL: With the inclusion of owner/user personnel from the 58 SOW, 150 SOW, and 377 SFG, the 377 ABW will be able to meet all manning requirements of this plan.

10. OTHER: Annex K to this plan can be detached and provided separately to units/organizations. Normal security items are listed only for referencing and resource protection incorporation to more effectively show the expansion/development of an increased FPCON. Distribution of Annex Z will be controlled.

KAFB IDP 31-101

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BASIC PLAN:

(FOUO) References: Restricted area maps and necessary reaction charts, posting boards, and checklists are located in the Site Security Control Center (WSSS/SSCC) and Base Defense Operations Center (BDOC). Other directives are:

DOD S- 5210.41-M / AFMAN 31-108, *Nuclear Weapon Security Manual*
DODI 5210.83, *DOD Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information*
DODI 4000.19, *Interagency Support Agreements (Agreements Between a DOD Component and a Federal Agency)*
DOD 3150.8-M, *DOD Response to Nuclear and Radiobiological Incidents*
DOD 5200.1, *Information Security Program*
DODD S-3600.1, *Information Operations*
CJCSI 3261.01B, *Recapture and Recovery of Nuclear Weapons*
CJCS Pub 1-03.7, *Joint Reporting Structure (JRS) General Instructions*
CJCS Pub 3-13, *Command and Control Warfare*
CJCS MOP 30, *Command and Control Warfare*
CJCSM 3220.01, *Joint Operations in the Electromagnetic Battle Space*
Joint Federal Travel Regulation, *Volume 1 and Volume 2*
Joint Publication 1-102, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*
Joint Publication 5-02.0, *Joint Operations Planning System*
Joint Publication 6-05 (Volumes. I-VII), *Manual for Deploying Joint Tactical Communications Systems*
AFI 10-101, *Format and Content of Mission Directives*
AFI 10-201, *Force Readiness Reporting*
AFI 10-206, *Operational Reporting*
AFI 10-245, *Antiterrorism (AT)*
AFI 10-401, *Air Force Operations Planning and Execution*
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AFI 10-414, *Requesting and Employing Deployable Communication Resources in Peacetime*
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AFI 34-501, *Mortuary Affairs Program*
AFI 33-332, *Air Force Privacy and Civil Liberties Program*
AFI 35-101, *Public Affairs Responsibilities and Management*
AFI 65-601, *Budget Guidance and Procedures*
AFI 84-101, *Historical Products Services and Requirements*
AFI 91-101, *Air Force Nuclear Weapons Surety Program*

AFI 91-204, *Safety Investigation and Reports*
AFMAN 31-113, *Installation Perimeter Access Control*
AFMAN 33-326, *Preparing Official Communications*
AFPD 35-1, *Public Affairs Management*
KAFB OPLAN 10-2, *Installation Emergency Management Plan (IEMP)*
KAFB OPLAN 10-245, *Antiterrorism Program*
KAFB LIRP
377 MDG MCRP, *377th Medical Group Contingency Response Plan*
KAFB Plan 91-11, *KUMMSC Emergency Response Plan*
KAFB Plan 91-01, *Nuclear Surety Plan*
KAFB Plan 10-205, *Personnel Notification and Recall*
KAFB Barrier Plan
377 SFG Tactical Assault Guide (TAG)
KAFB REFLEX DELTA Plan
sUAS Memo dtd 7 June 2016
***Includes all applicable Supplements referenced herein.*

CONTINUATION OF THE PLAN SUMMARY:

1. SITUATION:

1.1. General: KAFB is a closed base. This plan prescribes an acceptable level of security support for essential elements of the 377 ABW and KAFB mission partners; achieved through the coordinated efforts of the 377 SFG and assigned or attached units and agencies. An active interest in the support of security tasks by all personnel must be the goal of each assigned/attached unit and commander/staff agency chief. This plan provides for security operations during emergency situations and provides for preplanned responses to all known contingencies that may affect KAFB.

1.2. (FOUO) (FOUO) KAFB is designated as a contingency landing site for United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) Air Force Airborne Command Post (ABNCP) and Navy Take Charge and Move Out (TACAMO) aircraft which are PL 1 resources and should be considered a potential target of sabotage. PL aircraft are considered most vulnerable during arrival and departure. KAFB is host to the 150 SOW and 58 SOW. The diverse missions executed by these wings include, but are not limited to aircraft generation of C-130, CV-22, UH- 1N, and HH-60 aircraft. KAFB supports many agencies whose mission is to provide technological advances to increase the US war fighting capability. Some of the agencies include: The Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL), Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center (AFOTEC), the Space Development Test Directorate (SDTD), and the Air Force Safety Center (AFSEC). Other KAFB assets may be targets of sabotage because of their potential propaganda value.

1.3. Enemy Forces: The enemy is any adversary capable of threatening the installation's PL resources, personnel, facilities, and/or equipment. KAFB has the potential to be the scene of nonviolent/violent demonstrations and other forms of agitation; Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) annual Local Threat Assessment (LTA) and the Nuclear Security Threat Capability Assessment (NSTCA) must always be considered when planning to counter enemy threats. These assessments will drive protective actions when increased FPCONs are implemented. Both foreign and domestic elements have demonstrated the capability of engaging in violent terrorist activity; KAFB must be considered a target incident to general war situations.

1.3.1. (FOUO) Non-nuclear and Nuclear Threat: USAF installations, personnel, and resources face threats from criminals, terrorist groups (foreign and domestic), Special Operations Forces (SOF), and other hostile elements, motivated by one or more of the following: to satisfy political and/or military objectives, for financial profit, retribution, or for specific and non-specific psychological effects. Adversaries may attack both soft and hard targets and are capable of sabotage, destruction of USAF facilities and resources and murder of USAF personnel and their families. They have the capability to conduct close range and standoff attacks, to include small and large-scale bombings (suicide and otherwise), use of man portable air defense (MANPAD) systems, abductions, assassinations, in-transit ambushes, air assaults and small-scale chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) attacks.

1.3.2. Domestic Terrorism: According to the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI)'s Terrorist Research and Analytical Center, domestic terrorism is defined as "the unlawful UOF or violence, committed by a group(s) of two or more individuals, against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives." Acts of domestic terrorism are those which: (1) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or any state; (2) intend to intimidate or coerce a civilian population or to influence the policy of a government; (3) affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and (4) occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.

1.3.2.1. Criminal threat is described as an individual or small group of individuals, acting alone or in collusion with both the intent and means to commit criminal acts against USAF installations, personnel, and/or resources. This threat can be divided into random criminal acts and/or organized crime.

1.3.2.2. International terrorist threat is described as an individual, small group (cell), or several cells with both the intent and capability to target USAF installations, personnel, and/or resources. These groups have extensive knowledge of USAF security systems and protective operations associated with their intended target, based upon preoperational surveillance and various means of collecting open source information.

1.4. Friendly Forces: Friendly forces are receptive to our needs and will assist if possible, when called upon. The assignment of specific tasks is operationally difficult due to unforeseen commitments at any given time. Friendly forces include, but are not limited to the following: civil and federal agencies, although not specifically tasked by this plan, provide assistance and support in matters affecting the security of PL resources. The 377 SFG has entered into Memorandums of Understandings (MOU) with local law enforcement agencies which outline the requirements and implementations of an agreement reached by the 377 SFG and the agencies listed below. Types of support provided may include increased FPCON posting requirements, protest activity support, mitigation of standoff MANPAD attacks when requested. Additionally, general support may be requested for response to government/civilian owned areas outside of exclusive jurisdictions to detect/prevent criminal or suspicious activities. These MOUs are maintained by the 377 SFS/S5P and coordinated for review as required by AFI 25-201 and DODI 4000.19.

1.4.1. Neighboring Military Installations:

1.4.1.1. Holloman AFB, NM, located south of KAFB near Alamogordo, NM. Major Command (MAJCOM): Air Combat Command; Host Wing: 49th Fighter Wing.

1.4.1.2. Cannon AFB, NM, located southeast of KAFB eight miles west of Clovis, NM. MAJCOM: Air Force Special Operations Command; Host Wing: 27th Special Operations Wing.

1.4.1.3. Fort Bliss, TX, located south of KAFB near El Paso, TX. MAJCOM: US Army Training and Doctrine Command; Host Unit: 32nd Army Air and Missile Defense Command.

1.4.1.4. White Sands Missile Range, located south of KAFB, 27 miles east of Las Cruces, NM. MAJCOM: US Army Developmental Test Command; Host Unit: White Sands Test Center.

1.4.2. Civil Law Enforcement and Investigative Agencies:

1.4.2.1. (DCNI) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Albuquerque Field Office, 4200 Lucking Park Ave NE, Albuquerque, NM 87107, (505) 889-1550. Assistance may be requested for recapture/recovery operations and intelligence on terrorists or dissident forces. In the event of recapture/recovery operations for KUMMSC resources, the FBI is the lead federal agency (LFA) having overall jurisdiction on behalf of the Department of Justice (DoJ). For the purpose of this plan, any mention of LFA refers to the FBI.

1.4.2.2. New Mexico State Police, Albuquerque Office, 2501 Carlisle Blvd NE, Albuquerque, NM, 84110, (505) 841-9256. New Mexico State Police may be requested to assist the USAF in an event requiring civilian law enforcement assistance due to acts occurring off-base. Assistance will be requested for off-base incidents such as: assaults, the hostile removal of a PL resource from base, or an aircraft crash involving PL resources.

1.4.2.3. Albuquerque Police Department (APD), 400 Roma NW, Albuquerque, NM, 87102, (505) 242-2677. APD has exclusive jurisdiction on KAFB for public schools located on base and those areas listed in the agreement between the USAF and the city of Albuquerque, as well as certain areas enumerated on the base maps created by the Army Corps of Engineers. The agreement is maintained by 377th Logistics Readiness Squadron (377 LRS/LGRDX) office. Assistance will be requested for off-base incidents such as: assaults, the hostile removal of a PL resource from base, or an aircraft crash involving PL resources within the confines of the city of Albuquerque. Assistance may be requested during civil disturbances affecting entry/exit of personnel or vehicles to/from KAFB. The Phil Chacon Memorial Sub-station, APD Southeast Area Command is located at 800 Louisiana Blvd SE 87108, (505) 256-2050.

1.4.2.4. Bernalillo County Sheriff's Office (BCSO), 400 Marquette Ave NW, Albuquerque, NM, 87102, (505) 768-4100. BCSO has exclusive jurisdiction on KAFB for public schools located on-base and areas listed in the agreement between the USAF and the County of Bernalillo, 377 SFS/S5P maintains the agreement. Assistance will be requested for off-base incidents such as: assaults, the hostile removal of a PL resource from base, or an aircraft crash involving PL resources within the confines of Bernalillo County.

1.4.2.5. US Secret Service (USSS), 505 Marquette Ave NW, Albuquerque, NM 87102, (505) 248-5290. USSS deals with security arrangements for any high-ranking Distinguished Visitor (DV) visits.

1.4.2.6. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Police Department, 1501 San Pedro Drive SE, Albuquerque, NM, 87108, (505) 256-2730. VA Police can be called in to assist with any police matters that occur at the VA Hospital.

1.4.2.7. US Border Patrol (USBP). Due to the relative close proximity of national borders, the USBP is available to assist the USAF in the event of a hostile force gaining control of a PL resource and attempting to transport out of the country.

1.4.2.8. Isleta Tribal Police (ITP). ITP may be requested to assist the USAF in an event requiring civilian law enforcement assistance due to acts occurring off-base. Assistance will be requested for off base incidents such as: assaults, the hostile removal of a PL resource from base, or an aircraft crash involving PL resources within the Isleta Reservation.

1.4.2.9. The 150 SOW/150 SFS is located on KAFB. The resources assigned to this unit currently have a security priority of PL 3 and are provided protection by the 377 WSSS.

1.4.2.10. DoE Office of Secure Transportation (OST) Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) Protective Force. Assistance can be provided by way of mutual support of non-dedicated security forces during hostile adversary situations on KAFB which threatens DoE national security interests.

1.4.2.11. University of New Mexico (UNM) Police Department, 2500 Campus Blvd. NE, Hokona Hall Zuni Wing, Albuquerque, NM, 87131, (505) 277-2241.

1.4.2.12. City of Rio Rancho Police Department (RRPD), 2810 Southern Blvd. SE, Rio Rancho, NM, 87124, (505) 891-7227.

1.4.2.13. Bosque Farms Police Department (BFPD), 1455 W Bosque Loop, Bosque Farms, NM, 87068, (505) 869-2358.

1.4.2.14. City of Bernalillo Police Department (BPD), 739 Camino Del Pueblo, Bernalillo, NM, 87004, (505) 867-2304.

1.4.2.15. Valencia County Sheriff's Office (VCSO), 444 Luna Ave., Los Lunas, NM, 87031, (505) 866-2400.

1.4.2.16. Sandoval County Sheriff's Office (SCSO), 711 Camino Del Pueblo Bernalillo, NM, 87004, (505) 867-7526.

1.4.2.17. Santa Fe County Sheriff's Office (SFCISO), Public Safety Building, 35 Camino Justicia, Santa Fe, NM, 87508, (505) 986-2455.

1.5. Environment: See Annex O for weather and terrain analysis.

1.6. Civil Considerations: N/A

1.7. Assessments:

1.7.1. Local weapons of mass destruction (WMD) Assessment. Refer to Appendix 3 to Annex B to KAFB OPLAN, 10-245, (Local (VA)). Limited distribution is made on this appendix to provide maximum protection of elements of information. Agencies having a valid need for specific information in this enclosure may contact 377 SFS/S2 at (505) 846-4761 for access to the specific listing. The Integrated Defense Council (IDC) members will be knowledgeable of and consider WMD assessment when coordinating the approval of this plan. The DFC will ensure all SFG Security Forces personnel are knowledgeable of the WMD VA.

1.7.2. Local VA: Refer to Appendix 3 to Annex B to KAFB IDP 31-101. Limited distribution is made on this appendix to provide maximum protection of elements of information. Agencies having a valid need for specific information regarding this enclosure may contact 377 SFS/S2 at (505) 846-4761 for access to the specific listing. IDC members will be knowledgeable of and consider the Local VA when coordinating the approval of this plan. The DFC will ensure all SFG Security Forces personnel are knowledgeable of the Local VA.

1.8. Assumptions: This plan is based on the following assumptions. Additional assumptions relevant to specific aspects of the operation are included in the appendices, tabs, and enclosures of Annex C.

1.8.1. An assault could occur during adverse weather conditions or hours of darkness.

1.8.2. A hostile force could launch an attack during non-duty hours when the rapid reinforcement of on-duty SF would be delayed due to the non-availability of operations personnel.

1.8.3. Hostile forces could target specific security posts and patrols for elimination or neutralization.

1.8.4. KAFB could be targeted for hostile attack immediately preceding, concurrent with or shortly after initiation of strategic war.

1.8.5. A civil disturbance/riot could be directed against KAFB with the intent of disrupting the mission of the installation.

1.8.6. A hostile act could be directed at PL resources on the flightline which could disrupt all airfield operations.

2. MISSION: The mission of the 377 ABW is to provide world-class nuclear surety, expeditionary forces and support to base operations. Additionally, KAFB must prepare for and maintain the capability to prevent and neutralize hostile actions against PL resources. Counteract the analyzed threat (see Annex B) by establishing minimum essential responsibilities in response to the potential hostile threat (see Annex C).

3. EXECUTION:

3.1. Commanders Intent: Refer to Appendix 1 to Basic Plan.

3.2. (DCNI) Concept of Operations: FPCON Normal security operations are day-to-day security activities, which are in effect during non-emergency conditions to support PL resources. A combination of equipment, physical security aids, facilities, policies, procedures and ID forces consisting of the 377 SFG, personnel from other units identified and ID force responsible units will conduct security operations. When the Base Defense Operations Center (BDOC) or Site (SSCC) receives an alarm emanating from a PL resource, or ID force personnel directly in support of PL 1-3 resources, an armed response team will be immediately dispatched to determine the cause. A *Security Incident* will be declared (if applicable) and all on-duty ID forces alerted. If the response team determines there is no proof or possibility of hostile action and the area is secure, the alarm is terminated and the ID force returns to a normal vigilance posture. If the alarm situation is hostile and affects PL 1-3 resources, a *Covered Wagon* is declared, the on-duty ID force is ordered into a defensive reaction posture and FPCON Delta measures will be immediately implemented. Coordination and timely expansion of ID forces reaction and defensive capabilities will be made as rapidly as possible when an actual hostile assault occurs.

3.2.1. (FOUO) To reflect the mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops availability, time availability, and civil considerations (METT-TC) variations at each location, the force size and composition requirements include the statement “or more” to reflect that local circumstances may require additional security forces to properly support the currently deployed physical security technologies in order to deny unauthorized access to a weapon.

3.2.2. (FOUO) Integration of Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR), communication and sensor assets is essential to maintaining ID. ISR ensures all available information concerning the enemy, terrain, weather and civil considerations is obtained through intelligence reach, requests for information, reconnaissance and surveillance tasks. When combined with effective communication and sensor fusion, the results are successful reporting, production and dissemination of relevant information and intelligence to support ID.

3.3. Tasks to Integrated Defense Forces: Refer to Annex A for tasked organizations.

3.4. Coordinating Instructions:

3.4.1. The IDC will concur with the final draft of this plan prior to approval of the 377 ABW/CC. The 377 ABW/CC will approve and sign the plan. It will go into effect as of 0001 hrs, 14 calendar days after the letter of transmittal is signed.

3.4.2. Interim changes must be approved and signed by the 377 ABW/CC.

3.4.3. (FOUO) Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs) are elements of information required by the DFC that directly affect timely decision making. CCIRs are a key information management tool for the DFC that assists in the assessment of the operational environment and identifies decision points throughout the conduct of operations. Refer to Appendix 4 to Annex B for CCIRs.

3.4.4. Environmental hazards and special considerations (does not include TICs/TIMs, and Hazardous Materials (HAZMAT), which is addressed in the installation's Installation Emergency Management Plan, IEMP 10-2.

3.4.5. Each assigned/attached commander will establish and conduct an effective security education and motivation program in accordance with AFI 31-101, Integrated Defense.

3.4.6. All tasked and supporting units will provide active support in actual base defense operations and will implement appropriate checklists when notified of the following:

3.4.6.1. FPCAM.

3.4.6.2. *Covered Wagon*.

3.4.6.3. FPCON or contingency action.

3.4.6.4. Change in defense condition (DEFCON).

3.4.6.5. Initiation of contingency plans for deployment, wartime mission, or other operations affecting security operations.

4. SERVICE SUPPORT:

4.1. (FOUO) Concept of Support: During normal operations and implementation of FPCONs or contingencies, tasked and supporting units are responsible for providing support to SF by detecting and reporting unusual or suspicious events, personnel or activities. The goal is not only the security of PL resources, but of all USAF/DOD resources.

4.2. (FOUO) Security Force Augmentation Policy: The 377 SFG will continue to form subsequent Follow-on Backup Forces (FBFs) until SF manpower resources are depleted.

4.3. (FOUO) Weapons and Ammunition: Weapons, ammunition, and associated equipment employed by Security Forces are maintained in designated Security Forces facilities. Issue and maintenance of this equipment is the responsibility of the DFC. Direct support of

weapons, ammunition, and associated equipment will be issued at the guidance of the 377 SFS/CC and the 377 WSSS/CC. The 377 SFG Armory located in Bldg. 20221 and is designated as the primary arming point for SF personnel during contingencies. The 377 SFG Combat Arms Training and Maintenance (CATM) Vault located in Bldg. 706 is designated as the alternate arming point.

4.4. Resupply: Resupply is defined as enough ammunition to provide the RF and IBF with one full replacement basic load for each weapon used (in all environments). Resupply locations will be decided by the Incident Commander (IC) utilizing METT-TC.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL:

5.1. (FOUO) Command Relationships: The 377 Air Base Wing (ABW)/CC maintains overall responsibility for support of Air Force operations conducted at KAFB. The 377 SFG, 377 MXG, 377 MDG, and 377 MSG are major units and subordinate units to the ABW. They are responsible for ensuring the mission of the 377 ABW is completed IAW applicable DOD directives. Lines of command for the 377 ABW and a listing of tenant units may be found in the base support plan.

5.2. (FOUO) The DFC for KAFB directs ID support for host and tenant units. The DFC will maintain tactical control (TACON) over all assigned and attached SF, civilian, DAF, and other personnel assigned ID responsibilities.

5.3. Provisions of this plan are directive in nature for all assigned and tenant units on KAFB.

5.4. AFOSI Detachment 814 falls under the command and control of the 8th Field Investigations Region and Headquarters AFOSI, which is a field operating agency under the direction and guidance of the Air Force Inspector General (SAF/IG). It performs as a federal law enforcement agency with the authority to initiate independent criminal investigations, counterintelligence activities, provides specialized investigative and force protection (FP) support for the Air Force.

See AF FM 673
ERIC H. FROEHLICH, Colonel, USAF
Commander

APPENDIX 1 TO BASIC PLAN TO KAFB IDP 31-101
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Statement of Commander's Intent for ID

1. This memorandum provides the commander's intent for the protection of KAFB under guidance from the DOD Combating Terrorism program. It applies to all personnel, missions, and assets, either permanently or temporarily assigned, for which he has executive agent responsibilities for ID. The DFC will develop the IDP in coordination with the IDC. All wing agencies and organizations will assist in the development and execution of these plans.

2. (DCNI) Commander's Intent: KAFB will conduct a layered defense operation, identifying our threats as early as possible to ensure mission accomplishment and protect our personnel, their families, facilities and resources. Intelligence/information fusion and Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (IPOE) efforts will drive ID actions to deter an attack (first layer of defense). Included in this first layer is an active Public Affairs program to provide strong awareness, training and educational efforts for the installation and supporting community. If deterrence efforts fail and the installation is attacked, KAFB's ID forces will limit access and force the aggressor to deploy and defeat our efforts at the installation perimeter (second layer). Base sectorization will be established within the defined and optimally-defensible installation perimeter. Should an attacker penetrate the perimeter, interior protection of critical assets (third layer) will be established through a combination of technical and tactical means, with heavy emphasis placed on owner/user protection of assets. The ID priority of effort in the defense of the installation is: (1) To protect and ensure continued support of our nuclear operations, (2) to protect other protection level resources and government property (3) to save lives and prevent serious injury by reducing vulnerability to mass casualty incidents on the installation and off-base facilities when warranted; and (4) to minimize mission degradation. Integrating incident response planning to mitigate the results of a successful attack through training and exercising of first responder/emergency response teams and developing consequence management capabilities with the objective of returning to pre-incident conditions as quickly and efficiently as possible will be an ongoing action. Under the direction of the DFC, formal and natural working groups supporting ID efforts will accomplish the following specific tasks:

- a. The IDRMP will identify the most likely and most dangerous credible threats to our installation.
- b. Assess and prioritize critical assets that if attacked, could result in significant loss of life and mission degradation.
- c. Assess and prioritize the most exploitable threat-based vulnerabilities to our installation.
- d. (FOUO) Develop countermeasure courses of action (COA) maximizing defensive gains while affording the least burden to the mission and people on the installation. The SFG does not have the manpower or resources to defend the entire installation; therefore, we will protect key assets by maximizing owner/user security employed in defensive sectors

throughout the installation for key asset protection and will deploy SF for maximum show of force, aggressive patrolling and flexible response. A strong perimeter is the foremost goal, as this will allow greater freedom of maneuver on the interior of the installation with greater mission generation capability and quality of life.

e. (FOUO) The DFC will develop priority posting charts based on FPCONs Normal through Delta when National Threat Levels are low to severe. The DFC will provide defensive forces capable of deterring and defeating the most likely enemy COAs and maintain flexibility to rapidly address emerging threats.

f. (FOUO) In order to preserve nuclear operations and other mission requirements, we must address the area external to the installation perimeter fence line from which historical precedent indicates the threat will likely come. This requires the formulation of the BSZ as a planning tool to encompass the standoff threat weapons ranges most used by the Level 1 and 2 threats in our area of responsibility (AOR). Where the BSZ exceeds the capability of our organic forces within the base boundary, accommodations must be made with local civil authorities.

3. (DCNI) Commander's Risk Tolerance Statement: As the individual ultimately responsible for the defense of personnel and resources assigned to KAFB and given the reality that we cannot realistically afford to protect every mission asset or mission area all the time, I will accept some risk in the defense of the installation. We must prioritize critical assets and vulnerabilities, seeking the greatest payback in risk reduction for each resource invested. We will employ the IDRMP and develop reasonable COAs to mitigate risk capable of causing mass casualties or significant mission degradation. The protection and continued support of the nuclear operation is the number one priority.

4. Desired Installation End State: KAFB will meet DOD AT Standards and Air Force ID Standards by carefully selecting tactics and wisely committing resources. KAFB will have a clear, concise, and executable threat-based AT Plan and IDP. The IDP will contain specific, supportable action sets to effectively transition from FPCON Normal through Delta and fully integrate incident response, and consequence management. The installation will maintain a solid annual management program based on the plan-train-exercise-review cycle emphasizing readiness and flexible response capability.

5. The POC for this memorandum is the DFC, 377 SFG/CC. DSN: 246-0778.

See AF FM 673
ERIC H. FROEHLICH, Colonel, USAF
Commander

ANNEX A TO KAFB IDP 31-101
TASKED ORGANIZATIONS

REFERENCES: Refer to the Basic Plan.

1. SITUATION: All personnel assigned to KAFB, all associate and tenant units, and all other personnel located on this installation are subject to the provisions of this plan. Additionally, this Annex provides tasking for specific antiterrorism/FP working groups.

2. MISSION: See Basic Plan.

3. EXECUTION: See Basic Plan.

3.1. The 377 ABW/CC will:

3.1.1. Assume overall command of all defensive operations.

3.1.2. Request friendly force support as needed.

3.1.3. (FOUO) Form the Crisis Action Team (CAT) and the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) as required.

3.1.4. Ensure tasked agencies complete all tasks as outlined in this plan and supporting plans.

3.1.5. Task base organizations to augment critical functions during contingency and other operations as required.

3.2. The KCP will:

3.2.1. (FOUO) Ensure the WSSS/SSCC and SFS/BDOC are informed of all FPCAMs on any situation requiring implementation of increased security measures or any non-directive FPCAMs recommending actions ordered for implementation by the installation commander.

3.2.2. Provide immediate up-channel reporting of FPCONs and *Covered Wagons* to AFGSC and Air Force Service Watch Cell (AFSWC).

3.2.3. Keep the 377 ABW/CC updated on all reports or alerting orders.

3.2.4. Transmit follow-up reports to AFGSC and AFSWC.

3.2.5. (FOUO) Immediately notify the WSSS/SSCC and SFS/BDOC of any Commonwealth of Independent States (former Soviet Union) or Non-Allied Nation aircraft attempting to or has landed at or near KAFB.

3.2.6. Control entry into the KCP during normal operations.

3.2.7. Perform all tasks assigned under tabs to Annex C of the plan.

3.2.8. KCP notifies all on-call members of the CAT/EOC of its activation.

3.2.9. (DCNI) Ensure the National Military Command Center (NMCC) is notified immediately if the control of PL resources assigned to KUMMSC are seized/relinquished illegally from DoD/DoE control.

3.3. Airfield Management (377 MXS/MXO) will:

3.3.1. Report suspicious overhead-flights or unusual activities to WSSS/SSCC.

3.3.2. Immediately notify WSSS/SSCC and SFS/BDOC of any known unauthorized aircraft landings.

3.3.3. Immediately notify WSSS/SSCC when aircraft requiring security support are scheduled to land at KAFB.

3.3.4. Refer to Defense Transportation Regulation 4500.9-R for customs procedures and inspection procedures for crewmembers and personal baggage on aircraft.

3.3.5. Comply with all tasks as outlined in this plan.

3.4. The DFC will:

3.4.1. Maintain command and control over ID operations. This command and control is executed through the SFS/BDOC and WSSS/SSCC IAW the command relationship (refer to Plan Summary para. 7).

3.4.2. Be responsible for the management, supervision, and training of security and ID forces IAW with AFI 31-101 paragraph 1.5. The DFC will maintain TACON over all assigned and attached SF, civilian police, and other personnel assigned ID responsibilities.

3.4.3. Provide advisory services for units and organizations assigned ID responsibilities, receive requirements from units and organizations assigned ID responsibilities, and incorporate those requirements in the IDP.

3.4.4. Develop and conduct ID training through the 377 SFG Training and Combat Arms sections and provide input to units and organizations in the development of owner/user training requirements.

3.4.5. Ensure ID forces maintain a high degree of proficiency required to support this plan.

3.4.6. Develop and publish the IDP, incorporate and adapt installation security policies, and develop installation security standards and procedures.

3.4.7. Ensure the IDRMP is conducted every 12 months.

3.4.8. Provide input to installation risk assessments and response planning.

3.4.9. (FOUO) Provide an advisor to the EOC when activated, assist the 377 ABW/CC in security matters, and oversee security operations.

3.4.10. Through WSSS/SSCC and SFS/BDOC, ensure all ID force personnel are informed/recalled, as required by FPCAM orders and/or any situation requiring implementation of increased security measures.

3.4.11. Ensure normal operations/procedures are developed for liaison between 377 SFG, city, county, state, and federal law enforcement agencies.

3.4.12. Assist in evacuation of personnel when disasters, major accidents, mass casualties, or other contingencies warrant.

3.4.13. Ensure procedures are developed for aircrew removal in the event a commonwealth of Independent States (former Soviet Union) or Non-Allied Nation aircraft lands at KAFB.

3.4.14. React to up/down-channel reports and ensure KCP, WSSS/SSCC and SFS/BDOC are notified as appropriate.

3.4.15. Ensure follow-up reports are transmitted to KCP IAW DOD 5210.41M and AFI 31-101.

3.5. The 58 SOW/CC will:

3.5.1. (FOUO) Owner/user will provide unarmed ID forces for protection of PL resources within their restricted area IAW Enclosure 5 to Tab A to Appendix 1 to Annex C of this plan.

3.5.2. Ensure airlift support is provided as soon as possible during recapture/recovery operations.

3.5.3. The 58 SOW/CC, through the 58 SOW Wing Operations Center (WOC) will:

3.5.3.1. (FOUO) Provide WSSS/SSCC information on all aircraft movements with tail number of aircraft and location, and coordinate owner/user security support for any aircraft removed from the restricted area. **NOTE:** A temporary restricted area consisting of ropes, cones, stanchions and signs must be established by owner/user personnel when PL 3 or higher aircraft are to be left outside a permanently designated

restricted area. Owner/user personnel are also required to provide security on any such aircraft when removed from the permanently designated restricted areas.

3.5.3.2. Brief all 58 SOW personnel on changes in security and threat status as the need arises.

3.5.4. (FOUO) Requests for free-zone establishment will be coordinated as identified in Enclosure 11 To Tab A To Appendix 1 To Annex C of this plan. Aerospace Ground Equipment (AGE) will provide sufficient portable light units, not to exceed 10 total units, for pad security and flightline loading operations when requested.

3.5.5. For logistical support see Appendix 1 to Annex I, Logistics:

3.5.5.1. (FOUO) When available, provide helicopter support for support of PL 1 resources.

3.5.5.2. (DCNI) AGE will provide sufficient portable light units, not to exceed 10 total units, for pad security and flightline loading operations when requested by WSSS/SSCC and not exceed 14 light units for installation entry/checkpoint operations during contingencies when requested by SFS/BDOC. In all cases, light units will be available at the 377 ABW Transient Alert (TA) ready line for use. If positioning is required, the 58 SOW will position the units as needed. In the event of an increase in FPCON during daylight hours, light units will be positioned no later than (NLT) 1 hour prior to sunset.

3.5.5.3. (DCNI) AGE, will provide sufficient portable light units, not to exceed 10 total units for manned flightline entry control points (ECPs) and security operations during contingencies on the 58 SOW and 377 ABW TA aircraft parking ramps during loading operations when requested by WSSS/SSCC. Add additional light units not to exceed 4 total units for pad entry control/checkpoint and security operations during nuclear missions. In all cases, light units will be available at the TA ready line for use. If positioning is required, the 58 SOW will position the units as needed. In the event of an increase in FPCON during daylight hours, light units will be positioned NLT 1 hour prior to sunset.

3.5.5.4. Ensure the 58 MXS/MXMG provides light units, not to exceed 10 total units, during flightline or contingency operations on the 58 SOW and 377 TA aircraft parking ramps when requested by the 377 SFG.

NOTE: The above tasking's are not all-inclusive and depending on the situation, evaluation to meet needs must be made on the spot.

3.6. The 150 SOW/CC will:

3.6.1. (FOUO) Owner/user will provide unarmed or armed ID forces for protection of PL resources within their restricted area IAW Enclosure 4 to Tab A to Appendix 1 to Annex C of this plan.

3.6.2. (FOUO) The 150 SOW/WOC will provide the WSSS/SSCC information on all aircraft movements with tail number of aircraft and location. They will also coordinate security support of any aircraft removed from the restricted area. **NOTE:** A temporary restricted area consisting of ropes, cones, stanchions and signs must be established by owner/user personnel when PL 3 or higher aircraft are to be left outside a permanently designated restricted area. Owner/user personnel are also required to provide security on any such aircraft when removed from the permanently designated restricted areas.

3.6.3. Provide civil engineering support for all physical security safeguards, i.e., fencing, lighting, cables, highway dividers, etc., pertaining to their restricted area.

3.6.4. Provide necessary road and ground maintenance to include vegetation control in and around their restricted area.

3.6.5. Perform all tasks assigned in Annex C of this plan.

3.6.6. (FOUO) The 150 SOW will coordinate with WSSS/SSCC on PL resource movements out of the 150 SOW area. This reporting does not include aircraft departing for flight. Requests for free zone establishment will be coordinated as identified in Enclosure 11 To Tab A To Appendix 1 To Annex C of this plan.

3.7. The 898 MUNS/CC will:

3.7.1. (DCNI) Notify 377 WSSS (SSCC and S3OS) of convoy movements requiring security escort.

3.7.2. (DCNI) Notify 377 WSSS (SSCC and S3OS) of all scheduled deliveries of PL resources at KAFB and provide a copy of the notification message used by the convoy commander to verify the courier's identity against the notification message.

3.7.3. (DCNI) Ensure all notifications are completed with sufficient time to prepare for logistics movements.

3.7.4. (DCNI) Respond to major alarm system failures and emergency work orders associated with KUMMSC in the event resources need to be relocated, as determined by 898 MUNS/CC and DFC.

3.7.5. (DCNI) Ensure armed facility personnel, logistics movement technical advisors, and logistics movement vehicle drivers are adequately trained on appropriate topics identified in DOD S- 5210.41M_AFMAN 31-108 commensurate with their duties, as determined by 898 MUNS/CC and DFC.

3.7.6. (FOUO) 898 MUNS CTS technicians to repair and maintain the KUMMSC security system as required.

3.8. (FOUO) The 377 MXS/CC will ensure owner/user provides unarmed or armed ID forces for protection of PL resources within their restricted area IAW Enclosure 6, para 6.9 of this plan.

3.8.1. Sufficient quantities of base defense ammunition for FPCON and contingency actions based on available stockpiles and will be coordinated through 377 MXS.

APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX A TO KAFB IDP 31-101
SUPPORT UNIT TASKINGS

REFERENCES: Refer to the Basic Plan.

1. SITUATION: All personnel assigned to KAFB, all associate and tenant units, and all other personnel located on this installation are subject to the provisions of this plan. Additionally, this appendix provides tasking for specific support functions. Retiree's school children, visitors etc would not be subject to the provisions of this plan.

2. MISSION: See Basic Plan.

3. EXECUTION: See Basic Plan.

4. Tasks to Supporting Units:

4.1. The 377 MDG/CC will:

4.1.1. Provide public health support and environmental hazard recognition and control for KAFB.

4.1.2. Provide limited field medical response to disasters that occur in the facility and on Kirtland AFB.

4.1.3. Provide a Field Response Team to advise the Kirtland Fire Department and provide triage for flightline, KUMMSC and mass casualty incidents.

4.1.4. Ensure Bioenvironmental Engineering (BEE) provides a representative and available BEE response teams to support this plan and applicable FPCON Checklists.

4.1.5. Ensure medical personnel are trained on procedures for emergency entry into restricted areas and that these procedures are followed.

4.2. The 377 FSS/CL will:

4.2.1. Provide ground feeding capability for posted or deploying Security Forces personnel on a 24-hour basis. The 377 FSS/CL will also provide mortuary affairs support for deceased personnel IAW AFI 34-242.

4.2.2. Ensure that Temporary Duty (TDY) levy tasking's are received via Deliberate and Crisis Action Planning Segments (DCAPES), containing detailed levy data necessary for the required PERSDEP [(RCS: HAF/FPM9AR) 7150] reporting. The 377 FSS/FSOXI will acknowledge receipt of levy tasking's within four hours after their arrival. Use priority message to Headquarters (HQ) AFGSC/A1R.

4.2.3. Provide Casualty Assistance Support. Casualty reports will be submitted IAW AFI 36-3002, Casualty Services.

4.2.4. The 377 FSS/FSMM will coordinate augmentation duty manning through the Augmentation Review Board (ARB) for all units who have established requirements in support of this plan.

4.3. The 377 MSG/CE will:

4.3.1. Provide top priority maintenance for Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) and all other physical security safeguards (i.e., fencing and lighting) for all restricted areas to include the flightline. Maintenance teams will maintain the capability to respond to emergency calls within 2 hours. **NOTE:** 377 MSG/CE is responsible for IDS until all contract responsibilities are complete. Once contract responsibilities are complete; responsibility will transfer to Installation Base Defense Security System (IBDSS) contract holder.

4.3.2. (FOUO) Provide necessary road/ground maintenance in and around KUMMSC, convoy routes, and other areas where PL resources are located. Top priority consideration will be given to repair deficiencies noted.

4.3.3. Ensure compliance of this plan by private contractors.

4.3.3.1. (FOUO) Provide road and ground maintenance in and around KUMMSC, convoy routes, hot cargo pads, and other areas where operational resources are located in accordance with the Contract PWS. Top priority consideration will be given to required repairs, when necessary. 377 MSG/CE will ensure compliance of these requirements by private contractors upon notification and approval of the Contracting Officer.

4.3.3.2. (FOUO) Provide Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) support to identify, render safe, or dispose of hazards associated with improvised explosive devices (IEDs) or special weapons. EOD may be required to provide explosives and technical expertise to tactically enter areas for recapture/recovery operations.

4.3.3.3 Provide available barriers and maintenance of barriers to critical facilities listed in the approved 377 MSG/CE Barrier Plan.

4.3.3.4. Develop a coordinated contingency plan for WMD and IEMP/disaster preparedness response.

4.3.4. The Fire Chief or designated Senior Fire Official (SFO) will be the IC for all incidents involving two or more response agencies.

4.4. The 377 LRS/CC will:

4.4.1. Provide vehicles for SF use as approved on the Vehicle Authorization List (VAL).

4.4.2. Provide replacement vehicles to SF as requested for convoy operations when they are below minimum essential levels and on a one-for-one basis anytime the SFG is at less than minimum essential level. Additional requirements for 4x4s will be substituted with similarly capable vehicles when SFG 4x4s are not sufficiently available IAW DOD S-5210.41-M-V1 AFMAN 31-108V1 Enclosure 7.

4.4.3. (FOUO) During mobility operations, provide transportation for passengers and cargo for 377 SFG with assets from the Deployment Vehicle Operations (DVO) AFI 10-403 and KAFB Installation Deployment Plan for DVO operations.

4.4.4. (FOUO) Provide maximum vehicle support to the 377 SFG in the event of a hostile attack on PL resources.

4.4.5. The 377 LRS will provide vehicles to the 377 SFG IAW the 377 LRS Minimum Essential Vehicle/Priority Recall Listing.

4.4.6. (FOUO) Provide maintenance to vehicles assigned to the 377 SFG. Armored HMMWVs used in support of nuclear security operations will have the highest priority. Priority (Red) maintenance will be provided during contingency operations. Replacement of four-wheel drive vehicles will be IAW the 377 LRS Minimum Essential Vehicle/Priority Recall Listing.

4.4.7. Provide replacement vehicles to 377 SFG on a one-for-one basis when they are below minimum-essential levels.

4.4.8. Ensure coordination with 377 SFG to ensure Minimum Essential Vehicle/Priority Recall Listing is updated and meet posting requirements listed in this plan.

4.5. The 377 MXS/CC will:

4.5.1. (FOUO) Supply sufficient quantities of base defense ammunition to resupply Security Forces in an emergency operation. Resupply will be based on available AF "KAFB" stock. Issue and movement of munitions will be coordinated with the Munitions Accountable Systems Officer (MASO) and the Security Forces armory.

4.5.2. (FOUO) Coordinate with WSSS/SSCC on all PL resource movements in and out of the restricted area. Requests for free zone establishment will be coordinated as identified in Enclosure 11 To Tab A To Appendix 1 To Annex C of this plan.

4.6. The 377 ABW/JA will:

4.6.1. Furnish all possible legal advice, assistance and services to the wing command element and subordinate commands for all issues involving installation security and law and order operations.

4.6.2 Act as the OPR for defining, maintaining, and coordinating continuity, changes and other military jurisdiction issues. 377 SFG maintains exclusive and proprietary jurisdiction on KAFB. Due to the specific nature of KAFB, DOE maintains specific jurisdiction however, regarding DOD assets/personnel, USAF maintains responsibility for response/prosecution of all areas designated as exclusive jurisdiction. Proprietary jurisdictional areas will require a USAF response, however, local authorities are ultimately responsible for disposition of the perpetrator. A pictorial representation of installation jurisdiction is maintained at 377 ABW/JA, 377 SFS/S5P and 377 SFS/Law and Order Operations.

4.7. Public Affairs will:

4.7.1. The release of information authority for KAFB is the 377 ABW/CC, who has delegated this authority to the 377 ABW/PA Director. KAFB has three public affairs offices on the installation belonging to associate units:

1. 377 ABW/PA Director
2. AFSEC/PA
3. 150 SOW/PA

4.7.2. Air Force military and civilian employees must coordinate release of information through 377 ABW/PA or 377 ABW/CC when an incident occurs off base and requires a response from KAFB. This includes, but is not limited to, aircraft accidents, recapture/recovery operations, establishment of NDAs, cordons extending off the installation, and other actions that may have public impact.

4.7.3. All personnel supporting this plan will:

4.7.3.1. Refer all public and media questions to the 377 ABW/PA at 846-5991.

4.7.3.2. Inform 377 ABW/PA of activities that may be of interest to the public.

4.7.4. The 377 ABW/CC or delegated representative (377 ABW/PA) will:

4.7.4.1. Approve news releases and photos.

4.7.4.2. Ensure information proposed for public release is reviewed for security and policy consistency.

4.7.4.3. (FOUO) Ensure 377 ABW/PA establishes a Joint Information Center (JIC) when the situation dictates its implementation.

4.7.4.4. 377 ABW/PA, upon determining a contingency response or event to be significant enough to be channeled up the chain of command, will notify:

1. AFGSC/PA (DSN: 787-6306)
2. SAF/PA (DSN: 225-0640)
3. OASD/PA (DSN: 227-9312)

4.7.4.5. A JIC will be established in the event DoE, Sandia National Laboratories and/or the City of Albuquerque are affected.

4.7.5. (FOUO) The FBI will assume investigative or IC command and control for all responses within Annex C in which they respond. The 377 ABW/CC or designated representative will ensure proper coordination and review.

4.8. The 377 MSG/SC will:

4.8.1. (FOUO) Provide equipment, circuit restoration and Land Mobile Radio (LMR) repair as indicated by the KAFBC4 Restoration Plan. During contingency situations, the 377 ABW/CC may deem it necessary to change priorities based on recommendations from the CAT or 377 MSG/SC.

4.8.2. (FOUO) The 377 MSG/SC will assign a priority maintenance response for SF and related communications systems in accordance with Annex H of this plan. The current maintenance priority lists for SF radio nets are F8(primary)(SF1) and F9 (alternate)(SF1) for 377 WSSS Net, F1 (primary) (LE1) and F2 (alternate)(LE2) for 377SFS Net and F10 (PADS Ops) for Convoy Operations. This priority system (1) indicates an immediate, not to exceed 90 minute, response time. Alphabetical shred-out designates order of restoration when facilities of the same priority designates are encountered i.e., A before B. The Kirtland trunked radio system is managed by the Department of Energy (DOE), so overall restoral is dependent upon response from DOE staff and minatenance work centers.

4.8.3. (FOUO) 377 MSG/SC personnel will provide caretaker protection to key communications facilities utilizing increased surveillance and standby personnel from facilities in close proximity to identified trouble areas.

4.8.4. Provide Communications Security (COMSEC) assistance to all units on-base.

ANNEX B TO KAFB IDP 31-101
INTELLIGENCE

REFERENCES: Refer to the Basic Plan.

1. SITUATION: Intelligence information is necessary to make logical plans for contingency operations. The installation's arrangement of resources and the types of resources located at Kirtland present a challenge to the base security and protection against collection efforts of individuals either from or on behalf of a foreign intelligence entity (FIE). All personnel must assist in providing measures to prevent the disclosure or proliferation of sensitive information that would give adversaries a military advantage. For further information refer to the Basic Plan.

2. MISSION: To provide the DFC significant intelligence data that could affect the security and defense of KAFB. To provide background and history on terrorist, criminal or dissident groups known to be operating in the Albuquerque, NM area and/or those who pose a definite threat to resources and personnel located at KAFB, regardless of their geographical location. Analyze information and intelligence for use by the DFC to protect resources on KAFB from the threat of interference, damage, theft, or destruction and minimize disruption of mission capability.

3. EXECUTION: This annex's objective is to establish the installation requirements and components for IPOE. IPOE provides the DFC with information used to adjust the base security posture to deter threats and/or acts of violence against KAFB resources and personnel. The purpose of intelligence operations is to gather intelligence affecting KAFB and determine a possible course of action to counter the threat. AFOSI and 377 SFS/S2 are responsible for receiving and analyzing intel for trend analysis purposes. AFOSI is primarily responsible for conducting all intelligence gathering and counter intelligence activities for KAFB. Proper execution consists of:

3.1. Collection. The collection of intelligence information to protect the base and its resources will follow executive orders, policy directives and instructions. Any unit or agency that receives information of possible intelligence value will immediately report it to AFOSI and/or 377 SFS. AFOSI should be informed of all intelligence concerning a foreign nexus. Information pertaining to domestic US developments, including the local area, should be provided to AFOSI.

3.2. Collation. AFOSI will ensure all information of possible Intelligence value received is cross fed among other threat working group (TWG), IFC, integrated defense working group (IDWG) and integrated defense council (IDC) members (within security constraints) to ensure proper analysis and reporting is made. AFOSI has the primary responsibility for gathering and collating intelligence information pertaining to foreign threats against USAF resources and is responsible for ensuring the information is annotated in the integrated defense risk management process (IDRMP) whenever changes occur or new information is received.

3.3. Analysis. AFOSI will analyze all information of possible intelligence value pertaining to foreign terrorist or enemy threats. If needed, they may request assistance from 377 SFS/S2 or other base agencies.

3.4. Dissemination. AFOSI will inform the Installation Commander, through the TWG, of any changes pertaining to the FIE threat to USAF resources. Significant or imminent changes, or those affecting KAFB resources or missions, will be reported as soon as possible to the IDWG, so that information can be placed in the IDRMP. This will enable the Installation Commander, based on TWG recommendations, to implement increased protection. Commanders and branch chiefs will ensure all personnel are aware of the need to restrict dissemination of intelligence information. Intelligence information will not be released outside of USAF channels without prior approval of the 377 ABW/CC.

3.5. The Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center Intelligence section (AFNWC/NT) is the wing's primary source of Intelligence.

4. TASKS: Commanders, directors, and agency chiefs will understand their role in the IPOE process. The goal being to leverage information and intelligence to support the timely identification of indicators and warnings of emerging localized threats.

APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX B TO KAFB IDP 31-101
INTELLIGENCE FUSION CELL (IFC)

REFERENCES: Refer to the Basic Plan.

1. SITUATION: See Basic Plan
2. MISSION: Collect, assess, and analyze information to assist the DFC in making immediate, proactive decisions for ID planning
3. EXECUTION:
 - 3.1. Concept of Operations. The IFC is an action group whereby the 377 SFS/S2 Staff (Intelligence) function coordinates with subject matter experts (SMEs) from the Intelligence and AFOSI communities to collaborate and conduct IPOE, in direct support of the Installation Commander's ID mission. The goal being to leverage information and intelligence to support the timely identification of indicators and warnings of emerging localized threats.
 - 3.1.1. The IFC is a tactical-level action team whose primary function is to assess the threat for the DFC and recommend COAs to mitigate or counter the threat. The IFC functions in tandem with the DFC's operations staff in the planning and execution of ID. The IFC supports the DFC directly by enabling him/her to make timely, predictive and proactive decisions for ID planning through streaming analyses of real-time data. The IFC does not fulfill the function of a TWG.
 - 3.1.2. The IFC consists of representatives from the 377 SFS/S2, AFNWC/NT, and AFOSI Detachment 814. Intelligence and FP experts from other base organizations will be invited to participate. The IFC will meet as needed (virtually or otherwise) to review the current threat and advise the DFC accordingly.
 - 3.2. Assumptions: The IFC will operate under the following assumptions:
 - 3.2.1. The base is vulnerable to theft, pilferage, sabotage, and other threats due to its size and resources.
 - 3.2.2. The gathering of information with intelligence value is critical in assessing the threat against government assets. Intelligence must be evaluated on the local threat as well as the threat abroad. The timeliness and value of threat intelligence will determine threat response effectiveness.
 - 3.2.3. (FOUO) Security personnel, both military and civilian, may be insufficient to provide total protection of all installation resources; therefore, the principle owner/user of a facility, resource, or personnel must develop adequate unit awareness and safeguard measures.

3.2.4. The installation, personnel and resources may be targeted by hostile elements for political, criminal or other intentions. These hostile elements may be indigenous to the US or come from other nations.

3.3. Tasks and Responsibilities.

3.3.1. 377 ABW/CC will establish an IFC comprised of key base personnel to assess the local and global threat to KAFB assets.

3.3.2. The IFC will:

3.3.2.1. Execute a continuous information gathering/analyzing effort on threat information to ascertain if there is any information relative to KAFB or the surrounding area in direct support of the Installation Commander's ID mission.

3.3.2.2. Provide the DFC with threat information to assist in making immediate, proactive decisions for ID planning

3.3.2.3. Disseminate information to the public through the AFOSI "Eagle Eyes" program, briefings, commander's calls, SF guard mounts, and other normal military gatherings.

3.3.2.4. Participate in the planning of installation ID base exercises.

3.3.2.5. Develop adversary Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) and probable COAs for use by the DFC.

3.3.2.6. Develop/update the Local NSTCA annually or as changes to the threat occur.

3.3.2.7. Assist in the development of the Installation Commander and DFC CCIRs, to include Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs) and Friendly Force Information Requirements (FFIRs) for use to assess the operational environment and identify decision points throughout the conduct of operations.

3.3.2.8. Participate in the Integrated Defense Working Group (IDWG), TWG, and Antiterrorism Working Group (ATWG).

3.3.2.9. Provide information/assistance in the development/updates to the IDRMP.

3.3.3. AFOSI Detachment 814 will:

3.3.3.1. Execute information gathering to determine the existing and forecasted threat against KAFB and the local area at the national level. Coordinate with HQ AFOSI, federal, state, local law enforcement and other civil and military antiterrorism agencies to acquire a total sight picture of the threat.

3.3.3.2. Develop realistic threat scenarios for installation exercises in coordination with the other IFC members.

3.3.3.3. Participate in the development of the installation LTA, NSTCA, IDRMP, PIRs, and CCIRs to support the ID mission.

3.3.3.4. Conduct IPOE to include terrain analysis, route analysis, MANPADS/stand-off weapons footprints, adversary capabilities, TTPs, etc.

3.3.3.5. As required, develop foreign portions of the threat scenarios for installation exercises in coordination with the other IFC members.

3.3.4. The 377 SFS/S2 will:

3.3.4.1. Execute a continuous information gathering effort on foreign threat information to ascertain if there is any information relative to KAFB or the surrounding area.

3.3.4.2. Develop realistic threat scenarios for installation exercises in coordination with the other IFC members.

3.3.4.3. Participate in the development of the installation LTA, NSTCA, IDRMP, PIRs, and CCIRs to support the ID mission.

3.3.4.4. Organize and chair IFC meetings.

3.3.4.5. Research information effecting KAFB at the regional level. Coordinate with state and local law enforcement agencies on matters affecting KAFB.

3.3.5. Other KAFB intelligence agencies will monitor their intelligence channels for information on matters affecting KAFB.

APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX B TO KAFB IDP 31-101
LOCAL NUCLEAR SECURITY THREAT CAPABILITIES ASSESSMENT (NSTCA)

REFERENCES: DOD 5210.41-M, Nuclear Weapons Security Manual and AFMAN 31-108, The Air Force Nuclear Weapons Security Manual. This document is classified SECRET and is maintained by 377 SFS/S2 and 377 WSSS; personnel with the proper security clearance and a “need to know” must contact the 377 SFS/S2 for access.

1. SITUATION: See Basic Plan.
2. MISSION: Collect, assess, and analyze information to assist the DFC in making immediate, proactive decisions for ID planning in direct support of the PL 1 mission.
3. EXECUTION:
 - 3.1. Concept of Operations.
 - 3.1.1. (DCNI) The terrorist threat is credible, capable, and will continue to evolve and adapt over time. It must be assumed that nuclear weapons could be the target of a determined state or non-state adversary with access to substantial resources, intelligence, and advanced capabilities. A successful attack could undermine U.S. capability to project nuclear forces or may result in the damage, loss of control, unauthorized detonation, or theft of nuclear weapons.
 - 3.1.2. (DCNI) Threat capabilities and actors evolve and change. For nuclear weapons security planning purposes the DoD/DoE LNSTCA provides a baseline assessment based on adversary accessed capabilities. It is not an exhaustive list of ways an adversary can attack a nuclear weapon environment or attempt to gain unauthorized access to a weapon. Therefore, the base document must be tailored to include local factors of (METT-TC).
 - 3.1.3. The local NSTCA will be updated annually as a minimum and developed IAW the procedures outlined in AFMAN 31-108, Enclosure 4.
 - 3.2. Tasks and Responsibilities: The IFC will be responsible for developing/updating the local NSTCA.

APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX B TO KAFB IDP 31-101
LOCAL THREAT ASSESSMENT

REFERENCES: See the AFOSI Detachment 814 KAFB LTA. This document is classified SECRET and is maintained by AFOSI Detachment 814; personnel with the proper security clearance and a “need to know” basis, must contact AFOSI for access. This document is also available on the AFOSI SIPR Net homepage at www.afosi.af.smil.mil.

1. THREAT ESTIMATE ANALYSIS:

1.1. Criminal Threat: Generally, there are two basic types of criminal threat; internal and external.

1.1.1. (FOUO) The greatest threat to USAF protection level and non-protection level resources is the internal threat to include white-collar crimes (e.g., fraud, diversion of funds etc.). However, these crimes are a systems problem that physical security equipment will not totally eliminate. Personnel who work in or have intimate knowledge of the target area and security systems form the main source of the internal threat. This threat generally is considered a human reliability problem and is created when personnel that possess access to resources are driven by impulse or external motivation to steal, sabotage, and/or compromise the resource.

1.1.2. (FOUO) The external threat is generally perpetrated by skilled, semiskilled, or unskilled intruders. Our major threat is the semiskilled or unskilled intruder.

1.1.2.1 The skilled criminal intruder may be trained in covert or overt attacks and could initiate actions for the purpose of espionage, sabotage, theft, or compromise of sensitive or high value items.

1.1.2.2. The semi-skilled intruder normally attempts penetration for the purpose of vandalism or theft. Included in this category are base personnel who could manipulate records to aid a theft or its cover-up.

1.1.2.3. The unskilled intruder is usually associated with crimes of opportunity. Targets are chosen due to being unsecured/unprotected as opposed to a planned intrusion. Personnel are most likely to find this situation.

1.1.3. Some examples of targets identified as most significant for the criminal element (not sorted by protection level requirements or priority) are USAF PL resources, personnel, AA&E, electronic equipment, office equipment, special equipment (such as parachutes or field equipment), tools, cash, drugs (or other pilferage items), fuel, and rations.

1.1.4. Target protection level will change depending upon the variable of peacetime, mobilization, or wartime.

1.1.4.1. Peacetime: Normally pilferable items are most susceptible to criminal targeting. High technology must be protected from espionage. Saboteurs can be disgruntled employees or dissident groups.

1.1.4.2. Mobilization: Durable goods, although bulky and difficult to obtain, become a more lucrative target for theft because they are easily pilferable and readily marketable items.

1.1.4.3. Wartime: During wartime there is a ready market for almost anything rationed. It is critical to safeguard resources that are critical to national defense from the criminal threat.

1.2. Terrorist Threat: Attacks against US personnel and facilities overseas signal an increased threat against similar personnel and facilities in the United States.

1.3. Sabotage/Disorder Threat: The primary source for sabotage of resources at KAFB may come from base employees. Poor work relations or grievances against the government may cause disgruntled personnel to vent their frustration or take revenge against the government by damaging resources on KAFB. Anti-military and anti-government sentiment within the US makes it possible for similar incidents to occur at KAFB.

1.4. Espionage Threat: High tech equipment/information are prime targets for espionage. The managerial responsibility KAFB has for such equipment makes it a target for espionage by hostile agencies.

1.5. Civil Disturbance Threat: The threat posed by civil disturbances, riots, and other forms of illegal activity cannot be ignored. Such activities have impaired mission capabilities of USAF installations in the past. While KAFB has not experienced such incidents, the possibility of the threat must be recognized. AFOSI Detachment 814 will continue close coordination with federal, state, and local police agencies to ensure threat information is received in a timely manner. Affected commanders, directors, and base personnel will be immediately notified of threat(s) that impact their respective areas of responsibility.

2. REPORTING THREATS/INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION: Any person who receives information pertaining to a threat against KAFB, or information of intelligence value must report this information to the AFOSI Detachment 814 or the 377 SFG.

APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX B TO KAFB PLAN 31-101
**COMMANDERS CRITICAL INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS (CCIR) / PRIORITY
INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS (PIR), / FRIENDLY FORCES INFORMATION
REQUIREMENTS (FFIR)**

REFERENCES: Refer to the Basic Plan.

1. SITUATION: See Basic Plan.
2. MISSION: Collect, assess, and analyze information to assist the DFC in making immediate, proactive decisions for ID planning.
3. EXECUTION:
 - 3.1. Concept of Operations. CCIRs are elements of information required by the Installation Commander and DFC that directly affect timely decision making. CCIRs are a key information management tool that helps assess the operational environment, and identify decision points throughout the conduct of operations.
 - 3.1.1. (FOUO) The key elements of CCIRs include PIRs and FFIRs. CCIRs assist the commander in his/her decision-making ability.
 - 3.1.2. The IFC will develop CCIRs for approval by the Installation Commander and DFC. CCIRs will be reviewed annually as a minimum and updated as required.
 - 3.1.3. The intelligence and antiterrorism staff is responsible to collect, collate, evaluate, analyze, and assess the information gathered based on the CCIR document. Requests for information (RFIs) are forwarded to the appropriate intelligence agencies requesting CCIR information to be forwarded as it becomes available.
 - 3.1.4. Once vetted, to be effective, the information must be disseminated. Intelligence is conveyed in an appropriate form and by suitable means to those who need it, in accordance with the following principles: clarity, conciseness, standardization, urgency, distribution, regularity, and security. Intelligence is disseminated orally or in written reports, typically through intelligence reports, intelligence summaries, or law enforcement bulletins or “Be on the Lookout” (BOLO).
 - 3.2. PIRs are requirements associated with a decision that will affect the overall success of the KAFB mission.
 - 3.2.1. The IFC will determine PIRs for approval by the Installation Commander and the DFC. The PIRs will be reviewed annually as a minimum and updated as required. The PIRs will be divided into three categories:

3.2.1.1. (FOUO) Information that must be immediately forwarded to the Installation Commander or DFC. The IFC may be formed at the direction of the Installation Commander.

3.2.1.2. Information that must be discussed in a timely manner, but not an immediate threat. The DFC may direct a recall of the IFC to discuss this information if necessary.

3.2.1.3. (FOUO) Information to be discussed by certain members of the IFC, but does not necessitate the full involvement of the IFC.

3.2.2. The intelligence and antiterrorism staff will collect, collate, evaluate, analyze, and assess the information gathered based on the PIR document. RFIs are forwarded to intelligence agencies requesting PIR information be forwarded as it becomes available.

3.3. FFIRs are items the DFC needs to know about ID forces that affect his or her ability to execute the ID mission, such as changes in forces available or changes in the disposition of adjacent friendly units.

3.3.1. FFIRs will be developed by the DFC with the assistance of his/her staff.

3.3.2. FFIRs will be maintained by the 377 SFS/S2 and updated as needed.

3.3.3. Friendly Forces: Refer to the Basic Plan.

3.4. Tasks and Responsibilities.

3.4.1. The AFOSI Detachment 814 will:

3.4.1.1. As a member of the IFC, assist in the development of CCIRs, PIRs and FFIRs.

3.4.1.2. Research information affecting KAFB at the national level. Coordinate with federal agencies such as the Joint Terrorism Task Force, on matters affecting KAFB.

3.4.2. The AFNWC/NT will:

3.4.2.1. As a member of the IFC, assist in the development of the CCIRs, PIRs and FFIRs.

3.4.2.2. As a minimum, research intelligence sites for information affecting KAFB at the international level.

3.4.3. The 377 SFS/S2 will:

3.4.3.1. As a member of the IFC, assist in the development of the CCIRs, PIRs and FFIRs.

3.4.3.2. Research information affecting KAFB at the regional level. Coordinate with state and local law enforcement agencies on matters affecting KAFB.

3.4.4. Other KAFB intelligence agencies will monitor their intelligence channels for information on matters affecting KAFB.

3.4.5. CCIRs, PIRs and FFIRs will be maintained as separate documents by the 377 SFS/S2 due to classification.

APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX B TO KAFB IDP 31-101
BASE BOUNDARY AND BASE SECURITY ZONE (BSZ)

REFERENCES: Refer to Basic Plan.

1. GENERAL: The Base Boundary is a line that delineates the surface area of KAFB for the purpose of facilitating coordination and de-confliction of operations between adjacent units, formations, or areas. The KAFB Base Boundary is not necessarily the base perimeter; rather, it is established based upon the factors of METT-TC, specifically balancing the need of the base defense forces to control key terrain with their ability to accomplish the mission. Refer to Exhibit 1, Base Boundary.

1.1. As identified in AFDD 2-4.1, *Force Protection*, the BSZ is the area outside the base perimeter from which the base may be vulnerable from standoff threats (e.g., mortars, rockets, MANPADS). Refer to Exhibit 2-4 Base Security Zone (Anti-Tank Aerial), Base Security Zone (MANPADS Aerial).

1.1.1. (DCNI) Exposed nuclear assets shall be provided standoff protection against direct fire and by small arms flat trajectory fire. The need for protection against larger caliber weapons shall be evaluated based on the threat and the fragility of the nuclear assets(s). Nuclear assets must only be exposed in transit or deployment for the absolute minimum amount of time commensurate with mission objectives. Nuclear assets exposed during transit will be provided all or some of the following standoff protective measures to mitigate or eliminate direct fire by small arms:

1.1.1.1. (DCNI) Use of certified close precision engagement (CPE) teams posted along the route and armed with the M-24 or M-107 weapon systems. CPE teams will be posted several hours prior to initiation of any movement transporting exposed nuclear assets to maintain surveillance over the battle space.

1.1.1.2. (DCNI) Use of the Mk-19 automatic grenade launcher or M-2 .50 caliber machine gun, mounted on a mobile platform, posted along the route. Mk-19/M-2 teams will maintain the ability to quickly bring areas under effective weapons fire.

1.1.1.3. (FOUO) Use of continuous roving security patrols in/around the transit area. When available, all-terrain vehicles will be used to conduct these patrols.

1.1.1.4. (DCNI) Security sweeps of the transit routes prior to initiation of any movement transporting exposed nuclear assets.

1.1.1.5. (DCNI) One SF member will be posted in the Albuquerque Sunport Air Traffic Control Tower and one SF member will be posted with Albuquerque Sun port Police.

1.2. KAFB is divided into ID sectors to ensure adequate ID Force response to PL resources. Refer to exhibit 5 (Installation ID Sectors).

2. MISSION: Refer to Basic Plan.

3. EXECUTION: Refer to exhibits 1-5.

Limited distribution is made of the below exhibits to provide maximum protection of elements of information. Exhibits 1-5 refer to zones 1-5 on the jurisdictional map. Agencies having a valid need for specific information contained in this enclosure may contact 377 SFS/S5P at 505-846-3926 for access to the specific listing.

Exhibits: Located at SFS Shared Drive O:\++AIR PROVOST++\1. Archive\S-5\S5P\S5P
REFERENCE MATERIAL\KAFB Jurisdiction Map

1. - Base Boundary
2. - Base Security Zone (Anti-Tank Aerial)
3. - Base Security Zone (Indirect Fire Aerial)
4. - Base Security Zone (MANPADS Aerial)
5. - Installation ID Sectors

ANNEX C TO KAFB IDP 31-101
OPERATIONS

REFERENCE: Refer to Basic Plan.

1. SITUATION:

1.1. Enemy Forces. Refer to Basic Plan.

1.2. Friendly Forces. Refer to Basic Plan.

1.3. Assumption. Refer to Basic Plan.

1.4. Resource Availability. Refer to Basic Plan.

1.5. Planning factors. All tasked units will prepare detailed instructions to support this plan.

1.6. Area of Operations.

1.6.1. (DCNI) KUMMSC is 3 miles south of the main area of KAFB. Other areas include convoy routes, aircraft parking areas in support of logistics movements at the hot cargo pads, or other areas where operations occur. KUMMSC operations are detailed in the 377 WSSS SOP V1, WSSS Operations and the 377 SFG Tactical Assault Guide.

1.6.2. The 58 SOW flightline restricted area, referred to as “E” ramp, is located 50 meters north of runway 08 and one mile south of Truman Gate. The 58 SOW flightline parking area is designated a permanent PL 3 restricted area on KAFB and is located west of Fire Station 2, south of buildings 1017 and 1018, east of the transient ramp, and north of Taxiway Alpha. 30-ft clear zones are maintained around restricted areas wherever possible. Due to terrain considerations, mission impact, cost, and original flightline construction standards (prior to 3 October 1988), it is impractical and unfeasible to construct/designate clear zones at some locations along the restricted area boundary of the flightline. In areas where this is not feasible, an acceptable clear zone for these areas is four (4) ft.

1.6.3. Per AFI 31-101, Integrated Defense, AFI 31-101 AFGSC Sup: (Added) “6.5.5. Restricted areas with PL 3 resources that are not upgraded to a higher PL status during contingencies will maintain clear zones that allow early detection of intruders. The IDC will direct the width of the clear zone to meet local threat and environmental conditions.”

1.7. The 150 SOW is located at the NE corner of Runway 08.

1.7.1. The 150 SOW Command Post is located in the north end of Building 1044. Building 1047 is located directly south of Building 1055, the Air National Guard Headquarters.

1.7.2. The 58 SOW WOC is located in building 1017. Building 1017 is located on Hangar Road on the north side of hangars 1000 and 1001.

1.7.3. The 377th ABW Transient Ramp, area 6, west of the 58 SOW aircraft parking area, ramp Echo, south of Bravo 4/5, Apron C, east of building 333, Airfield Operations, and north of the active runway, taxiway Bravo. The restricted area includes the DV parking, Bravo (B1-B3) and Delta (D1-D18) ramps and helipads 2-5 located to the west of Hangar 1000. **NOTE:** The helipads are located within the Controlled Movement Area (CMA) and are off limits without prior approval through/direct contact with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) tower. Area 6 is designated a restricted area when PL 3 resources are in the area. The boundary consists of red painted lines with restricted area signs painted on the tarmac.

2. MISSION: Refer to Basic Plan.

3. EXECUTION:

3.1. Concept of Operations. Refer to Basic Plan.

3.2. Tasks.

3.2.1. Readiness, Alert, and Marshalling.

3.2.1.1. (FOUO) Readiness: ID Forces will maintain the capability to respond to hostile events in sufficient time and with sufficient force to prevent/limit the harassment, damage, or destruction of PL resources. During periods of increased tension/threats, larger tactical response teams may be assembled and placed in immediate stand-by for recall. The 377 SFG will ensure procedures are developed to enable all assigned personnel to be contacted by either telephone communications or by a manual system. Those personnel assigned to mobility will maintain the capability to respond with all required equipment within the designated time when advised.

3.2.1.2. (FOUO) Alert Emergency base recall procedures during duty/non-duty hours: The 377 ABW/CC, through the KCP, will recall base personnel as required. KCP controllers will use recall rosters, mass notification system, base telephone network, and if necessary, installation personnel to make notifications. The extent of the recall is based on mission requirements. Each unit will develop recall procedures. Upon notification, WSSS/SSCC and SFS/BDOC will recall all 377 SFG personnel as directed.

3.2.1.3. (DCNI) Marshalling: Initial SFG marshalling will take place at the SFS Armory (Bldg. 20221). The SFS Armory is also the primary arming point for ID Forces during contingencies affecting KUMMSC. The CATM Armory (Bldg. 706) is designated and used as the alternate arming point in the event the primary is disabled, captured, or not feasible to be utilized. The primary arming point for KUMMSC during normal security operations is the WSSS Armory (Bldg. 27492).

3.2.2. Aerospace Control-Counter Aerospace Operations.

3.2.2.1. Offensive Counter Aerospace. See Appendix 3, 4, and 5 to Annex C.

3.2.2.2. Defensive Counter Aerospace. See Appendix 3, 4, and 5 to Annex C.

3.2.3. Interdiction.

3.3. Security Operations Terms:

3.3.1. FPCAM is a down-channel alerting order that sets in motion an increase in readiness posture. As a rule, FPCAMs do not trigger a theater-wide or AF-wide FPCON change. Commanders tailor responses to local situations rather than mandating across-the-board actions. Evaluation of reports or current intelligence information may cause an increased state of readiness at a variety of levels. It may affect only one or two installations or installations AF-wide. The AFSWC, or MAJCOM Command Post, electronically transmits the FPCAM using a military precedence of IMMEDIATE or FLASH. When the FPCAM directs a FPCON, it must be implemented immediately. FPCON implemented in response to a FPCAM remains in effect until the originating or higher-level authority cancels it.

3.3.2. Security Incident: A Security Incident is an unclassified message relayed to KCP by 377 WSSS/SSCC or 377 SFS/BDOC of an unusual incident, possibly hostile, affecting PL 1, 2, or 3 resources. KCP should not immediately relay the information to higher headquarters. Security Forces will immediately investigate the situation until it is determined to be probably or actually hostile. If found to be probable or actual, implement a *Covered Wagon*. The installation commander has delegated authority to terminate a Security Incident situation to the on-duty 377 WSSS/FCC or FC and 377 SFS/FC. Upon Security Incident termination, 377 WSSS/SSCC or 377 SFS/BDOC, will notify the KCP.

3.3.3. (FOUO) Covered Wagon: Designed to be implemented immediately whenever an unusual incident, probably or actually hostile, affecting PL 1, 2, or 3 resources, occurs. Reports should be sent via local command posts to higher headquarters (KCP will notify higher headquarters immediately). A *Covered Wagon* will be reported as an Operations Report (OPREP-3) BEELINE according to AFI 10-206, Operational Reports (OPREP). If PL 1 resources involving KUMMSC are involved, OPREP-3 PINNACLE reporting procedures will be implemented.

3.3.4. Deployment of Security. This operation is implemented when orders for deployment to forward operating areas are received.

3.3.5. Sustaining Force Security. This condition exists when base SF have deployed and the responsibility for security of PL resources is assigned to remaining SF.

3.3.6. Natural Disaster/Catastrophe (Appendix 5 To Annex C to KAFB IDP 31-101). This appendix will be referenced upon notification by the KCP of impending natural disasters or

catastrophes such as severe weather, flooding, etc., which might degrade the security of PL resources.

3.3.7. Civil Disturbance/Riot Threatening PL Resources (Appendix 7 To Annex C to KAFB IDP 31-101). This appendix details procedures to follow in the event of civil disturbances or riots that threaten PL resources on the installation.

3.3.8. (FOUO) LFA. This refers to the FBI acting on behalf of the DOJ. The LFA must be notified immediately upon implementation of any recapture/recovery or terrorist/hostile operations involving PL 1 resources and/or KUMMSC. AFOSI is responsible for notifying the LFA.

3.3.9. (DCNI) National Military Command Center (NMCC). The KCP must ensure the NMCC is notified and two-way communication is established in the event of a recapture/recovery operation. Up-channel reports will be sent as PINNACLE/EMPTY QUIVER.

3.3.10. (DCNI) Forces assigned to recovery operations will pursue individuals who have possession of nuclear assets off KAFB/DOD property when in direct pursuit of the unauthorized persons or when there is a reasonable belief of their direction of travel until custody is regained or until relieved by the FBI as LFA. If resources make it off the installation, friendly law enforcement agencies have pursuit authority and all actions will be taken, to include the use of deadly force, to regain possession, custody/control, and security of weapons.

3.3.11. (DCNI) NDA: NDAs are established when necessary to secure PL 1, 2, or 3 resources located off the installation on lands not under the jurisdiction or administration of, or in the custody of, DOD or a military department of DOD. 377 ABW/CC is the only person authorized to establish a NDA. Exception: 377 ABW/CV may establish a NDA if contact cannot be made with the 377 ABW/CC.

3.4. (FOUO) If the situation warrants NMCC attention, the KCP will contact NMCC immediately and provide continuous update/status of the situation.

3.5. (FOUO) AFOSI Detachment 814 will contact the FBI immediately and act as liaison until their arrival.

3.6. (FOUO) The 58 SOW will provide air support for observation, transport, and/or assault if available.

3.7. (FOUO) Rules of Engagement (ROE) (Use of Deadly Force). The close proximity of military and civilian housing areas, work centers, and locations of non-security military and civilian personnel have a direct bearing on the use of deadly force. All personnel must make every effort short of using deadly force to halt unlawful entry, loss of resources, or similar acts. The use of deadly force when protecting PL 1, 2, and 3 resources is authorized by AFI 31-117. Deadly force is also authorized for PL 4 resources not involving national security, but

inherently dangerous to others. The use of deadly force is authorized to prevent hostile forces from damaging or taking resources, or in the process of recovering the resources from the hostile force. All personnel working around these resources must be thoroughly familiar with guidelines set forth in AFI 31-117 and KAFB 31-101.

3.7.1. (DCNI) Nuclear weapons are designated as assets vital to national security. SF shall use the degree of lawful force necessary, including deadly force, to prevent unauthorized access, damage, loss, theft, sabotage, or compromise of a nuclear weapon(s), consistent with the rules of engagement. Whenever possible, there shall be a defined action or an attempted breach of a specific safeguard or boundary as a precondition to the application of deadly force. When such hostile action has occurred, the IC SF must take immediate action to neutralize the intruder and/or force the adversary to immediately stop their actions. The IC SF must not wait for additional SF before taking action to force the adversary to halt their activities. The adversary must not be allowed to continue their actions to gain unauthorized access to the nuclear weapon unimpeded. Time is critical and on-duty SF must begin the recapture immediately, without the added delay of requesting and receiving permission from an installation authority such as the installation commander.

3.7.2. (DCNI) Nuclear weapon Security Forces shall use the degree of lawful force necessary, including deadly force, to prevent unauthorized access, damage, loss, theft, sabotage, or compromise of a nuclear weapon(s). Due to their special status, returning custody and control of lost, stolen, or seized nuclear weapons to the U.S. Government is paramount. Incidental or collateral damage inflicted while effecting recapture or recovery of nuclear weapons is unfortunate, but may sometimes be necessary or unavoidable. While incident planners and commanders shall take steps to avoid incidental collateral damage, recapture and/or recovery of the nuclear weapon(s) remains the primary mission and highest priority. Commanders must weigh the alternatives and tradeoffs when deciding upon a COA.

APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX C TO KAFB IDP 31-101
SECURITY AREAS

REFERENCES: Refer to the Basic Plan, DODI 5200.8, Security of DOD Installations and Resources, and Section 21, Internal Security Act of 1950 (Title 50 U.S.C. 797).

1. **SITUATION:** This appendix institutes procedures, authority, and responsibilities for establishing and maintaining restricted areas, NDAs, controlled areas and free zones during normal installation security operations on KAFB. The provisions of this appendix apply to, and are enforceable with all military and civilian personnel, including the general public who enter KAFB.

2. **MISSION:** To provide maximum security for PL resources located on KAFB.

3. **EXECUTION:** Concept of Operations: The concept of operations for security restricted areas includes, but is not limited to, operation of security facilities and equipment; physical security standards; control of entry and exit; and internal movement of personnel, materials, and vehicles associated with security areas. ID Forces have the authority to use various entry authority lists (EALs) and maps for boundary purposes to aid them in enforcing laws, directives, instructions, policies, and procedures regarding the establishment, location, and priority of ID posts.

TAB A TO APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX C TO KAFB IDP 31-101
RESTRICTED AREAS

REFERENCES: Refer to the Basic Plan.

1. **SITUATION:** This appendix institutes procedures, authority, and responsibilities for establishing and maintaining restricted areas during normal and contingency installation security operations on KAFB. The provisions of this appendix apply to, and are enforceable with, all military and civilian personnel, including the general public who enter KAFB.

2. **MISSION:** To provide maximum security for PL resources located on KAFB.

3. **EXECUTION:**

3.1. (FOUO) Concept of Operations: The concept of operations for establishing and maintaining restricted areas includes to, but is not limited to, operation of security facilities and equipment; physical security standards; control of entry and exit; and internal movement of personnel, materials, and vehicles associated with security areas. ID Forces have the authority to use various EALs and maps for boundary purposes to aid them in enforcing laws, directives, instructions, policies, and procedures regarding the establishment, location, and priority of ID posts.

3.2. Tasks.

3.2.1. The IDC acting on behalf of the Installation Commander will:

3.2.1.1. Identify and establish restricted areas IAW AFI 31-101, Integrated Defense, chapter 5.

3.2.1.2. (FOUO) Establish a realistic escort to visitor ratio of PL 1 restricted areas. This is established as one escort official to no more than six escorted personnel. Procedures for PL 1 areas will be defined in Annex Z of this publication.

3.2.1.3. (FOUO) All personnel issued a Restricted Area Badge (RAB) for PL 3 areas will be trained and may act as an escort official IAW AFI 31-101. No additional “approved escort official” markings are required.

3.2.2. The DFC will:

3.2.2.1. Be the senior SF representative and is responsible for enforcing circulation control of personnel and property in and out of restricted areas.

3.2.2.2. (FOUO) Establish security priority charts and determine which posts go unmanned during personnel shortages to ensure adequate coverage of all PL resources and restricted areas.

3.2.2.3. (FOUO) Ensure the internal and external Security Response Team (SRT's) are immediately dispatched to all Security Incidents affecting PL resources to investigate the situation.

3.2.2.4. (DCNI) The Initial Backup Force (IBF) for KUMMSC is comprised of posted flightline security patrols, therefore, if a security situation requiring an IBF response occurs at KUMMSC, restricted areas will be void of SF flightline security patrols. To compensate for this loss, owner/users will be notified to provide observation and protection of all PL resources within restricted areas. Owner/user personnel will challenge and attempt to detain any unauthorized personnel observed within the restricted area. If unable to detain unauthorized personnel, owner/users will contact SFS/BDOC with detailed descriptions (individual/vehicle) and directions of travel. If available, a law enforcement patrol will be dispatched to assist. As the security situation allows, SF will ultimately return and take control of any personnel detained by owner/user personnel. Upon returning from IBF response, SF will conduct 100% badge verifications to re-establish situational awareness and positive control of all personnel within flightline restricted areas.

3.2.2.5. (FOUO) During FPCONs Charlie and Delta, owner/user agencies may provide armed/unarmed ID for PL resources within their respective restricted areas. While performing regular duties, active duty personnel may be armed to provide an additional layer of defense immediately surrounding PL resources. The arming and integration of these owner/user ID forces will be situation dependent and will be coordinated in conjunction with the DFC as the situation dictates.

3.2.2.6. (FOUO) Ensure the 377 SFS/S5P develops and distributes the primary/alternate duress words /sign countersign every 6 months or when a compromise is suspected.

3.2.2.7. (FOUO) Ensure the Installation Commander is provided with the duress words/sign countersign. The Installation Commander personally escorting visitors ensures the capability for him/her to signal duress.

3.2.3. (FOUO) ABW/MSG/PK (Contracting) personnel will notify the DFC of all contracts involving entry into restricted areas. Contracting must have a Senior Security Forces Representative participate in pre-contract negotiation or performance briefings according to AFI 31-101, AFI 10-245, and AFI 32-1032.

Enclosures:

1. Restricted Area Entry and Circulation Control
2. KAFB Flightline / 377 ABW Transient Flightline Parking Area/REFLEX DELTA
3. KAFB Flightline / 377ABW Transient/Pad 5/ASCOT
4. KAFB Flightline / 150 SOW
5. KAFB Flightline / 58 SOW
6. KAFB Flightline / 377 ABW Transient Flightline Parking Area

7. KAFB Flightline Photograph Procedures
8. 150 SOW Operations Center (WOC)
9. KCP/KCP EA Cell and Generator Enclosure Area
10. Control and Issue of (RAB)s
11. Restricted Area Entry Procedures Free Zones
12. EAL Procedures
13. Active and Passive Duress Procedures

ENCLOSURE 1 TO TAB A TO APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX C TO KAFB IDP 31-101
RESTRICTED AREA ENTRY AND CIRCULATION CONTROL

REFERENCES: Refer to Basic Plan.

1. PURPOSE: This appendix outlines procedures for restricted area entry and circulation control. The objective of restricted area entry and circulation control is to ensure persons entering, working within, or exiting restricted areas are granted authority to be inside the area(s), are positively identified prior to entering, and accounted for as necessary.

2. MISSION: To prevent unauthorized entry, counter the introduction of contraband and prohibited items, detect hostile actions, and prevent unauthorized removal of material from restricted areas on KAFB.

2.1. (DCNI) The following items are considered CONTRABAND in all restricted areas:

NOTE: DOE Couriers, 377 ABW, 150 SOW and 58 SOW First Responders/ Support personnel authorized to carry weapons and/or explosives in the course of their official duties are exempt.

2.1.1. Any firearm, whether pistol, rifle or other, to include pellet guns, bb guns, etc.

2.1.2. Any type of explosive device or explosive material to include any IED.

2.1.3. Any other types of weapon, i.e. knives, tasers, stun guns, batons, etc.

2.2. (FOUO) Entry Authority: Only personnel with a need to enter to perform official duties will be permitted to enter a restricted area. A person may be authorized entry either by being granted unescorted entry according to AFI 31-101 and AFI 31-501 or by being properly escorted.

2.3. (DCNI) Protection Level 1 Restricted Area procedures are covered in Enclosure 3 to TAB A To APPENDIX 1 To ANNEX Z To KAFB IDP 31-101.

2.4. (FOUO) Unescorted Entry: This applies to a person who has a continuing and frequent need for entry to a restricted area to perform official duties. AFI 31-501 outlines investigative and personnel security requirements that must be satisfied prior to badge issue. All personnel must obtain specific written permission to enter restricted areas. The authority for a person to enter a restricted area comes from the Installation Commander. This authority may be delegated to and exercised by base officials or restricted area coordinating officials designated by the Installation Commander (see paragraph 3.5.1., Enclosure 10 to Tab A to Appendix 1 to Annex C). All personnel issued a RAB for PL 3 areas will be trained and may act as an escort official IAW AFI 31-101. No additional "approved escort official" markings are required. Documentation of this training must be maintained for as long as the individual has unescorted access. Training will consist of the threat and how it applies to their area of responsibility. General responsibilities of RAB holders consist of understanding how to

report known or suspected *Security Incidents* to WSSS/SSCC / SFS/BDOC as well as entry control procedures, including verification, authorization and official duty requirements. RAB holders also must know the responsibilities and duties of an escort official and the proper methods to gain authorized entry into a restricted area. Phase II, Continuation Training, must be administered at least annually.

3. Escort officials will:

3.1. Inspect all hand carried items prior to allowing entry into a restricted area ensuring no weapons, contraband or other unauthorized material(s) are present.

3.1.1. Provide escorted personnel a restricted area escort briefing.

3.1.2. Monitor the actions of all personnel under your escort ensuring their safe and authorized conduct.

3.1.3. The escort ratio for Protection Level 3 areas on KAFB is 1 escort per 10 escorted individuals.

3.1.4. Brief methods used to gain authorized entry to a restricted area.

3.2. Escorted Entry. This applies to a person who does not qualify for unescorted entry but is needed within a restricted area on a one-time or infrequent basis. The investigative requirements of AFI 31-501 are not applicable to escorted personnel unless classified information will be divulged during the visit. In this case, consult AFI 31-401 and AFD 31-6.

3.3. (FOUO) Flightline Protection Program: 377 WSSS will conduct a security awareness exercises in each flightline restricted area 10 times per quarter and update the IDC annually. Ensure the exercises are designed primarily to evaluate the ability of non-security forces personnel to detect and report security violations. The execution and tracking responsibility is delegated to the 377 WSSS/Flightline Constable (377 WSSS/S5 DSN: 246-7706). Detection exercises are not required in the 150 SOW and 377 ABW transient ramp restricted areas due to the lack of both PL resources and non-Security Forces personnel.

3.4. Flightline Gate Combinations: Each flightline restricted area on KAFB is protected by a fence line containing coded gates. The owner/user entity most closely associated with the gates will maintain and change gate combinations.

3.4.1. The 58 SOW will maintain/change the gate combinations surrounding the 58 SOW restricted area.

3.4.2. The 150 SOW will maintain/change the gate combinations surrounding the 150 SOW restricted area.

3.4.3. The 377 MXS/Airfield Management will maintain/change the gate combinations surrounding the 377 ABW transient ramp.

3.5. Gate combinations will be changed every year, when compromised, or when compromise is suspected. The following agencies/POCs will be notified at least 3 working days in advance to the gate combinations being changed:

3.5.1. 377 WSSS/S5 (Flightline Constable).

3.5.2. 377 MSG/CE Fire Department.

3.5.3. 377 MDG.

3.5.4. 377 SFS (BDOC).

3.5.5. 377 MXS/Airfield Management.

3.5.6. 150 SOW WOC (when activated).

3.5.7. 58 SOW WOC.

ENCLOSURE 2 TO TAB A TO APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX C TO KAFB IDP 31-101
KAFB FLIGHTLINE/377th AIR BASE WING TRANSIENT AIRCRAFT PARKING
AREA/REFLEX DELTA

REFERENCES: Refer to Basic Plan.

1. (FOUO) GENERAL: The purpose of REFLEX DELTA support is to host and bed down the United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) airborne alert command, control and communications (C3) aircraft. Official notification of REFLEX DELTA will come from KCP.
2. (FOUO) SITUATION: Refer to KAFB REFLEX DELTA Plan and 377 WSSS SOP V2, Ch. 1 for specific security procedures.

ENCLOSURE 3 TO TAB A TO APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX C TO KAFB IDP 31-101
KAFB Flightline /377 ABW Transient/PAD 5/ASCOT

SITUATION: KAFB supports the British Royal Air Force for DOE OST missions. Refer to KAFB ASCOT Support Plan for RAF ASCOT Support procedures.

ENCLOSURE 4 TO TAB A TO APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX C TO KAFB IDP 31-101
KAFB FLIGHTLINE / 150th SPECIAL OPERATIONS WING / NEW MEXICO AIR
NATIONAL GUARD

REFERENCES: Refer to Basic Plan.

1. (FOUO) GENERAL: The KAFB flightline is located south of the Truman Gate. Restricted area signs are posted around the boundary. Personnel are prohibited from entering this area without the consent of the Installation Commander. 30-ft clear zones are maintained around restricted areas wherever possible. Due to terrain considerations, mission impact, cost, and original flightline construction standards (prior to 3 October 1988), it is impractical and unfeasible to construct/designate clear zones at some locations along the restricted area boundary of the flightline. In areas where this is not feasible, an acceptable clear zone for these areas is four (4) ft.

2. (FOUO) Per AFI 31-101_AFGSC Sup: (Added) “6.5.5. Restricted areas with PL 3 resources that are not upgraded to a higher PL status during contingencies will maintain clear zones that allow early detection of intruders. The IDC will direct the width of the clear zone to meet local threat and environmental conditions.”

3. (FOUO) EXECUTION: The restricted area boundaries consist of a woven 9-gauge, steel-wire, chain link fence with Type A barbed wire outriggers, and highway dividers; the boundary on the south and west sides consist of red painted lines. Restricted area signs are attached to the chain link fence, highway dividers, and are painted on the tarmac.

4. (FOUO) The 150 SOW flightline parking area is designated a PL 3 restricted area when PL resources are present. The 150 SOW Restricted Area, designated as area 19, is located west and south of Randolph Avenue, East of the 58th SOW Restricted Area, and north of Taxiway Alpha.

4.1. The 150 SOW has five ECPs:

(FOUO) ECP #1: On the northeast perimeter adjacent to building 1030/“Barn 1”.

(FOUO) ECP #2: On the north perimeter adjacent to parking spot C1.

(FOUO) ECP #3: On the northwest perimeter adjacent to parking spot A1.

(FOUO) ECP #4: On the west perimeter adjacent to parking spot A6.

(FOUO) ECP #5: On the southwest perimeter at taxiway gap M6.

4.2. (FOUO) 150 SOW Flightline Restricted Area Entry and Circulation Controls: The following procedures apply to the 150 SOW Restricted Area containing PL 3 aircraft.

4.2.1. (FOUO) During maintenance duty hours, primary security responsibility for the flightline restricted area will be provided by maintenance personnel. When maintenance personnel are not available to provide security, the designated control center for each flightline restricted area will notify the 377 WSSS/SSCC. The 377 WSSS will assume primary security responsibility when maintenance personnel are not available.

4.2.2. (FOUO) The IBF for KUMMSC is comprised of posted flightline security patrols, therefore, if security situations requiring (IBF) response occur at KUMMSC, restricted areas will be void of SF flightline security patrols. To compensate for this loss, the 150 SOW Command Post/OP's Center will be notified to provide owner/user observation and protection of all PL resources within their restricted area. 150 SOW personnel will challenge and attempt to detain any unauthorized personnel observed within the restricted area. If unable to detain unauthorized personnel, 150 SOW personnel will contact the SFS/BDOC with detailed descriptions (individual/vehicle) and directions of travel. If available, a law enforcement patrol will be dispatched to assist. As the security situation allows, SF will ultimately return and take control of any personnel detained by 150 SOW personnel. Upon returning from IBF response, SF will conduct 100% badge verifications to re-establish situational awareness and positive control of all personnel within flightline restricted areas.

4.2.3. Training for owner/user ID Forces is the responsibility of the DFC.

4.2.4. (FOUO) During increased FPCONs of Charlie and Delta, owner/user agencies may provide armed/unarmed ID for PL resources within their respective restricted areas. While performing regular duties, activated 150 SOW personnel may be armed to provide an additional layer of defense immediately surrounding the PL resources. The integration and specific details of these owner/user ID forces will be situation dependent and will be coordinated with the DFC.

4.2.5. (FOUO) AF Form 1199D no longer authorized, AF Form 1199CG with area 19 open (single badge system) will be used to gain unescorted entry. One of the four supporting techniques identified in Enclosure 10 To Tab A To Appendix 1 To Annex C, para 3.7, will be used. UOF is authorized in accordance with AFI 31-117. Personnel are prohibited from entering this area without the consent of the Installation Commander.

4.2.6. (FOUO) Any person with unescorted entry authorization on their RAB, may be an escort official. Escort of visitors may be transferred to another authorized individual. The authorized individual will remain with the visitors at all times. Visitors do not need to be signed in on the AF Form 1109.

4.2.7. (FOUO) Authenticated crew orders and home stationed AF Form 1199/or military ID card will be used to grant unescorted entry for sister service and foreign units (all US military branches and friendly foreign countries), requesting entry into the 150 SOW restricted area.

4.2.8. (FOUO) Aircraft movements. Designated flightline control centers will coordinate all aircraft movements with the 377 WSSS/SSCC.

4.2.8.1. (FOUO) The owner/user is responsible for notifying SF when aircraft are unattended or removed from the restricted areas.

4.2.8.2. (FOUO) Owner/User will establish a temporary restricted area for any aircraft removed from and parked outside of the permanent restricted area. 377 WSSS/SSCC will be notified to establish procedures according to AFI 31-101, Integrated Defense and applicable supplements(SUP)s. Aircraft removed from the permanent restricted area and placed in a temporary restricted area will be relocated back to the permanent restricted area after operational and maintenance requirements are met.

4.2.9. At the end of the duty day, designated flightline control centers will notify 377 WSSS/SSCC of the aircraft parking locations including aircraft parked in hangars.

4.2.10. Emergency Entry Procedures in support of PL 3 Flightline Operations:

4.2.10.1. (FOUO) If any incident/emergency occurs inside a restricted area, 377 MXS/MXO will notify 377 WSSS/SSCC with the location, tail number of aircraft (if applicable), and nature of emergency via the secondary crash net (SCN). On-duty ID Forces will assist in containment, evacuation, and appropriate cordons if necessary.

4.2.10.2. (FOUO) Personnel who respond to the 150 SOW restricted area under emergency conditions (such as the fire department, military medical personnel, EOD, and ID Forces) will be granted entry without delay during verified emergencies. All emergency responders will be granted access upon successful "sign/countersign" demonstration.

4.2.10.3. (FOUO) SF will maintain accountability (a count of personnel and vehicles entering) of all emergency responders.

4.2.10.4. (FOUO) For unknown emergencies, on-duty ID Forces are responsible for verifying that an emergency condition exists and overseeing surveillance of personnel entering under emergency conditions. At no time will entry be allowed based solely on the use of lights and sirens. Once the emergency is confirmed, emergency entry procedures apply.

4.2.10.5. (FOUO) ID Force personnel will respond to and establish a 360-degree security perimeter around the aircraft or at the discretion of the IC.

4.2.10.6. (FOUO) Once the emergency has been terminated, all other follow-on response agencies (i.e., mortuary affairs, investigators, etc.) will be escorted into the area using normal escorted entry procedures.

4.2.10.7. Specifically identified 150 SOW personnel have the open area 19 indicated in the escort block. The use of this block is for the purpose of escorting and will only be used when the unit is at a deployed location other than KAFB.

4.2.10.8. The 150 SOW lighting is photo-sensitive and automatically turns on when it becomes dark. The alternate location of lighting controls is inside of Building 1044 in Room 11-A.

ENCLOSURE 5 TO TAB A TO APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX C TO KAFB IDP 31-101
KAFB FLIGHTLINE / 58th SPECIAL OPERATIONS WING (SOW)

REFERENCES: Refer to Basic Plan.

1. (FOUO) GENERAL: The 58 SOW Restricted Area, Area 4, located west of Fire Station 2, south of Bldgs #1017 and #1018, east of the 377 ABW Transient Ramp Restricted Area, and north of Taxiway Alpha to include Echo ramp, Hangars 1000, 1001, 1002, Bldg 985, 986, 979, portions of Bravo 4-5 parking apron, and the hangar floor portion (not including offices) of Bldg #1037 (Fuels Shop). Due to terrain considerations, mission impact, cost, and original flightline construction standards (prior to 3 October 1988), it is impractical and unfeasible to construct/designate clear zones at some locations along the restricted area boundary of the flightline. In areas where this is not feasible, an acceptable clear zone is four (4) ft.

2. AFI 31-101 AFGSC Sup Integrated Defense: (Added) “6.5.5. Restricted areas with PL 3 resources that are not upgraded to a higher PL status during contingencies will maintain clear zones that allow early detection of intruders. The IDC will direct the width of the clear zone to meet local threat and environmental conditions.”

3. (FOUO) EXECUTION: The restricted area boundaries consist of a woven 9-gauge, steel-wire, chain link fence with Type A barbed wire outriggers, and highway dividers; the boundaries consist of red painted lines and painted restricted area signs. Restricted area signs are attached to the chain link fence, highway dividers, and are painted on the tarmac.

4. The 58 SOW has sixteen ECPs:

(FOUO) ECP #6: Vehicle gate on the east perimeter adjacent to Fire Station 2.

(FOUO) ECP #7: Pedestrian gate on the northeast perimeter adjacent to parking spot F7.

(FOUO) ECP #7A: Vehicle gate on the north perimeter northwest of hangar 1002.

(FOUO) ECP #8: Pedestrian gate on the north perimeter between hangars 1001 and 1002.

(FOUO) ECP #9: Pedestrian gate on the north perimeter adjacent to the northeast corner of hangar 1001.

(FOUO) ECP #9A: Vehicle gate on the north perimeter adjacent to the northeast corner of hangar 1001.

(FOUO) ECP #9B: Vehicle gate on the northwestern corner of hangar 1001.

(FOUO) ECP #9C: Pedestrian gate on the northwestern corner of hangar 1001 (just west of ECP 9B).

(FOUO) ECP #10: Pedestrian gate on the north perimeter between hangars 1000 and 1001.

(FOUO) ECP #10A: Pedestrian entrance on the northeast corner of hangar 1000.

(FOUO) ECP #10B: Pedestrian entrance on the north end of hangar 1000.

(FOUO) ECP #10C: Pedestrian entrance on the northwest corner of hangar 1000.

(FOUO) ECP #11: Pedestrian gate on the north perimeter adjacent to the northwest corner of hangar 1000.

(FOUO) ECP #11A: Vehicle gate on the north perimeter adjacent to the northwest corner of hangar 1000.

(FOUO) ECP #12: On the northwest perimeter adjacent to parking spot B5.

(FOUO) ECP #13: On the south perimeter at taxiway gap A9.

(FOUO) ECP #24: Pedestrian entrance south of bldg. 985.

(FOUO) ECP #25: Pedestrian entrance south of bldg. 986.

(FOUO) ECP #26: Vehicle gate south of bldg. 979 on Randolph Ave.

(FOUO) ECP #27: Vehicle gate south of bldg. 484.

(FOUO) ECP #28: Vehicle gate south of bldg. 482.

5. 58 SOW Flightline Restricted Area Entry and Circulation Controls. The following procedures apply to the 58 SOW Restricted Area containing PL 3 aircraft.

5.1. (FOUO) During maintenance duty hours, primary security responsibility for the flightline restricted area will be provided by maintenance personnel. When maintenance personnel are not available to provide security, the designated control center for each flightline restricted area will notify the 377 WSSS/SSCC. The 377 WSSS will assume primary security responsibility when maintenance personnel are not available.

5.1.1. (DCNI) The Initial Backup Force (IBF) for the KUMMSC is comprised of posted flightline security patrols. Security situations at KUMMSC requiring IBF response will cause all SF flightline patrols to immediately respond to KUMMSC. During such responses, the 58 SOW restricted area will be void of SF flightline security patrols. To compensate for this loss, the 58 SOW WOC will be notified to provide owner/user observation and protection of all PL resources within their restricted area. 58 SOW personnel will challenge and attempt to detain any unauthorized personnel observed within their restricted area. If unable to detain unauthorized personnel, 58 SOW personnel will

contact the SFS/BDOC with detailed descriptions (individual or vehicle) and directions of travel. If available, a law enforcement patrol will be dispatched to assist. As the security situation allows, SF will ultimately return and take control of any personnel detained by 58 SOW personnel. Upon returning from IBF response, SF security patrols will conduct 100% badge verifications to re-establish situational awareness and positive control of all personnel within flightline restricted areas.

5.1.2. Training for owner/user ID Forces is the responsibility of the DFC.

5.2. (FOUO) AF Form 1199CG with area 4 open (single badge system) will be used to gain unescorted entry into the restricted area. One of the four supporting techniques identified in Enclosure 10, Tab A, Appendix 1, Annex C, para 3.7. will be used. UOF is authorized in accordance with AFI 31-117. Personnel are prohibited from entering this area without the consent of the Installation Commander.

5.2.1. (FOUO) Any person with unescorted entry authorization on their RAB, may be an escort official. Escort of visitors may be transferred to another authorized individual. The authorized individual will remain with the visitors at all times. Visitors do not need to be signed in on the AF Form 1109.

5.2.2. (FOUO) Unescorted entry into temporary restricted areas containing 58 SOW assets is authorized to personnel in possession of an AF Form 1199CG with the appropriate area open. One of the four supporting techniques listed in Enclosure 10, Tab A, Appendix 1, Annex C, para 3.7 will be used.

5.2.3. (FOUO) Authenticated crew orders and military ID cards will be used to grant unescorted entry for sister service and foreign units (all US military branches and friendly foreign countries), requesting entry into the Area 6 restricted area.

5.2.4. 58 SOW WOC is the designated control center responsible for the 58 SOW restricted area.

5.2.5. Aircraft movements: The 58 WOC will coordinate all aircraft movements with the 377 WSSS/SSCC.

5.2.6. The owner/user is responsible for notifying SF when aircraft are unattended or removed from the restricted areas.

5.2.7. (FOUO) A temporary restricted area will be established for any aircraft removed from and parked outside of the permanent restricted area. 377 WSSS/SSCC will be notified to establish procedures according to AFI 31-101, Integrated Defense and applicable SUPs. Aircraft removed from the permanent restricted area and placed in a temporary restricted area will be relocated back to the permanent restricted area after operational and maintenance requirements are met.

5.2.8. At the end of the duty day, designated flightline control centers will notify 377 WSSS/SSCC of the aircraft parking locations including aircraft parked in hangars.

5.3. Emergency Entry Procedures in support of PL 3 Flightline Operations:

5.3.1. (FOUO) If any incident/emergency occurs inside a restricted area, 377 MXS/MXO will notify 377 WSSS/SSCC with the location, tail number of aircraft (if applicable), and nature of emergency via the SCN. On-duty ID Forces will assist in containment, evacuation, and appropriate cordons if necessary.

5.3.2. (FOUO) Personnel who respond to the 58 SOW restricted area under emergency conditions (such as the fire department, military medical personnel, EOD, and ID Forces) will be granted entry without delay during verified emergencies. All emergency responders will be granted access upon successful "sign/countersign" demonstration.

5.3.3. (FOUO) Security Forces will maintain accountability (a count of personnel and vehicles entering) of all emergency responders.

5.3.4. (FOUO) For unknown emergencies, on-duty ID Forces are responsible for verifying that an emergency condition exists and overseeing surveillance of personnel entering under emergency conditions. At no time will entry be allowed based solely on the use of lights and sirens. Once the emergency is confirmed, emergency entry procedures apply.

5.3.5. (FOUO) ID Force personnel will respond to and establish a 360-degree security perimeter around the aircraft or at the discretion of the IC.

5.3.6. (FOUO) Once the emergency is terminated, all other follow-on response agencies (i.e., mortuary affairs, investigators, etc.) will be escorted into the area using normal escorted entry procedures.

5.3.7. The primary location of the 58 SOW lighting controls is on hangars 1000, 1001 and 1002. The alternate location of lighting controls is on the third floor of each hangar.

ENCLOSURE 6 TO TAB A TO APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX C TO KAFB IDP 31-101
KAFB FLIGHTLINE 377th AIR BASE WING / TRANSIENT AIRCRAFT PARKING AREA

REFERENCES: Refer to Basic Plan.

1. (FOUO) GENERAL: The 377th ABW Transient Ramp, area 6, is located west of parking ramp Echo, south of parking ramp Charlie, east of Airfield Operations, and north of taxiway Bravo to include Bravo and Delta ramps and the helipads located to the west of Hangar 1000.

NOTE: The helipads are located within the Controlled Movement Area (CMA) and are off limits without prior approval through/direct contact with the FAA tower. Area 6 is designated a restricted area when PL 3 resources are in the area. 30-ft clear zones are maintained around restricted areas wherever possible. Due to terrain considerations, mission impact, cost, and original flightline construction standards (prior to 3 October 1988), it is impractical and unfeasible to construct/designate clear zones at some locations along the restricted area boundary of the flightline. In areas where this is not feasible, an acceptable clear zone for these areas is four (4) ft.

2. (FOUO) Per AFI 31-101_AFGSC Sup, Integrated Defense: para 6.5.5. Restricted areas with PL 3 resources that are not upgraded to a higher PL status during contingencies will maintain clear zones that allow early detection of intruders. The IDC will direct the width of the clear zone to meet local threat and environmental conditions.”

3. (FOUO) The restricted area boundaries consist of a woven 9-gauge, steel-wire, chain link fence with Type A barbed wire outriggers, and highway dividers; the boundary on the south and west sides consist of red painted lines. Restricted area signs are attached to the chain link fence, highway dividers, and are painted on the tarmac.

4. (FOUO) EXECUTION: When PL 1 or PL 2 aircraft are parked within Area 6, a temporary restricted area, with a designated entry control point, will be established around the aircraft to separate it from lower priority aircraft. Security measures will be implemented commensurate with the priority of the aircraft. Area 6 is located east of building 333, south of Apron C, west of 58 SOW aircraft parking area, and north of runway 8/26. The restricted area boundaries consist of a woven 9-gauge, steel-wire, chain link fence with Type A barbed wire outriggers, highway dividers; the boundaries consist of red painted lines. Restricted area signs are attached to the chain link fence, highway dividers, and are painted on the tarmac. The 377 ABW Transient Ramp has nine ECPs:

1. (FOUO) ECP #14: On the northwest perimeter directly adjacent to building # 377.
2. (FOUO) ECP #15: On the west perimeter directly in front of building #376.
3. (FOUO) ECP #16: On the west perimeter approximately 100 feet north of the Presidential Gate.
4. (FOUO) ECP #17: On the west perimeter directly adjacent to the Presidential Gate.
5. (FOUO) ECP #18: On the west perimeter adjacent to building #333 (Base Operations).
6. (FOUO) ECP #19: On the south perimeter at taxiway gap B5 and D ramp intersection.
7. (FOUO) ECP #20: On the south perimeter at taxiway gap M2 and D ramp intersection.
8. (FOUO) ECP #21: On the south perimeter at taxiway B6 and D ramp intersection.

9. (FOUO) ECP #22: Helo Pads were completed and ECP was painted to enter the Helo Pads. ECP location is adjacent to D8.
5. (FOUO) 377 ABW Transient Aircraft Flightline Parking Area Entry and Circulation Controls. The following procedures apply to the 377 ABW Transient Aircraft Parking Restricted Area when it contains PL 3 aircraft:
 - 5.1. Transient protection level aircraft parking: The appropriate level of security for transient aircraft will be determined according to the standards set forth in AFI 31-101, Integrated Defense, and applicable SUPs. Security presence, detection capability, entry control, threat and alarm response will be considered. Transient protection level aircraft not parked in an existing restricted area will be parked on "D" ramp (military transient aircraft parking ramp) as directed by 377 MXS/MXO.
 - 5.2. (FOUO) AF Form 1199CG with area 6 open (single badge system) will be used to gain unescorted entry into the restricted area. AF Form 1199CG with area 6 open (single badge system) in conjunction with an EAL authenticated by the 377 WSSS, E-5 or above, will be used to allow entry into temporary restricted areas established within Area 6. Additional entry restrictions may apply depending on the priority of the resource. One of the four supporting techniques listed in Enclosure 10 To Tab A To Appendix 1 To Annex C, para 3.7 will be used. The use of deadly force is authorized IAW AFI 31-117. Personnel are prohibited from entering this area without the consent of the Installation Commander.
 - 5.3. (FOUO) Any person with unescorted entry authorization on their RAB, may be an escort official. Escort of visitors may be transferred to another authorized individual. The authorized individual will remain with the visitors at all times. Visitors do not need to be signed in on the AF Form 1109.
 - 5.4. (FOUO) A single badge system consisting of a home station RAB and an authenticated EAL or crew orders will be used for unescorted entry into PL 3 temporary restricted areas. Any person having unescorted entry authority may perform escort official duties.
 - 5.5. (FOUO) Authenticated crew orders and/or DOD/DoE ID cards will be used to grant unescorted entry for sister service personnel requesting entry into a temporary restricted area for transient aircraft. These personnel may act as escort officials.
 - 5.6. 377 MXS/MXO, PL aircraft parked in Hangar 333, on Alpha Ramp, Charlie Ramp, and Bravos 4/5 would be the responsibility of the MXO Airfield Management Operations. MXO Airfield Management Operations is also the designated control center responsible for the Area 6 restricted area and all other temporary restricted areas containing PL aircraft.
 - 5.7. Aircraft movements: Designated flightline control centers will coordinate all aircraft movements with the 377 WSSS/SSCC.
 - 5.8. The owner/user is responsible for notifying SF when aircraft are unattended or removed from the restricted areas.

5.9. At the end of the duty day, designated flightline control centers will notify 377 WSSS/SSCC of the aircraft parking locations including aircraft parked in hangars.

6. Emergency Entry Procedures in support of PL 3 Flightline Operations:

6.1. (FOUO) If any incident/emergency occurs inside a transient restricted area, 377 MXS/MXO will notify 377 WSSS/SSCC with the location, tail number of aircraft (if applicable), and nature of emergency via the SCN. On-duty ID Forces will assist in containment, evacuation, and appropriate cordons if necessary.

6.2. (FOUO) Personnel who respond to the 377 ABW Transient Aircraft Parking Ramp under emergency conditions (such as the fire department, military medical personnel, EOD, and ID Forces) will be granted entry without delay during verified emergencies. All emergency responders will be granted access upon successful "sign/countersign" demonstration.

6.3. (FOUO) ID Forces will maintain accountability (a count of personnel and vehicles entering) of all emergency responders.

6.4. For unknown emergencies, on-duty ID Forces are responsible for verifying that an emergency condition exists and overseeing surveillance of personnel entering under emergency conditions. At no time will entry be allowed based solely on the use of lights and sirens. Once the emergency is confirmed, emergency entry procedures apply.

6.5. (FOUO) ID Force personnel will respond to and establish a 360-degree security perimeter around the aircraft or at the discretion of the IC.

6.6. (FOUO) Once the emergency has been terminated, all other follow-on response agencies (i.e., mortuary affairs, investigators, etc.) will be escorted into the area using normal escorted entry procedures.

6.7. (FOUO) Standards for Foreign Aircraft: If feasible, non-US aircraft cleared to land at KAFB will be parked on the 377 ABW Transient Aircraft Flightline Parking Area (Area 6) located on B and D ramps.

6.8. (FOUO) Security for non-US aircraft will be on a case-by-case basis not to exceed the PL provided to equivalent AF aircraft, but may be less if the non-US aircraft or unit commander agrees. At a minimum, non-US aircraft will be placed in controlled areas with boundaries of rope and stanchions. Aircraft may be placed inside existing restricted areas to provide additional security, but are not considered PL resources. Visiting nations will provide a liaison and may provide unarmed assistance for access control to their assets.

6.9. (FOUO) The IBF for KUMMSC is comprised of posted flightline security patrols, therefore, if security situations requiring IBF response occur at KUMMSC, restricted areas will be void of SF flightline security patrols. To compensate for this loss, the 377 MXS Base Operations will be notified to provide owner/user observation and protection of all PL

resources within their restricted area. 377 MXS personnel will challenge and attempt to detain any unauthorized personnel observed within the restricted area. If unable to detain unauthorized personnel, 377 MXS personnel will contact the SFS/BDOC with detailed descriptions (individual or vehicle) and directions of travel. If available, a law enforcement patrol will be dispatched to assist. As the security situation allows, SF will ultimately return and take control of any personnel detained by 377 MXS personnel. Upon returning from IBF response, SF security patrols will conduct 100% badge verifications to re-establish situational awareness and positive control of all personnel within flightline restricted areas.

6.9.1. (FOUO) During FPCONs Charlie and Delta, owner/user agencies may provide armed/unarmed ID for PL resources within their respective restricted areas. While performing regular duties, active duty 377 MXS personnel may be armed to provide additional layer of defense immediately surrounding PL resources. The integration and specific details of these owner/user ID forces will be situation dependent and will be coordinated with the DFC. ID Forces will assist responding SF, but will not impede the response.

6.9.2. The primary location of the 377 ABW transient ramp lighting is the power box on a pole to the northeast of building 333. The alternate lighting is in the form of portable light carts which are available from 58 MXS/MXMG.

ENCLOSURE 7 TO TAB A TO APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX C TO KAFB IDP 31-101
KAFB FLIGHTLINE PHOTOGRAPH PROCEDURES

REFERENCES: Refer to Basic Plan.

1. GENERAL: Procedures for taking photographs on the flightline.
2. MISSION: To ensure requests to take photographs on the flightline are properly coordinated IAW established procedures.
3. EXECUTION: Concept of Operations.
 - 3.1. Photography (digital, film, video, etc.) of restricted areas containing PL resources is prohibited, unless the photographer has on his/her person a Photography Authorization Letter. This letter must be routed through 377 ABW/PA Office. This letter must be signed/approved by an E-7 or above or the security manager assigned to the owner/user agency. The PA office will submit all Photography Authorization Letters to the 377 WSSS Flightline Constable (377 WSSS/S5) for authentication. **NOTE:** KUMMSC has additional requirements restricting use of photography equipment. Contact 898 MUNS or 377 WSSS/S5 for photography requirements.
 - 3.2. For unescorted personnel, the request must contain the following information: Photographer's name, organization, government produced identification (GPID) number or last 6 of social security number (SSN), and timeframe authorized.
 - 3.3. For escorted personnel intended to accommodate single-events or other short-term activities, the letter must contain specific timeframes authorized, area authorized and organization of escorting personnel. Escort officials are responsible for photographers and content of photos taken.
 - 3.4. In addition to requirements identified in paragraph 3.1., Photography Authorization Letters intended to accommodate single-events or other short-term activities must contain specific dates/times for which it is to be in effect and must include an expiration date and time.
 - 3.5. Control Centers for flightline restricted areas may pre-announce personnel to take photographs on the flightline. The requesting control center must contact 377 WSSS/SSCC at 846-1478/4760 prior to the individual taking the pictures, filming, and/or recording. The control center must provide the following information: Photographer's name, organization, last 6 of SSN, timeframe authorized, and escort official's name and organization, if applicable.
 - 3.6. All personnel with photography authorization must have unescorted entry authority for the area they will be photographing or under escort by someone with applicable unescorted entry authority.

3.7. EXCEPTION: Photography of transient PL 2 or higher resources (such as POTUS, REFLEX DELTA, SAAM, etc.) is prohibited unless permission is granted prior by the aircrew commander, or designated representative.

ENCLOSURE 8 TO TAB A TO APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX C TO KAFB IDP 31-101
150 SOW COMMAND POST

REFERENCES: Refer to Basic Plan.

1. GENERAL: 150 SOW Command Post located within building 1047.
2. (FOUO) EXECUTION: The 150 SOW Command Post/Operations Center is normally a non-PL area but will become PL 3 upon federal activation, as directed by TAG NM or higher HQ, during Operational Readiness Inspections (ORI), or for training exercises.

2.1. 150 SOW Command Post/Operations Center Restricted Area Entry and Circulation Controls.

2.1.1. (FOUO) When the WOC is designated a restricted area, all personnel must have an AF Form 1199CG with area 20 open to be admitted to the operations center. One of the four supporting techniques listed in Enclosure 10, Tab A, Appendix 1, Annex C, para 3.7 will be used. The on-duty senior command post controller may authorize escorted entry to the facility. In the event of hostilities, ID Forces will respond to neutralize the threat. Open area 20, escort authority on either the AF FM 1199CG only applies to deployed locations away from KAFB. Use one of the four supporting techniques listed in Enclosure 10, Tab A, Appendix 1, Annex C, para 3.7. UOF is authorized in accordance with AFI 31-117. Personnel are prohibited from entering this area without the consent of the Installation Commander.

2.1.2. (FOUO) The IBF for the PL 1 KUMMSC is comprised of flight line security patrols. Security situations at KUMMSC requiring IBF response will cause all posted SF flightline patrols to immediately respond to KUMMSC. During such responses, the 150 SOW restricted area will be void of SF flight line security patrols. To compensate for this loss, the 150 SOW Command Post/Operations Center will be notified to provide owner/user observation and protection of all PL resources within their restricted area. 150 SOW personnel will challenge and attempt to detain any unauthorized personnel observed within the restricted area. If unable to detain unauthorized personnel, 150 SOW personnel will contact the SFS/BDOC detailed descriptions (individual/vehicle) and directions of travel. If available, a law enforcement patrol will be dispatched to assist. As the security situation allows, SF will ultimately return and take control of any personnel detained by 150 SOW personnel. Upon returning from IBF response, SF security patrols will conduct 100% badge verifications to re-establish situational awareness and positive control of all personnel within flightline restricted areas.

2.2. Training for owner/user ID Forces is the responsibility of the DFC.

2.2.1. (FOUO) During FPCONs Charlie and Delta, owner/user agencies may provide armed/unarmed ID for PL resources within their respective restricted areas. While performing regular duties, active duty 150 SOW personnel may be armed to provide an additional layer of defense immediately surrounding PL resources. The integration and specific details of these owner/user ID forces will be situation dependent and will be coordinated with the DFC. ID Forces will assist responding Security Forces, but will not impede the response.

ENCLOSURE 9 TO TAB A TO APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX C TO KAFB IDP 31-101
KIRTLAND COMMAND POST (KCP) / KCP EMERGENCY ACTION CELL (KCP EA
CELL) / KCP GENERATOR ENCLOSURE AREA

REFERENCES: Refer to Basic Plan.

1. (FOUO) GENERAL: The KCP is designated a permanent PL 3 restricted area during normal operation on KAFB and is located in Wing A, Room 103, of building 20604. During Prime Nuclear Airlift Force (PNAF) missions or contingency operations affecting PL 1 operations, KCP will be increased to a PL 1 restricted area.

2. EXECUTION:

2.1. (FOUO) KCP and Restricted Area Entry and Circulation Controls: The KCP is a PL 3 resource. All personnel must have an AF Form 1199CG with area 1 open to be admitted to the command post. One of the four supporting techniques listed in Enclosure 10 To Tab A To Appendix 1 To Annex C, para 3.7 will be used. The following requirements of the designated deviation authority will be adhered to:

2.2. (FOUO) KCP EA Cell, Generator Enclosure Area AF Form 1199CG with area 3 open (single badge system) will be used to gain authorized entry into the KCP EA Cell and Generator Enclosure Area restricted area. One of the four supporting techniques listed in Enclosure 10 To Tab A To Appendix 1 To Annex C, 3.7 will be used. A restricted area sign and a telephone to request entry are located at the entrance door. Authorized personnel will gain access through a cipher lock located at the entrance door. Only KCP Controllers may grant access to the EA Cell and Console areas. UOF is authorized in accordance with AFI 31-117. Personnel are prohibited from entering this area without consent of the Installation Commander.

2.3. (FOUO) The on-duty command post controller or other authorized command post personnel may authorize escorted entry to the facility as required. Personnel authorized to escort will have an open area 1 indicated in the appropriate block. The on-duty command post controller is unarmed. Escort ratios will follow information listed in Enclosure 1 to Tab A to Appendix 1 to Annex C paragraph 3.1.3.

2.4. (FOUO) In the event of hostilities, ID patrols will respond to neutralize the threat. The external security response team (ESRT) will provide backup upon request. The on-duty command post controller(s) serves as part of the internal response element. In a daily operating environment the on-duty controller(s) or authorized KCP personnel will conduct IVA. In the event the protection level of KCP is elevated due to mission requirements, the number of IVA sentries is identified within Enclosure 1 of Priority Posting chart.

2.5. (FOUO) ID Forces are posted during CAT activation, contingencies, or as directed by the DFC or higher authority.

2.6. (FOUO) All KCP EALs meet PL 1 EAL standards due to increase to PL 1 for PNAF missions.

ENCLOSURE 10 TO TAB A TO APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX C TO KAFB IDP 31-101
CONTROL AND ISSUE OF RESTRICTED AREA BADGES

REFERENCES: Refer to Basic Plan.

1. **PURPOSE:** To ensure persons entering, working within, or exiting restricted and controlled areas have been granted authority to be inside the area, are positively identified prior to entering, and accounted for as necessary.

2. **MISSION:** To prevent unauthorized entry, counter the introduction of prohibited items, detect hostile actions within areas, and prevent unauthorized removal of material from restricted areas on KAFB.

3. **EXECUTION:**

3.1. RAB Processing.

3.1.1. The following are KAFB organizations, including tenant units that are authorized to request (RAB)s and are responsible for initiating and completing the AF IMT 2586, Unescorted Entry Authorization Certificate.

377 ABW	377 ABW/CP	377 ABW/XP	377 CONS	377 CPTS	377 FSS	377 SFG
377 WSSS	377 SFS	377 MXS	377 MXG	377 MDS	898 MUNS	512 RQS
412 AMXS	550 SOS	71 SOS	58 MXG	58 MXS	58 AMXS	58 MOS
58 SOW	58 OSS	58 OG	58 TRS	415 SOS	377 SSPTS	377 MDSS
377 MSG	377 MSG/SC	377 MSG/CE	377 LRS	AFIA	AFNWC	AFOSI/Det 814
AFOTEC	AFRL	AFSEC	JNWC	NAG	DTRA	MDA-AL
US ARMY COE	SDTW	AF2-FSO	373 TRS/Det 16	705 CTS	351 BATS	150 NMANG SOW
150 SOW/SFS	210 REDHORSE	150 JF HQ	SANDIA	ABACUS	CHENEGA	377ABW/IG
AFGSC						

3.1.2. To obtain an Form 1199CG, the requesting organization will:

3.1.2.1. (FOUO) Complete AF IMT 2586 for required area IAW AFI 31-101. For personnel processed and cleared under the personnel reliability assurance program (PRAP), Section III (DUTY) will include either the statement “critical” or “controlled” and any other pertinent information deemed necessary, such as, items related in notes 1 and 2. Requesting official signs Section II (CERTIFICATION OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL). **NOTE 1:** Non-USAF activities, i.e., DoE and SNL, will include, at a minimum the following statement in Section III of all AF Forms 2586, “I certify the above named individual meets the spirit and intent of the Department of Defense Personnel Reliability Program.” **NOTE 2:** DOD personnel who have unescorted entry into KUMMSC and are not under PRAP will have, as a minimum, a favorable security investigation.

3.1.2.2. Obtain coordination, escort, and entry approval in Section IV (RESTRICTED OR CONTROLLED AREA COORDINATION) of the AF IMT 2586 from the designated officials identified in paragraph 3.5.1.

3.1.3. Area Coordinating Officials. Individuals identified in paragraph 3.5.1. having area coordinating official's duties will:

3.1.3.1. Enter the word "restricted" under the type area column.

3.1.3.2. Place an "X" for yes or no under the concur column.

3.1.3.3. Type/print/stamp the name of the coordinating/approving official and obtain a signature above the name in the appropriate column.

3.1.3.4. Enter the date signed.

3.1.4. Security managers will annotate in Section 3, Duty Description Section, of the AF IMT 2586, the clearance type, and date of clearance completion. Their signature in Section 2 will serve as proof that the individual listed on the AF IMT 2586 possesses the required clearance.

3.1.5. (FOUO) (FOUO) Unit Security Managers upload the AF IMT 2586 into the Process folder located in SharePoint under Pass & Registration. The individual will then report to the 377th Security Forces Squadron Pass and Registration (377 SFS/S5B), DP: 846-6429, for completion of Section V (restricted or controlled area badge issue) and issue of the AF Form 1199CG. Digitally signed AF IMT 2586 will be accepted and transmitted via e-mail ONLY if their correct 10-digit EDIPI number is listed on the current DD Form 577 on file in Pass and Registration. If electronic processing is not available the AF IMT 2586 may be hand carried and wet signatures are authorized.

3.1.6. All military personnel must be in uniform for photograph and issue of a RAB.

3.2. RAB Administration:

3.2.1. All personnel issued a RAB for PL 3 areas will be trained and may act as an escort official IAW AFI 31-101, paragraph 7.11.1. No additional "approved escort official" markings are required. Procedures for PL 1 areas will be defined in Enclosure 1 to Tab A to Appendix 1 to Annex Z, para 2.3.

3.2.2. A locally devised lesson plan and test will be used by security managers to train and formally certify escort officials. Security Managers will incorporate site specific training to their respective areas

3.2.3. At a minimum, escort officials will be trained annually and when any significant changes occur in visitor procedures. This training will be documented and tracked locally.

3.3. Issuing an AF Form 1199CG.

3.3.1. (FOUO) The issuing official will identify the person by checking an identification card. Annotate under the remarks block of the AF IMT 2586 identification (e.g., alpha roster, driver's license, RAB, passport, etc.) used to identify the person. The ID card and AF IMT 2586 must have identical information. The issuing official may only change the height, weight, eye color, and hair color blocks on the AF IMT 2586. All other incorrect or omitted information will be changed/added and initialed by the requesting official for Section II or coordinating/approving official for Section IV.

3.3.2. (FOUO) AF Form 1199CG (applicable to KUMMSC). Upon completion and issuance of the RAB, 377 SFS/S5B will send the AF IMT 2586 to the 377 WSSS and tell the individual to report to the KUMMSC Enrollment Center for enrollment into the security system. The Enrollment Center will maintain a copy of the AF IMT 2586 until database verification is complete and then forward the AF IMT 2586 to the individual's security manager. If digital processing is not available the form must utilize wet signatures and signature blocks in applicable areas. Due to Automated Entry Control System (AECS) software limitations the only control number acceptable is a SSN. Once it becomes available the use of DoD identification number can be used. **NOTE:** Compensatory measures are outlined in this plan, and 377 WSSS and 898 MUNS OIs.

3.3.2.1. (FOUO) Two issuing officials are required to issue an AF Form 1199 CG for area 8.

3.3.2.1.1. (FOUO) One issuing official will initiate the process, complete the AF IMT 2586, make the badges, and sign the forms.

3.3.2.1.2. (FOUO) The verifying official ensures the data inputted into the AECS is correct prior to issuance of the RAB and then the verifier's information is placed into the remarks section of the AF IMT 2586 and signed.

3.4. General Instructions.

3.4.1. The following restricted area numbers identified on the AF Form 1199 CG will be used to gain or designate authorized entry to restricted areas on KAFB:

AREA	LOCATION	RESPONSIBLE AGENCY
1	KCP (Primary and Alternate)	377 ABW/CP
2	NOT USED	NOT USED
3	KCP EA CELL	377 ABW/CP
4	58 SOW Flightline Restricted Area	58 SOW/CC
5	NOT USED	NOT USED
6	377 ABW Transient Aircraft Ramp	377 MXS/MXO
7	NOT USED	NOT USED
8	KUMMSC	898 MUNS/CC
9	Pad Operations/(Active Missions/Exercises)	898 MUNS/CC
10-18	NOT USED	NOT USED
19	150 SOW Flightline Restricted Area	150 SOW/CC

20	150 SOW Command Post/Operations Center	150 SOW/CC
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3.5. Tasks.

3.5.1. The Installation Commander has designated the following commanders and staff agency chiefs as having authority to grant unescorted entry and escort authority (section IV of AF IMT 2586) for persons assigned to their units as approving officials. The 377 SFS/S5B will ensure designation letters are updated when changes occur: The 377 ABW/CV may sign for all areas.

3.5.1.1. (FOUO) KCP Chief or superintendent - area 1 and 3.

3.5.1.2. (FOUO) 377 ABW/XP Chief - areas 4, 6, (8 unescorted only, no DCAs), 19, 20 (Wing Staff Agency personnel only).

3.5.1.3. (DCNI) 377 MXG/CC - areas 6 and (8 unescorted only) & (area 4 for MXG personnel only).

3.5.1.4. (DCNI) 898 MUNS/CC - areas 4, 6 (898 MUNS personnel only), 8 and 9.

3.5.1.5. (FOUO) 377 MXS/CC - area 6.

3.5.1.6. (FOUO) DFC - areas 1, 4, 6, 8, 9, 19, 20 (377 SFG personnel only).

3.5.1.7. (DCNI) 377 WSSS/CC - areas 1, 4, 6, 8, 9, 19, 20 (377 WSSS personnel only).

3.5.1.8. (DCNI) 377 SFS/CC - areas 1, 4, 6, 8, 9, 19, 20 (377 SFS personnel only).

3.5.1.9. (DCNI) 377 SSPTS/CC - areas 1, 4, 6, 8, 9, 19, 20 (377 SSPTS personnel only).

3.5.1.10. (FOUO) 150 SOW/CC - areas 19 and 20.

3.5.1.11. (FOUO) 150 MXG/CC - areas 19 and 20.

3.5.1.12. (FOUO) 150 OG/CC - areas 19 and 20.

3.5.1.13. (FOUO) 150 MSG/CC - areas 19 and 20.

3.5.1.14. (FOUO) 150 MXS/CC - areas 19 and 20.

3.5.1.15. (FOUO) 58 OG/CC - area 4.

3.5.1.16. (FOUO) 58 OG/CD - area 4.

- 3.5.1.17. (FOUO) 58 MXG/CC - area 4.
- 3.5.1.18. (FOUO) 58 MXG/CD - area 4.
- 3.5.1.19. (FOUO) 512 RQS/CC - area 4.
- 3.5.1.20. (FOUO) 550 SOS/CC - area 4.
- 3.5.1.21. (FOUO) 551 SOS/CC - area 4.
- 3.5.1.22. (FOUO) 58 MOS/CC - area 4.
- 3.5.1.23. (FOUO) 58 MXS/CC - area 4.
- 3.5.1.24. (FOUO) 58 OSS/CC - area 4.
- 3.5.1.25. (FOUO) 415 SOS/CC - area 4.
- 3.5.1.26. (FOUO) 58th Training Squadron (58 TRS)/CC - area 4.

NOTE: (FOUO) The 58 OG/CC, 58 MXG/CC, or designated representative will be the approving authorities for outside agencies requiring area 4 unescorted entry (Section IV of AF Form 2586).

3.6. DD Form 577, Appointment/Termination Record-Authorized Signature:

3.6.1. (DCNI) Commanders of agencies responsible for restricted areas will provide the KUMMSC Enrollment Center (when applying for entry to KUMMSC) with one copy of the DD Form 577, for all officials authorized or designated to authenticate Section IV of AF IMT 2586. DD Form 577 must contain specific and limiting language, the forms and sections to be signed and the area numbers to be coordinated. 377 SFS/S5B will provide KUMMSC one copy of DD Form 577, signed by DFC, System Authorization Access Request for all issuing officials authorized to sign Section V of the AF IMT 2586.

3.6.2. (FOUO) Commanders of requesting officials for RABs will provide 377 SFS/S5B a DD Form 577 for all officials designated to sign AF IMT 2586, Section II (Certification of Requesting Official) and Section IV (Restricted or Controlled Area Coordination). The DD Form 577 must contain specific and limiting language, i.e., the form and section to be signed and for what areas. If a digital signature is used on the AF IMT 2586, the current 10-digit EDIPI number must be included. **NOTE:** EDIPI numbers are unique to the Critical Action Checklist (CAC). Any change of CAC will require a new DD Form 577 with new EDIPI number. A hard copy AF IMT 2586 with ink signatures will still be accepted.

3.7. Supporting Techniques for the Single Badge System: The four supporting techniques used to reinforce the single badge system according to AFI 31-101, para 7.9., are as follows:

3.7.1. (FOUO) Personal Recognition: Personal recognition is defined as being able to provide name, rank, and organization of person requesting entry. Use personal recognition after the (EC) entry controller has initially verified the individual's authority to enter the restricted area.

3.7.2. (FOUO) Signature and Credential Check: Ask the bearer to produce a personal ID credential (official state or federally issued form of identification with signature and photo). Compare this with data on the RAB.

3.7.3. (FOUO) EAL: Compare entry credentials with information contained on an authenticated EAL, and ensure accuracy between the two documents. An EAL for areas 19 and 20 will be provided upon request.

3.7.4. (FOUO) Telephone or Radio Verification: Designated unit dispatching agencies or similar authorities notify WSSS/SSCC or SFS/BDOC when a person needs to enter an area.

3.7.4.1. (FOUO) SF control centers must use a call back procedure to verify the notification and ensure entry is authorized.

3.7.4.2. (FOUO) SF control centers inform the area EC of the impending entry.

3.8. Badge Loss. The loss or suspected loss of an AF Form 1199CG be processed as follows:

3.8.1. (DCNI) The RAB holder will report the lost badge immediately to the individual's commander or unit security manager.

3.8.2. (FOUO) Within 72 hours, the unit commander or designee will make a thorough investigation into the facts surrounding the loss with a report. The unit commander will sign the report and give the original to the individual. The individual must have the original report and the original AF IMT 2586 to obtain a replacement badge.

3.8.3. (FOUO) 377 SFS/S5B will accept the report when it meets all requirements, then cancel the badge from the database and reissue a badge with a new badge number. The original report of loss is filed by 377 SFS/S5B; a copy is maintained by the applicable security manager and is attached to original AF IMT 2586.

3.9. Badge Replacement.

3.9.1. (FOUO) When a badge needs replacement due to damage, mutilation, deterioration, faulty operation, or change of identification information, the individual will bring the unit's copy of the AF IMT 2586 and the damaged badge to 377 SFS/S5B. 377 SFS/S5B will issue a new badge utilizing current AF IMT 2586.

3.9.2. (FOUO) Turned in badges are immediately deleted from AECS and destroyed by the authorized personnel assigned to 377 SFS/S5B to ensure the badge is out of circulation. The original AF IMT 2586 will be stamped, signed, and dated by the destruction official.

The original (stamped) AF IMT 2586 will be kept on file by the corresponding security manager until no longer needed. The destruction official will record the name of the badge holder, reason for termination, area 8, and badge number. The destruction official will sign off on the 377 SFS/S5B Accountability Log. The signed Accountability Log page will be kept on file at 377 SFS/S5B.

3.9.3. (FOUO) A badge must be replaced due to dramatic personal appearance change, consisting of but not limited to the following: Gain or loss of 50 lbs. and significant changes/alterations of facial features.

3.10. Badge Compromise.

3.10.1. (FOUO) Due to KUMMSC's uniqueness, a mass reissue will not ordinarily be required.

3.10.2. (FOUO) The Installation Commander will order a mass reissue of flightline and other RABs (other than KUMMSC) when a compromise of the current system is indicated.

3.11. Personnel Departures.

3.11.1. (FOUO) Military Personnel Section, Civilian Personnel Section, mission partners, or contractors will send their respective security managers a monthly list or personal notification (i.e. telephone, fax, e-mail) of personnel projected to depart on a specific date (YYYYMMDD). This includes personnel (military, civilian, or contractor) who are reassigned, separated, terminated, discharged, or retired. The individual will bring their badge and AF IMT 2586 to 377 SFS/S5B at least one day prior to departure. The AF IMT 2586 will be stamped, dated, and initialed by 377 SFS/S5B personnel. The individual will be removed from Virtual Military Personnel Flight (VMPPF) and must return the AF IMT 2586 to their security manager. If the badge is not turned in, the security manager will be notified and the commander or designee will initiate retrieval action. Badges that are not retrieved will be reported as lost using the format in attachment 1.

3.11.2. (FOUO) Loss or Missing AF IMT 2586: If the member can't produce an AF IMT 2586, then they will hand-carry a Loss or Missing AF IMT 2586 Memorandum for Record (MFR) to 377 SFS/S5B.

3.12. Entry Withdrawal. If an individual's unescorted entry is withdrawn, the following procedures apply:

3.12.1. (FOUO) If the individual has been suspended from Arming UOF/PRAP, (i.e. assigned to flightline or command post duties, not requiring PRAP access) the unit security manager or designee may confiscate the RAB. For Decertification the badge will be immediately return the badge to 377 SFS/S5B for destruction.

3.12.2. (DCNI) If the individual is assigned to a PRAP access position with two-person area access, the commander will determine if the individual will have access to the

administrative areas within KUMMSC. The individual's commander or unit security manager will notify 377 WSSS/SSCC of the decision to allow access to the administrative areas or completely revoke the individual's access. For Decertification, the unit security manager will confiscate the badge and return it to 377 SFS/S5B.

3.13. Master Restricted Area Badge Listing (MRABL).

3.13.1. DFC ensures MRABL is produced monthly.

3.13.2. S5B will establish procedures ensuring the MRABL is current at all times.

3.13.2.1. Updates are completed by authorized S5B personnel.

3.13.2.2. MRABL and daily update spreadsheet will be password protected and uploaded to assigned file folder within the "O" drive.

ENCLOSURE 11 TO TAB A TO APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX C TO KAFB IDP 31-101
RESTRICTED AREA ENTRY PROCEDURES-FREE ZONES

REFERENCES: Refer to Basic Plan.

1. **GENERAL:** Free zones are established within restricted areas when construction projects and similar activities make it inappropriate or impractical to apply normal circulation controls. In such cases, establish a Free Zone corridor from some point on the restricted area boundary to the work project. Limit Free Zones to mission essential activities only (e.g., construction work, or site surveys).

2. **MISSION:** To prevent unauthorized entry, counter the introduction of prohibited items, detect hostile actions within areas, and prevent unauthorized removal of material from restricted areas on KAFB.

3. **EXECUTION:**

3.1. Task:

3.1.1. The IDC will convene to develop, review and approve entry control procedures for free zones.

3.1.2. The USAF agency most closely associated with the project and the owner/user of the restricted area shall:

3.1.2.1. (FOUO) Not allow any PL resources to remain within the free zone.

3.1.2.2. (FOUO) Provide escorts as necessary, during establishment of free zone and anytime contractor personnel require them.

3.1.2.3. (FOUO) Provide Immediate Visual Assessment (IVA) of free zone boundary.

3.1.2.4. (FOUO) Control entry and exit of free zone area.

3.1.2.4.1. (FOUO) The owner/user or separate contractor, not associated with the aforementioned contract, will provide onsite, continuous EAL verification of personnel entering/exiting the temporary ECP during working hours.

3.1.2.5. Be responsible for submitting, maintaining, and monitoring the EAL.

3.1.2.5.1. Draft EAL in memorandum format and include items provided by the contractor.

3.1.2.5.2. Submit to Flightline Constable (377 WSSS/S5) at 853-7551 for National Criminal Information Center (NCIC).

3.1.2.5.3. Provide updates to 377 SFS/S5P as needed.

3.1.2.6. (FOUO) Draft and coordinate for approval, the entire free zone package through the IDC.

3.1.2.7. (FOUO) Notify 377 WSSS/WSSS/SSCC at 846-1478 when opening/closing the free zone.

3.1.2.8. (FOUO) Provide daily security sweeps for the free zone upon closure to ensure all contractor personnel have departed.

3.1.3. The Contractor will:

3.1.3.1. (FOUO) Provide, erect, and maintain boundary markers for the free zone boundary consisting of elevated ropes, barriers, fencing, or other suitable materials to clearly delineate it from the restricted area.

3.1.3.2. (FOUO) Provide, erect, and maintain “restricted area” signs (Air Force Visual Aid (AFVA) 207-1) placed every 100ft on the free zone side of the marker to clearly delineate the free zone boundary.

3.1.3.3. (FOUO) Establish a temporary contractor Entry Control Point.

3.1.3.3.1. (FOUO) Mark the temporary ECP appropriately, as to alleviate any confusion for contractors. For example, via a sign at the ECP that says “Contractor Entry Control Point” or “Contractor ECP.”

3.1.3.3.2. (FOUO) Contractor personnel will enter/exit the free zone ONLY through the designated contractor ECP.

3.1.3.4. (FOUO) Notify the owner/user to open and close the free zone as required.

3.1.3.5. (FOUO) Provide the owner/user full name, last 6 of SSN, organization, clearance status, dates of visit, and expiration date for all personnel requiring access on a regular basis to the free zone for EALs; provide updates as needed.

3.1.3.6. (FOUO) Provide work schedule and notify the owner/user at least 72 hours prior of deviation.

3.1.3.7. (FOUO) Provide “Visitor” badges for personnel who are not on the EAL, but require access for short periods of time. Those individuals must be escorted by personnel with a RAB for the area or by personnel on the approved EAL.

3.1.3.8. (FOUO) Provide “Contractor Vehicle” signs for contract POVs that require access to the free zone. This can be accomplished with magnetic signs.

3.1.3.9. (FOUO) Notify the owner/user of any changes needed in the free zone configuration to accommodate construction requirements.

3.1.4. The Government Contract Representative will:

3.1.4.1. (FOUO) Remain responsible for the conduct of the contractor throughout the duration of the contract.

3.1.4.2. (FOUO) Provide the contractor a letter describing the procedures/responsibility for using free zones during the project and penalties for non-compliance. The installation Commander, or designee, must sign the letter.

3.1.5. The 377 SFG will:

3.1.5.1. (FOUO) Provide National Criminal Information Center checks for personnel on the EAL. Provide any questionable information to unit commanders involved, so a risk assessment and decision to grant access may be made.

3.1.5.2. (FOUO) Provide daily security sweeps for the free zone upon closure to ensure all contractor personnel have departed.

3.1.5.3. (FOUO) Provide armed response to any incident, not properly coordinated, where a contractor is viewed attempting to enter the restricted area or violating escort requirements.

3.1.5.4. (FOUO) Security Forces will not perform as escort officials or be responsible for providing an IVA for free zones IAW AFI 31-101.

3.1.6. (FOUO) Free Zones Within Areas Containing PL 1 or PL 2 Resources. Free zones contained within areas that have PL 1 or PL 2 resources have special procedures. In addition to the procedure identified for PL 3 areas, the following procedures will apply:

3.1.6.1. (FOUO) When necessary to establish a free zone boundary which will become the boundary of a PL 1 area, install a temporary fence which provides the equivalent delay, detection, and physical security deterrence as the permanent fence. Mark the free zone boundary with type-B fence for PL 2 resources.

3.1.6.2. (FOUO) If it is impossible to create a free zone corridor between the restricted area and work project area, owner/user personnel will escort contractor personnel to and from the work area.

3.1.6.3. (FOUO) Security Forces will conduct a sweep of the free zone area when closed for the day in PL 1 or PL 2 areas.

ENCLOSURE 12 TO TAB A TO APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX C TO KAFB IDP 31-101
ENTRY AUTHORITY LIST (EAL)

REFERENCES: Refer to Basic Plan.

1. GENERAL: Procedures for producing and distributing EALs.
2. MISSION: To ensure EALs are properly completed IAW AFI 31-101 standards and to establish procedures for producing and distributing EALs.
3. EXECUTION:
 - 3.1. Concept of Operations.
 - 3.1.1. EALs are used on a temporary basis for granting unescorted entry in conjunction with home base or temporary AF Form 1199s (i.e., transiting aircrew and inspection teams). Additionally, they are used as a support technique for single badge entry procedures or in conjunction with escorted entry procedures as a means of identification prior to allowing entry. Requesting agencies are responsible for the accuracy of the data contained on the EAL. Requesting agencies must verify personnel data by using the MRABL for personnel assigned to the installation.
 - 3.2. The creation of an EAL will start with the agency requesting restricted area access (requesting agency) making contact with the unit or agency most closely associated with the restricted area to be visited (owner/user). Requesting agencies will ensure the accuracy of all information to be used on the EAL is correct and forward all required information listed in paragraph 3.5. below to an owner/user Point of Contact (POC). In order to show owner/user approval of the EAL, the owner/user wing commander or designated representative must sign the EAL. **NOTE:** The representative must be properly designated on a DD Form 577 and be in the grade of E-5 or above.
 - 3.3. Once the EAL has been completed in its entirety and signed, a copy will be sent to one of the following 377 SFG POCs for authentication:
 - 3.3.1. The 377 WSSS/S5 (Flightline Constable) is the primary POC for authentication of EALs for flightline restricted areas.
 - 3.3.2. 898 MUNS/CCP (Security Manager/PRAP) is the OPR for EALS for KUMMSC. The 377 WSSS/S5 (Plans and Programs) is the POC for authenticating EALs for KUMMSC.
 - 3.3.3. 377 SFS/S5B (Pass and Registration) is the primary POC for authentication of EALs for restricted areas located at other locations on KAFB (I.E. KCP).
 - 3.4. Maintenance/Distribution of EALs. Once the EALs are properly authenticated by the 377 SFG POC, the following will occur:

3.4.1. The 377 SFG POC will create copies for 377 SFG posting, maintain a copy for their records (until expiration of the EAL), and will send a copy back to the owner/user unit.

3.4.2. In turn, the owner/user unit will maintain a copy for their records (until expiration of the EAL), and will forward a copy to the requesting agency.

3.5. Additions and Deletions to EALs: Care must be exercised when making changes (additions and deletions) to EALs to prevent unauthorized entry. Deletions may be made by using pen and ink changes to the existing EAL. Requesting agencies must provide an EAL showing the requested deletions to the authenticating agency. Additions may ONLY be made by providing separate EALs IAW above mentioned requirements. Requesting agencies must produce an updated version of the EAL at any time the original EAL with additions/deletions becomes cumbersome and difficult to use. Additions and deletions to EALs must be routed through the proper authenticating agency. **NO PEN AND INK ADDITIONS MAY BE MADE ONCE THE EAL IS SIGNED AND AUTHENTICATED.**

3.6. EAL Discrepancies. In the event there are minor typographical errors, pen and ink changes may be made unless the changes exceed three (3) separate errors. When these errors are corrected, the authenticator will initial the changes to show approval. Once the number of errors exceeds three (3), the EAL must be re-created. **NOTE:** Corrections in the form of hand written changes can only be made BEFORE the document is signed and authenticated.

3.7. Contractor or delivery company vehicles that the installation commander or 898 MUNS/CC as designated by 377 ABW/CC has authorized entry through established procedures are permitted to operate in restricted and/or limited areas when required by contract and properly vetted. Vehicles registered to an individual are considered POVs while vehicles registered to a company are considered contractor vehicles. A complete description of each vehicle (make, model, and Vehicle Identification Number) must be annotated on the EAL for limited areas.

ENCLOSURE 13 TO TAB A TO APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX C TO KAFB IDP 31-101
ACTIVE AND PASSIVE DURESS PROCEDURES

REFERENCES: Refer to Basic Plan.

1. SITUATION: Individual(s) are under duress by active or passive means.
2. MISSION: To ensure quick reaction and proper procedures are utilized if personnel are suspected of being under duress.
3. EXECUTION:
 - 3.1. (FOUO) Active duress is indicated by utilizing any pre-established duress procedures (i.e., passing the primary or alternate duress word, passing the incorrect response code, passing the incorrect sign-countersign, pressing a duress button/pedal or entering a duress pin). The intent is to try and alert personnel that someone is under duress and needs assistance quickly.
 - 3.1.1. (FOUO) Procedures for responding forces are as follows:
 - 3.1.2. (FOUO) Personnel responding should approach the incident slowly and assess the situation.
 - 3.1.3. (FOUO) Once the assessment is complete, challenge and place all members at a disadvantage.
 - 3.1.4. (FOUO) Separate all members and pull the individual that indicated duress aside to ascertain the reason for duress.
 - 3.1.5. (FOUO) Apprehend/detain individual(s) that caused duress on personnel and ensure a search is completed.
 - 3.2. (FOUO) Passive duress is indicated by non-compliance with established procedures (i.e., not answering a radio when called).
 - 3.2.1. (FOUO) Procedures for responding forces are as follows:
 - 3.2.2. (FOUO) Personnel responding should approach the incident slowly and assess the situation.
 - 3.2.3. (FOUO) Escort Officials will be recertified annually or when significant changes occur in escort procedures. This training will be documented locally and tracked by unit security managers.
 - 3.2.4. (FOUO) Separate all members and pull the individual responsible for the passive duress aside to ascertain the reason for duress.

3.2.5. (FOUO) Apprehend/detain individual(s) that caused duress on personnel and ensure a search is completed.

TAB B TO APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX C TO KAFB IDP 31-101
NATIONAL DEFENSE AREAS (NDA)

REFERENCES: Refer to Basic Plan and IEMP 10-2.

1. SITUATION: In the event an aircraft crashes off-base, PL aircraft must make an unscheduled landing at a civilian airport or other unplanned emergencies occur, it may be necessary to establish and NDA.

2. EXECUTION: NDA. NDAs are established when necessary to secure PL 1, 2, or 3 resources located off the installation on lands not under the jurisdiction or administration of, or in the custody of, DOD or a military department of the DOD. The 377 ABW/CC is the only person authorized to establish a NDA. EXCEPTION: 377 ABW/CV may establish a NDA if contact cannot be made with 377 ABW/CC. The 377 ABW/CC will:

2.1. (FOUO) Use a temporary barrier to mark the boundary of the area.

2.2. (FOUO) Ensure placement of restricted area signs.

2.3. (FOUO) Ensure contact is made with authorities having jurisdiction and/or landowners, explaining why it is necessary to set up the area and types of controls in effect. **NOTE:** Although it's not necessary for implementation/establishment, consent and cooperation of the authorities with jurisdiction and/or landowner is preferred.

2.4. (FOUO) To the greatest extent possible, let civilian authorities handle civilian arrest and detention. If local civil authorities are not present, military personnel may detain violators or trespassers. Work with Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) to release violators and trespassers to proper authorities as soon as reasonably practical.

2.5. (FOUO) When protecting the resource the UOF will be used IAW 31-117.

2.6. Ensure adequate resource lighting is provided to protect against intruders.

APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX C TO KAFB IDP 31-101
FORCE PROTECTION CONDITIONS / POST PRIORITY

REFERENCES: Refer to Basic Plan and KAFB Operations Plan (OPLAN) 10-245.

1. GENERAL: Due to the worldwide threat of terrorist acts against our resources and personnel, measures must be implemented to ensure the highest level of security possible exists for protection. The implementations of FPCONs contained in the tabs in this appendix are listed progressively.

1.1. Enemy Forces. Refer to the Basic Plan.

1.2. Friendly Forces. Refer to the Basic Plan.

1.3. Assumptions: The resources and personnel (both military and civilian) on KAFB would be prime targets due to the storage of PL resources and the on-going weapons systems research projects.

1.4. Limiting Factors. Refer to the Basic Plan.

1.5. Definitions:

1.5.1. Terrorist Threat/FPCON: The level of terrorist threat to US military facilities and personnel. There are five FPCONs: Normal, Alpha, Bravo, Charlie and Delta.

1.5.2. Force Protection Condition Alerting Message (FPCAM): This is a down-channel alerting order which may result in an increased state of readiness at levels from one or two affected bases up to an AF-wide increase. An FPCAM will be either directive or non-directive in nature. A directive FPCAM orders the Installation Commander to implement a specific FPCON or action to take. Non-directive FPCAMs are informative in nature and give guidance on recommended, but not mandatory actions to implement.

1.5.3. Threat Vulnerability categories:

1.5.3.1. Negligible: Existence and/or capability may or may not be present.

1.5.3.2. Low: Existence and capability must be present. History may or may not be present.

1.5.3.3. Medium: Factors of existence, capability, and history must be present.

1.5.3.4. High: Factors of existence, capability, history, and intentions must be present.

1.5.3.5. Critical: Factors of existence, capability, and targeting must be present. History and intention may or may not be present.

1.5.3.6. FPCON Alert Notification Procedures: In the event of a FPCON change, the KCP will initiate voice and e-mail notifications.

2. MISSION: To ensure active defensive measures are implemented to protect USAF resources and personnel from acts of terrorism.

3. EXECUTION:

3.1. Concept of Operations: The post priority list contained in tabs A and B to this appendix will be implemented to counter any threats/acts of terrorism directed against USAF resources and personnel. The post priority charts will be used when a higher threat exists that threatens KUMMSC.

3.2. Tasks.

3.2.1. The 377 ABW/CC will ensure all mandatory measures are implemented as outlined in KAFB Operations Plan (OPLAN) 10-245.

3.2.2. The KCP will:

3.2.2.1. Ensure all up/down-channel reports are accomplished within required timeline.

3.2.2.2. Accomplish all tasks outlined in KAFB OPLAN 10-245.

3.2.3. The DFC is responsible for and will ensure:

3.2.3.1. Accomplish all up-channel reporting procedures for PL resources through the KCP.

3.2.3.2. All PL resources are afforded the security protection IAW DOD 5210.41M/AFI 31-101 and applicable SUPs based on current threat.

3.2.3.3. (FOUO) Keep advised of all intelligence information that could affect the overall security of 377 ABW resources and personnel.

3.2.3.4. All tasks as outlined in this plan are accomplished.

3.2.3.5. (FOUO) All security reporting and alerting procedures are implemented, as appropriate, through the KCP.

3.2.3.6. All required actions are accomplished in support of FPCONs and sufficient personnel are available to do so.

3.2.3.7. (FOUO) The 898 MUNS Control is advised of all SF actions in support of 898 MUNS PL 1 Resources.

3.2.3.8. (FOUO) Coordinate with the 377 MSG/CE to establish a barrier plan to be implemented during increased FPCONs.

3.2.4. The 898 MUNS/CC will:

3.2.4.1. Advise the 377 SFG of all operations involving PL 1 resources.

3.2.4.2. Ensure all FPCON measures in the KAFB OPLAN 10-245 are accomplished as applicable.

3.2.4.3. (DCNI) Emergency arming of 898 MUNS personnel. Ensure 898 MUNS personnel are armed to aid in the defense of KUMMSC during Covered Wagon/FPCON Delta contingencies for final denial and defense of KUMMSC.

3.2.4.3.1. (DCNI) 898 MUNS personnel will remain behind B5 and will be armed at the MUNS armory. These personnel will be deployed as directed by Cerberus-1, or highest ranking 377 WSSS member/incident commander.

3.2.4.3.2. (DCNI) 898 MUNS personnel armed during convoy duties will assist SF in defense of resources in the event of hostile attack as well as additional personnel from the IBF and the follow-on backup forces (FBFs).

3.2.4.3.3. (DCNI) If resources are on the loading dock as a result of a logistics movement, 898 MUNS personnel will assist in providing armed protection of the resource(s) until they are secure behind B2/B4.

3.2.4.4. (DCNI) Final denial positions are located throughout KUMMSC and PAD 5 for any incident that requires SF to be in place. For specific guidance/locations refer to 377 SFG Tactical Assault Guide and 377 WSSS Posting Special Security Instructions (SSI's).

3.2.5. The 58 SOW/CC and 150 SOW/CC will ensure:

3.2.5.2. All FPCON measures in this plan and KAFB OPLAN 10-245, and other optional items directed by the Installation Commander are accomplished as applicable.

4. (FOUO) COMMAND RELATIONSHIP: WSSS/SSCC will be the operational control center of security operations for PL 1, 2, and 3 resources. If WSSS/SSCC is unable to assume operational control center responsibilities, then alternate WSSS/SSCC which is located at the SFS/BDOC will assume operational control center responsibilities. SFS/BDOC will be the operational control center for two PL 3 areas (KCP and KCP ESC/Generator) and all PL 4 resources. WSSS/SSCC will be the backup until alternate SFS/BDOC is activated. Control of armed non-security forces military personnel (support forces) within restricted areas will rest with the owning/using organization. These personnel will provide security for their facilities if needed. Owner/users will notify the DFC, through WSSS/SSCC/SFS/BDOC of responses and positioning of forces.

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ENCLOSURE 1 TO APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX C TO KAFB IDP 31-101

SECURITY FORCES GROUP PRIORITY POSTING - FPCON NORMAL / ALPHA / BRAVO

The following posts will be manned based on the threat and direction from Wing and/or SFG leadership:

Priority	Post	Call Sign	Crew Size	Days/ Week	Hours/ Day	Holiday	RF	IBF	Weapons	Radio	Vehicle	NVG LAD
1*	KUMMSC Security Control Supervisor	Guardian	1	7	24	YES			M4/M9	X		X
2*	KUMMSC Security Controller Alarm Monitor	Guardian	1	7	24	YES			M4/M9	X		X
3*	KUMMSC Security Controller	Guardian	1	7	24	YES			M4/M9	X		X
4*	KUMMSC Entry Control Leader	Cerberus-10	1	7	24	YES			M4/M9	X		X
5*	KUMMSC Entry Control Member	Cerberus-10A	1	7	24	YES			M4/M9	X		X
6*/***	KUMMSC Underground Area Supervisor	Cerberus-1	1	7	24	YES	1		M4/M9	X		X
7*	KUMMSC Internal SRT Member	Cerberus-2	1	7	24	YES	2		M4/M9	X		X
8*	KUMMSC Internal SRT Member	Cerberus-2A	1	7	24	YES	3		M249/M9	X		X
9*	KUMMSC ESRT Leader/ Fire Team Leader	Scorpion-2	1	7	24	YES	4		M4/M203/M9/CS/Smoke/SG	X	AH	X
10*	KUMMSC ESRT Member	Scorpion-2A	1	7	24	YES	5		M240/M9	X		X
11*	KUMMSC ESRT Leader	Scorpion-3	1	7	24	YES	6		M4/M203/M9/CS/Smoke/SG	X	AH	X
12*	KUMMSC ESRT Member	Scorpion-3A	1	7	24	YES	7		M4/M203/M9	X		X
13*	KUMMSC Controlled Area ISRT Leader	Scorpion-4	1	7	24	YES	8		M4/M203/M9	X	AH	X
14*	KUMMSC Controlled Area ISRT Member	Scorpion-4A	1	7	24	YES	9		M240/M9	X		X

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Priority	Post	Call Sign	Crew Size	Days/ Week	Hours/ Day	Holiday	RF	IBF	Weapons	Radio	Vehicle	NVG LAD
15*	KUMMSC Topside Area	Scorpion-1	1	7	24	YES	10		M4/M9/CS/ Smoke/SG	X	AH	X
16*	KUMMSC Topside Area	Scorpion-1A	1	7	24	YES	11		M4/M203/ M9	X		X
17*/***	RTES Operator Leader	Romeo-1	1	7	24	YES	12		M4/M9	X		X
18*/****	RTES Operator Member	Romeo-1A	1	7	24	YES	13		M4/M9 (M249/M9***)	X		X
Loading Dock Operations - when posted, insert at this point - see table below												
19*	KUMMSC Flight Chief	Guardian-2	1	7	24	YES			M4/M9	X	4X4	X
20*	KUMMSC Flight Commander	Guardian-1	1	7	24	YES			M4/M9	X	4X4	X
PNAF Operations - when posted, insert at this point - see table below												
REFLEX DELTA Operations - when posted, insert at this point - see table below												
21	Flightline External SRT Member	Coyote-1A	1	7	24	YES		1	M203/M9	X		X
22	Flightline External SRT Member	Coyote-1B	1	7	24	YES		2	M240/M9	X		X
23	Flightline Internal SRT Member (58 SOW)	Coyote-3A	1	7	24	YES		3	M203/M9	X		X
24	Flightline Internal SRT Member (58 SOW)	Coyote-3B	1	7	24	YES		4	M249/M9	X		X
25	Flightline Internal SRT Member (377 Transient Ramp)	Coyote-4A	1	7	24	YES		5	M203/M9	X		X
26	Flightline Internal SRT Member (377 Transient Ramp)	Coyote-4B	1	7	24	YES		6	M240/M9	X		X
27	Flightline Internal SRT Member (150 ANG SOW)	Coyote-2A	1	7	24	YES		7	M203/M9	X		X

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Priority	Post	Call Sign	Crew Size	Days/ Week	Hours/ Day	Holiday	RF	IBF	Weapons	Radio	Vehicle	NVG LAD
28	Flightline Internal SRT Member (150 ANG SOW)	Coyote-2B	1	7	24	YES		8	M249/M9	X		X
29	Flightline External SRT Leader/Flightline Area Sup	Coyote-1	1	7	24	YES		9	M4/M9/CS/Smoke/SG	X	4X4	X
30	Flightline Internal SRT Leader (58 SOW)	Coyote-3	1	7	24	YES		10	M4/M9/CS/Smoke/SG	X	4X4	X
31	Flightline Internal SRT Leader (377 Transient Ramp)	Coyote-4	1	7	24	YES		11	M4/M9/CS/Smoke/SG	X	4X4	X
32	Flightline Internal SRT Leader (150 ANG SOW)	Coyote-2	1	7	24	YES		12	M4/M9/CS/Smoke/SG	X	4X4	X
33	Flightline Internal SRT Member (58 SOW)	Coyote-3C	1	7	24	YES		13	M4/M9	X		X
34	Flightline Internal SRT Member (377 Transient Ramp)	Coyote-4C	1	7	24	YES		14	M4/M9	X		X
35	Flightline External SRT Member	Coyote-1C	1	7	24	YES		15	M4/M9	X		X
36*	KUMMSC Underground Area Supervisor	Cerberus-1	1	7	24	YES	14		M4/M9	X		X
37*/****	KUMMSC Internal SRT Member	Cerberus-2B	TBD	TBD	TBD	YES			M4/M9	X		X
38	KUMMSC Armorer	Arms-1	1	7	24	YES			M9	X		
39	BDOC Controller	Kirtland	1	7	24	YES			M9			
40*	Alarm Monitor/Alternate SSCC	Hotel-1	1	7	24	YES			M9			
41	Flight Chief (Law Enforcement)	Defender-2	1	7	24	YES			M9	X	TRUCK	X

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Priority	Post	Call Sign	Crew Size	Days/ Week	Hours/ Day	Holiday	RF	IBF	Weapons	Radio	Vehicle	NVG LAD
42	Gibson Gate Leader	Golf-3	1	7	24	YES			M9	X		X
43	Gibson Gate Member	Golf-3A	1	7	24	YES			M9	X		
44	Patrol	Police-1	1	7	24	YES			M9/M4 or 870**	X	SEDAN	X
45	Truman Gate Leader	Golf-4	1	7	24	YES			M9	X	G/P	X
46	Truman Gate Member	Golf-4A	1	7	24	YES			M9	X		
47	K-9 Patrol *(when available)	Police-3	1	7	24	YES			M9	X	SEDAN	
48	Medical Facility Guard	Police-6	1	5	9	NO			M9	X		
49	Patrol	Police-2	1	7	24	YES			M9/M4/ M870**	X	SEDAN	X
50	Eubank Gate Lead	Golf-1	1	7	19	YES			M9	X	G/P	X
51	Eubank Gate Member	Golf-1A	1	7	19	YES			M9	X		
52	Patrol	Police-4	1	7	24	YES			M9/M4/ M870**	X	SEDAN	X
53	Maxwell Gate Lead	Golf-5	1	7	24	YES			M9	X	G/P	X
54	Maxwell Gate Member	Golf-5A	1	7	24	YES			M9	X		
55	Wyoming Gate Lead	Golf-2	1	5	13.5	NO			M9	X	G/P	X

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Priority	Post	Call Sign	Crew Size	Days/ Week	Hours/ Day	Holiday	RF	IBF	Weapons	Radio	Vehicle	NVG LAD
56	Wyoming Gate Member	Golf-2A	1	5	13.5	NO			M9	X		
57	Kirtland Gate Lead	Golf-7	1	5	10	NO			M9/M4	X	G/P*	X
58	Kirtland Gate Member	Golf-7A	1	5	10	NO			M9	X		
59	Kirtland Gate Member	Golf-7B	1	5	10	NO			M9	X		
60	Gibson VCC	Golf -3 VCC	1	7	24	YES			M9	X		
61	Truman VCC	Golf -4 VCC	1	5	8	NO			M9	X		
62	Truman VCC Pass and Registration	Golf-4 VCCA	1	5	8	NO			M9	X		
63	Kirtland VCC	Golf-7 VCC	1	5	10	NO			M9	X		
64	Eubank Gate Member	Golf-1B	1	7	19	YES			M9*	X		
65	Eubank Gate Member	Golf-1C	1	7	19	YES			M9*	X		
66	Wyoming Gate Member	Golf-2B	1	5	13.5	YES			M9*	X		
67	Truman Gate Member	Golf-4B	1	7	24	YES			M-9	X		
68	Patrol	Police-5	1	7	24	YES			M9/M4 or 870**	X	SEDAN	X
69	LE Armorer	Arms-2	1	7	24	YES			M9	X		
70	Carlisle Gate Lead	Golf-6	1	5	12	NO			M9	X	G/P	X
71	Carlisle Gate Member	Golf-6A	1	5	12	NO			M9	X		

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Priority	Post	Call Sign	Crew Size	Days/ Week	Hours/ Day	Holiday	RF	IBF	Weapons	Radio	Vehicle	NVG LAD
72	South Valley Gate Lead	Golf-8	1	5	12	NO			M9	X	G/P	X
73	South Valley Gate Member	Golf-8A	1	5	12	NO			M9	X		
74	Patrol	Police-7	1	7	24	YES			M9/M4 or 870**	X	SEDAN	X
75	Patrol	Police-8	1	7	24	YES			M9/M4 or 870**	X	TRUCK	X
76	Patrol Member	Police-2A	1	7	24	YES			M9/M4 or 870**	X		
77	Patrol Member	Police-4A	1	7	24	YES			M9/M4 or 870**	X		
78	Patrol Member	Police-5A	1	7	24	YES			M9/M4 or 870**	X		
79	Patrol Member	Police-1A	1	7	24	YES			M9/M4 or 870**	X		
80	Installation Access Control Flight Chief	Sentry-1	1	5	10	NO			M9	X	SEDAN	

NOTE: In the event SFS/BDOC Alarm monitor is in “training” status and the SFS/BDOC controller is certified, the certified individual will fill this post.

NOTE: 1 asterisk (*) indicates Arming, UOF Suitability Standards certification is required to pull the post. All 31P/3POX1’s are required Arming, UOF Suitability Standard certification due to mission support requirements for Safe Guard Transports, PNAF, IBF and REFLEX DELTA posting. Whoever is monitoring AECS, either the SFS/BDOC Controller or Alarm Monitor, needs to be Arming, UOF Suitability Standards certified, not both.

NOTE: 2 asterisk (**) indicate arming is at the discretion of the flight chief or flight commander. Unless otherwise noted as “or” personnel are required to arm with all “weapons” column.

NOTE: 3 asterisk (***) indicates Romeo 1/1A will be posted in the loading dock if RTES is not operational during normal operations. If RTES is not operational the alpha member will post with a M249/M9 to maintain a final denial capability in the loading dock.

NOTE: 4 asterisk (****) indicates Cerberus-2B will only be posted when RTES is not operational to maintain the 4 person requirement in the back. When RTES is not operational Cerberus-1 will have to remain behind blast doors 3 & 4 to maintain the 4 personnel requirement.

PNAF OPERATIONS

Priority	Post	Call Sign	Crew Size	Days/ Week	Hours/ Day	Holiday	RF	IBF	Weapons	Radio	Vehicle	NVG LAD
1*	HCP-5/LSA Entry Controller	Mustang-10	1	TBD	TBD	TBD			M4/M9	X		X
2*	HCP-5/LSA Assistant Entry Controller	Mustang-10A	1	TBD	TBD	TBD			M4/M9	X		X
3*	LSA Pad Supervisor	Mustang-1	1	TBD	TBD	TBD			M4/M9	X	4X4	X
4*	LSA Close Boundary Sentry	Mustang-4	1	TBD	TBD	TBD			M4/M9	X		X
5*	LSA Close Boundary Sentry	Mustang-5	1	TBD	TBD	TBD			M4/M9	X		X
6*	LSA Close Boundary Sentry	Mustang-6	1	TBD	TBD	TBD			M4/M9	X		X
7*	LSA Internal Security Response Team Leader	Mustang-2	1	TBD	TBD	TBD			M4/M9	X	AH	X
8*	LSA Internal Security Response Team Member	Mustang-2A	1	TBD	TBD	TBD			M249/M9	X		X
9*	LSA External Security Response Team Leader	Mustang-3	1	TBD	TBD	TBD			M4/M9	X	AH	X
10*	LSA External Security Response Team Member	Mustang-3A	1	TBD	TBD	TBD			M4/M203/M9	X		X
11*	SAAM Response Force Leader	Mongoose-1	1	TBD	TBD	TBD	1		M4/M9/CS/Smoke/SG	X	AH	X
12*	SAAM Response Force Member	Mongoose-1A	1	TBD	TBD	TBD	2		M4/M203/M9	X		X
13*	SAAM Response Force Member	Mongoose-1B	1	TBD	TBD	TBD	3		M249/M9	X		X
14*	SAAM Response Force Fire Team Leader	Mongoose-2	1	TBD	TBD	TBD	4		M4/M9/CS/Smoke/SG	X	AH	X

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15*	SAAM Response Force Fire Team Member	Mongoose-2A	1	TBD	TBD	TBD	5		M4/M203/M9	X		X
Priority	Post	Call Sign	Crew Size	Days/Week	Hours/Day	Holiday	RF	IBF	Weapons	Radio	Vehicle	NVG LAD
16*	SAAM Response Force Fire Team Member	Mongoose-2B	1	TBD	TBD	TBD	6		M240/M9	X		X
17*	SAAM Response Force Fire Team Member	Mongoose-2C	1	TBD	TBD	TBD	7		M4/M9	X		X
18*	SAAM Response Force Fire Team Leader	Mongoose-3	1	TBD	TBD	TBD	8		M4/M9/CS/Smoke/SG	X	AH	X
19*	SAAM Response Force Fire Team Member	Mongoose-3A	1	TBD	TBD	TBD	9		M4/M203/M9	X		X
20*	SAAM Response Force Fire Team Member	Mongoose-3B	1	TBD	TBD	TBD	10		M249/M9	X		X
21*	SAAM Response Force Fire Team Member	Mongoose-3C	1	TBD	TBD	TBD	11		M4/M9	X		X
22*	SAAM Response Force Fire Team Leader	Mongoose-4	1	TBD	TBD	TBD	12		M4/M9/CS/Smoke/SG	X	AH	X
23*	SAAM Response Force Fire Team Member	Mongoose-4A	1	TBD	TBD	TBD	13		M4/M203/M9	X		X
24*	SAAM Response Force Fire Team Member	Mongoose-4B	1	TBD	TBD	TBD	14		M240/M9	X		X
25*	SAAM Response Force Fire Team Member	Mongoose-4C	1	TBD	TBD	TBD	15		M4/M9	X		X
26*	SAAM Initial Backup Force Leader	Viper-1	1	TBD	TBD	TBD		1	M4/M9/CS/Smoke/SG	X	AH	X
27*	SAAM Initial Backup Force Member	Viper-1A	1	TBD	TBD	TBD		2	M4/M203/M9	X		X
28*	SAAM Initial Backup Force Member	Viper-1B	1	TBD	TBD	TBD		3	M249/M9	X		X
29*	SAAM Initial Backup Force Fire Team Leader	Viper-2	1	TBD	TBD	TBD		4	M4/M9/CS/Smoke/SG	X	AH	X

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30*	SAAM Initial Backup Force Fire Team Member	Viper-2A	1	TBD	TBD	TBD		5	M4/M203/ M9	X		X
Priority	Post	Call Sign	Crew Size	Days/ Week	Hours/ Day	Holiday	RF	IBF	Weapons	Radio	Vehicle	NVG LAD
31*	SAAM Initial Backup Force Fire Team Member	Viper-2B	1	TBD	TBD	TBD		6	M240/M9	X		X
32*	SAAM Initial Backup Force Fire Team Member	Viper-2C	1	TBD	TBD	TBD		7	M4/M9	X		X
33*	SAAM Initial Backup Force Fire Team Leader	Viper-3	1	TBD	TBD	TBD		8	M4/M9/CS/ Smoke/SG	X	AH	X
34*	SAAM Initial Backup Force Fire Team Member	Viper-3A	1	TBD	TBD	TBD		9	M4/M203/ M9	X		X
35*	SAAM Initial Backup Force Fire Team Member	Viper-3B	1	TBD	TBD	TBD		10	M249/M9	X		X
36*	SAAM Initial Backup Force Fire Team Member	Viper-3C	1	TBD	TBD	TBD		11	M4/M9	X		X
37*	SAAM Initial Backup Force Fire Team Leader	Viper-4	1	TBD	TBD	TBD		12	M4/M9/CS/ Smoke/SG	X	AH	X
38*	SAAM Initial Backup Force Fire Team Member	Viper-4A	1	TBD	TBD	TBD		13	M4/M203/ M9	X		X
39*	SAAM Initial Backup Force	Viper-4B	1	TBD	TBD	TBD		14	M240/M9	X		X
40*	SAAM Initial Backup Force Fire Team Member	Viper-4C	1	TBD	TBD	TBD		15	M4/M9	X		X
41*	PNAF Convoy Commander	Cobra-1	1	TBD	TBD	TBD			M4/M9/ Smoke	X	AH	X
42*	PNAF Convoy Entry Controller	Cobra-10	1	TBD	TBD	TBD			M4/M9	X		X
43*	PNAF Convoy Security Response Team Leader	Cobra-2	1	TBD	TBD	TBD			M4/M9	X	AH	X
44*	PNAF Convoy Security Response Team Member	Cobra-2A	1	TBD	TBD	TBD			M240/M9	X		X
45*	PNAF Convoy Security Response Team Leader	Cobra-3	1	TBD	TBD	TBD			M4/M9	X	AH	X

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46*	PNAF Convoy Security Response Team Member	Cobra-3A	1	TBD	TBD	TBD			M240/M9	X		X
Priority	Post	Call Sign	Crew Size	Days/Week	Hours/Day	Holiday	RF	IBF	Weapons	Radio	Vehicle	NVG LAD
47*	PNAF Convoy Shadow Element Leader	Raptor-1	1	TBD	TBD	TBD			M4/M9	X	ATV	X
48*	PNAF Convoy Shadow Element Member	Raptor-1A	1	TBD	TBD	TBD			M249/M9	X		X
49*	PNAF Convoy Shadow Element Leader	Raptor-2	1	TBD	TBD	TBD			M4/M9	X	ATV	X
50*	PNAF Convoy Shadow Element Member	Raptor-2A	1	TBD	TBD	TBD			M249/M9	X		X
51*	PNAF Observation Post Leader (CPE)	Pelican-1	1	TBD	TBD	TBD			M107/M9	X		X
52*	PNAF Observation Post Member (CPE)	Pelican-1A	1	TBD	TBD	TBD			M4/M9	X		X
53*	PNAF Observation Post Leader (CPE)	Pelican-2	1	TBD	TBD	TBD			M24/M9	X		X
54*	PNAF Observation Post Member (CPE)	Pelican-2A	1	TBD	TBD	TBD			M4/M9	X		X
55*	PNAF Observation Post Leader (CPE)	Pelican-3	1	TBD	TBD	TBD			M24/M9	X		X
56*	PNAF Observation Post Member (CPE)	Pelican-3A	1	TBD	TBD	TBD			M4/M9	X		X
57*	PNAF Observation Post Leader	Pelican-4	1	TBD	TBD	TBD			MK19/M9	X	AH	X
58*	PNAF Observation Post Member	Pelican-4A	1	TBD	TBD	TBD			M4/M9	X		X
59*	PNAF Observation Post Member	Pelican-4B	1	TBD	TBD	TBD			M4/M9	X		X
60*	PNAF Observation Post Leader	Pelican-5	1	TBD	TBD	TBD			M2/M9	X	AH	X

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61*	PNAF Observation Post Member	Pelican-5A	1	TBD	TBD	TBD			M4/M9	X		X
Priority	Post	Call Sign	Crew Size	Days/Week	Hours/Day	Holiday	RF	IBF	Weapons	Radio	Vehicle	NVG LAD
62*	SAAM Explosive Detection Dog Team Leader	Kilo-1	2	TBD	TBD	TBD			M4/M9/EDD	X	Sedan	X
63*	SAAM Explosive Detection Dog Team Leader	Kilo-2	2	TBD	TBD	TBD			M4/M9/EDD	X	Sedan	X
64*	SAAM Security Controller	Guardian	1	TBD	TBD	TBD				X		X
65*	PNAF Traffic Control Point Leader	Tango-1	1	TBD	TBD	TBD			M4	X	Bus	X
66*	PNAF Traffic Control Point Member	Tango-2	1	TBD	TBD	TBD			M4	X		X
67*	PNAF Traffic Control Point Member	Tango-3	1	TBD	TBD	TBD			M4	X		X
68*	PNAF Traffic Control Point Member	Tango-4	1	TBD	TBD	TBD			M4	X		X
69*	PNAF Traffic Control Point Member	Tango-5	1	TBD	TBD	TBD			M4	X		X
70*	PNAF Traffic Control Point Member	Tango-6	1	TBD	TBD	TBD			M4	X		X
71*	PNAF Traffic Control Point Member	Tango-7	1	TBD	TBD	TBD			M4	X		X
72*	PNAF Traffic Control Point Member	Tango-8	1	TBD	TBD	TBD			M4	X		X
73*	FAA Tower Liaison	Watchdog	1	TBD	TBD	TBD				X		
74*	Sunport Liaison	Sunport	1	TBD	TBD	TBD				X		
75	Crisis Action Team Guard	Yankee-1	1	TBD	TBD	TBD			M9	X		
76*	Zia Skywatch Tower	Skywatch-1	1	TBD	TBD	TBD			M4	X		X

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77*	Hardin Road Skywatch Tower	Skywatch-2	1	TBD	TBD	TBD			M4	X		X
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LOADING DOCK OPERATIONS

Priority	Post	Call Sign	Crew Size	Days/ Week	Hours/ Day	Holiday	RF	IBF	Weapons	Radio	Vehicle	NVG LAD
1*	KUMMSC FT leader (Loading Dock Ops)	Scorpion-6	1	TBD	TBD	TBD	9		M4/M9	X	AH	X
2*	KUMMSC FT Member (Loading Dock Ops)	Scorpion-6A	1	TBD	TBD	TBD	10		M4/M9	X		X
3*	KUMMSC FT Member (Loading Dock Ops)	Scorpion-6B	1	TBD	TBD	TBD	11		M249/M9	X		X
4*	KUMMSC FT Member (Loading Dock Ops)	Scorpion-6C	1	TBD	TBD	TBD	12		M4/M9	X		X
5*	Loading Dock ISRT Leader	Cerberus-4	1	TBD	TBD	TBD	13		M4/M9	X		X
6*	Loading Dock ISRT Member	Cerberus-4a	1	TBD	TBD	TBD	14		M249/M9	X		X
7*	KUMMSC Controlled Area ISRT Member	Scorpion-4b	1	TBD	TBD	TBD	15		M4/M9	X		X

REFLEX DELTA OPERATIONS

Priority	Post	Call Sign	Crew Size	Days/ Week	Hours/ Day	Holiday	RF	IBF	Weapons	Radio	Vehicle	NVG LAD
1*	REFLEX DELTA Entry Controller	Coyote-10	1	TBD	TBD	TBD			M4/M9	X	4X4	X
2*	REFLEX DELTA Close Boundary Sentry	Coyote-11	1	TBD	TBD	TBD			M4/M9	X	4X4	X
3*	REFLEX DELTA ISRT Leader	Coyote-5	1	TBD	TBD	TBD			M4/M9	X	4X4	X
4*	REFLEX DELTA ISRT Member	Coyote-5A	1	TBD	TBD	TBD			M4/M203/ M9	X		X

KAFB IDP 31-101 14 March 2017**ENCLOSURE 2 TO APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX C TO KAFB IDP 31-101****SECURITY OPERATIONS PRIORITY POSTING - FPCON CHARLIE / DELTA**

Whenever there is an indication of an increased threat in an area where nuclear weapons are located, additional security measures appropriate to the threat shall be taken to ensure adequate protection. The following posts will be manned based on the threat and direction from Wing and/or SFG leadership:

Priority	Post	Call Sign	Crew Size	Days/ Week	Hours/ Day	Holiday	RF	IBF	Weapons	Radio	Vehicle	NVG LAD
82*	WSTI/TASS Monitor (SSCC)	Guardian	1	7	24	YES			M9			
83*	Alternate SSCC @BDOC	X-Ray	1	7	24	YES			M9			
84	SBF Leader	Charlie-1	1	7	24	YES			M4/M9	X	AH	X
85	SBF Member	Charlie-1A	1	7	24	YES			M4/M203/M9	X		X
86	SBF Member	Charlie-1B	1	7	24	YES			M249/M9	X		X
87	SBF Member	Charlie-1C	1	7	24	YES			M4/M9	X		X
88	SBF Member	Charlie-2	1	7	24	YES			M4/M9	X	AH	X
89	SBF Member	Charlie-2A	1	7	24	YES			M4/M203/M9	X		X
90	SBF Member	Charlie-2B	1	7	24	YES			M240/M9	X		X
91	SBF Member	Charlie-2C	1	7	24	YES			M4/M9	X		X
92	SBF Member	Charlie-3	1	7	24	YES			M4/M9	X	AH	X
93	SBF Member	Charlie-3A	1	7	24	YES			M4/M203/M9	X		X
94	SBF Member	Charlie-3B	1	7	24	YES			M249/M9	X		X
Priority	Post	Call Sign	Crew Size	Days/ Week	Hours/ Day	Holiday	RF	IBF	Weapons	Radio	Vehicle	NVG LAD

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Priority	Post	Call Sign	Crew Size	Days/ Week	Hours/ Day	Holiday	RF	IBF	Weapons	Radio	Vehicle	NVG LAD
95	SBF Member	Charlie-3C	1	7	24	YES			M4/M9	X		X
96	SBF Member	Charlie-4	1	7	24	YES			M4/M9	X	AH	X
97	SBF Member	Charlie-4A	1	7	24	YES			M4/M203/ M9	X		X
98	SBF Member	Charlie-4B	1	7	24	YES			M240/M9	X		X
99	SBF Member	Charlie-4C	1	7	24	YES			M4/M9	X		X
100	Kirtland Command Post/CAT Guard	Yankee-1	1	7	24	YES			M4/M9	X		
101	BDOC Controller Member	BDOC-A	1	7	24	NO			M9/M4	X		
102	Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Rep	EOC-1	1	TBD	TBD	TBD			M9	X		
103	KUMMSC Armory Member	Arms-1A	1	7	24	YES			M9			
104	LE Armory Member	Arms-2A	1	7	24	YES			M9			
105	Randolph Gate ECP (Flightline)	Coyote-7	1	7	24	YES			M4/M9	X		
106	Randolph Gate Searcher (Flightline)	Coyote-7A	1	7	24	YES			M9			
107	Presidential Gate ECP (Flightline)	Coyote-8	1	7	24	YES			M4/M9	X		
108	Presidential Gate Searcher (Flightline)	Coyote-8A	1	7	24	YES			M9			
109	Flightline ISRT Leader	Coyote-9	1	7	24	YES			M4/M9	X	4X4	
110	Flightline ISRT Member	Coyote-9A	1	7	24	YES			M4/M9			

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Priority	Post	Call Sign	Crew Size	Days/ Week	Hours/ Day	Holiday	RF	IBF	Weapons	Radio	Vehicle	NVG LAD
111#	RD Billet Entry Controller	Coyote-12	1	7	24	YES			M4/M9	X		
112#	RD Billet Close Boundary Sentry	Coyote-13	1	7	24	YES			M4/M9	X		
113#	RD Billet Close Boundary Sentry	Coyote-13A	1	7	24	YES			M4/M9	X		
114#	RD Billet ISRT Leader	Coyote-14	1	7	24	YES			M4/M9	X		
115#	RD Billet ISRT Leader	Coyote-14A	1	7	24	YES			M4/M9	X		
116	Medical Facility Guard	Police-6A	1	7	24	NO			M9	X		
117	Gibson Gate Member	Golf-3C	1	7	24	YES			M9/M4	X		
118	Truman Gate Member	Golf-4C	1	7	24	YES			M9/M4	X		
119	Eubank Gate Member	Golf-1D	1	7	19	YES			M9/M4	X		
120	Maxwell Gate Member	Golf-6B	1	7	24	YES			M9/M4	X		
121	Wyoming Gate Member	Golf-2C	1	5	13.5	YES			M9/M4	X		
122	Gibson Gate Overwatch	Golf-3 Watch	1	7	24	YES			M249 or M240/M9	X	AH	X
123	Truman Gate Overwatch	Golf-4 Watch	1	7	24	YES			M249 or M240/M9	X	AH	X
124	Eubank Gate Overwatch	Golf-1 Watch	1	7	19	YES			M249 or M240/M9	X	AH	X
125	Maxwell Gate Overwatch	Golf-6 Watch	1	7	24	YES			M249 or M240/M9	X	AH	X
126	Wyoming Gate Overwatch	Golf-2 Watch	1	5	13.5	YES			M249 or M240/M9	X	AH	X

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Priority	Post	Call Sign	Crew Size	Days/ Week	Hours/ Day	Holiday	RF	IBF	Weapons	Radio	Vehicle	NVG LAD
127	Kirtland Gate Overwatch	Golf-8 Watch	1	5	10	YES			M249 or M240/M9	X	AH	X
128	Patrol Member (If K-9 not posted)	Police-3A	1	7	24	YES			M9/M4	X		
129	Patrol Member	Police-7A	1	7	24	YES			M9/M4	X		
130	Patrol Member	Police-8A	1	7	24	YES			M9/M4	X		
131	Patrol Member	Defender-2A	1	7	24	YES			M9/M4	X		

NOTE: In the event SFS/BDOC Alarm monitor is in “training” status and the SFS/BDOC controller is certified, the certified individual will fill this post.

Note asterisk (*) indicates you must be Arming, UOF Suitability Standards certified to pull the post.

(#) Only post in the event a Reflex Delta is on station.

KAFB IDP 31-101 14 March 2017**ENCLOSURE 3 TO APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX C TO KAFB IDP 31-101**

(DCNI) All armored vehicles are listed to the vehicle validation list of 23 armored vehicles. Fire teams (FT) will be given armored vehicle priority over SRT's and area supervisors.

Normal Security: 10* only posted when loading dock is hot.

ARMORED VEHICLE PRIORITY CHART

Normal Security		PNAF	
Priority	Post	Priority	Post
1	Scorpion-5 (KUMMSC ISRT)	1	Cobra-3 (PNAF Convoy SRT Leader)
2	Scorpion-2 (KUMMSC ESRT)	2	Cobra-2 (PNAF Convoy SRT Leader)
3	Scorpion-3 (KUMMSC ESRT)	3	Viper-3 (PNAF Convoy SRT Leader)
4	Scorpion-4 (KUMMSC ESRT)	4	Viper-4 (SAAM IBF Leader)
5	Scorpion-1 (KUMMSC Topside AS)	5	Viper-1 (SAAM IBF Leader)
6	Coyote-1 (Flightline ESRT/AS)	6	Viper-2 (SAAM IBF Leader)
7	Coyote-3 (Flightline ISRT 58 SOW)	7	Pelican-4 (PNAF OP Leader)
8	Coyote-4 (Flightline ISRT 377 Transient Ramp)	8	Pelican-5 (PNAF OP Leader)
9	Coyote-2 (Flightline ISRT 150 SOW)	9	Mongoose-2 (SAAM RF FTL)
10*	Scorpion-6 (KUMMSC FT Leader)	10	Mongoose-4 (SAAM RF FTL)
		11	Mongoose-3 (SAAM RF FTL)
		12	Mongoose-1 (SAAM RF FTL)
		13	Cobra-1 (PNAF Convoy CC)
		14	Mustang-2 (LSA ESRT Leader)
		15	Mustang 3 (LSA ESRT Leader)
FPCON Charlie/Delta			
Priority	Post	Priority	Post
1	Charlie-1 (SBF Leader)	1	Gibson Gate Overwatch
2	Charlie-2 (SBF Member)	2	Truman Gate Overwatch
3	Charlie-3 (SBF Member)	3	Eubank Gate Overwatch
4	Charlie-4 (SBF Member)	4	Maxwell Gate Overwatch
		5	Wyoming Gate Overwatch
		6	Kirtland Gate Overwatch

APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX C TO KAFB IDP 31-101
FORCE PROTECTION CONDITION ALERTING MESSAGE (FPCAM)

REFERENCES: Refer to Basic Plan.

1. OBJECTIVE: To implement applicable FPCON, if mandated, in the FPCAM or as determined by the IC based on local situation. To protect USAF/DOD/DoE resources and personnel.
2. OPTION DESCRIPTION: The 377 ABW receives a FPCA requiring the implementation of a higher FPCON. The 377 ABW and all associate units will accomplish required actions as outlined in the FPCON that is in effect. The FPCON implemented will remain in effect until canceled by the originating authority.
3. CONSIDERATIONS: See assumptions in appendix 1.
4. TASK ORGANIZATIONS:
 - 4.1. The KCP will, upon receipt of the FPCAM:
 - 4.1.1. (FOUO) Notify the 377 ABW/CC, WSSS/SSCC, and SFS/BDOC, and request 377 SFG representative to report to KCP to pick up the message.
 - 4.1.2. Initiate FPCON procedures.
 - 4.2. The DFC will assemble the TWG if required and ensure:
 - 4.2.1. Implement the appropriate FPCON, notify all key squadron personnel, and brief all posts and patrols.
 - 4.2.2. (FOUO) All units comply with appropriate tasking's as outlined in the FPCON Checklist(s). **NOTE:** This will include compliance by private contractors.
 - 4.3. The 377 MDG/CC will comply with procedures in the appropriate contingency operation.
 - 4.4. 58 SOW/CC will comply with procedures outlined in the contingency operation.
 - 4.5. The 150 SOW/CC will comply with procedures outlined in the contingency operation.

APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX C TO KAFB IDP 31-101
DEPLOYMENT/RECEIPT OF SECURITY FORCES

Refer to Kirtland AFB Installation Deployment Plan (KAFBI 10-403).

APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX C TO KAFB IDP 31-101
NATURAL DISASTER/CATASTROPHE

Refer to KAFB IEMP 10-2, Installation Emergency Management Plan (IEMP), for specific guidance.

APPENDIX 6 TO ANNEX C TO KAFB IDP 31-101
UNAUTHORIZED AIRCRAFT MOVEMENT / ANTI-HIJACKING

REFERENCES: Refer to the Basic Plan.

1. SITUATION: The possibility exists that an aircraft could be moved without authorization or hijacked.

1.1. Enemy Forces. Refer to the Basic Plan.

1.2. Friendly Forces. Refer to the Basic Plan.

1.3. Limiting Factors. The active runways and associated taxiways are owned by the city of Albuquerque and USAF use is on a leased basis. All flight operations are controlled by the FAA.

2. MISSION: To provide maximum security for PL aircraft when located on KAFB.

3. EXECUTION:

3.1. (FOUO) Concept of Operations: The 377 WSSS will provide the required patrol/response coverage for PL aircraft when located on KAFB. Although the definitions of aircraft theft and hijack infer two separate concepts, Security Forces response to either incident is essentially the same. Variations in IC Operations are a product of evaluation and direction of the Security IC. In either instance, SF must maintain the capability for an immediate/rapid initial response to effectively neutralize the incident and as directed by the Security IC.

3.2. Tasks.

3.2.1. (FOUO) The 58 SOW WOC, 150 SOW Command Post or 377 MXS/MXO will notify WSSS/SSCC in the event of an unannounced aircraft movement or a suspected or actual hijacking.

3.2.2. The 377 WSSS senior security representative will:

3.2.2.1. (FOUO) Assume control of the IRF as IC until the arrival of the designated IC. The IC will establish radio communications with the KCP and other agencies, as necessary through the Commander's Net or other communication nets, as appropriate.

3.2.3. The SFS/BDOC/WSSS/SSCC will:

3.2.3.1. Up-channel all required reports, i.e., *Security Incident/Covered Wagon* to the KCP and continually update KCP on status of situation.

3.2.3.2. (FOUO) Coordinate with the fire department and maintenance personnel to block off all pad and taxiway accesses to prevent aircraft from leaving the installation.

3.2.3.3. (FOUO) Advise all posts and patrols not to fire on the aircraft unless the aircraft initiates hostile actions.

3.3. Should recovery operations be required, coordinate with the FAA and FBI prior to recovery operations. Once recovery operations begin, they will be conducted swiftly and effectively to regain control. Negotiation attempts will be used to recover the affected PL aircraft. If the IC issues an ultimatum, a specific time limit will be given to hostile forces. After the prescribed time limit has elapsed, swift, forceful tactics will be utilized to regain custody and control of the PL resources and release of the hostages. **NOTE:** An ultimatum only applies to non-nuclear PL resources. Nuclear laden aircraft will not be given an ultimatum and recapture/recovery operations shall begin immediately. See Annex Z for further guidance on PL 1 recapture/recovery procedures.

3.4. (FOUO) Apprehend all violators and return custody of aircraft to proper authorities.

3.5. (FOUO) If REFLEX DELTA is involved, ensure adequate Security Forces respond and are called upon to ensure mission capability.

3.6. (DCNI) If KUMMSC and the flightline are simultaneously attacked, KUMMSC will have higher priority.

3.7. (FOUO) Ensure recapture/recovery actions are taken in the event resources have fallen out of the USAF control. Comply with Annex Z for further guidance on PL 1 resources.

3.8. (FOUO) KCP will up-channel all reports submitted by WSSS/SSCC/SFS/BDOC and serve as the focal point during this period.

3.8.1. Notify AFOSI, FBI, and local law enforcement agencies.

3.9. (DCNI) If Convoy/PNAF operations are in progress, 898 MUNS Control and WSSS/SSCC will alert all MUNS and SF personnel conducting Convoy/PNAF operations of the threat. MUNS and SF personnel will take necessary action to secure all resources until the situation is terminated.

3.10 (FOUO) The 58 SOW WOC and 150 SOW CP will consider suspending all flying and maintenance operations until the situation is terminated. All airborne aircraft may land and recover.

4. LOGISTICS AND ADMINISTRATION: Refer to Annex I and the Basic Plan.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL:

5.1. Command Relationship: Refer to Basic Plan.

5.2. Signal: Refer to Annex H.

5.3. (FOUO) Pilot Duress Signals: Pilots will indicate duress through air traffic control personnel.

TAB A TO APPENDIX 6 TO ANNEX C TO KAFB IDP 31-101
ATTACK ON PROTECTION LEVEL AIRCRAFT

REFERENCES: Refer to Basic Plan.

1. SITUATION: Hostile forces have launched an attack against PL 3 aircraft parked in the 150 SOW Mass Parking Area, PL 3 aircraft parked in 58 SOW area, or in associated hangars, or any PL aircraft in transient parked on the transient ramp.

2. MISSION: Provide an immediate security response to protect assigned PL 3 aircraft or transient PL aircraft against damage, theft, loss or destruction.

3. SECURITY REPORTING AND ALERTING ACTION: Implement *Covered Wagon* and FPCON Delta.

4. EXECUTION:

4.1. Concept of Operations: SF will utilize proper deployment techniques and strategies to prevent the loss, theft, and capture of PL aircraft by hostile forces.

4.1.1. Containment actions may require establishment of a cordon around the affected area to seal off all avenues of escape.

4.1.2. Deadly force will be utilized as a last resort. Under no circumstances will a hostile force be allowed to depart the immediate area of a PL aircraft/incident. Responding SF will contain and remove hostile forces from the area containing or in the vicinity of PL resources.

4.2. Tasks.

4.2.1. The WSSS/SSCC will:

4.2.1.1. (FOUO) Up-channel a *Covered Wagon* report to the KCP and implement the appropriate checklists.

4.2.1.2. (FOUO) Immediately dispatch the internal and external security response teams, flight commander, flight chief and any other required posts/patrols.

4.2.1.3. In conjunction with SFS/BDOC, notify all SF posts and patrols.

4.2.1.4. Contact SFS/BDOC and implement 377 SFG-wide recall procedures.

4.2.1.5. The 377 SFG will identify/form FBFs.

4.2.1.6. Coordinate with local civil authorities in conjunction with SFS/BDOC.

4.2.1.7. Implement appropriate FPCON actions, as required.

4.2.1.8. Establish cordons, as appropriate.

4.2.1.9. Establish safety route for follow-on forces.

4.2.1.10. Establish logistics support to response forces, as required.

4.2.2. AFOSI Detachment 814 will:

4.2.2.1. (FOUO) Take custody of and process captured/surviving enemy forces.

4.2.2.2. (FOUO) Assess potential for further attack (based on gathered intelligence).

4.2.2.3. (FOUO) Initiate/coordinate investigation of the incident upon elimination of threats to PL resources.

4.2.3. KCP will:

4.2.3.1. Notify key personnel and agencies (CAT and/or EOC representatives, as applicable).

4.2.3.1.1. Notify 377 SFS/BDOC

4.2.3.1.2. Notify AFOSI.

4.2.3.1.3. Notify FBI.

4.2.3.1.4. Notify FAA.

4.2.3.2. The KCP will keep base populace informed, PA handles the rest of the public communication.

4.2.3.3. Reporting: The KCP will initiate OPREP-3 voice and hard copy reporting, as required.

TAB B TO APPENDIX 6 TO ANNEX C TO KAFB IDP 31-101
FLIGHTLINE UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEM DETECTION / DENIAL / SURVEILLANCE
OF PROTECTION LEVEL-1, 2 OR 3 RESTRICTED AREAS

REFERENCES: Refer to Basic Plan.

1. **SITUATION:** An unidentified unmanned aerial system that has been spotted landing, attempted landing, hovering or flying over/near restricted areas and its intent/purpose is unknown.

1.1. (FOUO) Limiting Factors. The active runway and associated taxiways are owned by the city of Albuquerque and USAF use is on a leased basis. All flight operations will be controlled by the FAA.

2. **SECURITY OBJECTIVE:** To provide the KCP fixed field sites with interim guidance for the development and implementation of response protocols, to include administrative and investigative procedures, to address potential threats posed by sUAS not approved (unsanctioned) for operations within airspace over (KAFB) property. This guidance will be updated as technologies, Federal regulations and/or Departmental policies are promulgated to respond to the threat.

3. **REPORTING AND ALERTING ACTION:** Initiate Security Incident situation if affecting PL 1, 2, or 3 resources. If determined hostile, upgrade to a Covered Wagon situation and initiate FPCON Delta measures. Security Forces will keep a safe distance along with a visual of the sUAS and maintain contact with Site (SSCC). KCP will be notified immediately, subsequent notifications will include Department of Defense (DOD), FBI, FAA, Defense Nuclear Security (DNS), Local Law Enforcement Agencies (LLEAs). KCP will report using Rule 9B for Unauthorized Air Vehicle/Military Installation Airspace Violation/Intrusion when notified by Security Forces of any civilian remotely piloted aircraft (RPA), unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), gyrocopter, or similar.

4. **EXECUTION:**

4.1. Concept of Operations: The 377 WSSS will provide the required patrol/response coverage for sUAS when located on KAFB flightline. Although the definitions of sUAS denial and detection for PL 1 resources infer separate concepts, Security Forces response to either incident is essentially the same. Variations in the Incident Commander Operations are a product of evaluation and direction of the Security Incident Commander. In either instance Security forces must maintain the capability for an immediate/rapid initial response to effectively neutralize the incident and as directed by the Security Incident Commander.

4.2. (FOUO) Tasks.

4.2.1. (FOUO) The FAA Tower, 58 SOW WOC, 150 SOW Command Post or 377 MXS/MXO will notify WSSS/SSCC in the event of an unannounced sUAS has been detected.

4.2.2. (FOUO) The 377 WSSS senior security representative will:

4.2.1.1. (FOUO) Ensure Security Forces keep a safe distance and at a minimum notify WSSS/SSCC with last known location, direction of travel, altitude (how far off ground), size, shape, color, activity (hovering, circling, etc.) and any distinguishing features (camera, emission of liquid or vapor, attachment hanging from it, etc.). Patrols should utilize the SALUTE report to transmit information.

4.2.3. (FOUO) If a device capable of still images or video footage is available from the on-duty Flight Chief they will attempt to capture images/footage of the sUAS and provide to higher authorities and/or IC.

4.2.3.1. (FOUO) Do not attempt to interfere with the flight path of the sUAS.

4.2.4. (FOUO) If a sUAS has landed or is observed on the ground within KAFB ensure the above notifications have been made. Do not tamper with or make contact with sUAS. Provide a cordon appropriate to size of sUAS and treat as unknown/suspicious package and exercise extreme caution. Maintain visual of object if applicable.

4.2.4.1. (FOUO) If the sUAS discharges any substance don a protective mask (M-50/MCU-2AP), move to a safe location up-wind and attempt to maintain visual.

4.2.5. (FOUO) The Security Forces must be in a position to provide a high volume of fire able to be directed towards sUAS in order to disable if it becomes hostile (i.e. Firing, projectiles, etc.). Ensure positions do not hinder from defeating enemy ground forces if encountered.

4.2.6. (FOUO) WSSS/SSCC/SFS/BDOC will:

4.2.6.1. (DCNI) Up-channel all required reports; i.e., Security incident/Covered Wagon to the KCP and continually update the KCP on status of situation.

4.2.6.1. (DCNI) Advise all post patrols not to fire on the sUAS unless the vehicle initiates hostile actions.

4.2.6.2. (FOUO) Initiate a SFG recall if sUAS is deemed hostile. Instruct personnel not to respond until directed by the IC. Personnel will remain on standby in the FBF formation area until dispatched or the situation terminates.

4.2.6.3. (DCNI) Detection and Warning. All personnel must be aware of the possibility of unmanned aerial systems and immediately notify WSSS/SSCC/SFS/BDOC and KCP of all sUAS sightings within KAFB flightline area.

4.2.6.4. (FOUO) Provide assistance to the IC as well as monitor direct IC Security Forces.

4.2.6.5. (FOUO) If REFLEX DELTA is involved, ensure adequate Security Forces respond and are recalled to ensure mission capability.

4.2.6.6. (DCNI) If KUMMSC, Protection Level 1 resource movements, SAAM aircraft and the flightline are simultaneously attacked, exposed resources will have the priority, followed by KUMMSC and then the flightline. Comply with Annex Z for further guidance on KUMMSC, Protection Level 1 resource movements, and SAAM aircraft.

5. (FOUO) Civil Engineering and EOD Support will:

5.1. (FOUO) In support to sUAS, refer to Annex A.

5.1.1. (FOUO) Provide support to the security operations contained within this plan. Support details identified in annexes, appendices, exhibits, tabs, or enclosures to this plan.

TAB C TO APPENDIX 6 TO ANNEX C TO KAFB IDP 31-101

**UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEM DETECTION / DENIAL / SURVEILLANCE OF KAFB
Main Base (Non-Restricted Areas)**

REFERENCES: Refer to Basic Plan, and HAF Small Unmanned Aerial Systems (sUAS) Memo dtd 7 June 2016.

1. SITUATION: An unidentified unmanned aerial system that has been spotted landing, attempted landing, hovering or flying over KAFB and its intent/purpose is unknown.

1.1. (FOUO) Limiting Factors. The active runway and associated taxiways are owned by the city of Albuquerque and USAF use is on a leased basis. All flight operations will be controlled by the FAA. Not all of KAFB is considered Restricted Air Space.

2. SECURITY OBJECTIVE: To provide the KCP fixed field sites with interim guidance for the development and implementation of response protocols, to include administrative and investigative procedures, to address potential threats posed by sUAS not approved (unsanctioned) for operations within airspace over KAFB property. This guidance will be updated as technologies, Federal regulations and/or Departmental policies are promulgated to respond to the threat.

3. REPORTING AND ALERTING ACTION: If a sUAS is located over KAFB Security Forces will keep a safe distance along with a visual of the sUAS and maintain contact with Base Defense Operation Center (BDOC). Additional patrols will conduct sector sweeps trying to locate the Pilot who should be in direct line of sight of the sUAS. SFS/BDOC will contact the control tower to see if the sUAS is hindering their operations. KCP will be notified immediately, subsequent notifications if necessary will include Department of Defense (DOD), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Defense Nuclear Security (DNS), Local Law Enforcement Agencies (LLEAs). KCP will report using Rule 9B for Unauthorized Air Vehicle/Military Installation Airspace Violation/Intrusion when notified by Security Forces of any civilian remotely piloted aircraft (RPA), unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), gyrocopter, or similar craft violating protected military airspace.

4. EXECUTION:

4.1. Radio Controlled Aircraft, sUAS and Drone Operations. The 377 SFS will provide the required patrol/response coverage for sUAS when located on KAFB. LE Patrols will ensure that the pilot of the sUAS complies with the following FAA regulation while flying hobby style sUAS over non-restricted areas.

4.1.1. For the purpose of this instruction sUAS will be used to define any form of flying model aircraft, rocket, toy, et cetera.

4.1.2. sUAS must be visible to the operator at all times. sUASs weighing 0.55 pounds or more will not be flown on Kirtland AFB property except at the AUX Field IAW SUP13-204 and the by-laws of the model aviation club as well as IAW all FAA regulations.

4.1.3. sUASs weighing less than 0.55 pounds may be flown on Kirtland AFB but are limited to the housing areas, Pershing Park and Zia Park. sUAS must be visible to the operator at all times. They will not be flown higher than the tallest obstacle within 100 yards. No other area, to include Hardin Field, is sanctioned for the use of sUASs.

4.1.4. All sUASs owned and operated by the US Government and/or its contractors will be operated IAW the FAA Certificate of Authorization (COA) and AFI 11-502 V3.

4.1.5. Cannot have any type of audio/visual recording/capturing equipment.

4.1.6. May only be operated in designated areas.

4.1.7. May not be flown across roads, parking lots, over fences or buildings/structures.

4.1.8. May not be flown within 20 ft. of any individual, except for the operator(s).

4.1.9. sUASs weighing less than 5 pounds may be flown in the housing areas but must be kept within the confines of the individuals authorized "yard" area.

4.1.10. Request for commercial use of sUAS on Kirtland will be approved by the Installation Commander on a case by case basis.

4.1.11. Government use of All sUAS will be coordinated through the 377 ABW Safety Office.

4.1.12. Authorized sUAS areas are Pershing and Zia Park; West Sandia is not authorized.

4.1.13. All sUAS must be registered with the FAA; for questions, go to AShelp@faa.gov.

4.2. (FOUO) Tasks.

4.2.1. (FOUO) The FAA Tower, 58 SOW WOC, 150 SOW Command Post or 377 MXS/MXO will notify SFS/BDOC in the event of an unannounced sUAS has been detected over KAFB that does not involve restricted areas.

4.2.2. (FOUO) The 377 SFS Flight Chief will:

4.2.2.1. (FOUO) Ensure LE Patrols keep a safe distance and at a minimum notify WSSS/SSCC with last known location, direction of travel, altitude (how far off ground), size, shape, color, activity (hovering, circling, etc.) and any distinguishing features (camera, emission of liquid or vapor, attachment hanging from it, etc.). Patrols should utilize the SALUTE report to transmit information.

4.2.3. (FOUO) If a device capable of still images or video footage is available from the on-duty Flight Chief they will attempt to capture images/footage of the sUAS and provide to higher authorities.

- 4.2.3.1. (FOUO) Do not attempt to interfere with the flight path of the sUAS.
- 4.2.4. (FOUO) If a sUAS has landed or is observed on the ground within KAFB ensure the above notifications have been made. Do not tamper with or make contact with sUAS. Attempted to locate and make contact with the pilot of the aUAS. If sUAS has damaged Government or Personal property ensure patrols investigate and get statements from witnesses and Pilot. Patrols will ensure a SFMIS case (3545) is accomplished. At a minimum a Field Interview Card will be accomplished if there is no damage to property.
 - 4.2.4.1. (FOUO) If a sUAS has landed and appears to be carrying a package provide a cordon appropriate to size of sUAS and treat as unknown or suspicious package while exercising extreme caution. Maintain visual of object if applicable.
 - 4.2.4.2. (FOUO) If the sUAS discharges any substance don a protective mask (M-50/MCU-2AP), move to a safe location up-wind and attempt to maintain visual.
- 4.2.5. (FOUO) The LE Patrol must be in a position to provide a high volume of fire able to be directed towards sUAS in order to disable if it becomes hostile (i.e. Firing, projectiles, etc.). Ensure positions do not hinder from defeating enemy ground forces if encountered.
- 4.2.6. (FOUO) WSSS/SSCC/SFS/BDOC will:
 - 4.2.6.1. (DCNI) Up-channel all required reports; i.e., Security Incident/Covered Wagon to the KCP and continually update the KCP on status of situation if sUAS is involving restricted areas.
 - 4.2.6.2. (DCNI) Advise all post patrols not to fire on the sUAS unless the vehicle initiates hostile actions.
 - 4.2.6.3. (FOUO) Initiate a SFG recall if sUAS is deemed hostile. Instruct personnel not to respond until directed by the IC. Personnel will remain on standby in the FBF formation area until dispatched or the situation terminates.
 - 4.2.6.4. (DCNI) Detection and Warning. All personnel must be aware of the possibility of unmanned aerial systems and immediately notify WSSS/SSCC/SFS/BDOC and KCP of all sUAS sightings within KAFB.
 - 4.2.6.5. (FOUO) Provide assistance to the Flight Chief as well as monitor direct all Patrols.
- 5. (FOUO) Civil Engineering and EOD Support will:
 - 5.1. (FOUO) sUAS, refer to Annex A.

5.1.1. (FOUO) Provide support to the security operations contained within this plan.
Support details identified in annexes, appendices, exhibits, tabs, or enclosures to this plan.

APPENDIX 7 TO ANNEX C TO KAFB IDP 31-101
CIVIL DISTURBANCE/RIOT THREATENING PROTECTION LEVEL RESOURCES

REFERENCES: Refer to the Basic Plan.

1. SITUATION: A group of private citizens can assemble and peacefully protest any decision of the government at any level without fear of retribution. This normally will attract media attention and not concern the security of any AF resources in the area. When this assembly deteriorates into demonstrations and riots directed towards or against the government, military personnel and property, or PL resources, SF must be prepared to take action.

1.1. (FOUO) Other Assumptions: A civilian demonstration directed against a purely civilian matter could expand to include KAFB. The basic reaction will be made by the civilian police agencies. The 150 SOW can provide assistance and support, if activated by the governor. Federal military intervention is prohibited unless the demonstrators trespass onto the military reservation. At that time, the installation's reaction is limited to controlling and removing them from the reservation. Only upon direct orders of the President can the federal military intervene off-base.

1.2. Limiting Factors:

1.2.1. (FOUO) Reaction by the 377 SFG is limited due to the size of the installation and detection capabilities of an illegal trespass onto KAFB.

1.2.2. (FOUO) Due to jurisdictional restraints, fresh pursuit may be used only when the person fleeing has committed or attempted a major crime against personnel or property, i.e., murder, rape, aggravated assault, armed robbery, arson of an occupied building, etc. or has committed a theft of property inherently dangerous to others (weapons, explosives) or vital to national security (classified documents, weapon system components, etc.).

1.2.3. (FOUO) The objective of off-base pursuit is to maintain contact with the suspect(s) until civilian authorities assume pursuit. Conduct off-base pursuit at a safe speed. If the subject flees at speeds that are reckless or dangerous, break off pursuit immediately. Once off-base authorities have assumed the pursuit, SF involvement should be limited to shadowing the pursuit and working out jurisdictional concerns once the pursuit has terminated. SF have no authority to make an off-base apprehension of civilian personnel unless a NDA is established.

2. MISSION: To actively confront any demonstration or Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) occurring within the boundaries of KAFB. Guidance and rules will be according to AFMAN 31-201 Volume 4, Civil Disturbance. Additional guidance can be found at Appendix 2 to Annex M Confrontation Management.

3. EXECUTION:

3.1. Concept of Operations.

3.2. WSSS/SSCC and SFS/BDOC will:

3.2.1. (FOUO) Notify KCP and key senior leadership, flight commander, flight chief, posted patrols, 898 MUNS Munitions Control (MC), AFOSI, and other units or personnel in the area.

3.2.2. (FOUO) Implement appropriate checklists. Assume an increased security vigilance posture.

3.2.3. Provide periodic updates to the KCP, SFS/BDOC, WSSS/SSCC, DFC, and all posts/patrols, as necessary.

3.2.4. Upon direction of DFC, recall additional personnel.

3.2.5. (DCNI) Security Forces will not be directed away from KUMMSC or PL restricted areas in support of the civil disturbance.

3.2.6. (DCNI) WSSS/SSCC will advise supporting control centers and SF posts/patrols of the changes in the civil disturbance phases. If the situation continues to deteriorate and demonstrators are reported proceeding toward a restricted area, WSSS/SSCC will direct Security Forces to secure the area and prepare for confrontation. If the disturbance directly affects KUMMSC, the facility will be locked down.

3.2.7. (DCNI) If demonstrators penetrate the base perimeter and are approaching KUMMSC topside, they will be met prior to arriving within 100 feet of the outer fence line and instructed to turn back. Demonstrators will be treated as an unarmed threat unless they persist in trying to breach the KUMMSC fence line, which dictates hostile activity. The appropriate contingency operation and a *Covered Wagon* will be initiated if hostile acts from the demonstrators occur.

3.2.8. Hostile acts with hostile fire will be immediately countered by SF. The constraints of AFI 31-117 will be applied pertaining to the use of deadly force. See ROE in Annex C to this plan.

APPENDIX 8 TO ANNEX C TO KAFB IDP 31-101

**MUTUAL SUPPORT BETWEEN 377th SECURITY FORCES AND SANDIA NATIONAL
LABORATORIES SECURITY FORCES**

Refer to Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between 377 ABW and DoE.

APPENDIX 9 TO ANNEX C TO KAFB IDP 31-101
RECEIVE SECURITY FORCES

REFERENCES: Refer to the Basic Plan.

1. SITUATION: The 377 SFG is receiving Security Forces support from AFGSC or other commands to augment in-place forces. This need could arise from a deployment tasking heavily impacting the 377 SFG or from other factors such as increased deployment tasking coupled with increased FPCONs.

1.1. Enemy Forces: Refer to the Basic Plan.

1.2. Friendly Forces: Refer to the Basic Plan.

1.3. (FOUO) Assumptions: The manning level of the 377 SFG has dropped below minimum levels required to effectively defend the base during heightened security measures. Increased deployment taskings have over-tasked our capability to support in-place resources during contingencies to the point that augmentation is necessary.

1.4. Limiting Factors. Refer to the Basic Plan.

2. MISSION: The mission of the inbound forces will be to augment in-place forces to defend KAFB and maintain security operations supporting PL 1 through PL 4 resources. Consider PRAP status of inbound personnel. Non-PRAP personnel cannot work in direct support of PL 1 resources.

3. EXECUTION:

3.1. Concept of Operations: The tasking message will contain the number, arrival date, period of deployment, and re-deployment actions according to applicable directives.

3.2. Tasks: The 377 SFG will be responsible for coordinating/securing appropriate lodging quarters for the inbound forces. Coordinate any required in-processing actions through the 377 MSG/CC. Conduct training on local SF policies and procedures. Tasking information received outside of 21 days of movement is subject to the CJCSM Classification Guidance.

3.3. Coordinating Instructions: The 377 SFS/WSSS, through their respective operations staff, are responsible for accomplishing flight assignments duty schedules for the inbound forces.

4. LOGISTICS AND ADMINISTRATION: 377 SSPT/S4L will issue inbound forces equipment not organic to the inbound unit(s) required to accomplish the mission. The 377 SSPT/S1 will accomplish or facilitate the accomplishment of all personnel administrative requirements. Personnel will also be required to attend Course II (Local Driving Conditions) after arriving on station.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL: Inbound forces will follow the established chain of command within their deployment team. Upon arrival and in-processing at KAFB, inbound forces will integrate into the command structure of the 377 SFG. Follow KAFB reporting instructions.

APPENDIX 10 TO ANNEX C TO KAFB IDP 31-101
377th SECURITY FORCES ACTIVE SHOOTER PLAN

Refer to the KAFB 10-245 Antiterrorism Plan for specific guidance.

APPENDIX 11 TO ANNEX C TO KAFB IDP 31-101
MEMORANDUMS OF AGREEMENT / UNDERSTANDING

1. Memorandums of Agreement (MOA) / Memorandums of Understanding (MOU) are on file to support PL resources.
2. A copy of any MOA / MOUs can be viewed in their entirety by contacting SFS/S5P at DSN 856-3926 or LRS/LGRDX at DSN 846-4232.

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ANNEX D TO KAFB IDP 31-101
FIELDS OF FIRE/FIRE SUPPORT

REFERENCES: NOT USED

ANNEX E TO KAFB IDP 31-101

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT/SPECIAL RULES ON USE OF FORCE

REFERENCES: NOT USED

APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX F TO KAFB IDP 31-101
EOD SUPPORT

REFERENCES: See Basic Plan.

1. SITUATION:

1.1. Expected enemy actions that would require 377th EOD support are, but not limited to, IEDs, conventional munitions (rockets, mortars, landmines, bombs, etc.), chemical munitions, nuclear weapons (military weapons, Improvised Nuclear Devices and Radiological Dispersal Devices).

1.2. EOD supports KAFB mission partners (Sandia National Laboratories, Dept. of Energy) along with local law enforcement agencies (Albuquerque Police Department, State Police, Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms, and Federal Bureau of Investigations) when the incident concerns military munitions or when requested through and approved by the 377th ABW Commander. EOD support normally includes the identification, render safe, and/or emergency disposal of military munitions responded to by these organizations.

2. MISSION: The EOD Branch detects, identifies, renders safe, recovers, and disposes of U.S. and foreign conventional, incendiary, chemical, biological, and nuclear ordnance. Renders safe and disposes of criminal/terrorist IEDs on military installations or as requested by outside agencies, under the Defense Support to Civil Authorities Statutes.

3. EXECUTION:

3.1. Response posture EOD personnel perform, supervise and manage Explosive Ordnance Disposal Operations to protect people, resources and the environment from the effects of hazardous explosive ordnance and IEDs, including WMD. EOD maintains the ability to detect, identify, render safe, recover and dispose of conventional, incendiary, chemical, biological and nuclear ordnance delivered or placed by enemy forces, and US or allied ordnance made dangerous by accident or other circumstance. Additionally, EOD personnel can render safe and dispose of criminal/terrorist IEDs. The EOD Branch will always maintain qualified personnel on 24-hour standby, one of which will be a minimum of a 7-level Staff Sergeant.

3.2. During duty hours, EOD is located in building 20413 from 0800-1600, Monday through Friday (excluding federal holidays). Call 846-2229 for any questions/assistance. If an emergency response is needed, contact KCP to generate key leadership knowledge and approval for EOD to respond off base. Expected response time on base during duty hours is 30 minutes. If EOD support is required after duty hours, contact the KCP directly and they will contact EOD standby members via phone. For off-duty EOD team is to be responding to the scene within 60 minutes after initial notification IAW AFI 32-3001.

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ANNEX G TO KAFB IDP 31-101
AIR DEFENSE

REFERENCES: NOT USED

ANNEX H TO KAFB IDP 31-101
COMMUNICATIONS

REFERENCES: Refer to Basic Plan.

1. GENERAL:

1.1. Purpose: This annex provides instructions and guidance covered in the basic plan for employment of command and control, communications, and computer (C4) systems in support of PL resources in the 377 ABW areas of responsibility (AOR). This includes information regarding deployable communication resources to be used during the operation/exercise.

1.2. (DCNI) KUMMSC requires redundant and diverse communication systems for site security. SF protecting PL 1 sites shall be equipped with multiple dedicated and reliable types of communication equipment. These communication systems shall assure rapid contact among security personnel at the site, the WSSS/SSCC and the security RFs.

1.3. The following criteria must be met for security operations:

1.3.1. (FOUO) A secure, encrypted communications system, through redundant and protected means, must be provided to permit command and control of security activities to ensure that all countermeasures contribute to effective attainment of security objectives. This includes monitoring of the security systems, relay of alarm data, providing assessment of on-scene information, notification of off-site SF and higher authorities, and command and control of security activities.

1.3.2. (DCNI) At least two systems of communication must exist between the locations responsible for providing security to KUMMSC and PL 1 operations, and one of these systems must be a secure radio.

1.3.3. (FOUO) At least two systems of communication must be provided to WSSS/SSCC/SFS/BDOC, linking all fixed SF locations. One system shall be a radio and the second system must be a direct-line type of telephone network.

1.3.4. (DCNI) The sentry telephone network must be connected to each permanent sentry post and the WSSS/SSCC/SFS/BDOC. The central telephone station must have a capability to call any or all telephones located in fixed sentry locations, separately or simultaneously. KUMMSC storage structures and maintenance facilities must be equipped either with a permanently installed receiver or phone jack, and a capability must be afforded for the WSSS/SSCC/SFS/BDOC to call any or all such facilities when occupied.

1.3.5. (FOUO) Two-way radio communication must be provided between all patrols, including foot and mobile, all other site SF vehicles and WSSS/SSCC/SFS/BDOC.

1.3.6. (FOUO) The radio system must have the capability for uninterrupted operation. To provide uninterrupted operation of the base station, the WSSS/SSCC must be provided with an interim power source. The power source must operate the radio communication system when commercial power is lost or until the standby generator can accept the load.

1.3.7. The radio communications system must include repeater equipment when required. Repeaters shall be provided the same level of physical protection, power stability, and security as is the remainder of the communications system.

1.3.8. Radio equipment must use encrypted voice communications.

1.3.9. (FOUO) Alternate radio frequencies or separate means of communication must be available to SF to enable continued communications during jamming or interference conditions. SF must be trained to recognize radio jamming and methods to work through it, including implementing alternate methods of communication while the condition exists.

1.3.10. (FOUO) Prior to the movement of any PL 1 resource, an encrypted communication capability, with multi-frequency capability, must be utilized between the responsible commander (through a communications control center), the individual in charge of the movement, and security personnel.

1.4. Guiding Principles:

1.4.1. (FOUO) The 377 ABW/CC may preempt any base communications facility or network system except the command and control communications equipment in the operational control of defending forces during hostile assault or attack on KAFB. The HQ AFGSC Command Center will be advised of the communications being pre-empted, its need, and estimated duration.

1.4.2. (FOUO) Emergency Forces communications support is provided by 377 MSG/SC. 377 MSG/SC will maintain status of on-base communications and advise the 377 ABW/CC on their status and best usage as necessary.

1.4.3. Additional communications support will be requested only by the 377 ABW/CC, 377 MSG/SC, or those authorized by the 377 ABW/CC.

1.4.4. All requests for communications support from other than normal base support communications service will be forwarded through channels to HQ AFGSC.

1.4.5. OPSEC was considered in the preparation of this annex and is to be considered in all subsequent planning, preparatory, and execution actions pertinent to supporting communications facilities/equipment or their use.

1.4.6. COMSEC procedures and guidance are contained in appendix 1 to this annex. COMSEC will be adhered to at all levels.

1.4.7. Control over crypto-materials will be increased when annex C of this plan is in effect.

2. EXECUTION:

2.1. Concept of Operations.

2.1.1. The use of communications facilities and circuits for up-channel reporting will be in accordance with HQ AFGSC policy.

2.1.2. The use of on-base communications, including intra-base radios, will be kept to a minimum and be consistent with the situation.

2.1.3. Increased protection of communications facilities will be provided by the 377 ABW/CC under advisement of the DFC and the 377 MSG/SC.

2.1.4. (FOUO) In the event jamming of intra-base radios occur, continue to operate, if available, two radios on the same frequency passing dummy messages to prevent knowledge of the jamming success.

2.1.5. (FOUO) Telephone: Should a party call a telephone extension that is used as a primary means of controlling base forces and fail to hang up, the extension will remain busy. If this should happen, see the telephone directory for "Telephone Troubles" and request assistance in clearing the problem. Direct encrypted lines will be used to the maximum extent practical.

2.2. Tasks.

2.2.1. The 377 MSG/CC will ensure:

2.2.1.1. (FOUO) The 377 MSG/SC or designated representative will implement the pyramid alerting system to all division personnel at declaration of contingency operations. The Major Unit Control Center (MUCC) will activate to continuously monitor accountability of squadron personnel during contingency operations. All absenteeism will be reported from the MUCC to the EOC.

2.2.1.2. (FOUO) The 377 MSG/SC will assign a priority maintenance response for SF and related communications systems in accordance with Annex H of this plan. The current maintenance priority lists for SF radio nets are F8 (primary) (SF1) and F9 (alternate) (SF1) for 377 WSSS Net, F1 (primary) (LE1) and F2 (alternate) (LE2) for 377 SFS Net and F10 (PADS Ops) for Convoy Operations. This priority system (1) indicates an immediate, not to exceed 90 minute, response time. Alphabetical shred-out designates order of restoration when facilities of the same priority designates are encountered i.e., A before B. The Kirtland trunked radio system is managed by the Department of Energy (DOE), so overall restoral is dependent upon response from DOE staff and maintenance work centers.

2.2.1.3. (FOUO) The 377 MSG/SC personnel will provide caretaker protection of key communications facilities with increased surveillance using standby personnel in facilities located in close proximity to identified trouble areas.

2.2.1.4. Standby personnel will remain at a location close to trouble areas and as prescribed by 377 MSG/SC/KAFB C-4

2.2.1.5. Increased surveillance will be conducted at all communications facilities.

2.2.1.6. Communications facilities manned 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, will report any unusual occurrences requiring security assistance to the 377 MSG/SC.

2.2.1.7. 377 MSG/SC through the 377 FSS UCC will act as squadron operational reports section, and be responsive to requests for O and M support from the 377 ABW/CC, CSS, EOC, DFC or representatives as required.

2.2.2. The 377 FSS UCC will:

2.2.2.1. (FOUO) Request augmentation of existing radio nets which are frequently compatible with other AFGSC bases through command channels and coordinate with 377 MSG/SC. Ensure the communications network of the 377 ABW command and control system will be used to control deployment of forces on KAFB and transmitting up-channel and receiving down-channel reports to coordinate with 377 MSG/SC.

Appendixs:

Appendix 1 - Secure Communications.

Appendix 2 - Command, Control, Communication, Computer Information (C4I) System Protection.

Appendix 3 - (COMSEC).

APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX H TO KAFB IDP 31-101
SECURE COMMUNICATIONS

REFERENCES: Refer to Basic Plan.

1. PURPOSE: Establish the procedures necessary to attain a secure communications electronics environment in support of installation security or resource protection.

2. GENERAL: Refer to Basic Plan.

3. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS: See Basic Plan.

4. POSITIVE ACTION:

4.1. Unit commanders will involve unit COMSEC, OPSEC officers and security managers to ensure that all affected personnel are briefed on the following subject matter to ensure compliance.

4.2. Unsecured Telephone and Radio Communications:

4.2.1. Maintain strict communications discipline.

4.2.2. Restrict number and length of telephone calls and radio transmissions.

4.2.3. Advise personnel of open circuit or un-cradled phones to prevent background conversations over non-secure paths.

4.3. Secure Communications Links:

4.3.1. Must be used to pass CIs and sensitive, but unclassified information.

4.3.2. Must be used to pass actual or suspected COMSEC violations.

4.3.3. Physical security is required and must be provided for crypto equipment and materials. In some cases, this may require personnel to be armed for COMSEC material movements.

APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX H TO KAFB IDP 31-101
C4 INFORMATION SYSTEM PROTECTION

REFERENCES: Refer to Basic Plan.

1. SITUATION:

1.1. General: Information protection encompasses all measures taken to protect friendly information, particularly information supporting operational decisions and employment of weapons.

1.2. Enemy: Refer to Basic Plan.

1.3. Friendly: Refer to Basic Plan.

1.4. Assumptions: Refer to Basic Plan.

1.5. Planning Factors: Identification of critical information and all systems, networks, and transmission infrastructure necessary to support information operations is required to effectively plan Cybersecurity measures.

2. MISSION: Execute measures to protect against an adversary's attempt to deny, exploit, corrupt, or destroy friendly information.

3. EXECUTION:

3.1. Concept of Operations.

3.1.1. The 377 MSG/SC, AFNET and DISA will employ all automated tools available to counter all types of lethal and nonlethal attacks on friendly information and the C4I systems transferring or processing friendly information.

3.1.2. Commanders will take actions necessary to protect friendly C4I information.

3.1.3. Particular attention will be given at all command levels to ensure the physical security and survivability of friendly Command and Control (C2) capabilities.

3.2. Tasks.

3.2.1. (FOUO) Unit commanders may involve unit representatives and the Wing Information Assurance Office to brief all unit personnel regarding the following subjects to ensure compliance. Affected unit personnel will use the procedures below as a guideline for full compliance. Questionable concerns or exceptions must be approved by the commander. Additional specific measures will be taken as indicated below.

3.2.2. All Functional Areas will:

- 3.2.2.1. Based on situation, identify and prioritize information and associated C4I systems essential to the successful mission accomplishment.
- 3.2.2.2. (FOUO) Long Haul Transmission System (e.g., microwave, satellite dishes, etc.). DISA will be contacted for action, but tech control will assist.
- 3.2.2.3. Protect base infrastructure to include order of importance (e.g., routers, hubs, etc.).
- 3.2.2.4. (FOUO) SIPRNET, NIPRNET, DMS, and base phone systems.
- 3.2.2.5. (FOUO) Gunter controlled system (e.g., Logmod.)
- 3.2.2.6. Determine level of protection and system performance required to ensure successful mission accomplishment.
- 3.2.2.7. (FOUO) PDS, BDC.
- 3.2.2.8. (FOUO) Exchange servers, needed for DMS.
- 3.2.2.9. (FOUO) Firewalls.
- 3.2.2.10. (FOUO) Cache Flow.
- 3.2.2.11. Plan for and be prepared to execute appropriate TO 00-33A-1109-WA-1 actions and Wing Cybersecurity incident procedures.
- 3.2.2.12. Ensure virus protection software is loaded on all AISs, either stand alone or networked.
- 3.2.2.13. Report incidents IAWTO 00-33A-1109-WA-1, Vulnerability and Incident Reporting.
- 3.2.2.14. Be prepared to recover and execute alternatives if Cybersecurity measures fail.
- 3.2.2.15. Integration: This appendix is effective for planning upon receipt.

APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX H TO KAFB IDP 31-101
COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY

REFERENCES: Refer to Basic Plan

1. GENERAL: This appendix is prepared on the basis of known limitations of USAF communications capabilities and assumptions relative to those systems. It is imperative that appropriate COMSEC and transmission security (TRANSEC) procedures are strictly observed. This will prevent unauthorized persons from assessing the unit's capabilities and denying them information that would indicate military or civilian community status.
2. GUIDING PRINCIPLES:
 - 2.1. All personnel must utilize security measures to ensure protection of information pertaining to this plan during all phases of planning, coordination and execution. Maximizing the denial of information, even though unclassified, to unauthorized persons will contribute to the successful execution of the plan without external interference.
 - 2.2. Secure circuits (voice and record) will be used whenever available. Unsecured circuits will only be used if secured circuits are unavailable.
 - 2.3. Messages, other than alerting messages, will be prepared in accordance with AFI 33-113, Managing Air Force Messaging Center, and safeguarded in accordance with AFI 31-101 and DOD 5210.41M.
 - 2.4. Cryptographic material will be safeguarded IAW AFKAGs 1, 3 and the AFSSI 4100 series.
 - 2.5. During all subsequent planning, annex OPRs must make sure that all items pertinent to this plan requiring COMSEC protection are identified to their COMSEC officers for inclusion in the COMSEC annex of this plan.

ANNEX I TO KAFB IDP 31-101
SERVICE AND SUPPORT

REFERENCES: Refer to the Basic Plan.

1. GENERAL:

1.1. Purpose: This annex provides service and support of ID Forces for both normal operations and when in FPCONs or contingency operations.

1.2. Concept: Supporting activities addressed in this annex will provide for required services, supplies, equipment, and personnel to support SF as indicated for both normal operations and when notified of FPCONs or contingency operations.

2. EXECUTION: Concept of Operations. The following organizations are responsible for furnishing required equipment, supplies and services in support of contingency operations on KAFB.

APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX I TO KAFB IDP 31-101
LOGISTICS

REFERENCES: Refer to the Basic Plan.

1. GENERAL:

1.1. Purpose: This annex provides for logistics support of SF for both normal operations and when in FPCONs or contingency operations.

1.2. Concept: Supporting activities addressed in this annex will provide for required supplies/equipment and personnel to support SF as indicated for both normal operations and when notified of FPCONs or contingency operations.

2. EXECUTION:

2.1. Concept of Operations. The following organizations are responsible for furnishing required equipment, supplies and services in support of contingency operations on KAFB.

2.2. Tasks.

2.2.1. The 377 ABW/CC will:

2.2.1.1. Through the 377 ABW/XP, request the review of contingency plans IAW OPR policies.

2.2.1.2. Through the EOC, when activated, coordinate and resolve undetermined or unforeseen logistical issues.

2.2.2. The 377 MSG/CC will:

2.2.2.1. Through 377 LRS, provide vehicles to the 377 SFG IAW the 377 LRS Minimum Essential Vehicle/Priority Recall Listing.

2.2.2.2. (FOUO) Provide maintenance to vehicles assigned to the 377 SFG. Armored HMMWVs used in support of PL 1 security operations will have the highest priority. Priority (Red) maintenance will be provided during contingency operations. Replacement of four-wheel drive vehicles will be IAW the 377 LRS Minimum Essential Vehicle/Priority Recall Listing.

2.2.2.3. Provide replacement vehicles to 377 SFG on a one-for-one basis when they are below minimum-essential levels.

2.2.2.4. (FOUO) Provide 377 SFG with replacement vehicles for convoy operations when they are below minimum essential levels.

2.2.2.5. Through the 377 FSS, coordinate/provide food service support to posted/deployed Security Forces.

2.2.2.6. Through the 377 MSG/SC, provide top priority maintenance for all communications equipment for the SFG.

2.2.2.7. Through the 377 MSG/SC, develop and prioritize a coordinated contingency maintenance and acquisition support plan with base agencies.

2.2.3. The 377 MXG/CC through the 377 MXS/CC will:

2.2.3.1. Provide sufficient quantities of base defense ammunition for FPCON and contingency actions based on available stockpiles.

2.2.3.2. Provide 898 MUNS/CTS technicians to repair and maintain the KUMMSC security system as required.

2.2.4. The 377 MDG/CC will provide medical or dental services to posted or deployed SF as required.

2.2.5. The 58 SOW/CC will:

2.2.5.1. When available, provide helicopter support for support of PL 1 resources.

2.2.5.2. (DCNI) Through AGE, provide sufficient portable light units, not to exceed 10 total units, for pad security and flightline loading operations when requested by WSSS/SSCC and not exceed 14 light units for installation entry/checkpoint operations during contingencies when requested by SFS/BDOC. In all cases, light units will be available at the TA ready line for use. If positioning is required, the 58 SOW will position the units as needed. In the event of an increase in FPCON during daylight hours, light units will be positioned NLT 1 hour prior to sunset.

2.2.5.3. (DCNI) Through AGE, provide sufficient portable light units, not to exceed 10 total units for manned flightline ECPs and security operations during contingencies on the 58 SOW and 377 ABW TA aircraft parking ramps during loading operations when requested by WSSS/SSCC. Add additional light units, not to exceed 4 total units, for pad entry control/checkpoint and security operations during nuclear missions. In all cases, light units will be available at the TA ready line for use. If positioning is required, the 58 SOW will position the units as needed. In the event of an increase in FPCON during daylight hours, light units will be positioned NLT 1 hour prior to sunset.

2.2.5.4. Ensure the 58 MXS/MXMG provides light units, not to exceed 10 total units, during flightline or contingency operations on the 58 SOW and 377 TA aircraft parking ramps when requested by the 377 SFG. **NOTE:** The above tasking's are not all-inclusive, and depending on the situation, evaluation to meet needs must be made on the spot.

APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX I TO KAFB IDP 31-101
PERSONNEL SERVICES

REFERENCES: Refer to Basic Plan.

1. GENERAL:

1.1. Purpose: This annex establishes policy guidance and instructions for the accomplishment of personnel actions required to support the operational mission outlined in the basic plan.

1.2. Assumptions: Refer to Basic Plan.

2. EXECUTION:

2.1. General Guidance.

2.1.1. Reporting Procedures: The TDY levy taskings will be received via Deliberate and Crisis Action Planning Segments (DCAPES) containing detailed levy data necessary for the required PERSDEP [(RCS: HAF/FPM9AR) 7150] reporting. The 377 FSS/FSOXI will acknowledge receipt of levy tasking's within four hours after their arrival. Use priority message to HQ AFGSC/A1R.

2.2. Concept of Operations: The 377 FSS/CC will ensure the following requirements are prepared for implementation:

2.2.1. Manpower and Personnel Reporting Procedures.

2.2.2. Filler Replacement Requests.

2.2.3. Rotation policies: TDY for deploying personnel will be for an initial period of 30 days. Depending on the situation, incremental extensions of TDY may be required. Make sure the individuals are not placed in TDY status for more than 179 days.

2.2.4. Use of Personnel with Critical Skills and Specialties.

2.2.5. Non-combatant Evacuation Order (NEO). Not Used.

2.2.6. US Citizen Civilian Personnel. Not Used.

2.2.7. Non-US Citizen Labor. Not Used.

2.2.8. Enemy Prisoners of War, Civilian Internees and Other Detained Persons. Not Used.

2.2.9. Formerly Captured, Missing and Detained US Military Personnel. Not Used.

- 2.2.10. Family Support Services. See KAFB Plan 36-1, Family Readiness.
- 2.2.11. Casualty Reports. Casualty reports will be submitted IAW AFI 36-3002, Casualty services.
- 2.2.12. Personnel Processing Agency. Not Used.
- 2.2.13. Decorations and Awards. Procedures listed in AFI 36-2803, The Air Force Awards and Decorations Program are adhered to.
- 2.2.14. Hostile Fire Pay. DOD Pay and Allowance Manual will be utilized.
- 2.2.15. Travel Procedures. See KAFB Installation Deployment Plan.
- 2.2.16. Military Law, Discipline, and Order. See appendix 2 to annex E.
- 2.2.17. Medical Returnees to Duty. Not Used.
- 2.2.18. Spot or Field Promotions. Not Used.
- 2.2.19. Single and Dual Military Service Parents. See KAFB Plan 36-1.
- 2.2.20. Leave Accumulation. AFI 36-3003, Military Leave Program will be adhered to.
- 2.2.21. War Zone Benefits. DOD Pay and Allowance Manual will be utilized.

APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX I TO KAFB IDP 31-101
COMPTROLLER

REFERENCES: Refer to Basic Plan.

1. PURPOSE: This annex provides guidance for comptroller support with the implementation of this plan.

2. SPECIFIC GUIDANCE:

2.1. Comptroller.

2.1.1. Ensure a record is maintained of military and civilian comptroller personnel absent from duty.

2.1.2. Designate sufficient personnel to provide caretaker type security of the accounting and finance facility. Personnel designated will be on alert for suspicious personnel or activities and make prompt reports to SFS/BDOC.

2.2. Financial Services.

2.2.1. AFGSC personnel supporting this plan will receive per diem, if any is due, in accordance with the Joint Federal Travel Regulation/Joint Travel Regulation. Conditions existing at the TDY location will govern/decide the entitlement to per diem. Lodging and dining provided by contractors are considered to be government provided for the purpose of determining per diem entitlement.

2.2.2. Prior to departure from home station, personnel going TDY under this plan will endeavor to make necessary financial arrangements to preclude the requirement of partial/casual payments at TDY points.

2.3. Financial Analysis.

2.3.1. Normal accounting procedures will be followed. Subsidiary records will be maintained to identify funds used and expenses incurred by appropriated funds organizations in support of this operation. Document processing, records maintenance, and related reporting will continue IAW existing directives. Organizations providing reimbursable support to other agencies will submit their bills to 377 CPTS/FMAS. Complete documentation will be required to substantiate the billings.

2.3.2. Funds currently available to this command will be utilized in order to support these operations. If a lack of funding becomes imminent, the budget officer will take action through channels until relief is obtained.

2.3.2.1. (FOUO) The budget office will establish a local Emergency and Special Program (ESP) code to identify the support costs associated with the operation. The Comptroller or designee will ensure personnel involved with the operation are made aware of the assigned ESP code and are briefed to include the ESP code on all financial documents pertaining to the operation.

2.3.2.2. (FOUO) The budget office will provide units a report format to identify expenses by program element code (PEC) and element of expense/investment code (EEIC) with a narrative explanation for each EEIC used. Units are responsible to ensure additional costs on existing contracts are identified and included in the report. In addition to the report, a copy of all expenditures will be submitted to the budget office.

2.3.2.3. (FOUO) Units will use operating funds for all expenses and the budget office will be responsible for reporting the costs to higher headquarters. If supplemental funding is released, the budget office will issue funding to units as identified in the submitted report.

2.3.3.4. Management Analysis: Any report associated with this operation not specifically identified by a reports control symbol (RCS) is exempt from assignment of an RCS.

APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX I TO KAFB IDP 31-101
LEGAL / STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE (SJA)

REFERENCES: Refer to Basic Plan.

1. GENERAL: Within the US, its territories, and its possessions, DOD installation military commanders or civilian managers have full authority to initially respond to criminal or terrorist incidents on DOD installations or within DOD facilities to protect personnel and property from immediate threat of injury. Installation commanders and managers must notify appropriate federal or state civilian law enforcement authorities as soon as possible. Primary responsibility for managing certain significant crimes and conducting criminal investigations on US government reservations may rest with the appropriate DoJ investigative agency supported as necessary, by other state, federal, and DOD investigative agencies. The JA will furnish all possible legal advice, assistance and services to the wing command element and subordinate commands for all issues involving installation security and police services.

2. MISSION: To provide guidance on legal issues regarding installation security.

3. EXECUTION:

3.1. Concept of Operations.

3.1.1. Incidents involving attacks on DOD personnel, facilities, or assets are invariably criminal acts. Such incidents trigger a need to establish legal responsibility and authority for three separate but related activities:

3.1.1.1. Immediate response, containment, and resolution of an incident.

3.1.1.2. Investigation of an incident for purposes of prosecuting alleged perpetrators.

3.1.1.3. Prosecution of the alleged perpetrators.

3.1.2. (FOUO) The DOD may provide technical assistance to the FBI or other DoJ agencies in response to civil disturbances or terrorist incidents occurring outside DOD installations as permitted by law and implementing regulations. These regulations include DODD 3025.18, Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DISA); DODD 5525.5, DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials; and DODI 5525.7, Implementation of the MOU Between the Department of Justice relating to Investigation and Prosecution of Certain Crimes.

3.1.3. (FOUO) The installation commander may request assistance from the FBI in resolving an incident in those circumstances in which the FBI has superior tactical assets at its disposal. Such assets include regional Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) units or the Hostage Rescue Team (HRT). In the event that FBI assistance is requested and provided, the installation commander should transfer TACON to the FBI special agent in charge for the purpose of concluding the incident. The installation commander should assume TACON immediately after the conclusion of the FBI tactical action.

3.1.4. (FOUO) Attacks on DOD personnel or assets within the US, its territories, and its possessions outside DOD installations are to be contained and resolved by local law enforcement with the assistance of the FBI in most circumstances. Exceptions to this rule may occur when incidents involve DOD units moving in convoy from one DOD installation to another.

3.1.5. (FOUO) Installation specific MOA/MOUs and other arrangements improve the resources and/or forces available to support any KAFB IDP. These MOA/MOUs may include, but are not limited to, host nation and US military SF, fire, emergency services, medical, federal, state, and local agencies, special operations forces, engineers, detection (CBRN), decontamination or smoke units, and EOD.

3.2. (FOUO) 377 ABW/JA is the OPR for defining, maintaining, and coordinating continuity, changes and other military jurisdiction issues. Specifically, 377 SFG maintains jurisdiction over exclusive DOD federal jurisdiction areas; however, there are some sections of KAFB that are proprietary state jurisdiction and some areas that are federal jurisdiction but under jurisdiction of the DOE. However, regarding DOD assets/personnel, USAF maintains responsibility for response/prosecution of all areas designated as exclusive federal jurisdiction.

3.3. (DCNI) KUMMSC and both the primary and alternate routes for PL 1 operations fall under DOD exclusive federal jurisdiction with the exception of a section of Pennsylvania Road, which crosses through a corner of proprietary state jurisdiction within a DoE boundary. The routes travel on Muns Haul Road, Hot Cargo Pad, alternate AC parking location, Power Line Road, and a portion of Pennsylvania Road. Building 333, Base Ops, delineates jurisdictional boundaries between federal and local police jurisdiction. Anything west of Base Ops is proprietary state jurisdiction and protected by Sunport Albuquerque Police. 377 SFG responds to accidents/incidents in proprietary jurisdictional areas; however, local authorities are ultimately responsible for disposition of the perpetrator. A pictorial representation of all jurisdictional areas on KAFB is maintained with 377 ABW/JA, 377 SFS/S5P and 377 SFS/Police Services.

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ANNEX J TO KAFB IDP 31-101
CBRNE PREPAREDNESS

REFERENCES: Refer to the 377 ABW CBRN PLAN. IEMP 10-2

ANNEX K TO KAFB IDP 31-101
SF LAW AND ORDER RESPONSIBILITIES

REFERENCES: Refer to Basic Plan.

1. GENERAL: Air Force power projection depends on secure home station installations. Law Enforcement Operations are fundamental to installation security and ID. Robust Law Enforcement Operations foster a culture of safety and accountability that underpins good order and military discipline. Safe, crime-free neighborhoods allow installation housing residents to focus on mission performance, particularly while deployed.
2. MISSION: Law Enforcement Operations are a core competency of the 377 SFS. These operations include active and passive defense measures, employed across the legally-defined boundary of KAFB, to mitigate potential risks and defeat adversary threats to promote public order and efficient military operations.
3. EXECUTION: Concept of Operations for 377 SFS Law Enforcement Operations directly contribute to KAFB's ID, but also encompass many other special disciplines. These include crime prevention, initial criminal investigations, corrections, traffic enforcement, access control and Military Working Dogs (MWDs).

Appendixs:

Appendix 1 - Police Operations

Appendix 2 - Installation Access Control

Appendix 3 - RPP (Controlled Areas and IDS Alarm Systems)

APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX K TO KAFB IDP 31-101
POLICE OPERATIONS

REFERENCES: Refer to Basic Plan.

1. SITUATION: The threat of criminal activity is low. Criminal incidents are at a normal level and the major threat is internal.

2. MISSION: Provide protection for DOD/DoE personnel and resources during normal day-to-day and contingency operations.

3. EXECUTION:

3.1. Concept of Operations: USAF/DOD resources and personnel will be provided protection by a combination of physical security aids, procedures, and training. The level of protection will be adequate for a low-level threat.

3.2. Tasks.

3.2.1. The DFC will:

3.2.1.1. Ensure adequate SF are available to support this annex.

3.2.2. Unit commanders and staff agency chiefs will ensure resources under their control are provided adequate protection on a day-to-day basis.

3.2.3. Unit commanders and staff agency chiefs who have controlled areas, funds activities, arms and/or ammunition storage areas, sensitive resources, mission essential resources or equipment, and similar sensitive or high risk theft items bare a particular responsibility under this annex. These personnel must ensure the administrative and compliance aspects of AFI 31-101 and DOD 5100.76M are met.

3.2.4. The 377 LRS will furnish vehicles for SF as required, based on specific needs.

3.2.5. (FOUO) AFOSI Detachment 814 will keep SF advised of current intelligence information affecting operations.

4. COMMAND AND CONTROL:

4.1. (FOUO) Base Defense Operations Center (BDOC): SFS/BDOC is the initial POC for reporting all suspected/actual robberies, bomb threat situations, and suspected infiltration of the installation, controlled areas, or weapons/ammunition and explosives facilities. Timely reporting and alerting of incidents involving sensitive PL and non-PL resources is essential to the implementation of this annex. SFS/BDOC, (building 20220) will control initial execution of action to neutralize such incidents. The alternate control center will be WSSS/SSCC until the alternate SFS/BDOC (building 20452) can be activated.

4.2. (FOUO) Command Relationships: Whenever SF are alerted and required to respond, they will function under the control of the DFC or designated IC. For command functions during FPCONs, the 377 ABW/CC will provide direction to commanders and functional managers as needed. The designated IC will dictate command relationships during contingency actions. Civil authorities will remain under the command and control of their respective agencies.

4.3. (FOUO) Communications: During contingencies, telephone and non-tactical radio nets are primary means of communication. COMSEC must be emphasized to all base radio net users to prevent the disclosure of sensitive information by anyone monitoring the net.

4.4. (FOUO) Jurisdiction: KAFB has areas of proprietary and exclusive jurisdiction that might complicate SF response. During contingencies, SF in conjunction with the controlling agency for that jurisdiction, will respond and safeguard personnel and DOD resources.

4.5. Succession of Command.

4.5.1. Command of the 377 ABW will be exercised in the order listed below:

4.5.1.1. 377 ABW/CC.

4.5.1.2. 377 ABW/CV.

4.5.1.3. Senior Ranking Group Commander (Line Officer).

4.5.2. Command and control of the 377th SFG will be exercised in the order listed below:

4.5.2.1. DFC.

4.5.2.2. 377 SFS/CC.

4.5.2.3. 377 SFS/S3O.

4.5.2.4. Senior Ranking Senior NCO (E-8/E-9).

4.5.2.5. Senior Ranking Flight Chief.

4.5.2.6. Senior Patrolman.

TAB A TO APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX K TO KAFB IDP 31-101
LAW ENFORCEMENT POST AND PATROL COVERAGE REQUIREMENTS

REFERENCES: Refer to Basic Plan.

1. **OBJECTIVE:** To provide adequate protection of resources through the use of motorized patrol coverage and posted sentries.
2. **MISSION:** The mission of SF law enforcement patrols is to protect life and personal/government property, control the flow of vehicular traffic, prevent and/or investigate motor vehicle accidents, respond to on-base emergency situations, enforce laws, regulations, and safeguard government resources.
3. **SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS:**
 - 3.1. The DFC, through the 377 SFS/CC will:
 - 3.1.1. (FOUO) Ensure detailed SF procedures are formulated to effect prompt and efficient SF support and response to bomb threat, anti-robbery, resource protection, and civil disturbances.
 - 3.1.2. (FOUO) Ensure exercises to evaluate the SF response to emergencies and support of DOD resources located on KAFB are periodically conducted.
 - 3.1.3. (FOUO) Ensure checklists are formulated and placed at SFS/BDOC with pertinent information available to make immediate notifications and take follow-up actions in the event any emergency situation described in this plan occurs.
 - 3.1.4. (FOUO) 377 SFS Posts and Patrols: KAFB is divided into specific patrol zones. These patrol zones are established for normal operation and may be changed or altered by the on-duty flight chief as necessary to ensure overall mission accomplishment. When personnel shortages exist, the flight chief will alter patrol coverage to ensure constant patrol area coverage. A list of patrol zones is located in Enclosure 1 to Tab A to Appendix 1 to Annex K. A priority posting chart will be used for posting based on personnel availability and the protection level of the resource. Refer to Appendix 2 to Annex C Enclosure 1 and 2 for listing of post priority.
 - 3.1.5. (FOUO) 377 SFS Defense Biometric Identification System (DBIDS) Usage: DBIDS will be used by all installation entry control points, except during peak traffic times. Peak traffic times are defined as 0600-0900 and 1130-1330 at all open installation access control points. Even during these times DBIDS may be used at the installation access controllers' discretion if traffic permits. Permission to waive this requirement must be granted by the flight chief or higher.

ENCLOSURE 1 TO TAB A TO APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX K TO KAFB IDP 31-101
LE OPERATIONS PATROL ZONES (ID BASE BOUNDARY SECTORS)

REFERENCES: Refer to Basic Plan.

1. PURPOSE: To establish installation patrol sectors
2. DESCRIPTION: The primary functions of installation SF patrols are to deter adversaries and serve as a means of detection against threats to mission support assets. Furthermore, they respond to threats against PL 1-4 resources when dispatched. KAFB is divided into specific patrol zones to ensure adequate response to PL resources. Priority Posting charts will be used for posting during normal and advance readiness operations based on personnel availability. See Appendix 2 to Annex C Enclosure 1 and 2 for listing of post priority.
3. EXECUTION: The ID Patrol Zones are listed below in order of priority:
 - 3.1. South side: The south side zone encompasses the entire area south of Hardin Blvd to runway 08/26, and from South Valley gate east to the Lovelace Research Institute. During normal operations, Police 4 will be the primary unit to serve this sector. Police 8 and Police 9 will serve this sector during increased FPCONs.
 - 3.2. West side: The west side zone encompasses the entire area north of runway 08/27 eastward to the intersection of Randolph Ave and Hardin Blvd area, including Truman, Carlisle, Kirtland, and Maxwell gates. Police 2 and Police 5 serve this sector during increased FPCONs.
 - 3.3. East side: The east side zone encompasses the entire area north of Hardin Blvd and west to Randolph Ave, including Gibson, Wyoming, and Eubank gates. During normal operations, Police 3 will be the primary unit to serve this sector. Police 6 and Police 7 will serve this sector during increased FPCONs.

TAB B TO APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX K TO KAFB IDP 31-101
RESPONSE TO EMERGENCY SITUATIONS

REFERENCES: Refer to Basic Plan.

1. **OBJECTIVE:** The conditions surrounding an emergency response situation are so variable it is impractical to establish a specific procedure to be applied in all instances. This plan establishes minimum precautions and actions wing agencies, in conjunction with SF, will initiate should there be hostilities against or adjacent to wing resources. Commanders will implement the steps in the following appendices and develop supporting checklists. All commanders must also establish protective procedures for personnel and resources under their command and control.

2. **MISSION:** The appendices are designed to provide a flexible response and to counter possible, probable, or known hostile activities.

3. **EXECUTION:**

3.1. The 377 ABW/CC will:

3.1.1. (FOUO) Assemble the CAT and/or EOC as deemed necessary.

3.1.2. (FOUO) Direct implementation of the appropriate FPCON in support of the situation.

3.2. The KCP will:

3.2.1. (FOUO) Establish procedures to alert the base populace to the situation.

3.2.2. (FOUO) Initiate the assembly of the CAT/EOC upon direction of the 377 ABW/CC.

3.3. The DFC will:

3.3.1. (FOUO) The FES Fire Chief or designated Senior Fire Official (SFO) will be the IC. If SF has established Incident Command, upon SFO arrival, the SF IC will brief and then transfer command to the SFO (face-to-face or by LMR). The SFO will assume IC and assign SF to the Operations General Staff position to provide tactical operations to support the IC. Assume duties as IC during hostile situations.

3.3.2. (FOUO) Direct backup forces recall, as necessary.

3.3.3. (FOUO) Marshal the number of ID forces adequate for the situation and direct increased patrol coverage and more stringent entry control and detection capabilities.

3.3.4. (FOUO) Task IC base personnel to remain on scene as part of the cordon posting until relieved by recalled ID force personnel.

3.3.5. (FOUO) Make notifications IAW checklists and notification matrices maintained at SFS/BDOC.

3.3.6. (FOUO) Ensure expedited emergency entry for off-base fire, medical (AAS) or law enforcement personnel. If ECPs are congested, an ID patrol may meet personnel at the gate of entry and escort to the scene.

3.4. All Personnel will:

3.4.1. (FOUO) Implement notification procedures to alert their personnel.

3.4.2. (FOUO) Implement required FPCON actions.

TAB C TO APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX K TO KAFB IDP 31-101
GATE CLOSURE POLICY DURING ALARM ACTIVATIONS

REFERENCES: Refer to Basic Plan.

1. (FOUO) **SITUATION:** In the past, policy was to close all installation entry control points during alarm activations until the validity of the alarm was determined. This practice often tied up traffic entering and exiting the base, causing confusion and in some instances, traffic accidents. The small number of actual robberies or duress situations on KAFB can no longer be used as justification for closing Installation Access Control Points (IACP) automatically during an alarm activation. It is mandatory to close IACPs when alarms from AA&E facilities located on the installation are received. A stop, check and pass procedure should be implemented to identify all known or suspected individual(s), and may also be used to alleviate traffic congestion onto the installation.

2. **MISSION:** To prevent loss of resources and escape of perpetrators with minimum risk to personnel and disruption of installation operations.

3. **CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS:** In the event of an unannounced alarm activation or similar situation, the following procedures will be initiated at all IACPs.

3.1. (FOUO) Robbery Actions: For alarms other than those affecting AA&E facilities, the flight chief will consider the location of the alarm, amount of time from notification to determining a robbery/event occurred, and other factors when making the decision whether or not to direct IECP closure.

3.1.1. (FOUO) When SFS/BDOC receives information that an actual robbery or attempted robbery occurred at the affected non-AA&E facility, IACP sentries will secure their gates. IECPs will be secured automatically for any AA&E facility upon receiving an alarm.

3.1.2. (FOUO) SFS/BDOC will notify WSSS/SSCC of all IACP closures: WSSS/SSCC controllers will verify with Munitions Squadron (MUNS) control that the closure does not affect any inbound or outbound DoE Safeguards Transport (SGT) convoys.

3.1.3. (FOUO) When directed by the flight chief (through SFS/BDOC) to secure the IACPs, the sentries will use the physical barriers to block both the inbound and outbound traffic lanes.

3.1.4. (FOUO) Upon receipt of a vehicle or personal description of the suspects, stop, check and pass procedures will be initiated in outbound lanes if manning permits effective implementation. The inbound traffic will be allowed to proceed provided sufficient vehicles remain in the lane to prevent the suspect from departing the base.

3.2. (FOUO) Termination of Robbery Actions: When directed by the flight chief or higher authority, (through SFS/BDOC) IECP closure procedures will be terminated unless an AA&E facility is involved. 377 SFS/S3O or higher authority is required to terminate IACP closure procedures for AA&E facility robberies.

TAB D TO APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX K TO KAFB IDP 31-101
RESPONSE TO ARMED ROBBERY / ALARM SITUATIONS

REFERENCES: Refer to Basic Plan.

1. OBJECTIVE: To provide guidance to owner/user personnel and SF responding to attempted.
2. PURPOSE: This section applies to agencies handling or storing funds, arms, ammunition, explosives, or classified materials requiring alarms and any other facility which is equipped with an alarm. Additionally, individuals in their quarters, POV, or on foot who observe a robbery must report the incident to 377 SFS/BDOC at 846-7913, 1300 Texas Avenue, Building 20220.
3. CONSIDERATIONS:
 - 3.1. Funds Activities: The base has numerous funds activities. Considering the stored dollar levels and close proximity to the base perimeter of some of these facilities, a robbery could be both attempted and successfully executed.
 - 3.2. Personal Safety: Personal safety is paramount.
 - 3.3. Arming and UOF: Arming and UOF by responding SF patrols will be according to AFI 31-117.
4. SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS: All personnel involved in attempted or actual robberies will adhere to the following procedures.
 - 4.1. (FOUO) All custodians will use the AF Form 439, Robbery Checklist, when recording and reporting robbery activities. The form will be posted conspicuously and be readily available. Control of a robbery situation requires participation from all personnel within a facility.
 - 4.2. (FOUO) Stay calm and follow all directions. Avoid any life endangering actions.
 - 4.3. (FOUO) Control your actions carefully. Do not make any sudden noise or movements that could be misinterpreted by the suspect as hostile or threatening.
 - 4.4. (FOUO) Covertly activate a duress alarm, if possible, or activate the alarm upon suspect's departure
 - 4.5. (FOUO) Do not make any noticeable movements to activate the duress alarm if the suspect is present.
 - 4.6. (FOUO) Agencies with/without alarms will contact 377 SFS/BDOC at 911, or 853-9111 if off-base or using a cell phone. Stay on the phone with 377 SFS/BDOC and follow instructions.

4.7. (FOUO) If possible, make mental notes of the suspect's appearance or peculiarities to aid identification. Observe the suspect's physical features, voice and accent, mannerisms, dress, weapon, and any other traits that can be used for identification.

4.8. (FOUO) If a weapon is used, note its description.

4.9. (FOUO) Give only what is demanded and include marked money, if possible.

4.10. (FOUO) Notify co-workers and key supervisors as soon as safely possible. A code word system is good to use so customers or bystanders will not be alarmed.

4.11. (FOUO) Secure the facility by locking all doors and not allowing anyone to enter the facility. Make every effort to keep witnesses inside and separated within the facility.

4.12. (FOUO) After the suspect departs, notify 377 SFS/BDOC and annotate the description on the AF Form 439.

4.13. (FOUO) If possible, note the suspect's mode and direction of departure. Do not follow the suspect as it will put you in harm's way.

4.14. (FOUO) Protect the crime scene. Ensure anything that may have been touched by the suspect is not touched by others. In addition, ensure the suspect's departure path is not used by anyone.

4.15. (FOUO) Identify and separate all witnesses, if possible. Do not compare notes with witnesses.

4.16. (FOUO) Designate an employee to meet SF outside of the facility when told to do so by the BDOC Controller/BDOC Alarm Monitor.

4.17. (FOUO) Obey all instructions of investigating officials.

5. EXECUTION:

5.1. SF will:

5.1.1. (FOUO) Use the appropriate checklists and OIs when notified of a robbery.

5.1.2. (FOUO) Close all base IACPs at the direction of the IC or immediately if an AA&E facility is involved.

5.1.2.1 (FOUO) SFS/BDOC will notify WSSS/SSCC of any IACP closures.
Closures may affect inbound or outbound DoE SGT Convoys.

5.1.3. (FOUO) Dispatch available units to establish 360-degree surveillance of the facility if the perpetrator is still not apprehended.

5.1.4. (FOUO) Use cover and concealment so as not to force a hostage/barricaded suspect situation, should a hostage situation occur.

5.1.5. (FOUO) In cases where the suspect(s) have departed, establish and secure the crime scene with the minimum number of personnel necessary.

5.1.6. (FOUO) The SFS/BDOC Controller will obtain the description of the perpetrator(s) recorded on the AF Form 439 and disseminate it to all responding patrols.

5.1.7. (FOUO) Once a description of the perpetrator(s) has been obtained, SF will implement stop, check and pass procedures at all applicable IACPs.

5.1.8. (FOUO) The DFC, 377 SFS/CC, 377 SFS/Operations Officer/Superintendent, NCOIC, LE Operations, or flight chief will determine if recall of off-duty personnel is required.

5.1.9. (FOUO) Provide off-base police agencies (APD and FBI) all available information, and request their assistance, if necessary.

6. ALARM ACTIVATIONS:

6.1. SF will respond to alarm activations IAW appropriate Quick Reaction Checklists and time requirements within 9.3.1. - 9.3.5. in Appendix 3 to Annex K of this IDP.

6.2. Classification of alarm activation and required paperwork.

6.3. (FOUO) Alarm Custodian Responsibilities: Alarm custodians or representatives will be notified to respond immediately to a designated location by SFS/BDOC. Custodians will follow the instructions of the IC and stay on scene if alarm cannot be fixed.

6.3.1. (FOUO) Personnel who inadvertently activate alarms will notify SFS/BDOC immediately, identify themselves and their facility, and follow the SFS/BDOC Controller's/Alarm Monitor's instructions.

TAB E TO APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX K TO KAFB IDP 31-101
BOMB THREATS

REFERENCES: Refer to Basic Plan.

1. **PURPOSE:** To establish effective procedures on receipt, reporting, and response to bomb threats. The conditions surrounding a bomb threat incident are so variable it is impractical to establish a specific procedure to apply to all instances.

2. **GENERAL:** The presence of a bomb may be factual or fictitious. The warning may encompass a single structure, area, or many places simultaneously. The following key points were determined by the FBI to be likely indicators of a serious or actual bomb threat.

2.1. (FOUO) The caller may give a short time limit. In the majority of cases, when a threat is received, the caller (or group) placed the device to draw attention to a cause or grievance. Public attention is desired; however, they do not want to cause an excessive amount of public outrage. This allows evacuation of the building so that no one will be hurt, but does not always leave sufficient time to locate and deactivate the explosive device.

2.2. (FOUO) The caller may identify the group or person responsible. Since bomb threats are most often used as a way of focusing public attention to a cause or grievance, identifying the person or group is a must for the caller. In addition, since the caller is out for public attention, he or she may be willing to talk about the device and the ideology behind his/her group.

2.3. The caller may give a specific reason for each specific act. In order to avoid the public impression that the person/group is causing or trying to cause damage purely for the sake of doing so, the person/group will often try to justify the acts by stating it is in retaliation for a recent event.

2.4. (FOUO) The caller may state the device has been placed in a logical location. This typically means a location where an explosive device would cause a large amount of damage, such as a fuel dump, a power station or other public area. Public areas are an ideal target because they are easier to enter and plant a device, and because of the high potential for injuries and deaths to innocent persons. A logical location could also be at the headquarters of a group or organization which the caller has a grievance.

3. **CONSIDERATIONS:**

3.1. Bomb Threats: Bomb threats may be received anonymously or from known sources.

3.2. Multiple threats may be received simultaneously.

3.3. Bomb Threat Plans: It is essential to include bomb threat plans in each unit's emergency actions (EA) and make sure all assigned personnel know them.

3.4. Bomb Threat Evaluation: Bomb threats require careful evaluation. The following actions should be considered when making decisions.

3.4.1. (FOUO) Caller characteristics (age, sex, ethnic grouping, sobriety, and mental condition).

3.4.2. (FOUO) Background noises.

3.4.3. (FOUO) Valid target identification.

3.4.4. (FOUO) Technology (bomb composition).

3.4.5. (FOUO) Analysis of recent bombings or bomb threat activity in the general area.

3.5. (FOUO) Bomb Threat (Telephonic/Written) Response: Response is as “low key” as possible. (RF)s are limited to those required to accomplish necessary tasks as SAFELY as possible.

3.6. Assumption: It is assumed that bomb threats will increase during periods of increased tension in order to attempt to disperse, divert or place responding forces at a disadvantage.

3.7. Priority of Response: Consider the following priorities if simultaneous threats are received:

3.7.1. (FOUO) PL resources.

3.7.2. (FOUO) AA&E facilities.

3.7.3. (FOUO) Base Network Control Center (B20449).

3.7.4. (FOUO) Unique Research and/or Storage Facilities (i.e., 5-minute response facilities, Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF)s, etc.)

3.7.5. (FOUO) BDOC – Alarms.

3.7.6. (FOUO) Fire Department Alarms.

3.7.7. (FOUO) Wing headquarters facilities.

3.7.8. (FOUO) RAPCON (phone facility).

3.7.9. (FOUO) Control tower.

3.7.10. (FOUO) POL.

3.7.11. (FOUO) Base Telecommunications Center (B20449).

3.7.12. (FOUO) Hospital.

3.7.13. (FOUO) Schools.

4. (FOUO) SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS: All organizations will update their building custodian listing with the 377 MSG/CE as changes occur and develop plans to support general procedures identified below. The 377 MSG/CE will provide a current building custodian listing to SF on a monthly basis. Interim changes must also be provided.

5. EXECUTION:

5.1. The 377 ABW/CC will:

5.1.1. (FOUO) Implement the appropriate FPCON.

5.2. The KCP will:

5.2.1. (FOUO) Maintain the communications link between the 377 ABW and the IC.

5.2.2. (FOUO) Notify EOD and place them on standby.

5.3. The DFC will:

5.3.1. (FOUO) Ensure SF obtains as much information as possible. In conjunction with the Fire Dept., SF will establish an on scene ECP and cordon the affected area.

5.3.2. Complete initial notifications, to include immediate notification, to KCP.

5.3.3. (FOUO) If necessary, respond to the on scene ECP and assume duties as IC until relieved by the FES SFO, or designated IC, if required.

5.3.4. (FOUO) Dispatch personnel and an explosives-certified MWD team, if necessary.

5.4. The Fire Chief will:

5.4.1. (FOUO) Establish the initial ECP and cordon requirements.

5.4.2. (FOUO) The FES Fire Chief or designated Senior Fire Official (SFO) will be the IC. If SF has established Incident Command, upon SFO arrival, the SF IC will brief and then transfer command to the SFO (face-to-face or by LMR). The SFO will assume IC and assign SF to the Operations General Staff position to provide tactical operations to support the IC.

5.5. The IC will:

5.5.1. (FOUO) Direct SFS/BDOC to notify and instruct building custodians to evacuate affected facilities. Evacuees will be directed to report any suspicious objects, personnel, etc., they may have observed while evacuating to SF.

5.5.2. (FOUO) Direct search operations and request medical, communications, and EOD support, as required.

5.5.3. (FOUO) Direct building custodians, ID force members, and MWD teams to form a search team and enter the affected area to look for devices.

5.5.4. (FOUO) Ensure teams are briefed on evacuation times. When a detonation time has been specified by telephone call or note, all personnel will be required to evacuate the area 15 minutes prior. Searches will not be reinitiated until 15 minutes after the stated detonation time.

5.5.5. (FOUO) Ensure at least one ambulance with medical personnel responds when requested.

5.6. The 377 MSG/SC will:

5.6.1. (FOUO) Establish and maintain communications, but ensure all radio and cellular phone transmissions are kept to a minimum. No communication transmissions will be made within 300 feet of the affected area.

5.7. (FOUO) Building Custodians will report to the IC and identify all personnel remaining in the affected facilities.

5.8. (FOUO) The 58 SOW Maintenance Control Officer will, in cases where flightline resources are involved, report to the IC and direct the removal of resources and equipment from the affected area.

6. (FOUO) COMMAND AND CONTROL: All groups, units, and agencies (military and contractor) assigned to KAFB will respond as requested by the 377 ABW/CC. Response should be calm and provide the level of cooperation to ensure the safety of all personnel and missions.

7. (FOUO) REPORTS: The appropriate agencies will prepare reports IAW applicable directives, instructions, OIs, and checklists.

ENCLOSURE 1 TO TAB E TO APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX K TO KAFB IDP 31-101
BOMB THREAT CHECKLIST

REFERENCES: Refer to Basic Plan.

1. (FOUO) RESPONSIBILITY: Each person in the Air Force (military/civilian) must clearly understand procedures for reacting to a telephone bomb threat and treat each threat as real. Post an AF Form 440, Bomb Threat Aid, near each telephone. The form is completed by anyone who receives a bomb threat over the telephone. The person who receives the bomb threat solicits information on the form and records all identifying data. The completed form is given to responding SF personnel which is referenced to determine further response requirements and to conduct their investigation.

2. EXECUTION:

2.1. Telephonic Bomb Threat: Personnel who receive bomb threats over the telephone must take the following actions:

2.1.1. (FOUO) Alert co-workers to contact SF.

2.1.2. (FOUO) Solicit and record the information on the AF Form 440, Bomb Threat Aid, and relay information to SFS/BDOC.

2.1.3. (FOUO) Keep the caller on the phone as long as possible.

2.1.4. (FOUO) Leave the phone off the hook when the caller hangs up.

2.1.5. (FOUO) Evacuate affected area to a designated location.

2.2. Written Bomb Threat: If an individual finds or receives a written bomb threat, the following actions will be taken:

2.2.1. (FOUO) Handle the note as little as possible.

2.2.2. (FOUO) Contact SF.

2.2.3. (FOUO) Alert co-workers and evacuate to a designated location.

2.3. Facility Custodian: See Enclosure 2 for bomb threat search checklist for facility custodians.

ENCLOSURE 2 TO TAB E TO APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX K TO KAFB IDP 31-101
BOMB THREAT SEARCH CHECKLIST

REFERENCES: Refer to Basic Plan.

1. The following is a typical search checklist. It is a sample only and is designed to give the facility manager (FM) an idea of how the checklist should be designed.
2. (FOUO) Search teams will not activate light switches/power equipment. Do not use radios within 300 feet of the affected area.

2.1. (FOUO) Place an X when each item is searched out.

1. Air conditioning closet.
2. Area of location of suspected device.
3. Desks, lockers, files (location, room number, etc.).
4. Telephone control room.
5. Inside of vault.
6. Map room.
7. Reception area and switchboard.
8. Small janitor storage closet.
9. Men's and women's washrooms and shower stalls.
10. Fan rooms.
11. Stairwell.
12. Projector room.
13. Material storage room.
14. Outside perimeter of main building and parking lot.
15. Furnace room.
16. Elevators.
17. Privately owned or government vehicles near or adjacent to the facility.

NOTE 1: Office personnel should be assigned search areas they are familiar with and make periodic checks. A detailed map is required for an effective search.

NOTE 2: All of the building search team personnel will report to the FM upon completion of their portions of the search.

ENCLOSURE 3 TO TAB E TO APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX K TO KAFB IDP 31-101
SUSPICIOUS DEVICE / BOMB FOUND

REFERENCES: Refer to Basic Plan.

1. **PURPOSE:** To provide time critical response to a suspicious device or bomb in a safe manner and ensure the safety of the RF personnel and base populace.
2. **SITUATION:** A threat to installation personnel and mission has been determined likely or confirmed. The potential for injury, death, and mission interruption is considered high.
3. **MISSION:** To respond to, and neutralize a suspicious device or bomb in a safe manner, minimizing the potential threat to responding forces, base populace, and installation missions.
4. **PROCEDURES:** The following actions will be taken if a suspicious device or bomb is found.

4.1. Suspicious Device/Found Bomb Actions:

4.1.1. Response must be immediate.

4.1.2. (FOUO) To ensure the safety of the base populace, the cordon and ECP must be established immediately. SAFETY is paramount.

4.1.3. (FOUO) Ensure 377 ABW/CC is notified; activate EOC/CAT, as applicable.
Complete all actions under Bomb Threat Checklist (see attachment 11).

5. **EXECUTION:**

5.1. The IC will:

5.1.1. (FOUO) Establish cordon or expand the cordon if necessary.

5.1.2. (FOUO) When a device is found during search team operations, order the immediate withdrawal of the search team and all other personnel.

5.1.3. Dispatch EOD to the device (recall if not IC).

5.1.4. (FOUO) Depending on EOD options to defuse/safely detonate the device, establish safe routes if the device has to be moved.

5.1.5. (FOUO) If or after the initial device is cleared, direct continuation of search in the affected area.

5.1.6. Determine/recommend termination of operation.

5.2. The 377 SFG senior representative will:

- 5.2.1. Coordinate cordon requirements with IC.
- 5.2.2. (FOUO) Establish an entry control point.
- 5.2.3. (FOUO) Coordinate evacuation of area with SFS/BDOC.
- 5.2.4. (FOUO) Coordinate safe route of travel with IC and SFS/BDOC.
- 5.2.5. (FOUO) Direct posting of cordon personnel in conjunction with SFS/BDOC.
- 5.3. (FOUO) EOD will determine if it's an actual device/bomb.
- 5.4. (FOUO) 377 WSSS/SSCC, if protection level resources are affected, will coordinate with the KCP for implementation of a Covered Wagon Report.
- 5.5. (FOUO) The 377 ABW/CC will implement the appropriate FPCON, if deemed necessary.
- 5.6. (FOUO) The 377 MSG/CE will cut utilities to the affected area, as appropriate to the situation.
- 5.7. When directed by the 377 ABW/CC, the KCP will:
 - 5.7.1. Notify AFOSI and Public Affairs officer; place them on call.
 - 5.7.2. Notify EOD place on standby or recall as appropriate.
 - 5.7.3. Notify Base Operations of termination.
 - 5.7.4. Submit OPREP-3 to HHQ, as required.
- 5.8. Base Operations will terminate via the SCN.
- 6. **COMMAND AND CONTROL:** All groups, units, and agencies (military and contractor) assigned to KAFB will respond as requested by the 377 ABW/CC. Response should be calm and provide the level of cooperation to ensure the safety of all personnel and missions.

TAB F TO APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX K TO KAFB IDP 31-101
RESPONSE TO SCHOOL VIOLENCE

REFERENCES: Refer to the Basic Plan.

1. **SITUATION:** A violent incident is occurring at an elementary school located on KAFB.
2. **MISSION:** Respond to, contain, and neutralize incidents occurring at Sandia Base Elementary School. Provide assistance to Albuquerque Public School (APS) authorities or Albuquerque Police Department (APD) containing the incident, and protecting personnel and Department of Defense (DOD) property in and around the area of incidents at Wherry and Kirtland Elementary Schools.
3. **EXECUTION:**
 - 3.1. Concept of Operations. USAF/DOD personnel will respond to and contain situations occurring at Sandia Base Elementary School and may be needed to provide assistance in containing a situation occurring at Wherry and Kirtland Elementary Schools located adjacent to KAFB to protect base personnel and DOD property.
 - 3.2. Tasks.
 - 3.2.1. The DFC will provide adequate forces to contain and neutralize situations occurring at Sandia Base Elementary School and protect base personnel and property located in or around the area of incidents occurring at Wherry and Kirtland Elementary Schools. SF may be requested to assist in quelling the incident.
 - 3.2.2. Depending on the nature of the incident, AFOSI Detachment 814, may be requested to assist or augment the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
 - 3.2.3. Depending on the nature of the incident, Sandia National Laboratory's Protection Force may be requested to assist or augment the FBI.
4. **COMMAND AND CONTROL:**
 - 4.1. (FOUO) Operations Center. Timely reporting of incidents occurring at one of the elementary schools is essential to the implementation of these procedures. SFS/BDOC (building 20220) will control all actions by Security Forces involved in the incident. The alternate SFS/BDOC (building 20452) can be activated if necessary.
 - 4.2. (FOUO) Command Relationships. The DFC is the Security Forces Group Commander. When Security Forces are alerted and requested to respond, they will function under the control of the DFC or designated IC. For command functions during FP Conditions, the 377 ABW/CC through the KCP, will provide guidance to commanders and functional managers. The designated IC will dictate command relationships during contingency actions. Civil authorities will remain under the command and control of their respective agencies. The FES

Fire Chief or designated Senior Fire Official (SFO) will be the IC. If SF has established Incident Command, upon SFO arrival, the SF IC will brief and then transfer command to the SFO (face-to-face or by LMR). The SFO will assume IC and assign SF to the Operations General Staff position to provide tactical operations to support the IC.

4.3. Communications. Telephone and non-tactical radio nets are the primary means of communication. Communication Security must be emphasized to all users of base radio nets to prevent disclosure of sensitive information by anyone monitoring the network.

4.3.1. SFS/BDOC is the initial POC for reporting all suspected/actual incidents occurring at the elementary schools.

4.4. Jurisdiction. The property on which Sandia Base and Wherry Elementary Schools are located is under Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction.

TAB G TO APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX K TO KAFB IDP 31-101
RESPONSE TO CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER AND SIMILAR FACILITIES

REFERENCES: Refer to the Basic Plan.

1. **SITUATION:** An incident is occurring at the Child Development Center (CDC) or similar facility on KAFB.

2. **MISSION:** Respond to, contain, and neutralize incidents occurring at the CDC or similar facility located on KAFB.

3. **EXECUTION:**

3.1. Concept of Operations. USAF/DOD personnel will respond to, contain, and neutralize situations occurring at the CDC to protect personnel and DOD property.

3.2. Tasks.

3.2.1. The DFC will provide adequate forces to contain and neutralize situations occurring at the CDC.

3.2.2. Depending on the nature of the incident, AFOSI Detachment 814, may be requested to assist or augment the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

3.2.3. Depending on the nature of the incident, Family Advocacy or other appropriate base agencies may be required to assist.

4. **COMMAND AND CONTROL:**

4.1. (FOUO) Operations Center. Timely reporting of incidents occurring at the CDC is essential to the implementation of these procedures. SFS/BDOC, (building 20220) will control all actions by Security Forces involved in the incident. The alternate SFS/BDOC (building 20452) can be activated if necessary.

4.2. (FOUO) Command Relationships. When Security Forces are alerted and requested to respond, they will function under the control of the DFC or designated IC. For command functions during FP conditions, the 377 ABW/CC, through the KCP, will provide guidance to commanders and functional managers. The designated IC will dictate command relationships during contingency actions. The FES Fire Chief or designated Senior Fire Official (SFO) will be the IC. If Security Forces has established Incident Command, upon SFO arrival, the Security Forces IC will brief and then transfer command to the SFO (face-to-face or by LMR). The SFO will assume IC and assign Security Forces to the Operations General Staff position to provide tactical operations to support the IC.

4.3. Communications. Telephone and non-tactical radio nets are the primary means of communication. Communication Security (COMSEC) must be emphasized to all users of

base radio nets to prevent disclosure of sensitive information by anyone monitoring the network.

4.3.1. SFS/BDOC is the initial POC for reporting all suspected/actual incidents.

4.4. Jurisdiction. The property on which the Gibson CDC is located is under Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction. The property on which the Maxwell CDC is located is under Proprietary Jurisdiction.

TAB H TO APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX K TO KAFB IDP 31-101
RESPONSE TO WORKPLACE VIOLENCE

REFERENCES: Refer to the Basic Plan.

1. SITUATION: A violent incident is occurring at a workplace located on KAFB.
2. MISSION: Respond to, contain, and neutralize incidents occurring at workplaces throughout KAFB.
3. EXECUTION:
 - 3.1. Concept of Operations. USAF/Department of Defense personnel will respond to and contain situations occurring at workplaces throughout KAFB to protect base personnel and DOD property.
 - 3.2. Tasks.
 - 3.2.1. The DFC will provide adequate forces to contain and neutralize situations occurring at any workplace on KAFB. Additionally, Security Forces may be requested to assist in quelling the incident.
 - 3.2.2. Depending on the nature of the incident, AFOSI Detachment 814, may be requested to assist or augment the FBI.
4. COMMAND AND CONTROL:
 - 4.1. (FOUO) Operations Center. Timely reporting of incidents occurring at any workplace is essential to the implementation of these procedures. SFS/BDOC, (building 20220) will control all actions by Security Forces involved in the incident. The alternate SFS/BDOC (building 20452) can be activated if necessary.
 - 4.2. (FOUO) Command Relationships. When Security Forces are alerted and requested to respond, they will function under the control of the DFC or designated IC. For command functions during FP conditions, the 377 ABW/CC, through the KCP will provide guidance to commanders and functional managers. The designated IC will dictate command relationships during contingency actions. Civil authorities will remain under the command and control of their respective agencies. The FES Fire Chief or designated Senior Fire Official (SFO) will be the IC. If SF has established Incident Command, upon SFO arrival, the SF IC will brief and then transfer command to the SFO (face-to-face or by LMR). The SFO will assume IC and assign SF to the Operations General Staff position to provide tactical operations to support the IC.
 - 4.3. Communications. Telephone and non-tactical radio nets are the primary means of communication. Communication Security (COMSEC) must be emphasized to all users of

base radio nets to prevent disclosure of sensitive information by anyone monitoring the network.

4.3.1. SFS/BDOC, building 20220, is the initial POC for reporting all suspected/actual incidents occurring at installation workplaces.

4.4. Jurisdiction. The majority of KAFB is under Exclusive Federal jurisdiction with a few proprietary designations around the gates.

TAB I TO APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX K TO KAFB IDP 31-101
RESIDENT / TRANSIENT DISTINGUISHED VISITORS PROTECTION PROCEDURES

REFERENCES: Refer to the Basic Plan.

1. **OBJECTIVE:** To establish security protection through planning for distinguished visitors (DV) and their assigned aircraft.

2. **PURPOSE:** The threat of physical harm to high ranking civilian and senior military personnel is possible. An effective resource protection and personnel protection program is needed to prevent and/or preclude any harm for DVs.

3. **EXECUTION:**

3.1. The 377 ABW/CC will evaluate intelligence and implement security measures as needed.

3.2. The KCP will:

3.2.1. (FOUO) Update SFG and AFOSI on arrival schedules.

3.2.2. (FOUO) Request current threat analysis from AFOSI.

3.2.3. (FOUO) Advise the DV of any threats in the area and the measures taken to provide security.

3.2.4. For DVs whose protection is the responsibility of the United States Secret Service (USSS), furnish assistance and support as outlined IAW AFI 71-101V2.

3.3. The DFC will:

3.3.1. Upon notification of the visit, ensure appropriate security measures are implemented and inform the 377 ABW/CC.

3.3.2. For protection standards of DV aircraft refer to AFI 31-101.

3.4. (FOUO) AFOSI Detachment 814 will provide a threat analysis to the 377 ABW/CC as required.

3.5. The 377 MDG will provide medical support as needed.

3.6. Distinguished Visitor Codes:

3.6.1. (FOUO) DV Code 1. President of the United States and Heads of State of Foreign Countries or Reigning Royalty.

3.6.2. (FOUO) DV Code 2.

- 3.6.2.1. (FOUO) Vice President of the United States.
- 3.6.2.2. (FOUO) Speaker of the House of Representatives.
- 3.6.2.3. (FOUO) Former Presidents of the United States.
- 3.6.2.4. (FOUO) Secretary of State.
- 3.6.2.5. (FOUO) Secretary General of the United Nations.
- 3.6.2.6. (FOUO) Ambassadors of Foreign Powers.
- 3.6.2.7. (FOUO) Cabinet members including Secretary of Transportation, Treasury, Defense, Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, Labor, Housing, Education, Health and Welfare, and the Attorney General.
- 3.6.2.8. (FOUO) United States Senators.
- 3.6.2.9. (FOUO) Members of the House of Representatives.
- 3.6.2.10. (FOUO) Secretary of the Army, Air Force, and Navy.
- 3.6.2.11. (FOUO) Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- 3.6.2.12. (FOUO) Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- 3.6.2.13. (FOUO) Chiefs of Staff, Chief of Naval Operations and Commandant of the Marine Corps.
- 3.6.2.14. (FOUO) Commandant, United States Coast Guard.
- 3.6.2.15. (FOUO) General of the Army and Admiral of the Fleet.
- 3.6.3. (FOUO) DV Code 3.
 - 3.6.3.1. (FOUO) Special Assistants to the President.
 - 3.6.3.2. (FOUO) Under Secretary of the Navy, Army and Air Force.
 - 3.6.3.3. (FOUO) Commanders-in-Chief of the Unified and Specified Commands of the four star grade.
 - 3.6.3.4. (FOUO) Vice Chiefs of Staff, Vice Chief of Naval Operations and Assistant Commandant of the US Marine Corps.
 - 3.6.3.5. (FOUO) Generals and Admirals (Four Star grade).

- 3.6.3.6. (FOUO) Retired Generals and Admirals.
- 3.6.3.7. (FOUO) Assistant Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.
- 3.6.3.8. (FOUO) Assistant Secretary of Defense.
- 3.6.4. (FOUO) DV Code 4.
 - 3.6.4.1. (FOUO) General Counsels of the Army, Navy and Air Force.
 - 3.6.4.2. (FOUO) Deputy Under Secretaries of Defense.
 - 3.6.4.3. (FOUO) Lieutenant Generals and Vice Admirals.
 - 3.6.4.4. (FOUO) Former United States Ambassadors and Ministers to Foreign countries.
 - 3.6.4.5. (FOUO) Deputy Under Secretaries of the Army, Navy and Air Force.
 - 3.6.4.6. (FOUO) Senior Executive Service.
- 3.6.5. (FOUO) DV Code 5. Major Generals, Rear Admirals (upper).
- 3.6.6. (FOUO) DV Code 6. Brigadier General, Rear Admirals (lower).
- 3.6.7. (FOUO) DV Code 7.
 - 3.6.7.1. (FOUO) Captains (U.S. Navy or U.S. Coast Guard), Colonels.
 - 3.6.7.2. (FOUO) Civilians (GS/GM-15).
- 3.6.8. (FOUO) DV Code 8. Senior Enlisted Advisors of the Armed Services (Master Chief Petty Officers of the Navy and Coast Guard, Sergeants Major of the Army and Marine Corps, and Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force).

TAB J TO APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX K TO KAFB IDP 31-101
EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION PROCEDURES

REFERENCES: Refer to the Basic Plan.

1. **GENERAL:** Establish uniform procedures to expand from normal to emergency operations in a timely and efficient manner.
2. **EXECUTION:** KAFB must have the capability to respond to immediate emergency contingencies. Additional personnel are required to protect resources and personnel. Emergency notification procedures are documented in KAFB Plan 10-205, Personnel Notification and Recall (PNAR), and developed by the 377 ABW/XP.
3. **TASKINGS:** All units, to include tenant organizations in support of contingencies must adhere to KAFB Plan 10-205.
 - 3.1. (FOUO) The KCP will ensure all other organizations not having direct support of contingencies are notified of any change in FP condition.
 - 3.2. (FOUO) The 377 SFG will notify key personnel who live on base in the event of a complete communications and/or power outage if doing so will not degrade the mission.

TAB K TO APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX K TO KAFB IDP 31-101
CIVIL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY COORDINATION

REFERENCES: Refer to the Basic Plan.

1. **OBJECTIVE:** Ensure all channels of communication between civilian police agencies remain open at all times. 377 SFG and AFOSI must maintain close liaison with civil law enforcement agencies in the surrounding area.

2. **GENERAL:** All questions about release of information and cooperative investigation efforts will be cleared through the Judge Advocate office and approved by the DFC. Direct contact is authorized between Security Forces elements, on-duty supervisors, or SFS/BDOC Controllers of local law enforcement agencies. The DFC, AFOSI, and representatives are authorized to coordinate routine police matters with other police agencies as necessary.

2.1. (FOUO) Monitoring Civil Investigations. The DFC and AFOSI detachment commander are authorized to monitor civil investigations pertaining to Air Force personnel and their dependents having an adverse effect on the installation and should regularly update the Judge Advocate.

2.2. (FOUO) The AFOSI detachment commander will maintain liaison with AFNWC/NT, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, U.S. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement, and investigative agencies of the uniformed services. AFOSI will coordinate when incidents involve protection level resources or when off-base coordination is needed.

2.3. (FOUO) The use of the Defense Biometric Identification System (DBIDS) and Security Forces Management Information System (SFMIS) assist in identifying personnel and vehicles in questionable situations, or incidents investigated by Security Forces or AFOSI. Use of the DBIDS and SFMIS is strictly limited to official use only.

2.4. (FOUO) MWD Support. The 377 SFG supports federal, state, and local authorities in providing MWD support for detection of explosives throughout New Mexico. Federal, state, and local agencies within New Mexico do not have Explosive Detection Dog (EDD) capability. Federal agencies such as US Immigrations and Customs Enforcement are also supported with drug detector MWDs.

2.5. (FOUO) 377 SFG will review procedures annually with 377 ABW/JA to ensure legality of using MWDs is current and legal.

2.6. (FOUO) MWD support will not be authorized if the protection of PL resources would be compromised.

TAB L TO APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX K TO KAFB IDP 31-101
PROTECTION OF OTHER THAN PROTECTION LEVEL RESOURCES

REFERENCES: Refer to the Basic Plan.

1. **SITUATION:** To provide protection/security to resources other than protection level resources.

1.1. **OJECTIVE:** To establish responsibilities and duties of unit commanders and assigned personnel who have custody over hazardous or essential material.

1.2. **CONTROL PROCEDURES:** It is of utmost importance to discourage theft, robbery, pilferage, or destruction through rigid custodial procedures emphasizing proper actions and establish positive procedures for control of fuel trucks entering and exiting the installation.

1.2.1. (FOUO) The 377 ABW/CC will designate Petroleum, Oil, Lubricants (POL) and Liquid Oxygen (LOX) storage areas as controlled areas.

1.2.2. The 377 LRS/CC will:

1.2.2.1. Comply with controlled area protection requirements identified in Appendix 3 to Annex K.

1.2.2.2. (FOUO) Personal recognition or entry lists and identification cards will be necessary for entry into controlled areas. The appropriate branch will maintain entry authority lists. Unauthorized personnel will not be permitted to loiter in these work areas. Personnel will challenge all strangers in their work areas. If an unauthorized person cannot be identified and their reason for being in the area cannot be established, Security Forces will be notified and respond.

1.2.2.3. (FOUO) Visitors permitted to enter POL or LOX storage areas will be under continuous escort while inside the area. When the escorted person's work is completed, the escort will ensure the individual exits the area.

2. (DCNI) Transuranic Material (Atomic/Nuclear material).

2.1. (FOUO) All materials entering the installation having atomic/nuclear properties must be coordinated with the 377 AMDS/SGPB and comply with rules, exceptions, and deviations outlined in KAFBI 40-201, KAFB Ionizing Radiation Safety Program.

2.2. (FOUO) During increased FPCONs, all organizations to include tenant units will ensure SF are notified of these shipments. DoE/Sandia National Laboratory will notify Sandia Protection Forces.

3. **RESEARCH FACILITIES:**

3.1. (FOUO) Security Manager Responsibilities: KAFB has numerous research facilities on the installation. Each security manager for these facilities is directly responsible for ensuring there is adequate security to protect their resources according to all applicable directives under DODD 5200.8, Security of DOD Installations and Resources, AFI 31-101, and this Plan. DoE/Sandia facilities will comply with all applicable DoE directives for their areas.

3.2. (FOUO) Security Actions/Planning: Unit Security Managers, Antiterrorism Officers and Representatives (ATO/ATR) will ensure contingency actions/plans are written for each facility, known by personnel working within the facility, and comply with the KAFB FPCON checklist upon implementation of higher FPCONs. These written plans should be reviewed and approved through Installation ATO for compliance. Plans should be reviewed annually for accuracy and relevancy.

3.3. (FOUO) 377 SFS Responsibilities: Security Forces will provide response to these facilities when notified of an emergency situation or incident requiring police action. Facilities included in the SFS/BDOC Alarm Monitor's listing have established local response procedures. These procedures are highly restricted/specific to Security Forces and AFRL personnel and not releasable outside the installation unless approved by 377 SFS/S5C and/or AFRL security office.

3.4. (FOUO) SINGLE CHANNEL ANTI-JAM MAN PORTABLE (SCAMP) TERMINALS: SCAMP terminals, formerly called Ground Wave Emergency Network (GWEN) Systems are not present on KAFB. In the event a SCAMP is brought to KAFB, it will be designated a PL 4 resource.

APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX K TO KAFB IDP 31-101
INSTALLATION ACCESS CONTROL

REFERENCES: Refer to the Basic Plan.

1. OBJECTIVE: Utilize entry and internal control procedures that provide the greatest control and deterrence possible while ensuring smooth and rapid entry, exit, and circulation for authorized personnel. Apply stringent entry, exit, and internal controls to help deter thieves, vandals, and terrorists, and make a safe and secure environment for base personnel.

1.1. BASE DESIGNATION: KAFB is designated a closed base in accordance with AFI 31-101 and this instruction.

1.2. RESPONSIBILITIES: It is the responsibility of the 377 ABW/CC to establish an effective installation entry control program approved by the 377 377 ABW/JA. The DFC will ensure random base entry point checks are conducted.

2. AUTHORITY: The Installation Commander delegates the responsibility for the Random Installation Entry/Exit Vehicle Checks (RIEVC) Program to the 377 MSG/CC.

3. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS: (FOUO) Specific permission of the 377 ABW/CC is required for entry to KAFB. The KAFB standard for entry control is based on local threat conditions and need, as determined by the 377 ABW/CC. As a minimum, the base entry standards include positive ID card checks 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.

TAB A TO APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX K TO KAFB IDP 31-101
INSTALLATION ACCESS CONTROL PROCEDURES

REFERENCES: Refer to Basic Plan.

1. **OBJECTIVE:** To establish KAFB installation entry procedures
2. **MISSION:** See basic plan.
3. **EXECUTION:** Installation Access Control Procedures.

3.1. (FOUO) There are two types of installation access control points (commonly called gates); routine and special purpose. The following is a list of all installation access control points:

3.1.1. (FOUO) Gibson Gate (24 hours). This is a routine entry point with a minimum of two access controllers. This entry point has a 24 hour visitor's center. Gibson Visitor Center parking is reserved for personnel/visitors conducting business at the Gibson Visitor Center. Parking at the visitor center is limited to 30 minutes. Vehicle operators who depart the visitor center while leaving their car at the visitor center will be cited for overdue parking and/or have their vehicle towed at their own expense.

3.1.2. (FOUO) Truman Gate (24 hours). This is a routine entry point with a minimum of two access controllers. The Truman gate is also the primary entry point for receiving explosive shipments. This entry point has a visitor's center that is open. The visitor center parking is reserved for personnel/visitors conducting business in the Truman Visitor Center. The parking lot opens 30 minutes prior and closes 30 minutes after Truman Visitor Center opens and closes. Unattended vehicles are subject to being cited for overdue parking and/or towed at the owner's expense.

3.1.3. (FOUO) Maxwell Gate (24 hours). This is a routine entry point with a minimum of two access controllers. This gate allows entry into the Maxwell Housing area only. Non-base affiliated housing residence and visitors to this area will not be allowed access to the rest of the installation without proper sponsorship. Visitors/Guests to Maxwell Housing are prohibited from parking and/or leaving their vehicle unattended in front of the Kirtland Family Housing Office. Vehicles left unattended after 1800 hours or when the Housing Office is closed will be towed at the owner's expense.

3.1.4. (FOUO) Wyoming Gate. This is a routine entry point with a minimum of two access controllers. It is open from 0530-1900 hours Monday through Friday, specified holidays excluded.

3.1.5. (FOUO) Eubank Gate. This is a routine entry point with a minimum of two installation access controllers. It is open from 0500-2400 hours daily. The Eubank gate is also the alternate point for receiving explosive shipments.

3.1.6. (FOUO) Sandia Contractor Gate. This is a special purpose gate staffed by Sandia National Labs Protection Force personnel for the purpose of processing commercial vehicle deliveries to SNL areas. This gate is open from 0600-1800 hours Monday through Friday, weekends and specified holidays on a case-by-case basis. It includes a card swipe, turnstile pedestrian and bicycle gate just to its south. The Sandia contractor gate also receives explosive shipments going to SNL or DOE. SNL will comply with all base entry requirements.

3.1.7. (FOUO) (FOUO) Carlisle Gate. This is a routine entry point with a minimum of two installation access controllers. It is open for inbound traffic 0600-0900 hours and 1530-1730 hours for outbound traffic Monday through Friday, specified holidays excluded.

3.1.8. (FOUO) South Valley Gate. This is a routine entry point with a minimum of two installation access controllers. This gate is open from 0600-0830 and 1530-1730, Monday through Friday, specified holidays excluded.

3.1.9. (FOUO) Ridgecrest Gate. This is a special purpose gate used for evacuations, special events, and authorized oversized vehicle entry. It is located on Ridgecrest Dr. on the north of Randolph Ave. This gate is closed and locked when not used for one of the above purposes.

3.1.10. (FOUO) Veterans Affairs (VA) electronic gate (377 MDG Access Gate). This is a special purpose gate used for evacuations, emergency access and egress to the USAF clinic. It is also used for emergency entry to the installation by medical support teams, and periodic entry/exit for disposing of hazardous wastes generated on site at the 377th Medical Group. This gate is located on Ventura Dr. approximately 1/4 mile from Randolph Ave. Per the 377 ABW/JA, "the MDG facility is "contiguous" with Kirtland AFB for Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) purposes." The MDG's RCRA activities require the use of the VA/MDG gate to ensure the MDG remains within the legal requirements mandated by KAFB Civil Engineering/Environmental Management and New Mexico state laws. This gate will not be used for convenient access to the installation, but may be used for official purposes listed above. The MDG/CC may use this gate for official purposes. This gate will remain closed and locked when not used for one of the above purposes.

3.1.11. (FOUO) Kirtland Contractor Gate. This is a special purpose gate used for commercial vehicle access, evacuations, emergency entry, and special events. The Kirtland Contractor gate is opened from 0600-1600 Monday through Friday, specified holidays excluded. The gate is located on the west side of the installation behind building #201, Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) Conference Center.

3.1.12. (FOUO) Presidential Gate. This gate is used for entry to and from the flightline. It is also used as part of Presidential support operations as well as special events and emergency entry point for in-flight emergencies. It is located on Carlisle Ave adjacent to

building #333, Base Operations. This gate is electronically opened by a keypad. Only personnel with official business on the flightline are authorized to have the code.

3.1.13. (FOUO) Randolph Gate. This gate is used for entry to and from the flightline. It's also used for special events and alternate for the Presidential gate. It is located on Randolph Ave adjacent to building #255. The Randolph Gate is electronically opened by a keypad. Only personnel with official business on the flightline are authorized to have the code.

3.1.14. (FOUO) Flightline access gates. There are six flightline access gates all along South Valley Rd. These gates are controlled by owner/user with lock and key. The general public does not have access to these gates due to the active runway being immediately in front of their access points. Only personnel with flightline access have access to these gates.

3.1.15. (FOUO) Perimeter Gates. There are two perimeter gates located on the southeast side of the installation adjacent to and behind the Manzano Mountain area. These gates are used only for evacuation and alternate means of entering/exiting the installation from the south in the event of an emergency.

3.2. 100% Positive ID checks.

3.2.1. (FOUO) All inbound traffic (motorized, self-propelled and pedestrian) will be stopped. KAFB Security Forces must identify and process trespassers and barred personnel, enforce New Mexico Statutes annotated (NMSA), and apprehend/detain personnel attempting to gain fraudulent entry onto the installation or criminal flight from the installation. Security Forces must process visitors smoothly, efficiently, and politely. Treat all customers requesting assistance with courtesy. Personnel must not proceed through the installation gate onto KAFB until the on-duty sentry grants approval. This approval may be given through an arm signal or verbally. Refer to unescorted entry for a list of authorized forms of identification.

3.2.2. When Albuquerque Ambulance Service arrives at an installation gate, the IAC will perform a cursory look inside the cab and in the back of the ambulance looking for any unauthorized personnel and/or obvious explosives.

3.2.3. (FOUO) General/flag officers or civilian equivalents (Senior Executive Service) will be afforded entry without delay as soon as identified or recognized as a general/flag officer. No further identification check is required for visitors accompanying general officers, but sentries must be alert to detect any signs of duress.

3.2.4. (FOUO) Visitors to the Installation (Individuals Without a Valid Unescorted Base Access Credential). A computer generated Defense Biometric Identification System (DBIDS) visitor pass or a Security Forces Management Information System (SFMIS) pass, if DBIDS is not operational, is issued to individuals who do not possess an approved credential allowing for unescorted entry to the installation, but require

unescorted access. To obtain a pass, the visitor must be identity proofed providing one of the documents listed in AFMAN 31-113, Installation Perimeter Access Control, paragraph 1.1 (identified in paragraph 1.1.1. - 1.1.1.3.6.2.). All documents must have a picture and be unexpired to be valid. If the visitor is operating a vehicle, they must have a valid driver's license and provide proof of insurance and current vehicle registration. Hand-written AF Form 75s may be issued when both SFMIS and DBIDS are nonoperational, but will not be issued for a period longer than 24 hours unless authorized by the on-duty Flight Chief or higher authority. In all cases, however, sponsorship onto the installation is required for visitors who do not possess an identification credential identified in paragraph 1.5.12.5. **NOTE:** Only personnel 18 years of age or older can sponsor personnel onto the installation. Dependent children 15 years of age and older may escort (must be in the same vehicle) up to five personnel onto the installation. All SFMIS/DBIDS passes written for over 30 days must be laminated. Non-base affiliated Maxwell Housing Residents will be issued a DBIDS ID card for the extent of their lease and it will state "Maxwell Housing Resident" in the remarks section. This ID will be valid for access to the Maxwell Housing area only.

3.2.5. (FOUO) Visitors will be identity proofed and vetted to determine fitness for access to the installation. The minimum vetting standards for individual access include a check via the National Crime Information Center (NCIC), the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB), State ID or driver's license check, local Bernalillo County Warrants check, national sex offender registry, and Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE), if citizenship/status cannot be verified (If available at the visitor center and a certified operator is on duty). Refer to paragraph 3.26.3.2. - 3.26.3.2.23. for more information and fitness determination disqualifying factors. If a background check was not conducted it will be annotated in the remarks section of the pass. All personnel receiving an extended base pass through 377 SFS/S5B are required to consent to a background check and will be vetted as stated above before the pass will be issued. If an individual refuses to consent to a background check they will be denied entry.

3.2.6. (FOUO) All personnel requiring a SFMIS/DBIDS pass who are 18 years and older will be required to submit one of the following forms of identification. The identification must have a picture ID and cannot be expired. The following are examples of acceptable forms of identification:

3.2.6.1. United States Passport.

3.2.6.2. Form I-551 Permanent Resident Card/Alien Registration Receipt Card.

3.2.6.3. Foreign passport with a temporary (I-551) stamp or temporary printed notation on a machine readable immigrant visa.

3.2.6.4. I-766 Employment Authorization Card w/photograph.

3.2.6.5. A current/valid driver's license or identification card issued by a state or outlying possession of the United States provided it contains a photograph and

biographic information such as name, date of birth (DOB), gender, height, weight, eye color and address.

3.2.6.5.1. Identification card issued by federal, state, or local government agencies, provided it contains a photograph and biographic information such as name, DOB, gender, height, eye color, and address.

3.2.6.6. U.S. Coast Guard Merchant Mariner Cards/Credentials.

3.2.6.7. In addition to the above identity proofing documents, any of the following credentials are also acceptable for the purpose of identity proofing for persons under the age of 18 who do not possess a photo ID. Minors who are accompanied by a parent or guardian do not require identity proofing.

3.2.6.7.1. School record or report card.

3.2.6.7.2. Birth certificate.

3.2.6.8. Additional supplemental sources of identity proofing (to be used in concert with the documents above to further substantiate identity), during increased FPCONS, Random Antiterrorism Measures (RAMs), or when their identity is in question include, but are not limited to:

3.2.6.8.1. School identification card with a photograph.

3.2.6.8.2. U.S. Military or draft record.

3.2.6.8.3. Native American Tribal Document.

3.2.6.8.4. U.S. Social Security card issued by the Social Security Administration (SSA).

3.2.6.8.5. Certification of Birth Abroad issued by the Department of State (Form FS-545 or Form DS-1350).

3.2.6.8.6. Original or certified copy of a birth certificate issued by a state, county, municipal authority or outlying possession of the United States bearing an official seal.

3.2.6.8.7. U.S. Citizen ID Card (Form I-197).

3.2.6.8.8. ID card for use of Resident Citizen in the United States (Form I-179).

3.2.6.8.9. Unexpired employment authorization document issued by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), including (a) a Form I-94

identifying the holder as an asylee (by stating "asylum", "asylee" or appropriate provision of law), or (b) other documentation issued by DHS (or the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) that identifies the holder as an asylee, lawful permanent resident, and refugee (except for the Form I-94 identifying the holder as a refugee, which is considered a receipt only), or other status authorized to work in the United States incident to status. Foreign Military or Government Identification Credentials. Foreign passport with a current Arrival-2127 Departure Record (Form I-94) bearing the same name as the passport and containing an endorsement of the alien's nonimmigrant status, if that status authorizes the alien to work for the employer. In the case of a nonimmigrant alien authorized to work for a specific employer incident to status, a foreign passport with Form I-94 or Form I-94A bearing the same name as the passport and containing an endorsement of the alien's nonimmigrant status, as long as the endorsement has not yet expired, and the proposed employment is not in conflict with any restrictions or limitations identified on the form.

3.2.7. (FOUO) Military Personnel Section (MPS), Lost, stolen ID cards.

3.2.7.1. (FOUO) During duty-hours: A valid government issued picture ID card (DL, State ID, etc.) will be presented to the Visitor Control Center (VCC) personnel. A base affiliation check will be conducted via Defense Biometric Identification System (DBIDS). Once base affiliation is validated, a 15 minute base pass will be issued. Time and date will be annotated and the pass will be signed by the issuer and requester. The member will be instructed to enter the base and proceed directly to the Consolidated Support Building (20245) to obtain a new ID card from MPS personnel. The pass must be displayed in the vehicle's windshield while driving, and will be turned in to MPS personnel once assisted.

3.2.7.2. (FOUO) During non-duty hours: Personnel will report to the Gibson VCC. A base affiliation check will be conducted using DBIDS. A valid government issued picture ID card (DL, State ID, etc.) will be presented to the VCC personnel. Once base affiliation is validated, the member will be issued a pass and allowed access to the installation. If base affiliation unable to be validated using DBIDS, the member must have an authorized sponsor report to the Gibson VCC to obtain a visitor pass or the member will be denied access.

3.2.7.3. (FOUO) Forgotten ID cards. A valid government issued picture ID card (DL, State ID, etc.) will be presented by the individual to the VCC personnel. After a base affiliation check is conducted through the DEERS system using SFMIS/DBIDS, the individual will be allowed access to the installation. The individual's duty location may be called to verify the individual works at that location.

3.2.8. (FOUO) Military Personnel Section (MPS), Expired ID cards.

3.2.8.1 (FOUO) During duty hours: A valid government issued picture ID card (DL, State ID, etc.) will be presented to the VCC personnel. A base affiliation check will be conducted via DEERS by contacting MPS personnel. Once base affiliation is validated, a 15 minute base pass will be issued. Time and date will be annotated and the pass will be signed by the issuer and requester. The member will be instructed to enter the base and proceed directly to the Consolidated Support Building to obtain a new ID card from MPS personnel. The pass must be displayed in the vehicle's windshield while driving, and will be turned in to MPS personnel once assisted. If MPS personnel are not available via telephone, the member must have an authorized sponsor present at the VCC to obtain a visitor pass.

3.2.8.2. (FOUO) DEERS outage: In the event DEERS is down and/or MPS personnel are unable to issue ID cards, members will be instructed to return once the system is operational. If members require base access during a DEERS outage and are currently at the Consolidated Support building, they can obtain a DBIDS visitor pass from the Pass and Registration office. Due to DBIDS software restrictions, members are not allowed to sponsor themselves and must have an authorized sponsor present. If an authorized sponsor is not available the member will be instructed to return the next duty day to obtain a new ID card. If a member reports to the VCC requesting a 15 minute pass to obtain a new ID card they will be denied access unless they have an authorized sponsor present.

3.2.8.3. (FOUO) During non-duty hours: DBIDS does not validate expired credentials. Personnel requiring installation access must report to the Gibson VCC with an authorized sponsor. A valid government issued picture ID card (DL, State ID, etc.) must be presented to obtain a visitor pass.

3.2.9 (FOUO) Forgotten ID cards. A valid government issued picture ID card (DL, State ID, etc.) will be presented by the individual to the VCC personnel. After a base affiliation check is conducted utilizing DBIDS, the individual will be allowed access to the installation. The individual's duty location may be called to verify the individual works at that location.

3.3. (FOUO) Unescorted Entry. The following personnel are authorized unescorted entry to the installation. All personnel who are authorized unescorted entry are authorized to sponsor/granted escort authority unless specifically noted below. Unless otherwise noted in this document, personnel will be authorized to sponsor a maximum of 20 personnel. Unit commanders/directors may request an increase in this number for members of their unit on a case by case basis. Request will be sent to the 377 SFS/S5B and include a justification. The DFC is the approval authority for these requests.

3.3.1. DOD Common Access Cards (CAC) all versions (active duty, guard/reserve, government employed civilian, contractor personnel etc.)

3.3.2. DD Form 2 series ID cards all versions (active duty, retired, reserve).

3.3.3. DD Form 1173, Uniformed Services Identification and Privilege Card, Utilized by family members of active duty and retired military.

3.3.4. DD Form 1173-1, Department of Defense Guard and Reserve Dependent Identification Card.

3.3.5. Defense Biometric Identification System (DBIDS) ID cards.

3.3.6. DD Form 2765, Department of Defense/Uniformed Services Identification and Privilege Card.

3.3.7. DA Form 1602, Department of the Army Civilian ID Card.

3.3.8. General Services Administration (GSA) Forms 277, General Employee Identification, and 22, Employee Identification Credential – General.

3.3.9. AF Form 354, Civilian Identification Card (current AF civilian employees not permanently assigned to KAFB).

3.3.10. (FOUO) Retired Air Force Civilian employees and dependents (10 YOA and older) of both active and retired AF civilian employees are authorized to receive a DBIDS ID card for a period not to exceed three years or the expiration of the sponsors ID card, whichever is less. All sponsored personnel are required to be identity proofed and vetted IAW paragraph 3.26. Before the ID/pass may be issued. Sponsors are responsible for submitting the required pass request/consent for background check paperwork to 377 SFS/S5B 10 duty days before the requested issue date for the pass. Personnel age 18 and above will be authorized to sponsor/escort up to 5 personnel onto the installation.

3.3.11. Non-DOD Federal Personal Identity Verification (PIV) ID cards, (A federal PIV is any approved federal credential issued by legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the federal government. Ex. Department of Energy, Department of V379-Veterans Affairs, Department of Transportation (DOT), National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), National Security Agency (NSA), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, Bureau of Immigration and customs, Bureau of Reclamation, Centers for Disease Control (CDC), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), GSA, Department of Justice (DOJ), U.S. Treasury Department, U.S. Forest Service, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) etc. Federal employees that do not work on Kirtland AFB must be on official business to be allowed entry onto KAFB. Agencies IDs produced locally for internal access control of their facilities/areas will not be accepted for installation access.

3.4. (FOUO) Permanently assigned personnel who use the above listed ID cards for access will be required to obtain a DBIDS ID card if their ID cards are not compatible with the DBIDS system. The ID may be issued for a period not to exceed 3 years or the expiration of their ID card, whichever is less.

3.4.1. (FOUO) Transportation Workers Identification Credentials (TWIC). TWIC card holders are authorized unescorted access, but not authorized to sponsor/escort visitors onto the installation.

3.4.2. (FOUO) Law Enforcement Officers (i.e., State Police, Sheriff's Department, Police Department, etc.) must be on official business and show their badge and credentials (photo ID card).

3.4.3. (FOUO) Federal law enforcement officers, including but not limited to, Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), U.S. Department of Justice-Alcohol-Tobacco-Firearms and Explosives Bureau (ATF), Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Criminal Investigation Department (CID), Criminal Investigation Services (CIS), U.S. Secret Service (USSS), U.S. Marshals, and Defense Security Service (DSS) personnel in possession of appropriate credentials (must be a photo ID) and on official business are allowed access to KAFB.

3.4.4. (FOUO) Other organizations/companies: Companies or organizations that have a permanent presence on KAFB and do not possess an identification credential listed above will receive a DBIDS ID card after completion of a background check (unless otherwise vetted) i.e. :Central Training Academy, Defense Logistics Agency, Seismological Laboratory, American Red Cross, Lovelace Respiratory Research Institute etc. The DBIDS card will identify if the individual has sponsorship/escort authority. DBIDS ID cards may be issued for a period not to exceed 1 year at the request of the sponsoring organization. It is the responsibility of the sponsoring organization to retrieve and return ID cards to the 377 SFS/S5B if the employee is terminated or quits prior to the expiration of the ID card. United States Postal Service (USPS) employees on official business will be granted access with their USPS ID card.

3.4.5. (FOUO) Commercial, delivery, and/or contract vehicles i.e. Pepsi, Coca Cola, Staples, Federal Express (FedEx), United Postal Service (UPS), Hot Shots Delivery, restaurant/pizza delivery personnel, armored car companies, etc., providing authorized services to installation customers may enter unescorted after verification of a valid need for entry (a bill of lading or delivery bill) and the driver and passengers are identity proofed and properly vetted. For restaurant/fast food delivery service personnel, the sponsor must contact the gate with the name, address etc. of the driver and the name of restaurant delivering food, i.e., Pizza Hut, Domino's etc. Identity proofing and vetting will be accomplished each time the individual enters the installation.

3.4.6. (FOUO) Employees who require regular entry may be added to a commercial vendor base access list (BAL) for a period not to exceed 180 days upon written request from the parent company and approval from the base agency for which they provide a service. The requirements in paragraph 3.2.5. Will be followed prior to the individual's name being added to the access list. Background checks will not be required for personnel on the access list each time they enter the installation. These individuals will not have escort/sponsorship authority. Personnel on the access list may enter the

installation through the Commercial Vehicle Gate or Truman Gate when the Commercial Vehicle Gate is closed. It is the responsibility of the parent company, through the base sponsoring agency, to submit /re-submit access request letters.

3.5. Visitors to KAFB.

3.5.1. (FOUO) In accordance with AFMAN 31-113, Installation Perimeter Access Control, paragraph 6.6.5, Telephone sponsorship is not authorized without identity proofing the sponsor. A telephone with caller identification is not an acceptable identity proofing measure. Due to certain mission partner restrictions VCC personnel do not have the capability to accept a digitally signed and encrypted email with all required information. There are only two methods acceptable and available for use:

3.5.1.1. (FOUO) Face-to-face Sponsorship. Sponsors must physically report to the Gibson or Truman VCC with their visitor(s). VCC personnel must validate sponsorship authority. The visitor will be vetted via background check and Suspension, Revocation, Barment and Warrant (SRBW) listing. Once all information has been validated, VCC personnel will issue the visitor pass.

3.5.1.2. (FOUO) Visitor Pass Pre-Notification form. Sponsors must complete the locally developed sponsorship form and hand-carry to the appropriate VCC no earlier than 72 hours prior to visitor arrival. Upon form submittal, VCC personnel will validate sponsorship authority and verify the form is completed correctly. The visitor must report to the designated VCC with a valid government issued picture ID card (DL, State ID, etc.) to obtain a pass. The visitor will be vetted via background check and Suspension, Revocation, Barment and Warrant (SRBW) listing. Once all information has been validated, VCC personnel will issue the visitor pass.

3.5.1.2.1. (FOUO) If the sponsor does not or is unable to turn in a locally-developed sponsorship form they must report to either the Truman VCC or Gibson VCC with their visitor and be validated as an authorized sponsor. After validated as an authorized sponsor, the visitor will be vetted utilizing the LEADS or NCIC program and verified they are not on the Suspense and Revocation Barment Warrant (SRBW) listing. VCC personnel will issue a DBIDS visitor pass using the requested dates/times of access given by the authorized sponsor.

3.5.1.3. (FOUO) Authorized sponsors may preannounce visitors by responding to the Visitor Center and providing the information listed in paragraph 3.5.1.2. If the visitor arrives unannounced, the sponsor will be required to respond to the Visitor Center for a pass to be issued.

3.5.1.4. (FOUO) Official visitors to base organization. When pre-announcing official visitors, base organizations (ex. DoE, SNL, AAFES, CIV personnel etc.) may provide the names of more than one individual that can verify the pass request information when the visitor arrives.

3.5.1.5. (FOUO) Visitor passes can be written for up to 72 hours at the VCCs. If the sponsor is present, the pass can be written for up to 30 days with the approval of the SF on-duty Flight Chief, the S5B NCOIC or higher authority.

3.5.1.6. (FOUO) If the visitor has 3 or more passes in SFMIS and/or DBIDS that have a total of 30 days or more within a 90 day period, the sponsor and visitor will be required to follow the procedures to obtain a Long Term Pass for their visitor. The purpose of this approval/validation process is to ensure non-base affiliated personnel are given the appropriate passes.

3.5.1.7. (FOUO) Guests staying in excess of 30 days or those personnel who require regular/frequent access will be sent to 377 SFS/S5B to complete out a long term pass request form which their sponsor will return to 377 SFS/S5B. The sponsor must submit a signed letter of request specifying the circumstances that require the issuance of a long term pass (i.e. transportation, daycare, health care provider etc.). Long term passes will not be issued for the convenience of the sponsor or visitor. Sponsors are responsible for submitting the required paperwork to 377 SFS/S5B 10 duty days before the requested issue date for the pass. All visitors must be identity proofed and vetted IAW paragraph 3.2.5. Once the sponsor is notified of approval/denial of the visitor pass, the visitor may then obtain their visitor pass from 377/ SFS/S5B.

3.5.1.8. (FOUO) Except for immediate family, dormitory guests must be a minimum of 18 years of age.

3.6. Escorted entry procedures.

3.6.1. Escorted entry procedures. If a visitor is with, and will remain with an authorized individual who has escort privileges, they may be escorted on the installation. **NOTE:** this is widely known as the Trusted Traveler procedure IAW DTM 09-012, and AFMAN 31-113. This may only be extended to individuals riding in the same vehicle or immediate area they are walking. Personnel escorted within the installation do not require passes, but must stay within the physical custody of the sponsor, within the sponsor's residence, or adjacent public areas of the sponsor's residence. Sponsors must remain in control of their escorted individual.

3.6.2. (FOUO) All foreign national visit requests will be forwarded to the 377 SFS/S5B a minimum of 30 calendar days (21 duty days) prior to the visit. The sponsor/sponsoring organization will complete visit request forms which will contain the following information: Visitor's personal information; reason for visit; dates of the visit; duty hours and days the visitor will need access to the installation; a specific POC for each visitor; escort requirements; and proof of vetting. 377 SFS/S5B will complete an NCIC check and forward all requests/results to AFOSI Detachment 814 for review.

3.6.2.1. The above requirements will be followed for foreign nationals from high risk countries with the following exception: FN visitors from high risk countries (to be determined by AFOSI) will not be allowed unescorted access to the installation and therefore will not be issued a base access credential. Sponsoring organizations must include the specific time(s) for access and locations of the visit. Organizations may request an exemption to this policy on a case by case basis. Requests will be sent to the 377 ABW/SMO a minimum of 30 calendar days (21 duty days) prior to the visit and must be approved by the 377 ABW/CC. AFOSI will assist in determining if any additional security measures are necessary.

3.6.2.2. (FOUO) Escort authority members are not authorized to vouch for non-US individuals (non U.S. citizens/non U.S. permanent resident aliens) to include those with foreign passports or identification credentials. All foreign visitors must have a visitor pass and present it to the access controller. Exception: FN visitors from high risk nations are not authorized unescorted installation access IAW paragraph 3.6.2.1.

3.6.3. (FOUO) Commanders may suspend escort authority based on the local threat, or may revoke individual escort authority privileges at their discretion.

3.6.4. (FOUO) Escort authority privileges are automatically suspended at FPCON Charlie.

3.7. Sandia Base Elementary School (SBES) and Albuquerque Public Schools (APS) Employees:

3.7.1. (FOUO) SBES Faculty and Staff: Non-DOD personnel employed by APS and assigned to Sandia Base Elementary School will be identity proofed and vetted IAW paragraph 3.2.5. Before a pass may be issued. The below guidelines will be followed when issuing access credentials:

3.7.1.1. (FOUO) The principal and school custodians will be authorized access 24 hours/day, 7 days/week for a period not to exceed one year, to Sandia Base Elementary School, 377 ABW Headquarters Building, and the Consolidated Support Building. Custodians are authorized access to SBES only.

3.7.1.2. (FOUO) All other SBES faculty and staff will be authorized access 7 days/week, 0600-2100 for a period not to exceed one year to Sandia Base Elementary School, 377 ABW Headquarters Building, and the Consolidated Support Building. SBES Faculty and Staff will be granted escort authority for up to 5 personnel. They are not authorized to sponsor personnel onto the installation.

3.7.1.3. (FOUO) The principal, counselor, instructional coach, secretary and clerk are the only personnel authorized to sponsor visitors. Any additions to this list must be approved in writing by the Installation Commander. These personnel will be listed as the sponsors for non-base affiliated parents and guardians of SBES students. As such, their sponsorship limits will be adjusted to accommodate this action.

3.7.1.4. (FOUO) SBES Parents/Guardians: Each student is authorized a maximum of 5 non-DOD personnel designated to enter the installation for drop-off/pickup of students or to attend school related functions. These non-DOD designated personnel will be identity proofed and vetted IAW paragraph 3.2.5. before a pass may be issued. The below guidelines will be followed when issuing access credentials:

3.7.1.4.1. (FOUO) SBES parent/guardians will be issued passes for the period 01 Aug- 31 May and authorized times will be Monday-Friday, 0730-1830 to Sandia Base Elementary School only. SBES Parents/Guardians will not be authorized escort or sponsorship authority.

3.7.1.4.2. (FOUO) SBES Regular Substitutes/Volunteers: If a substitute teacher or school volunteer regularly needs access to SBES, they may be issued a pass at the request of one of the individuals identified in paragraph 3.7.1.3. The Regular Substitutes/Volunteers must be identity proofed and vetted. They will be granted escort authority for up to 5 personnel. They are not authorized to sponsor personnel onto the installation.

3.8. (FOUO) Dependent Children (minors) of Divorced Parents. When a child of any age (including infants) possesses a valid DD Form 1173, Dependent Identification Card, and are accompanied by a non-base affiliated custodial parent, the non-base affiliated parent may obtain a one-day pass to the Consolidated Support Building (20245) to obtain an Agent Pass from the 377th Force Support Squadron. They will then proceed to 377 SFS/S5B to receive a base DBIDS ID card to be able to enter the Installation to use the Main Exchange and other authorized support facilities to transact business on behalf of the child. The DBIDS ID card will be coded to restrict entry to the installation only during the days/times support facilities are open. They will be identity proofed and vetted IAW paragraph 3.2.5. Before a pass may be issued. If the dependent is on base to visit the sponsor, the sponsor will be contacted prior to the pass being issued.

3.9. (FOUO) Media. A representative from a government public affairs office on KAFB must escort any media representatives wanting to cover an event on the installation. Escorts must remain within close proximity of press members they are escorting from the time and place of installation entry to time and place of installation departure. The following public affairs offices are authorized to escort media personnel onto the installation: 377 ABW, Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center (AFOTEC), DOE, SNL, 150 SOW, Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), AFSC, U.S. Customs Office, and the Lovelace Respiratory Research Institute. All tenant unit public affairs offices must notify 377 ABW Public Affairs office (377 ABW/PA) prior to vouching media onto the installation.

3.9.1. (FOUO) Media arriving in privately-owned vehicles (POVs) will be asked to show proof of insurance, registration, and driver's license before being allowed to proceed.

3.9.2. (FOUO) The 377 ABW/CC authorizes personnel assigned to the 377th Public Affairs office to escort up to 3 media vehicles with one Public Affairs escort vehicle to any media event (Exception to paragraph 3.6.1.). 377 ABW/PA will have the responsibility to escort all media vehicles and personnel from the time of entering Kirtland AFB up until their departure from the installation. They will escort no more than 3 separate vehicles at a time, and will call the SFS/BDOC immediately if a vehicle is separated from them. At no time will a media vehicle or personnel be without an immediate Public Affairs escort while on the installation.

3.10. (FOUO) Foreign Nationals: The following procedures will be followed by all agencies assigned to or sponsoring foreign nationals onto KAFB:

3.10.1. (FOUO) All foreign national visit requests will be forwarded to the 377 SFS/S5B a minimum of 30 calendar days (21 duty days) prior to the visit. The sponsor/sponsoring organization will complete a visit request form which will contain the following information: Visitor's personal information, reason for visit, dates of the visit, duty hours and days the visitor will need access to the installation, a specific POC for each visitor, escort requirements, and proof of vetting. 377 SFS/S5B will complete an NCIC check and forward all request/results to AFOSI Detachment 814 for review.

3.10.2. (FOUO) The above requirements will be followed for foreign nationals from high risk countries with the following exceptions; Foreign National (FN) visitors from high risk countries (to be determined by AFOSI) will not be allowed unescorted access to the installation and therefore will not be issued a base access credential. Sponsoring Organizations must include the specific time(s) for access and locations of the visit. Organizations may request an exemption to this policy on a case by case basis. Requests will be sent to the AFOSI who will assist in determining if any additional security measures are necessary.

3.10.3. (FOUO) AFOSI will be responsible for developing and updating the high risk countries list.

3.10.4. The 377 ABW/SMO will be responsible for disseminating the list to base agencies.

3.10.5. (FOUO) FN visitors requiring escort will be provided with a form letter from the 377 SFS/S5B indicating they are properly vetted and approved for base access provided they are escorted.

3.10.6. (FOUO) Lawful Permanent Residents (LPR). LPR visitors from high risk countries will be granted unescorted access upon review/recommendation from AFOSI. LPR employees of a KAFB organization will be granted unescorted access upon review/recommendation from AFOSI. Approved LPR employees will be granted escort/sponsorship authority.

3.10.7. (FOUO) FN employees of KAFB organizations. FN employees, including those from high risk countries, will be granted unescorted access upon review/recommendation from AFOSI. FN employees will be issued a DBIDS ID card.

3.10.8. (FOUO) Once visits are approved; AFOSI will forward them to 377 SFS/S5B who will inform the sponsoring organization. The sponsoring organization will contact 377 SFS/S5B and schedule ID card issue. The sponsoring organization will be responsible for escorting the FN to 377 SFS/S5B.

3.10.9. (FOUO) The Defense Biometric Identification Card System (DBIDS) will be used for ID card issue of all FNs who do not receive a Common Access Card (CAC). FNs who receive a CAC will be required to register in DBIDS. Unless specifically approved by the Installation Commander, FNs not employed or assigned to KAFB, will not be granted sponsorship authority. FN employees and FN military/dependents assigned to KAFB will be granted the same sponsorship authority as other employees/military members.

3.10.10. (FOUO) DBIDS ID cards/passes will be issued for the duration of the approved visit only, even if the FN is a recurring visitor. Specific access restrictions will be programmed into the DBIDS system identifying times/days of the week the FN is allowed access and the escort requirements.

3.10.11. (FOUO) The sponsoring organization will be required to return the DBIDS ID cards/passes to 377 SFS/S5B when the visit is over.

3.10.12. (FOUO) If a unit or organization has a foreign national that is reported AWOL or unauthorized absence, they must contact the 377 SFS/S5B, Pass and Registration office. The individual will be flagged in DBIDS along with their dependents. Profile status will be updated to read "AWOL" or "Unauthorized Absence" to include the date and initials of the individual updating the status.

3.11. (FOUO) Solicitation. Visitors requesting permission to solicit on KAFB will be referred to the 377 MSG/CC for authorization. Entry will be denied until such authorization is granted in writing.

3.12. (FOUO) U.S. State, County, or City Government Vehicles. These vehicles must have official markings or license plates identifying them as an official vehicle. As long as they are on official business, occupants of these vehicles do not require a visitor/vehicle pass. Occupants must have a valid credential from the agency they represent.

3.13. (FOUO) The granting of Sponsorship and/or Escort authority is authorized for any Wing Commander, equivalent or above assigned to the installation. This includes (but is not limited to) the AFNWC/CC, AFOTEC/CC, 58 SOW/CC, 150 SOW/CC, Civil Air Patrol Wing/CC, etc.

3.14. (FOUO) Commercial Vehicle Entry. Commercial vehicles are described as commercial, delivery, and/or contractor vehicles, including AAFES vehicles larger than a passenger vehicle (15 Pax van or larger). **NOTE:** Commercial parcel delivery services (e.g., FEDEX, UPS, DHL, USPS, etc.) pose an increased risk due to the ability of unknown personnel to send potentially dangerous packages from anywhere in the world. Based on the higher risk associated with these types of services, their vehicles will be searched regardless of the size or configuration.

3.14.1. (FOUO) All commercial vehicles will be required to enter through the Kirtland Contractor Gate or SNL Contractor Gate (SNL traffic only) commercial vehicle search gates and submit to a search before being allowed entry.

3.14.2. (FOUO) Commercial vehicles will enter through Kirtland Contractor Gate during duty hours (0600–1600) M-F. During weekends, holidays, and non-duty hours, large commercial vehicles will enter through Truman Gate. See paragraph 3.1.1.-3.1.14. for locations of access control points to the installation. Deliveries to SNL will use the Sandia Contractor Gate.

3.14.3 (FOUO) Drivers and all passengers must provide access controllers with a valid ID (as listed in 3.2.6.). Any driver or passenger that does not have a DBIDS ID card/pass will be identity proofed and vetted IAW paragraph 3.2.5. before a pass may be issued. A background check is required each time an individual accesses the installation unless they have a DBIDS ID card/pass. In addition, the driver must have a bill of lading, manifest, or service order showing they have business on the installation. If the drivers do not have the previously listed documents and the sponsoring organization/individual has not given the gate pre-notification, contact will be made with the sponsoring organization/individual to verify the legitimacy of the service call or delivery. Commercial vehicles do not require the issuance of a SFMIS/DBIDS pass after verification with the sponsoring organization/individual is made.

3.14.4. (FOUO) Shipments with sealed containers will have their seal numbers cross-checked with the seal number on the bill of lading. If the numbers match, the seal will not be broken to search the container.

3.14.5. (FOUO) Randomly, on-duty sentries will call the recipient of the shipment to verify the delivery. Commercial vehicles will be searched at the Kirtland Contractor Gate prior to entry to KAFB.

3.15. (FOUO) A visitor's pass is not required for taxis and courtesy shuttles (i.e., car dealership and hotel shuttles) provided there is an occupant with a valid base identification credential. The procedures in 3.21.5. Will be followed. Other vehicles exempt from obtaining a SFMIS/DBIDS pass are:

3.15.1. Explosives-laden vehicles will follow the procedures outlined in KAFBI 91-201, Transportation Procedures For Hazardous Materials, Radioactive Materials and Explosives, Para 1.3.1. – 1.3.4. During their hours of operation, all commercial vehicles will be

required to enter through the Kirtland or SNL (SNL traffic only) commercial vehicle search gates and submit to a search before being allowed entry.

3.15.2. U.S. Post Office vehicles.

3.15.3. Sun-Tran buses. Drivers must provide access controllers with a valid company ID and all passengers must provide a valid ID (as listed in 3.2.6.). Any driver or passenger that does not have a valid ID will be required to consent to, and have a favorable background check along with being sponsored before being allowed entry. A background check is required each time an individual accesses the installation unless they have a valid ID.

3.16. (FOUO) Motorcycles. "Active duty military must complete the Motorcycle Safety Foundation (MSF) Basic Rider Course (BRC) before operating a motorcycle. Additional motorcycle driver and passenger requirements are identified in KSUP 31-116, Motor Vehicle Traffic Supervision. AFI 91-207, 4.5 lists the categories of personnel exempt from the safety course requirements. Military personnel who operate or intend to operate a motorcycle on a roadway, or who are required to operate a government-owned or leased motorcycle for work are required to complete the motorcycle safety training. This requirement includes civilians who are required to operate a motorcycle for their job.

3.17. (FOUO) Special Events Gate Access. KAFB has specific guidelines for the sponsoring of guests onto the installation during FP condition NORMAL or ALPHA, with special emphasis on large or significant special events.

3.17.1. (FOUO) Sponsor-generated Base Access List (BAL) is only necessary when there are 10 or more guests attending the event, otherwise the sponsor may follow the procedures in 3.5.3. When the event includes 10 or more guests, the sponsor's BAL must be typed and include (in alphabetical order) both the last and first name, DOB and last 4 of the SSN of every invited guest (last 4 of SSN is not required for guests under the age of 18 years old, unless they are going to be driving on base). All personnel on the guest list are subject to background checks. The BAL must also include the time, date, and location of the event; name and phone number of a POC in the event any problems or changes occur; and gate of entry. The BAL should clearly identify the event; the guests should know the name of the event/BAL number. Guests should be informed to use the gate(s) which is identified on the BAL. Below is a listing of gates available:

3.17.1.1. (FOUO) Gibson Gate (846-7240). 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.

3.17.1.2. (FOUO) Wyoming Gate (846-6118). 0530-1900, Monday through Friday, excluding holidays.

3.17.1.3. (FOUO) Truman Gate (846-7509). 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.

3.17.1.4. (FOUO) Eubank Gate (846-6231). 0500-2359, 7 days a week.

3.17.2. (FOUO) An event sponsor must reside in local area, be base-affiliated and have sponsorship authority. The sponsor will hand-carry the BAL to the Pass and Registration Office (377 SFS/S5B) located in the Consolidated Support Building, M-F between the hours of 0900-1500, and present valid, base-affiliated identification. This BAL may also be e-mailed from a .mil address to the following: 377SFS.S5.SFOLPR@us.af.mil. The BAL must be submitted at least three (3) duty days prior to the event for proper vetting of guests. When all guests on the list have been properly vetted IAW paragraph 3.2.5. and cleared, the BAL will be authenticated with time, date, printed name and signature of the individual that processed the BAL. Additional guests to an existing BAL must be typed and hand-carried to the Pass & Registration Office. Once approved, the Pass & Registration Office will enter the information into the Defense Biometric Identification System (DBIDS) Access Roster, when applicable. The BAL will also be posted at the applicable installation gate(s) 24 hrs prior to the event. Guests who are not on the BAL will be processed IAW para 3.5., Visitors to KAFB.

3.17.3. (FOUO) Event/guest lists and changes received less than three duty days prior to the event may result in the guest(s) being delayed at the gate. In these circumstances, the guest(s) may be required to obtain a traditional visitor's pass and should consider arriving early for the event.

3.17.4. (FOUO) All individuals attending any properly coordinated special event must present a valid identification as listed in 3.2.6. Additionally, vehicle operators must provide a valid driver's license, and when requested from Installation Access Controller, vehicle registration, and current proof of insurance. Drivers who are unable to present the proper credentials will not be permitted to drive their vehicle on the installation. They must park their vehicle outside the installation and be transported to the event by another guest.

3.17.5. (FOUO) All personnel arriving in the same vehicle (18 YOA and older) will have to present valid identification. If any of these individuals are not on the event list, they will not be allowed access to the installation. Only base-affiliated individuals are authorized to sponsor guests. A guest cannot sponsor another guest.

3.17.6. (FOUO) Any exceptions to this policy will be handled on a case-by-case basis. If you cannot meet BAL requirements, notify Pass and Registration immediately.

3.17.7. (FOUO) During FP conditions BRAVO and above, the procedures outlined above still apply, with one exception. In this FPCON, if directed, sponsors must physically meet guests at the specified gate of entry to verify their identities. The 377 ABW/CC will determine if special events will be allowed during increased FPCONs.

3.17.8. (FOUO) Non-base affiliated civilian members of base clubs or functions (i.e. Mountain View Club, Golf Course, etc.). Base organizations may sponsor non base affiliated (NBA) civilian members for a period not to exceed one year. All sponsored personnel are required to be identity proofed and vetted IAW paragraph 3.2.5. before a long term pass may be issued. Sponsoring organizations are responsible for submitting the

required paperwork to 377 SFS/S5B 10 duty days before the requested issue date for the pass. These personnel will not be authorized to escort/sponsor other NBA personnel onto the installation.

3.18. (FOUO) Special Passes. These passes are provided by a base agency for a specific major base function or event (i.e. Sandia Day, change of command ceremonies, etc.). These passes must include an organizational logo and event name. Personnel desiring to sponsor a special event on KAFB will follow the requirements in 3.16.

3.19. (FOUO) Public Affairs and Protocol Distinguished Visitors' Passes. These are approved passes supplied by Public Affairs or Protocol to distinguished visitors. These passes will be produced by 377 SFS/S5B via DBIDS. PA will provide 377 SFS/S5B all pertinent information and a recent photo of the Distinguished Visitor (DV). The DV will be issued a DBIDS card which states "Distinguished Visitor" on it. Individuals with these passes will be rendered all proper customs and courtesies.

3.20. (FOUO) Non-Base Affiliated (NBA) Student Registration. NBA students will not be allowed to register for on base classes at the education center. Students must register for classes at the university or college off- base location. It is the responsibility of the university or college to issue the student a confirmation of registration letter. All NBA students must be identity proofed and vetted IAW paragraph 3.2.5. before a pass may be issued. The sponsoring college or university is responsible for obtaining the consent/information forms and providing them to the 377 SFS/S5B. Once a favorable background check is received, the college/university will be contacted and the student will be issued a DBIDS ID/pass. Exception: Students registering for Embry Riddle Aeronautical University and Southern Illinois University may receive a pass at the Gibson gate only to register for class. The university must be contacted to sponsor the student. Students will be directed to proceed directly to the education office. When the student arrives, the university will contact the Gibson gate and inform them of their arrival. If the Gibson gate is not contacted within 15 minutes, SFS/BDOC will be notified and a patrol will be dispatched to locate the student.

3.21. (FOUO) U.S. Department of Labor (DoL), Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) Inspector(s) and State of New Mexico requesting access to the installation for official business will be instructed to standby at the gate of entry for a representative of the Occupational Safety office, 377 ABW/SEG, to escort. The on-duty sentry will notify the Occupational Safety office that an OSHA Inspector is requesting entry to the installation. All OSHA inspectors are required to be escorted by the installation safety office IAW AFI 91-202, The US Air Force Mishap Prevention Program, para 8.8, Fire Protection, and Health (ADOSH) Program para 8.8 Department of Labor (DoL) inspections and Investigations of DOD Working Conditions. OSHA Inspectors will remain at the installation gate until a representative of the 377 ABW/SEG arrives to provide escort onto the installation. Personnel from the State of New Mexico, Environment Department, requesting access to the installation for official business will be instructed to standby at the gate of entry for a representative of the 377 MSG/CEI, Environmental Management Branch Office to escort. The on-duty sentry will notify the Environmental Management Branch office that a

member from the State of New Mexico, Environment Department is requesting entry to the installation.

3.22. Special Instructions.

3.22.1. (FOUO) Storage of Classified Material. Anyone approaching an installation entry control point requesting to store classified material will be referred to the KAFB Command Post who can make arrangements for temporary storage of the material.

3.22.2. (FOUO) Normal Checks. All vehicle drivers will be checked for valid identification as specified in paragraph 3.3. between the hours of 0530 and 1800.

3.22.3. (FOUO) After Hours Checks. After hour checks may be implemented by the on-duty SF flight chief or higher authority based on local events, i.e., New Mexico State Fair, Balloon Fiesta, etc. All vehicle occupants will be required to have a valid identification as specified in paragraph 3.3 or a SFMIS/DBIDS pass. The driver's license of the vehicle operator may be checked as additional identity verification when necessary.

3.22.4. (FOUO) Safety Belt Requirements. AFI 31-218, Motor Vehicle Traffic Supervision, requires all occupants of all vehicles to be restrained and all children 4 years and younger or less than 45 pounds to be in a "Child Restraint" car seat. IAW New Mexico Statutes Annotated, 66-7-369a, children less than one year of age shall be properly secured in a rear-facing child passenger restraint device that meets federal standards in the rear seat of a vehicle that is equipped with a rear seat. If the vehicle is not equipped with a rear seat, the child may ride in the front seat of the vehicle if the passenger-side air bag is deactivated, or if the vehicle is not equipped with a deactivation switch for the passenger-side air bag; children one year of age through four years of age, regardless of weight, or children who weigh less than forty pounds, regardless of age, shall be properly secured in a child passenger restraint device that meets federal standards; children five years of age through six years of age, regardless of weight, or children who weigh less than sixty pounds, regardless of age, shall be properly secured in either a child booster seat or an appropriate child passenger restraint device that meets federal standards; children seven years of age through twelve years of age shall be properly secured in a child passenger restraint device or by a seat belt. The child restraint law applies to all passenger cars, vans, and pickup trucks. Emergency vehicles, school buses, and public transportation are exempt.

3.22.5. (FOUO) Taxis. Contract taxis with passengers will only be allowed entry to KAFB if passengers meet all entry requirements. Taxis without passengers coming on base to pick up a fare must have their dispatch verified by verbal confirmation from the sponsor. Taxi drivers must be identity proofed and vetted IAW paragraph 3.2.5. if they do not already have an approved access credential. If the taxi has other passengers on board who do not have access to the installation, and are not guests of an authorized sponsor, they will not be permitted to enter KAFB. They will be dropped off prior to

reaching the installation gate. All vehicles entering and while on the installation are subject to search.

3.22.6. (FOUO) Safe Havens. The term SAFE HAVEN is used to identify shipments in which emergency assistance is provided by an installation to a carrier's vehicle transporting ammunition and explosives due to circumstances beyond a carrier's control (such as severe weather, vehicle breakdown or attack). If the SAFE HAVEN involves a DoE Safeguard Transporter and accompanying convoy vehicle shipments of classified or hazardous materials refer to KAFB IDP Appendix 5 to Annex C for actions. If a SAFE HAVEN is requested by a commercial vehicle refer to KAFBI 91-201, Transportation Procedures for Hazardous Material.

3.22.7. (FOUO) Parking at the KAFB VCCs will not exceed 30 minutes. Any vehicle not meeting this standard will be issued a DD Form 1408, Armed Forces Traffic Ticket. A DD Form 1805, Violation Notice, can be issued for handicapped parking violations if the on-duty sentry has contact with the driver. A DD Form 2504, Abandoned Vehicle Notice, may be used if the vehicle appears to be abandoned. Based on extenuating circumstances, the 30-minute parking limit may be waived by the flight chief or higher authority.

3.22.8. (FOUO) Buses. Installation access controllers will board all buses, including Sun Van Para-Transit Vans, to determine the eligibility of the occupants for unescorted entry for Sun Van Para-Transit Vans, access controllers must check operator's driver license. For school buses, access controllers must check the driver's Albuquerque Public School identification against their driver's license and walk the entire length of the bus to ensure nobody is laying down in any of the seats. Unauthorized personnel will be instructed to get off the bus and seek alternative transportation. The installation access controller will complete an AF Form 3907, Security Forces Field Interview Card for all unauthorized personnel.

3.22.8.1. (FOUO) Sun Van Para-Transit Vans. These vans are special purpose transports that provide transportation for people with disabilities to and from specific locations, and as such, follow a specific route. Passengers will have a Sun Van riders ID specific to this type of transportation. Non Base Affiliated passengers in these vans will not be required to get off of the van prior to base entry. Installation access controller will board the vans and validate ridership eligibility via their Sun Van riders ID. For pickups, a DOD ID card holder does not need to be present for entry, but all other requirements apply.

3.22.8.2. (FOUO) Entry During Emergency Periods. Upon implementation of increased FP conditions (FPCONs), contingency operations, confrontation management plans, or as required in support of anti-robbery procedures, anti-hijack operations, etc., stop-check-pass procedures will be enforced and available MWD support will be utilized at all base entry points to search vehicles.

3.23. (FOUO) Stop-check-pass procedures. Stop, check, and pass is performed at the installation access control points normally on outbound traffic. Its purpose is to identify and detain vehicles/individuals who may have been involved in an incident on base.

3.23.1. (FOUO) Base lock-down. Initially, during increased FPCONs, all installation gates will be closed for inbound and outbound traffic. Entry will be granted to only those with a mission-critical task that must be performed. These individuals are pre-identified by commanders in writing to the SFS/S2 branch and updated in DBIDS by the 377 SFS/S5B. An addition to an organization's mission critical listing requires accomplishment of a new letter. The new letter must include all pre-identified personnel for the unit with new additions annotated. The letter requires the same approval and routing process as the original. Multiple letters for the same organization will not be accepted. Specific procedures are detailed in KAFB Plan 10-245 Tab B, Appendix 6, Annex C, and Installation Curtailment Plan.

3.24. Base Entry Gate Closure Policy During Alarm Activations.

3.24.1. Objective. To prevent the loss of resources and the escape of perpetrators with minimum risk to personnel and disruption of installation operations.

3.24.2. Concept of Operations. In the event of an unannounced alarm activation or similar situation, the following procedures will be initiated at the installation gates.

3.24.2.1. Robbery of AA&E actions.

3.24.2.2. (FOUO) All installation access control points (except Maxwell Gate) will be closed upon receiving an alarm or duress notification from facilities containing AA&E until directed otherwise by the on-duty flight chief.

3.24.3. Robbery of Non-AA&E Actions.

3.24.3.1. (FOUO) For alarms other than those affecting AA&E facilities, the flight chief will consider location of the alarm, amount of time from notification to determining a robbery/event occurred, and other factors when making the decision whether or not to direct gate closure.

3.24.3.2. (FOUO) When the flight chief receives information an actual or attempted robbery occurred at the affected facility, he/she will direct the gate sentries to secure their gates. Exception: The gates will be secured automatically for any AA&E facility upon receiving an alarm.

3.24.3.3. (FOUO) Termination of Robbery Actions. When directed by the flight chief, or higher authority (through SFS/BDOC), gate closure procedures will be terminated.

3.24.4. Additional procedures for gate closure during emergency situations and unannounced alarm activations are contained in KAFB IDP 31-101.

3.25. (FOUO) Vehicle Checks for Contraband. Vehicles will be checked as often as considered necessary by the 377 ABW/CC, or designated representative, upon advice by the Integrated Defense Council (IDC) and IAW RIEVC as outlined in AFMAN 31-113, *Installation Perimeter Access Control*, to guard against theft, pilferage, or illegal use of or transportation of narcotics. The authority for program management is delegated to the 377 MSG/CC. Maximum utilization of (MWD) teams will be employed in conducting vehicle checks. Non-Base Affiliated civilians refusing to allow a check of their vehicles will be denied entry onto the installation. In the event a base affiliated individual refuses, SJA will be contacted for guidance. The Security Forces Law Enforcement (S3O) Form 2, Base Entry Point Checks, will be used for recording both military and civilian vehicles checked. In the event government property needs to be removed from the installation, the item(s) must be documented on an AF Form 1297, Temporary Issue Receipt. Personnel found with classified material in their possession must produce a DD Form 2501, Courier Card, or signed courier letter. Responding emergency vehicles and general officers are exempt.

3.26. (FOUO) Internal and Installation Entry Point Random Vehicle Inspections (RVI) will be conducted as directed by the 377 ABW/CC and approved by the 377 ABW/SJA, IAW the requirements in AFI 10-245 and USNORTHCOM FP Advisories. 377 SFS/S2 will publish the schedule. A minimum of two on duty patrolmen will set up the random checkpoint. RIEVC procedures for refusal of inspection and found evidence will be used for RVIs. Inspections will be documented on the S3L Form 2 and in the 377 SFS Blotter.

3.27. Identity Proofing, Registration, Identity Vetting, and Fitness Determination.

3.27.1. (FOUO) Identity Proofing is the process of providing sufficient information (e.g., identity history, credentials, documents) when attempting to establish an identity. Personnel assigned to the 377 SFG and 377 FSS will perform identity proofing during ID card/visitor pass issue and entry control. The following procedures apply:

3.27.1.1. CAC Populations. Persons possessing a CAC issued card IAW Directive Type Memorandum (DTM) 08-003-USD (P&R), Next Generation Common Access Card (CAC) Implementation Guidance, 1 Dec 2008, are identity proofed at card issuance sites from federally authorized identity documents and shall be considered identity proofed.

3.27.1.2. Non-CAC DOD Populations. Identity proofing requirements for military, retiree/dependent, civilian (included non-appropriated) and contractor populations are prescribed in DTM 09-012, Interim Policy Guidance for DOD Physical Access Control, 8 Dec 09. Persons possessing a DOD issued card IAW DODI 1000.13, Identification (ID) Cards for Members of the Uniformed Services, Their Dependents, and Other Eligible Individuals, 5 Dec 97, are identity proofed at card issuance sites from federally authorized identity documents and shall be considered identity proofed.

3.27.1.3. Non-DOD Federal PIV Populations. Persons possessing Federal PIV credentials that conform to DODI 5400.16, DOD Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) Guidance, 12 Feb 09, are vetted and adjudicated by government security specialists on a National Agency Check Inquiries (NACI) or Office of Personnel Management (OPM) Tier I standards (when implemented), and shall be considered identity proofed.

3.27.1.4. TWIC Holders. TWIC ID cards may be used for Identity Proofing, but holders must be vetted and have a valid need for access before being granted access to the installation.

3.27.1.5. Locally produced DBIDS ID card/pass and SFMIS pass holders. Personnel that do not possess a credential authorized to facilitate access, that have a validated need for one-time, intermittent or routine unescorted physical access to an installation require identity proofing and vetting to determine fitness and eligibility for access. The procedures in paragraph 3.5. will be followed.

3.27.2. (FOUO) Registration. All persons who have demonstrated a need for a credential allowing access to KAFB and are identity proofed and vetted will be required to register in the Defense Biometric Identification System (DBIDS). The 377 SFS/S5B is responsible for the administration of DBIDS.

3.27.2.1. (FOUO) Personnel who are not registered in DBIDS may be delayed access to the installation and directed to register.

3.27.3. (FOUO) Identity Vetting and Fitness Determination. Once an individual has undergone successful identity proofing, the individual's fitness for installation entry must be determined. The underlying factor in this determination is whether an individual poses an unreasonable threat to USAF resources or personnel if granted access to the installation.

3.27.3.1. Identity Vetting Requirements.

3.27.3.1.1. CAC Populations. Identity vetting requirements for CAC populations is prescribed in AFI 36- 3026 (IP), Volume 1, Identification Cards for Members of the Uniformed Services, Their Eligible Family Members, and Other Eligible Personnel, 17 Jun 09; HSPD-12, Policy for a Common Identification Standard for Federal Employees and Contractors, 27 Aug 04; DTM 09-012, Interim Policy Guidance for DOD Physical Access Control, 8 Dec 2009; and Office of Management Budget (OMB) implementing guidance and instructions. The vetting requirement for Active Duty, Civilian Employee and Contractor Eligible CAC holder personnel includes a minimum NACI or equivalent investigation. Fitness standards for these populations are listed in AFI 31-501, Personnel Security Program Management, 27 Jan 05. The 377 FSS is responsible for ensuring vetting requirements for CAC holders are met.

3.27.3.1.2. Non-CAC DOD Populations. Identity vetting requirements for military, retiree/dependent, civilian (included non-appropriated) and contractor populations is prescribed in AFI 36-3026 (IP), Volume 1, Identification Cards for Members of the Uniformed Services, Their Eligible Family Members, and Other Eligible Personnel, 17 Jun 09; DTM 09-012, Interim Policy Guidance for DOD Physical Access Control, 8 Dec 2009; and OMB implementing guidance and instructions.

3.27.3.1.2.1. The vetting requirement for Active Duty, Civilian Employee and Contractor Eligible Non- CAC DOD credential holders includes a minimum NACI or equivalent investigation. Fitness standards for these populations are listed in AFI 31-501, Personnel Security Program Management, 27 Jan 05.

3.27.3.1.3. Retiree personnel had their NACI or equivalent investigation while on active duty.

3.27.3.1.4. (FOUO) The dependent population has not been properly vetted. Their approved DOD sponsor assumes responsibility for assuring their fitness is appropriate to enter an Air Force Installation.

3.27.3.1.5. (FOUO) Non-DOD federal PIV populations. Per DTM 09-012, Interim Policy Guidance for DOD Physical Access Control, 8 Dec 09, personnel in possession of a valid Federal PIV are considered identity proofed and vetted for the purpose of installation access. These individuals are not allowed unabated access without sponsorship or a valid need for entry as determined by Installation Commander.

3.27.3.1.6. (FOUO) TWIC Holders. Per DOD policy, personnel in possession of a valid TWIC are considered identity proofed and vetted for the purpose of installation access. These individuals are not allowed unabated access without sponsorship or a valid need for entry as determined by the Installation Commander.

3.27.3.1.7. (FOUO) DBIDS ID cards/passes and SFMIS Pass populations. Personnel that do not possess a credential authorized to facilitate access, and have a validated need for one-time, intermittent or routine unescorted installation access require identity proofing and vetting to determine fitness and eligibility for access. Persons requesting access shall provide justification and/or purpose for access and must be sponsored IAW paragraph 3.5. All personnel are required to produce an ID credential listed in paragraph 3.2.6.

3.27.3.1.8. (FOUO) The minimum vetting standards for individual access could include a check via the National Crime Information Center (NCIC), the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB), State ID or driver's license check,

local Bernalillo County Warrants check, national sex offender registry, and Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE), if citizenship/status cannot be verified. Criminal history reports that indicate the case disposition is unknown or unavailable will be considered as convictions for the purpose of vetting and fitness determination. It is the responsibility of the individual requesting installation access to provide documented proof that the disqualifying information is not accurate.

3.27.3.2. (FOUO) Fitness Determination. Once an individual is vetted, the information will be reviewed to determine fitness to access the installation. Only members of the 377 SFG, designated by the DFC, are authorized to determine fitness. Any individual with the below listed negative screening criteria (disqualifying factors) will be denied access to the installation.

3.27.3.2.1. The individual is known to be or reasonably suspected of being a terrorist or belongs to an organization with known terrorism links/support.

3.27.3.2.2. The installation is unable to verify the individual's claimed identity.

3.27.3.2.3. There is a reasonable basis to believe the individual has submitted fraudulent information concerning his or her identity.

3.27.3.2.4. There is a reasonable basis to believe the individual will attempt to gain unauthorized access to classified documents, information protected by the Privacy Act, information that is proprietary in nature, or other sensitive or protected information.

3.27.3.2.5. There is a reasonable basis to believe the individual will unlawfully or inappropriately use an access credential outside the workplace.

3.27.3.2.6. There is a reasonable basis to believe based on an individual's criminal or dishonest history, that issuance of an access credential poses an unacceptable risk.

3.27.3.2.7. The individual has/had been barred from entry/access to a Federal installation or facility.

3.27.3.2.8. The individual is wanted by Federal or civil law enforcement authorities, regardless of offense or violation.

3.27.3.2.9. The individual was incarcerated for 12 months or longer within the past ten years, regardless of offense/violation, unless released on proof of innocence.

3.27.3.2.10. The individual has any conviction for espionage, sabotage, treason, terrorism, or murder.

3.27.3.2.11. The individual's name appears on any Federal agency's watch list or hit list for criminal behavior or terrorist activity.

3.27.3.2.12. The individual was convicted of a firearms or explosive violation (felony) within the past ten years or misdemeanor violation within the last three years.

3.27.3.2.13. The individual was convicted of sexual assault, armed robbery, rape, child molestation, child pornography, trafficking in humans, kidnapping (felony), drug possession with intent to sell/distribute, drug trafficking or drug distribution.

3.27.3.2.14. The individual was convicted of any felony drug possession offense, felony where a firearm or other dangerous weapon was used, aggravated assault or aggravated battery with great bodily harm to include vehicular homicide/manslaughter within the last ten years.

3.27.3.2.15. The individual was convicted of any misdemeanor offense where a firearm or other dangerous weapon was used within the last three years.

3.27.3.2.16. The individual was convicted of misdemeanor drug possession within the past 12 months.

3.27.3.2.17. The individual was convicted of any non-violent or drug related felony not previously addressed within the past 12 months.

3.27.3.2.18. The individual is a habitual offender regardless of the severity of the offense, with the exception of traffic violations.

3.27.3.2.19. There is a reasonable basis to believe, based on the individual's material, intentional false statement, deception, or fraud in connection with federal or contract employment, that issuance of an access credential poses an unacceptable risk.

3.27.3.2.20. There is a reasonable basis to believe, based on the nature or duration of the individual's alcohol abuse without evidence of substantial rehabilitation, that issuance of an access credential poses an unacceptable risk.

3.27.3.2.21. There is a reasonable basis to believe, based on the nature or duration of the individual's illegal use of narcotics, drugs, or other controlled substances without evidence of substantial rehabilitation, that issuance of an access credential poses an unacceptable risk.

3.27.3.2.22. Statutory or regulatory bar prevents the individual's contract employment; or would prevent federal employment under circumstances that furnish a reasonable basis to believe that issuance of an access credential poses an unacceptable risk.

3.27.3.2.23. The individual has knowingly and willfully engaged in acts or activities designed to overthrow the U.S. Government by force.

3.28.4. (FOUO) The 377th Security Forces Squadron (SFS), Pass and Registration Office (S5B), 377th SFS On-Duty Flight Chief, and 377th Security Forces Investigation section (S2I) are designated for oversight of the installation's vetting/fitness determination program. Prior to issuing any installation pass, they will ensure the following:

3.28.4.1. (FOUO) All required vetting paperwork is received from the sponsoring agency. All paperwork will be verified to ensure accuracy and completion. Any incomplete paperwork will be returned to the sponsoring agency to be re-accomplished. No passes will be issued until all paperwork is completed properly.

3.28.4.2. (FOUO) Maintain all copies of all visitor paperwork for the duration of the visit. Background checks are valid for the duration of the "visitors" need for access only. A new check must be completed before a new base credential can be issued. Upon completion of the contract period, unless notified in writing by the contracting office that the contract was extended, all paperwork will be destroyed.

3.28. Request for Reconsideration of Base Access Due to Disqualifying Information. Individuals may request reconsideration under the following circumstances:

3.28.1. (FOUO) Individuals who can provide official documentation showing the offense(s) are inaccurate or no longer valid i.e. dismissed or expunged. Documentation must be provided to the vetting agency, which can make the determination to issue the access credential.

3.28.2. (FOUO) Current KAFB Employees. Current "employees" who have disqualifying information when applying for a new access credential may request reconsideration by providing a request letter, endorsed by their agency commander/director to 377 SFS/S5B. The request will be staffed through 377 ABW/JA to the Installation Commander for approval/denial. Personnel who have requested reconsideration may continue to work, but must be escorted while on the installation by an authorized individual while their request is processed.

3.28.5.1. (FOUO) Reconsideration packages will include the employees request letter, background check paperwork, a recommend/non recommend letter from the DFC or 377 SFS/CC, and letters of recommendation or other supporting documentation provided by the requestor.

3.28.5.2. (FOUO) Under special circumstances (i.e. distinguished visitors, medical caregivers, family visitors, etc.) the Installation Commander may authorize unescorted access to an individual who is denied access due to disqualifying information. The sponsor of the individual must provide a request/justification letter to the 377 SFS/S5B (commander/director endorsement is not required) who will process the request IAW the procedures in paragraphs 3.26.5.2.-3.26.5.2.1. This provision does not apply to new/prospective employees of any agency/company working or located on the installation.

3.28.5.3. (FOUO) All contracting offices on KAFB, to include non DOD agencies, will ensure all contracts include a provision mandating contractors and subcontractors to be properly identity proofed and vetted IAW the procedures in this document. In addition, the provision will require the contractor to ensure all issued base access credentials are returned to 377 SFS/S5B when the contract employee no longer requires access to the installation. Any employee whose credential is not returned may be denied access to the installation for a period of one year.

3.29. On-Base Contractor Operations.

3.29.1. (FOUO) The Installation Commander has designated the Information Security Program Manager (ISPM), as the authority for oversight and administration of the Industrial Security Program to include oversight, support, and supervision over on-base contractor operations. The 377th Air Base Wing, Industrial Security Office (377 ABW/IPD) manages this function for the ISPM.

3.29.2. (FOUO) The 377 ABW/IPD designates on-base contractor operations that require access to classified information as intermittent, integrated, National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual, (NISPOM) or cleared facility visitor groups requiring access to classified information. The 377 ABW/IPD executes the Visitor Group Security Agreement (VGSA) for all contractors within the cognizance of the 377 ABW/IP offices operating continuously for periods over 90-days that require access to classified information. The prime contractor VGSA is executed and signed by all parties prior to on-base operations, to include their subcontractors.

3.29.3. (FOUO) The 377 ABW/IPD tracks completion of on-base integrated visitor groups, cleared facilities visitor groups, and NISPOM visitor group's contractor operations. The contracting officer shall ensure the government program manager, project manager, or AF activity notify 377 ABW/IPD in writing (memorandum letter or e-mail) when contractual services and/or performance are determined to be completed, terminated, final, or follow-on.

3.29.4. (FOUO) The contracting officer shall notify 377 ABW/IPD when contractors work on KAFB or at the site with their organizations for periods of 30-days or more continuously prior to on-base operations for locally generated contracts. This applies to

classified and unclassified contracts, contractor visitor groups that require access to classified information, and contractors operating on unclassified contract work efforts. The notification shall list company name, contract number, duration of performance, number of employees, and whether the contract is a classified contract or an unclassified contract at that time.

3.29.5. (FOUO) The AF activity and/or security manager shall notify 377 ABW/IPD of on-base contractor visitor groups operating within their organizations for periods of 30-days or more continuously prior to on-base operations when the contract was not generated locally. The notification shall list company name, contract number, duration of performance, number of employees, and whether the contract is a classified contract or an unclassified contract at that time.

3.30. Debarment Procedures.

3.30.1. Under the authority of 50 U.S.C. 797 and DODI 5200.08, Installation Commanders may deny access to the installation through the use of a debarment order. Installation Commanders may not delegate this authority. The 377 ABW/CC is the approval authority for all debarment actions occurring on KAFB.

3.30.1.1. (FOUO) Personnel recommending/requesting debarment action will forward a request to the 377 SFS Reports and Analysis section (377 SFS/S2R) with supporting documentation. 377 SFS/S2R will compile all required supporting documentation and forward debarment packages to 377 ABW/JA for recommendation. The 377 ABW/JA will review all supporting documents and make recommendations to the 377 ABW/CC.

3.30.1.1.1. (FOUO) The offenses listed in Table 1 will be used by the 377 SFS/S2R to initiate debarment packages for offenses that occur on the installation. The 377 ABW/JA is responsible for determining the length of the debarment and recommending debarment of individuals who commit offenses off of the installation or that are not listed in Table 1 located on page 227.

3.30.1.1.2. (FOUO) Debarment packages should be staffed during normal duty hours. When the 377 ABW/CC orders a debarment, the 377 SFS/S2R will ensure the debarment action is served on the individual in person or via certified mail.

3.30.1.1.3. (FOUO) The 377 SFS/S2R will update all base debarment listings and maintain supporting documentation for the period of the debarment.

3.30.2. (FOUO) Immediate Debarment Procedures. Debarment requests for incidents which pose a threat to the installation or personnel may be initiated immediately. Generally, base affiliated individuals, to include government employed contractors,

should not be barred using this procedure. Determination as to the base affiliation of an individual should be made prior to initiating debarment. The 377 ABW/JA will be contacted prior to requesting debarment from the 377 ABW/CC. Immediate debarment should be pursued regardless of the offense or individual's base affiliation if an individual's action(s) pose a threat to the installation or personnel. Offenses warranting initiation of immediate debarment of non-base affiliated personnel are listed in Table 2. Located on page 227.

3.30.2.1. (FOUO) The Base Defense Operations Center (SFS/BDOC) controller will contact the Command Post to initiate a three-way conference call between 377 ABW/CC, 377 ABW/JA, and SFS/BDOC or the Security Forces patrolman requesting the debarment. 377 ABW/JA and the 377 ABW/CC will be fully briefed on the incident and the 377 ABW/CC will make a final decision on debarment. Specific procedures for completing and serving the letter will be outlined in the 377 SFS Instructions. After issuance of an immediate debarment order, a package will be routed in accordance with paragraph 3.28.1.1. – 3.28.1.1.3. above.

3.30.3. Debarment Appeal Process/Reinstatement. Anyone barred from an installation may petition the Installation Commander for full reinstatement, partial reinstatement, or limited privileges.

3.30.3.1. (FOUO) Personnel who wish to request reinstatement will provide a request letter addressed to the 377 ABW/CC, through the 377 SFS/S2R. The 377 SFS/S2R will staff a request for reinstatement package through the 377 ABW/JA and the DFC to the 377 ABW/CC for a determination.

3.30.3.1.1. 377 SFS/S2R will notify the individual in writing, person, or via certified mail, of the 377 ABW/CCs decision.

TABLE 1. OFFENSES THAT WARRANT INITIATION OF DEBARMENT PACKAGES THAT OCCUR ON THE INSTALLATION

Offense	Military Member	Dependent's	Retirees	Civilian Employees	BA Contractors	Other Affiliations	NBA Personnel	Recommended Term
Possession of illegal drugs		X	X	X	X	X	X	3 Years
assault/Battery		X	X	X	X	X	X	3 Years
Sex Offenses		X	X	X	X	X	X	3 Years
Any violent crime		X	X	X	X	X	X	3 Years
Weapons violations		X	X	X	X	X	X	1 Year
Harassment and Stalking		X	X	X	X	X	X	3 Years
Kidnapping		X	X	X	X	X	X	3 Years
Damage to Government Property				X	X	X	X	1 Year
Larceny				X	X	X	X	1 Year
Military members upon discharge for any of the above offenses	X							Determined by SJA
Criminal trespass/violation of a debarment order		X	X	X	X	X	X	3 Years

TABLE 2. OFFENSES WARRANTING INITIATION OF IMMEDIATE DEBARMENT OF NON-BASE AFFILIATED PERSONNEL

Offense	Recommend Debarment Term
Possession/use of Illegal Drugs/paraphernalia	3 Years
Assault or Battery regardless of degree	3 Years
Sex Offenses (all)	3 Years
Any violent crime	3 Years
Weapons violations	3 Years

ENCLOSURE 1 TO TAB A TO APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX K TO KAFB IDP 31-101
GATE RUNNER PROCEDURES

REFERENCES: Refer to Basic Plan.

1. OBJECTIVE: To establish KAFB security procedures for installation gate runner(s).
2. MISSION: See basic plan.
3. EXECUTION: To stop and or detain unauthorized individuals from gaining access to installation. Once unauthorized access has been gained utilize required resources to stop and remove the subject from installation, as required.

3.1. 377 SFS will:

- 3.1.1. Activate Vehicle Barrier System (VBS) and notify all posts/patrols.
- 3.1.2. Contact KCP and provide vehicle description, occupant information and last known direction of travel for up-channeling to ABW/CC or designee and proper dissemination to all KAFB organizations.
- 3.1.3. Initiate installation lockdown/stop check and pass procedures, as directed.
- 3.1.4. Establish necessary blocking forces and request additional support (i.e. sector sweeps) from WSSS/SSCC as necessary.
- 3.1.5. Upon situation termination, contact KCP and WSSS/SSCC.

3.2. KCP will:

- 3.2.1. Make appropriate notifications for situation initiation/termination to ABW/CC or designee and tenant organizations IAW established notification matrix(s).

3.3. WSSS/SSCC will:

- 3.3.1. Provide patrols as requested by SFS/BDOC.

TAB B TO APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX K TO KAFB IDP 31-101
BASE OPEN HOUSE PROTECTION PROCEDURES

REFERENCES: Refer to the Basic Plan.

1. PURPOSE: To safeguard assigned and deployed resources while maintaining a positive image through the effective management and movement of pedestrian and vehicular traffic on KAFB.
2. OPTION DESCRIPTION: KAFB may host an open house each year. During these events, the need for base security is increased. Awareness by all base personnel is a constant necessity. A written plan will be prepared prior to implementation. Through close coordination and heightened vigilance by both on and off-base agencies, base personnel will maintain the ability to effectively handle all contingencies and create a positive image for the Air Force and its mission.
3. EXECUTION:
 - 3.1. The 377 MSG/CC will:
 - 3.1.1. (FOUO) Assist in the procurement and placement of barriers around displays or other areas having been placed off limits to visitors.
 - 3.1.2. (FOUO) Ensure adequate firefighting personnel are on duty during the entire open house.
 - 3.1.3. (FOUO) Water cannons or water trucks are positioned at essential crowd control points such as entrances to runways or aircraft parking areas, if appropriate, as an added protective measure.
 - 3.2. The 58 SOW/CC will:
 - 3.2.1. Brief air crews on potential threats.
 - 3.2.2. (FOUO) Detail duty air crews around display aircraft to maintain public relations and provide vigilance for unusual activities.
 - 3.3. The 377 MDG/CC will:
 - 3.3.1. (FOUO) Provide contracted ambulance service and first aid treatment stations.
 - 3.3.2. (FOUO) Ensure adequate response capability to mass casualty or similar Emergencies is provided.
 - 3.4. The DFC will:

3.4.1. (FOUO) Ensure joint SF and local police agency coordination is established. Consider the use of a mobile command center that can communicate with open house police on a separate radio net and when possible, normal duty Security Forces and base open house police will operate on separate nets. If this is not possible, law enforcement patrols/base open house police will operate on the same net and security patrols will be on a separate net.

3.4.2. Arm essential personnel only.

3.4.3. Ensure adequate traffic and parking plans are established and maintained.

3.4.4. Identify and clearly mark prohibited areas.

3.4.5. Establish DV protection procedures.

3.4.6. (FOUO) Respond to any demonstrations, acts of vandalism, or any other situation in a low-key manner to prevent unnecessary escalation of the situation.

3.4.7. Form an Open House Planning Committee.

3.4.7.1. (FOUO) Additional tasking's will be determined by the planning committee, which will consist of representatives from 377 SFG, 377 ABW/SE, 377 ABW/JA, 377 ABW/PA, 377 MSG/CE, 377 SFG/ATO, 377 ABW/XP, 377 AFOSI Detachment 814, EOD, 377 MXS/MXO, 58 SOW, 377 FSS, 377 MSG/SC and 377 MDG.

3.5. (FOUO) The AFOSI Detachment 814 will collect counterintelligence information concerning organizations that might disrupt open house activities and coordinate with Security Forces to determine possible threats and the ability to react accordingly.

3.6. The 377 ABW/JA will determine procedures, in coordination with the Security Forces, for prosecution of civilian demonstrators and lawbreakers.

3.7. The 377 ABW/SE will:

3.7.1. (FOUO) Determine requirements for the safety of large crowds, proper distances for cordoning off potentially hazardous areas, proper use of safety barriers, and other safety related items.

3.7.2. Coordinate with Security Forces on the plan for vehicle flow and parking procedures.

4. COMMAND AND CONTROL:

4.1. (FOUO) Reporting. Up-channel reporting procedures for serious incident reports and U.S. Air Force protection level resources are unchanged. However, when planning open

house activities, determine methods to enhance these requirements. Base officials normally notified during such events must be able to be contacted by the command post at all times.

4.2. (FOUO) Open House. During the open house, mission capable aircraft assigned a security protection level (1, 2, or 3) do not lose their protection level for open house displays and demonstrations. Therefore, the coordinated efforts of the aircrew and posted Security Forces are essential. Consider limiting the number of visitors allowed near protection level aircraft.

4.2.1. (FOUO) For large aircraft, such as airlift aircraft, consider regulating the number of visitors consistent with Security Forces and aircrew surveillance abilities.

4.2.2. (FOUO) If necessary, based on the threat intelligence and local decision, establish the identity of visitors before allowing them to enter the restricted area around the protection level aircraft.

4.2.3. (FOUO) Visitors may be required to sign an entry log after positive identification and before entry to the restricted area. The owning command and the aircraft commander make the final determination on protection procedures required; however, if a visitor log is used, the AF Form 1109, Visitor Register Log, is ideally suited for the purpose.

4.2.4. (FOUO) Consider limiting display aircraft to a number that can be observed by on-duty Security Forces. Increasing the number of displays, and thus over extending Security Forces, will diminish the quality of security and degrade the overall installation security effort.

4.3. (FOUO) Guidelines. The guidelines in AFI 31-101 will be considered for safeguarding display aircraft during the open house.

APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX K TO KAFB IDP 31-101
RESOURCE PROTECTION PROGRAM (CONTROLLED AREAS AND IDS ALARM
SYSTEM)

REFERENCES: Refer to the Basic Plan.

1. OBJECTIVE: To provide guidance to owner/user personnel on controlled area actions, IDS alarm actions, installation security and Security Forces responding to attempted or actual events.

2. PURPOSE: This section applies to agencies having existing or establishing controlled areas and approved IDS alarm systems. Identify responsibilities of activities involved in supporting alarmed facilities to include the procedures and responsibilities of the owner/user of alarmed facilities. Determine level of response for alarm activations. KAFB uses the Advantor® Suites for Networking (ASN) intrusion detection system (IDS) Service Pack 6.

3. MISSION: KAFB has established controlled areas IAW AFI 31-101, Integrated Defense, to provide an added degree of security to certain PL 3 and PL 4 resources. The designation "Controlled Area" carries the same legal and moral restrictions as a physical barrier. The owner/user agency is primarily responsible for providing entry and internal control over these areas. An intrusion detection system (IDS) is a vital part of any protection system designed to provide an in-depth protection for base resources. The acquisition and use of IDS must be a basic consideration in all RPPs. Reliable IDS, used with timely alarm assessment and adequate armed response, is invaluable to the RPP. The IDS performs best when fully integrated with barriers, lighting, manpower, and operational procedures.

4. EXECUTION FOR CONTROLLED AREA:

4.1. Concept of Operations. USAF/DOD resources and personnel will be provided protection by a combination of physical security aids, procedures, and training. The level of protection will be adequate for a low-level threat.

4.2. Responsibilities. Commanders at all levels are responsible for the physical protection of DOD resources under their jurisdiction. Consequently, they must ensure their respective facilities are afforded adequate protection. A continuing program must be established to educate all personnel of their responsibility for the protection of government resources.

4.3. Criterion for the Establishment, Control and Regulation of Controlled Areas. These criteria are contained in AFI 31-101 and AFI 31-101 AFGSC Sup. Criterion for Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) areas is controlled by Intelligence Community Standard (ICS) 705, Technical Specifications for Construction and Management of Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities. When AFI 31-101 and other regulations conflict, the more stringent regulation will apply.

4.4. (FOUO) Requesting establishment, modification, or disestablishment of a Controlled Area. Units requesting to establish a controlled area must submit their request through 377 SFS Resource Protection office (S5C) meeting requirements within AFI 31-101 and AFI 31-

101 AFGSC Sup. The request letter must include the specific areas of the controlled area, reason the area needs to be a controlled area, and the physical construction of the area (i.e., type of doors, locks, walls, and ceilings). Units requesting to modify areas will notify 377 SFS/S5C with specification and guidance will be provided through 377 SFS/S5C. Units requesting to disestablish an area will send a memo signed by unit commander to 377 SFS/S5C stating reason. 377 SFS/S5C will submit all packages through the proper IDC voting members for coordination before getting approval from 377 ABW/CC of designation, modification, or disestablishment of any controlled area. Units will not maintain any protection level materials within the requested area until approved by the 377 ABW/CC.

4.5. Tasked Organizations.

4.5.1. 377 ABW/CC will designate, approve modifications, and disestablish all controlled areas.

4.5.2. (FOUO) The DFC monitors installation controlled areas through the Installation Security Section (ISS) which is the 377 SFS/S5C Office. The 377SFS/S5C will provide physical security inspections and surveys, guidance pertaining to protecting resources, responses to threat situations when notified, verify the need for intrusion/detection equipment systems, and review of all units/activities written OIs. For AA&E, ensure that only secure government facilities are used.

4.5.3. (FOUO) AFSFC sustainment contract will provide solicited support for sustainment and maintenance required physical security protection devices after receiving coordination from 377 SFS/S5C and work order. Provide response according to contract guidelines and required PL 3-4 times. Ensure the 377 SFS/S5C are included on the coordination phase of all work requests involving construction, modification, or installation so further coordination between organization can develop.

4.5.3.1. (FOUO) Within the sustainment and maintenance contract the Contractor shall provide appropriate technician manning to perform the work listed within contract and in accordance with this PWS. Preventative Maintenance (PM) shall be provided. PM is defined as the scheduled care and servicing for the purpose of maintaining equipment and systems in a satisfactory condition. PM provides for the systematic inspection, detection, and correction of incipient failures either before they occur or before they develop into major defects. Preventative Maintenance consists of visual inspection, concise operational testing, adjustments, calibration, and cleaning, lubricating, replacement of minor parts, consumables, and performance verification of applications software and system electronics. Preventative Maintenance on PL 3 and PL 4 areas will be conducted at least annually but may occur more regularly if necessitated by manufacturer's guidelines, environmental conditions, or other factors that would increase periodicity. Tests according to PWS will be on uninterrupted power supplies (UPS), battery power, associated sensors integrated with approved annunciators, and only on A7S approved systems and devices. Preventative maintenance is considered routine in nature and therefore shall be scheduled during regular working hours, Monday

through Friday, excluding legal holidays. Preventative Maintenance activities shall be logged, managed, and tracked using the Government owned instance of IMMS.

4.5.3.2. (FOUO) After all maintenance and before the area is removed from owner/user responsibility conduct an operational test on sensor.

4.5.4. Owner/user agencies having controlled areas.

4.5.4.1. (FOUO) Develop written Ois and coordinate for approval through 377 SFS/S5C before implementation. The OI must cover all requirements listed within AFI 31-101 for the classification for their controlled areas (i.e., classified, AA&E, funds, drug, etc.) and any other specific regulation for their area noted within AFI 31-101.

4.5.4.2. (FOUO) Designate a primary and alternate controlled area monitor (CAM) and forward a copy of the designation letter to 377 SFS/S5C. 377 SFS/S5C will provide training to all alarm custodians and controlled area monitors annually. The monitor is responsible for monitoring, programming, and coordinating all protection requirements to support the controlled area. Continue to update this letter as changes in personnel occur.

4.5.4.3. Post a proper sign for the area as identified in AFI 31-101 chapter 6 and 8. Utilize Air Force Visual Aid (AFVA) 31-203/204 or 205, Controlled Area Warning Signs and if protected with intrusion detection alarm systems, post the AFVA 31-232, Intrusion Detection Warning Sign, on all entry points to the controlled area. It is the responsibility of the owner/user to obtain signs through their customer account representative for forms and publications. The Internet address for ordering is: [http://afpubs.hq.af.mil/Physical Products/Physical.asp](http://afpubs.hq.af.mil/Physical%20Products/Physical.asp).

4.5.4.4. (FOUO) Coordinate plans for free zone operations within the controlled area with 377 SFS/S5C before implementation. All security requirements listed in AFI 31-101 and AFI 31-101 AFGSC Sup, will be accomplished before establishment.

4.5.4.4.1. Free Zones for PL 4 Resources (Controlled Areas). Free Zones are established within controlled areas when construction or similar activities makes securing the area and applying normal circulation controls non-functional. In such cases, establish a Free Zone corridor from some point on the controlled area boundary to the work project to aid in moving personnel and equipment or the removal of PL 4 resources and other mission-essential resources from the Free Zone area.

4.5.4.4.2. As a minimum, controlled area entry/exit is the responsibility of the owning commander for the area. The commander for the area will establish Free Zone procedures to include: boundary markings; who performs entry control duties; how entry is controlled; and escort ratios (suitable to the space).

The ratio should be determined by assessing the ability of the escort official to effectively control escorted or visitors within in the area; however, no more than 10 escorted/visitors per escort official. The procedures will be provided to 377 SFS/S5C prior to implementation. **NOTE:** SF will not be used to conduct these activities. Arming requirements for PL 4 resources is not applicable.

4.5.4.4.2.1. Close the Free Zone and secure the controlled area after normal work hours.

4.5.4.4.2.2. Vehicle entry is not applicable to controlled areas within a facility; however, specific areas that conduct vehicle entry will codify entry, control, and search procedures within unit OIs or Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs).

4.5.4.4.3. Contractors. Contractors must be provided a signed letter from the Installation Commander, or their designee, describing procedures for Free Zone utilization. Owner/user personnel responsible for the respective Free Zones are responsible for completing this requirement.

4.5.4.5. (FOUO) Ensure all procedures concerning alarm operations and controlled areas are complied with, to include physical security and administrative requirements as identified in AFI 31-101 and AFI 31-101 AFGSC Sup.

4.5.4.6. (FOUO) Owner/user agencies of alarmed facilities will provide visual surveillance of facilities and control entry when alarm systems are accessed. Area commander holds responsibility for complains and with key control of sensor system and power distribution systems.

4.5.4.7. (FOUO) Submit a list of areas requiring more than normal Security Forces protection to 377 SFS/S5C and state the reasons why additional protection is required.

4.5.4.8. Activities with a regulatory requirement for communications electronics will ensure they are maintained in accordance with this plan and AFI 31-101.

4.5.4.9. (FOUO) Any physical changes to the controlled area (i.e., transfer of ownership, downgrading the status, modifying boundaries) must be coordinated with the RPP manager and approved in writing by the Installation Commander.

4.6. Tasks.

4.6.1. All organizations with PL 4 controlled areas and sensitive areas will comply with applicable portions of AFI 31-101, AFI 31-101 AFGSC Sup, and this instruction.

4.6.1.1. Areas using an approved badging system are not required to have all information on an EAL; however, the unit will follow steps outlined in paragraphs 4.6.6.2. - 4.6.6.4.

4.6.2. (FOUO) The owners/users of the controlled areas and sensitive areas have primary responsibility for controlling and safeguarding their associated areas. Current established entry and ID credentials used for controlled areas are addressed to the IDC; newly established credentials will first be approved.

4.6.3. (FOUO) All personnel who work in controlled areas must receive initial and follow-on training from the controlled area custodian/monitor. Training will include all requirements as stated within AFI 31-101, Chapter 8 and documentation will be maintained within the controlled area.

4.6.4. A list of approved controlled areas is maintained in Tab 1 of this Annex. Responsible owner/users must develop increased protection standards for use during increased FP conditions and contingencies.

4.6.5. Controlled Area Entry Requirements. There are two basic standards for entering a controlled area, qualification and authority:

4.6.5.1. (FOUO) In determining a system qualification, unit commanders must balance the need for stringent entry qualifications against normal operational requirements and the sensitivity of the protected resources. Basic qualifications can range from local file checks to special investigations.

4.6.5.2. (FOUO) Authority to enter controlled areas is delegated to the unit commander having jurisdiction over the protected resource. Authority to enter must be given only to personnel who need access to the area to perform official duties on a continuing and regular basis.

4.6.5.3. (FOUO) Unit commanders or designated representative of the controlled area with their appointed custodians develop and grant access to enter controlled areas under their responsibility.

4.6.6. EAL Requirements. EALs must identify whether or not an individual is authorized unescorted entry or requires an escort. In addition, EALs must contain the following information to enhance identity verification:

4.6.6.1. (FOUO) Last name, first name, middle initial, OFF/ENL/CIV, last six numbers of the SSN or DOD ID number to protect personal identity, and clearance level if applicable for the designated area. Areas using an approved badging system are not required to have all information on an EAL, however, will follow below steps within 4.6.6.2 - 4.6.6.4.

4.6.6.2. (FOUO) The owning commander or designated representative of the controlled area will sign the EAL for approval. Authentication procedures are not required for controlled areas due to the area being a commanders program.

4.6.6.3. Follow all procedures for additions, deletions and discrepancies to EALs as stated in AFI 31-101.

4.6.6.4. (FOUO) Custodians will post EALs conspicuously within their areas and publish the criteria in a unit OI or equivalent. All personnel who work within the controlled area are responsible for knowing and complying with the procedures.

4.6.7. (FOUO) Escort Procedures. Personnel not listed on a signed EAL will be escorted and monitored the entire time of visit. Visitors' information will be logged onto a visitor form, and an escort briefing is provided on all security and safety requirements. The custodian or monitor will be required to follow guidance stated in AFI 31-101. The ratio should be determined by the organization's commander and be predicated on the ability of the escort official to effectively control escorted or visitors within in the area. At no time will the escort ratio exceed 1 escort official to 10 persons.

4.6.8. Controlled Area Monitors.

4.6.8.1. (FOUO) Controlled area monitors must conduct initial and annual security awareness training for users and document the training. The controlled area monitor must maintain the following: designation letter; appointment letter for primary and alternate controlled area monitor to include other specialty appointment letters; (examples are funds custodian, weapons/munitions and key and lock custodian, etc.); initial and most recent resource protection surveys, most recent penetration entry exercises report and/or anti-robbery exercise (if applicable); security awareness training for all personnel listed on the EAL; a signed OI detailing all requirements stated above and within AFI 31-101; a copy of AFI 31-101; AFI 31-101 AFGSC Sup; KAFB IDP 31-101; and all special instruction (may be maintained on electronic media). Areas with alarm accounts need all applicable alarm paperwork.

4.6.9. Owner/User Responsibility in Controlled Areas. The gaining of access to controlled areas by unauthorized individuals poses a threat through theft, damage to resources, and possible compromise of classified material, or loss of government property. Situations or events posing a threat to controlled areas could occur with little or no warning.

4.6.10. Limiting Factors.

4.6.10.1. (FOUO) Security Forces are not available to guard the boundaries of each controlled area; therefore, occupants will assume such functions.

4.6.10.2. (FOUO) Personnel move throughout offices, warehouses, or other controlled areas without displaying positive means of identification.

4.6.10.3. (FOUO) The use of physical security aids such as fencing, screens, high security padlocks, lighting, and intrusion detection alarm systems is restricted by available funds.

4.6.10.4. (FOUO) SF patrols cannot constantly observe all controlled areas.

5. CONSIDERATIONS AND EXECUTION FOR IDS ALARMED AREA:

5.1. (FOUO) Alarm Systems. KAFB uses the Advantor® Suites for Networking (ASN) intrusion detection system (IDS) Service Pack 6.

5.2. (FOUO) IDS System Failure. Due to limited manning, the number of alarmed facilities on-base, and mission requirements of Security Forces, owners/users of alarmed facilities on KAFB will provide security protection IAW AFI 31-101 and this plan in the event of a total alarm system failure. The DFC may waive this requirement if appropriate compensatory measures can be applied that would otherwise meet the intent of the instruction.

5.3. (FOUO) Quarterly and Monthly Alarm Testing. All alarmed facilities/custodians will test and document the alarm testing via a log which is maintained for one year and includes the time, date, name of tester and name of SFS/BDOC Alarm Monitor for each test. AFI 31-101 mandated duress buttons will be tested monthly and quarterly for all other alarm points. SCIF regulations mandate they be tested semi-annually. AA&E facilities test all alarm points and duress buttons monthly. Duress alarms at a 24-hour manned area will have duress buttons tested at a minimum once per shift.

5.4. (FOUO) Conducting Alarm Checks. AA&E alarmed structure checks will be conducted by the owner/user during duty hours IAW AFI 31-101 and AFI 31-101 AFGSC Sup. Non-Duty hour checks will be conducted by Security Forces at least once per shift. Documentation of Security Forces checks are maintained within daily blotters.

5.5. Maintenance of the alarm system is provided by AFSFC sustainment contract.

5.5.1. (FOUO) Include the 377 SFS/5C, along with the user agency, on all planning and survey actions for intrusion detection systems.

5.5.2. (FOUO) Be responsible for sustainment and maintenance of all IDS and duress systems for resource protection and conducting work within established timeframe as specified by the contract and the protection level of the affected asset.

5.5.3. (FOUO) Provide Security Forces with a current list of all alarm maintenance personnel who are authorized to work on the base security alarm system.

5.5.4. (FOUO) Ensure all resource protection alarms terminate at SFS/BDOC, Building 20220, Room 100.

5.5.5. (FOUO) Complete new installation or modifications requested by the alarm custodian.

5.5.6. For Preventative Maintenance (PM) and function testing refer to above paragraph 4.5.3.1. - 4.5.3.2 in this appendix.

6.1. The DFC will:

6.1.1. Appoint an ISS IAW AFI 31-101.

6.1.2. Appoint an Electronic Security Section (ESS) IAW AFI 31-101.

6.1.3. Ensure armed response to alarmed activities.

6.1.4. (FOUO) Corrective actions to secure PL 4 resources after a partial, major, catastrophic failure will be annotated on a Quick Reaction Checklist (QRC). Alarm Maintenance personnel will be called to attempt to correct the deficiencies according to contracted timelines.

6.1.5. (FOUO) If a partial, major or catastrophic sensor failure occurs, alarm custodians personnel will be contacted to respond. Alarm maintenance personnel will be called to attempt to correct the deficiencies according to contracted timelines. If the failure cannot be corrected in a timely manner, owner/user personnel will be responsible for security of the area until the alarm system is operational. Notifications will be conducted IAW 377 SFS notification matrix. A priority alarm response listing is provided by the 377 SFS/S5C to alarm monitors for use in dispatching during multiple alarm activation situations.

6.1.6. Alarm monitors will be certified by Stan-Eval. Training is conducted by flight personnel. Procedures for monitoring PL 3-4 IDS are maintained within the alarm monitor area. Quick Reaction Checklists (QRC) for alarm monitors to follow during alarm situations and emergencies are written by S3O. A secondary monitoring system is located within alternate SFS/BDOC for contingency operations. After all maintenance and before removing an area from owner/user status conducts an operational test on effective sensor. Reactivation of sensors must also be annotated in the blotter. Reactivation of malfunctioned sensors after maintenance activity requires the blotter entry to reflect an operational test by security forces.

6.1.7. DFC is the requestor for PL 4 deviation. Follow all guidance within AFI 31-101 and AFI 31-101 AFGSC Sup, chapter 6.

6.1.8. Have overall management of the Advantor® alarm system.

6.1.8.1. (FOUO) In the event of an IDS malfunction or system failure, 377 ABW/IP has identified certified "Secret" secure rooms that meet security measures consistent with DODM 5200.01-V3, Enclosure 3, para 3b(3). The alarm monitor will notify the secure room alarm custodian of the IDS issue. The secure room alarm custodian will respond, make an initial assessment, and remain within the secure room until the IDS is repaired. As an alternative, the custodian may choose to establish 4-hour security checks until the IDS is repaired. If 4-hour checks are elected, they will be documented in the "Guard Check" block of the SF 702, Security Container Check Sheet. Signs of tampering or forced entry will immediately be reported to SFS/BDOC.

6.1.9. Establish Security Forces patrol zones or sectors to ensure a prompt response capability are maintained for alarm activations in each sector to meet alarm response priorities. A priority alarm response listing is provided by 377 SFS/S5C to alarm monitors for use in dispatching during multiple alarm activation situations.

6.2. The ISS/ESS will:

6.2.1. (FOUO) Be actively involved with planning and survey action for facilities owning controlled areas and requesting IDS with alarm maintenance personnel and the user agency.

6.2.2. (FOUO) Have overall management responsibility for all controlled areas and approved IDS alarm systems.

6.2.3. (FOUO) Develop and distribute the local alarm authentication codes, facility or building numbers, and employee numbers. Codes will be changed every six months or when personnel are deleted from the alarm system.

6.2.4. (FOUO) Maintain proper paperwork for SFS/BDOC and Law Enforcement Alarm Monitor to use in the event of an alarm activation.

6.2.5. (FOUO) Before allowing a new IDS system to function fully the system will go through a 72-hour checkout for process based on system requirements.

7. The 377 SFS will:

7.1. (FOUO) Respond in accordance with designated response time and direction in AFMAN 21-209, para 10.3. If the alarms will not reset, the owner/user will remain at the facility until adequate compensatory measures are taken. Establish a communications system (i.e., telephone, radio, or frequent checks by roving patrols), if appropriate, until the alarm system is repaired.

7.2. (FOUO) Use the computer-generated letter provided by 377 SFS/S5C to verify those persons requesting authorization to activate, deactivate, or test the alarmed facility.

7.3. (FOUO) Secure all installation entry control points when an alarm is received from any Arms, Ammunition and Explosives facility until the reason for the alarm can be determined. If the alarm is the result of an actual robbery or attempted robbery, the installation entry control points will remain secure until 377 SFS/S3O or higher authority determines otherwise.

7.4. (FOUO) During non-duty hours AA&E facilities will be checked and documented in blotter at least once per shift.

7.5. (FOUO) Follow alarm activation response procedures and QRCs. Use information on alarm transaction letters to verify those persons requesting authorization to activate, deactivate, or test an alarmed facility. Use current Alarm Authentication Code matrix or last four of the member's SSN for testing and authentication purposes.

7.5.1. (FOUO) Direct forces during alarm activations and secure the facility. Contact owner/user personnel by using the provided authorization letter and instruct custodian to respond.

7.5.2. (FOUO) Upon arrival of owner/user personnel, conduct a joint check of the entire facility. Exception: Certain classified facilities, as identified by facility alarm custodian, cannot be entered by the Security Forces members unless the SFS/BDOC Alarm Monitor identifies a penetration pattern. **NOTE:** Owner/user personnel will brief Security Forces after termination of the situation.

7.5.3. (FOUO) If the facility is found to be secure and the alarms reset, patrols can resume normal operations.

7.5.4. (FOUO) If the alarms will not reset, the owner/user will remain at the facility until adequate compensatory measures are taken. A work order should be established with AFSFC sustainment contract in these instances.

7.5.5. (FOUO) Establish a communications system (i.e., telephone, radio, or frequent checks by roving patrols), if appropriate, until the alarm system is repaired.

7.5.6. (FOUO) Maintain a 5 minute or less response time for Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities (SCIF) with open storage of classified and a 15 minute or less response time for closed storage of classified.

7.5.7. (FOUO) Secure all Installation Entry Control Points (IECP) whenever an alarm is received from an Arms, Ammunition and Explosives facility until the reason for the alarm can be determined. If the alarm is the result of an actual robbery or attempted robbery, the IECPs will remain secure until 377 SFS/S3O or higher authority determines otherwise.

8. Owner/Users will:

8.1. (FOUO) Ensure the 377 SFS/S5C and alarm maintenance personnel are included on all planning and survey action for IDS. IDE requirements will be based upon local threat, value, and theft potential IAW with IDRMP.

8.2. (FOUO) Ensure, when the IDS malfunctions or repairs are being made, compensatory measures are taken to provide adequate protection.

8.3. (FOUO) Conduct alarm tests/vulnerability testing according to area requirements listed below. All tests must be documented on the alarm testing log and maintained for one year inactive, one year active and will include the time, date, name of tester and name of SFS/BDOC Alarm Monitor for each test.

8.3.1. Alarm tests will be conducted monthly for all installed duress buttons at facilities. DV housing is different; seek advice from 377 SFS/S5C.

8.3.1.1. Duress alarms at a 24-hour manned area will have duress buttons tested at a minimum once per shift.

8.3.2. Alarm tests will be conducted monthly for all installed alarm points and duress buttons if installed within AA&E facilities.

8.3.3. Alarm tests will be conducted quarterly for all other areas alarm points.

8.3.4. Conduct a minimum of three intrusion scenarios per likely avenue of approach in each sensor sector or zone.

8.3.3.1. SCIF's IAW ICD 705 chapter 7 section D number 3D states these areas can test all alarm points semiannually. SFS/S5C request areas provided this request to their office for filing.

8.4. (FOUO) Due to limited manning, the number of alarmed facilities on-base, and mission requirements of Security Forces, the owner/user of all alarmed facilities on KAFB will provide security protection IAW AFI 31-101 in the event of a total system failure. Owner/user will respond and provide security protection of their facilities until the alarm system is repaired. The responsibility for accessing and security alarms for each IDS facility falls on the owner/user. After all maintenance and before the area is removed from owner/user responsibility conduct an operational test on sensor.

8.4.1. (FOUO) Except within the event of an IDS malfunction or system failure, 377 ABW/IP has identified certified "Secret" secure rooms that meet security measures consistent with DODM 5200.01-V3, Enclosure 3, para 3b(3). The alarm monitor will notify the secure room alarm custodian of the IDS issue. The secure room alarm custodian will respond, make an initial assessment, and remain within the secure room until the IDS is repaired. As an alternative, the custodian may choose to establish 4-hour security checks until the IDS is repaired. If 4-hour checks are elected, they will be

documented in the "Guard Check" block of the SF 702, Security Container Check Sheet. Signs of tampering or forced entry will immediately be reported to SFS/BDOC.

8.5. (FOUO) Prepare and update the computer-generated letter, custodian appointment letters, and DD Form 577.

8.6 (FOUO) Notify and obtain new facility/employee numbers from the 377 SFS/S5C if the codes are compromised or someone is deleted from the list.

8.7. Comply with opening and closing established by the organizational commander.

8.8. (FOUO) Establish written procedures for prompt response to alarm activations when requested by SF. When notified to respond, the person responding must comply with the following: immediately respond to the facility and make contact with Security Forces to conduct a joint check of the entire facility or alarm system.

8.8.1. (FOUO) If the alarm resets, conduct a check of the entire alarm system to ensure it is operational, then properly secure the facility.

8.8.2. (FOUO) If the alarm will not reset, the alarm monitor will activate a work order to have alarm maintenance respond. If the alarm cannot be fixed, it is the owner/users responsibility to provide adequate compensatory measures, to include providing an armed guard, if required.

8.9. (FOUO) Prominently mark the alarmed facility with the AFVA 31-232 to indicate IDS protects the facility.

8.10. (FOUO) All new upgrades, installations, or modifications will be coordinated by area custodians. Area custodians will seek advice through 377 SFS/S5C and the appropriate contracting agency for approval and funding.

8.11. (FOUO) Owners/users of SCIFs will advise the DFC by letter or memorandum of the SCIFs storage accreditation (open/closed).

8.12. (FOUO) During duty hours, AA&E facilities will be checked by on-duty personnel working within the area.

8.13. (FOUO) The IDS equipment requirement for Category III and IV ammunition and explosives will be based upon local threat, value, and theft potentials. Category III and IV ammunition and explosives facilities on KAFB not equipped with IDS will have owner/user checks during duty hours and security forces checks at least once a shift during non-duty hours.

9. ALARM RESPONSE PRIORITY CHART:

9.1. Objective. To provide guidance for Security Forces response to alarmed facilities in the event of simultaneous multiple alarm activations and other reports of a serious nature.

9.2. (FOUO) Description. In the event more than one alarm activation is received simultaneously, sufficient patrols may not be available to respond to each alarm. To ensure efficient response during multiple alarms, a response priority is given to each alarmed facility. Upon receipt of simultaneous alarms at multiple facilities, SFS/BDOC will dispatch patrols to affected facilities IAW the Alarm Response Priority Chart from highest to lowest priority. Upon termination of the highest priority response, patrols will then be directed to the next highest priority facility until all alarm activations are investigated.

9.3. Restricted Distribution. The chart is located at 377 SFS/S5C and posted at SFS/BDOC.

9.3.1. (FOUO) PL 3 Command and Control (C2) will have a 5 minute response.

9.3.2. (FOUO) AA&E, munitions storage, mission essential resources, critical alarm system resources, and duress alarms should have a 10 minute response.

9.3.3. (FOUO) SCIF, Special Access Program (SAP) classified, and Top Secret classified storage should have a 15 minute response.

9.3.4. (FOUO) Secret Classified, Narcotics, Funds and other identified Special Interest items should have a 30 minute response.

9.3.5. During responses to multiple incidents/alarms, response will be IAW 377 SFS Alarm Response Priority Chart. Response times may exceed times listed in 9.3.1 - 9.3.4 depending on response team availability and guidance from para 6.1.6.

TAB A TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX K TO KAFB IDP 31-101
CONTROLLED AREA LISTING

AREA	Organization/Area Description/ Room Number or Location	BLDG	TYPE
1	AFRL/RDMI Vaults B and C	405	CLASSIFIED (SCIF)
2	AFRL/RDTE Room 119	914	CLASSIFIED (Computer)
3	ARA Fenced Area (DTRA)	29022-29026	AA&E (Storage)
4	AFRL/RDTE Rooms 211, 212 & 213	914	CLASSIFIED (SCIF)
5	351 BATS Pararescue Weapons Vault	937	AA&E (Storage)
6	AFRL/RDS Starfire Optical Range	66008	CLASSIFIED (SAP)
7	SDTW Bldg. & Fenced Area	410	CLASSIFIED (Storage)
8	AF/A2 Bldg. & Fenced Area	1029	CLASSIFIED (SCIF)
9	377 LRS Fenced Area POL/LOX	1032	MISSION ESSENTIAL
10	58 MXS EWS Room 28	996	CLASSIFIED (Storage)
11	377 MSG/SC Rm 100 Phone Exchange	20449	MISSION ESSENTIAL
12	AFOTEC Vaults 100, 103-106	20129	CLASSIFIED (SCIF)
13	377 CPTS Finance Vault	20245	MAJOR FUNDS
14	58 TRS Simulator Facility	948	CLASSIFIED (Storage)
15	377 MXS Fenced in 750 Area	750	AA&E (Storage)
16	AFRL/RDTE Room 205A-D	914	CLASSIFIED (SCIF)
17	372 Quartermaster Bttn	20616	CLASSIFIED (SAP)
18	377 SFS BDOC Desk Room	20220	MISSION ESSENTIAL
19	58 TRS Simulator Facility	949	CLASSIFIED (Storage)
20	377 SFS BDOC Comm Room	20220	MISSION ESSENTIAL
21	377 SFS Comm Room 117A	20245	MISSION ESSENTIAL
22	377 WSSS Enrollment Ctr/Comm/C2B	27494	MISSION ESSENTIAL
23	377 SSPT LE Armory	20221	AA&E (Armory)
24	58 TRS Simulator Facility CV-22	955	CLASSIFIED (Open Secret)
25	58 TRS Simulator Facility	950	CLASSIFIED (Open Secret)
26	377 MXS Fenced in 740 Area	740	AA&E (Storage)
27	150 NMANG LRS Logistics	1056	AA&E (Storage)
28	150 NMANG SFS SF Armory	1062	AA&E (Armory)
29	377 SSPT CATM Armory	706	AA&E (Armory)
30	377 LRS Armory Vault/Room D	1015	AA&E (Storage)

AREA	Organization/Area/Description/Room Number or Location	BLDG	TYPE
31	58 TRS Simulator Facility	956	CLASSIFIED (Storage)
34	Company D 4th Recon	20616	AA&E (Storage)
36	377 MSG Manzano Bunker	37200	AA&E (Storage)
37	58 MXS Room 1, Weapons Vault	376B	AA&E (Storage)
38	AF/A2 Eastside of building	1025	CLASSIFIED (Open Secret)
39	210 IS Intelligence Annex	1047	CLASSIFIED (SCIF) areas
40	377 MSG/SC Room 20A, 20B	20604	CLASSIFIED (Open Secret)
41	377 SFG/S2I Evidence/Property Room	1010	MISSION ESSENTIAL
42	377 MXS Manzano Bunker	37013	AA&E (Storage)
43	377 MXS Manzano Bunker	37014	AA&E (Storage)
44	377 MXS Manzano Bunker	37015	AA&E (Storage)
45	AFRL/RDTE Room 504	914	CLASSIFIED (SCIF)
46	AFRL Room 2234	570	CLASSIFIED (SCIF)
47	377 MSG/SC Telephone Switch	1004	MISSION ESSENTIAL
48	377 MSG/SC Telephone Switch	1043	MISSION ESSENTIAL
49	377 MSG/SC Telephone Switch	498	CLASSIFIED (Open Secret)
50	377 MSG/SC Telephone Switch	30158	CLASSIFIED (Open Secret)
51	377 MSG/SC Telephone Switch	29010	CLASSIFIED (Open Secret)
52	58 OG/OGI RM B-04/05/06/06A	1017	CLASSIFIED (SCIF)
53	DTRA (CMAT) Room B6	20363	AA&E (Storage)
54	377 LRS Fenced Area (Fuel)	255	MISSION ESSENTIAL
55	377 MXS Transit Ramp (outside RA)	Outside RA	MISSION ESSENTIAL
56	58 OSS/OSL Hanger 1000	C05	AA&E (Storage)
57	58 OSS/OSL Room 30	1010	AA&E (Storage)
58	377 SFG/S2I Impound Lot	Adj. 20415	MISSION ESSENTIAL
59	377 WSSS Rm F-4 (KUMMSC Armory)	27494	AA&E (Armory)
60	150 OG Intelligence Annex	1047	CLASSIFIED (Storage)
61	AFNWC/709 ASS	20325	CLASSIFIED (Open Secret)
63	705 EXS First floor	942	CLASSIFIED (Open Secret)
64	NAG Bldg. & Fenced Compound	20451	CLASSIFIED (SCIF)
65	SDTW Bldg & Fenced Area	402	CLASSIFIED (Storage)
66	AF/A2 Fenced Area	1049	CLASSIFIED (Storage)

AREA	Organization/Area/Description/Room Number or Location	BLDG	TYPE
67	AFNWC Rms 101, 102, and 117	20200	CLASSIFIED (Storage)
68	AFRL/SEF	48065	MISSION ESSENTIAL
69	377 MDG Basement Med Logistics Vault	1200	MEDS (Storage)
70	377 MDG Main Pharmacy	1200	MEDS (Pharmacy)
71	898 MUNS KUMMSC UB/Topside	27495/27496	MISSION ESSENTIAL
72	21st EOD/WMD ARMAG	Adj. 29053	AA&E (Storage)
73	AFRL Rooms M60 and M61	472	CLASSIFIED (SCIF)
77	58 MXS AME Vault	979	AA&E (Storage)
78	ANG 210 Red Horse ARMAG	Adj. 1060	AA&E (Storage)

TAB B TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX K TO KAFB IDP 31-101
ARMS, AMMUNITION AND EXPLOSIVES (AA&E) PROTECTION

REFERENCES: Refer to the Basic Plan.

1. PURPOSE: To establish responsibilities and duties of unit commanders, staff agency chiefs, custodians, and all assigned personnel who store, use or employ AA&E.

2. OBJECTIVE: To deter theft, robbery or destruction through rigid custodial security procedures and establish positive and uniform procedures to reduce the possibility of loss of government AA&E.

3. CONSIDERATIONS:

3.1. Transient Munitions. Munitions transiting KAFB will, when off-loaded, be stored in a secure munitions storage facility, if possible.

3.2. Transient Aircraft. Aircraft transiting KAFB and carrying munitions will, if possible, be parked on the hazardous cargo loading pads or within a restricted area.

3.3. AA&E Movement. The unit transporting or owning AA&E must notify the SFS/BDOC Controller before moving Category I and II AA&E from approved storage facilities/areas. Promptly report all emergencies, theft or discovery of missing munitions or weapons to SFS/BDOC at 911 or 846-9111.

3.3.1. (FOUO) The receiving agency must immediately notify SFS/BDOC of completion of the movement upon arrival of the AA&E shipment.

3.3.2. All AA&E must be provided security required by AFI 31-101, DOD 5100.76M, and this plan.

3.4. Deployment Operations. During deployment operations under wing deployment plans, AA&E escort and protection will be followed as outlined in DOD 5100.76M.

3.4.1. The Munitions Custodians will:

3.4.1.1. Review the protection philosophy for munitions and explosives as outlined in AFI 31-101 and DOD 5100.76M.

3.4.1.2. Notify 377 SFS/S5C when changes in munitions and explosives storage levels and risk categories are made within the Munitions Storage Area (MSA).

3.4.1.3. Avoid the use of temporary open storage if secure facilities are available. If open storage must be considered, coordinate with 377 SFS/S5C and comply with DOD 5100.76M.

3.4.1.4. During consolidation of munitions assets, maintain separate stocks clearly identified by organization. Assign prime responsibility for the facility to one of the units using the storage, and establish joint written procedures for operation and control of the area. Coordinate procedures through 377 SFS/S5C before implementation.

3.4.1.5. Notify 377 SFS/S5C, in writing, of location and justification for activities with requirements to maintain operating levels of munitions.

3.4.1.6. Ensure conventional munitions movements comply with DOD 5100.76M and this Annex.

3.4.1.7. Ensure transportation protection procedures for munitions during FPCONs comply with AFI 31-101, and this Annex.

3.4.1.8. Ensure written procedures are established governing the protection of munitions in an emergency, to include procedures for actions to be taken for anti-robbery, alarm outages, and alarm testing procedures. The procedures must be coordinated through 377 SFS/S3 before implementation.

3.4.1.9. (FOUO) Ensure coordination with SFS/BDOC for all proposed movements of munitions.

3.4.1.10. (FOUO) Ensure prompt reporting to SFS/BDOC of any emergencies at 911 or 846-9111.

3.4.1.11. (FOUO) Ensure prompt reporting to SFS/BDOC of any theft/missing munitions at 911 or 846-9111.

3.4.1.12. (FOUO) Maintain documentation pertaining to munitions IAW Appendix 3 to Annex K of this plan.

3.4.1.13. (FOUO) Ensure facility checks are conducted during duty hours by owner/user personnel.

4. EXECUTION:

4.1. The 377 ABW/CC will:

4.1.1. (FOUO) Designate, in writing, those areas authorized to store AA&E. Additionally, the 377 ABW/CC authorizes all unit commanders on KAFB to designate, in writing, lock and key custodians for their respective units.

4.1.2. (FOUO) Ensure only secure government facilities are used to store AA&E.

4.2. The DFC will:

4.2.1. Monitor inspection and exercise reports for corrective actions through the IDC.

4.2.2. Provide escort and/or monitor movements as designated in Enclosures 1, 2, and 3 of this Tab.

4.2.3. Safeguard and account for keys provided by owner/user to conduct building checks as indicated in paragraph 4.1.1. above.

4.2.4. (FOUO) Ensure ID Forces conduct facility checks during non-duty hours.

4.2.5. (FOUO) Ensure lost, stolen, unaccounted for, or recovered US government AA&E, found, confiscated or inventory adjustments are reported as soon as possible after telephone notification. The DFC will provide a follow-up report by message to AFOSI Detachment, AFGSC/A4S and HAF/A4S.

4.2.6. (FOUO) Ensure confirmed thefts, losses, and recoveries of DOD arms are reported immediately to the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) and the AFGSC/A4S. Reports will be submitted within 72 hours to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), Intelligence Division, ATF Headquarters, Department of the Treasury.

4.2.7. Submit a copy of any incident report involving a commercial driver to the Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command Carrier Performance section, Fort Eustis, VA 23602; commercial telephone (757) 878-7478; fax (757) 818-7404; or DSN 826-7478.

4.2.8. Submit closing reports to AFGSC/A4S on significant incidents when actions are final.

4.3. Unit Commanders will:

4.3.1. (FOUO) Establish procedures to ensure lost, stolen, unaccounted for or recovered US government AA&E are reported to the DFC. This includes found, confiscated or inventory adjustments. Immediately after discovering a significant incident, the DFC notifies the servicing AFOSI, HHQ and/or AFGSC/A4S by telephone.

4.3.2. (FOUO) Establish procedures to ensure keys and locks are inventoried semiannually.

4.4. Firearms Custodians will:

4.4.1. (FOUO) Ensure firearms are removed from designated storage areas for as short as possible and only in quantities needed to support specific missions or projects. Coordinate all weapons movements with SFS/BDOC.

4.4.2. (FOUO) Ensure firearms storage facilities are approved by the 377 ABW/CC and specifically designated as a controlled area for 30 or more category (CAT) IV arms and any number of CAT I-III AA&E. Category III and IV Missiles, Rockets, Ammunition and

Explosives should have one level of IDS. All identified AA&E areas, regardless of IDS criteria, are required to have duty hour checks from the organization and after hour checks by SFS.

4.4.3. (FOUO) Ensure emergency forced entry procedures are formulated according to AFI 31-101, Chapter 8 and coordinated through the DFC, 377 MSG/CE and 377 MSG/CED.

4.4.4. (FOUO) Ensure firearms movements comply with DOD 5100.76M.

4.4.5. (FOUO) Provide Safe Haven or Safe Refuge for protection of classified AA&E shipments if tasked to do so. All requirements of DOD 5100.76M, AFI 31-101, Chapter 5, as supplemented, KAFBI 91-201, and DOD 5200.1R must be met.

4.4.6. (FOUO) Ensure, during periods of construction or remodeling, proposed compensatory measures are coordinated through 377 SFS/S5C before implementation, and ensure these measures are followed until construction or remodeling is complete.

4.4.7. (FOUO) Notify 377 SFS/S5C of any internal layout changes to a firearm storage facility. Example: Crates added, weapons racks moved, etc. The 377 SFS/S5C will conduct a controlled area survey to ensure alarm coverage is not jeopardized.

4.4.8. (FOUO) Ensure written procedures for control and operation of storage facilities are developed and coordinated through 377 SFS/S5C before implementation.

4.4.9. (FOUO) Immediately notify SFS/BDOC in case of robbery or other emergency.

4.4.10. (FOUO) Ensure written procedures are established for owner/user security of firearms when alarm outages occur.

4.4.11. (FOUO) Maintain a controlled area folder/book. If firearms and munitions are collocated, only one folder is required to be maintained. This folder will contain documentation pertaining to firearms IAW AFI 31-101.

4.4.12. (FOUO) All AA&E storage facilities will maintain a weapons identification list.

4.4.13. (FOUO) Ensure written procedures are established for owner/user security of firearms when alarm outages occur.

4.4.14. (FOUO) Maintain a controlled area folder/book. If firearms and munitions are both stored, only one folder is required to be maintained. This folder will contain documentation pertaining to firearms IAW AFI 31-101.

4.4.15. (FOUO) All AA&E storage facilities will maintain a weapons identification list.

ENCLOSURE 1 TO TAB B TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX K TO KAFB IDP 31-101
FIREARMS MOVEMENT PROCEDURES

REFERENCES: Refer to the Basic Plan.

1. PURPOSE: To identify uniform procedures for firearm movements.
2. GENERAL: Firearms are extremely vulnerable to theft, especially while outside secured storage areas.
3. SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS:
 - 3.1. Movement Procedures. Follow the procedures listed in DOD 5100.76M and this plan.
 - 3.1.1. Security of firearms prior to transport to aircraft is the responsibility of the owner unit.
 - 3.1.2. If firearms are lost or stolen in transit, immediately notify the airline and the owning installation Security Forces, who will in turn notify the FBI, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, and the owning MAJCOM/A4S.
 - 3.1.3. The shipper or owner must notify Security Forces before moving the weapons from approved storage or processing facilities.
 - 3.1.4. Consignees (the receiving agency), when notified of a firearms shipment, must notify Security Forces and inform them where the firearms are to be located when they arrive, and who will be responsible for the weapons until they are in an authorized storage area.
 - 3.1.5. Transportation protection procedures during FPCONs will be according to this annex.
 - 3.2. Movement Escorts. Escorts to and from marshalling areas during deployment processing will be according to KAFB Deployment Plan.
 - 3.3. (FOUO) All government owned AA&E must be transported in a government owned vehicle, IAW DOD 5100.76M. Exception: personnel may transport 14 or fewer CAT II, III, or IV arms in the trunk of a privately owned vehicle (POV) for the purpose of training or weapons qualifications.
 - 3.3.1. (FOUO) If 14 or more CAT II, III, or IV arms and associated ammunition are to be transported, an armed guard (E-5 or civilian equivalent) is required.

ENCLOSURE 2 TO TAB B TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX K TO KAFB IDP 31-101
FIREARMS / DANGEROUS WEAPONS REQUIREMENTS

REFERENCES: Refer to the Basic Plan.

1. PURPOSE: To identify uniform procedures for the arming of authorized personnel, registration and control of privately owned weapons (POW)s, and restrictions on other weapons classified as dangerous to the public.

2. PERSONNEL AUTHORIZED TO BEAR FIREARMS:

2.1. Civilian law enforcement personnel (federal, county, municipalities, Department of Energy couriers, etc.) who are authorized to bear and use firearms may:

2.1.1. Carry such firearms on KAFB while on duty and having or conducting official police business on the installation.

2.1.2. Carry such firearms on KAFB when off-duty if their agencies require them to be armed. Firearms will not be carried into any facilities where alcoholic beverages are consumed or dispensed.

2.2. KAFB Personnel authorized to bear and use firearms:

2.2.1. 377th Civil Engineer Division, Explosive Ordnance Branch personnel assigned to escort munitions and explosives under AFI 31-101.

2.2.2. Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL), Civil Engineer Research Division personnel assigned to escort munitions off-base when required under AFI 31-101.

2.2.3. Sandia National Laboratories security guard force personnel on official business and patrolling their designated area.

2.2.4. New Mexico Air National Guard (NMANG) personnel in Group A and B status, and when performing official duties for the Federal Government or the State of New Mexico.

2.2.5. 58th Special Operations Wing (58 SOW), Avionics Flight (58 MXS/MXMV), weapons service guns section personnel assigned to escort weapons and munitions to and from aircraft and the weapons storage area (WSA).

2.2.6. United States Marine Corps (USMC) Reserve personnel assigned to escort firearms to and from base entry gates to the USMC firearms storage area.

2.2.7. 342nd Pararescue School cadre while transporting and protecting very high-risk and high-risk weapons, explosives and munitions to and from aircraft, WSAs, explosives and munitions storage areas, and training areas (both on and off-base). 2.2.8. KAFB Honor Guard as required in AFI 31-101 for the escort of ceremonial weapons.

2.2.8. 898 MUNS maintains qualified personnel for PL escort/site final denial as required (AFI 31-101).

2.2.9. Army Reserve, 377 SFG, 377 SFS, 377 WSSS.

3. PRIVATELY OWNED WEAPONS REQUIREMENTS:

3.1. Carrying/Transporting/Storing Dangerous Weapons: On KAFB a dangerous weapon is defined as any firearm, other weapons that fire a projectile (including air rifles, BB guns, paintball guns, etc.), martial arts weapons (nun chucks, stars, swords, etc.), bows and cross bows, knives with fixed blades more than three inches, or any switchblade knife.

3.1.1. In accordance with the Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C., Section 921(a)(3) a firearm is any weapon (to include a starter gun) which will, is designed to, or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive.

3.1.2. Transportation of Dangerous Weapons. Transporting dangerous weapons in vehicles (Government Owned Vehicle (GOV/POV)) is permissible, provided weapons/firearms are completely unloaded (no magazine or ammunition in the weapon) and POFs will not be readily available or within reach of vehicle occupants during transportation. If vehicle configuration does not allow for POFs to be out of reach, then POF must be in a locked container (does not apply to personnel authorized concealed carry in Para 3.1.3.). Anyone transporting a weapon must immediately notify any Law Enforcement or command officials of the weapon's presence upon initial contact. If the weapon is left unattended in the vehicle, the weapon must be out of sight (dorm residents are not authorized to keep weapons in their vehicles). Government weapons in the possession of personnel deploying to a training venue and/or troop movements fall within this category and are the responsibility of the person or team assigned. Government weapons will not be left unattended in a vehicle, unless it is a duty weapon secured in a rack designed for that purpose.

3.1.3. Concealed Carry on the installation under the provisions of H.R. 218: The Law Enforcement Officer's Safety Act (LEOSA) is permissible IAW AFI 31-101. The permit holders outlined in para. 3.1.4. are authorized to carry in all open areas, vehicles and facilities with the exception of dormitories, the MDG/VA Complex, and restricted/controlled areas. No credentialed person is authorized to carry in their place of duty.

3.1.3.1. Installation Commander or DFC may suspend concealed carry for an individual or for all individuals installation-wide based upon increased FPCON, local threat, lack of adherence to standards or discretion.

3.1.3.2. Contact with Law Enforcement or Command Officials. LEOSA credentialed individuals stopped for base entry point checks, traffic violations, or for any other reason by law enforcement or command official (Commanders, First Sergeants, Security Forces, or AFOSI) must immediately inform the official that there is a

firearm in their vehicle or on their person. The LEOSA certified member must have the credential on their person.

3.1.4. Acceptable LEOSA Credentials. Individuals must have their valid LEOSA credentials immediately available at all times when they have a firearm in their POV or on their person while on KAFB. Acceptable LEOSA forms:

3.1.4.1. AF Form 688D, USAF LEOSA 926B.

3.1.4.2. AF Form 688E, USAF LEOSA 926C.

3.1.4.3. AFOSI Form 59A.

3.1.4.4. AFOSI LEOSA Identification Card.

3.1.4.5. Other Federal/State/Local Law Enforcement Officer Credentials.

3.1.5. Air rifles (BB guns) are authorized on KAFB, but can only be fired at an approved range. Family members under 18 years of age must be supervised at all times while on the range by either a parent or an adult 18 years or older. Shooters must fire their weapons from the firing line to a target placed down range and must observe all safety rules. Paintball guns are not authorized for use on KAFB unless specifically approved by the Installation Commander. Airsoft weapons are not authorized for use in any populated area (housing, dormitory etc.).

3.1.6. Self-Defense Weapons. Personnel in possession of self-defense weapons such as pepper spray, mace, and stun guns must be thoroughly knowledgeable of their use and be able to properly secure them when on their person.

3.2. IAW AFI 31-117, *Arming and Use Of Force by Air Force Personnel*, All commanders (not just SF CC's) must continually monitor personnel for suitability of to bear firearms and evaluate available information and if necessary, take immediate action to temporarily withdraw the affected person's authority to bear a firearm. If warranted, commanders must also deny the person access to any government-owned or privately owned firearm and associated ammunition stored in a government firearm storage facility.

3.2.1. A commander may determine it necessary to withdraw a member's authority to bear firearms (both government and courtesy storage of (POW)s in the Security Forces Armory) for the following reasons:

3.2.1.1. Personnel found to have a qualifying conviction under the Gun Control Act/Lautenberg Amendment.

3.2.1.2. Identified substance abusers.

3.2.1.3. Emotionally unstable or behavior suggests they are incapable of using firearms with care.

3.2.1.4. Determined by medical authority to be suffering from alcohol abuse or dependence.

3.2.1.5. Taking prescription medication that impairs their ability to use firearms. Use of prescription medication does not always disqualify individuals from bearing firearms. However, commanders must consult with the responsible physician when medication that impairs the ability to handle firearms is prescribed.

3.2.1.6. Relieved of duty for disciplinary reasons.

3.2.1.7. Relieved of duty pending a UOF Review Board, following a member's UOF shooting.

3.2.2. Commanders that have determined the need to temporarily withdraw authority to bear firearms (both government and courtesy storage of POWs/ammunition in the Security Forces Armory) are required immediately to notify the servicing armory(s). The verbal notification can be made by the commander, first sergeant, or duty roster authentication official to the servicing armory(s) and the affected person. If applicable, notice to the affected individual will also include their inability to carry a concealed firearm under the Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act. Servicing armories will take appropriate action to ensure any government-owned or privately owned firearm and associated ammunition is not issued to a person whose authority has been withdrawn. Within 72 hours, commanders will submit, to the servicing armory(s), a written memorandum containing the individual's name, rank, squadron, SSN, weapons serial number, general reason for the temporary withdrawal (i.e. medical, disciplinary, investigation, etc.) and commanders intention to deny weapon/ammunition access. This memorandum must also be signed by the affected individual notifying him of the withdrawal action.

3.2.3. Commanders are responsible for ensuring compliance with the Gun Control Act of 1968, Public Law 104-208, and (18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(9) and (g)(9) (Lautenberg Amendment). The Gun Control Act prohibits military personnel, civilians, and contractors with a qualifying conviction of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence from shipping or transporting in interstate or foreign commerce, or possessing in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or receiving any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce. Furthermore, it is a felony for any person to sell or otherwise dispose of firearms or ammunition to any person whom he or she knows or has reasonable cause to believe has been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.

3.2.4. Commanders that are required, by Gun Control Act/Lautenberg Amendment, to withdraw authority to bear firearms (both government and courtesy storage of POWs/ammunition in the Security Forces Armory) are required immediately to notify the

servicing armory(s). If applicable, notice to the affected individual will also include their inability to carry a concealed firearm under the Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act.

3.2.4.1. Servicing armories will take appropriate action to ensure any government-owned or privately owned firearm and associated ammunition is not issued to a person whose authority has been withdrawn..

3.2.4.2. Within 72 hours, commanders will submit, to the servicing armory(s), a written memorandum containing the individual's name, rank, squadron, SSN, weapons serial number, general reason for the withdrawal (i.e. qualifying conviction under the Gun Control Act/Lautenberg Amendment), and commanders intention to deny weapon/ammunition access. This memorandum must also be signed by the affected individual notifying him of the withdrawal action.

3.2.4.3. Final disposition of the affected member's property: The property owner will be required to appoint an individual, via power of attorney, not affected by the Gun Control Act/Lautenberg Amendment before the weapon/ammunition can be released from the servicing armory. Servicing armories will maintain a copy of the Power of attorney with other required paperwork associated with the transfer from the armory. The commander must brief the affected member that the weapon must be disposed of IAW the Gun Control Act/Lautenberg Amendment via memorandum.

3.2.4.4. Purchases of firearms at AAFES facilities. Firearms purchased at the Main Exchange will be secured and transported IAW paragraph 3.1.2. In addition AAFES will be required to place a trigger lock or similar device on all firearms before they are released to the customer and provide them information on the transportation requirements.

3.3. Registration and Storage of Dangerous Weapons.

3.3.1. Personnel residing in base housing, including the Maxwell housing area, are required to register their privately owned firearms, with 377 SFS Armory. In addition, weapons must be stored in such a manner as to deter theft and preclude improper usage, especially by children.

3.3.2. Personnel residing in temporary government quarters, i.e., Temporary Lodging Facility (TLF), Visiting Officer Quarters (VOQ), and Visiting Airman Quarters (VAQ) must check firearms into the 377 SFS Armory for the duration of their stay at KAFB.

3.3.3. Personnel residing in the dormitories are prohibited from storing firearms or any other dangerous weapons in the dormitory. Dormitory residents will register and store their dangerous weapons with the 377 SFS Armory or secure them at an off base location.

3.3.4. When registering a weapon, the on-duty Armorer will ask the individual for their ID card. The individual will be given an AF IMT 1314 and a DD Form 2760 to complete for registration and/or storage of the firearms(s). Military personnel are required to have their

unit commander or designee sign the AF IMT 1314. All DOD civilians and contractors are required to have their supervisors sign the AF IMT 1314. All other civilians and retirees are not required to have a commander or designee sign their AF IMT 1314.

3.3.5. These forms must be completed and returned to the Armory within three duty days. The individual will be contacted if they fail to return the AF IMT 1314 and DD Form 2760 within the prescribed time. A copy of the AF IMT 1314, signed by the on-duty armorer, will be given to the individual as a receipt.

ENCLOSURE 3 TO TAB B TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX K TO KAFB IDP 31-101
NON-NUCLEAR MUNITIONS MOVEMENT PROCEDURES

REFERENCES: Refer to the Basic Plan.

1. PURPOSE: To establish uniform procedures for non-nuclear munitions movements.
2. DESCRIPTION: Conventional munitions shipments are extremely vulnerable to theft, especially while outside secured storage areas.
3. TRANSPORTING MUNITIONS ON-BASE: This section applies to on-base ground movements of munitions by Air Force units or organizational vehicles. When munitions are shipped by commercial carrier through supply channels, they must be protected as outlined in AFI 24-201, Cargo Movement.
 - 3.1. (FOUO) Checking Shipments. Shipments must be checked upon receipt by the receiving activity to ensure that seals are intact and for any signs of theft, tampering or damage. If there are such signs, an immediate inventory must be performed to determine the extent of theft/loss, tampering or damage IAW DOD 5100.76-M.
 - 3.1.1. (FOUO) If the seals are intact, and there are no signs of damage or tampering, an inventory verification of Category I and II shipments will be conducted within 24 hours of receipt.
 - 3.1.2. (FOUO) CAT III and IV shipments: An inventory quantity verification will be conducted within 48 hours of receipt.
 - 3.2. (FOUO) Accountability. Serial number accountability will be maintained at all times from shipper to consignee. Each container will be checked, sealed, and locked by two shipping agents in each other's presence, before delivery to the carrier. This two-person certification is required at each transshipment point and terminal whenever the shipment loses its original identity (e.g., when two or more shipments are consolidated into another container for further movement or if re-packing is required).
 - 3.3. (FOUO) On-base Category I Movements. On-base movements of CAT I munitions will, as a minimum, be moved under continuous surveillance by two personnel, one of whom is armed.
 - 3.3.1. (FOUO) During such movements, the munitions items must be placed in the custody of a commissioned officer, warrant officer, senior noncommissioned officer (SNCO), or DOD civilian of equivalent grade, as required by DOD 5100.76M, Chapter 7.
 - 3.3.2. (FOUO) The munitions custodian must maintain radio contact with an agency capable of requesting or dispatching an armed response element, typically SFS/BDOC or WSSS/SSCC.

3.3.3. (FOUO) During increased threats to the installation, CAT I munitions movements on-base must comply with armed escort requirements as defined in AFI 31-101 and KAFBI 91-201, Movement of Explosives.

3.4. (FOUO) On-base CAT II Movements. On-base movements of CAT II munitions will, as a minimum, be moved by two unarmed personnel based on the threat to the installation, resources being transported, and mission requirements.

3.4.1. (FOUO) During the movement, one of the personnel must remain vigilant in the vehicle at all times or be within 10 feet of the vehicle at all times.

3.4.2. (FOUO) One of the escorts must maintain radio contact with an agency capable of requesting or dispatching an armed response element, typically SFS/BDOC or WSSS/SSCC.

3.4.3. (FOUO) During increased threats to the installation, CAT I and II munitions movements on-base must comply with protective service requirements as outlined in KAFBI 91-201. **NOTE:** Munitions movements within a MSA with posted Security Forces or other armed attendants do not require armed escorts.

3.5. (FOUO) On-base CAT III and IV Movements. For CAT III and IV munitions movements, one person must be assigned to continuously attend the shipment.

3.6. (FOUO) Transporting Munitions Off-base. Transportation of munitions off-base will be IAW AFI 31-101.

3.6.1. (FOUO) Off-base CAT I Movements. Movement of CAT I munitions using Defense Transportation System (DTS) off-base must be moved in compliance with armed escort requirements as defined in AFI 31-101 and KAFBI 91-201. All movements must comply with the following:

3.6.1.1. (FOUO) When possible, maintain radio contact with the installation.

3.6.1.2. (FOUO) When possible, coordinate the off-base movement with the appropriate civilian police agencies. Contact base Security Forces for coordination assistance.

3.6.1.3. (FOUO) Sensitive AA&E shipments will be secured according to DOD 5200.76-M, Physical Security of Sensitive Conventional Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives, Chapter 7, paragraph E, Table 7-1.

3.6.1.4. (FOUO) The armed escort will be accomplished by the user agency. If the 377 ABW/CC decides more armed personnel are required due to the local threat, quantities of munitions, or the risk category involved, procedures outlined in KAFBI 91-201 and the 377 ABW FPCON Checklist, if applicable, will be implemented.

3.6.2. (FOUO) Off-base CAT II Movements. Movement of CAT II munitions off-base must be done with two personnel assigned to the movement and Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS). One of these personnel must be armed and must remain in the vehicle at all times. They must be awake and not in the sleeper berth.

4. (FOUO) TRANSPORTING DURING FPCONs: Transportation protection procedures for munitions movements during increased FPCONs are identified in Enclosures 6, 7, 8, and 9 of Tab B to Annex K and AFI 31-101. These standards will be adhered to for movements both on and off-base.

5. ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS:

5.1. (FOUO) Off-base Movement. Owner/user personnel will notify Security Forces 24 hours in advance of movements so coordination can be made with civil authorities.

5.2. (FOUO) Emergency Procedures. In the event of an emergency, notify SFS/BDOC, if possible, or the nearest law enforcement agency for assistance. Use the minimum amount of force necessary to protect the munitions IAW AFI 31-117.

ENCLOSURE 4 TO TAB B TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX K TO KAFB IDP 31-101
SAFE HAVEN PROCEDURES FOR DoE NUCLEAR SHIPMENTS AND NON-NUCLEAR
MUNITIONS MOVEMENTS

REFERENCES: Refer to the Basic Plan.

1. **PURPOSE:** To establish procedures for DoE nuclear and non-nuclear munitions movements requiring Safe Haven status.
2. **DESCRIPTION:** Conventional and DoE classified munitions shipments are extremely vulnerable to theft, especially while outside secured storage areas. A Safe Haven is an agreement between the DOD and DoE to provide temporary storage for non-emergency or emergency DoE classified shipments at DOD facilities in order to ensure the safety and security of nuclear and/or non-nuclear classified materials. An unannounced arrival of a DoE Safe Ground Transport (SGT) is also referred to as a Safe Haven.
3. **DoE SAFE HAVENS:** For DoE nuclear shipments requesting Safe Haven, refer to Appendix 3 to Tab B Enclosure 4 of this plan, if access is granted, and KAFBI 91-201, Transportation Procedures For Hazardous Materials, Radioactive Materials and Explosives, para 8.
4. **SAFE HAVENS (CONVENTIONAL):**
 - 4.1. (FOUO) Safe Haven Arrival. SFS/BDOC will receive notification of the Safe Haven request from KCP, and if possible, direct the shipment to Truman gate. SFS/BDOC and KCP will make appropriate notifications. Refer to KAFBI 91-201, Movement of Explosives for additional guidance.
 - 4.2. (FOUO) Hostile Actions. If there is a hostile attack against a shipment, the SFS/BDOC Controller will dispatch available patrols to assist in neutralizing hostilities.
 - 4.2.1. (FOUO) Change to read: Parking area on Ordanance Road, East of Pad-5; the alternate location on Tow Road adjacent to Pad-5 may be used by exception but must be deconflicted with Pad-5 operations.
 - 4.3. (FOUO) Other Than Hostile Attack.
 - 4.3.1. (FOUO) Change to read: parking area on Ordanance Road, East of Pad-5; the alternate location on Tow Road adjacent to Pad-5 may be used by exception but must be deconflicted with Pad-5 operations.
 - 4.3.2. (FOUO) KCP and SFS/BDOC will assist, if necessary, in the notification of any other agency requested by the courier.

ENCLOSURE 5 TO TAB B TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX K TO KAFB IDP 31-101
NON-NUCLEAR MUNITIONS STORAGE AREA (MSA) PROTECTION

REFERENCES: Refer to the Basic Plan.

1. PURPOSE: To identify procedures for protection of non-nuclear MSA.
2. GENERAL: Munitions are vulnerable to theft/destruction by hostile/criminal elements due to their potential danger to large numbers of personnel. Areas containing these resources are potential targets for attack.
3. MISSION: To provide response and protection capabilities to the Maintenance Storage Area (MSA) (750 Area), (740) Area and Manzano Mountain Igloos.
4. EXECUTION: The 377 SFS will respond to situations affecting the security of the 740 and 750 Area. The primary emphasis will be on neutralizing the attack or threat. Recall of additional Security Forces personnel may be necessary to accomplish this task.

4.1. The 377 SFS will:

- 4.1.1. Initiate appropriate Quick Reaction Checklists (QRC), and dispatch patrols to contain/eliminate the threat.
- 4.1.2. (FOUO) Accomplish key notifications to include the KCP and AFOSI Detachment 814.
- 4.1.3. (FOUO) Recall and dispatch additional Security Forces personnel if necessary.
- 4.1.4. (FOUO) Notify 377 MXS of the situation. During non-duty hours, contact the KCP (846-3777) to make the notification.

4.2. The 377 MXS will:

- 4.2.1. (FOUO) Upon termination of hostilities, check the resources and facilities to verify integrity.
- 4.2.2. (FOUO) Report findings to the appropriate agencies.
- 4.2.3. (FOUO) Notify 377 SFS/BDOC of physical security deficiencies.

4.3. (FOUO) The KCP will: Accomplish key 377 ABW notifications.

4.4. (FOUO) AFOSI Detachment 814 will:

- 4.4.1. (FOUO) Contact the FBI.

4.4.2. (FOUO) Interrogate captured/surviving enemy forces.

4.4.3. (FOUO) Assess potential for further attack (based on gathered intelligence).

4.4.4. (FOUO) Initiate/coordinate investigation of the incident upon elimination of the threat.

**ENCLOSURE 6 TO TAB B TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX K TO KAFB IDP 31-101
NON NUCLEAR MUNITIONS STORAGE AREA (MSA) PROTECTION DURING
INCREASED THREATS / FPCONS**

REFERENCES: Refer to the Basic Plan.

1. **SITUATION:** MSAs may require increased security measures during periods of increased threats/higher FPCONS.
2. **MISSION:** To provide adequate protection to MSAs during periods of increased threats/higher FPCONS.
3. **EXECUTION:** MSA owner/user commanders are responsible for developing plans to provide internal security for MSAs during periods of increased threats/higher FPCONS. Based on the threat, the Installation Commander may consider arming all owner/user personnel in these areas in accordance with unit OIs. Other appropriate protection measures, to include dedicated owner/user RFs, may be considered. Before authorizing personnel to bear firearms, they must fulfill the training requirements; refer to AFI 31-117, paragraph 2.4. This training will be provided by the 377 SSPT Combat Arms.
4. **COMMAND AND CONTROL:**
 - 4.1. (FOUO) Operational Support. An appropriate level of owner/user protection is essential to the overall protection of MSAs. Owner/user personnel will provide the first line of defense to the MSA.
 - 4.2. (FOUO) Command Relationship. The senior owner/user on scene will assume initial command and control. 377 SFS will respond to incidents involving these resources and assume control of the situation upon arrival. 377 SFS response will be based on the response priority of the area.

ENCLOSURE 7 TO TAB B TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX K TO KAFB IDP 31-101
OFF-BASE ARMS, AMMUNITIONS & EXPLOSIVES (AA&E) MOVEMENTS DURING
FPCON ALPHA

REFERENCES: Refer to the Basic Plan.

1. PURPOSE: To provide security for AA&E overland movement from KAFB.
2. SITUATION: AA&E are extremely vulnerable to theft and terrorist acts off the installation. Protection criteria must include overland security procedures.
3. EXECUTION: AFI 31-101 for training requirements.
 - 3.1. The 377 ABW/CC, will determine the need for armed Security Forces escorts of AA&E during off-base movements and when to terminate all movements based on the installation/local threat assessment.
 - 3.2. The DFC will:
 - 3.2.1. (FOUO) Comply with/enforce all actions IAW AFI 31-101. Notify owner/users of possible threats, if time permits.
 - 3.2.2. (FOUO) Provide armed response when requested and approved by 377 ABW/CC or higher authority to protect AA&E. Implement the appropriate QRCs in the event of robbery, theft, or terrorist act.
 - 3.3. All AA&E FMs will:
 - 3.3.1. Adhere to the requirements IAW AFI 31-101 and DOD 5100.76M, Chapter 7.
 - 3.3.2. (FOUO) Maintain an effective recall system and ensure personnel are available during emergencies.
 - 3.3.3. (FOUO) If time permits, advise all personnel of the threat.
 - 3.3.4. (FOUO) Ensure all on and off-base firearm movements are consistent with operational necessity and limited to the minimum extent possible.
 - 3.3.5. (FOUO) Conduct liaison with Security Forces, AFOSI, and civil authorities to review specific local threat conditions.
 - 3.3.6. (FOUO) Check the FPCON level at the destination and locations along the route. Make appropriate plans to ensure security and protection of AA&E.
4. SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS: Comply with KAFB FPCON checklist.

ENCLOSURE 8 TO TAB B TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX K TO KAFB IDP 31-101
OFF-BASE AA&E MOVEMENTS DURING FPCON BRAVO

REFERENCES: Refer to the Basic Plan.

1. OBJECTIVE: To provide security for AA&E being moved off-base during FPCON BRAVO.
2. EXECUTION: AFI 36-2654 for training requirements.
 - 2.1. All AA&E facilities managers will:
 - 2.1.1. Comply with FPCON ALPHA requirements.
 - 2.1.2. (FOUO) Postpone non-essential movements of high and very high risk items and classified munitions, or ship by military air, if feasible.
 - 2.1.3. (FOUO) Use Security Escort Vehicle Service (SEVS) for all high and very high risk items and classified munitions.
 - 2.1.4. (FOUO) Plan possible overtime requirements for anticipated increased use of the installation as a DOD Safe Haven, if necessary.
 - 2.1.5. (FOUO) To ensure the availability of sufficient "Safe Haven" areas, clear all holding yards and other temporary storage areas, to the maximum extent practical, of sensitive conventional AA&E, classified munitions, and uncategorized Class A or B explosives, by relocating material to permanent, secure storage. Additionally, consider shipping uncategorized and unclassified material to its final destination.
 - 2.1.6. (FOUO) Consider the FPCON may be different at the travel origin point, final destination, or any point on the route.
 - 2.1.7. (FOUO) Review physical protection such as fencing, lighting, and communications equipment for all AA&E holding yards and other temporary storage areas.
 - 2.1.8. Adhere to requirements set forth in DOD 5100.76M, Chapter 7.
 - 2.1.9. Prepare checklists/OIs to support this tab.
3. CONSIDERATIONS: All tasking's in FPCON ALPHA have been implemented.
4. SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS: Comply with KAFB FPCON checklist.

ENCLOSURE 9 TO TAB B TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX K TO KAFB IDP 31-101
OFF-BASE AA&E MOVEMENTS DURING FPCON CHARLIE

REFERENCES: Refer to the Basic Plan.

1. OBJECTIVE: To provide security for off-base AA&E movements during FPCON CHARLIE.
2. EXECUTION: Refer to AFI 36-2654 for training requirements.
 - 2.1. All AA&E FMs will:
 - 2.1.1. Comply with FPCON ALPHA and BRAVO requirements.
 - 2.1.2. (FOUO) Provide armed military escort in separate vehicles for all high and very high risk items and classified munitions shipments in lieu of commercial SEVS.
 - 2.1.3. (FOUO) Conduct liaison with base, state and local law enforcement officials prior to movement of high and very high-risk items or classified munitions. Discuss support requirements, schedules, routes, and other information of mutual concern.
 - 2.1.4. (FOUO) Verify the seal serial numbers of all vehicles and other containers with classified munitions and high and very high-risk items in holding yards at least once every four hours. Seal serial numbers for medium and low risk items and all uncategorized Class A and B explosives must be verified at least once every eight hours.
3. CONSIDERATIONS: All taskings in FPCON ALPHA and BRAVO have been implemented according to KAFB FPCON checklists.
4. SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS: Comply with KAFB FPCON checklist.

ENCLOSURE 10 TO TAB B TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX K TO KAFB IDP 31-101
OFF-BASE AA&E MOVEMENTS DURING FPCON DELTA

REFERENCES: Refer to the Basic Plan.

1. OBJECTIVE: To provide security for AA&E during FPCON DELTA.
2. EXECUTION: Refer to AFI 36-2654 for training requirements.
 - 2.1. All AA&E Facilities Managers will:
 - 2.1.1. Comply with “KAFB FPCON checklists” after implemented.
 - 2.1.2. (FOUO) Temporarily suspend all shipments in and out of the local area, except for those needed to meet critical operational requirements.
 - 2.1.3. (FOUO) For shipments deemed critical, ship by military air, if feasible. Provide military transport and drivers with armed military escort in separate vehicles for all sensitive conventional AA&E and uncategorized Class A and B explosives.
3. CONSIDERATIONS: All taskings for FPCON ALPHA, BRAVO, and CHARLIE have been implemented according to KAFB FPCON checklist.
4. SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS: Comply with KAFB FPCON checklist.

TAB C TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX K TO KAFB IDP 31-101
FUNDS & PRECIOUS METALS PROTECTION

REFERENCES: Refer to the Basic Plan.

1. **PURPOSE:** To establish strict controls, protection requirements and responsibilities to prevent loss of government funds, precious metals, and jewels due to theft, burglary, or robbery. The standards and procedures outlined below apply to all government funds, as explained in AFI 31-101, Integrated Defense. Although this instruction does not generally apply to funds controlled by private associations (such as a credit union, American Red Cross, Air Force Aid Society, an exchange concessionaire, a contracted commercial bank, or a scheduled airline ticket office), the 377 ABW/CC must strongly encourage such activities to meet the protection requirements outlined in AFI 31-101.

2. **SITUATION:** Funds and precious metals are extremely vulnerable to theft and terrorist acts off the installation. Protection criteria must include overland security procedures.

3. **EXECUTION:** Refer to AFI 36-2654 for training requirements.

3.1. Requirements specified in this tab apply to all major funds facilities, facilities storing government funds, and accounting and finance vaults. Compliance is mandatory.

3.2 (FOUO) Army and Air Force Exchange Services (AAFES) Facilities. AAFES facilities are guided by the protection requirements outlined in AAFES manuals. These requirements must provide protection equal to, or greater than, the standards in AFI 31-101, as supplemented. AAFES will provide the 377 SFS/S5C copies of exchange publications applicable to funds storage procedures. This information will be used by SF inspectors to ensure an optimum balance of protection is maintained. The policy providing the greater degree of protection will be used.

3.3 (FOUO) Classified Material. Do not store classified items with funds or high cash value items.

3.4. (FOUO) Funds Resource Protection Folder. Facilities storing and handling funds will maintain a funds resource protection folder with the following information:

3.4.1. (FOUO) A letter designating a primary and alternate funds custodian.

3.4.2. (FOUO) Controlled area designation letter (where applicable).

3.4.3. (FOUO) A letter signed by the DFC authorizing funds storage limits.

3.4.4. (FOUO) Initial and most recent resource protection surveys and most recent anti-robbery/controlled area penetration exercise report.

3.4.5. Copies of this instruction.

3.4.6. (FOUO) An OI detailing at a minimum: entry and circulation control requirements, anti-robbery and bomb threat procedures, funds handling procedures, key and lock control procedures, funds escort procedures, and responsibilities for securing buildings or offices at the end of the duty day.

3.5. (FOUO) Funds Activities. Minor funds activities are those storing or handling \$99,999.00 or less. An activity storing or handling more than \$99,999 is considered a major funds activity.

3.6. (FOUO) Major Funds Activities Survey. The 377 SFS/S5C will survey all major funds activities initially and annually thereafter to determine the activity's capability to properly protect funds and to assist in correcting any discrepancies.

3.7. (FOUO) Minor Funds Activity Survey. Minor funds activities can request to be surveyed by 377 SFS/S5C. Checklists are available at 377 SFS/S5C for self-inspection purposes. 377 SFS/S5C personnel may conduct random inspections of activities at any time upon request.

3.8. (FOUO) Integrated Defense Council Guidelines. The IDC established the following guidelines for government funds, precious metals, jewels, or other high cash value resources requiring escort.

3.8.1. (FOUO) The activity may transport funds up to \$7,499 on base without making notification to the Security Forces.

3.8.2. (FOUO) Amounts between \$7,500 and \$25,000 will be transported by the owner or user using funds movement procedures outlined in Annex.

3.8.3. (FOUO) Amounts over \$25,000 will require armed ID forces escort.

3.8.4. (FOUO) ID forces will be used to escort government funds only. NAF, DeCA, and AAFES facilities are encouraged to hire contract escort services.

3.8.5. (FOUO) Movements during increased threats. During increased threats, funds, precious metals, jewels, or high cash value resources in the amount of \$10,000 or more will require armed ID force escort.

3.8.5.1. (FOUO) Notification to SFS/BDOC. Before the activity transports funds, precious metals, jewels, or high cash value resources between \$7,500 and \$24,999 without an armed escort, the following information must be provided to SFS/BDOC:

3.8.5.1.1. Name and physical description of the individual transporting the funds.

3.8.5.1.2. Description and license plate number of the vehicle the funds will be transported in.

3.8.5.1.3. Identify the building departing from and location going to.

3.8.5.1.4. Route to be taken. **NOTE:** Route should be varied daily.

3.8.5.1.5. Time of departure and estimated time of arrival at destination.

3.8.5.1.6. (FOUO) SFS/BDOC must be notified when the funds movement is terminated. **NOTE:** If SFS/BDOC is not notified of termination of the funds movement within five minutes of the estimated time of arrival at the activity's destination, they will assume the individual transporting the funds needs assistance and dispatch ID patrols to look for the individual.

3.8.5.1.7. (FOUO) If a robbery is attempted or occurs during the funds movement, comply with reporting procedures.

3.9. (FOUO) Funds Storage Limits. The DFC is authorized to prescribe funds storage limits.

3.9.1. (FOUO) Funds in the amount of \$7,499 or less can be stored in non-GSA approved containers or safes secured with three position changeable combination lock or key actuated lock meeting specifications listed in A-A-1927D. Funds in amounts between \$7,500 and \$99,999 will be stored in a GSA approved container. If the container weighs less than 500 pounds, it must be secured to the facility.

3.9.2. (FOUO) If assistance is required in certifying new funds containers, contact the 377 SFS Resource Protection Manager. Facilities with funds containers must post and annotate a SF Form 700, Security Container Information (inside container), SF Form 701, Activity Security Checklist, and a SF Form 702, Security Container Check Sheet.

3.10. (FOUO) ID Forces Escort Guidelines. ID forces conducting escorts will adhere to the following guidelines:

3.10.1. (FOUO) SF personnel involved in the escort will go to the office or location where the escort will initiate. They will telephone the SFS/BDOC with a description of the vehicle, name of escortee and route to be taken. They will initiate the escort via radio and accompany the person carrying the funds to the funds transporting vehicle. A security check of the vehicle will be made. The funds carrier will be escorted to each and every destination of the funds transfer.

3.10.2. (FOUO) SF personnel involved in a funds escort, regardless of the state of the escort, will possess a portable radio and shall maintain radio contact with SFS/BDOC. Notify SFS/BDOC when the escort starts and terminates. Security status checks will be made at five-minute intervals during the escort between SFS/BDOC and the escort vehicle.

3.10.3. (FOUO) ID force personnel will not carry funds, open doors, or engage in any activity that detracts or hampers escort duties. SF's will maintain constant surveillance over the area and route for suspicious vehicles and personnel. If warranted, the escort will

contact SFS/BDOC to dispatch a patrol to physically check out any suspicious vehicles or personnel.

3.10.4. (FOUO) The ID force escort will instruct the funds carrier on what route to take, how far ahead to drive in front of the escort vehicle, and to follow all traffic regulations.

3.10.5. (FOUO) The ID patrol providing escort duties will inform and ensure the person moving the funds does not allow too great a distance between the funds vehicle and the escort vehicle. The ID force escort will ensure all traffic regulations are followed.

3.10.6. (FOUO) When walking with the person carrying funds, ID forces will maintain constant surveillance over the area for suspicious personnel.

3.10.7. (FOUO) SF will make an entry in the Blotter, AF Form 53, indicating when the escort begins and ends, name of person being escorted, and SF patrol conducting the escort.

3.11. (FOUO) Off-Base Funds Movement. ID forces will not escort non-governmental funds off-base. Agencies will coordinate with contractor services for transporting funds off the installation. **NOTE:** Commissaries, AAFES facilities, and non-appropriated funds (NAF) activities are encouraged to contract escort services if needed.

3.12. (FOUO) Key Control. The 377 SFS/S5C must approve key control procedures before implementation.

3.13. (FOUO) Duress Alarms. Cashier's cages must, at a minimum, have duress alarm capability.

3.14. Program Validations.

3.14.1. (FOUO) AAFES, DeCA, and NAF funds facilities storing less than \$100,000 are exempt from this instruction, but may voluntarily participate by sending a written request to 377 SFS/S5C. Program participation may include program validations using a checklist derived on, on-site anti-robbery training/exercises, funds escort training, funds custodian training, and initial funds container certification.

3.14.2. (FOUO) To ensure prompt police service response to actual anti-robbery situations and other emergencies at minor funds facilities, submit a letter of funds storage notification to 377 SFS/S5C.

3.15. Tasked Organizations.

3.15.1. The DFC will:

3.15.1.1. (FOUO) Ensure owner/user agencies with established funds controlled areas have funds reduction and escort procedures written within units operating

procedures. Agencies procedures will be coordinated with 377 SFS/S5C before implementation.

3.16. Unit custodian will:

3.16.1. (FOUO) Establish written key control procedures and coordinate with 377 SFS/S5C before implementation.

3.16.2. (FOUO) If an IDS fails, ensure an authorized attendant responds to the facility and provides continuous surveillance of the funds until the IDS is repaired or the funds are relocated to an approved facility. When providing surveillance, the attendant must have a capability (radio, telephone, or duress alarm) to summon Security Forces during a theft attempt. Military banking facilities may be exempt from owner/user surveillance depending on contract requirements. However, at most, Security Forces will only conduct periodic checks while the IDS are inoperative.

3.16.3. (FOUO) Ensure GSA Class 5 or higher containers are used when storing \$25,000 or more.

3.16.4. (FOUO) Ensure funds container combinations for other funds facilities storing over \$100,000 or more are changed every 12 months when personnel are transferred, discharged/separated, or as directed by the IDC.

ENCLOSURE 1 TO TAB C TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX K TO KAFB IDP 31-101
FUNDS MOVEMENTS

REFERENCES: Refer to the Basic Plan.

1. PURPOSE: To identify owner/user and Security Forces responsibilities during funds, precious metals and jewel escorts and movements. The IDC has established the amount of funds, precious metals, jewels or other high cash value resources requiring on or off-base escort in the following guidelines. **NOTE:** Security Forces escort government funds only.

2. SITUATION: Funds and precious metals are extremely vulnerable to theft and terrorist acts off the installation. Protection criteria must include overland security procedures.

3. EXECUTION:

3.1. (FOUO) Amounts up to \$7,499.99 being transported on base does not apply with this Enclosure. The activity may move funds without making notifications to the 377 SFS.

3.2. (FOUO) Amounts between \$7,500 and \$24,999.99 will be transported by owner/user, using the funds movement procedures outlined in this enclosure.

3.3. (FOUO) Amounts over \$25,000 will require armed ID force escort.

3.4. (FOUO) Movements during increased threats. During increased threats, funds, precious metals, jewels, or high cash value resources in the amount of \$10,000 or more will require armed ID force escort.

3.4.1. (FOUO) Notification to SFS/BDOC. Before the activity transports funds, precious metals, jewels, or high cash value resources between \$7,500 and \$24,999 without an armed escort, the following information must be provided to SFS/BDOC:

3.4.1.1. Name and physical description of the individual transporting the funds.

3.4.1.2. Description and license plate number of the vehicle the funds will be transported in.

3.4.1.3. Identify the building departing from and location going to.

3.4.1.4. Route to be taken. **NOTE:** Route should be varied daily.

3.4.1.5. Time of departure and estimated time of arrival at destination.

3.4.1.6. (FOUO) SFS/BDOC must be notified when the funds movement is terminated. **NOTE:** If SFS/BDOC is not notified of termination of the funds movement within five minutes of the estimated time of arrival at the activity's destination, they will assume the individual transporting the funds needs assistance and dispatch ID patrols to look for the individual.

3.4.1.7. If a robbery is attempted or occurs during the funds movement, comply with reporting procedures.

3.5. ID Forces Escort Guidelines. ID forces conducting escorts will adhere to the following guidelines:

3.5.1. (FOUO) Personnel involved in the escort will go to the office or location where the escort will initiate. They will then telephone the SFS/BDOC with a description of the vehicle, name of escortee and route to be taken. They will then initiate the escort via radio and accompany the person carrying the funds to the funds transporting vehicle. A security check of the vehicle will be made. The funds carrier will be escorted to each and every destination of the funds transfer.

3.5.2. (FOUO) SF personnel involved in a funds escort, regardless of the state of the escort, will possess a portable radio and shall maintain radio contact with SFS/BDOC. Notify SFS/BDOC when the escort starts and terminates. Security status checks will be made at five-minute intervals during the escort between SFS/BDOC and the escort vehicle.

3.5.3. (FOUO) ID force personnel will not carry funds, open doors, or engage in any activity that detracts or hampers their escort duties. The SF will maintain constant surveillance over the area and route for suspicious vehicles and personnel. If warranted, the escort will contact SFS/BDOC to dispatch a patrol to physically check out any suspicious vehicles or personnel.

3.5.4. (FOUO) The ID force escort will instruct the funds carrier on what route to take, how far ahead to drive in front of the escort vehicle, and to follow all regulations traffic.

3.5.5. (FOUO) The ID patrol providing escort duties will inform and ensure the person moving the funds does not allow too great a distance between the funds vehicle and the escort vehicle. The ID force escort will ensure all traffic regulations are followed.

3.5.6. (FOUO) When walking with the person carrying funds, ID forces will maintain constant surveillance over the area for suspicious personnel.

3.5.7. (FOUO) SF will make an entry in the Blotter indicating when the escort begins and ends, name of person being escorted, and SF patrol conducting the escort.

3.6. (FOUO) Off-Base Funds Movement. ID forces will not escort non-governmental funds off-base. Agencies will coordinate with contractor services for transporting funds off the installation. **NOTE:** Commissaries, AAFES facilities, and NAF activities are encouraged to contract escort services if needed.

3.7. Key Control. The 377 SFS/S5C must approve key control procedures before implementation.

3.8. (FOUO) Duress Alarms. Cashier's cages must, at a minimum, have duress alarm capability.

3.9. Program Validations.

3.9.1. (FOUO) AAFES, DeCA, and NAF funds facilities storing less than \$100,000 are exempt from this instruction, but may voluntarily participate by sending a written request to 377 SFS/S5C. Program participation may include program validations using a checklist derived on, on-site anti-robbery training/exercises, funds escort training, funds custodian training, and initial funds container certification.

3.9.2. To ensure prompt police service response to actual anti-robbery situations and other emergencies at minor funds facilities, submit a letter of funds storage notification to 377 SFS/S5C.

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ANNEX L TO KAFB IDP 31-101
RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE

REFERENCES: NOT USED

ANNEX M TO KAFB IDP 31-101
CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

REFERENCES: Refer to the Basic Plan.

1. SITUATION: A situation develops that requires immediate response by commanders or directors in conjunction with Security Forces. Immediate response will deter or preclude loss of government resources, and/or personal injury or death.

1.1. ASSUMPTIONS:

1.1.1. The ability to detect an attempted theft or terrorist act against KAFB resources must be maintained by all base personnel.

1.1.2. The capability to sound an immediate alarm and respond to actual or suspected thefts or terrorist acts results from effective training of all personnel, efficient communication systems, and immediate reporting by all assigned personnel to proper authorities.

1.1.3. The capability to provide prompt and effective armed response to the scene of a reported incident, once an alarm has been initiated, is provided by SF.

1.1.4. The capability to differentiate between real and probable threats against non-priority resources is provided by command authority, usually the IC or Security Forces IC. Differentiation should serve as a basis for the initiation of resource protection antiterrorism options and for armed response by Security Forces.

1.1.5. The capability of all tasked organizations to expand immediately into a heightened state of security, when notified to implement any portion of this plan, ensures effective and quick neutralization of possible or probable terrorist activity and the prevention or limiting of theft or damage to KAFB resources.

2. MISSION: This annex is designed to provide flexible responses to possible, general hostile activity and to neutralize any potential threat by hostile person(s) or terrorists prior to loss of KAFB resources (personnel or equipment).

3. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS: This annex provides general guidance for implementing contingencies listed in separate tabs. The execution of this annex will be directed by the 377 ABW/CC. Since each situation is different, specific actions required in this annex may be changed to meet the situation or incident by the command element.

4. EXECUTION:

4.1. Unit Commanders/Directors. All Unit Commanders and Directors will ensure compliance with the requirements of this annex.

4.2. (FOUO) The 377 ABW/CC will ensure adequate support is provided by all agencies in the event situations identified in this annex develop. 377 ABW/CC activates CAT/EOC, as applicable.

4.3. (FOUO) The DFC will ensure adequate Security Forces are available to provide increased patrol coverage, entry control, and detection capabilities during operations under this annex.

4.4. Additional Tasks. Additional tasks are contained in individual tabs and enclosures to this annex.

5. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS: All organizations called upon to support this annex will coordinate their activities through the DFC, IC, and EOC, if formed.

6. LIMITING FACTORS:

6.1. (FOUO) 377 SFG. Security Forces mobility requirements and manning shortfalls could hinder initial response in carrying out security functions.

6.2. (FOUO) Commanders/Directors. The installation's commanders and directors may not be afforded the opportunity to develop or plan specific responses for specific situations.

7. COMMAND AND SIGNAL:

7.1. (FOUO) Coordination. Notification of contingency operations will come from SFS/BDOC through the KCP. If deemed necessary, the CAT and/or EOC will form to ensure support of operations.

7.2. Execution Checklists. All tasked organizations will prepare checklists as applicable to support the annex.

APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX M TO KAFB IDP 31-101
HOSTAGE NEGOTIATIONS

REFERENCES: Refer to the Basic Plan.

1. PURPOSE:

1.1. To define the responsibilities of base units during HNT and Emergency Service Team (EST) response during actual emergency situations.

1.2. To provide guidance for responding personnel and ensure a secure environment until the situation is terminated.

2. CONSIDERATIONS:

2.1. Time. Time is of utmost importance in the successful completion of an EST operation.

2.2. Strategy. No strategy should be considered fail-safe.

2.3. Negotiators. These individuals are not the decision makers.

3. EXECUTION:

3.1. The 377 ABW/CC:

3.1.1. Is responsible for maintaining law and order on KAFB.

3.1.2. (FOUO) May take immediate action to prevent loss of life or government property prior to FBI arrival. The 377 ABW/CC will direct activation of EOC/CAT, as applicable.

3.1.3. (FOUO) Ensures the capability to handle emergency situations on the installation exists.

3.1.4. (FOUO) Higher Headquarters. NAF/MAJCOM/HQ USAF are kept apprised of the situation, as appropriate. This includes situations the military does not have initial responsibility for, but are of significant interest to the military because of the resources involved or the location.

3.2. (FOUO) Attorney General. The Attorney General will assume primary responsibility for coordinating federal law enforcement response.

3.3. Federal Bureau of Investigations.

3.3.1. (FOUO) Has primary law enforcement responsibility for terrorist incidents.

3.3.2. (FOUO) Assumes jurisdiction of a hostage situation.

3.4. The DFC:

3.4.1. (FOUO) Is the primary advisor to the 377 ABW/CC on contingencies requiring HNT/EST response.

3.4.2. (FOUO) Does not currently have the capability to train, equip, maintain and provide a dedicated EST to respond to and/or counteract hostile threats to the base and its resources that exceed the capabilities of on-duty Security Forces (i.e., hostage situations, sniper, terrorist activities, special event operations, apprehension of dangerous persons, and large scale apprehensions). In the event these high risk situations develop, the DFC will request assistance from APD to provide a specialized response team capable of handling these scenarios.

3.4.3. (FOUO) Will coordinate with, advise, and assist local authorities, within legal limits, when military members are involved in off-base hostage incidents, but may not directly assist in law enforcement activities without authorization from higher headquarters. Assistance may include, but is not limited to, requests for background data, technical advice, negotiator assistance, or emergency use of a MWD team to conduct explosive searches.

3.5. AFOSI Detachment 814 will:

3.5.1. (FOUO) Within capabilities, provide investigative support when needed.

3.5.2. (FOUO) Coordinate with other federal or local agencies capable of performing specialized tasks.

3.5.3. (FOUO) Maintain liaison with the FBI.

3.5.4. (FOUO) Maintain liaison and coordinate with local law enforcement agencies, as necessary.

3.5.5. (FOUO) Conduct interviews of personnel who have knowledge of the situation to establish the number and identity of offenders, victims, weapons, background, and medical histories.

3.5.6. (FOUO) Evaluate threat information.

3.5.7. (FOUO) Advise the 377 ABW/CC and IC on counterintelligence and investigative matters.

3.6. (FOUO) FAA: The FAA has primary responsibility when an aircraft, military or civilian, is directly involved. Notification to the FAA is made through the National Military Command Center (NMCC).

3.7. The 377 SFG will:

- 3.7.1. (FOUO) Notify the KCP, AFOSI, Fire Department, Communications Division and associate units involved, (e.g., (SNL), (DoE), etc., when a situation occurs).
- 3.7.2. (FOUO) Establish a command center.
- 3.7.3. (FOUO) Isolate the affected area, to include an inner perimeter.
- 3.7.4. (FOUO) Relay all inquiries, especially by the media, concerning an incident to public affairs.
- 3.7.5. (FOUO) Maintain a log of the incident.
- 3.7.6. (FOUO) Keep the IC updated on Security Forces activities, to include plans and developments.
- 3.7.7. (FOUO) Establish ROE and priorities for UOF. All personnel involved in a situation must fully review and understand the rules.
- 3.7.8. (FOUO) Establish procedures to negate mobile situations as much as possible.
- 3.8. The KCP will:
 - 3.8.1. (FOUO) Notify the ABW/CC or designated representative.
 - 3.8.2. (FOUO) Notifies/recalls the CAT, EOC and/or other units/personnel, as directed by 377 ABW/CC.
- 3.9. (FOUO) Units: All recalled personnel will follow the appropriate checklists.
- 3.10. (FOUO) The 377 ABW/PA will:
 - 3.10.1. (FOUO) Handle media inquiries and notify AFGSC/PA of all known details of a situation as soon as possible.
 - 3.10.2. (FOUO) Coordinate proposed responses to media queries with appropriate authorities to facilitate accuracy, discourage and dispel rumors, and avoid premature publicity that could be dangerous in critical situations.
 - 3.10.3. (FOUO) Designate a news media center with telephones and desks away from the incident. The center will not be collocated with the IC command center or the EST area of operations. Media representatives will not be allowed inside the outer or inner perimeter. Video cameras and other video equipment belonging to media representatives are not permitted in the area of operations.
 - 3.10.4. (FOUO) Escort media representatives at all times.

3.10.5. (FOUO) 377 ABW/CC authorizing personnel assigned to the 377th Public Affairs office to escort up to three media vehicles with one Public Affairs escort vehicle to a media event. In accordance with AFMAN 31-113, *Installation Perimeter Access Control*, escort authority allows an individual, with an authorized form of identification that certifies he/she has been successfully identity proofed and favorably vetted, to vouch for any vehicle occupants entering the installation or pedestrians if walking through a pedestrian gate, and escort them onto an installation without identity proofing, vetting or pass issuance.

3.10.6. (FOUO) Escort authorities may only vouch for individuals riding in the same vehicle they are riding or are in the immediate area if they are walking. Escort authority does not authorize vehicle occupants, or pedestrians, to enter installation restricted areas (e.g., controlled, limited, or exclusion areas) without first meeting all security requirements and procedures for those areas.

3.10.7. (FOUO) 377 ABW/PA will have the responsibility to escort all media vehicles and personnel from the time of entering Kirtland AFB up until their departure from the installation. They will escort no more than three separate vehicles at a time, and will call the SFS/BDOC immediately if a vehicle is separated from them. At no time will a media vehicle or personnel be without an immediate Public Affairs escort while on the installation.

3.10.8. (FOUO) Conduct, if applicable, a warranted and/or directed press conference with a base subject matter expert (s) to address the installation's response.

3.10.9. (FOUO) Report interview requests through AFGSC/PA to SAF/PAM.

3.10.10. (FOUO) Coordinate response with 377 ABW/JA to ensure proper legal information is released.

3.11. The 377 MSG/SC will:

3.11.1. (FOUO) If the capability exists, Establish effective communications to include isolation, direct lines, conference lines, etc., during duty and non-duty hours, even if telephone services are contracted.

3.11.2. (FOUO) If the capability exists, Establish and control telephone communications between the HNT and the hostage taker.

3.11.3. (FOUO) If the capability exists, Maintain positive control of incoming and outgoing telephone communications from the incident location, which are routed through the base telephone switch and are not commercial numbers.

3.11.4. (FOUO) If the capability exists, Establish communication links between the IC and KCP, HNT, media center, hospital emergency room and SFS/BDOC.

3.11.5. (FOUO) If the capability exists, Provide negotiations monitoring capability to the HNT members, IC, and the command center.

3.11.6. (FOUO) If the capability exists, May not have the technical ability to satisfy HNT requirements for isolated telephone comms.

3.12. The 377 MSG/CE will:

3.12.1. (FOUO) Have readily available diagrams of facilities to include water, electrical, telephone, and other pertinent information.

3.12.2. (FOUO) Provide resources in support of the establishment of the IC command post at the location designated by the DFC or designated representative.

3.13. The 377 ABW/JA will:

3.13.1. (FOUO) Advise the commander on legal ramifications of decisions, actions, and advice on jurisdictional concerns.

3.13.2. (FOUO) Advise on the status of forces agreements, memorandums of understanding, and other agreements, as appropriate.

3.14. The 377 MDG/CC will:

3.14.1. (FOUO) Provide the medical support, including psychological aspects of criminal activities.

3.14.2. (FOUO) Provide advice to the IC on health and safety matters.

3.15. The 377 FSS/CL will:

3.15.1. (FOUO) Coordinate lodging and food support to victims or persons evacuated from their homes during a hostage incident, as directed by the IC.

3.15.2. (FOUO) Coordinate/provide food service support to RF personnel during prolonged operations.

3.15.3. (FOUO) Coordinate temporary lodging support for military and civilian personnel as needed.

3.15.4. (FOUO) Provide mortuary affairs support as required IAW AFI 34-242.

3.16. (FOUO) The AAFES and the Commissary will:

3.16.1. (FOUO) Issue available clothing and supplies from AAFES and Commissary stocks, if not readily available from base supply or other disaster relief sources. Issues will be approved by the 377 ABW/CC or designated representative.

3.16.2. Provide additional AAFES and Commissary support as required.

3.17. (FOUO) 377 LRS will provide vehicles to the Security Forces for road blocks, and other transportation on request of the 377 ABW/CC or IC. This request will be channeled through the CAT to the Transportation Emergency Operations Center (EOC) representative and the 377 SFG Vehicle Control Officer (VCO) or Vehicle Control Noncommissioned Officer (S4NCO).

3.18. The 58 SOW/CC will:

3.18.1. (FOUO) Provide light-all units, as available.

3.18.2. (FOUO) Relocate aircraft or other priority assets, as necessary.

3.18.3. (FOUO) Provide technical advice regarding the entry and egress points of aircraft.

3.18.4. (FOUO) Provide other service, if available, at the request of the installation or IC.

3.19. The 377 ABW Chaplain Office (377 ABW/HC) will:

3.19.1. (FOUO) Provide spiritual aid, comfort and counseling to family members of those involved, if requested.

3.19.2. (FOUO) Provide appropriate religious rites to persons involved, if requested.

4. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS: See Basic Plan.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL: See Basic Plan.

6. REPORTS:

6.1. OPREP-3 Requirements. All incidents are initially reported through OPREP-3 channels.

6.2. (FOUO) SF Reporting. The DFC or designated representative will report any actual HNT/EST employment through intermediate commands to HQ Air Force Security Forces Center (AFSFC)/SFL within 24 hours of the incident.

6.2.1. (FOUO) Follow-up reports will be submitted as determined by the 377 ABW/CC.

6.2.2. (FOUO) Letter reports will be sent within 30 days after resolution of an incident to HQ AFSFC/SFL, with information copies to all intermediate levels of command IAW AFI 31-101.

6.2.3. (FOUO) If associate units or personnel are involved in the incident, the DFC will provide copies of initial and follow-up reports to the parent MAJCOM/SF.

TAB A TO APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX M TO KAFB IDP 31-101
EMERGENCY SERVICE TEAM (EST) EMPLOYMENT

REFERENCES: Refer to the Basic Plan.

1. PURPOSE: To provide armed response to counteract specific hostile threats to the base and its resources.
2. MISSION: The 377 SFS does not currently have the capability to train, equip, maintain and provide a dedicated EST to respond to and/or counteract hostile threats to the base and its resources that exceed the capabilities of on-duty Security Forces (i.e., hostage situations, sniper, terrorist activities, special event operations, apprehension of dangerous persons, and large scale apprehensions). In the event these high risk situations develop, the 377 SFS will request assistance from APD to provide a specialized response team capable of handling these scenarios.
3. EXECUTION:
 - 3.1. Concept of Operations. The DFC will assess confrontations and high risk operations that may exceed response capabilities of on-duty Security Forces and determine if APD assistance is required.
 - 3.2. Tasks.
 - 3.2.1. Upon recommendation of the DFC, the 377 ABW/CC, or designated representative, will issue execution orders in the event APD assistance is required to support confrontations and high risk operations.
 - 3.2.2. The DFC will:
 - 3.2.2.1. (FOUO) When warranted and upon issuance of execution orders, request APD assistance to support confrontations and high risk operations.
 - 3.2.2.2. (FOUO) Appoint a Security Forces officer or senior NCO to act as the liaison between the APD response team and the DFC, or designated representative.
4. COMMAND AND SIGNAL: See Basic Plan.
 - 4.1. Command Relationship. Normal.
 - 4.2. Operations Centers.
 - 4.2.1. SFS/BDOC, Bldg. 20220.
 - 4.2.2. Command Post, Bldg. 20604. The KCP is located in Wing A, Room 103 of Building 20604.
 - 4.2.3. Emergency Operations Center, Bldg. 1900.

4.2.4. (FOUO) Alternate SFS/BDOC, Bldg. 20452, in the event the primary SFS/BDOC becomes incapacitated or the incident is located near or at their location.

4.3. (FOUO) Signal. The APD response team's primary means of communication are inner-squad radios. The alternate means of communications for the APD response team are manual signals.

TAB B TO APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX M TO KAFB IDP 31-101
HOSTAGE NEGOTIATION TEAM (HNT) EMPLOYMENT

REFERENCES: Refer to the Basic Plan.

1. **PURPOSE:** To negotiate hostage situations and eliminate or reduce the threat to the base, its personnel, and resources.

2. **DESCRIPTION:** Concept of Operations. The success of friendly forces in any hostage situation depends upon the team approach, communication, and timely response by personnel trained in the use of small unit tactics, psychology and techniques of hostage negotiation.

3. **EXECUTION:**

3.1. Based on manning, training availability, and other personnel factors, 377 SFG should train, equip, and maintain a dedicated HNT capability. If the 377 SFG does not have a HNT manning capability, then they will have to request assistance from APD or FBI, depending on the nature of the incident and contingent on 377 ABW/CC approval when a high risk incident occurs.

3.2. When a 377 SFG HNT is employed: The HNT supervisor will:

3.2.1. (FOUO) Be a Security Forces officer or noncommissioned officer (NCO) (E-5 or above).

3.2.2. Coordinate and delegate activities within the team.

3.2.3. (FOUO) Serve as liaison between the team and the DFC or designated representative.

3.3. The Primary Negotiator will:

3.3.1. (FOUO) Establish and maintain communications with hostage takers.

3.3.2. The Backup Negotiator will:

3.3.3. (FOUO) Provide relief for the primary negotiator.

3.3.4. (FOUO) Assume responsibilities when the primary negotiator becomes unable to continue.

3.4. The HNT Investigator.

3.4.1. (FOUO) Is a Security Forces investigator, AFOSI or FBI agent.

3.4.2. (FOUO) Establishes criminal profiles, as needed.

3.5. (FOUO) The HNT Mental Health Representative.

3.5.1. (FOUO) Is either a military or DOD civilian medical officer.

3.5.2. (FOUO) Advises the team on the psychological identification of hostages and hostage takers.

TAB C TO APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX M TO KAFB IDP 31-101
HOSTAGE / BARRICADE SITUATIONS

REFERENCES: Refer to the Basic Plan.

1. **PURPOSE:** Civilian or military personnel may be taken hostage by terrorists, criminals, or mentally deranged persons seeking to gain access to base resources or attempting to cover their escape from the base or a specific location on the base. The procedures in this enclosure do not apply to hostage situations involving aircraft hijackings. Anti-hijacking procedures are covered in Appendix 9 to Annex C of this plan.

2. **CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS:** The following procedures were established to ensure the safety of all persons involved and the apprehension of the suspects. This enclosure cannot establish specific detailed instructions for all hostages/barricaded suspect situations.

3. **EXECUTION:**

3.1. Upon notification of a hostage/barricaded suspect situation, the 377 SFG will:

3.1.1. (FOUO) Notify the 377 ABW/CC through the KCP.

3.1.2. (FOUO) Recall the HNT and additional personnel, as directed by the DFC.

3.1.3. (FOUO) When directed by the DFC, request EST support from APD.

3.1.4. (FOUO) Attempt to determine the number of hostages, hostage takers, and their exact location within the facility.

3.1.5. (FOUO) Establish an IZ zone security cordon until the arrival of EST personnel.

3.1.6. (FOUO) Direct evacuation of all non-essential personnel from the area. Direct all evacuated personnel to a specific location for interviews.

3.1.7. (FOUO) Direct SF personnel to interview all evacuated personnel, other witnesses, family members and friends of hostage(s), and hostage taker(s). Obtain descriptions of hostage taker (s) and hostage (s) and obtain other relevant facts involving the incident (i.e., motivations of hostage taker (s) personalities involved, etc.).

3.1.8. (FOUO) Direct establishment of an outer security zone cordon.

3.1.9. (FOUO) Establish a cordon out of range of possible hostile weapons and out of sight of hostage taker(s).

3.1.10. (FOUO) Direct patrols to re-route traffic and establish traffic control points (TCPs) as necessary.

- 3.1.11. (FOUO) Direct evacuation to protect innocent bystanders from weapon fire and keep non-essential personnel away from the scene.
- 3.1.12. (FOUO) Direct establishment of an IC Command Post, preferably in a building out of sight of the hostage taker (s).
- 3.1.13. (FOUO) Plot the location of all Security Forces posts within the inner and outer cordons.
- 3.1.14. (FOUO) Obtain building blueprints for the HNT and EST from CE.
- 3.1.15. (FOUO) Initiate negotiations when directed by DFC or IC.
- 3.1.16. (FOUO) Ensure adequate relief personnel are available for all EST and security zone posts.
- 3.1.17. (FOUO) Contact civil police agencies and the FBI or other friendly forces, as directed.
- 3.2. (FOUO) The 377 MSG/CE will isolate the building as directed by the IC by cutting off or controlling the heat, air conditioning, electricity, and water.
- 3.3. (FOUO) Support Units. All support units will provide technical assistance and specific equipment when requested. They will not initiate any action that might intensify the situation unless authorized by the IC or the designated representative.

APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX M TO KAFB IDP 31-101
CONFRONTATION MANAGEMENT

REFERENCES: Refer to the Basic Plan.

1. PURPOSE: To provide general guidance when group disorder is imminent or occurring, and to provide Security Forces to maintain or restore order on-base through military operations other than war (MOOTW). These operations are designed to protect operational resources, facilities, personnel, and prepare for possible deployment to support other AFGSC bases or other military installations on receipt of orders from higher headquarters. This tab implements Electronic Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Guides (e-TTPGs) Library located on the Air Force Security Forces Centers' web site.

2. OPTION DESCRIPTION: Situations listed below can be managed by the 377 ABW/CC, DFC, or higher authority.

2.1. (FOUO) Phase I. Period of increased tension; situation build-up exceeding normal day-to-day disorders or difficulties.

2.2. (FOUO) Phase II. Scattered minor incidents.

2.3. (FOUO) Phase III. Group-oriented law breaking, such as destruction of property, assaults, defiance of authority, and disobedience to order.

2.4. (FOUO) Phase IV. Full riot phase.

3. CONSIDERATIONS:

3.1. Situation Variation. No single course of action defines what is appropriate for every situation. Flexibility is a key factor in any successful operation.

3.2. Evaluation of Situation. The effective control of disorder requires timely evaluation by those in charge of the RF.

3.3. Pre-Planning. Certain actions can be anticipated; plans can be developed for their implementation.

3.4. (FOUO) Deployment to Other Installations. Deployment is required, in varying degrees, in support of other AFGSC bases when directed by HQ AFGSC or higher authority.

3.5. Civil Disturbance. Support of civil disturbances or civil defense emergencies as in the case of an off-base riot or contingency.

3.6. General Operations. The general natures of operations are:

3.6.1. Normal day-to-day operations.

3.6.2. Initiating immediate response to alarms at the scenes of disorders.

3.6.3. Discriminating between hostile and non-hostile actions of a crowd or mob and expanding into effective confrontation management operations required to neutralize conceivable levels of crowd or mob actions.

3.6.4. Reacting to local or MAJCOM down channel reports concerning dissident activities that could involve KAFB property or personnel,

3.6.5. The restoration of law and order when group disorder breaks out.

3.7. Forces Assigned. All Security Forces assigned to the 377 SFG and personnel from other base units. When necessary, HQ AFGSC or higher authority may designate reinforcement from other AFGSC bases.

3.8. Use of confrontation management. The grievance and complaint system may break down making the UOF necessary to maintain or restore order.

3.9. Personnel Limiting Factors. Adequate personnel and resources may not be available to support this plan.

3.10. Priority of confrontation management. Implementation of this plan will take precedence over all other related activities or plans, unless specified otherwise by the IC or higher authority.

3.11. Operational Command and Control. The DFC will maintain operational command and control over all assigned matters pertinent to maintaining order and protection of property of the confrontation forces and supporting operations when deemed necessary. The provisions of this plan are general in nature, allowing for flexibility in handling a specific incident.

3.12. Exercise of confrontation management plans. Confrontation management procedures should be exercised as needed to ensure proficiency of responding forces.

4. EXECUTION:

4.1. (FOUO) All organizations will prepare local OIs and checklists to support extended operations. Instructions should consider recall procedures, loss of Individual Mobilization Augmenters' (IMAs), owner/user security operations, two-person security teams to protect critical resources and communications outages.

4.2. The 377 ABW/CC will:

4.2.1. (FOUO) For any level of confrontation, initiate requests to HQ AFGSC for reinforcements of additional Security Forces or for such forces to be placed on standby alert. Base resources will be committed before requesting reinforcements. As a minimum,

the request will include details of the threat, number of Security Forces members required, and desired status (standby alert or immediate deployment).

4.2.2. (FOUO) Develop and maintain the capability to gather information on potential on-base disorders.

4.2.3. (FOUO) Through the DFC, coordinate with local authorities to ensure information relative to large or unusual purchases of firearms or ammunition by individuals or large groups of individuals, particularly military personnel, is made available to the installation authorities in a timely manner.

4.2.4. (FOUO) Ensure base personnel tasked under this plan are properly trained and equipped to maintain and restore order.

4.2.5. (FOUO) Ensure Security Forces are properly trained and equipped for deployment to other bases.

4.3. The DFC, in conjunction with the 377 ABW/CC, will determine the necessity for an after-action report.

TAB A TO APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX M TO KAFB IDP 31-101
PHASE I OPERATIONS / PERIODS OF INCREASED TENSIONS

REFERENCES: Refer to the Basic Plan.

1. **OBJECTIVE:** To provide general and specific guidance to protect base resources during Phase I operations.
2. **CONSIDERATIONS:** The potential for disorder could remain constant for several months or escalate quickly and then subside.
3. **EXECUTION:**
 - 3.1. The 377 ABW/CC will:
 - 3.1.1. (FOUO) Direct an intensified internal information program.
 - 3.1.2. (FOUO) Review reports on dissident activities and potential disorder gathered from intelligence sources and determine what additional security measures should be implemented.
 - 3.1.3. (FOUO) Direct activation of the CAT and/or EOC, if necessary.
 - 3.1.4. (FOUO) Advise higher headquarters of situation developments and request assistance if needed.
 - 3.1.5. (FOUO) Direct monitoring of activities in dormitories and places of public gatherings.
 - 3.1.6. (FOUO) Meet with dissenters or their leaders and determine the precise nature of their grievances.
 - 3.1.7. (FOUO) Place emergency personnel on standby.
 - 3.2. The 377 ABW/PA will:
 - 3.2.1. (FOUO) Activate the Straight Talk Line, when directed.
 - 3.2.2. (FOUO) Be alert to information indicating increased tension or sources of dissatisfaction.
 - 3.2.3. (FOUO) Be prepared to receive and answer queries and escort media members.
 - 3.3. The 377 MDG will:

3.3.1. (FOUO) Provide information on tension indications through social actions representatives throughout the base.

3.3.2. (FOUO) Be prepared to provide emergency medical care to all personnel injured during a disorder, and employ mass casualty assistance, if required.

3.3.3. (FOUO) Place necessary medical personnel on telephone alert when notified of a potential problem.

3.3.4. (FOUO) Dispatch medical teams and vehicles as required.

3.3.5. (FOUO) Render emergency treatment at the scene(s) of any disorder or clash.

3.4. (FOUO) The 377 LRS will:

3.4.1. (FOUO) Dispatch vehicles and drivers as requested by Security Forces, through the EOC/CAT.

3.4.2. (FOUO) Dispatch vehicles in support of the 377 MDG, as requested by the EOC/CAT.

3.4.3. (FOUO) Place two drivers and two 28-passenger buses on standby to transport riot control forces, in the event Security Forces buses are down for maintenance.

3.4.4. (FOUO) Expedite requisition/notice of shortages of applicable organizational equipment resources as authorized within basis of issue in appropriate Table of Allowances (TAs), as required.

3.4.5. (FOUO) Ensure security and control of weapons and ammunition under LRS jurisdiction is in complete compliance with AFI 31-101.

3.5. The 377 SFG will:

3.5.1. (FOUO) Maintain close liaison with AFOSI and local intelligence gathering agencies, and review agreements with other police agencies.

3.5.2. (FOUO) Immediately report to the 377 ABW/CC any incident, event, or gathering with racial, anti-war, or other signals of unrest.

3.5.3. (FOUO) Attempt to identify group leaders or spokespersons to gain insight into their causes or grievances; report findings to the 377 ABW/CC.

3.5.4. (FOUO) Keep squadron personnel apprised of the facts, thereby lessening the chances for escalation of tensions due to Security Forces overreaction or undue UOF.

3.5.5. (FOUO) Continuously coordinate with and update the 377 ABW/CC on Security Forces actions.

3.6. The 377 MSG/CE will:

3.6.1. (FOUO) Provide road blocking material, i.e., barricades or suitable substitutes for vehicles and personnel control, as necessary.

3.6.2. (FOUO) Ensure the Fire Department develops plans to respond in accordance with the levels of confrontation prescribed in this Tab.

3.6.3. (FOUO) If Security Forces are not in control of a disturbance that results in a fire, firefighters will not leave the protection of their vehicles to fight the fire until the situation is under control.

3.6.4. (FOUO) Any time firefighters find themselves between Security Forces and demonstrators, they will terminate firefighting operations and withdraw.

3.7. (FOUO) The 377 FSS will coordinate/provide lodging support for unit commanders and first sergeants when necessary, and provide quarters for Security Forces reinforcements deployed to KAFB in support of confrontation management.

TAB B TO APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX M TO KAFB IDP 31-101
PHASE II OPERATIONS / SCATTERED MINOR INCIDENTS OF VIOLENCE

REFERENCES: Refer to the Basic Plan.

1. **PURPOSE:** To provide general and specific guidance to protect installation resources during Phase II operations.
2. **CONSIDERATIONS:** The potential for disorder could remain steady or escalate with little or no warning.
3. **EXECUTION:** The 377 ABW/CC, unit commanders, and supervisors will increase their visibility. Discipline rests with the first line supervisors and commanders. In addition to tasks listed below, unit commanders will review Phase I actions and, if not previously accomplished, implement applicable actions, as required.

3.1. The 377 ABW/CC will:

- 3.1.1. (FOUO) Determine what type of actions should be implemented based upon current situation and intelligence reports.
- 3.1.2. (FOUO) Advise higher headquarters of developments.
- 3.1.3. (FOUO) Visit areas of public gatherings, (i.e., clubs, snack bars, etc.,) to stabilize the situation.
- 3.1.4. (FOUO) Consider implementing an increased FPCON.
- 3.1.5. (FOUO) Identify and determine what action to take concerning leaders of groups involved in dissident activities.
- 3.1.6. (FOUO) Employ and publicize the Straight Talk Center.
- 3.1.7. (FOUO) In considering a dispersal order, ensure an adequate Security Forces presence is maintained for immediate enforcement action should the order be refused or circumvented.
- 3.1.8. (FOUO) Direct all base RFs, Security Forces, medical, fire department, disaster preparedness, etc., to place their personnel on telephone standby.

3.2. The DFC will:

- 3.2.1. (FOUO) Continue low key normal operations and increase watchfulness and preparation. The risk of disorder in this phase is increased and can extend indefinitely.
- 3.2.2. (FOUO) Continue actions from Phase I.

3.2.3. (FOUO) Consider increasing patrol composition to at least two people. When needed, dispatch at least two, two-person patrols to major disturbance scenes. When only one patrol is dispatched, the team should observe and report activities and wait for back-up forces. Other units should be alerted of possible dispatch.

3.2.4. (FOUO) Consider use of photography for identification purposes.

3.2.5. (FOUO) Increase patrol coverage of critical operational resources and request the 377 ABW/CC to direct Arms, AA&E and major fund custodians to secure their facilities on a 24-hour basis.

3.2.6. (FOUO) Consider placing of Security Forces.

3.2.7. (FOUO) Assess Security Forces resources and consider requesting reinforcements from other base agencies. Consider placing such forces on standby alert. Base requests on the number of available Security Forces, probability of disorder, scale and size, and time and distance factors for deploying reinforcements.

3.2.8. (FOUO) Alert other base agencies to possible support requirements.

3.2.9. (FOUO) Provide frequent spot checks of all facilities.

3.2.10. (FOUO) Prior to initiating a dispersal order, recall enough personnel to implement immediate enforcement action should the order be refused or circumvented.

3.2.11. (FOUO) Inform units of potential dangers/risk so they can take precautions.

3.3. Unit commanders will:

3.3.1. (FOUO) Order key supervisors and first sergeants, not ordinarily residing on-base, to move into base billets and be on 24-hour standby until the disturbances are terminated.

3.3.2. (FOUO) Increase internal security surveillance over facilities, equipment and aircraft and immediately report unusual or suspicious incidents to Security Forces.

TAB C TO APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX M TO KAFB IDP 31-101
PHASE III OPERATIONS / GROUP-ORIENTED VIOLENCE

REFERENCES: Refer to the Basic Plan.

1. **PURPOSE:** To provide general and specific guidance to protect installation resources during Phase III operations.

2. **CONSIDERATIONS:** The disorder and violence in this phase could easily escalate due to improper actions by authorities.

3. **EXECUTION:** This phase depicts initial overt actions by Security Forces to maintain and restore order, augment on-duty personnel, and organize forces into apprehension teams and riot control squads. This phase is usually of short duration, but can fluctuate lower or higher. In addition to tasks listed below, unit commanders will review Phase I and Phase II actions and, if not previously accomplished, implement applicable actions, as required.

3.1. The 377 ABW/CC will:

3.1.1. (FOUO) Activate the CAT and/or EOC, if not previously accomplished.

3.1.2. (FOUO) Consider increasing the FPCON.

3.1.3. (FOUO) Recall base riot control forces

3.1.4. (FOUO) Ensure protection of vital elements such as classified material, weapon systems, operations centers, communications centers, motor pools, POL areas, warehouses, banks, credit unions, finance offices, power and water plants, storage areas for firearms, ammunition and explosives, restricted and controlled areas. Owner units will have primary security responsibility to act as detectors and to notify SF of unusual or dangerous situations.

3.1.5. (FOUO) Apprehend offenders (especially those with weapons), group leaders, and agitators.

3.1.6. (FOUO) Restrict the on-base container sale of gasoline and other flammable liquids, alcoholic beverages, weapons, and ammunition.

3.1.7. (FOUO) Establish a curfew.

3.1.8. (FOUO) Assign impartial observers (i.e., equal opportunity, chaplain, etc.).

3.1.9. (FOUO) Restrict the use of recreational firing ranges and the issue of recreational firearms, i.e., restricting access to POWs located in the Security Forces armory.

3.1.10. (FOUO) When confronted with specific threatening situations, activate the IC command element. The CAT and EOC will assist the 377 ABW/CC by ensuring their functional areas are informed and react properly to the situation.

3.1.11. (FOUO) Determine the level of force necessary to quell the disturbance. Consider the use of MWDs, firefighting equipment, chemical irritants, smoke, and, as a last resort, the use of firearms.

3.1.12. (FOUO) Direct emergency response organizations with exposed emergency power generating equipment to provide security of this equipment.

3.1.13. (FOUO) Place vital support functions into 24-hour operations or extend duty hours, as necessary.

3.1.14. (FOUO) Coordinate additional requirements of support agencies and all associate units.

3.2. The 58 SOW/CC will:

3.2.1. (FOUO) Deploy personnel to assist in protecting critical assets.

3.2.2. (FOUO) Consider the feasibility and practicality of consolidating aircraft away from parking area perimeters for added security.

3.2.3. (FOUO) Provide helicopter support if requested and available.

3.2.4. (FOUO) Provide aerial lighting of the incident scene if available.

3.2.5. (FOUO) Provide sound amplification of orders issued by the IC, orders to field units, etc.

3.2.6. (FOUO) Provide an observation platform for aerial reconnaissance and surveillance or as an airborne command and control unit if available.

3.2.7. (FOUO) Assist in deployment of Security Forces or evacuation of injured personnel.

3.3. The DFC will:

3.3.1. (FOUO) Establish a command center.

3.3.2. (FOUO) Establish positive control at base entry points (stop-check-pass system).

3.3.3. (FOUO) Deploy all available communication equipment.

3.3.4. (FOUO) Establish cordons to isolate affected areas.

3.3.5. (FOUO) Ensure adequate relief is available for duty personnel. If a recall is planned, consider:

3.3.5.1. (FOUO) Show of force may or may not deter disorder.

3.3.5.2. (FOUO) Establishing a standing back up force.

3.3.6. (FOUO) Be part of the IC command element.

3.3.7. (FOUO) Pre-position fully organized and equipped forces for immediate responses.

3.3.8. (FOUO) Organize mass apprehension teams.

3.3.9. (FOUO) Request that 377 ABW/CC direct each unit commander and staff agency to provide continuous surveillance of vital base resources.

3.3.10. (FOUO) Request additional vehicles and drivers from the 377LRS/LGRDDO Vehicle Operations.

3.3.11. (FOUO) Alert EOC members to the possible need for additional support (Fire Department, Civil Engineering, Medical, OSI, JA, etc.).

3.3.12. (FOUO) Apprehend offenders, especially those with weapons, group leaders, and agitators. UOF will be IAW AFI 31-117, and guidance from 377 ABW/CC.

3.3.13. (FOUO) Close non-essential installation entry gates, and ensure manning at remaining gates is sufficient to support stop-check-pass procedures.

3.3.14. (FOUO) Continuously update all unit personnel, especially on the UOF and ROE.

3.3.15. (FOUO) Plan for sustained operations.

3.3.16. (FOUO) Provide information to Public Affairs.

3.3.17. (FOUO) Consider using the base photography section for documentation.

3.3.18. (FOUO) Maintain an official log of incidents for future use. Include dates, times, locations, major incidents, decisions, actions, changes in command, and other significant matters.

3.3.19. (FOUO) Consider requesting APD EST support.

3.3.20. (FOUO) Secure vehicles when not in use or left unattended.

3.3.21. (FOUO) Keep the IC apprised of Security Forces actions and coordinate future plans. Specifically discuss the following:

- 3.3.21.1. (FOUO) UOF.
- 3.3.21.2. (FOUO) Use and composition of impartial observer groups or teams.
- 3.3.21.3. (FOUO) Restrictions on sales of gasoline, alcoholic beverages and weapons.
- 3.3.21.4. (FOUO) Curfew.
- 3.3.21.5. (FOUO) Isolation of affected area.
- 3.3.21.6. (FOUO) Transfer of prisoners to off-base locations.
- 3.3.21.7. (FOUO) Mandatory wear of military uniforms by all military personnel.
- 3.3.21.8. (FOUO) Prospect of containing the situation before it elevates, but plan for escalation of the situation.
- 3.3.21.9. (FOUO) Feasibility of requesting higher headquarters support.
- 3.3.21.10. (FOUO) Inspection of all dormitories for weapons or ammunition.
- 3.3.21.11. (FOUO) Support agreements and coordination with other military installations and civilian police agencies.
- 3.3.21.12. (FOUO) ROE.

3.4. The 377 LRS/CC will:

- 3.4.1. (FOUO) Recall personnel when directed.
- 3.4.2. (FOUO) Provide drivers and vehicles, as requested through the EOC/CAT.

3.5. The 377 MSG/SC Director will:

- 3.5.1. (FOUO) Recall communications equipment compatible with Security Forces equipment and frequencies for deployment.
- 3.5.2. (FOUO) Reconfigure communications equipment as necessary to support extended operations.
- 3.5.3. (FOUO) Assist in deploying communication resources to critical agencies.

3.6. The 377 MDG/CC will:

- 3.6.1. (FOUO) Prepare to handle injuries.

3.6.2. (FOUO) Implement additional internal security (coordinate with Veterans Administration police).

TAB D TO APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX M TO KAFB IDP 31-101
PHASE IV OPERATIONS / FULL RIOT PHASE

REFERENCES: Refer to the Basic Plan.

1. **PURPOSE:** To provide general and specific guidance to protect installation resources during Phase IV operations.

2. **CONSIDERATIONS:** The need for speedy conclusion of this phase of the disorder is of paramount importance.

3. **EXECUTION:** Maximum mobilization of Security Forces is required. Restoration of order using the minimum amount of force is the immediate objective. The actual employment of forces should be of short duration. In addition to tasks listed below, unit commanders will review Phase I, II, and III actions and implement applicable actions not already addressed.

3.1. The 377 ABW/CC will:

3.1.1. (FOUO) Make decisions concerning the use of firearms to restore order.

3.1.2. (FOUO) Assess the situation and advise higher headquarters of additional Security Forces reinforcement requirements.

3.1.3. (FOUO) Consider implementing an increased FPCON.

3.1.4. (FOUO) Direct the immediate restoration of order through the use of Security Forces and other base resources to contain and localize the problem, effect mass apprehension and force dispersal. Consider the use of MWD and chemical devices.

3.1.5. (FOUO) Consider restricting base entry to official traffic only.

3.1.6. (FOUO) Consider stopping the flow of all, but official traffic in the affected and adjacent areas.

3.1.7. (FOUO) Consider transfer of detainees and/or prisoners to other bases or civilian jails.

3.1.8. (FOUO) Direct use of firefighting equipment, as required.

3.2. The DFC will:

3.2.1. (FOUO) Restore order through the use of apprehension teams and riot control squads using the appropriate degree of force. Actions to restore order should follow the below sequence.

3.2.2. (FOUO) Isolate and contain the scene. Stabilize the situation by preventing others from joining.

3.2.3. (FOUO) Initiate mass apprehensions of all offenders.

3.2.4. (FOUO) Attempt to break large groups into small, manageable units and continue to apprehend.

3.2.5. (FOUO) Upon 377 ABW/CC approval, request EST support from APD, to include anti-sniper capability for the optional use of the 377 ABW/CC.

3.2.6. (FOUO) Keep the IC apprised of 377 SFG actions, and plan future actions to include as a minimum:

3.2.6.1. (FOUO) UOF considerations.

3.2.6.2. (FOUO) Impose and enforce a curfew.

3.2.6.3. (FOUO) Assess the need for emergency reinforcement from nearby bases or civilian police agencies IAW existing agreements. The request is always accompanied by a request to higher headquarters for AFGSC reinforcement if such a request has not previously been submitted.

3.2.6.4. (FOUO) Possibility of looting, arson, attempts to free prisoners, sniping, attempts to break into arms and ammunition storage facilities, threats against aircraft and command facilities, occupation of offices of command authority, thefts of classified information or material, robberies, and thefts from funds activities and bomb threats.

3.2.6.5. (FOUO) Restricting entry to the base to persons on official business only.

3.2.6.6. (FOUO) Request impartial observer teams be assigned to affected areas. When possible, assign a SF member to each team as a communicator and to protect the group.

3.2.6.7. (FOUO) Monitor incoming traffic at base entry points for persons wanted for specific charges.

3.2.6.8. (FOUO) Request Low Light Level Television (LLTV) cameras if available.

4. POST CONFRONTATION:

4.1. The 377 ABW/CC will:

4.1.1. (FOUO) Order the resumption of normal mission and mission support activities.

4.1.2. (FOUO) Continue close liaison with AFOSI, Commanders, and appropriate staff members until the situation is completely returned to normal.

4.1.3. (FOUO) If necessary, direct the return of reinforcement, i.e. Security Forces, to their home bases at the earliest possible time.

4.1.4. (FOUO) Continue to emphasize the internal and public information program.

4.1.5. (FOUO) Ensure expeditious processing of follow-on administrative and judicial actions.

4.1.6. (FOUO) Direct preparation of after-action reports to higher headquarters.

4.1.7. (FOUO) Arrange for return of detainees/prisoners to home station when appropriate.

4.2. The DFC will:

4.2.1. (FOUO) Continue two-person patrols, if necessary.

4.2.2. (FOUO) Continue close liaison with AFOSI and request they continue to collect information concerning further disorder. Ensure procedures are still in effect to gather information from other friendly forces.

4.2.3. (FOUO) Debrief Security Forces and review the official record of events for the base after-action report. Ensure the expeditious processing of police reports.

4.2.4. (FOUO) When appropriate, recommend to the 377 ABW/CC to return reinforcements to their home station or agency. The order of priority for return is civilian police, military personnel from adjacent installations, and AFGSC/A4S.

4.2.5. (FOUO) When appropriate, make recommendations to the 377 ABW/CC for the return of installation prisoners from off-base locations.

4.3. (FOUO) 377 ABW/PA will comply with this plan.

4.4. (FOUO) 377 ABW/JA will assist with legal matters pertaining to the incident.

TAB E TO APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX M TO KAFB IDP 31-101
DEPLOYMENT AND RE-DEPLOYMENT

REFERENCES: Refer to the Basic Plan.

1. **PURPOSE:** To provide general and specific guidance to deploy and/or re-deploy forces when ordered by HQ AFGSC.

2. **CONSIDERATION:** It is Air Force policy to use the resources of the MAJCOM experiencing the disorder before requesting reinforcement from HQ USAF.

3. **EXECUTION:**

3.1. Requesting and Using Reinforcement Forces.

3.1.1. (FOUO) Requests for reinforcements are initiated by the DFC and passed to the 377 ABW/CC, and must include details for the threat, number of police forces required, and a summary on the use of base Security Forces.

3.1.2. (FOUO) Ensure reinforcements are assembled at a designated assembly area on arrival and briefed on the current situation, the specific tasks to be performed, lines of command and control, communications, and UOF.

3.1.3. (FOUO) Reinforcements should maintain unit integrity at employment level as much as possible. A host base Security Forces member will be assigned to each squad to provide necessary directions when the squad is assigned or reassigned to a location.

3.2. (FOUO) Redeployment of Reinforcement Forces.

3.2.1. (FOUO) The host base DFC will initiate re-deployment action through the 377 ABW/CC.

3.2.2. (FOUO) Reinforcement personnel are normally alerted to the re-deployment within four hours. Reinforcements are identified and assembled for return to home station. Unit equipment is accounted for and packaged for shipment with the reinforcements.

3.3. (FOUO) Providing Reinforcements for Deployment.

3.3.1. (FOUO) Only AFGSC/A4S may place Security Forces on standby alert. When placed on alert, specific Security Forces are identified for deployment. KAFB will provide a maximum of 44 Security Forces personnel when directed by AFGSC/A4S for deployment to reinforce another AFGSC base or command. The DFC should deploy personnel proficient in riot control duties. Unit equipment should be assembled and available for immediate deployment.

3.3.2. (FOUO) In most instances where reinforcement of another base is required, time will permit the issuance of an alerting order prior to the movement order. The time between the alerting order and the movement order will normally allow sufficient time to organize the deployment force in an orderly manner. After being placed on alert, the force must be ready to move within two hours of receipt of the movement order. However, planning should consider the potential for a no-notice movement order. In such cases, RFs must be prepared to move within four hours.

3.3.3. (FOUO) When a standby alert order is received, designated Security Forces will be identified and placed on telephone standby with personal gear packed. The names of individuals identified for deployment will be provided to the personnel readiness unit for manifesting and to personnel for orders and advance pay if applicable. Unit equipment will be packaged for shipment.

3.3.4. (FOUO) When directed to deploy, personnel will be assembled for departure from the home station within four hours.

3.3.5. (FOUO) When an order to deploy is received without first being placed on standby alert status, tasked bases will concurrently identify, recall, and assemble Security Forces personnel and take the actions outlined in the above paragraphs, within four hours.

3.3.6. (FOUO) Deployed forces will be placed under the command and control of the DFC at the affected base and employed as required.

3.4. (FOUO) Transportation. When tasked by AFGSC/A4S, reinforcements will use either surface or airlift movement. Where feasible, and when time schedules can be met, surface transportation will be used. When required, airlift will be provided for movement from the home base to the disturbance threatened base in accordance with the following:

3.4.1. (FOUO) Operational support airlift should be used if available.

3.4.2. (FOUO) If operational support airlift is not available; AFGSC will coordinate airlift support.

TAB F TO APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX M TO KAFB IDP 31-101
DEMONSTRATIONS

REFERENCES: Refer to the Basic Plan.

1. **SITUATION:** The 377 ABW/CC is required to provide protection and ensure the uninterrupted and successful accomplishment of the mission at all times, but particularly during military operation other than war (MOOTW). Civil disturbances, demonstrations, unlawful entry, and isolated acts of violence against an installation must be handled in a concise, fair, and prudent manner.
2. **MISSION:** The 377 ABW/CC is responsible for the enforcement of order at installations under their jurisdiction. They are required to protect personnel and property, maintain order, and ensure the uninterrupted and successful accomplishment of the mission.
3. **CONCEPT OF OPERATION:** The 377 ABW/CC must be able to react to civil disorders, lawful demonstrations, and acts of violence at or near those installations under his/her control. When the situation warrants intervention, the DFC will provide forces to control and contain these situations. Civil authorities will be used to quell or control situations at or near the installation unless they are unable or unwilling to do so. The 377 ABW/CC will obtain authorization from HQ USAF according to AFI 10-206 Operational Reporting, prior to taking actions off the installation, unless the situation presents imminent danger to base personnel or property.
4. **EXECUTION:**
 - 4.1. The 377 ABW/CC will:
 - 4.1.1. (FOUO) Direct base agencies to implement this enclosure as the situation dictates. The actual response will be a measured response to the situation at hand.
 - 4.1.2. (FOUO) Implement FPCON measures/contingency response actions, as applicable.
 - 4.1.3. (FOUO) Place personnel on standby, as needed.
 - 4.1.4. (FOUO) Activate the CAT and/or EOC, as directed.
 - 4.1.5. (FOUO) Direct all base agencies to increase security in their respective areas.
 - 4.1.6. (FOUO) Appoint an IC and dispatch him/her to the location of the disturbance.
 - 4.1.7. (FOUO) Direct the DFC to respond to the scene.
 - 4.2. The DFC will:

- 4.2.1. (FOUO) Use SFS/BDOC as the command and control center for all SF operations during the demonstration.
- 4.2.2. (FOUO) Place SF personnel on telephone standby, as needed.
- 4.2.3. (FOUO) Execute FPCON measures/contingency response actions, as applicable.
- 4.2.4. (FOUO) Request assistance from APD and/or New Mexico State Police for crowd control, if needed.
- 4.2.5. (FOUO) Recall riot control forces and request APD EST, if needed.
- 4.2.6. (FOUO) Dispatch a riot control squad to the scene to monitor the situation.
- 4.2.7. (FOUO) Dispatch a riot control flight to standby close to the scene but out of sight.
- 4.2.8. (FOUO) Activate the Mobile Processing Unit for possible employment.
- 4.2.9. (FOUO) Activate the temporary holding facility in the west gym.
- 4.2.10. (FOUO) Prepare to implement Confrontation Management procedures in the event demonstrators gain access to the base.
- 4.2.11. (FOUO) Terminate FPCON/contingency response actions when situation warrants.
- 4.2.12. (FOUO) Prepare an after-action report.
- 4.2.13. (FOUO) Direct all press inquiries to 377 ABW/PA.

4.3. The 377 MSG/CC will:

- 4.3.1. (FOUO) Close all non-essential facilities/activities when directed by the 377 ABW/CC.
- 4.3.2. (FOUO) Provide a temporary holding area at the West Fitness Center when directed by the 377 ABW/CC.

5. PROCEDURES:

5.1. Handling of Violators:

- 5.1.1. (FOUO) The 377 ABW/CC shall prevent violators from interfering with base operations.

5.1.2. (FOUO) Violators may be apprehended/detained, or ordered to leave and escorted off the installation.

5.1.3. (FOUO) Violators will be identified and photographed. If prosecution is contemplated, a written order of debarment should be considered whenever a person's presence on-base is deemed prejudicial to good order and discipline. 377 ABW/CC has discretionary authority. 377 ABW/JA assistance will be sought in all cases.

5.1.4. (FOUO) Violators who re-enter, after having been ordered not to re-enter, may be prosecuted. **NOTE:** Only civil authorities have the power of arrest and prosecution of civil offenders when off-base or outside federal military jurisdiction. Inconsequential interference, such as blocking gates, may be tolerated if other gates are available for entry.

5.1.5. (FOUO) Consider coordinating with U.S. Marshals for arrest and detention of violators.

6. ACTIONS DURING PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATIONS:

6.1. Lawful Expression. Air Force personnel will not interfere with the lawful exercise of the right to expression and assembly.

6.2. Neutrality by Air Force Personnel. Air Force personnel will remain neutral in regards to demonstrations.

6.3. Use of Government Facilities. Unit commanders shall not allow use of government facilities for partisan political purposes.

6.4. Public Affairs: Public comments on any demonstration or possible demonstration will not be made except as authorized by the public affairs office (377 ABW/PA).

6.5. Confrontation. The 377 ABW/CC will minimize the potential for confrontation between military personnel and the demonstrators.

6.6. Military Members. Military members cannot comment while on duty or in uniform, but they have First Amendment rights to speak/comment off-duty out of uniform.

TAB G TO APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX M TO KAFB IDP 31-101
MASS APPREHENSION / DETAINMENT

REFERENCES: Refer to the Basic Plan.

1. GENERAL: During the restoration of order, large scale apprehension of offenders may be expected. These apprehensions cause a saturation of normal prisoner/detainee processing procedures. Therefore, a system for processing prisoners must be established.
2. (FOUO) MOBILE PROCESSING UNIT: Following apprehension, suspects are restrained by handcuffs, rapidly removed from the area of the disorder, and transported to a Mobile Processing Unit (MPU). MPU's are established out of view, close to the disorder(s). Mobility is essential to permit relocation should the disturbance shift to other areas. The purpose of the MPU is the expeditious processing of suspects and documentation of the charges so that apprehending personnel may be rapidly returned to the scene of the disorder.

2.1. Equipping and Staffing the MPU:

2.1.1. Equipment should consist of a vehicle with a container to hold supplies and a portable or mobile radio. Supplies should include battery-operated illumination, restraining devices, camera, ink pad, and administrative supplies including bags for preservation of evidence and first aid kit.

2.1.2. The staff is composed of the NCOIC (normally an investigator), a driver, and a female SF member (or trained female military member) to assist in the searching and processing of possible female suspects. Additional vehicles, drivers (provided by the 377 LRS through the EOC/CAT) and, SF members are provided to the MPU to transfer prisoners from the MPU to the mass detention area. Medical teams may be needed to administer treatment to injured persons. Consideration should be given to the use of MWD's since they provide an important psychological impact/deterrent on disorderly groups. Security Forces personnel assigned to the MPU will be armed with a sidearm.

2.2. MPU Procedures:

2.2.1. (FOUO) When a suspect is brought to the MPU, a simple frisk is conducted for weapons, other contraband, and identification documents. Because of the necessity for rapid processing, other personal property is not confiscated at this time.

2.2.2. (FOUO) If weapons are confiscated, they will be placed in a bag and the bag will be stapled at the top. If the weapon is too large to place in the bag, the bag will be wrapped around the weapon or otherwise securely attached to the weapon.

2.2.3. (FOUO) If an ID card or other identification is found, it will be placed in the bag with the weapon. If no weapon is found, the ID card or other identification should be stapled to the photograph and AF Form 52, Evidence Tag.

2.2.4. (FOUO) If not previously accomplished, the suspect is restrained, preferably with disposable handcuffs.

2.2.5. (FOUO) A photograph is taken of the suspect. The suspect will hold the apprehension card in front of him/her with a large number printed on it. Numbers will be assigned to prisoners/detainees consecutively. As a further means of identification, each suspect will have his/her right thumb print placed on the apprehension card.

2.2.6. (FOUO) The Apprehension Data Card is completed (to the fullest extent possible) in longhand by the apprehending official. The Apprehension Data Card is then stapled to the photograph and the paper bag containing weapon and/or ID card. This information will be used for identification and the preparation of reports at a later time.

2.2.7. (FOUO) The suspect, Apprehension Data Card, and confiscated weapons are then placed in the custody of the Security Forces escorts for transfer to the detention facility. The apprehending official then returns to the scene of the disorder for further duty.

2.2.8. (FOUO) When ringleaders can be identified and apprehended, they should if possible, be escorted by the apprehending official(s) for processing. Ringleader(s) should be isolated from other suspects.

3. (FOUO) DETENTION FACILITIES: Will be established in a secure building, remote from the disturbance area, suitable for the detention of large numbers of prisoners/detainees. On KAFB, the West Fitness Center has been identified as Mass Detention Facilities.

3.1. Equipping and Staffing:

3.1.1. (FOUO) Equipment will include a portable radio, telephone, computer, latrine facilities, and separate areas for female Air Force personnel, administrative supplies, and wire cutters to remove flex-cuffs.

3.1.2. The staff will include representatives of the SJA, administrative personnel, medical personnel, OSI personnel, SF, and other base personnel, as required. A female SF will be made available to assist in the searching, processing, and detention of female suspects. A SF NCO will be assigned as NCOIC of the detention facility/operation.

3.2. Procedures:

3.2.1. (FOUO) Suspects will normally be brought to the facility from the MPU. Suspects will have an Apprehension Data Card with picture. Immediately upon entering, the suspects are thoroughly searched and personal property is confiscated. The property is placed inside an envelope, sealed, and signed across the flap by the suspect. An AF Form 52 must be prepared at this time for acquired evidence.

3.2.2. (FOUO) Administrative personnel will type the confinement order and a JA representative will review the Apprehension Card Data for legal sufficiency. The suspect

will be placed in confinement and the confinement order will be signed by the designated commissioned officer. Contact JA and U.S. Marshals for coordination on the status of civilians.

3.2.3. (FOUO) The personal property envelope, with the Apprehension Data Card attached, will then be filed and safeguarded.

3.2.4. (FOUO) Under these conditions, large numbers of suspects may be processed who do not possess identification or who refuse to identify themselves. During all processing, they will be given a number to match the numbers on their photograph, Apprehension Data Card, and evidence bag, until proper identification is possible. In such cases, unit commanders, First Sergeants, and OSI representatives should be called upon to identify personnel. In the event identity cannot be established, individuals will be held for civil authorities.

3.2.5. (FOUO) Female Air Force personnel will assist in the processing and detention of female prisoners. Under no circumstances will male and female prisoners be confined together.

3.2.6. (FOUO) Medical personnel perform first aid.

3.2.7. (FOUO) Coordinate with civilian authorities on procedures dealing with suspected civilian lawbreakers.

4. OFF-BASE CONFINEMENT: In the event the 377 ABW/CC directs off-base prisoner transfers, the following procedures apply.

4.1. (FOUO) Prisoner Escort. The 377 SFS will provide escorts to accompany the prisoners. Other base personnel may assist, if needed.

4.2. (FOUO) Military Prisoners. Only those prisoners positively identified as military personnel may be relocated to other installations.

4.3. (FOUO) Prisoner Accountability. Maintain strict accountability of prisoners and their location. The personal property envelopes and the Apprehension Data Card should accompany the prisoner.

TAB H TO APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX M TO KAFB IDP 31-101
APPLICATION OF USE OF FORCE

REFERENCES: Refer to the Basic Plan.

1. GENERAL:

1.1. Air Force UOF Policy: Air Force policy, as stated in AFI 31-117, prohibits the UOF that could create a substantial risk of causing death or serious bodily harm except as a last resort. Personnel will be given ROE briefing. An ROE can consist of simply informing Security Forces personnel to comply directly with AFI 31-117 due to their extensive knowledge of it to an extensive briefing on actions to take for extremely violent personnel. The extensive briefing is preferred.

1.2. Application of Force: For many, the appearance (show of force) of a well-disciplined SF formation will be sufficient enough to deter law abiding citizens who have been caught up in mob. The application of force, by degrees, will cause these individuals to recognize their error, and possibly depart. Applying force in this manner ensures the minimum force necessary to restore order will be applied only to the most lawless and violent of the mob. Unwarranted application of force may incite the mob to further violence, as well as kindle seeds of resentment that could cause recurrence of the rioting. It is most important that both the degree of force and the order of application be clearly spelled out in contingency plans. All Security Forces involved in the operation must know and understand the application of each succeeding degree.

1.3. UOF: Prior to the use force, if possible, a dispersal proclamation will be given. See Enclosure 12 of this Tab for authorized proclamation.

2. DECISION LEVEL: At the scene of the disturbance, the progression through the various degrees of force must be decided by the IC command element. The use of deadly force requires the approval of the 377 ABW/CC.

3. WEAPONS/RESOURCES:

3.1. (FOUO) Cap Stun Weapons: Cap Stun Weapon Systems crowd control pepper spray serves two purposes: First, to prevent or curtail violence and, secondly, to disperse the mob. Cap Stun weapons make these essentials possible with a minimum danger to either the rioter or the RF. Prior to the use of pepper spray, it must be established that the mob has an avenue of escape; if not, panic could result. Properly employed pepper spray provides the IC with a distinct advantage that can negate the numerical superiority of the mob. Cap Stun Weapons are the most humane and effective means of temporarily neutralizing a mob with a minimum of personal injury. Cap Stun will only be used by squad leaders under order of the IC.

3.2. (FOUO) Riot Batons: The riot baton is an adaptable instrument that provides SF with both an offensive and defensive weapon. Training in its use will be a part of the training program for all Security Forces. In a disturbance, it must be judiciously used to avoid

criticism for excessive UOF. Like other injury producing weapons, it will be used only in an emergency. When utilizing baton strikes, it will be with the intention to temporarily disable rather than inflicting serious injury. Blows to the head will be avoided.

3.3. (FOUO) Fire Hoses: Water from fire hoses may be effective in moving small groups, groups on a narrow front, or defending a file formation or a road block. As an impressive part of the initial show of force, the fire trucks in evidence are effective. It should always be used in support of troops and never alone. Water has often been used in civil disturbances and has been found to have a psychological as well as a physical effect. Water may be used as a high trajectory spray, akin to heavy rainfall. The latter method has been especially effective in cold weather. A harmless dye may be mixed into the stream for possible later identification of the rioters. The potential for physical injury and even death from high pressure water when used on a flat trajectory must not be overlooked. The decision to use water and how it is to be used should be made by the IC with advice from Security Forces and fire department incident command commanders.

3.4. (FOUO) MWDs: MWDs are effective as an added measure in a show of force and as a backup for RFs. Consideration should also be given to using patrol dogs and handlers at the Mobile Processing Unit to provide a quieting effect on offenders, as back-up for riot control squads in riot control formations, and at detention facilities during the processing of offenders. However, direct confrontation with personnel involved in disorders will be avoided to reduce fear and resentment. The decision to use patrol dogs must be made by the IC command element. **NOTE:** When performing duties in support of PL1 areas, MWD teams are under the operational control of the Area Supervisor of that area.

4. USE OF FIREARMS:

4.1. (FOUO) Use of non-lethal and deadly force: The IC is authorized to use non-lethal force to control disorders, prevent crimes, and apprehend or detain persons who have committed crimes. The degree of force used must be no greater than reasonably necessary under the circumstances. The use of deadly force can be justified only by extreme necessity. Accordingly, its use is not authorized for the purpose of preventing activities that do not pose an absolute risk of death or serious bodily harm (i.e., curfew violations or looting). All the requirements of paragraph 4.2., below, must be met in every case that deadly force is employed.

4.2. (FOUO) Use of Deadly Force: The use of deadly force is authorized only as a last resort when facing conditions of extreme necessity, when all lesser means of force aren't feasible or have failed, and only under one or more of these circumstances set forth in DOD Directive 5210.56.

4.2.1. (FOUO) Protection of DOD assets designated as vital to the national security. DOD designates its assets as "vital to the national security" only when their loss, damage, or compromise would seriously jeopardize the fulfillment of a national defense mission. This includes PL 1–3 resources defined in AFI 31-101.

4.2.2. (FOUO) Protection of DOD assets not vital to national security but inherently dangerous to others. These resources are so designated if their theft or sabotage presents a substantial danger of death or serious bodily harm to others. This category includes weapons, ammunition, missiles, rockets, explosives, chemical agents, and special nuclear material.

4.2.3. (FOUO) Deadly force may be used while performing official duties when you reasonably believe yourself or others may be in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm.

4.2.4. (FOUO) Deadly force may be used to prevent serious violent offenses that could result in death or serious bodily harm.

4.2.5. (FOUO) Deadly force may be used when it reasonably appears necessary to arrest or apprehend a person suspected of committing an offense of the nature specified above.

4.2.6. (FOUO) Competent authority may specifically authorize the use of deadly force when it reasonably appears necessary to prevent the escape of a prisoner who threatens serious bodily harm or death to escorting personnel or other persons. During an escape attempt, you must have probable cause to believe the prisoner is in fact attempting to escape and that the escaping prisoner poses a threat of serious bodily harm, either to yourself or others.

4.3. (FOUO) Special Considerations for the Use of Deadly Force. Fire shots only with due regard for the safety of innocent bystanders. Do not fire shots if they are likely to endanger innocent bystanders. When possible, give the order to "HALT" before discharging a firearm to prevent death or serious bodily harm to others. When you are under hostile attack in protection and recovery operations involving designated protection level 1 resources in AFI 31-117 or lethal chemical/biological agents, the safety of innocent bystanders or hostages will be considered, but will not deter aggressive actions.

4.3.1. (FOUO) When you discharge a firearm, fire it with the intent of rendering the targeted person or persons incapable of continuing the activity or course of behavior that led you to shoot. Rendering incapable may not require death in every circumstance. Do not fire shots as a warning to a suspect.

4.3.2. When assigned to PL 1 through 4 resources, refer to outlined in AFI 31-117.

4.3.3. (FOUO) Even when its use is authorized pursuant to paragraph 4.2., above, deadly force must be employed with great selectivity and precision against the particular threat justifying its use. For example, the receipt of sniper fire--however deadly--from an unknown location can never justify returning the fire against any or all persons who may be visible on the street or in nearby buildings. Such an indiscriminate response is far too likely to result in casualties among innocent bystanders or fellow RF personnel. The appropriate response is to take cover and attempt to locate the source of the fire so the threat can be neutralized.

4.4. (FOUO) Arming of RF: Arming RFs must be consistent with the controlling principle of using only the minimum force necessary to accomplish the mission. Use of deadly force will be used only as a last resort and in accordance with AFI 31-117.

4.5. Loading Weapons.

4.5.1. (FOUO) The 377 ABW/CC is authorized to have live ammunition issued to personnel under their command. Individual Airmen will be instructed they may not load their weapons except when authorized by competent authority, and only when circumstances justify the use of deadly force pursuant to paragraph 4.2. above. Control over loading weapons until the necessity of action is clearly established, is critical in preventing an unjustified use of deadly force. Whenever possible, command and control arrangements should be specifically designed to facilitate careful control of deadly weapons and orders regarding their use.

4.5.2. (FOUO) The presence of loaded weapons in tense situations may invite the application of deadly force in response to provocation, but are not sufficient to justify its use. It also increases the possibility of a weapon being improperly discharged. This could then lead others to a reflex response on the mistaken assumption that an order to fire has been given. Security Forces supervisors must be clearly instructed that they have a personal obligation to withhold permission for loading weapons until circumstances indicate a high probability of deadly force will be imminently necessary and justified pursuant to the criteria set forth in paragraph 4.2., above. Command supervision must be strong, and strictly exercised to assure loading weapons is not authorized in a routine, premature, or blanket manner.

**TAB I TO APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX M TO KAFB IDP 31-101
EQUIPMENT**

REFERENCES: Refer to the Basic Plan.

1. **EQUIPMENT FOR LOCAL USE:** The DFC will ensure the following items of equipment are procured, maintained, and available for immediate use in the implementation of Confrontation Management procedures. Basis of issue will be in accordance with the appropriate Table of Allowance (TA).

- 1.1. Rifle, M-4.
- 1.2. Pistol, semi-auto/9 MM.
- 1.3. Holster, 9 MM Pistol.
- 1.4. Loudspeaker Microphone.
- 1.5. Flashlight, MX 994/V, 3 batteries.
- 1.6. Badge, Security Forces (3POXX).
- 1.7. Belt, Cotton Webbing.
- 1.8. Whistle, Bell, Plastic.
- 1.9. Handcuffs, 2 Keys Ratchet.
- 1.10. Video camera with the audio disabled.
- 1.11. Case, Ammo Magazine type M16.
- 1.12. Flak Vest or second chance vest.
- 1.13. Case, First Aid.
- 1.14. Canteen.
- 1.15. Cup, Water Canteen.
- 1.16. Cover, Canteen.
- 1.17. Gloves (leather).
- 1.18. Wool liner, Gloves.

- 1.19. Fiberglass Riot Control helmet w/Face Shield.
- 1.20. Mask, Protective Field, MCU2P.
- 1.21. Filter, Protective Field Mask M-13A2.
- 1.22. Baton, riot 33" or 36" (1 for each Security Forces member assigned riot control duty).
- 1.23. Radios, Portable, w/3 batteries per radio.
- 1.24. Foul Weather Gear.
- 1.25. Grenade, Hand Riot CS-M25A2.
- 1.26. Grenade, Hand Smoke HC, AN-M8.
- 1.27. Dispenser, Z-305 (Cap Stun Weapons Systems).
- 1.28. Handcuffs, Disposable.
- 1.29. Digital Camera w/ photo capable printer.

2. EQUIPMENT FOR DEPLOYMENT: The DFC will ensure the following items of equipment are available either in the custody of individual Airmen, or ready for immediate issue, when a deployment order to another installation is received:

2.1. Items. All items listed in paragraph 1, plus the following:

2.1.1. Digital Camera w/ photo capable printer.

2.2. Individual Equipment. Additionally, deployment forces will be in possession of the following:

2.2.1. Three complete field utility/battle dress uniforms.

2.2.2. One complete non-field uniform appropriate for seasonal and local requirements.

NOTE: The purpose of non-field uniforms is to assist personnel involved in confrontation management operations to depart in attire other than ABUs to assist in concealing their identity.

2.2.3. Ample personal clothing items, socks, underwear, etc. to last for at least one week, including toilet articles and personal comfort items.

3. (FOUO) WEAPONS: The basic weapons for tactical teams are the riot baton and pepper spray. These weapons, as well as the M9 Pistol, will be issued at the home stations using AF Form 1297, Temporary Hand Receipt for deploying personnel. These personnel will have, in their possession, the AF Form 629 for the M9 pistol. The AF Form 629 will be used to verify qualification and receipt for weapons at the host base when receiving weapons from storage locations. Provisions for the proper storage of additional weapons at deployment bases must be made in advance; bearing in mind the weapons must be readily available for issue. These may be stored in the SF armament/equipment rooms (space permitting) or at other approved storage locations.

4. TRANSPORT OF CHEMICAL AGENTS: Riot control agents will be transported via aircraft IAW AFMAN 24-204, Preparing Hazardous Material For Military Air Shipment, paragraph A10.8 or KAFB Installation Deployment Plan 10-403 (Civilian) for Movement of HAZMAT on Civilian Aircraft.

TAB J TO APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX M TO KAFB IDP 31-101
PROCLAMATION

REFERENCES: Refer to the Basic Plan.

1. GENERAL: The following proclamations will be used, if appropriate, before the UOF is authorized. These proclamations are reviewed by the 377 ABW/JA during the annual review of this plan.

2. PROCLAMATIONS:

2.1. Declaration Advisement Prior to Removal.

2.1.1. “You are presently on a United States military reservation at KAFB, New Mexico.”

2.1.2. “Individuals without legitimate business on KAFB will not be permitted to enter or to remain within the geographical confines of this installation.”

2.1.3. “The Installation Commander has determined that any political or protest demonstration taking place within the boundaries of KAFB interferes with the mission of the USAF units assigned to this base.”

2.1.4. “By order of the Commander, 377th Air Base Wing, you are ordered, effective immediately, to leave KAFB. You will have two minutes to leave this area and to depart KAFB by the most direct route. Your failure to depart KAFB after two minutes will place you in violation of the installation commander’s lawful order to leave and will result in your permanent restriction from this base.”

2.1.5. (FOUO) “You are again ordered to leave this area and now have two minutes to depart KAFB by the most direct route.” **NOTE:** Wait for one minute to pass. If the protestors still do not leave, read the following statement:

2.1.6. “You now have 1 minute to leave this area and to depart KAFB by the most direct route. Your failure to depart after 1 minute will result in your permanent restriction from this base.”

2.2. Final Removal Advisement.

2.2.1. “You were previously advised that the KAFB installation commander ordered you to leave this base. You were given a reasonable time to comply with the order to leave. By remaining on the base, you are now in violation of that lawful order”.

2.2.2. (FOUO) “Air Force Security Forces will now take you to a processing center where you will be given a letter from the installation commander formally and permanently restricting you from the confines of KAFB. After receiving the restriction letter, you will be escorted off the base. Registered owners of vehicles now at KAFB will be returned to

their vehicle and then escorted off-base by Security Forces. All other vehicles will be impounded at the owner's expense."

2.2.3. (FOUO) "Please cooperate with Air Force Security Forces as they escort you from this area to the processing center and off KAFB."

2.3. (FOUO) Post-Processing Advisement.

2.3.1. (FOUO) "All of you were given a letter from the installation commander of KAFB restricting you from reentering this military installation. You were also given a map outlining the boundaries of KAFB."

2.3.2. (FOUO) "You will now be escorted off KAFB. Registered vehicles owners now at KAFB will be returned to their vehicles and escorted off-base by Security Forces. All other vehicles will be impounded at the owner's expense."

2.3.3. (FOUO) "At this time, you are not charged with violating federal law. However, as your letter explains, if you reenter KAFB without the written permission of the installation commander, you will be in violation of Section 1382, of Title 18, of the United States Code. Accordingly, if you return to KAFB, you will be subject to apprehension, detainment, and delivery to civilian authorities for prosecution in federal court."

APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX M TO KAFB IDP 31-101
MOBILITY DEPLOYMENTS (FIREARMS PROTECTION)

REFERENCES: Refer to the Basic Plan.

1. PURPOSE:

1.1. General. The 377 ABW may be tasked to deploy personnel and equipment in support of operation plans, contingencies, exercises, or other mobility activities as directed by the 377 ABW/CC, or higher authority.

1.2. Specific. Commanders of units tasked to deploy, receive, or support deployments will establish procedures to protect mobility resources under their control. The deploying commander must establish and enforce procedures for deployed firearms according to the requirements in AFI 31-101. The DFC will provide staff guidance regarding resource protection requirements for deploying forces.

2. EXECUTION:

2.1. Equipment Custodian. All equipment custodians will establish procedures that assure protection of all sensitive and highly pilferable items under their control. Procedures will be written and placed in unit instructions, regulations, etc. These procedures should include, but are not limited, to the following:

2.1.1. Physical security measures used to protect items.

2.1.2. Individuals or sections responsible for items.

2.1.3. Accounting and inventory procedures.

2.1.4. Issue and return procedures.

2.1.5. Access to storage facilities.

2.1.6. Protective aids such as lighting, locks, windows, doors, etc.

2.1.7. Individuals responsible for securing items during duty/non-duty hours.

2.1.8. Theft prevention.

2.1.9. Procedures to notify supervisors and Security Forces immediately when a theft occurs.

2.2. Physical Security Requirements.

2.2.1. (FOUO) Security Forces patrols, if available, will conduct physical security checks of storage areas at deployed locations containing high value or sensitive equipment at least every four hours when owner/user personnel cannot.

2.2.2. (FOUO) Storage areas at deployed locations containing high value, sensitive equipment or pilferable items will be designated as controlled areas by the deployed commander or 377 ABW/CC.

2.2.3. (FOUO) Small arms and ammunition will be secured.

3. CONSIDERATIONS: Government and private property are more vulnerable to theft under deployed field conditions. Field conditions will not have adequate storage facilities or physical security safeguards. All personnel must be motivated to be more security conscious under such conditions.

APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX M TO KAFB IDP 31-101
MASS CASUALTY

REFERENCES: Basic Plan, Refer to KAFB IEMP 10-2 and Medical Contingency Response Plan.

1. PURPOSE: The possibility exists for the use of KAFB and 377 ABW facilities in the arrival, processing, and storage of mass casualties.
2. EXECUTION:
3. During mass casualty operations, Security Forces will:
 - 3.1. (FOUO) Maintain the required level of security and law enforcement coverage for KAFB priority and non-priority resources.
 - 3.2. (FOUO) Provide security, as determined by the DFC, for the arrival, processing and storage of remains on KAFB.
 - 3.3. (FOUO) Establish or modify procedures for entry and control of visitors, press personnel, and relatives of casualty victims to KAFB.
4. CONSIDERATIONS: Refer to KAFB IEMP 10-2 and Medical Group Response Plan.

APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX M TO KAFB IDP 31-101
ARMS CONTROL COMPLIANCE ACTIVITIES

REFERENCES: Basic Plan, Refer to KAFB START Treaty Plan

1. PURPOSE: The possibility exists for KAFB and 377 ABW facilities to be included in the START Treaty II plans to include the arrival and processing of personnel for inspection activities.

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ANNEX N TO KAFB IDP 31-101
GEOGRAPHICALLY SEPARATED UNIT (GSU) SUPPORT

REFERENCES: NOT USED

ANNEX O TO KAFB IDP 31-101
WEATHER-TERRAIN ANALYSIS

1. SITUATION: See Basic Plan.
2. MISSION: To ensure security sustainment in New Mexico's desert, rugged terrain and weather conditions.
3. EXECUTION:

3.1 WEATHER: Albuquerque is known for its moderate year-round climate. Low humidity and warm temperatures combine to make Albuquerque enjoyable during any season. Summer highs around 90°F/32°C are common, but not uncomfortable, due to low humidity. The city's latitude and altitude combine to give it a pleasant year-round climate. Albuquerque is just far enough south to be spared many of the storms that often touch northern NM. Its elevation of over 5,000 feet spares us the extreme heat of other lower-altitude cities in the same latitude. The altitude also provides four distinct but temperate seasons. The average daily range of temperature is relatively wide, but long periods of extreme temperatures are rare. Summers usually bring no more than 15 to 20 days when the temperature reaches 100°F and winter nights seldom drop to 0°F. The Sandia Mountains represent a broken segment of the almost continuous Rocky Mountain chain. They obstruct the atmospheric flow that exerts a strong influence on the local weather of the Central Rio Grande Valley. Many polar air outbreaks from the east are steered away from the city (although they occasionally "leak" through Tijeras Canyon). Humid summer air and thunderstorm-spawned tornadoes are usually kept away by the mountain barrier. Summer showers frequently cluster along the mountains thus doubling or tripling the average annual precipitation received in the adjacent valley. Albuquerque's low humidity, little cloud cover, and valley location encourage formation of significant atmospheric layers or temperature inversion. Normally, during the day, air temperature decreases with altitude, but at night, "tile air" next to the ground becomes cooler than the air above, forming an inversion. The layer suppresses vertical mixing, keeping pollutants trapped near the ground. This condition can cause episodes of unacceptably large concentrations of pollutants. These weather conditions affect operations in the following manner:

3.1.1 (DCNI) Severe electrical storms, heat, and blowing sand could cause IDS to register nuisance alarms or become inoperative, thus reducing or eliminating their effectiveness.

3.1.2 (DCNI) High winds, dust, and heavy rainfall at times could degrade the response times of security patrols.

3.1.3 (DCNI) Heavy rainfall could cause erosion or wash outs and high winds could cause buildup of tumble weeds against controlled and restricted area boundary fences reduces the overall effectiveness of the fence making access to restricted areas more likely, as well as providing possible concealment for the enemy.

3.1.4 (DCNI) In addition, flooding may cause standing water to gather around the entrance and exit tunnels to KUMMSC producing nuisance alarms. Adverse weather conditions may reduce visibility or road conditions which may have an effect on response times, or the ability to respond.

3.1.5 (DCNI) Cold temperatures cause SF to use warmup vehicles to assure survivability of exposed sentries. This fact, plus the extra cold weather clothing worn by exposed sentries, reduces their ability to detect and react to a threat.

3.1.6 Any request for weather support can be coordinated through 377 MXS. Lists criteria for weather warnings, watches and advisories at KAFB.

TABLE 5.1.1. AVERAGE WEATHER BY MONTH

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
Average temp. (°F)	35	41	47	55	63	73	77	75	68	56	43	35
High temperature (°F)	48	55	62	71	80	90	92	88	82	71	57	48
Low temperature (°F)	22	26	32	38	47	56	62	61	54	41	30	22
Precipitation (in)	0.4	0.4	0.6	0.5	0.6	0.6	1.3	1.8	1	0.9	0.7	0.5
Days with precipitation	4	4	5	3	4	4	9	10	6	5	4	4
Wind speed (mph)	8	8.8	9.9	11	11	9.8	8.9	8.1	8.4	8.2	7.9	7.6
Morning humidity (%)	68	63	55	48	47	46	59	65	61	60	64	69
Afternoon humidity (%)	39	31	24	19	19	18	27	31	30	30	36	43
Sunshine (%)	72	72	73	77	79	83	76	75	79	79	76	71
	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
Days clear of clouds	13	11	11	13	14	17	12	13	17	17	15	14
Partly cloudy days	8	8	10	10	10	9	14	13	8	8	8	7
Cloudy days	10	10	10	8	7	4	5	5	6	6	7	10
Snowfall (in)	2.5	2.1	1.8	0.6	0	0	0	0	0	0.1	1.2	2.7

3.2. TERRAIN: KAFB is located in central New Mexico at 35° 2' 25" N, 106° 36' 33" W on the southern periphery of Albuquerque and has station elevation of 5,350 feet above sea level. The airfield and southern Albuquerque are in a relatively flat area while the overall terrain slopes downward from east to west due to the adjacent mountainous areas. To the north and south, including the southern portions of the base, rolling hills with sparse vegetation is the norm. To the west, the Rio Grande River valley runs generally north to south and is several hundred feet below the airfield. The Sandia Mountains rise to a height of 10,300 feet, 15 miles to the northeast of the airfield where the Manzano Mountains start about 6,550 feet, 10 miles to the east-southeast and extend southward to a final height of 10,098 feet, 25-30 miles to the south-southeast. Between them, the Tijeras (pronounced Te-hare-es) Canyon, located almost due east of the airfield, is a local feature that plays a prominent role in producing canyon wind events. According to the United States Census Bureau, the city has a total area of 469.5 km² (181.3 mi²). 467.9 km² (180.6 mi²) of it is land and 1.7 km² (0.6 mi²) of it is water. The total area is 0.35% water.

3.2.1 KAFB is located in the SE quadrant of Albuquerque and shares the airfield with the Albuquerque Sunport. The terrain on KAFB is primarily flat, rolling hills and high desert. The unimproved areas of the base are covered with sparse vegetation. The

installation is divided into three distinct areas: east, west, and south. The east and west sections of the base are primarily urbanized areas, while to the south the land becomes increasingly hilly and mountainous. The southeastern part of the base perimeter is approximately 7 miles long and bordered by the Manzano Mountains. The majority of this area is too steep or rocky to allow access to standard vehicles, however can be negotiated by off road vehicles (ATVs, four wheel drives, etc.) or personnel on foot. The Tijeras Arroyo enters the base through the northeast perimeter near Powerline Road, cuts through the installation and exits via the southwest perimeter. A number of smaller washes and ravines extend out from the Arroyo through the southern areas of the base. The farther one travels south, specifically toward Southgate Avenue and the South Valley Gate, the more hills are encountered. The land also becomes hillier to the east, eventually giving way to more mountainous terrain and forests. The terrain in the northwestern half of the installation is predominantly flat, giving way to more urbanized areas of KAFB and the city of Albuquerque. Visibility north of Hardin Boulevard is uninterrupted by naturally occurring terrain features. Hills, arroyos and more hazardous terrain begin to become an issue south of Hardin Boulevard, specifically in the areas of Pad 5, Manzano Bridge and Low Water Bridge. The area around the Kirtland Underground Maintenance and Munitions Storage Complex is also considerably flat, covered with sparse vegetation, but able to be clearly observed from positions on Manzano Mountain. North of Hardin Boulevard, unauthorized personnel are more likely to gain access to the installation by simply jumping the fence. Due to high traffic and high visibility in the more built-up sections of KAFB, unauthorized access is typically observed and reported quickly. Conventional law enforcement vehicles (i.e., Crown Victorias, Chargers, and Impalas) are best suited for these types of areas. In the southeastern areas of the installation, access to the base is hampered by the mountainous nature of the terrain. ATVs and similar off-road vehicles could potentially traverse this terrain, while personnel on foot could easily gain access to the installation and potentially go undetected. It is here that security patrols in off-road vehicles would best be utilized, although the terrain still prohibits complete and in-depth patrolling of every inch of the perimeter.

3.3. (DCNI) TOPOGRAPHY: Ditches, gullies, mountains, and arroyos surround the base providing ample cover for hostile forces attempting to delay or prevent SF response to KUMMSC and other wing resources.

ANNEX P TO KAFB IDP 31-101
COMMAND AND CONTROL

REFERENCES: Refer to Basic Plan.

1. SITUATION: This annex provides the relationship between the position of the Commander, KAFB and other subordinate coordinating authorities.

2. MISSION: Command and control warfare (C2W) is the integrated use of OPSEC, military deception, and physical destruction, mutually supported by intelligence to deny information to, influence, degrade, or destroy adversary C2 capabilities while protecting friendly C2 capabilities against such actions.

3. EXECUTION: The 377 ABW/CC directs the initiation of this plan within the military requirements except where otherwise specified in the inter-support tenant agreements. The command line has been identified below:

3.1. The DFC, in coordination with the 377 ABW/CC, is in command of the SF operations established in this plan.

3.2. Succession of command to the position of DFC.

3.2.1. 377 SFG/CD.

3.2.2. 377 WSSS/CC.

3.2.3. 377 SFS/CC.

3.2.4. 377 SSPTS/CC.

3.3. Other Subordinate Commands: The senior official will be responsible for their unit/agencies.

3.4. Coordinating Authorities: In the absence of the designated on-scene commander, the on-duty SF flight leader/flight sergeant will assume control of the responding forces until relieved by higher authority.

3.5. Non-Military Agencies: If actions/activities are directed solely against KAFB resources, the 377 ABW/CC will assume authority as overall commander of forces through the on-scene commanders of responding local or federal agencies supporting the operation. Responding friendly forces will maintain their normal command structure but will be subject to the 377 ABW/CC or ICs control regarding any operations conducted solely on KAFB.

APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX P TO KAFB IDP 31-101
COMMUNICATIONS FAILURE ON BASE

REFERENCES: Refer to Basic Plan.

1. (DCNI) SITUATION: An unexplained or un-programmed total or partial loss of the primary communications network due to either hostile or non-hostile acts against direct lines, dial lines, or UHF/VHF remote radios on base affecting all or part of areas containing PL resources. These procedures can also be implemented during increased security contingencies.

2. (DCNI) MISSION: To protect all resources and facilities from a possible hostile force or from possible harassment by dissident elements that have interrupted all forms of communication. To establish lines of communications between all command/control agencies in order to provide a continuous flow of communication/information to all agencies on base to include nuclear weapons movements. Additionally, to provide an alternate means of communication (i.e., radio, patrols, landline, field phone, manual signals or runner).

3. EXECUTION:

3.1. (DCNI) SFS/BDOC will take the following actions:

3.1.1. (DCNI) Attempt to up-channel Security Incidents/Covered Wagon reports, as applicable, to MAJCOM Command Center via alternate methods of communications, if KCP is unable to up-channel, until communications are restored.

3.1.1.1. Optional items to be considered:

3.1.1.1.1. Recall/form SF Battlestaff.

3.1.1.1.2. Notify AFOSI.

3.1.1.1.3. Form CAT.

3.1.1.1.4. Identify/form BF.

3.1.1.1.5. Dispatch BF, if necessary.

3.2. (DCNI) Review 377 ABW AT Plan, 377 ABW RAMs, and implement as required.

3.3. (DCNI) Use any means available to contact all posts, patrols, agencies, and key personnel.

3.4. (DCNI) Dispatch a patrol to 377 ABW/HQ and to check the status of buildings

3.5. (DCNI) Dispatch nearest mobile patrol to the affected area and attempt to determine cause of the failure.

3.6. (DCNI) Should there be no means of communication with KUMMSC, SFS/BDOC will dispatch a patrol to determine the security status, face-to-face with the topside area supervisor and advise to maintain continuous Interior/Exterior SRT patrol coverage.

3.7. (DCNI) The following SF agencies will designate a runner(s) who will be equipped with a portable radio and cell phone. These runners will report to the SFS/BDOC and stand-by until dispatched.

3.7.1. (DCNI) SFS/BDOC.

3.7.2. (DCNI) WSSS/SSCC.

3.7.3. (DCNI) 377th Weapons System Security Squadron (377 WSSS).

3.7.4. (DCNI) 377th Security Forces Squadron (377 SFS).

3.7.5. (DCNI) 377th Security Support Squadron (377 SSPTS).

3.8. (DCNI) Alert/dispatch Flight Commander/Chief to the affected areas.

3.9. (DCNI) Have KCP attempt to contact affected areas/UCCs, via all available means of communication, to determine their status.

4. (DCNI) Communications Failure – On-Base Nuclear Weapons Movements: MSC will take the following actions for a total communications loss affecting a nuclear weapons movement.

4.1. (DCNI) If communications is lost with a nuclear weapons movement on base, ensure WSSS/SSCC dispatches a patrol to intercept the movement and determine the status. This will be accomplished through the use of the sign/countersign.

4.2. (DCNI) After the patrol has located the movement and determined no duress exists, the patrol will instruct the movement to proceed to or remain at the closest safe area, depending on the situation, until the communications loss is corrected.

4.3. (DCNI) The following actions should be considered and implemented, as directed, for each area of communications loss:

4.3.1. (DCNI) Send a SF representative to the KCP, if the CAT is formed.

4.3.2. (DCNI) Form the SFG Battlestaff.

4.3.3. (DCNI) During the hours of darkness, post a MWD patrol topside KUMMSC.

4.3.4. (DCNI) Consider arming 898 MUNS personnel in the KUMMSC.

4.3.5. (DCNI) Dispatch additional Security Forces as directed.

4.3.6. (DCNI) WSSS/SSCC/SFS/BDOC will advise KCP and key personnel of the results of the investigation as to the cause of the communications loss. Normal movement operations will be resumed, when applicable.

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ANNEX Q TO KAFB IDP 31-101
OPERATIONS SECURITY (OPSEC) PLAN

REFERENCES: Refer to 377 ABW OPSEC Plan.

ANNEX R TO KAFB IDP 31-101
PUBLIC AFFAIRS (PA)

REFERENCES: Refer to the 377 ABW Public Affairs Plan

ANNEX S TO KAFB IDP 31-101
DEVIATIONS

REFERENCES: Refer to the Basic Plan.

1. GENERAL: The security deviation program formalizes security program risk acceptance when compliance with specific instructions cannot be met. The inability to meet minimum DOD and AF ID program requirements results in a higher security program risk. Commanders must implement the Security Deviation Program where resources are not protected at the assigned level of protection required to meet HHQ guidance. There are two types of deviations: Temporary and Permanent.

2. MISSION: To provide a management tool for Installation Commanders and MAJCOMs to review, monitor, plan, and program corrections to deviations from approved guidance. The ultimate goal of the program is to ensure correction of all deviations as quickly as possible. Based on the long-term nature or risk-tolerance level of permanent deviations, once formal approval has been granted, the deviation will be incorporated into this Annex.

3. EXECUTION:

3.1. Tasks:

3.1.1. The IDC, acting on behalf of the Installation Commander, will:

3.1.1.1. (FOUO) Coordinate on all requests for security deviations during the routing process on the AF IMT 116, Request for Deviation Form Security Criteria.

3.1.1.2. (FOUO) Conduct reviews of all deviations in effect every 12 months. Validate compensatory measures and costs, and track estimated completion dates.

3.1.1.3. (FOUO) KAFB does not have any technical deviations.

3.1.2. The 377 ABW/CC, or authorized designee, will:

3.1.2.1. (FOUO) Coordinate on all requests for security deviations during the routing process and sign as requester/initiator on the AF IMT 116.

3.1.3. (FOUO) The DFC is designated as the OPR for installation security deviations.

3.2. The DFC will:

3.2.1. (FOUO) Submit all security deviation requests, through the IDC (applicable members), to the Installation Commander.

3.3. (FOUO) KAFB Permanent Security Deviations:

3.3.1. (FOUO) PL 3 Deviation 05-S-09: During real-world and exercise contingencies at the Kirtland Underground Munitions Maintenance and Storage Complex (KUMMSC), AFI 31-101 PL 3 aircraft security requirements will not be met.

3.3.2. (FOUO) Compensatory measures include notifications to owner/user control centers informing the lack of Security Forces, RAB verifications, and purge efforts upon return to flightline restricted areas.

3.3.3. (FOUO) PL 3 Deviation 97-S-08: No continuous intrusion detection system exists for flightline restricted areas IAW AFI 31-101 Integrated Defense, paragraph 9.4.1.2.

3.3.3.1. (FOUO) Compensatory measures will be random restricted area perimeter checks and conducted twice per shift.

3.3.4. (FOUO) PL 3 Deviation 12-S-05: Restricted area fencing does not meet Type A requirements of eight feet in total height IAW AFI 31-101 paragraphs 6.5.2.4.2. and 6.5.2.7.

3.3.4.1. (FOUO) Compensatory measures include random restricted area perimeter checks and RAB checks twice per shift for areas containing protection level resources.

3.3.5. (FOUO) PL 3 Deviation 06-RP-05: Flightline roadways and taxiways B5, M2, B6, M3, A9, M6 and M7 are not designated as controlled areas IAW AFI 31-101 paragraph 8.3.4.4.

3.3.5.1. (FOUO) Compensatory measures include random restricted area perimeter checks and RAB checks twice per shift for areas containing protection level resources.

3.3.6. (FOUO) PL 3 Deviation 13-RP-01: Installation Fencing and perimeter fencing is required. KAFB installation perimeter lacks required fencing in several areas on the Eastern portion of the installation, adjacent to the Tijeras Arroyo, Manzano Mountain and U.S Forest Service Land.

3.3.6.1. (FOUO) Compensatory measures: The legal boundary of KAFB is 53 square miles. Approximately 8 miles adjacent to U.S Forest Service land lacks recommended fencing and is instead marked as a legal boundary by signs and intermittent wire or other raised material. MILCON project number MHMV043147A would fence a portion of the East Mountain perimeter approximately 5.5 miles long at a cost of \$6.9 million, and would bring the perimeter to 95% fenced.

3.3.7. (FOUO) PL 3 Deviation 13-S-01: All light fixtures, wiring, switches and transformers are required to be inside the restricted area. The area lighting and lighting controls for the 377 ABW Transient Ramp and the 150 SOW restricted areas are located outside of the restricted area.

3.3.7.1. (FOUO) Compensatory measures: Currently, the 377th Weapons System Security Squadron (377 WSSS) conducts nightly lighting inspections in all restricted areas, which exceeds the weekly requirement per AFI 31-101. Additionally, 377 WSSS Flight line Constable performs weekly checks on all lighting equipment.

ANNEX T TO KAFB IDP 31-101

INTEGRATED DEFENSE RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS (IDRMP)

REFERENCES: Refer to the Basic Plan.

1. SITUATION: A proper risk assessment based on threats, vulnerabilities, and asset criticality must be accomplished to properly create defense plans for assets assigned to the KAFB.
2. MISSION: Conduct IDRMP by combining relevant principles of the Military Decision Making Process, Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (IPOE), and the Risk Assessment (RA) process described in DOD O-2000.12-H to support the transition of installation security from compliance-based standards to capabilities and effects-based standards in an effort to “deter, detect, and defeat” hostile acts.

3. EXECUTION:

3.1. Concept of Operations. The Integrated Defense Working Group (IDWG) is in charge of identifying specific tasks required for Integrated Defense (ID) mission accomplishment, development of critical asset lists, creation of criticality and risk assessment products, Enemy Course of Action (ECOA) development, counter-measure COAs for mitigation/elimination of vulnerabilities and reduction of unacceptable risks, and development of ID guidance applicable to installation personnel. When feasible, the IDWG will combine with other working groups (e.g., Antiterrorism Working Group (ATWG) and Emergency Management Working Group (EMWG) to consolidate unity of effort and as a working level member body, accomplish tasks for the Integrated Defense Council (IDC). The IDWG will convene semiannually, as a minimum.

3.1.1. IDWG membership consists of the following:

1. DFC	2. 377 MXS
3. 377 MSG/CC	4. 898 MUNS
5. 377 SFS/S2	6. 377 MSG/SC
7. 377 SFS	8. 377 EOD BRANCH
9. 377 WSSS	10. 377 LRS
11. 377 SFG/ATO	12. 377 ABW/IPO
13. AFNWC/XRI (Intel)	14. 377 MXS/MXO
15. AFOSI Detachment 814	16. 377 MSG
17. 377 ABW/JA	18. 377 MDSS/SGSX (Medical Readiness)
19. 377 ABW/PA	20. 377 MSG/CEF (Fire Department)
21. 377 MSG/CEX (CE Readiness)	

3.1.1.1. Other members may be added at the discretion of the working group’s chairperson. Added members may be temporary or for longer periods of time based upon the objectives.

3.1.2. The Integrated Defense Council provides executive coordination on the IDRMP, Criticality Assessments (CAs), Threat Assessments (TAs), VAs, Risk Assessments (RAs) and the IDP.

3.1.3. (FOUO) Due to classification, IDRMP products will be stored separately from this document by members of the Intelligence Fusion Cell.

3.2. Tasks.

3.2.1. The 377 ABW/CC will:

3.2.1.1. (FOUO) Establish the Integrated Defense Working Group (IDWG).

3.2.1.2. (FOUO) Establish intent and defines risk tolerance for plan development.

3.2.1.3. (FOUO) Accept, remediate or mitigate risk for assigned assets as appropriate.

3.2.1.4. (FOUO) Coordinate ID, Emergency Management (EM), antiterrorism (AT) and service support operations to ensure unity of effort to achieve the ID mission.

3.2.1.5. (FOUO) Approve the ID Plan every 12 months.

3.2.2. The DFC will:

3.2.2.1. (FOUO) Participate in/Chair the IDWG.

3.2.2.2. (FOUO) Ensure the IDWG conducts and coordinates the IDRMP.

3.2.2.3. (FOUO) Ensure the IDRMP is conducted every 12 months or when changes occur.

3.2.2.4. (FOUO) Facilitate creation of the IDP utilizing the IDRMP products.

3.2.2.5. (FOUO) Utilize IPOE information to shape and support ID actions to mitigate threats.

3.2.3. AFOSI Detachment 814 is the primary agency responsible for collecting, analyzing and reporting information relating to threats to KAFB. They will support the IDRMP through expertise in crime, espionage, hostile surveillance, sabotage, subversion, civil unrest and domestic terrorism. AFOSI Detachment 814 will:

3.2.3.1. (FOUO) Develop and provide current Local Threat Assessments (LTA).

3.2.3.2. (FOUO) Interact with civilian authorities to enhance IDRMP efforts.

3.2.3.3. (FOUO) Participate in IDWG operations.

3.2.3.4. (FOUO) Participate in IFC operations (Refer to Annex B).

3.2.4. The 377 SFG/ATO primarily supports the IDWG as liaison to the DFC on Force Protection Intelligence (FPI) matters. 377 SFG/AT will:

3.2.4.1. (FOUO) Serve as SME for VAs for use in IDRMP.

3.2.4.2. (FOUO) Facilitate development of Criticality Assessments for use in IDRMP.

3.2.4.3. (FOUO) Facilitates development of Risk Assessments for use in IDRMP.

3.2.4.4. (FOUO) Participate in IDWG operations.

3.2.4.5. (FOUO) Participate in IFC operations (Refer to Annex B).

3.2.5. The IFC primarily supports activities focused on traditional and non-traditional ground threats including, but are not limited to, crime, espionage, hostile surveillance, sabotage, subversion, civil unrest, terrorism, irregular and/or unconventional warfare. The IFC will:

3.2.5.1. (FOUO) Conduct Intelligence Preparation of the Operating Environment (IPOE).

3.2.5.2. Provide the IDWG with the most current data regarding the threat and operating environments for consideration/evaluation while conducting IDRMP.

3.2.5.3. (FOUO) Participate in the IDWG and maintain IDRMP classified products.

3.2.5.4. (FOUO) Participate in IFC operations (Refer to Annex B).

3.2.6. The Installation Unit Commanders and Staff Agency Chiefs will:

3.2.6.1. (FOUO) Actively participate in the IDRMP to ensure the criticality of their mission assets is adequately considered.

3.2.6.2. (FOUO) Provide members for the IDWG as requested by the IDWG Chair.

3.2.6.3. (FOUO) Participate in the IDWG.

3.2.6.4. (FOUO) Participate in IFC operations (Refer to Annex B).

4. SERVICE SUPPORT: See Annex I

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL: See Annex H and Basic Plan.

ANNEX U TO KAFB IDP 31-101

RECEIPT OF PRESIDENTIAL, SENIOR EXECUTIVE MISSION (SENEX), SPECIFICALLY DESIGNATED SPECIAL AIRLIFT ASSIGNMENT MISSION (SDSAAM), SPECIAL AIRLIFT ASSIGNMENT MISSION (SAAM), PRIME NUCLEAR AIRLIFT FORCE (PNAF) AIRCRAFT

REFERENCES: Refer to the Basic Plan.

1. SITUATION: Priorities and Security Forces requirements, physical security, and special procedures for PL 1 Presidential, Senior Executive Mission (SENEX), Specifically Designated Special Air Mission (SDSAAM), and Special Air Mission (SAAM) aircraft.

2. MISSION: Provide security necessary to protect aircraft from damage, theft, loss, or destruction due to overt hostile action.

3. EXECUTION:

3.1. Concept of Operations:

3.1.1. The DFC will:

3.1.2. (FOUO) Provide the required patrol or response coverage for aircraft when located on KAFB.

3.1.3. (FOUO) Establish temporary restricted areas and provide lighting, if not parked in a permanent restricted area.

3.1.3.1. (FOUO) Entry procedures. A single badge system, supported by an EAL, will be used to control initial entry for home station personnel. Aircraft crews are authorized unrestricted access once the aircraft commander and 377 SFG E-5 or higher authenticate crew orders. The aircraft commander or his/her designated representative will act as the sole authority for granting entry. Crew orders authenticated by a 377 SFG E-5 or higher will act as an EAL for the aircraft and will be used in conjunction with the individual's home station AF Form 1199.

3.1.3.2. (FOUO) Subsequent Entry for Aircraft. The EC external response team will control subsequent entry to the aircraft through the use of authenticated crew orders by a 377 SFG E-5 or higher. The crew orders then act as an EAL for the aircraft and will be used in conjunction with the individual's home station AF Form 1199.

3.1.4. (FOUO) Provide a close boundary surveillance sentry (CBS) when requested by aircraft commanders. When requested, boundary surveillance will consist of two members of the host ID forces armed with an M-4 and an M-9 for Presidential aircraft, one member armed with an M-9 for SENEX aircraft, and one member armed with a M4 for SAAM aircraft as a minimum, and posted at the rear of the aircraft.

3.1.5. (FOUO) Provide an external SRT armed with M-4/M-16 and M-9 capable of responding immediately for all type of aircraft.

3.1.6. (FOUO) Vehicle searches. Vehicle and equipment will be searched and sanitized prior to aircraft arrival. Vehicle requesting entry after the aircraft has landed will be searched before allowing entry with the approval of the aircraft commander. **NOTE:** During increased FPCONs vehicle entry will be mission essential only with coordination from the aircraft commander.

APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX U TO KAFB IDP 31-101
**INSTALLATION SUPPORT TO PRESIDENTIAL AND SENIOR EXECUTIVE MISSION
(SENEX) AIRCRAFT**

REFERENCES: Refer to the Basic Plan.

1. GENERAL: Presidential and Senior Executive Mission (SENEX) Aircraft.
2. MISSION: To provide security and other support during visits by the President of the United States (POTUS) and Senior Executive Personnel.
3. EXECUTION:
 - 3.1. Concept of Operations.
 - 3.1.1. (FOUO) Provide security and logistical support for POTUS and SENEX visits to KAFB.
 - 3.1.1.2. (FOUO) Provide two CBSs at the rear of each aircraft, armed with M-4/M-16 and M-9. Exception: Provide only one CBS for C-37, C-20 and C-40 aircraft upgraded to Presidential status due to the smaller size of the aircraft.
 - 3.1.1.3. (FOUO) Inspect all vehicles and equipment prior to aircraft arrival and inspect all vehicles requesting entry after the aircraft has landed.
 - 3.2. Tasks and Responsibilities:
 - 3.2.1. The DFC will:
 - 3.2.1.1. (FOUO) Be the lead base agency for all POTUS and SENEX visits.
 - 3.2.1.2. (FOUO) Commit ID forces for boundary surveillance.
 - 3.2.1.3. (FOUO) Coordinate security requirements with the Secret Service or other lead federal law enforcement agencies.
 - 3.2.1.4. (FOUO) Coordinate aircraft and crowd security, and closure of on-base perimeter road requirement with the Aircraft ADVON or SF personnel.
 - 3.2.1.5. Provide guards for aircraft fuel if required.
 - 3.2.1.6. Provide motorcade route security as requested.
 - 3.2.1.7. (FOUO) Provide a two-person security response element armed with M-4/M-16 and M-9 and equipped with NVDs at all times capable of responding immediately, as defined in the IDP, to defeat the adversary before any negative effect against the

resource occurs. Provide portable intra-base radios to EC and SF members posted at the aircraft.

3.2.1.8. (FOUO) Provide K-9 support as requested throughout the event. **NOTE:** All AGE must be inspected with an explosives detection dog team or a qualified EOD team before using it for Presidential and SENEX aircraft.

3.2.1.9. (FOUO) Establish a temporary restricted area for each aircraft (within a hangar, if available). Designate a single ECP to the aircraft area. Provide enough rope, stanchions, and restricted area signs to establish a temporary restricted area for each aircraft.

3.2.1.10. (FOUO) Provide boundary surveillance as defined in paragraph 3.2.1.2., above, and external response armed with M-4/M-16 capable of responding immediately, as defined in the paragraph 3.2.1.7. above, to defeat the adversary before any negative effect against the resource occurs.

3.2.2. The 377 LRS/CC will:

3.2.2.1. (FOUO) Provide logistical and vehicle support during pre-arrival/arrival and departure of Air Force 1 support assets.

3.2.2.2. (FOUO) Provide vehicle and special equipment support to include flatbed trucks, buses, k-loaders etc., as requested.

3.2.2.2. (FOUO) Provide vehicle and special equipment support to include flatbed trucks, buses, k-loaders etc., as requested through the EOC/CAT.

3.2.2.3. (FOUO) Provide a vehicle or sentry shelter for each EC, through the EOC/CAT.

3.2.2.4. (FOUO) Provide vehicle support to address security issues i.e. line of sight, through the EOC/CAT.

3.2.2.5. (FOUO) Provide transportation for meet and greet crowd when approved by, through the EOC/CAT.

3.2.3. The 377 MSG/CE will:

3.2.3.1. (FOUO) Provide/set up barricades for crowd/press control as requested.

3.2.3.2. (FOUO) Provided portable toilet services and water stations during event if requested.

3.2.3.3. (FOUO) Provide motorcade route traffic control barriers as requested.

3.2.3.4. (FOUO) Provide fire response/HAZMAT/Decon support during the event.

3.2.3.5. (FOUO) Coordinate medical response when requested.

3.2.3.6. (FOUO) Provide EOD support when requested.

3.2.4. The 377 MXS/CC will:

3.2.4.1. (FOUO) Coordinate aircraft parking and chalking on the ramp.

3.2.4.2. (FOUO) Coordinate all aircraft support services, lavatory and waste disposal as requested.

3.2.4.3. (FOUO) Provide stair trucks as requested,

3.2.4.4. (FOUO) Disseminate aircraft ramp restrictions to flightline agencies during the event.

3.2.5. The 377 ABW/PA will:

3.2.5.1. (FOUO) Coordinate all event press releases in conjunction with White House Press Staff.

3.2.5.2. (FOUO) Provide escort, and coordinate press personnel entry onto the base and event area.

3.2.6. The 58 MXS/CC will:

3.2.6.1. (FOUO) Provide aircraft support equipment requests i.e., lighting, power as requested by 377 MXS/CC. Provide four light-all units, as a minimum, for each aircraft, and two light-all units for presidential fuel supplies.

3.2.7. The 377 ABW/CCP will:

3.2.7.1. (FOUO) Coordinate distinguished visitor EALs in conjunction with White House Staff.

3.2.7.2. (FOUO) Provide escort of DV's and official greeting party guests onto the event area.

3.2.8. (FOUO) The 377 MSG/SC will provide communication support as required.

3.2.9. The AFOSI Detachment 814 will:

3.2.9.1. (FOUO) Provide aircraft and personnel support IAW AFOSI PAM 71-104, Protective Service Operations, and governing directives.

3.2.9.2. (FOUO) Provide additional support requested by Secret Service personnel.

3.2.9.3. (FOUO) Provide intelligence updates as to possible threats against the aircraft upon arrival, and will provide updates as information changes concerning an increase or decrease to the threat.

APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX U TO KAFB IDP 31-101
SPECIFICALLY DESIGNATED SPECIAL AIR MISSION, (SDSAAM) AND SPECIAL
ASSIGNMENT MISSION (SAAM) AIRCRAFT

REFERENCES: Refer to the Basic Plan.

1. SITUATION: Priorities and SF requirements, physical security, and special procedures for Specifically Designated Special Air Mission (SDSAAM), and Special Assignment Mission (SAAM) aircraft.

2. MISSION: Provide security necessary to protect the following aircraft from damage, theft, loss, or destruction due to overt hostile action.

2.1. (FOUO) PL 1 SDSAAM aircraft three (3) hours prior to scheduled departure through mission completion.

2.2. (FOUO) PL 2 SAAM VC-137 aircraft.

2.3. (FOUO) Wing support procedures for National Airborne Operations Center (NAOC) and Tacoma Aircraft are contained in KAFB REFLEX DELTA Plan.

3. EXECUTION:

3.1. Concept of Operations.

3.1.1. The 377 SFG will provide the required immediate patrol or response coverage for aircraft when located on KAFB.

3.2. Tasks.

3.2.1. (FOUO) Security for SDSAAM Aircraft. The 377 SFG must provide boundary surveillance consisting of one ID force member armed with an M-4, as a minimum, posted at the rear of the aircraft and external response within five (5) minutes. Visually inspect AGE equipment before allowing entry into the restricted area.

3.2.2. (FOUO) Security for SAAM Aircraft. The aircrew must provide security and entry control during short stops. If the aircraft remains on-base for extended periods, the 377 SFG will provide entry control armed with an M4, as a minimum, and external response within five (5) minutes.

3.2.3. (FOUO) Subsequent Entry for SAAM Aircraft. The external response team will control subsequent entry to PL 2 SAAM Aircraft through the use of crew orders authenticated by a 377 SFG E-5 or higher. The crew orders then act as an EAL for the aircraft and will be used in conjunction with the individual's home station AF Form 1199.

3.2.4. REFLEX DELTA Support. Wing support procedures for United States Strategic Command aircraft are contained in the KAFB REFLEX DELTA Plan.

TAB A TO APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX U TO KAFB IDP 31-101

UNPLANNED ARRIVAL/DIVERSION OF PRESIDENTIAL, SENIOR EXECUTIVE MISSION (SENEX), SPECIFICALLY DESIGNATED SPECIAL ASSIGNMENT MISSION (SDSAAM), SPECIAL AIR MISSION (SAAM), PRIME NUCLEAR AIRLIFT FORCE (PNAF) AIRCRAFT

REFERENCES: Refer to the Basic Plan.

1. SITUATION: KCP is notified of an unplanned arrival of a Presidential, SENEX aircraft, SDSAAM aircraft or SAAM aircraft.
2. MISSION: Provide security necessary to protect aircraft and cargo from damage, theft, loss, or destruction due to overt hostile action.
3. EXECUTION:
 - 3.1. Refer to APPENDIX 10 TO ANNEX C.
 - 3.1.1. In accordance with the 377th Air Base Wing Nuclear Surety Plan, KCP must give a minimum of thirty (30) minutes notification to SF of the aircraft arrival; however, a diversion may occur at any time. For detailed security procedures, refer to 377 WSSS SOP VOL 3.

ANNEX V TO KAFB IDP 31-101
INTEGRATED DEFENSE COUNCIL (IDC)

REFERENCES: Refer to Basic Plan.

1. GENERAL: This annex establishes roles and responsibilities of the Integrated Defense Council (IDC). The IDC is a cross-functional governing body responsible to the 377 ABW/CC for oversight of installation ID issues from normal day to-day security operations to emergency postures designed to prevent damage or destruction from hostile actions against KAFB, its personnel, and resources.

2. MISSION: The IDC is the single governing body responsible to the 377 ABW/CC for installation security and is vital to the installation's ID planning process.

3. EXECUTION:

3.1. (FOUO) Integrated Defense Council (IDC). The IDC is vital to both nuclear and non-nuclear installation security program planning processes. IDC working groups may be established as necessary to address specific needs. The IDC will use the local threat assessment in developing the IDP. The threat assessment forms the basis for all installation security planning and considers all threats to protection level resources, to include civil disturbances and riots. It will also cover dispersed and satellite locations supported by the installation.

3.1.1. The IDC, acting on behalf of the Installation Commander, will:

3.1.1.1. Convene annually at a minimum.

3.1.1.2. Provide executive coordination on the IDRMP, Criticality Assessments (CA), Threat Assessments (TA), VAs, Risk Assessments (RA) and the IDP. IDCs may be formed as required and staffed according to the 377 ABW/CC's preference.

3.1.1.3. Select and designate restricted and controlled areas.

3.1.1.4. Ensure protection level resources are provided adequate personnel, equipment, and facilities.

3.1.1.5. Monitor all on-going security enhancement projects through completion.

3.1.1.6. Develop, review, and approve entry control procedures for free zones only for restricted areas.

3.1.1.7. Review the IDP every 12 months. The IDC will publish a new plan if events occur which change the installation security program significantly, as determined by the Installation Commander.

3.1.1.8. Conduct reviews of all deviations in effect every 12 months. Validate compensatory measures, costs, and track estimated completion dates.

3.1.1.9. Ensure that the DFC sends approved copies of KAFB IDP to AFGSC/A4S.

3.1.1.10. Determine if a badge system is essential to identify persons in controlled areas and develop local procedures to issue and control the badges IAW AFI 31-101.

3.1.2. Integrated Defense Council Composition. IDC membership consists of the following:

3.1.1.2. 377 ABW/CC, or authorized designee. The 377 ABW/CC, or authorized designee, will be the chairperson of the IDC. The 377 ABW/CC, or authorized designee, is a voting member of the IDC for all matters.

3.1.2.2. 377 ABW/CV, or authorized designee.

3.1.2.3. DFC, or authorized designee. The DFC, or authorized designee, will serve as the recorder. The DFC, or authorized designee, is a voting member of the IDC for all matters.

3.1.2.3.1. The DFC is designated as the OPR for the IDP and authorized to sign letters of transmittal.

3.1.2.3.2. All matters concerning existing restricted areas or the establishment of new restricted areas will be submitted to the Installation Commander through the DFC.

3.1.2.3.3. SFG ATO for all AT/FP matters/concerns.

3.1.2.4. 377 MSG/CC, or authorized designee. The 377 MSG/CC, or authorized designee, is a voting member of the IDC for MSG matters.

3.1.2.5. (FOUO) 377 MXG/CC, or authorized designee. The 377 MXG/CC, or authorized designee, is a voting member of the IDC for issues dealing with KUMMSC and the transient aircraft restricted area.

3.1.2.6. 377 MXS/CC, or authorized designee. The 377 MXS/CC, or authorized designee, is a voting member of the IDC for issues dealing with the transient aircraft restricted area.

3.1.2.7. 58 SOW/CC, or authorized designee, is a voting member for issues dealing with the 58 SOW restricted area.

3.1.2.8. (FOUO) 898 MUNS/CC, or authorized designee, is a voting member for issues dealing with KUMMSC.

3.1.2.9. 150 SOW/CC, or authorized designee, is a voting member for issues dealing with the 150 SOW restricted area.

3.1.2.10. Special Voting Members. These personnel will consist of commander/director level for units which do not have permanent membership to the IDC, but do get to vote when issues directly affecting their unit or operations are addressed.

3.1.2.10.1. Units or organizations that are affected will be notified prior to or decided upon through the permanent-voting members. Approval authority must not extend below the deputy or vice level. The most common members include, but not all-inclusive, are the AFRL/RD and AFRL/RV, DTRA, AFOTEC, 377 ABW/XP and AFOSI Detachment 814.

3.1.2.10.2. Issues affecting special voting members will most often only pertain to resource and FP.

3.1.2.10.3. Working Groups. The IDC determines the need for and may establish working groups to address specific needs. These groups may be established to test program effectiveness and work under the direction and authority of the IDC. The IDC designate an OPR for each working group. OPRs determine membership based on the issues and problems involved. Units are encouraged to have working groups within their unit and have a designated individual attend base-level working groups. The IDC may merge working groups where appropriate.

3.1.3.1. Integrated Defense Working Group (IDWG). The OPR for the IDWG will be the 377 SFS Plans and Programs (S5P). The DFC will chair the IDWG. The group is composed of the DFC, AT Officer, Intelligence, AFOSI, CE Readiness and Emergency Management, EOD, Logistics Readiness Squadron (LRS), Medical Readiness, Public Affairs, Legal, Fire Department (CEF) and major tenants consistent with parent service directives and local MOUs.

3.1.3.1.1. The IDWG accomplishes tasks for the IDC and convenes semiannually, as a minimum.

3.1.3.1.2. The IDWG conducts and coordinates the IDRMP.

3.1.3.2. (FOUO) TWG. The OPR for the TWG will be the 377 SFG/ATO. The DFC will chair the TWG. The group includes representatives from AFOSI, SFG, 377 MDG, and any other agencies the OPR deems appropriate.

3.1.3.3. Alarm Working Group (AWG). The OPR for the AWG will be 377 SFS Resource Protection (S5C). The AWG is normally composed of representatives from SF, Civil Engineers, Communications, AFSFC sustainment contract, and representatives from units using intrusion detection systems (IDS). This group is

charged with reviewing the status of IDS equipment and recommending priorities to the IDC for resource allocation and maintenance. The AWG convenes as needed.

3.1.3.4. Loss Prevention Working Group (LPWG). The OPR for the LPWG will be the 377th Mission Support Group Deputy Director (377 MSG/DD).

3.1.3.5. IFC. The OPR for the IFC will be the 377 SFS/S-2 (Intelligence) Officer.

4. CONSIDERATIONS:

4.1. Entry Control Considerations.

4.1.1. The IDC will advise the Installation Commander on recommended gate closure procedures and gate closure devices.

4.2. Resource Protection Considerations.

4.2.1. Installation perimeter lighting requirements will be determined by the IDC.

4.2.1.1. If motion-activated security lighting is requested for physical security, it must be approved by the IDC.

4.2.2. The IDC and AWG are the vehicles for long-term IDS replacement planning issues.

4.2.3. The IDC determines when fencing is practical for controlled areas.

4.2.4. IDC will determine how EALs are produced/distributed.

4.2.5. The Installation Commander and the IDC must closely scrutinize the number and location of all firearms storage facilities on KAFB with the goal of reducing and consolidating facilities wherever possible.

4.2.6. The IDC will determine arming requirements for weapons storage facilities.

4.2.7. Arms rooms not constructed IAW MIL-HNBK-1013/1A must be approved by the IDC.

4.2.8. The decision to designate funds facilities other than those storing funds \$100K or more as controlled areas rests with the IDC, but is discouraged.

4.2.9. If contractor services are not available or the IDC determines the threat level is such that contractor services are impractical, the IDC will determine if Security Forces personnel will perform escorts for non-government funds, i.e. AAFES and DeCA.

4.2.10. (FOUO) The IDC may determine the need for additional duress alarms other than those required for unattended storage of funds and Financial Services Office cashier cages.

4.2.11. The IDC must direct the owner/user to develop specific protective measures when certain types of property are particularly susceptible to theft.

4.3. Installation Security Considerations.

4.3.1. If more than one ECP for each restricted area is requested by the owner/user, the IDC will decide whether additional ECPs are needed and where to place them.

4.3.2. The IDC determines final placement of restricted area fencing, especially in situations where the location is questionable or controversial.

4.3.3. All requests for acquisition/modification of alarm systems must be coordinated through the IDC before contract tendering.

4.3.4. For areas without mandatory requirements, the IDC will determine alternate power supplies.

4.3.5. The IDC determines the extent of a perimeter clear zone.

4.3.6. The IDC will determine (through the IDRMP) whether or not restricted/controlled areas will be manned by an on-duty EC.

4.3.7. In coordination with the base RPP Manager, the IDC approves the use of sensitive items for IDS.

4.3.8. The IDC must determine who is responsible for conducting monthly visible checks of IDS transmission lines.

4.3.9. (FOUO) The IDC may approve two-person external SRTs to separate and work as single-person security patrols within their assigned area in order to facilitate area coverage and response to alarms. If separated, the two security patrols must join together to respond to alarms in the restricted area.

4.3.10. Installation Commanders, through the IDC, determine when body armor and protective masks will be worn or readily available.

ANNEX W TO KAFB IDP 31-101
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

<u>Acronym</u>	<u>Title</u>
AA&E	Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives
AAFES	Army & Air Force Exchange Service
ADCON	Administrative Control
AO	Action Officer
AECS	Automated Entry Control System
AFGSC	Air Force Global Strike Command
AFH	Air Force Handbook
AFI	Air Force Instruction
AFIMS	Air Force Incident Management System
AFMAN	Air Force Manual
AFOSI	Air Force Office of Special Investigations
AFPAM	Air Force Pamphlet
AFVA	Air Force Visual Aid
AGE	Aerospace Ground Equipment
ART	Alarm Response Team
AT	Antiterrorism
BDOC	Base Defense Operations Center
BMS	Balanced Magnetic Switch
BWS	Base Weather Station
CAC	Common Access Card
CAM	Controlled Area Monitor
CAT	Crisis Action Team
CATM	Combat Arms, Training and Maintenance
CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear
CBS	Close Boundary Sentry
COMSEC	Communications Security
DBIDS	Defense Biometrics Identification System
DCNI	DOD Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
DEFCON	Defense Condition
DFC	Defense Force Commander
DOB	Date of Birth
DOD	Department of Defense
DoE	Department of Energy
DoT	Department of Transportation
DTRA	Defense Threat Reduction Agency
DV	Distinguished Visitor
EA	Emergency Actions
EAL	Entry Authority List
EC	Entry Controller
ECP	Entry Control Point
EDD	Explosive Detector Dog
EMR	Electromagnetic Radiation

<u>Acronym</u>	<u>Title</u>
EOC	Emergency Operations Center
EOD	Explosive Ordinance Disposal
ESS	Electronic Security Systems
FAA	Federal Aviation Administration
FBF	Follow-on Backup Force
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigations
FDB	Field Distribution Box
FM	Facility Manager
FOUO	For Official Use Only
FP	Force Protection
FPCAM	Force Protection Condition Alerting Message
FPCON	Force Protection Condition
FT	Fire Team
GOV	Government Owned Vehicle
GSA	General Services Administration
GSU	Geographically Separated Unit
HAZMAT	Hazardous Materials
HCP	Hot Cargo Pad
HNT	Hostage Negotiation Team
HQ	Headquarters
IAC	Installation Access Controller
IAW	In Accordance With
IC	Incident Commander
ID	Integrated Defense
IDC	Integrated Defense Council
IDP	Integrated Defense Plan
IDRMP	Integrated Defense Risk Management Process
IDS	Intrusion Detection System
IDWG	Integrated Defense Working Group
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IFC	Intelligence Fusion Cell
IG	Inspector General
IEMP	Installation Emergency Management Plan
IIDS	Infrared Intrusion Detection System
IRF	Initial Response Force
ISD	Immediate Sufficient Duress
ISS	Installation Security Section
IVA	Immediate Visual Assessment
IZ	Inner Zone
KAFB	Kirtland Air Force Base
KCP	Kirtland Command Post
LE	Law Enforcement
LFA	Lead Federal Agency
LLC	Limited Life Component

<u>Acronym</u>	<u>Title</u>
LMR	Land Mobile Radio
NSTCA	Nuclear Security Threat Capabilities Assessment
MAJCOM	Major Command
MRABL	Master Restricted Area Badge Listing
MWD	Military Working Dog
NAF	Non-Appropriated Funds
NCC	Network Control Center
NCO	Noncommissioned Officer
NDA	National Defense Area
NLT	No Later Than
OI	Operating Instruction
OPR	Office of Primary Responsibility
OPREP	Operational Report
OPSEC	Operations Security
OSHA	Occupational Safety and Health Administration
OST	Office of Secure Transportation
PL	Protection Level
PNAF	Prime Nuclear Airlift Force
POC	Point of Contact
POL	Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants
POV	Privately Owned Vehicle
POW	Privately Owned Weapon
PRAP	Personnel Reliability Assurance Program
RAB	Restricted Area Badge
RAM	Random Antiterrorism Measures
RF	Response Force
RIEVC	Random Installation Entry / Exit Vehicle Checks
ROE	Rules of Engagement
RPP	Resource Protection Program
RTES	Remote Target Engagement System
SAM	Special Air Mission
SCC	Security Control Center
SCN	Secondary Crash Net
SDSAM	Specifically Designated Special Air Mission
SENEX	Senior Executive
SET	Security Escort Team
SF	Security Forces
SJA	Staff Judge Advocate
SRT	Security Response Team
SSI	Special Security Instructions
SSCC	Site Security Control Center
SSN	Social Security Number
SUP	Supplement
SVA	Sole-Vouching Authority

<u>Acronym</u>	<u>Title</u>
TACON	Tactical Control
TCP	Traffic Control Point
TDY	Temporary Duty
TWG	Threat Working Group
UCMJ	Uniform Code of Military Justice
UOF	Use of Force
USAF	United States Air Force
USPS	United States Postal Service
USSS	United States Secret Service
VA	Vulnerability Assessment
VCC	Visitor Control Center
WMD	Weapon of Mass Destruction
WSA	Weapons Storage Area

ANNEX X TO KAFB IDP 31-101
DISTRIBUTION

377 ABW UNITS

377 ABW/CC
377 ABW/CP
377 ABW/SE
377 ABW/XP
377 SFG/CC/DFC
377 WSSS/CC
377 SFS/CC
377 MXG/CC
377 MXS/CC
898 MUNS/CC
377 MSG/CC
377 MSG/CE
377 MSG/SC
377 LRS/CC
377 FSS/CL
377 MDG/CC

OTHER UNITS

AFGSC/A4S
58 SOW/CC
58 SOW/XP
150 SOW/CC
150 SOW/XP
150 NMANG SFS/CC
AFOSI Detachment 814
AFIA
SDTD/CC
NAG
AFRL/XRI
DTRA
Detachment 12, SMC
SNL Security Forces
FBI Albuquerque Office-The FBI is listed on the distribution list to receive the IDP which includes recap/recovery procedures.
DOE/OST

KAFB IDP 31-101 14 March 2017

ANNEX Y TO KAFB IDP 31-101
NOT USED

ANNEX Z TO KAFB IDP 31-101
PROTECTION LEVEL 1 OPERATIONS

REFERENCES: Refer to Basic Plan. DOD S-5210.41M, Nuclear Weapons Security Manual, AFMAN 31-108, Air Force Nuclear Weapons Security Manual.

1. SITUATION: This annex is the basis for procedures involving Protection Level 1 resources during normal and contingency installation security operations at KAFB.

1.1. Enemy Forces. Refer to Basic Plan.

1.2. Friendly Forces. Refer to Basic Plan.

1.3. Assumption. Refer to Basic Plan.

1.4. Resource Availability. Refer to Basic Plan.

1.5. Planning factors. All tasked units will prepare detailed instructions to support this plan.

1.6. Area of Operations.

1.6.1. (DCNI) Kirtland Underground Munitions Maintenance and Storage Complex (KUMMSC) is 3 miles south of the main area of KAFB. Other areas include convoy routes, aircraft parking areas in support of logistics movements at the hot cargo pads, or other areas where operations occur.

2. MISSION: Refer to Basic Plan.

2.1. (DCNI) KUMMSC has several different controlled areas, which carry the same legal restrictions as a physical barrier. Pedestrian traffic will normally process through the entry point identified as V1B. Vehicle traffic will normally process through the entry point identified V1AA/V1AB. On-duty SF personnel are authorized unescorted entry into the KUMMSC Armory, Enrollment Center, C2B, Utility Building, and F1 during alarm activations and training/orientation. Responding patrols are not required to authenticate for entry during alarm activations. Additionally, a letter is maintained in each controlled area and WSSS/SSCC authorizing unescorted entry. The following are controlled areas associated with KUMMSC:

3. EXECUTION: Refer to Basic Plan.

3.1. Concept of Operations. Refer to Basic Plan.

3.2. Tasks.

3.2.1. Readiness, Alert, and Marshalling.

3.2.1.1. (DCNI) Readiness. ID Forces will maintain the capability to respond to hostile events in sufficient time and with sufficient force to prevent/limit the harassment, damage, or destruction of PL resources. During periods of increased tension/threats, larger tactical response teams may be assembled and placed in immediate stand-by for recall. The 377 SFG will ensure procedures are developed to enable all assigned personnel to be contacted by either telephone communications or by a manual system. Those personnel assigned to mobility will maintain the capability to respond with all required equipment within the designated time when advised.

3.2.1.2. Alert. Emergency base recall procedures during duty/non-duty hours. The 377 ABW/CC, through the KCP, will recall base personnel as required. KCP controllers will use recall rosters, mass notification system, base telephone network, and, if necessary, installation personnel to make notifications. The extent of the recall is based on mission requirements. Each unit will develop recall procedures. Once a recall of personnel is directed, WSSS/SSCC and SFS/BDOC will accomplish it for 377 SFG personnel.

3.2.1.3. (DCNI) Marshalling. Initial 377 SFG marshalling will take place at SFS Armory (Bldg. 20221). This is the primary arming point for ID Forces before contingencies effecting KUMMSC. The CATM Armory (Bldg. 706) is designated and used as the alternate arming point in the event the primary is disabled, captured, or when it is not feasible to arm personnel there. The primary arming point for KUMMSC during normal security operations is the WSSS Armory (Bldg. 27494).

3.3. Security Operations Terms: Refer to Basic Plan.

APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX Z TO KAFB IDP 31-101
PROTECTION LEVEL 1 SECURITY AREAS

REFERENCES: Refer to the Basic Plan. DOD S-5210.41M, Nuclear Weapon Security Manual, DODI 5200.8, Security of DOD Installations and Resources, and Section 21, Internal Security Act of 1950 (Title 50 U.S.C. 797) and AFMAN 31-108, The Air Force Nuclear Weapon Security Manual.

1. **SITUATION**: This appendix is the basis for procedures, authority, and responsibilities for establishing and maintaining restricted areas, NDAs, controlled areas, and free zones during normal PL 1 security operations on KAFB. The provisions of this appendix apply to, and are enforceable, with all military and civilian personnel, including the general public who enter KAFB.
2. **MISSION**: To provide maximum security for PL 1 resources located on KAFB.
3. **EXECUTION**: The concept of operations for security restricted areas includes, but is not limited to, operation of security facilities and equipment, physical security standards, control of entry and exit, and internal movement of personnel, materials, and vehicles associated with security areas. ID Forces have the authority to use various entry authority lists and maps for boundary purposes to aid them in enforcing laws, directives, instructions, policies, and procedures regarding the establishment, location, and priority of ID posts.

TAB A TO APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX Z TO KAFB IDP 31-101
PROTECTION LEVEL 1 RESTRICTED AREAS

REFERENCES: Refer to the Basic Plan.

1. **SITUATION:** This appendix is the basis for procedures, authority, and responsibilities for establishing and maintaining Protection Level 1 restricted areas during normal and contingency installation security operations on KAFB. The provisions of this appendix apply to, and are enforceable with, all military and civilian personnel, including the general public who enter KAFB.
2. **MISSION:** To provide maximum security for PL 1 resources located on KAFB.
3. **EXECUTION:** The concept of operations for establishing and maintaining restricted areas includes, but is not limited to, operation of security facilities and equipment, physical security standards, control of entry and exit, and internal movement of personnel, materials, and vehicles associated with security areas. ID forces have the authority to use various entry authority lists and maps for boundary purposes to aid them in enforcing laws, directives, instructions, policies, and procedures regarding the establishment, location, and priority of ID posts.
4. Unit Responsibilities:
 - 4.1. 898th Munitions Squadron CC will:
 - 4.1.1. Ensure Electronic Security Systems (ESS) maintenance personnel ensure day to day operability of the AECS.
 - 4.1.2. Ensure ESS maintenance personnel perform Preventative Maintenance Inspections on AECS equipment at set intervals as required.
 - 4.1.3. Ensure ESS maintenance personnel respond within 1 hour for catastrophic failures and major malfunctions (Priority 1).
 - 4.1.4. Ensure ESS maintenance personnel respond NLT the next duty day for malfunctions classified as partial failures (Priority 2 or lower).
 - 4.1.5. Ensure ESS maintenance personnel assist the WSSS Sensor NCO when conducting quarterly and annual functional and vulnerability testing of AECS related sensors and alarms.
 - 4.1.6. 898 MUNS will provide ESS maintenance with all required tools, including duty related support equipment (e.g. safety equipment and tools).
 - 4.1.7. Provide System Administrator support for AECS within KUMMSC, Pass and ID, and SFS/BDOC areas as needed.

4.1.8. IAW AFMAN 31-108 to "DOD S- 5210.41M_AFMAN 31-108, Volume 1, Enclosure 6, the Sole-Vouching Authority (SVA) will ensure the appropriate personnel are armed to maintain the final denial capability for any manned exclusion areas.

4.2. 377th Weapons System Security Squadron CC will:

4.2.1. Conduct quarterly vulnerability tests. Plan testing to ensure that all installed interior and exterior IDS are tested annually. Document and retrain vulnerability test results for a period of two years.

4.2.2. Conduct a quarterly functional test of each facility and individual resource IDS.

4.2.3. Conduct a functional test of each sensor with ESS maintenance personnel that send any type of alarm as a result of maintenance activity.

4.2.4. Maintain records on all alarms (to include false and nuisance alarms), malfunctions, and maintenance to allow for evaluation of the system.

4.2.5. When ESS maintenance personnel are servicing key nodes, assist to the fullest extent possible by being present to validate operational status during closing of all key nodes.

4.2.6. Provide funding for ESS maintenance support of security equipment to include the AECS, X-ray machine, metal detector, video cameras, and associated hardware order parts and supplies as necessary.

4.2.7. (DCNI) Provide System Administrator support for AECS within KUMMSC, Pass and ID, and SFS/BDOC areas as needed.

4.2.8. Provide complete operational control of the site intrusion detection system.

ENCLOSURE 1 TO TAB A TO APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX Z TO KAFB IDP 31-101
KIRTLAND UNDERGROUND MUNITIONS MAINTENANCE STORAGE COMPLEX
(KUMMSC)

REFERENCES: Refer to Basic Plan.

1. (DCNI) GENERAL: KUMMSC is located on the southeast side of the installation approximately 3.5 miles south of the main base. KUMMSC contains PL 1 resources. The topside area includes the entry and exit tunnels to the restricted area. Included in the topside controlled area is the utility building (Bldg. #27497). Personnel are prohibited from entering this area without the consent of the Installation Commander. Individuals must use an AF Form 1199CG with area 8 open to obtain a RAB that allows authorized entry to the topside controlled and restricted areas of KUMMSC.

2. (DCNI) EXECUTION: A portion of KUMMSC is designated as a permanent restricted area on KAFB. The restricted/limited area begins at turnstile 3, door 6, door 7, and vehicle gate 5 for entry, and turnstile 5 and vehicle gate 6 for exit. The areas behind B7, B14, and B15 are to be treated as two-person areas when established by the SVA. During normal operations while PL-1 resources are located only in the storage area, the exclusion areas will begin at B8/B13 while those doors are secured. Additionally, during internal and logistical movements the exclusion zone will be located in the immediate area surrounding the PL-1 asset(s) (defined by doors, floors, walls, ceilings, or temporary and permanent barriers) regardless of its location throughout the facility as designated by the SVA. The area will be purged jointly by the SVA and Weapon System Security Squadron (WSSS) personnel. After the purge is completed the exclusion area will be established. The Entry Control Points (ECP) for these areas will be established at the B7, B14 and B15 doorways and the load dock gate, respectively. These ECPs are subject to change for mission requirements. For further information regarding locations of exclusion areas associated with KUMMSC contact 377 WSSS and 898 MUNS.

2.1. (DCNI) KUMMSC has several different controlled areas, which carry the same legal restrictions as a physical barrier. Pedestrian traffic will normally process through the entry point identified as V1B. Vehicle traffic will normally process through the entry point identified V1AA/V1AB. The following are controlled areas associated with KUMMSC:

2.1.1. (DCNI) The topside area; this includes the entry and exit tunnels to the restricted area boundary.

2.1.2. (DCNI) The Utility Building (UB), "Included in the topside controlled area is the restricted area and the utility building" (Bldg. #27497).

2.1.3. (DCNI) The Enrollment Center: located within the Squadron Operations Building (Bldg. #27494).

2.1.4. (DCNI) The 898 MUNS KUMMSC Armory: located within the restricted area (Bldg. #27496).

2.1.5. (DCNI) Communications room F1: located within the Squadron Operations Building (Bldg. #27494).

2.1.6. (DCNI) Radio room C2B: located within the Squadron Operations building (Bldg. #27494).

2.1.7. (DCNI) 377 WSSS Armory: located within the Squadron Operations Building (Bldg. #27494).

2.1.8. (DCNI) KUMMSC has rooms within the restricted area that are not designated as controlled areas, but do require specific procedures to grant entry.

2.1.8.1. (DCNI) Room 148 contains LMR equipment and the SGT/Remote Control Unit (RCU) communication module. Entry into this room requires a valid reason for entry, verification through Munitions Control, and a key signed out from MC.

2.1.8.2. (DCNI) Room 153 contains vital security system components as well as telephone communication equipment, and is designated a two-person IDS maintenance concept room. Entry will be accomplished by an authorized two-person maintenance team contacting WSSS/SSCC and validated by using the appropriate authorization letter.

2.1.8.3. (DCNI) Room 158 contains vital critical power components. Any one individual with unescorted entry into KUMMSC is authorized. Those individuals are also authorized to escort personnel into room 158. **NOTE:** Individuals requesting entry must have a valid reason for entry.

2.1.8.4. (DCNI) Room 160 contains the Battery Backup Power Supply for KUMMSC and other vital critical power components. Any one individual with unescorted entry into KUMMSC is authorized. Those individuals are also authorized to escort personnel into room 160. **NOTE:** Individuals requesting entry must have a valid reason for entry.

2.1.8.5. (DCNI) The 898 MUNS Underground Armory contains weapons. Entry to the 898 MUNS armory will be granted by WSSS/SSCC through use of an authorization letter maintained by 898 MUNS Control and WSSS/SSCC. Personnel requesting entry will contact 898 MUNS Control for entry. 898 MUNS Control will notify WSSS/SSCC of the valid opening request and coordinate entry.

2.2. Entry procedures into rooms 148, 153, 158, and 160:

2.2.1. 898 MUNS will:

2.2.1.1. (DCNI) Through Munitions Control, direct individuals requesting entry to sign out the key. **NOTE:** (DCNI) For entry into room 153, ensure personnel are

listed on the Access Approval and Authority List (AAAL) or Two Person Access List (TPAL).

2.2.1.2. (DCNI) Munitions Control will notify WSSS/SSCC of impending entry and access to the room.

2.2.1.3. (DCNI) Notify WSSS/SSCC when all work is complete in order to secure the room.

2.2.1.4. (DCNI) Ensure Munitions Control received the key upon departure of the room.

2.2.2. 377 WSSS will:

2.2.2.1. (DCNI) Allow access through the WSSS/SSCC, via AECS, to KUMMSC rooms prior to entry into the room.

2.2.2.2 (DCNI) Upon notification by Munitions Control secure room 158, via AECS, upon departure of the area.

2.3. (DCNI) To prevent unauthorized penetration of limited and exclusion areas containing PL 1 assets, individuals must use an AF Form 1199CG with an open area 8 to receive a RAB that allows authorized entry to the topside controlled and restricted areas of KUMMSC. For personnel with authorized entry to KUMMSC, the AF Form 1199CG will be specifically coded, and all personal information entered in the security system database at the KUMMSC Enrollment Center located in building 27494.

3. (DCNI) Override Procedures.

3.1. (DCNI) For all vehicle entry barriers/gates and blast doors, B1 through B6, the on-duty WSSS Flight Chief will approve the override opening. Override procedures are authorized for facility malfunctions, non-hostile emergencies, and immediate SF response/recapture operations.

3.2 (DCNI) Override procedures are never authorized for convenience or WSSS/MUNS level and below exercises. Override procedures are authorized for wing level Fire/EOD/BEE response exercises after 377 ABW/CC approval.

3.3. (DCNI) Override for Non-Hostile Emergency: In a non-hostile emergency (e.g. fire alarm, blast sensor activation, chemical spill), the 377 ABW/CC or designated representative will only give authority to override B7/14/15 and beyond when a Blast Containment Management System (BCMS) alarm is received from within the affected zone(exception): Tritium release requires immediate ventilation/evacuation and does not require 377 ABW/CC authority.

3.4. (DCNI) Override for SF Response: Permission from 377 ABW/CC is not required to open B7/14/15 and beyond if a resource is seized, custody cannot be validated, or is no longer

under positive control of authorized personnel (including seizure by an insider threat). Recapture operations will commence immediately with SF on hand under direction of the senior ranking SF member immediately present at the situation. Munitions Control will immediately access the two-person key box and facilitate opening of doors as required to expedite SF recapture operations. 377 WSSS/CC and 898 MUNS/CC will be notified of the use of override codes when practical.

3.5. (DCNI) The 898 MUNS and 377 WSSS passwords will be secured in separate envelopes in the two-person key box. The two-person key box will require two combinations to open, one from 898 MUNS and the other from 377 WSSS.

3.6. (DCNI) Anytime override code envelopes are opened, the system administrator must be notified. The system administrator(s) will be recalled and the override passwords will be changed within 24 hours. Once the situation requiring use of the override codes is terminated, override passwords will be placed back into an envelope, re-sealed, and returned to the two-person key box until changed by system administrators. **NOTE:** Override passwords have been compromised if either the SCS or MUNS controller has had the opportunity to view the other's portion of the password. This would allow the opportunity for a lone individual to possibly execute an emergency override for interlocks and special functions.

3.7. (U) Entry/Exit Searches. DODM S-5210.41-M_AFMAN 31-108_AFGSCSUP personnel, vehicle and hand-carried inspection procedures apply. Inspections/searches will be conducted to identify potential items entering (i.e. contraband) or being removed from the restricted and/or limited area (i.e. critical components, classified items). It is the responsibility of the escorting official to ensure these procedures are included during entry and exit. It is the responsibility of SF leadership to ensure these inspections have been accomplished. EXCEPTION: The 377 ABW/CC may exempt specific visitors from inspection. Security personnel, security forces or properly trained support personnel will inspect all vehicles for contraband. Only those vehicles essential to the mission and/or in support of official business and properly vetted will be allowed in the restricted and/or limited areas. Contractor vehicles are allowed into restricted and/or limited areas if deemed mission essential and/or in support of official business, and permission to bring the vehicles into the restricted and/or limited area is identified on the EAL. For exclusion areas, the SVA is responsible for allowing/controlling items that are not restricted by security requirements. These are identified as items that may impact nuclear surety operations (e.g. Electromagnetic Radiation (EMR)). **NOTE:** See Enclosure 3 to Tab A to Appendix 1 to Annex Z and Enclosure 1 to Tab A to Appendix 1 to Annex C for contraband definition and listings.

**ENCLOSURE 2 TO TAB A TO APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX Z TO KAFB IDP 31-101
HOT CARGO PAD / ALTERNATE HOT CARGO PAD WITH PROTECTION LEVEL 1
RESOURCES PRESENT**

REFERENCES: Refer to Basic Plan.

1. (DCNI) **GENERAL:** The hot cargo pad is normally located at the east end of the flightline at Pad 5, but may be relocated to the alternate hot cargo pad for aircraft loaded with explosives. The alternate hot cargo pad parking location for aircraft is the bend in the taxiway at Pad 5. An alternate location may be used based on mission requirements as long as all operational requirements are met (explosive citing, security, surety).

2. (DCNI) **EXECUTION:** When logistics aircraft containing priority level (PL 1) resources are located in the area, a temporary restricted area will be established and marked by appropriate restricted area and ECP signs. Use of the alternate hot cargo pad must be approved by the 377 ABW/CC or designated representative. The use of deadly force is authorized (refer to AFI 31-117). Personnel are prohibited from entering this area without the consent of the 377 ABW/CC.

2.1. (DCNI) Aircraft with general cargo may be parked anywhere on the military side of the flightline with 377 ABW/CC or designated representative's approval. When such an alternate parking area is designated, the area will be marked by the use of ropes, stanchions, restricted area and entry control point signs. This area will be designated the appropriate priority level according to the priority of the aircraft/resources parked in the area. Personnel are prohibited from entering this area without the consent of the Installation Commander.

2.2. Hot Cargo Pad Entry and Circulation Control.

2.2.1. (DCNI) Hot cargo aircraft pads will be designated as restricted areas whenever protection level resources are present. The limited/exclusion area will start at the fence line of PAD 5. The means preventing unauthorized penetration of Hot Cargo Pad/Pad 5 limited and exclusion areas containing PL 1 resources are as follows:

2.2.1.1. (FOUO) The AF Form 1199 (KAFB or home station) along with a properly authenticated EAL or crew orders will be required for entry when PL 1 resources are located on the pad or other properly marked restricted areas. Credentials identified in DOD S-5210.41M for the Defense Threat Reduction Agency personnel will be honored.

2.2.2. (FOUO) Authenticated crew orders and/or DOD/DoE ID cards will be used to grant unescorted entry for sister service personnel requesting entry into a temporary restricted area for transient aircraft. These personnel may act as escort officials.

2.2.3. The primary location of the cargo pad lighting controls is the power box on the east side of Pad 5. The alternate lighting is in the form of portable light carts which are located in the parking area east of Pad 5.

2.3. IG Entry into Hot Cargo Pad Area.

2.3.1. (DCNI) An authenticated IG EAL will be provided to the EC. This EAL is not the sole basis for allowing entry into the area. DOD S- 5210.41M_AFMAN 31-108, Volume 1 Enclosure 6 the SVA will ensure the appropriate arming requirements are met to maintain the final denial capability for any manned exclusion areas. If an inspector approaches the EC, the EC will inspect the home station credentials against the EAL and report their post to the inspector. If the inspector requests entry into the restricted area, the EC will contact the SVA who will vouch the inspector into the area. Once the SVA has authorized entry of inspector personnel, all inspector personnel will be signed in on the AF Form 1109 (for accountability only) and trans frisked prior to entry.

2.3.2. (DCNI) An authenticated IG EAL will be provided to the SVA. This EAL is not the sole basis to allow entry into the area. The SVA must vouch for personnel entering the exclusion area. The EC will inspect the individual's credentials and verify the information against the EAL. The EC will search individuals for readily detectable items prior to entry and exit. The SVA (courier) will accept the personnel screened by the certified EC and authorize entry. At no time will inspectors be authorized to form, or be part of a two-person team.

**ENCLOSURE 3 TO TAB A TO APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX Z TO KAFB IDP 31-101
PROTECTION LEVEL 1 RESTRICTED AREA ENTRY AND CIRCULATION CONTROL
KUMMSC RESTRICTED AREA ENTRY AND CIRCULATION CONTROL**

1. **PURPOSE:** This enclosure outlines procedures for restricted area entry and circulation control. The objective of restricted area entry and circulation control is to ensure persons entering, working within, or exiting restricted areas are granted authority to be inside the area(s), are positively identified prior to entering, and accounted for as necessary.

2. **MISSION:** To prevent unauthorized entry, counter the introduction of contraband and prohibited items, detect hostile actions, and prevent unauthorized removal of material from restricted areas on KAFB. Hand carried items will be screened through the x-ray machine prior to entry and exit.

2.1. The following items are considered CONTRABAND: **NOTE:** DOE Couriers, 377 ABW, 150 SOW and 58 SOW First Responders/ Support personnel authorized to carry weapons and/or explosives in the course of their official duties are exempt.

2.1.1. Any firearm, whether pistol, rifle or other, to include pellet guns, BB guns, etc.

2.1.2. Any type of explosive device or explosive material to include any IED.

2.1.3. Any other type of weapon, such as, tasers, stun guns, batons, etc.

2.1.4. Any non-mission essential flame producing devices such as torches (regardless of fuel type), chemicals, solids, gases, liquids or anything else used to produce a flame or start a fire, etc.

2.1.5. Any unauthorized type of recording device, whether it be capable of recording sound, video, or both, as well as any device which can be used to record electronic information or signals, or manipulate those sources of information or signals.

2.1.6. Alcoholic beverages.

2.2. (DCNI) In addition to the items listed in 2.1., the following items are PROHIBITED inside the KUMMSC restricted area. If any questions arise, contact senior leadership for guidance (Flight Sergeant, Flight Commander, SVA, etc.).

2.2.1. All cameras and/or video equipment not authorized in writing by the 898 MUNS/CC and authenticated by a 377 WSSS official, Staff Sergeant (E-5) or above.

2.2.2. Any personal or government issued device with photography capability (photo, video recording, etc.) such as photo/video capable cellular telephone, PDAs, etc. **NOTE:** Government issued cellular telephones are not authorized, Personal Digital Assistants are authorized as long as they DO NOT have photographic capabilities. Personal cell phones of any type are not allowed.

2.2.3. All electronic are restricted “entertainment-type” devices such as Mp3® and removable Media, IPODS®, Zune® players, laptops, Xbox®, Play stations®, Gameboys®, Smart Watches, etc., UNLESS ISSUED/PURCHASED by the US Government for MUNN/SF use. The only electronic devices authorized within KUMMSC are government issued/purchased equipment such as, laptops, electronic T.O. devices, and maintenance test equipment. If the validity of a device is called into question, the EC will contact MUNN Control for MUNN personnel or WSSS/SSCC for SF personnel to validate.

2.2.4. Any hazardous chemicals or liquids not being used for official purposes.

2.2.5. Any type of mace or pepper spray. **NOTE:** SF-issued pepper spray used in the course of their official duties is exempt.

2.2.6. (DCNI) In addition to the items listed in para 2.1 for the restricted area, the following items are PROHIBITED inside the KUMMSC exclusion area, commonly identified as the area behind B-7/B-14. (These items are prohibited under the enforcement of the SVA).

2.2.6.1. Any flame or spark producing device.

2.2.6.2. Any personal tools such as Leatherman’s, Gerber’s, pocket knives, etc.

2.2.6.3. Any electronic devices. **NOTE:** Mission essential government issued/purchased electronic equipment such as, T.O. devices, maintenance test equipment or other electronic as deemed appropriate by 898 MUNN/CC are exempt and, the SVA will be the determining authority for the validity of the equipment and its requirements if questions or concerns should arise.

2.2.6.4. (DCNI) Means for preventing unauthorized penetration of exclusion areas: The SVA will ensure required inspections of hand carried items, personnel, and vehicles are accomplished in accordance with DOD S-5210.41-M-V2_AFMAN 31-108 V2, Enclosure 3. The SVA may complete the inspections or direct Security Forces or exclusion area escorts to assist/complete inspections.

2.2.6.5. (DCNI) In accordance with DOD S-5210.41-M-V2_AFMAN 31-108, paragraph C6.6.7.2., specific items entering KUMMSC are not required to be searched because of their classification and strict storage and control requirements. The following items are exempt from search into KUMMSC.

2.2.6.5.1. (DCNI) Hermetically-sealed munitions supplies and equipment (e.g. LLC’s, explosive ejector cartridges and other similar materials).

2.2.6.5.2. (DCNI) Munitions supplies and equipment in heat sealed barrier bags (e.g. humidity indicators, missile components and other similar materials).

2.2.6.5.3. (DCNI) Munitions containers with intact shipping or storage seals (e.g. deployment kits, classified munitions and other similar materials).

2.2.6.5.4. (DCNI) LLC's enclosed in non-commercial closed wooden or cardboard containers with affixed shipping documents.

2.2.6.5.5. (DCNI) Items prepared for shipment and placed in scaled containers, including secondary ordnance (e.g., ballistic gas generator cartridges, explosive bolts and other electro-explosive devices) and reentry system (RS) and reentry vehicle (RV) pieces/parts (e.g. aft shroud for Force Development Evaluation).

2.2.6.5.6. (DCNI) Sealed metal, wood, or cardboard containers with shipping documentation (DD Form 1348 series, DoD Single Line Item Requisition System Document, Issue release/Receipt Document, or equivalent) attached and may/may not have a DD Form 1387, Military Shipping Label, attached.

2.2.6.5.7. (DCNI) Sealed metal, wood, or cardboard containers without shipping documentation (DD Form 1348 series, DoD Single Line Item Requisition System Document, Issue Release/Receipt Document, or equivalent) attached; however, have a status tag (DD Form 1574, Serviceable Tag Material, DD Form 1575, Serviceable Tag Material, DD Form 1576, Test/Modification Tag Material, or DD Form 1577, Unserviceable Tag Material) or DD Form 1387, Military Shipping Label, attached.

2.2.6.5.8. (DCNI) Factory/depot-sealed containers (e.g., equipment, supplies).

2.2.6.5.9. (DCNI) Warhead/component shipping and storage containers (H1616, H1700, neutron generator, H1388, H1408, H1473, H1639 and H1224A, etc).

2.2.6.5.10. (DCNI) Sealed communications kit in sealed canvas bag.

2.2.6.5.11. (DCNI) Authenticated/verified Department of Energy transport and escort vehicles.

2.2.6.5.12. (DCNI) Classified/Tamper Detection Indicators/Code Components/COMSEC/Special Access material in sealed or locked folders/containers/briefcases. In order to maintain proper control, code handlers will not be separated from code components and code materials.

2.2.6.5.13. (DCNI) Weapons configuration folder, hand-carried by weapons officer.

2.2.6.5.14. (DCNI) Sealed Single Integrated Operations Plans support equipment (Code Management System, Code Enabling Switch, etc.).

2.2.6.6. (FOUO) Entry Authority. Only those personnel with a need to enter to perform official duties will be permitted to enter a restricted area. A person may be authorized entry either by being granted unescorted entry according to AFI 31-101 and AFI 31-501 or by being properly escorted. All items entering or exiting KUMMSC are subject to inspection unless the item is listed on an exemption letter. When any items listed above enter or exit KUMMSC, a pre-notification must be received from Munitions Control.

3.1. (FOUO) Unescorted Entry. This applies to a person who has a continuing and frequent need for entry to a restricted area to perform official duties. AFI 31-501 outlines investigative and personnel security requirements that must be satisfied prior to badge issue. All personnel must obtain specific written permission to enter restricted areas. The authority for a person to enter a restricted area comes from the Installation Commander. This authority may be delegated to and exercised by base officials or restricted area coordinating officials designated by the Installation Commander (see paragraph 3.5.1., Enclosure 9 to Tab A to Appendix 1 to Annex C). IAW AFI 21-200, Munitions and Missile Maintenance Management individuals requiring access to the no-lone zone areas of KUMMSC require the 898 MUNS MASO's signature in the remarks block of the AF Form 2586, Unescorted Entry Authorization Certificate, authorizing access to these areas.

3.1.1 (FOUO) Unescorted Vehicle Entry Requirements: All vehicles/passengers requesting access to the topside Controlled Area or the KUMMSC Restricted Area must utilize their Restricted Area Badge and request access through the north vehicle barrier/V1AA terminal. If proceeding to the Restricted Area, they will turn left towards the east side vehicle barrier/V2. Once at that location, they will be met by the Internal Security Response Team/S-5 to verify the need for entry and ensure they have a valid restricted area badge with open area 8. Once verification is complete, they will swipe their badge and enter their pin at the V2 terminal to request access through the Entry Controller. All vehicles driving down the tunnel will proceed through each vehicle boundary gate one at a time. The entry controller must ensure the previous boundary is closed prior to opening the next.

3.1.1.1. (FOUO) For day to day operations, when there are no personnel being escorted, the driver is the only authorized person allowed to drive down the tunnel. All passengers must exit and process into the facility as pedestrians through D1.

3.2. (DCNI) EXECUTION: A portion of KUMMSC is designated as a permanent restricted area on KAFB. The restricted/limited area begins at turnstile 3, door 6, door 7, and vehicle gate 5 for entry, and turnstile 5 and vehicle gate 6 for exit. (FOUO) Escorted Entry.

3.2.1. Escort officials will:

3.2.1.1. Ensure all hand-carried items are inspected prior to allowing entry into a restricted area ensuring no weapons, contraband or other unauthorized material(s) are present.

3.2.1.2. Provide personnel a restricted area and exclusion area escort briefing, as necessary.

3.2.1.3. Monitor the actions of all personnel under escort ensuring their safe and authorized conduct.

3.2.1.4. Not exceed the authorized ratios of escort to personnel escorted.

3.2.2. Escorted Entry Vehicle Requirements: On occasion, KUMMSC will have contractors that must be escorted into the facility. Often times, these personnel have specialized vehicles that can only be operated by the escortee. During these situations, the escort and the escortee/s are authorized to drive down the entry tunnel and proceed to the search area between V4 and V5. Once in the search area the escort and escortee/s will be processed into the restricted/limited area at D6.

3.2.2.1 The Entry Controller must verify their status against a validated EAL and ensure they receive the escort briefing prior to granting entry into the restricted/limited area.

3.2.3. Entry requests from agencies other than KAFB agencies (DOD).

3.2.3.1. (DCNI) DOD agencies not assigned to KAFB requesting visits to KUMMSC must coordinate their requests through 377 ABW/XP. It will be approved/disapproved and then forwarded to the 898 MUNSC Security Manager. Requests must include the reason for the visit and dates required. The request will provide information 30 calendar days before expected visit. The 377 ABW/CC and the 898 MUNSC/CC are final approval authorities for access to KUMMSC. The 898 MUNSC/CC is the final approval authority for all requests requiring access as defined by DOD S-5210.41M_AFMAN 31-108, Vol 3, Nuclear Weapon Security Manual: DOD Nuclear Weapon Environment-Specific Requirements. If distinguished visitors (O-6 and above and Civilian equivalents) are included, the request must be coordinated through the 377 ABW Protocol Office who will coordinate through the 377th Air Base Wing Staff.

3.2.4. (DCNI) For all inspectors granted unescorted entry to KUMMSC (area 8): All other inspectors that do not have unescorted entry into area 8 will be granted entry within facilities other than KUMMSC by using an EAL signed by the Installation Commander or designee, and authenticated by a SF member, E-5 or above, in conjunction with their home base RAB, DD Form 2, or CAC. Validate the appropriate security clearance via an authenticated EAL or Joint Personnel Adjudication System (JPAS) prior to granting inspector personnel access to classified information. The following procedures will be used for entry into the KUMMSC restricted area.

3.2.4.1. (DCNI) The inspecting agency will send a formal inspection notice with arrival dates and inspection dates. They will provide an Entry Authority List (EAL) requesting unescorted entry to include Discrete Control Areas (DCA) (DCAs 59, 60

and 61) that meet the requirements of DOD S-5210.41M_AFMAN 31-108, Vol 2, Enclosure 3, paragraph 5.e. They must also request authority to bring hand-carried items and photographic equipment into the area as needed. The make, model, and serial number of all equipment must be included in the request. Security clearance information listed on the EAL will be validated against JPAS by 898 MUNS/CCS to ensure security clearance data is appropriately annotated on the EAL.

3.2.4.2. (DCNI) 377 WSSS personnel will verify the EAL against a valid identification credential (DD Form 2 for military personnel or civilian identification and valid form of federal or state issued identification containing the individual's name, rank, and control number from government-issued identification. Personnel may not have a SSN or may not have identification media with SSN. In such cases, positive ID must be made using a valid photo ID (e.g. State driver license, other ID, passport). Control numbers from these media may be used on EAL in lieu of SSN. Once the EAL is verified, the installation commander will authorize unescorted entry by signing the EAL. A member of the 377 WSSS staff (E-5 or above) will authenticate the EAL. Information must be on the EAL IAW DOD S-5210.41M_AFMAN 31-108, Vol 2, Enclosure 3, paragraph 5.a.c(1)(2)(3).

3.2.4.3. (DCNI) An EAL signed by the 377 ABW/CC and authenticated by an individual from the 377 WSSS (E-5 or above) will be posted in the KUMMSC Entry Control Point (ECP), ECP for PAD 5 operations, KCP, Enrollment Center, Pass and Registration, SFS/BDOC, and WSSS/SSCC. WSSS/SSCC will maintain the EAL with original signatures from the 377 ABW/CC. All other positions will have an original authentication signature. Other positions/offices not listed above that require an EAL will be provided an EAL with an original authentication signature from 377 WSSS (E-5 or above) personnel. 377 WSSS will maintain an additional 377 ABW/CC original signature copy of the EAL.

3.2.5. (DCNI) During emergency or time-sensitive urgent events, known by SF, the 377 ABW/CC is authorized exigent entry authority into limited areas (i.e., emergency circumstances such as response to serious weapons safety, or incidents involving treaty verification team). A pre-announcement from the 377 ABW/CC is required for entry. In addition, the following restrictions/measures will apply:

3.2.5.1. (FOUO) This authority is inherent with the 377 ABW/CC and cannot be delegated.

3.2.5.2. (DCNI) The 377 ABW/CC will pass entry information verbally in the form of a pre-announcement to the Site (SSCC) prior to arriving at the affected limited area(s) entry control point. WSSS/SSCC will validate the identity of the 377 ABW/CC, receive the pre-announcement and communicate it to the required Security Forces posted personnel. The pre-announcement will contain as a minimum:

3.2.5.3. (DCNI) Expected time of arrival at the limited area.

3.2.5.4. (DCNI) Number of individuals to be escorted. Restrictions to the number of personnel who can be escorted still apply per DOD S-5210.41M_AFMAN 31-108-V2. One escort may control six personnel.

3.2.5.5. (DCNI) Upon arrival at the limited area entry control point, the EC will confirm the information provided in the pre-announcement with the 377 ABW/CC. If information provided in the pre-announcement is not consistent with the party requesting entry, the EC will speak directly to the 377 ABW/CC to confirm the changes and notify WSSS/SSCC. The EC will document entry and exit.

3.2.5.6. (DCNI) Security Forces must positively identify the 377 ABW/CC and provide an opportunity for the commander to signal duress. The 377 ABW/CC may vouch for the security of his/her vehicle upon entry.

3.2.5.7. (DCNI) The 377 ABW/CC must maintain visual contact with persons under escort at all times, and must acknowledge the identity, integrity and security of the escorted individual(s) prior to limited area entry. Upon entry into the limited area, the 377 ABW/CC may transfer persons under their escort to the control of another authorized escort official when unique circumstances prohibit the presence of the escorted personnel (i.e. if the 377 ABW/CC were required to enter an exclusion area).

3.2.5.8. (DCNI) All members who are in the 377 ABW/CC's immediate party, whom the 377 ABW/CC vouches for, with valid access authority (i.e. authorized RAB) to the limited area may expeditiously enter and exit with the 377 ABW/CC's party; however, these authorized individuals will not require escort after entry.

3.2.6. (DCNI) The KUMMSC Munitions Haul Road is not a controlled area but is restricted to use by government-owned vehicles (GOV) performing official duties only. This road is off-limits to all bicycles, pedestrians, and any vehicle(s) not being used for official duties associated with the area. Use of this road requires prior coordination with 377 WSSS/SSCC, 846-1478/4760.

3.2.7. Empty Canister Removal.

3.2.7.1. 898 MUNS will:

3.2.7.1.1. Munitions Control will notify Security Forces that empty canisters will be removed from KUMMSC.

3.2.7.1.2. Initiate movement of all canisters into Brandt Hall from appropriate storage area.

3.2.7.1.3. (DCNI) Ensure an 898 MUNS representative (E5 or above) is present in Brandt Hall to make contact with the SF Underground Area Supervisor prior to initiation of the search. **NOTE:** Prior to movement into Brandt Hall, ensure 898 MUNS representative retrieves "Empty Canister Guide

Book” from Munitions Control and verifies all empty canisters are marked properly.

3.2.7.1.4. (DCNI) Initiate a search of all canisters that are scheduled to be removed from the area.

3.2.7.1.5. (DCNI) If Security Forces personnel identify any unexplained items within the canister, comply with instructions and contact, via Munitions Control, senior ranking 898 MUNS representative.

3.2.7.1.6. (DCNI) Upon approval of empty status, via Security Forces, move canisters into loading dock for final disposition.

3.2.7.2. 377 WSSS will:

3.2.7.2.1. (DCNI) WSSS/SSCC will notify Underground Area Supervisor that empty canisters will be removed from KUMMSC. **NOTE:** Anytime canisters are removed from the facility, a blotter entry will be accomplished.

3.2.7.2.2. (DCNI) The Underground Area Supervisor will initiate a search of all canisters scheduled to be removed from the area. **NOTE:** Utilize the “Empty Canister Guide Book” while searching all canisters for specific information regarding required/non-required items. Upon initiation and completion of the search, a blotter entry will be made.

3.2.7.2.3. (DCNI) If unexplained items are located within a canister, detain all individuals and immediately request contact with 377 WSSS/S3 section, via WSSS/SSCC, for further direction. **NOTE:** Do not immediately initiate a Security Incident until 377 WSSS/S3 section and a senior 898 MUNS representatives have validated the reason for the unexplained item.

3.2.7.2.4. (DCNI) Upon search and validation of all empty canisters, supervise the movement of all canisters onto the loading dock for final disposition.

3.2.7.2.5. (DCNI) Loading Dock security personnel will maintain visual coverage (additionally WSSS/SSCC will utilize CCTV coverage if available) of canisters until removal from KUMMSC. **NOTE:** If canisters remain in the loading dock for more than 24 hours, re-initiate searches on all canisters prior to removal. Upon departure from the facility, a blotter entry will be made.

3.2.8. Two-Person Area Processing: The following procedures are for Two-Person Area processing when operating the AECS.

3.2.8.1. The 898 MUNS will:

3.2.8.1.1. (FOUO) Verify a valid JCN and ensure the two-person team is authorized unescorted entry within the two-person area via the AECS cardholder database.

3.2.8.1.2. (DCNI) Provide WSSS/SSCC the following information in writing (MUNS Form 1) for entry into B7, B14, or B15:

3.2.8.1.3. (DCNI) Name, rank, badge number of both two-person team members; designate SVA by Senior Munitions Controller initials; time of entry; locations to be accessed (Hallway, Maintenance Bay, Cells).

3.2.8.1.4. (DCNI) SVA will notify Munitions Controller of additional locations to be accessed not in writing on the original MUNS Form 1. Munitions Controller will generate a new MUNS Form 1 or make pen and ink changes to the original.

3.2.8.1.5. (DCNI) The SVA will utilize the 898 MUNS Two-Person Area Authorization List (TPAL) and EAL to verify personnel entry into the two-person area (B7/B14/B15).

3.2.8.1.6. (DCNI) The SVA will ensure all hand carried items, prior to entering/exiting the exclusion area for unescorted personnel, are subject to search to detect possible contraband, prohibited items, and to ensure that critical items do not leave the two-person area.

3.2.8.1.7. (DCNI) Senior Munitions Controller will notify SCS/AM anytime maintenance activities are completed and two-person teams will not access the two-person area for the remainder of the day. SCS/AM will direct Joint MUNS End-of-Duty-Day check with Underground ISRT and SVA/SVA two person team.

3.2.8.2. 377 WSSS will:

3.2.8.2.1. (FOUO) Validate MUNS Form 1 IAW Para. 3.2.7.1.2.1. with TPAL.

3.2.8.2.2. (FOUO) Validate MC authorized via letter to make MUNS Form 1 pre-announcement.

3.2.8.2.3. (DCNI) Ensure NARS representative is present prior to accessing NARS cells.

3.2.8.2.4. (FOUO) Ensure all Munitions personnel within the two-person area swipe as they transition throughout KUMMSC DCAs.

3.2.9. Two-Person Authentication Procedures:

3.2.9.1. (DCNI) SCS and AM will utilize two-person authentication matrix produced by 377 WSSS/S3OS for authentication procedures in conjunction with MUNS two-person team. SCS/AM will notify Munitions Control when the authentication matrix changes.

3.2.9.2. (DCNI) AM in conjunction with SCS will pass the letter/number combination to the two-person team via landline, separated by a minimum of ten feet (verified by CCTV) to ensure the chance to pass duress. Follow the same procedures for the second member of the two-person team. SCS/AM will direct two-person team to standby at applicable card reader. Refer to para for mis-authentication procedures.

3.2.9.3. (FOUO) SCS/AM will contact Munitions Control with notification of valid authentication with instructions to standby for dual authorization request via AECS.

3.2.10. Entry Procedures:

3.2.10.1. (DCNI) The SVA will contact SCS/AM via telephone/stenophone to request initial entry into B7/B14/B15. After authorized access via MUNS Form 1 is verified, SCS/AM will "GRANT ACCESS" to the applicable card reader and both members of the two-person team will swipe at the card reader.

3.2.10.2. (DCNI) For B15, two-person team will authenticate in Brandt Hall via landline for entry into B10/B11 utilizing the same procedures in Para. 3.2.7.3. Once two-person team and all personnel are within B15 interlock and doors are secure, SVA will contact SCS/AM to request access to B10 and/or B11.

3.2.10.3. (DCNI) If Type 1 material is located within the B7/B14 interlock, authentication procedures will be accomplished prior to entry into B7/B14.

3.2.10.4. (DCNI) If Type 1 material is within Brandt Hall or the Loading Dock and transitioning via MC2, authentication procedures will be accomplished prior to initiation of special function.

3.2.10.5. (DCNI) Munitions Control must concur with the dual authorization request by clicking "GRANT" within three seconds. If both control centers concur, SCS/AM and Munitions Control will press the B7/B14 buttons within three seconds.

3.2.10.6. (DCNI) Once entry into B7/B14/B15 is complete, the SVA will contact the SCS/AM to secure the blast doors.

3.2.10.7. (DCNI) The SVA will contact the AM and request entry into locations (Hallway, Maintenance Bay, Cells) listed on the MUNS Form 1, utilizing two-person area authentication procedures.

3.2.10.8. (DCNI) After valid authentication, SCS/AM will grant access to the applicable card reader or initiate a special function. Special functions and cell access require dual authorization with Munitions Control.

3.2.11. Escorted Entry Procedures:

3.2.11.1. (DCNI) The SVA will verify one form of identification for personnel escorted into the two-person area/exclusion area. ID must be state or federally issued, have a picture, and an identification number that is listed on the Entry Authority List (e.g. last six of SSN or Driver's License number) on the Entry Authority Listing.

3.2.11.2. (DCNI) SVA will ensure that all personnel under escort are given the visitor briefing and assigned adequate escorts.

3.2.11.3. (DCNI) The SVA will ensure all hand carried items, prior to entering/exiting the exclusion area for escorted personnel, are searched to detect possible contraband, prohibited items, and to ensure that critical items do not leave the two-person area.

3.2.12. Exit Procedures:

3.2.12.1 (FOUO) Two-Person team SVA will contact the AM and request departure from the area (B7/B14/B15).

3.2.11.2. (DCNI) Once all personnel are within the applicable interlock, SVA will account for all personnel. SCS/AM will verify all personnel have departed via CCTV and System Status.

3.2.12.3. (DCNI) SCS/AM will secure all cells. Once all cells have been secured, SCS/AM will secure all applicable blast doors. SCS/AM will secure all sensors once applicable doors are secure.

3.2.12.4. (DCNI) SCS/AM will conduct authentication procedures with two-person team prior to exit.

3.2.12.4.1. (DCNI) For B15, SCS/AM will conduct authentication procedures after departure from B15 in Brandt Hall via landline.

3.2.12.4.2. (DCNI) When munitions personnel depart the area or when maintenance activities are completed for the day, the underground ISRT in conjunction with SVA and SVA two person, will sweep the interlock of B7/B14 and ensure any blast door (B8/B9/B12/B13) with Type I material behind it is secure. WSSS/SSCC will validate all personnel have swiped out of the applicable locations via system status..

3.2.13. (DCNI) Misauthentication Procedures. The following procedures will be conducted in the event a misauthentication occurs when an authorized two-person team is requesting entry at B7 through B15.

3.2.13.1. (DCNI) The 377 WSSS will:

3.2.13.1.1. (DCNI) The AM will direct all individuals to the center of the interlock (or between B7/B14 in Brandt Hall, if applicable) and instruct them to remain there.

3.2.13.1.2. (DCNI) WSSS/SSCC will initiate a Security Incident and two-person area extraction procedures. Once the final sweep by 898 MUNs is complete with negative issues, the on-scene commander will terminate the Security Incident.

3.2.13.1.3. An ISRT will extract all personnel from the two-person area. Once all personnel are extracted from the two-person area, they will be assessed in Brandt Hall. If the situation is deemed to be hostile, the individuals will be placed at a disadvantage in Brandt Hall until the hostile situation is terminated. The extracted individuals will then be removed from the affected area and taken topside.

3.2.13.1.4. (DCNI) After all personnel are extracted from the two-person area, WSSS/SSCC will coordinate with 898 MUNs to break codes and dispatch the ISRT to sweep the affected area for unauthorized individuals or contraband.

3.2.13.1.5. (DCNI) 898 MUNs will:

3.2.13.1.6. (DCNI) Upon termination of sweep by the ISRT for unauthorized personnel or contraband, an 898 MUNs two-person team will accomplish a thorough sweep of the affected area and report findings to the on-scene commander.

3.2.14. (DCNI) Unauthorized Access to a Cell. The following procedures will be conducted in the event an individual accesses a cell without proper authentication.

3.2.14.1. (DCNI) The 377 WSSS will:

3.2.14.1.1. (DCNI) The AM will direct all individuals to the center of the interlock (or between B7/B14 in Brandt Hall, if applicable) and instruct them to remain there.

3.2.14.1.2. (DCNI) WSSS/SSCC will initiate a Security Incident and two-person area extraction procedures. Once the final sweep by 898 MUNs is complete with negative issues, the on-scene commander will terminate the Security Incident.

3.2.14.1.3. An ISRT will extract all personnel from the two-person area. Once all personnel are extracted from the two-person area, they will be assessed in Brandt Hall. If the situation is deemed to be hostile, the individuals will be placed at a disadvantage in Brandt Hall until the hostile situation is terminated. The extracted individuals will then be removed from the affected area and taken topside.

3.2.14.1.4. (DCNI) After all personnel are extracted from the two-person area, WSSS/SSCC will coordinate with 898 MUNS to break codes and dispatch the ISRT to sweep the affected area for unauthorized individuals or contraband.

3.2.14.2. (DCNI) 898 MUNS will:

3.2.14.2.1. (DCNI) Upon termination of sweep by the ISRT for unauthorized personnel or contraband, an 898 MUNS two-person team will accomplish a thorough sweep of the affected area and report findings to the on-scene commander.

3.3. (DCNI) Discrete Controlled Area (DCA). A DCA is a secure area controlled by barriers and credential verification. Valid cardholders are tracked between DCA passages; they will always exit from one DCA and enter another. The AECS keeps track of how many card holders are in a DCA in real-time. This enables operators to track personnel as they move throughout KUMMSC. Access to the DCA by an individual is determined at the time of badge enrollment. This ensures personnel are only able to access areas for which they are authorized. The SCS has the capability to generate a report of individuals that are within the facility by DCA. In times of emergency where an evacuation of the facility would be initiated, the SCS needs to know an exact count of personnel in each DCA. When the SCS processes the evacuation report VIA AECS, the system generates an automatic list of all personnel within the specific DCAs in KUMMSC, in order to insure this count is generated correctly everyone must ensure they swipe in/out of each DCA properly.

APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX Z TO KAFB IDP 31-101
OVERT ATTACK AGAINST KUMMSC

REFERENCES: Refer to Basic Plan.

1. OBJECTIVE: To provide the highest degree of security possible for all PL 1 resources located within KUMMSC, while maintaining a high state of readiness.
2. DESCRIPTION: A hostile force has assaulted the KUMMSC area with the intention of damaging, destroying, or stealing a PL 1 resource.
3. CONSIDERATIONS: Implement requirements in the KAFB FPCON Delta checklist.
4. (DCNI) SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS: If a probable or actual hostile event/attack against PL resources has occurred, a Covered Wagon will be declared.

4.1. Task Organizations:

4.1.1. The 377 ABW/CC will:

4.1.1.1. Ensure the base is informed of FPCON changes and implementations.

4.1.1.2. (FOUO) Assume command and control of the overall situation and assemble the CAT and EOC, as appropriate.

4.1.2. The KCP will:

4.1.2.1. (FOUO) Notify command and control facilities of the FPCON information using voice and e-mail notifications.

4.1.2.2. (FOUO) Keep WSSS/SSCC/SFS/BDOC advised of any information received that could affect the overall security of KAFB.

4.1.2.3. (FOUO) Ensure all agencies are directed to implement all mandatory measures under this FPCON, as outlined in KAFB OPLAN 10-245.

4.1.3. The DFC is responsible for and will ensure:

4.1.3.1. (FOUO) 377 SFS and 377 WSSS accomplish key personnel/squadron notifications. Implement emergency recall procedures across the entire 377 SFG and immediately begin to assemble. Recall additional security personnel to form FBFs.

4.1.3.1.1. All posts and patrols don alert gear and prepare for engagement.

4.1.3.1.2. Implement denial, recapture, and/or recovery operations as necessary.

4.1.3.1.3. Close all installation gates.

4.1.3.1.4. (FOUO) When directed, implement mandatory and recommended measures under FPCON Alpha, Bravo, Charlie and Delta in KAFB FPCON checklists.

4.1.3.1.5. Up-channel reports through KCP to higher headquarters.

4.1.3.1.6. Requires notification of the Fire Department (CEF) who is responsible for Incident Command and other emergency responder requirements in direct support of EOD activities. Request EOD through KCP if suspicious devices are found.

4.1.3.1.7. (FOUO) Request notified agencies to instruct their personnel to increase security awareness and stay indoors until the situation is terminated.

4.1.3.1.8. Keep SFS/BDOC and 898 MUNS Control advised of the situation.

4.1.3.1.9. (FOUO) Assign a SF NCO to the EOC.

4.1.3.1.10. (FOUO) Advise MSG/CC when additional forces are needed to support higher FPCONs.

4.1.3.1.11. (FOUO) The 377 SFS will ensure an EC is posted at the KCP once the CAT is activated.

4.1.3.2. (FOUO) 377 FSS will coordinate food services support for deployed Security Forces personnel.

4.1.3.3. 377 MSG/CE will, when requested by CAT, EOC, WSSS/SSCC, or SFS/BDOC, dispatch:

4.1.3.3.1. (FOUO) Repair crews for repairing damaged physical security safeguards.

4.1.3.3.2. Power production personnel in the event the emergency generators malfunction during commercial power outages.

4.1.3.3.3. 377 MSG/CE will ensure compliance with requirements accomplished by private contractors.

4.1.4. 898 MUNS/CC, through MUNS Control, will:

4.1.4.1. (DCNI) Ensure 898 MUNS provides CTS technicians for repair and maintenance of KUMMSC IDS.

4.1.4.2. (DCNI) Divert any Special Assignment Airlift Mission (SAAM) or Safeguard Transport (SGT) operations scheduled during this time frame, and notify their personnel of the increase in security and the reason.

4.1.4.3. (FOUO) Through the 898 MUNS: provide personnel-allocated quantities of base defense ammunition for FPCON and contingency actions.

4.1.4.4. (DCNI) WSSS/SSCC will notify Munitions Control (MC) of the situation and ensure 898 MUNS personnel are armed for defense of KUMMSC. MC will notify facility personnel of the situation via the public address system or any available means and have all qualified personnel report to the 898 MUNS armory for arming. If MC is not functioning, WSSS/SSCC will notify 898 MUNS personnel using the public address system. All armed 898 MUNS personnel will be deployed for final denial as directed by the senior SF leader on scene.

4.1.5. (FOUO) The 58 SOW/CC will:

4.1.5.1. (FOUO) Suspend all non-essential flightline operations until declaration of a lower FPCON unless those flightline activities are related to generation of aircraft in support of the defense to the base or KUMMSC.

4.1.5.2. (FOUO) Provide security for area 4 if additional SFs are required to respond to KUMMSC per para 5.1.1 of Enclosure 5 to Tab A to Appendix 1 to Annex C.

4.1.5.3. (FOUO) Provide a list of aircraft available, timeline for launch, and weapon capabilities to the KCP.

4.1.5.4. (FOUO) Provide recapture/recovery air support as available when requested by KCP.

4.1.6. The 150 SOW/CC will:

4.1.6.1. (FOUO) Suspend all flightline operations until implementation of a lower FPCON.

4.1.7. SNL Protection Force will assist as needed.

4.1.8. Once an attack has occurred, AFOSI Detachment 814 will:

4.1.8.1. (FOUO) Take custody of and process captured/surviving enemy forces.

4.1.8.2. (FOUO) Assess potential for further attack (based on gathered intelligence).

4.1.8.3. (FOUO) Initiate/coordinate investigation of the incident once threats to PL resources are neutralized.

4.1.8.4. (FOUO) Coordinate with the LFA (FBI).

4.1.9. (FOUO) Tasked units will address their responsibilities when units implement their instructions.

5. Resupply.

5.1. Resupply is defined as enough ammunition to provide the RF and IBF with one full replacement basic load for each weapon used (in all environments). Resupply locations will be decided by the IC utilizing METT-TC.

APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX Z TO KAFB IDP 31-101
DoE SAFEGUARDS TRANSPORTER / SAFE HAVEN

REFERENCES: Refer to Basic Plan.

1. (FOUO) SITUATION: Department of Energy (DoE) vehicle, Safeguard Transport (SGT), has requested a Safe Haven.

1.1. Enemy Forces. Refer to the Basic Plan.

1.2. Friendly Forces. Refer to the Basic Plan.

2. SECURITY OBJECTIVE: To provide support for the protection of DoE assets, while in transit, under DoE control.

2.1. Concept of Operations. At no time will PL 1 resources/critical components be allowed to depart the immediate vicinity of the convoy. Containment actions will require 360 degree security using all available on-duty Security Forces and non-security forces members, if necessary.

2.2. Tasks.

2.2.1. (FOUO) The DoE Secure Communication (SECOM) Control Center will notify WSSS/SSCC of the DoE shipment's expected arrival time and status.

2.2.2. The KCP will:

2.2.2.1. Verify the Safe Haven request through Defense Transportation Tracking System (DTTS) IAW KAFBI 91-201; contact DTTS: Commercial: 1-800-826-0794

2.2.2.2. (FOUO) Notify WSSS/SSCC immediately of the status and location of the SGT if the Safe Haven is the result of a hostile event.

2.2.2.3. (FOUO) Notify or confirm notification to:

2.2.2.3.1. (FOUO) 377 WSSS/SSCC.

2.2.2.3.2. (FOUO) 898 MUNS Control.

2.2.2.3.3. (FOUO) 377 ABW/CC.

2.2.2.3.4. (FOUO) DFC.

2.2.2.3.5. (FOUO) 898 MUNS/CC.

2.2.2.3.6. (FOUO) 377 ABW/SEW.

2.2.2.3.7. (FOUO) 377 WSSS/S3OS.

2.2.2.4. (FOUO) Up-channel required reports to higher headquarters.

2.2.3. The WSSS/SSCC will:

2.2.3.1. (FOUO) Notify 377 SFS/BDOC and all posts and patrols.

2.2.3.2. (FOUO) Implement appropriate Contingency Action Checklists (CAC) and make notifications.

2.2.3.3. (DCNI) Coordinate with 898 MUNS to ensure the required space is available within the loading dock.

2.2.3.4. (DCNI) Dispatch patrol to gate V1AA to verify the SGT and/or security escort's status (if required).

2.2.3.5. (DCNI) Ensure appropriate posts and patrols are positioned prior to initiation of EC-1.

2.2.3.6. (DCNI) Have ECP initiate EC-1 (if required).

2.2.3.7. (DCNI) Ensure vehicle is secured in loading dock.

2.2.4. 377 SFS/BDOC will:

2.2.4.1. (FOUO) Notify all posts and patrols.

2.2.4.2. (FOUO) Dispatch patrol coverage as needed.

2.2.4.3. (DCNI) Instruct gate guards to allow SGTs and escort vehicles to enter and park on the installation at their gate.

2.2.4.4. (DCNI) Dispatch a patrol to verify courier's identification (SSCC has an EAL of all authorized DoE couriers) and allow the agent from the escort vehicle to vouch for all vehicles and personnel (an agent from the escort vehicle or forward vehicle will ride with the patrolman to KUMMSC/V1AA).

2.2.4.5. (DCNI) The patrol escorts vehicle to gate V1AA at KUMMSC.

2.2.5. (DCNI) The 898 MUNS will:

2.2.5.1. (DCNI) Designate the area within KUMMSC for parking the SAFE HAVEN vehicle(s).

2.2.5.2. (DCNI) Provide storage facilities for DoE PL resources which require to be downloaded because of an emergency situation.

2.2.5.3. (DCNI) Provide personnel to assist DoE drivers in downloading and storing resources, if required.

2.2.6. (DCNI) WSSS/SSCC will receive a notification from Munitions Control of a SGT two hours prior, and again, 30 minutes prior to the scheduled arrival time. This notification will include the name, SSN, and DOE credential number of the courier/convoy commander and the number of vehicles, if known, entering the facility. If WSSS/SSCC has not received the notification, Munitions Control will contact DOE Security Communications Control Center (SECOM) for the update. If there is a discrepancy, contact the DOE Transportation Safeguards Division.

2.2.6.1. (DCNI) Fifteen minutes prior to SGT arrival, WSSS/SSCC will dispatch a topside patrol to V1AA to stand-by.

2.2.6.2. (FOUO) The following forms may be used for identification of personnel assigned to a DOE convoy:

2.2.6.2.1 (FOUO) OST Form 5631.K, Federal Officers Credential.

2.2.6.2.2. (FOUO) Serially numbered metal shields (badges) designating the individual as a US DOE Federal Officer.

2.2.6.2.3. (FOUO) DOE Albuquerque Operations Office ID Badge.

2.2.6.2.4. (FOUO) Civilian driver's license.

2.2.6.2.5. (FOUO) Pre-entry requirements.

2.2.6.2.6. (FOUO) Name of convoy commander/courier.

2.2.6.2.7. (FOUO) SSN.

2.2.6.2.8. (FOUO) DOE credentials (badge number).

2.2.6.3. (DCNI) After all vehicles have been parked at the appropriate loading dock, the EC and an escort official will contact the courier/convoy commander and verify all DOE personnel using the listing located in the ECP. 377 WSSS personnel will escort for Remain Over-Night (RONs), and 898 MUNS will escort for upload or download operations.

2.2.6.3.1. (DCNI) The DOE convoy personnel entering KUMMSC will be under escort of an AF escort official at all times.

2.2.6.3.2. Visitor badges will not be issued.

2.2.6.3.3. (DCNI) All convoy personnel will be signed in on the AF Form 1109.

2.2.6.4. (DCNI) Only the MASO or MASO representative will accept custody of DOE material. Individuals authorized to sign on behalf of the MASO are designated by letter, appointed by the 377 ABW/CC.

2.2.6.4.1. (DCNI) Once entry procedures are completed, the Area Supervisor, 898 MUNS MASO or designated representative and the courier/convoy commander will conduct a verification of the trailer and seal numbers and that the trailer has been plugged into the security system.

2.2.6.5. (DCNI) The 377 ABW/CC or group commander, when delegated, is responsible for security of the area, and may direct inspections of all DOE vehicles entering or leaving restricted areas and the courier's personal gear, if deemed necessary.

2.2.6.6. (DCNI) SGT Convoy Arrival/Departure and Upload/Download Procedures.

2.2.6.6.1. (DCNI) Thirty minutes prior to the SGT arrival time, MC will make an all-call announcement stating the ECP and loading dock area will be locked down in 15 minutes. They will then dispatch a patrol to V1AA, and direct Underground ISRT to prepare for SGT arrival. Fifteen minutes prior to the SGT arrival time, WSSS/SSCC will instruct the ECP to stop processing and lock down.

2.2.6.6.2. (DCNI) DOE convoy personnel entering KUMMSC will be escorted by an AF escort official. For upload/download missions, 898 MUNS personnel are responsible for providing the escort official for SGT convoy personnel.

2.2.6.6.3. (DCNI) Once the SGT arrives at V1AA, the awaiting patrol will make positive identification of the courier/convoy commander, ascertain their status, and confirm the number of vehicles and personnel requesting entry to the facility.

2.2.6.6.4. (DCNI) The patrol will ask the SGT convoy courier/commander if they certify that all arriving convoy vehicles have been sanitized and kept under continuous observation following sanitation.

2.2.6.6.5. (DCNI) If 898 MUNS or 377 WSSS teams are not in place and ready to receive the shipment, due to unforeseen circumstances such as weather delays, early arrivals or improper notification, the DOE

courier/commander will be instructed to remain outside the controlled area until directed to proceed into the area.

2.2.6.6.6. (DCNI) After all pre-entry requirements have been met, the topside patrol will contact the ECP, inform them of the status of the convoy, and initiate an EC-1. All convoy personnel will be signed in on the AF Form 1109.

2.2.6.6.7. (DCNI) When the SGTs are secured in the loading dock, the area supervisor will ensure the pins at V-5 and V-6 are secured.

2.2.6.6.8. (DCNI) KUMMSC may come out of lock down after the EC has completed entry requirements and the SVA has contacted the SCS to lock D-12/D-13. During modified lockdown of the facility, personnel processing will be allowed through the ECP and B-1/B-3. The SVA is the approving authority for all subsequent entry into the loading dock. If the resources are in the dock area, B-2 and V-5/V-6 will not be opened unless approved by the SVA.

2.2.6.6.9. (DCNI) For download missions, the 15/5 will be released after all the resources have been removed from the loading dock and B-2/B-4 have been closed. For upload missions, the 15/5 may be released after all resources are uploaded on the SGT and the trailer has been locked/sealed.

2.2.6.7. (DCNI) Exit Procedures for Download Missions. The EC will notify the ECP when the SGT convoy personnel are prepared for departure. WSSS/SSCC will dispatch a topside patrol to V-8, and the ECP will initiate an EC-2. B-2/B-4 must be closed before the EC-2 is initiated. The EC will log all personnel out on the AF Form 1109.

2.2.6.8. (DCNI) Exit Procedures for Upload Missions. The EC will notify the ECP when the convoy personnel are prepared for departure. WSSS/SSCC will dispatch a topside patrol to V-8, and the ECP will initiate an EC-2. The EC will log all personnel out on the AF Form 1109.

2.2.6.9. (DCNI) SGT Checks: SGTs are required to be checked every 4 hours if they are located inside the loading dock, and every 2 hours when outside of the loading dock, or when the CCTV is inoperative.

2.2.6.10. SGT-Remote Control Unit (RCU).

2.2.6.10.1. (DCNI) The SGT/RCU Unit is located inside WSSS/SSCC, and the SGT/RCU control unit components are located inside room 148.

2.2.6.10.2. (DCNI) The SGT/RCU is used to initiate the internal security system to any SGTs within the loading dock that are connected to the security system.

2.2.6.10.3. SGT/RCU Test/Activation Procedures. Refer to SGT-RCU Test/Activation Procedures checklist located in WSSS/SSCC.

2.2.6.10.4. (DCNI) If the SGT-RCU cannot be properly connected, contact SECOM and request a technician to respond to correct the problem. The seal number on the rear door, the locks, and the security lights on the rear of the trailer will be checked. WSSS/SSCC will be immediately notified if any light is illuminated or flashing. These checks will be annotated in the blotter.

2.2.6.10.5. (DCNI) SGT Warning Light System. SGTs are equipped with three warning lights on the rear and front of the trailer. The lights on the front are located in the upper right corner and the lights on the rear are located on the upper left side or centered across the top. The three lights signify the following:

2.2.6.10.6. (DCNI) AM Light. The left light, as you are looking at the trailer, indicates the status of the SGT internal security system. This will illuminate when the internal security system of the SGT has been activated. The light will remain flashing for 100 seconds after activation.

2.2.6.10.7. (DCNI) Temperature Alarm (TA) Light. The center light, as you are looking at the trailer, indicates the internal temperature status of the SGT. This will illuminate when the temperature is too hot or too cold.

2.2.6.10.8. (DCNI) Fire Alarm (FA) Light. The right light, as you are looking at the trailer, will illuminate to signify a fire condition in the SGT or when temperature conditions inside indicate conditions are prevalent for an internal fire.

TAB A TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX Z TO KAFB IDP 31-101
OVERT ATTACK AGAINST DOE SHIPMENT

REFERENCES: Refer to Basic Plan and KAFB Annex to FBI LIRP.

1. SITUATION: A hostile group has launched an attack against a PL 1 DoE movement on KAFB.
2. SECURITY OBJECTIVE: To provide a security response to protect against damage, theft, loss, or destruction of PL 1 resources/critical components.
3. (FOUO) SECURITY REPORTING AND ALERTING ACTION: Declare Covered Wagon situation/implement FPCON Delta.
4. EXECUTION:
 - 4.1. (FOUO) Concept of Operations. Containment actions will require 360 degree security using all available on-duty Security Forces and non-security forces members, if necessary. Advise 377 ABW/CC to activate EOC/CAT/KCP, as applicable. The FBI will be the LFA for recovery efforts.
 - 4.1.1. (DCNI) Security Forces will utilize containment actions necessary to prevent hostile forces from gaining control or custody of the resources. When resources being attacked are located within the loading dock and plugged into the SGT RCU, WSSS/SSCC controllers will activate the trailer's disablement/denial functions. When the resources under attack are not present in the KUMMSC loading dock, DoE personnel should activate the trailer's disablement/denial functions. If DoE personnel are not available, the first SF arriving on scene will prevent movement of the trailer; disabling actions are activated. Once disabling actions are activated, it is not stoppable or reversible. Once activated, Security Forces will establish a cordon around the SGT until arrival of DoE personnel. WSSS/SSCC has an Entry Authority List (EAL) of all authorized DoE couriers.
 - 4.1.2. (DCNI) Deadly force will be utilized as a last resort; however, under no circumstances will a hostile force be allowed to depart the immediate area of responding Security Forces. Responding Security Forces will contain and remove hostile forces from the area containing or surrounding PL resources.
 - 4.1.3. (DCNI) Should hostages be used to gain control of PL 1 resources/critical components, their welfare will be considered. Hostage presence will not provide hostile forces a cover to remove resources/critical components from a protected environment. Should recapture operations be required, they will commence immediately. At no time will negotiations be used to recover the resources. Once the SGT is recaptured/recovered, Security Forces will establish a cordon around the SGT until arrival of authorized DoE personnel.
 - 4.2. Tasks.

4.2.1. The WSSS/SSCC will:

4.2.1.1. (FOUO) Up-channel Covered Wagon report and implement FPCON Delta actions (as required), and any other required checklists.

4.2.1.2. (FOUO) Ensure KUMMSC facility is locked down. Posts will take up final denial positions.

4.2.1.2.1. (DCNI) Cerberus-2 will immediately proceed into Brandt Hall and assume final denial positions.

4.2.1.2.1.1. Final denial positions are located throughout KUMMSC and PAD 5 for any incident that requires Security Forces to be in place. For specific guidance/locations refer to 377 SFG Tactical Assault Guide and 377 WSSS Posting SSIs.

4.2.1.3. (DCNI) Ensure 898 MUNs personnel are armed for defense of KUMMSC, and personnel take up final denial position. All 898 MUNs personnel armed during convoy duties will assist Security Forces in defense of the resource in the event of hostile attack and will be deployed as directed by the senior SF leader on scene.

4.2.1.4. (FOUO) Dispatch initial backup force (IBF).

4.2.1.5. (FOUO) Notify SFS/BDOC and all posts and patrols. Instruct SFS/BDOC to initiate recall of personnel for formation of subsequent Follow-on backup forces (FBFs).

4.2.1.6. (FOUO) Implement notifications.

4.2.2. The 377 SFS/BDOC will:

4.2.2.1. (FOUO) Notify all posts and patrols.

4.2.2.2. (FOUO) Close installation gates (if directed). Dispatch patrol coverage as needed.

4.2.2.3. (FOUO) Instruct gate guards to allow the SGT to enter and park in a safe area inside of the gate, if the situation warrants.

4.2.2.4. (FOUO) Dispatch patrol supervisor or senior patrol to verify courier's identification, if feasible. WSSS/SSCC has an EAL of all authorized DoE couriers.

4.2.2.5. (FOUO) Patrol will escort vehicle to gate V1AA (KUMMSC).

4.2.2.6. (FOUO) Make necessary preparation for the activation of alternate WSSS/SSCC.

4.3.3. Notifications include:

4.3.3.1. (FOUO) Key personnel and agencies.

4.3.3.2. (FOUO) Members of CAT/EOC/KCP, as applicable.

4.3.3.3. (FOUO) AFOSI Detachment 814. **NOTE:** The LFA FBI will be contacted by AFOSI.

4.3.3.4. (FOUO) Joint Nuclear Agency Coordinating Center (JNACC), DSN 221-2102.

4.3.3.5. (FOUO) Implement pyramid recall.

4.3.3.6. (FOUO) Initiate klaxon for recall and formation of FBFs.

4.3.3.7. (FOUO) Coordinate with local civil authorities.

4.3.4. AFOSI Detachment 814 will:

4.3.4.1. (FOUO) Take custody of, and process captured/surviving enemy forces.

4.3.4.2. (FOUO) Assess potential for further attack (based on gathered intelligence).

4.3.4.3. (FOUO) Upon elimination of threats to PL resources, initiate/coordinate investigation of the incident with FBI.

5. Resupply.

5.1. Resupply is defined as enough ammunition to provide the RF and IBF with one full replacement basic load for each weapon used (in all environments). Resupply locations will be decided by the IC utilizing METT-TC.

APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX Z TO KAFB IDP 31-101
NUCLEAR LOGISTICS AIRCRAFT / MOVEMENT SUPPORT

REFERENCES: Refer to the Basic Plan.

1. SITUATION: KAFB is notified of a scheduled PL 1 Nuclear Logistics Aircraft arrival/departure and subsequent movement to/from KUMMSC.

1.1. Enemy Forces. Refer to the Basic Plan.

1.2. Friendly Forces. Refer to Basic Plan.

1.3. Assumptions. Refer to Basic Plan.

2. MISSION: To provide a secure environment for inbound/outbound PL 1 resources by preventing unauthorized access, loss/theft, or damage to the resources during all phases of movement to or from KUMMSC.

3. EXECUTION:

3.1. Concept of Operations. When notified of a PL 1 resource movement, the 377 SFG will assemble the required manning, equipment and vehicles necessary to meet the mission tasking. It will coordinate with appropriate agencies to ensure all actions necessary for the safe and secure transport of the PL 1 resources are accomplished. An increased state of readiness will be implemented by Security Forces personnel during pad operations to ensure optimum security during all phases.

3.1.1. (DCNI) During on-load/off-load PNAF Operations, the combined limited/exclusion area is designated by the fence surrounding Pad 5, to include the painted red line north of the Pad, which will be roped off upon arrival of the aircraft. The limited and exclusion area verification and inspection will occur at the designated entry control point.

3.2. All tasked units will comply with the requirements in this plan and KAFB 91-01 Nuclear Surety Plan: Develop internal instructions, checklists, etc., as necessary, to support requirements in these plans.

3.2.1. The 377 ABW/CC will:

3.2.1.1. (DCNI) Designate a SAAM coordinator for all logistical aircraft arrivals/departures, and ensure the designated SAAM coordinator is in place.

3.2.1.2. (DCNI) Implement and ensure compliance with the KAFB Nuclear Surety Plan.

3.2.2. The 58 SOW/CC will:

3.2.3. (FOUO) Ensure light units are available for pad entry control/checkpoint and security operations not to exceed 4, and provide necessary AGE equipment for aircraft servicing/ground operations identified during mission brief, if available.

3.2.3.1. (FOUO) Provide aircraft support during real world FPCON Charlie or higher, support accidents, incidents aerial or observation due to contingencies involving SAAM operations, and/or PL 1 movements to/from KUMMSC.

3.2.4. (FOUO) The 377 MSG/CC will ensure the capability to support all SAAM operations is maintained and subordinate units accomplish all tasks as indicated.

3.2.5. The 377 MXG/CC will ensure compliance with the KAFB 91-01 Nuclear Surety Plan and subordinate units accomplish tasks as indicated.

3.2.6. The KCP will:

3.2.6.1. (FOUO) Advise WSSS/SSCC and MUNS Control of all notifications concerning logistical aircraft arrivals and departures.

3.2.6.2. (FOUO) Notify the primary and alternate SAAM coordinators.

3.2.6.3. (FOUO) Advise WSSS/SSCC, MUNS Control and CAT. If CAT is not activated, notify 377 ABW/XP.

3.2.6.4. (FOUO) The 377 MXS/MXO will ensure transient alert personnel meet the aircraft and escort to the appropriate parking location.

3.2.7. The 898 MUNS will:

3.2.7.1. (FOUO) Develop and maintain guides/checklists to be used by the SAAM coordinators based on inputs from 898 MUNS, 377 ABW/SEW, and 377 WSSS.

3.2.7.2. (FOUO) Notify 377 WSSS/S3O of all scheduled logistical movements that require protection by Security Forces. This notification will be provided to allow sufficient lead time for coordination and notification of security operations for the movement.

3.2.7.3. (FOUO) Notify 377 WSSS and 377 ABW/XP of any changes in mission sequence or anything that may affect security operations.

3.2.7.4. (DCNI) Provide an EAL according to criteria listed in DOD S-5210.41-M_AFMAN 31-108 and AFI 31-101, as supplemented.

3.2.7.5. (DCNI) Ensure all MUNS convoy personnel are present at the SF convoy briefing.

3.2.7.6. (DCNI) Provide a technical advisor to ride with the convoy commander during all logistical movements. 898 MUNS maintenance personnel may follow the convoy at a distance determined by the convoy commander. This will facilitate maintenance/receiving at the destination point.

3.2.7.7. (DCNI) Provide a copy of notification message to 377 WSSS convoy commander, which is needed to verify the courier's identity required by DOD S-5210.41-M_AFMAN 31-108.

3.2.7.8. (DCNI) Provide close-in security of the tow vehicle in the event the convoy is stopped.

3.2.8. The DFC will:

3.2.8.1. Ensure appropriate security is provided for Type I and Type II logistical aircraft while on KAFB IAW DOD S-5210.41-M_AFMAN 31-108.

3.2.8.2. (FOUO) When notified of a SAAM, designate a convoy commander and identify those Security Forces personnel needed to support the aircraft and convoy operations.

3.2.8.3. (FOUO) Coordinate plans with appropriate agencies.

3.2.8.4. (FOUO) Develop contingency procedures in the event any portion of the primary route is blocked or impassable.

3.2.9. The 377 WSSS/Convoy Commander will:

3.2.9.1. (DCNI) Ensure all equipment and vehicles necessary to support all phases of operations are available.

3.2.9.2. (DCNI) EDDs are utilized for aircraft sanitation during outbound logistical operations, if available.

3.2.9.3. (DCNI) Ensure required security is in place and convoy/pad areas are swept/cleared to prevent close-in or stand-off attack.

3.2.9.4 (DCNI) Ensure counter sniper teams are in appropriate positions prior to mission brief.

3.2.9.5 (FOUO) These specialized teams are not required to post with standardized alert equipment.

3.2.9.6. (DCNI) Provide briefing(s) to all SF and MUNS personnel participating in the convoy prior to commencement of convoy operations.

3.2.9.7. (DCNI) Coordinate security procedures with the aircrew courier for the efficient transfer of custody of PL resources.

3.2.9.8. (DCNI) Ensure all security procedures and operations are executed IAW local and higher level directives.

3.2.9.9. (DCNI) Ensure Security Forces search all hand carried possessions for contraband or prohibited items as identified in Enclosure 3 to Tab A to Appendix 1 of this Annex entering/exiting the PNAF specific limited and exclusion areas.

3.2.9.10. (DCNI) During a resource movement, Ensure a patrol(s) provides final denial for the convoy. While the resource is located on Pad 5, ensure a patrol provides final denial. Further information regarding convoy and PNAF responses can be found by referencing WSSS SOP 31-101V3, PNAF/Convoy Security.

3.2.10. The 377 MSG/CE will:

3.2.10.1. (FOUO) When requested, provide repair crews for damage of physical security safeguards.

3.2.10.2. (FOUO) Provide equipment and personnel for cleaning of the taxiway to prevent foreign object damage (FOD) to the aircraft. Ensure taxiways and pads are properly maintained.

3.2.10.3. (FOUO) Provide fire protection and response capabilities in support of logistical aircraft.

3.2.10.4. (FOUO) Provide EOD and Incident Response Team (IRT) capabilities to nuclear and explosives hazards.

3.2.10.5. (FOUO) Ensure compliance of above requirements by private contractors.

3.2.11. The 377 LRS/CC will:

3.2.11.1. Provide priority aircraft and vehicle fuel support IAW the KAFB Plan 91-01 Nuclear Surety Plan in a timely manner.

3.2.12. (DCNI) The IC and SAAM coordinates with the EOC, and provides ground support meals and temporary shelter, upon request, for command personnel, and break capability for SAAM operations for the following events:

3.2.12.1. (DCNI) Any incident, hostile or non-hostile, preventing weapons from being transported to KUMMSC resulting in the establishment of a cordon and temporary restricted area.

3.2.13. (DCNI) AFRL/XZ will provide current intelligence support to transient PNAF mission aircrews when directed by the Tactical Airlift Control Center (TACC). This will take precedence over all other mission and responsibilities IAW the KAFB Nuclear Surety Plan.

3.3. (DCNI) Unscheduled/Emergency SAAM Arrival Operations. The KCP will be the single POC for all SAAMs transporting PL 1 resources when such missions are diverted to KAFB.

3.3.1. The KCP will:

3.3.1.1. (DCNI) Request aircraft to remain airborne, if possible, until security is established.

3.3.1.2. (DCNI) Advise the aircraft commander when security is established and a remote parking spot is available.

3.3.1.3. (DCNI) Advise WSSS/SSCC of the reason for the diversion via secure line.

3.3.2. The 377 WSSS/SSCC will:

3.3.2.1. (DCNI) Implement the appropriate checklists and immediately establish security for reception of the aircraft. Ensure the procedures outlined in 377 WSSS SOP 31-101 V3 and the KAFB Nuclear Surety Plan are followed, required security is in place, and convoy/pad areas are swept/cleared to prevent close-in or stand-off attack.

3.3.2.2. (DCNI) Notify key Security Forces personnel. Organize and brief follow-on convoy forces.

3.3.2.3. (DCNI) 377 LRS/LGRDDO will provide vehicles and available drivers as requested by WSSS/SSCC, through the EOC/CAT.

3.3.2.4 (DCNI) Contact AFOSI to coordinate with local law enforcement agencies prior to any scheduled/tentatively scheduled PNAF for mitigation of stand-off/MANPAD attacks as required by DOD S-5210.41-M. **NOTE:** SF will maintain MOUs with local law enforcement agencies to ensure support may be provided, if necessary.

3.4. (DCNI) Coordinating Instructions. The SAAM coordinator will monitor all operations in support of the airlift mission. The KCP will be the focal point for the overall operation. WSSS/SSCC will be the operational control center for security operations, and the 898 MUNS Control will be the focal point for matters concerning the physical handling of PL resources.

4. LOGISTICS AND ADMINISTRATION: Refer to Basic Plan and Annex I.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL:

5.1. Command Relationships. See Basic Plan

5.2. (DCNI) The aircraft commander maintains control over resources contained within the aircraft until Security Forces assumes Type 1 security.

5.2.1. (DCNI) The SAAM coordinator is responsible for all support operations. The senior ranking Security Forces member becomes the IC in the event a hostile or high threat contingency event occurs, until relieved. If the fire department is on scene, the FES Fire Chief or designated Senior Fire Official (SFO) will be the IC. If Security Forces has established Incident Command, upon SFO arrival, the Security Forces IC will brief and then transfer command to the SFO (face-to-face or by LMR). The SFO will assume IC and assign Security Forces to the Operations General Staff position to provide tactical operations to support the IC.

5.2.2. (DCNI) All personnel supporting SAAM operations will maintain the capability to respond immediately for 30 minutes after an aircraft departs for an outbound operation.

TAB A TO APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX Z TO KAFB IDP 31-101
OVERT ATTACK AGAINST PROTECTION LEVEL 1 RESOURCE MOVEMENT

REFERENCES: Refer to Basic Plan and KAFB Annex to FBI LIRP.

1. SITUATION: A hostile force has launched an attack against a PL 1 movement transiting between KUMMSC and the hot cargo pad on KAFB.
2. SECURITY OBJECTIVES: To provide a security response to protect PL resources from damage, loss, theft, or destruction.
3. (FOUO) SECURITY REPORTING AND ALERTING ACTION: Implement a Covered Wagon and FPCON Delta.
4. EXECUTION:
 - 4.1. Task Organizations.
 - 4.1.1. (FOUO) The 377 ABW/CC is responsible for and will ensure the base is informed of FPCON changes and implementations.
 - 4.1.1.1. (FOUO) Assume command and control of the overall situation and assemble the CAT and EOC as appropriate.
 - 4.1.2. The KCP will:
 - 4.1.2.1. (FOUO) Accomplish AFI 10-206, OPREP-3 reporting to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), USAF and/or AFGSC and other MAJCOM's, as required. Accomplish notifications to host and associate units as deemed necessary. The most expeditious means available will be used in reporting the information.
 - 4.1.2.2. (FOUO) Notify command and control facilities of FPCON changes/information using voice and e-mail systems.
 - 4.1.2.3. (FOUO) Assist in recovery operations through establishment of communication links, as required.
 - 4.1.2.4. (FOUO) Maintain established lines of communications with agencies to monitor threat advisories from all sources.
 - 4.1.2.5. (FOUO) Ensure all up/down channel reports are rapidly transmitted.
 - 4.1.2.6. (FOUO) Keep WSSS/SSCC/SFS/BDOC advised of any information received that could affect the overall security of KAFB.

4.1.2.7. (FOUO) Ensure all agencies are directed to implement all mandatory measures under the appropriate FPCONs, as outlined in KAFB OPLAN 10-245.

4.1.3. The DFC will:

4.1.3.1. (FOUO) Accomplish key personnel and group notifications. Implement emergency recall procedures. Recall additional security personnel to form subsequent follow-on backup forces, as necessary.

4.1.3.1.1. (FOUO) Have all posts and patrols don alert gear and prepare for engagement.

4.1.3.1.2. (FOUO) Implement denial, recapture, or recovery operations as necessary.

4.1.3.1.3. (FOUO) Close all installation gates.

4.1.3.1.4. (FOUO) When directed, implement mandatory and recommended measures under FPCON Alpha, Bravo, Charlie and Delta in KAFB OPLAN 10-245.

4.1.3.1.5. (FOUO) Up-channel reports are submitted through KCP or higher headquarters.

4.1.3.1.6. (FOUO) Request EOD support through KCP if suspicious devices are found. This requires notification of the Fire Department (CEF) who is responsible for Incident Command and other emergency responder requirements in direct support of EOD activities.

4.1.3.1.7. (FOUO) Request notified agencies to instruct their personnel to increase security awareness and stay indoors until the situation is terminated.

4.1.3.1.8. (FOUO) Keep SFS/BDOC and 898 MUNS Munitions Control advised of the situation.

4.1.3.1.9. (FOUO) Assign a Senior Non-Commissioned Officer of SF as a supervisor to the EOC.

4.1.3.1.10. (FOUO) Provide additional forces when they are needed to support higher FPCON.

4.1.3.1.11. (FOUO) The 377 SFS will ensure an EC is posted at the KCP once the CAT is activated.

4.1.4. The 377 MSG/CC will:

4.1.4.1. (FOUO) Request when needed, the 377 FSS to coordinate food service support for deployed Security Forces personnel.

4.1.4.2. (FOUO) 377 MSG/CE will, when requested by CAT, EOC, WSSS/SSCC or SFS/BDOD:

4.1.4.3.1. (FOUO) Provide repair crews for repairing damaged physical security safeguards.

4.1.4.3.2. (FOUO) Provide power production personnel in the event the emergency generators malfunction during commercial power outages.

4.1.4.3.3. (FOUO) Provide technicians in support of repair and maintenance of IDS and KUMMSC security systems.

4.1.4.3.4. (FOUO) Ensure compliance with requirements accomplished by private contractors.

4.1.4.3.5. (FOUO) The 377 MDG through Albuquerque Ambulance will provide treatment and transport of injured personnel as capable.

4.1.5. The 377 MXG/CC will:

4.1.5.1. (DCNI) Ensure that the 898 MUNS CTS provides technicians for repair and maintenance of KUMMSC security systems.

4.1.5.2. (DCNI) Ensure that the 898 MUNS/MXWK, when notified, diverts any Special Assignment Mission (SAAM) or Safeguards Transporter (SGT) operations scheduled during this time frame, and notify their personnel of the increase in security and the reason why.

4.1.5.3. (DCNI) Ensure 898 MUNS personnel are armed for defense of KUMMSC, and personnel take up final denial position. All 898 MUNS personnel armed during convoy duties will assist Security Forces in defense of the resource in the event of hostile attack and will be deployed as directed by the senior SF leader on scene.

4.1.5.4. (DCNI) Ensure/provide AF-allocated quantities of base defense munitions for FPCON and contingency actions.

4.1.6. The 58 SOW/CC is responsible for:

4.1.6.1. (FOUO) Implementing all required FPCON measures.

4.1.6.2. (FOUO) Suspend all non-essential flightline operations until declaration of a lower FPCON, except those flightline activities related to generation of aircraft in support of the defense of the base or KUMMSC.

4.1.6.3. (DCNI) Provide security for area 4 if additional SFs are required to respond to KUMMSC per Enclosure 6 to Tab A to Appendix 1 of this plan.

4.1.6.4. (FOUO) Provide a list of aircraft available, timeline for launch, and weapon capabilities to the KCP.

4.1.6.5. (FOUO) Provide recapture/recovery air support as available when requested by KCP.

4.1.7. The 150 SOW/CC is responsible for:

4.1.7.1. (FOUO) Implementing all required FPCON measures.

4.1.7.2. (FOUO) Suspend all flightline operations until notified of a lower FPCON.

4.1.8. (FOUO) SNL Protection Forces will assist as requested and as capable.

4.1.9. (FOUO) The 377 MSG/SC will provide communications support as required.

4.1.10. Once an attack has occurred AFOSI Detachment 814 will:

4.1.10.1. (FOUO) Take custody of, and process captured/surviving enemy forces.

4.1.10.2. (FOUO) Assess potential for further attack (based on gathered intelligence).

4.1.10.3. (FOUO) Initiate/coordinate investigation of the incident upon elimination of threats to PL resources.

4.1.10.4. (FOUO) Coordinate with the FBI.

4.1.11. (FOUO) Tasked units will address their responsibilities in the unit implementing instructions.

5. Resupply.

5.1. Resupply is defined as enough ammunition to provide the RF and IBF with one full replacement basic load for each weapon used (in all environments). Resupply locations will be decided by the IC utilizing METT-TC.

APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX Z TO KAFB IDP 31-101

**MAJOR ACCIDENT / INCIDENT RESPONSE INVOLVING PROTECTION LEVEL 1
RESOURCES (BROKEN ARROW)**

REFERENCES: Refer to the Basic Plan, KAFB Annex to FBI LIRP, AFGSC Plan 10-1, Radiological Accident/Incident Response and Recovery Plan.

1. SITUATION: An aircraft or transport vehicle carrying PL-1 cargo has crashed on or off-base, or an accident at KUMMSC requires an immediate response by the 377 ABW IRF.

1.1. Enemy Forces. Refer to the Basic Plan.

1.2. Friendly Forces. Refer to the Basic Plan.

2. MISSION: To protect USAF PL resources and personnel either on or off-base.

3. EXECUTION: The concept of operations. Responding Security Forces will be responsible for securing the area. The KAFB IEMP 10-2 will be implemented and will govern operations both on and off-base.

APPENDIX 6 TO ANNEX Z TO KAFB IDP 31-101
MAJOR INCIDENT RESPONSE INVOLVING PROTECTION LEVEL 1 RESOURCES
(BENT SPEAR)

REFERENCES: Refer to the Basic Plan, KAFB Annex to FBI LIRP, AFGSC Plan 10-1, Radiological Accident/Incident Response and Recovery Plan.

1. SITUATION: An aircraft, transport vehicle, or assets inside KUMMSC have been involved in a nuclear incident on or off-base, requiring major rework/re-certification by DOE and may require an immediate response by the 377 ABW IRF.
2. MISSION: To protect USAF PL resources and personnel either on or off-base.
3. EXECUTION: The concept of operations. Responding Security Forces will be responsible for securing the area. The KAFB IEMP 10-2 will be implemented and will govern operations both on and off-base.

APPENDIX 7 TO ANNEX Z TO KAFB IDP 31-101
RECAPTURE / RECOVERY OPERATIONS (EMPTY QUIVER)

REFERENCES: Refer to Basic Plan and KAFB Annex to FBI LIRP.

1. SITUATION: DoE or DOD PL 1 resources are no longer under the custodial control of authorized personnel. Unauthorized personnel have gained access or possession of the resources or critical components and will not voluntarily relinquish control.

1. MISSION: (DCNI) To employ all necessary KAFB forces to regain custody of PL 1 resources. If the hostile force is located on-base, recapture operations are conducted. If located off-base, recovery operations are initiated.

2.1. Application of AFCIA-R:

2.1.1. (U) Nuclear Environments. The concept of the AFCIA-R process is considered an on-scene commander or tactical decision maker's priority of work. Application of each tenant transcends nuclear environments. It is important to note that in some cases, every facet of the process may not be used. For example, after a team assesses a situation, they may determine access has not yet been gained, and are thus able to apply final denial weapon fire to stop forward movement of adversaries. While assaulting the area to physically occupy the ground and sweep/clear any other potential threats is still necessary, ISD and restoring government control of resources may not need to be applied.

2.1.2. (U) For tactical planning to be truly effective, SF personnel must apply all of the factors that go into tactical decision making. Tactical decision making is a time competitive process that controls the tempo of the battle. Use the Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act loop (OODA Loop) to increase the opportunity for success. The cornerstone for mission success will be to achieve the goal or state of aggressive and continuous tactical advancement.

2.1.3 (U) SF personnel must first account for the factors associated with security response and operating/physical environment (METT-TC, OCOKA, and AFCIA-R) as these factors will serve as the basis for the overall assessment. They must also have an accurate perspective and the proper battle space orientation in order to make clear assessments in relation to the nature of response.

2.1.4 (U) The course of action (COA) developed should be based upon the best and most accurate data that is available to them at the time. Time is critical and response decisions should be made as quickly and as accurately as possible. Use the cycle of Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act to gain momentum and increase the opportunity for success.

2.1.5 (U) While the application of the AFCIA-R process is a command wide standard, every tactical situation will determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to include actions, are used only as examples of how to apply the concept and are not authoritative in nature as specific actions upon contact.

2.2. (DCNI) Overarching Tactics. The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the adversary and are broken down into six major movements: The acronym AFCIA-R will facilitate decision making processes and aid in the application of decisive steps for AFGSC Security Forces personnel performing duties in support of nuclear weapons.

NOTE: While the application of the AFCIA-R process is an AFGSC wide standard, every tactical situation will determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to include actions, are used only as examples of how to apply the concept and are not authoritative in nature as specific actions upon contact.

2.2.1. AFCIA-R:

2.2.1.1. (DCNI) Assess: Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force has achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear resources. The assessment phase is pivotal when determining what level of force to direct toward an adversary. Factors to assist assessment include; available terrain/concealment, camera systems (RVA), available helicopter units (with FLIR capability) and early detection via alarm indications (received by WSSS/SSCC).

2.2.1.2. (DCNI) Final Denial: The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining unauthorized access to nuclear weapons. Final denial fire is typically placed at storage structure entrances, identified avenues of approach, or at any weapon system access point. Final denial will be achieved by using weapon fire and may be used at any point during an attack. To the greatest extent possible, all forces should coordinate final denial fire to achieve interlocking and overlapping fields of fire.

2.2.1.3. (DCNI) Control: The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in the defined battle-space. Suppressive fire directly on or in the vicinity of the enemy to disrupt hostile actions/advancement meets this intent. Suppressive fire can also be achieved through employment of a coordinated weapons mixture and creation of physical barriers to prevent an adversary from continuing advancement toward the resource.

2.2.1.4. (DCNI) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD): Those actions, proportional to the threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in order to prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a nuclear weapon. ISD can be achieved through use of smoke, CS gas, stun grenade, weapon fire, or any other possible means to disrupt the adversary's actions.

2.2.1.5. (DCNI) Assault: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile persons in the area surrounding the nuclear weapon. Violence of action, coordinated efforts, and sound tactics on the part of the security force (SF, maintenance, helicopter integration, etc.) are paramount in this mission set.

2.2.1.6. (DCNI) Restore Government Control: Physically regain possession of

resources and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum of two personnel are positioned to control entry to the affected area (as determined by the on-scene commander).

2.2.1.6.1. (DCNI) Lockdown ISD: to disrupt/suppress the enemy.

2.2.1.6.2. (DCNI) Assault: to defeat the enemy force.

2.2.6.1.3. (DCNI) Security: to establish security on the resource and ultimately in the area.

2.2.1.6.4. (DCNI) Treat: treat all wounded/dead and establish a tactical CCP.

3. EXECUTION:

3.1. (DCNI) Concept of Operations. Recapture refers to actions taken to regain custody of a US PL 1 resource within the boundaries of a storage site, operational site/unit, convoy, facility, transport unit, or military installation where it has been seized by a hostile force/unauthorized person(s).

3.2. (DCNI) Recovery refers to actions taken to locate, if necessary, and to regain custody of a US PL 1 resource outside the boundaries of a storage site, operational site/unit, convoy, facility, transport unit, or military installation from where it has been lost, removed, or seized by a hostile force/unauthorized person(s).

3.3. (DCNI) Effective countermeasures must be developed to ensure timely notification of any attempt to capture or hijack a resource or critical component, and rapid, expeditious response to recover the resource in the event the resource or critical component comes under the control of hostile elements.

3.4. (DCNI) Actions to recapture or recover a PL 1 resource will be undertaken immediately. Permissions to proceed with recapture or recovery operations are not required.

3.4.1. (DCNI) Commanders will ensure that any unauthorized persons who have gained access to a PL 1 resource are immediately subjected to sufficient duress to preclude their ability to cause theft, unauthorized destruction, or detonation.

3.4.2. (DCNI) The presence of hostages will not deter the taking of decisive action to prevent unauthorized access to, or capture or removal of, a PL 1 resource.

3.5. (FOUO) Follow-on operations should be the result of accurate assessment of initial reconnaissance information and planning by the EOC and the commander of recovery forces. All forces should know the deployment plan and should execute it smoothly. Specific recapture and recovery plans, to include specific actions to take for each scenario, procedures

to follow in planning and implementing operations, and personnel required will be developed by 377 SFG Tactical Assault Guide.

3.6. (DCNI) Security Forces personnel will be armed in accordance with local instructions, to include M-4, M-203, M-240b, M-249, MK-19, M-2, M-107, M-24, smoke grenades, and CS/CN grenades.

3.7. (DCNI) For recapture, theft, loss, or hijack leading off-base, the most important requirement is the timely deployment of Security Forces and civil law enforcement to delay, contain and prevent the removal of the PL 1 resource or critical component from the immediate area.

3.8. (DCNI) Should the attacking force be of such size that preventive efforts would be futile, the responding force, as well as the aircraft support, will attempt to follow the stolen PL resource/critical component transport vehicle and advise WSSS/SSCC of the route of escape. They will also give any additional information relevant to the identification of accompanying vehicles. Every effort will be expended to disable the resources transport vehicle.

3.9. (DCNI) Pursuit off-base by Security Forces is authorized. Generally, the sequence of events set forth in this plan encompasses six general phases: notification, response, containment, reconnaissance, recovery actions, and the securing of resources.

4. Tasks.

4.1. The 377 ABW/CC will:

4.1.1. (DCNI) As the senior AF representative, determine all actions regarding the safety of the resources and welfare of the local populace. Exercise termination authority over recapture and recovery operations.

4.1.2. (DCNI) The presence of hostages shall not deter the taking of decisive action to prevent unauthorized access to, or capture or removal of, a nuclear weapon. Commanders shall take any and all lawful actions, to include the use of deadly force, to immediately regain custody and control of the weapon(s).

4.1.3. (FOUO) Ensure overall command and control, senior guidance and any required support are provided to the IC and Security Forces.

4.1.4. (FOUO) Declare an "Empty Quiver."

4.1.5. (FOUO) Direct assembly of the CAT, when necessary.

4.1.6. (FOUO) Have the EOC assembled for possible dispatch, if required.

4.1.7. (DCNI) Establish communications with the NMCC and obtain permission before international boundaries are crossed in pursuit of a hijacked resource or critical component.

The Department of State, through coordination with the National Security Agency (NSA), will be notified of any recovery actions in the vicinity of an international border.

4.2. The KCP will:

4.2.1. (DCNI) Up-channel OPREP-3 PINNACLE/EMPTY QUIVER and all associated reports.

4.2.2. (FOUO) Notify all essential base personnel to report to their duty sections immediately, and notify non-essential personnel to evacuate the affected area.

4.2.3. (FOUO) Recall the CAT and EOC, as directed by the 377 ABW/CC.

4.3. The 377 MXG/CC through the 898 MUNS/CC will:

4.3.1. (FOUO) Have Munitions Control alert all munitions personnel in the immediate area and assist in evacuation efforts.

4.3.2. (FOUO) Ensure tow vehicles and other accessory equipment are available, when requested.

4.3.3. (FOUO) Provide additional support as requested by the IC.

4.3.4. (DCNI) IC IAW (NARP), ensure weapons are safe and properly secured for transport to a secure environment once recaptured/recovered.

4.4. The 377 MSG/CE will:

4.4.1. (FOUO) Request EOD through KCP if suspicious devices are found.

4.4.2. (FOUO) Ensure the on-duty Senior Fire Official (SFO) responds to the Incident Command Post to assume IC Responsibilities. If SF has established Incident Command, upon arrival of the SFO, the SF IC will brief and then transfer command to the SFO. The SFO will assume IC and assign SF to the Operations General Staff position to provide tactical operations to support the IC.

4.5. The DFC will ensure:

4.5.1. (DCNI) Recapture efforts are immediately established by the direction of the senior Security Forces supervisor on-duty, to include a 360-degree coverage of the affected facility/area, isolate and contain the affected resource, provide final denial to all exposed PL 1 resources and evacuation of all nonessential personnel. Containment actions should include the use of installed bollards and closure of all restricted area aircraft, vehicle and personnel gates. Inbound/outbound installation entry points will also be closed to prevent the escape of hostile forces if the containment action in the affected area failed.

4.5.2. (DCNI) If at the outset of recapture operations and the situation presents the opportunity for immediate entry and neutralization of the threat, the senior Security Forces supervisor will not delay recapture actions while awaiting the arrival of additional forces.

4.5.3. (DCNI) Ensure 898 MUNS personnel are armed for defense of KUMMSC, and personnel take up final denial position. All armed 898 MUNS personnel will be deployed for final denial as directed by the senior SF leader on scene.

4.5.3.1. (DNCI) 898 MUNS Control and 377 WSSS/SSCC personnel will immediately access the two-person safe, obtain AECS Override codes, and prepare to operate AECS as appropriate to expedite security forces response. The on-duty WSSS Flight Chief directs the use of override codes. Override codes are never used for squadron level and below exercises.

4.5.3.2. (DNCI) 377 ABW/CC must authorize use of override codes prior to SF entry if a blast or fire has been detected in the affected zone.

4.5.4. (DCNI) WSSS/SSCC implements a site defensive posture and immediately initiates a Security Forces recall. Accomplish applicable CACs as warranted.

4.5.5. (DCNI) WSSS/SSCC up-channels required information and reports to the KCP, and notifies them when site containment is established. Continuously keep KCP advised of the situation.

4.5.6. (DCNI) The IC directs forces to conduct direct pursuit of individuals in unauthorized possession of PL 1 resources off of KAFB/DOD, if there is a reasonable belief of their direction of travel, until relieved by the FBI as LFA. WSSS/SSCC will notify the KCP should off-base pursuit become necessary.

4.5.7. (DCNI) Considering the insider threat, the individual(s) may have knowledge of procedures to gain access to weapons and recapture/recovery operations. Individual(s) may be armed and/or have access to Security Forces/maintenance LMRs.

4.5.8. (DCNI) Ensure a senior Security Forces officer responds to the IC control point.

4.5.9. (DCNI) Ensure all recapture or recovery operations are coordinated with the IC and all affected agencies (i.e., EOD, Fire Dept., and Power Pro).

4.6. (FOUO) The 377 MDG/CC will dispatch medical personnel to the IC entry control point to provide emergency medical care, when requested.

4.7. (FOUO) Aircraft generation: 58 SOW will provide support aircraft based on availability of airframes and aircrew members.

4.7.1. Aircraft may be used for multiple purposes including:

- 4.7.1.1. (FOUO) Surveillance and reconnaissance
- 4.7.1.2. (FOUO) Command, control, and communication.
- 4.7.1.3. (FOUO) Air mobility
- 4.7.1.4. (FOUO) Aircrews will only consist of permanent party, instructor, or evaluator personnel when practical. Aircrew personnel will be added to critical personnel list for base access during emergency and final denial fire.
- 4.7.1.5. (FOUO) Maintenance personnel will be added to critical personnel list for base access during emergency.
- 4.7.1.6. (FOUO) 58 SOW/SOF located in the WOC will coordinate with subordinate units to ensure aircraft and aircrew availability.
- 4.7.1.7. (FOUO) 58 SOW/WOC will disseminate any pertinent mission data to subordinate units through their current operations function.
- 4.7.1.8. (DCNI) Launch and/or divert authority for all 58 SOW aircraft will rest with the 58 SOW/CC. Airborne aircraft will be diverted to the incident scene or KAFB. If Albuquerque Airport is closed, the FBI will coordinate with Albuquerque Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) representatives to ensure 58 SOW aircraft are allowed to recover and takeoff in support of LIRP operations.
- 4.7.1.9. (FOUO) Once notified, maintenance units will generate available aircraft as soon as possible.
- 4.7.1.10. (FOUO) Once notified and assembled, aircrews will make preparations for contingency operations.
- 4.7.1.11. (FOUO) 377 ABW will communicate with the 58 SOW/WOC to coordinate alternate, pre-designated rally points for transportation of personnel. Ground reference coordination between 58 SOW aircraft and ground personnel/C2 will either be the UTM grid coordinate system or latitude/longitude coordinates to relay positional updates. Refer to KAFB Annex to FBI LIRP for rally points
- 4.7.1.12. Air to Ground Communications: Refer to appendix B, Tab B in KAFB Annex to FBI LIRP for air to ground communications plan.
- 4.7.1.13. (FOUO) Air Traffic Control: The mission of the Albuquerque Air Traffic Control Tower is to control aircraft, both on the ground and in the air, expediting friendly forces aircraft into the affected area and prohibiting unauthorized aircraft from the affected area. Notification of an incident will usually occur over the crash phone and be initiated by the Tower. The crash phone has a direct link to the KAFB Fire Department, Site (SSCC), and 377 ABW/CP and to the Airport Communications

Center. Typically, the Tower activates the crash phone for any and all aircraft emergencies, accidents, incidents and contingencies.

TAB A TO APPENDIX 7 TO ANNEX Z TO KAFB IDP 31-101
KUMMSC PROTECTION LEVEL 1 RESOURCES RECAPTURE / RECOVERY

REFERENCES: Refer to the Basic Plan and KAFB Annex to FBI LIRP.

1. SITUATION: Hostile forces have gained custody of PL 1 resources within the confines of KUMMSC.

2. SECURITY OBJECTIVE: Regain control and recapture PL 1 resources in a swift and decisive manner through any available means to prevent theft, destruction or detonation. Security Forces will not under any circumstances allow PL 1 resources to be removed from the area.

3. EXECUTION:

3.1. Concept of Operations. See Annex C, Operations of this plan.

3.2. Tasks.

3.2.1. 377 ABW/CC will:

3.2.1.1. (FOUO) Have final authority and ultimate responsibility for all PL 1 resource recapture operations on KAFB.

3.2.1.2. (FOUO) Direct a recall or formation of the CAT and EOC, as applicable.

3.2.1.3. (FOUO) Direct operational response of the EOC as soon as they are adequately apprised of the situation and have immediate direct communications with the incident commander (IC).

3.2.1.4. (FOUO) Provide requested support to the recapture or recovery operations to effectively thwart theft of PL 1 resources by a hostile force.

3.2.2. The KCP will:

3.2.2.1. (FOUO) Ensure all reports received from WSSS/SSCC are properly recorded.

3.2.2.2. (FOUO) Ensure all reports are up-channeled to the appropriate command level, as required.

3.2.2.3. (FOUO) Ensure that all EOC representatives are recalled, when directed by the installation commander.

3.2.2.4. (FOUO) Contact EOD and have them placed in a stand-by status. When needed, have them respond to the ECP to assist Security Forces and munitions personnel.

3.2.2.5. (FOUO) Ensure civil authorities are notified as directed in applicable checklists.

3.2.3. The 377 MSG/CC will:

3.2.3.1. (FOUO) Be responsible for providing requested support to the recapture and recovery operations to effectively thwart attempts on the theft of PL 1 resources by a hostile force.

3.2.3.2. (FOUO) Provide whatever support resources are needed to successfully complete the operation.

3.2.4. The DFC will:

3.2.4.1. (FOUO) Establish communications with the IC.

3.2.4.2. (FOUO) Ensure Security Forces conduct immediate, swift and decisive recapture and recovery operations.

3.2.4.3. (FOUO) Ensure the EOC is briefed on the actions Security Forces are utilizing during recovery operations.

3.2.4.4. (FOUO) Provide sufficient in-place Security Forces for recapture operations.

3.2.4.5. (FOUO) Ensure a group recall is initiated. All recalled personnel will be utilized to form FBFs.

3.2.4.6. (DCNI) When available, post the alternate WSSS/SSCC with a critically certified controller who is knowledgeable of KUMMSC response procedures.

3.2.5. The 377 WSSS Flight Commanders/Flight Chiefs will:

3.2.5.1. (FOUO) Upon notification of the situation, assume duties as the IC until properly relieved by competent authority.

3.2.5.2. (DCNI) Ensure KUMMSC facility is locked down, posts take up final denial positions, and responding forces are deployed in the defense of KUMMSC.

3.2.5.3. (DCNI) Ensure 898 MUNS personnel are armed for defense of KUMMSC during Covered Wagon/FPCON Delta. WSSS/SSCC will notify Munitions Control (MC) of the situation and ensure 898 MUNS personnel are armed for defense of KUMMSC. MC will notify facility personnel of the situation via the public address

system or any available means and have all qualified personnel within the administrative area of Blast Door (B5) report to the 898 MUNS armory for arming. If MC is not functioning, WSSS/SSCC will notify 898 MUNS personnel using the public address system. All armed 898 MUNS personnel will be deployed for final denial as directed by the senior SF leader on scene.

3.2.5.4. (FOUO) Keep EOC updated during all phases of the recapture operations.

3.2.5.5. (FOUO) Implement actions outlined in 377 SFG Tactical Assault Guide.

3.2.5.6. (FOUO) Continue direct pursuit of individuals in unauthorized possession of PL 1 resources off of KAFB/DOD property, or conduct off-installation pursuit while still visually or militarily engaged, until relieved by the FBI as LFA.

3.2.6. SFS/BDOC will:

3.2.6.1. (FOUO) Notify installation gate guards to close all inbound and outbound gates until authorization to reopen is received from EOC, CAT and/or 377ABW/CC.

3.2.6.2. (FOUO) Activate the klaxon recall alarm to expedite recall response of personnel.

3.2.6.3. (FOUO) Track all Security Forces functions and prepare to take over in case of emergency, and provide assistance to WSSS/SSCC during all phases of the recapture.

3.2.6.4. Dispatch a K-9 team to the incident cordon entry control point and contact the IC for further dispatch as the situation dictates.

3.2.6.5. (FOUO) Notify 377 MDG of the situation and request medical support as needed.

3.2.6.6. (FOUO) Provide assistance to AFOSI and the LFA (FBI) in transporting apprehended personnel.

3.2.6.7. (DCNI) Provide patrols for re-arming and dispatch to KUMMSC.

3.2.6.8. (DCNI) Monitor the camera system inside KUMMSC to verify status and provide information to IC as deemed necessary or when requested.

3.2.7. WSSS/SSCC will:

3.2.7.1. (FOUO) Be the primary control center for recapture operations. **NOTE:** SFS/BDOC will be the alternate control center until alternate WSSS/SSCC is operationally manned by a certified controller.

3.2.7.2. (FOUO) Implement Covered Wagon/FPCON Delta/Empty Quiver checklists.

3.2.7.3. (FOUO) Maintain command and control of all security operations and advise EOC of all actions taken.

3.2.7.4. (FOUO) Monitor progress of responding forces and keep the IC advised on the response of the BF and FBFs.

3.2.7.5. (FOUO) Track and document recapture operations both by plotting the events as they happen and noting information as events take place.

3.2.7.6. (FOUO) Ensure the Fire Department (CEF) responds to the Incident Command Post to assume IC Responsibilities. The CEF will ensure all appropriate FES resources respond to support the incident. If SF has established Incident Command, upon arrival of CEF, the SF IC will brief and then transfer command to the CEF. The CEF will assume IC and assign SF to the Operations General Staff position to provide tactical operations to support the IC.

3.2.7.7. (FOUO) When necessary, contact off-base law enforcement and investigative agencies listed in 1.4.2.3. - 1.4.2.17. to request assistance in the event of a recovery operation.

3.2.8. The 377 MSG/CE will:

3.2.8.1. (FOUO) Provide heavy equipment needed to gain entry into an area or facility upon request of the IC.

3.2.8.2. (FOUO) Ensure the on-duty Senior Fire Official (SFO) responds to the Incident Command Post to assume IC Responsibilities. The SFO will ensure all appropriate FES resources respond to support the incident. If SF has established Incident Command, upon arrival of the SFO, the SF IC will brief and then transfer command to the SFO. The SFO will assume IC and assign SF to the Operations General Staff position to provide tactical operations to support the IC.

3.2.8.3. (FOUO) Ensure compliance of these requirements by private contractors.

3.2.8.4. (FOUO) 377 MDG/CC through Albuquerque Ambulance will provide treatment and transport of injured personnel upon request of the IC.

3.2.9. AFOSI Detachment 814 will:

3.2.9.1. (FOUO) Take custody of, and process captured or surviving enemy forces.

3.2.9.2. (FOUO) Assess potential for further attack (based on gathered intelligence).

3.2.9.3. (FOUO) Initiate or coordinate investigation of the incident with LFA (FBI) upon elimination of threats to PL resources.

4. RESUPPLY:

4.1. Resupply is defined as enough ammunition to provide the RF and IBF with one full replacement basic load for each weapon used (in all environments). Resupply locations will be decided by the IC utilizing METT-TC.

TAB B TO APPENDIX 7 TO ANNEX Z TO KAFB IDP 31-101

PROTECTION LEVEL 1 RESOURCES MOVEMENT RECAPTURE / RECOVERY

REFERENCES: Refer to the Basic Plan and KAFB Annex to FBI LIRP.

1. SITUATION: A hostile force has gained control of a PL 1 resource movement.
2. SECURITY OBJECTIVE: To immediately regain control and custody of a captured or stolen resource in transit.
3. EXECUTION:
 - 3.1. Concept of Operations. Refer to Basic Plan.
 - 3.2. Tasks.
 - 3.2.1. The 377 ABW/CC will:
 - 3.2.1.1. (FOUO) Determine actions in which the safety of the resource and populace may be threatened.
 - 3.2.1.2. (FOUO) Ensure command and control of the situation is provided at all echelons.
 - 3.2.1.3. (FOUO) Provide direct support to the IC and ensure any necessary/required materials and/or equipment are made available to support this contingency.
 - 3.2.1.4. (FOUO) Direct recall and formation of the CAT.
 - 3.2.1.5. (FOUO) Ensure two-way communications are maintained with higher headquarters.
 - 3.2.1.6. (FOUO) Direct formation of the EOC.
 - 3.2.1.7. (FOUO) KCP will notify the installation commander or EOC and submit reports to higher HQ.
 - 3.2.2. The DFC will:
 - 3.2.2.1. (FOUO) Provide requested support to the recapture/recovery operations to effectively thwart the attempted theft of PL 1 resources by a hostile force.
 - 3.2.2.2. (FOUO) Immediately employ the applicable IC RF and IBF to apply sufficient duress actions to disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work to prevent theft, sabotage, destruction or detonation of a PL 1 resource.

3.2.2.3. (FOUO) Ensure support for recapture/recovery operations is provided expeditiously.

3.2.2.4. (FOUO) Keep CAT and EOC informed of all recapture/recovery actions taken to regain control or custody of the resource.

3.2.2.5. (DCNI) Ensure KUMMSC facility is locked down, posts/patrols take up final denial positions, and responding forces are deployed as directed by the IC.

3.2.2.6. (DCNI) Ensure 898 MUNs personnel are armed for defense of KUMMSC, and personnel take up final denial position. All 898 MUNs personnel armed during convoy duties will assist Security Forces in defense of the resource in the event of hostile attack and will be deployed as directed by the senior SF leader on scene. All 898 MUNs personnel armed during convoy duties will assist Security Forces in defense of the resource in the event of hostile attack and will be deployed as directed by the senior SF leader on scene.

3.2.2.7. (FOUO) Establish communications with the IC.

3.2.2.8. (FOUO) Ensure Security Forces conduct immediate swift and decisive recapture/recovery operations.

3.2.2.9. (FOUO) Ensure the CAT and EOC are briefed on the actions Security Forces are utilizing during recovery operations.

3.2.2.10. (FOUO) Provide sufficient in-place Security Forces for recapture operations.

3.2.2.11. (FOUO) Ensure a SFG recall is initiated. All staff personnel and recalled personnel will be used to form FBFs.

3.2.2.12. (DCNI) Activate alternate WSSS/SSCC with a critically certified SCS or SCAM controller knowledgeable with KUMMSC security operations.

3.2.2.13. (FOUO) Direct Security Forces actions and procedures through the EOC.

3.2.2.14. (DCNI) Direct forces to conduct pursuit of individuals in unauthorized possession of PL 1 resources off of KAFB or DOD property, or conduct off-installation pursuit while still visually or militarily engaged with hostile forces, until relieved by the FBI as LFA.

3.2.3. The WSSS/SSCC will:

3.2.3.1. (FOUO) Implement Covered Wagon/FPCON Delta/Empty Quiver checklists and any other required checklists/procedures.

3.2.3.2. (FOUO) Keep KCP informed of all containment actions and recapture or recovery phase completion. KCP will be responsible for notifying the installation commander and submitting reports to higher headquarters.

3.2.3.3. (FOUO) Provide assistance to the IC as well as monitor and direct IC Security Forces.

3.2.4. The 377 MSG/CE will:

3.2.4.1. (FOUO) Provide heavy equipment to be used as road blocks to seal off all avenues of escape as directed by the IC. Ensure compliance of these requirements by private contractors.

3.2.4.2. (FOUO) Provide any firefighting equipment, cutting torches and emergency lifesaving equipment to the IC/senior military representative, as directed.

3.2.5. (FOUO) The senior IC/Security Forces representative will:

3.2.5.1. (FOUO) Direct all actions of the recapture or recovery operations.

3.2.5.2. (FOUO) Upon completion of containment, proceed immediately with swift and effective recapture operations.

3.2.5.3. (FOUO) Ensure Security Forces use all resources at their disposal such as disabling the tow vehicle/trailer, removing keys, deflating tires, etc. to prevent loss of PL 1 resources.

3.2.6. AFOSI Detachment 814 will:

3.2.6.1. (FOUO) Take custody of, and process captured or surviving enemy forces.

3.2.6.2. (FOUO) Assess potential for further attack (based on gathered intelligence).

3.2.6.3. (FOUO) Initiate/coordinate incident investigation upon termination of threats to PL resources.

3.2.6.4. (FOUO) Coordinate all efforts with the FBI.

4. RESUPPLY:

4.1. Resupply is defined as enough ammunition to provide the RF and IBF with one full replacement basic load for each weapon used (in all environments). Resupply locations will be decided by the IC utilizing METT-TC.

TAB C TO APPENDIX 7 TO ANNEX Z TO KAFB IDP 31-101
SPECIAL ASSIGNMENT AIRLIFT MISSION (SAAM) AIRCRAFT RECAPTURE /
RECOVERY (EMPTY QUIVER)

REFERENCES: Refer to the Basic Plan and KAFB Annex to FBI LIRP.

1. **SITUATION:** A hostile force has gained control of an aircraft loaded with PL 1 resources or critical components.

2. **SECURITY OBJECTIVE:** To prevent the launch, destruction or detonation of PL 1 resources or critical components and to immediately regain control/custody of seized or stolen resources.

3. **EXECUTION:**

3.1. Concept of Operations.

3.2. Tasks.

3.2.1. The 377 ABW/CC will:

3.2.1.1. (FOUO) Determine actions in which the safety of the resource and populace may be threatened.

3.2.1.2. (FOUO) Ensure command and control of the situation is provided at all echelons.

3.2.1.3. (FOUO) Provide direct support to the IC and ensure any necessary or required materials and equipment are made available to support this contingency.

3.2.1.4. (FOUO) Ensure two-way communications are maintained with higher headquarters.

3.2.1.5. (FOUO) KCP will notify the installation commander and submit reports to higher headquarters.

3.2.2. The DFC will:

3.2.2.1. (FOUO) Provide SF personnel for recapture or recovery operations to effectively thwart successful attempts or theft of PL 1 resources by a hostile force.

3.2.2.2. (FOUO) Ensure forces support for recapture/recovery operations are provided expeditiously.

3.2.2.3. (FOUO) Keep CAT and EOC informed of all recapture or recovery actions taken to regain control or custody of the resource.

3.2.2.4. (FOUO) Establish communications with the IC.

3.2.2.5. (FOUO) Ensure Security Forces conduct immediate and decisive recapture or recovery operations.

3.2.2.6. (DCNI) Ensure KUMMSC facility is locked down, posts/patrols take up final denial positions, and responding forces are deployed as directed by the senior SF leader on scene.

3.2.2.7. (DCNI) Ensure 898 MUNS personnel are armed for defense of KUMMSC, and personnel in direct support of the convoy take up final denial position. Personnel will be deployed as directed by the senior SF leader on scene.

3.2.2.8. (FOUO) Ensure the EOC is briefed on actions Security Forces are using during recovery operations.

3.2.2.9. (FOUO) Provide sufficient Security Forces for recapture operations.

3.2.2.10. (FOUO) Ensure a security forces group recall is initiated. All staff personnel and recalled personnel will be utilized to form FBFs.

3.2.2.11. (DCNI) When available, post the alternate WSSS/SSCC with a critically certified controller who is knowledgeable with KUMMSC response procedures.

3.2.2.12. (FOUO) Direct Security Forces actions and procedures through the EOC.

3.2.3. The WSSS/SSCC will:

3.2.3.1. (FOUO) Implement Covered Wagon/FPCON Delta/Empty Quiver checklists and any other required checklists or procedures.

3.2.3.2. (FOUO) Keep KCP informed of all containment action and recapture/recovery phase completion. KCP will be responsible for notifying the installation commander and submitting reports to higher headquarters.

3.2.3.3. (FOUO) Provide assistance to the IC, as well as monitor and direct IC Security Forces.

3.2.4. The 377 MSG/CE will:

3.2.4.1. (FOUO) Provide heavy equipment to be used as road blocks to seal off all avenues of escape as directed by the IC. Ensure compliance of these requirements by private contractors.

3.2.4.2. (FOUO) Ensure the on-duty Senior Fire Official (SFO) responds to the Incident Command Post to assume IC Responsibilities. The SFO will ensure all

appropriate FES resources respond to support the incident. If SF has established Incident Command, upon arrival of the SFO, the SF IC will brief and then transfer command to the SFO. The SFO will assume IC and assign SF to the Operations General Staff position to provide tactical operations to support the IC.

3.2.5. Senior Security Forces representative/IC will:

3.2.5.1. (FOUO) Direct all actions of the recapture/recovery operations.

3.2.5.2. (FOUO) Upon completion of containment, proceed immediately with swift and effective recapture operations.

3.2.5.3. (DCNI) Ensure Security Forces use all resources at their disposal to prevent loss of PL 1 resources i.e., disabling the tow vehicle or trailer, removing keys, deflating tires, etc., (to immobilize the vehicle).

3.2.5.4. (DCNI) If loss of custody is likely or imminent and the authorization to command disable a resource is granted, ensure the CDS codes are transmitted by any means available. Upon transmission of the codes, the nearest friendly force personnel will execute CDS procedures.

3.2.6. AFOSI Detachment 814 will:

3.2.6.1. (FOUO) Take custody of, and process captured or surviving Enemy Forces.

3.2.6.2. (FOUO) Assess potential for further attack (based on gathered intelligence).

3.2.6.3. (FOUO) Initiate/coordinate investigation of the incident upon elimination of threats to PL resources.

3.2.6.4. (FOUO) Coordinate all effort with the FBI.

4. RESUPPLY:

4.1. Resupply is defined as enough ammunition to provide the RF and IBF with one full replacement basic load for each weapon used (in all environments). Resupply locations will be decided by the IC utilizing METT-TC.

TAB D TO APPENDIX 7 TO ANNEX Z TO KAFB IDP 31-101
AMMUNITION RESUPPLY PROCEDURES

REFERENCES: Refer to Basic Plan.

1. (U) SITUATION: The following procedures are in place to deliver resupply ammunition to the affected area during Covered Wagon situations and exercises.
2. (U) SECURITY OBJECTIVE: To ensure that resupply ammunition is processed and transported with minimum delay to the situation at hand, thus ensuring that ground forces can continue the denial or recapture process.
3. (U) EXECUTION:
 - a. (DCNI) During a Covered Wagon situation at KAFB, the on-scene commander will contact the Security Control Supervisor (SCS), who will then contact the 377 SSPTS Armory personnel and request resupply munitions to the affected area.
 4. (DCNI) Resupply ammunition consists of enough ammunition to provide the RF and IBF with one full replacement load for each weapon used. Specific amounts will be determined based on posted forces.
 - b. (DCNI) Armory personnel will coordinate resupply amounts and then deliver the resupply to the required location. In the event of adverse weather or other possible circumstances that affect the delivery of the resupply, the next formed Follow-on Backup Force (FBF) will make the delivery to the necessary location.

TAB E TO APPENDIX 7 TO ANNEX Z TO KAFB IDP 31-101
POST ATTACK PROCEDURES FOR NWSS

REFERENCES: Refer to the Basic Plan, KAFB Annex to FBI LIRP, 377 SFG Tactical Assault Guide.

1. **SITUATION:** Actions have been taken to locate and to regain custody of a U.S. nuclear weapon outside the boundaries of a storage or operational site, convoy, facility, or military installation from where it has been lost, removed, or seized by a hostile force or unauthorized person(s).
2. **SECURITY OBJECTIVE:** (DCNI) Following a recapture/recovery incident, a nuclear weapon is considered an Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) and while security is required, establishment of an exclusion area is not required. Until all hostilities have ceased, as soon as reasonably possible and if mission allows, establish an exclusion area around the PL 1 resource(s) to prevent possible two-person concept violations. As soon as possible, after an exclusion area has been reestablished post a certified EC at the ECP.
3. **EXECUTION:** Immediate post attack procedures may be METT-TC dependent and more specific procedures may be found in the KAFB FBI LIRP and the 377 SFG Tactical Assault Guide.
 - 3.1. Ensure proper searches/purges of affected areas and personnel prior to reestablishing an exclusion area.
 - 3.2. Remove all injured personnel to the casualty collection point for MDG transport.
 - 3.3. Separating the friendly and enemy forces.
 - 3.4. The ECP will be reestablished as soon as mission allows, provided a purge of the area has been conducted.
 - 3.5. The SVA and EC will validate/account for all personnel (previously) inside the exclusion area.

APPENDIX 8 TO ANNEX Z TO KAFB IDP 31-101
PARTIAL / MAJOR / CATASTROPHIC SENSOR SYSTEM FAILURE

REFERENCES: See Basic Plan.

1. SITUATION: (DCNI) This appendix will be implemented anytime ESS components or systems fail. There are three categories of ESS failures for KUMMSC: partial, major, and catastrophic. A partial failure occurs when only one line of detection is operational or a portion of the structure, shelter, or individual resource line of detection fails (e.g., A-Side Curtain PIR sensor fails, a line of detection still exists). A major malfunction occurs when an intruder can penetrate a limited area boundary without crossing at least one operational line of detection, the entire structure, shelter or individual resource IDS components fail, the primary or redundant annunciator display equipment fails, or the redundant location cannot monitor the primary location (e.g., one A-Side FDB fails results in a loss of coverage for approximately half of resource cubicles to include associated volumetric sensors). A catastrophic failure is when the entire ESS or a major portion fails, (e.g., all A-Side FDBs fail, losing all sensor coverage in A-Side).

2. MISSION: (DCNI) To increase the detection capability of the security force by alerting security personnel of an approach, intrusion or attempted intrusion to KUMMSC. To provide immediate compensatory measures in the event of ESS component or system failure and restore capability as quickly as possible.

3. EXECUTION: Concept of Operations. When this appendix is implemented, compensatory measures for IDS malfunctions and/or failures may require immediate on-duty Security Forces posting. Response from 898 MUNS/CTS maintenance will be required in the event of ESS malfunctions and/or failures.

3.1. Tasks.

3.1.1. The DFC will ensure subordinate units accomplish tasks as indicated:

3.1.1.1. (DCNI) Ensure WSSS/SSCC up-channels reports concerning security of PL 1 resources. The WSSS/SSCC is the focal point for all security matters related to KUMMSC. WSSS/SSCC will initiate a Security Incident through the KCP, as required.

3.1.1.2. (DCNI) Maintain the ability to expand security to include posting of Security Forces personnel in support of ESS malfunctions and/or failure and recalling of off-duty personnel if necessary.

3.1.1.3. (DCNI) 898 MUNS/MXWKV, AECS System Administrators, and 377 WSSS Sensor NCO will maintain the ability to immediately respond in support of ESS malfunctions and/or failures at KUMMSC for ESS failures.

3.1.1.4. (DCNI) Catastrophic Failure. A catastrophic failure occurs when the entire ESS or a major portion fails, (e.g., all A-Side FDBs fail, losing all sensor coverage in A-Side).

3.1.1.4.1. (DCNI) If a Catastrophic Failure occurs, implement the following steps and reference WSSS SOP 31-101V4 or ESS NCO:

3.1.1.4.2. (DCNI) Establish topside 360, cease all processing and circulation within the facility, and form the IBF at an established rally point until the failure of the AECS can be identified as a non-hostile event, at which time dispatched patrols can resume normal.

3.1.1.4.3. (DCNI) Post a two person SF team located at B7/B14. Recall or post personnel as available: one Close-in Sentry and one Close Boundary Sentry, in order to control two-person area processing and to act as the two lines of IDS into the two-person areas.

3.1.1.4.4. (DCNI) A continuous walking patrol of downstairs common areas located in Brandt Hall or behind B5/B6 will be conducted by either of the two ISRTs throughout the duration of the tour of duty.

3.1.1.4.5. (DCNI) Conduct 4-hour checks on all controlled areas and 30-minute duress checks.

3.1.1.4.6. (DCNI) Make initial notification to System Administrator and all other appropriate notifications following.

3.1.1.4.7. (DCNI) The EC/Area Supervisor will manually turn off magnetic locks at D1, D2, D6, D7 and D11. Personnel processing into the KUMMSC will enter via D1, proceed to D2 and await EC verification at T3. **NOTE:** Only emergency response personnel, CTS and system administrators will be allow entry into KUMMSC until the situation can be rectified.

3.1.1.4.7.1. (DCNI) The EC will validate the AF Form 1199 by verifying an open area 8. Verify individual requesting entry is not suspended, temporarily decertified or permanently decertified via AF Form 164. If all information is correct and entry is authorized, the EC will manually operate T3 and allow entry via D6, D7 and D11.

3.1.1.4.7.2. (DCNI) If information is incorrect, challenge the individual and initiate appropriate response to remove them from the area. If necessary, initiate a Security Incident.

3.1.1.5. Major Malfunction. Major malfunctions occur when:

3.1.1.5.1. (DCNI) An intruder can penetrate a restricted area boundary without crossing at least one line of detection.

3.1.1.5.2. (DCNI) The entire structure and shelter or individual resources IDS components fail.

3.1.1.5.3. (DCNI) Either the primary or alternate annunciation and display equipment fails.

3.1.1.5.4. (DCNI) The remote location can't monitor the primary location.

3.1.1.6. Partial Failure. Partial failure occurs when:

3.1.1.6.1. (DCNI) Only one line of detection at the boundary is operational.

3.1.1.6.2. (DCNI) A portion of the structure, shelter, or individual resource line of detection fails at the entrance or the interior.

TAB A TO APPENDIX 8 TO ANNEX Z TO KAFB IDP 31-101
PARTIAL / MAJOR / CATASTROPHIC CCTV FAILURE

REFERENCES: See Basic Plan.

1. **OBJECTIVE:** (DCNI) Take corrective action to secure PL resources after a partial, major, catastrophic, or CCTV failure within the confines of KUMMSC. Take corrective actions to repair or replace alarm sensor(s) or CCTV providing coverage of PL resources within KUMMSC.

2. **OPTION DESCRIPTION:** The following options are available after a partial, major, catastrophic, or CCTV security system failure.

2.1. (DCNI) AECS System Administrators, 377 WSSS Sensor NCO and 898 MUNS Facility Maintenance and/or CTS personnel will respond to KUMMSC to attempt to correct the alarm or CCTV deficiencies affecting the facility.

2.2. (DCNI) 898 MUNS will incorporate employment of compensatory measures and when directed by the 898 MUNS/CC.

2.3. 377 WSSS will implement compensatory measures as necessary.

3. **CONSIDERATIONS:** The likelihood of a complete security system failure is remote. Immediate actions to increase security vigilance and to correct the problem must be initiated by the on-duty Security Forces.

4. **SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS:**

4.1. Tasks:

4.2. WSSS/SSCC or (SFS/BDOC alternate). WSSS/SSCC, upon being notified of a KUMMSC security system failure, will:

4.2.1. (DCNI) Declare a Security Incident through KCP.

4.2.2. (DCNI) Accomplish key personnel and squadron notifications.

4.2.3. (DCNI) Dispatch patrols to affected areas.

4.2.4. (DCNI) Contact 898 MUNS facility maintenance personnel.

4.7. (DCNI) If a partial sensor failure occurs within the two-person area, WSSS/SSCC will conduct 30 minute CCTV checks of the affected area. If the failure cannot be corrected in a timely manner, 898 MUNS will relocate resources if able. Compensatory measures will remain in effect until the failure is corrected by CTS personnel and an operational test has been accomplished by the AECS System Administrator or Sensor NCO.

4.8. (DCNI) If a major or catastrophic sensor failure occurs within the two-person area, WSSS/SSCC will conduct 30 minute CCTV checks of the affected area and two Security Forces members will be posted at the applicable blast door(s) (i.e., B-7/B-14). Compensatory measures will remain in effect until the failure is corrected by CTS personnel and an operational test has been accomplished by the AECS System Administrator or Sensor NCO.

4.9. (DCNI) CCTV Failure. Alarms occurring from areas not under CCTV surveillance will require an immediate security response. If camera coverage fails within the two-person area to the extent where IVA of alarms is not possible, then a priority 1 Job Control Number (JCN) will be initiated. Alarm activations from within the area not covered by cameras will require a two-person team to escort the ISRT to assess the situation.

4.10. (DCNI) If a CCTV failure occurs within the two-person area, WSSS/SSCC will initiate a Priority-1 JCN. **NOTE:** All alarms from the affected area are required to be assessed by Security Forces and appropriate MUNS two-person team, regardless of camera status.

4.10.1 Document all appropriate forms.

4.10.2. 898 MUNS/CTS technicians, 377 WSSS Sensor NCO, and AECS System Administrator, upon being notified of an alarm failure, will:

4.10.2.1. (DCNI) If a partial failure occurs, respond within 1 hour to repair or replace affected alarm when located within the two-person area. Respond within 24 hours to repair or replace affected alarm when located outside the two-person area.

4.10.2.2. (DCNI) If a major or catastrophic failure occurs, respond within 1 hour to replace or repair affected alarms.

4.10.2.3. (DCNI) In the event of a sensor failure, WSSS/SSCC will initiate a JCN work order through 898 MUNS/CTS personnel. For the duration of the downed sensor, appropriate compensatory measures will be in place to ensure adequate security in accordance with DOD S-5210.41-M_AFMAN 31-108.

4.10.2.4. (DCNI) CCTV Failure. Alarms occurring from areas not under CCTV surveillance will require an immediate security response. If camera coverage fails within the two-person area to the extent where IVA of alarms is not possible, then a priority 1 JCN will be initiated. Alarm activations from within the area, not covered by cameras, will require a two-person team to escort the ISRT to assess the situation.

APPENDIX 9 TO ANNEX Z TO KAFB IDP 31-101
EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROCEDURES

REFERENCES: Refer to Basic Plan.

1. SITUATION: An emergency such as a fire or medical emergency has occurred within a PL 1 restricted area. Refer to KAFB Plan 91-11, KUMMSC Emergency Response Plan, for emergency response procedures to KUMMSC, PNAF and Convoy.

APPENDIX 10 TO ANNEX Z TO KAFB IDP 31-101
AIRBORNE DENIAL / UNAUTHORIZED / UNANNOUNCED AIRCRAFT ARRIVAL /
LANDING IN A PROTECTION LEVEL RESTRICTED AREA

REFERENCES: Refer to Basic Plan.

1. SITUATION: An unidentified airborne threat has either landed, attempted to land, or is hovering over/near a restricted area and its intent/purpose is unknown. The procedures listed in this annex are applicable to any airborne threat.
2. SECURITY OBJECTIVE: To provide an immediate security response necessary to protect PL resources from damage, theft, loss, or destruction due to overt hostile action.
3. REPORTING AND ALERTING ACTION: Initiate Security Incident situation if affecting PL 1, 2, or 3 resources. If determined hostile, upgrade to a Covered Wagon situation and initiate FPCON Delta measures. Security Forces will be dispatched depending on the situation and the sector the incident occurs. KCP will be notified immediately.
4. EXECUTION.

4.1. Concept of Operations:

4.1.1. (FOUO) Dispatch Security Forces to the landing, attempted landing, or suspicious activity of any unannounced or unauthorized airborne threat within KAFB restricted airspace that could potentially threaten assets secured in any designated restricted area. Security Forces will assess the situation, neutralize the threat, and contain the incident, as appropriate.

4.1.1.1. (DCNI) The landing, attempted landing, or suspicious activity of any unannounced or unauthorized airborne threat inside the topside KUMMSC controlled area and/or in the area of the hot cargo pad during PL operations shall result in the immediate dispatch of the RF and Initial Backup Force (IBF).

4.1.1.2. (DCNI) The KUMMSC facility will be locked down, posts will take up final denial positions, and responding forces will be deployed as directed by the IC.

4.1.1.2.1. (DCNI) 898 MUNS personnel will be armed for defense of KUMMSC. MUNS personnel will be armed with weapons from the MUNS armory and deployed by the senior SF leader on scene.

4.1.2. (FOUO) Security Forces must be in a position to provide a high volume of fire towards the aircraft if hostilities are encountered. Equally important is the ability of Security Forces to defeat any ground force, should they also be encountered.

4.1.3. (FOUO) In all cases, a potential airborne threat will not be fired upon unless it displays a condition of intent or action to steal, damage, destroy, or immediately jeopardize

a PL 1, 2, or 3 resource. Use the minimum force necessary to stop the threat, including the use of deadly force as a last resort.

4.2. Tasks.

4.2.1. (FOUO) The Albuquerque FAA Air Traffic Control Tower (FAA ATCT) personnel will notify KCP in the event an unauthorized violation of KAFB airspace occurs.

4.2.1.1. (FOUO) FAA ATCT personnel will attempt to identify the aircraft and direct it away from restricted airspace.

4.2.1.2. (FOUO) If the aircraft demonstrates a hostile intent towards any on-base resource and subsequently departs the immediate area, the direction of travel will be given to the KCP by the FAA and Albuquerque (ATRCC). The telephone number for the Air Route Traffic Control Center ATRCC is 856-4500.

4.2.2. The DFC will:

4.2.2.1. (FOUO) Develop procedures outlining specific actions required to support unauthorized aircraft landing operations.

4.2.2.2. (FOUO) Provide Security Forces with guidance and training on ROE and security response tactics to be utilized.

4.2.2.3. (FOUO) Keep the EOC updated on all Security Forces actions.

4.2.3. WSSS/SSCC/SFS/BDOC will:

4.2.3.1. (DCNI) Implement immediate lockdown of KUMMSC.

4.2.3.2. (DCNI) Ensure Security Forces take up defensive fighting positions/final denial positions.

4.2.3.3. (FOUO) Initiate a SFG recall. Instruct personnel not to respond until directed by the IC. Personnel will remain on standby in the FBF formation area until dispatched or the situation terminates.

4.2.4. (DCNI) Detection and Warning. All personnel must be aware of the possibility of an airborne attack, and immediately notify WSSS/SSCC/SFS/BDOC and KCP of all sightings of unannounced or suspicious aircraft in the immediate vicinity of KUMMSC, convoys, SAAM aircraft, and/or the flightline area.

4.2.5. ROE.

4.2.5.1. (FOUO) The FAA Control Tower will attempt to make radio contact with any unidentified/unannounced aircraft sighted within KAFB restricted airspace and direct its flight away from the area.

4.2.5.2. (FOUO) If the aircraft fails to depart the area and continues on, the FAA control tower will warn the aircraft of the potential use of deadly force by military personnel. Example warning, "A failure to heed instructions could result in the use of deadly force by military personnel."

4.2.5.3. (FOUO) Should the aircraft depart the immediate area or land near, but outside the clear zone of a NDA or restricted area, it will be kept under surveillance until a determination can be made as to whether the situation is hostile/non-hostile. Security Forces will attempt, by whatever means possible, to have the pilot approach their position to explain their presence; however, Security Forces must not leave their cover to approach the aircraft.

4.2.5.4. (FOUO) Should the aircraft land within or adjacent to the clear zone of the NDA or restricted area, it will be surrounded, and an attempt will be made to contain all personnel within the aircraft by means of voice instruction (bull horn, PA system, etc.). Warnings concerning the use of deadly force will be announced. Emergency situations (fire, medical) will be dealt with on a case-by-case basis by the IC.

4.2.5.5. (FOUO) Should it become apparent that the aircraft is going to attempt to land on the flightline, anywhere near PL aircraft parking areas, all personnel working on the flightline will strategically place vehicles, pieces of equipment, and/or other available obstacles as barriers to prevent the aircraft from landing in or near these areas.

4.2.5.6. (FOUO) If after a landing, intruders comply with instructions, remove them from the aircraft and remove them from the area. No attempt should be made to question intruders pending the arrival of AFOSI, FBI, civil law enforcement, etc.

4.2.5.7. (FOUO) In the event hostile actions are encountered, Security Forces will use all means available to neutralize the situation, including the use of deadly force.

4.2.5.8. (FOUO) The provisions of DOD 5210.41M and AFI 31-101, as supplemented, apply in the event of hostile action.

4.2.5.9. (DCNI) The FBI will be the LFA for recovery operations in the event of an attack on KUMMSC or specific PL 1 resources.

TAB A TO APPENDIX 10 TO ANNEX Z TO KAFB IDP 31-101

**UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEM DETECTION / DENIAL / SURVEILLANCE OF KUMMSC
/ PROTECTION LEVEL 1 RESOURCE MOVEMENTS / SAAM AIRCRAFT**

REFERENCES: Refer to Basic Plan.

1. **SITUATION:** An unidentified unmanned aerial system that has been spotted landing, attempted landing, hovering or flying over/near KUMMSC, during Protection Level 1 resource movements and over/near SAAM aircraft and its intent/purpose is unknown.
2. **SECURITY OBJECTIVE:** To provide the KCP fixed field sites with interim guidance for the development and implementation of response protocols, to include administrative and investigative procedures, to address potential threats posed by Unmanned Aerial Systems (sUAS) not approved (unsanctioned) for operations within airspace over KAFB property. This guidance will be updated as technologies, Federal regulations and/or Departmental policies are promulgated to respond to the threat.
3. **REPORTING AND ALERTING ACTION:** Initiate Security Incident situation if affecting KUMMSC, during Protection Level 1 resource movements and over/near SAAM aircraft. If determined hostile, upgrade to a Covered Wagon situation and initiate FPCON Delta measures. Security Forces will keep a safe distance along with a visual of the sUAS and maintain contact with Site (SSCC). KCP will be notified immediately, subsequent notifications will include Department of Defense (DOD), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Defense Nuclear Security (DNS), Local Law Enforcement Agencies (LLEAs). KCP will report using Rule 9B for Unauthorized Air Vehicle/Military Installation Airspace Violation/Intrusion when notified by Security Forces of any civilian remotely piloted aircraft (RPA), unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), gyrocopter, or similar craft violating protected military airspace
.
4. **EXECUTION:**
 - 4.1. Concept of Operations:
 - 4.1.1. (FOUO) Security Forces will keep a safe distance based on METT-TC and will notify WSSS/SSCC with last known location, direction of travel, altitude (how far off ground), size, shape, color, activity (hovering, circling, etc.) and any distinguishing features (camera, emission of liquid or vapor, hanging attachments, etc.). Security Forces should utilize the SALUTE report when up-channeling information.
 - 4.1.2. (FOUO) If a device capable of still images or video footage is available from the on-duty Flight Chief they will attempt to capture images/footage of the sUAS and provide to higher authorities and/or IC.
 - 4.1.2.1. (FOUO) Do not attempt to interfere with the flight path of the sUAS.

4.1.3. (FOUO) If a sUAS has landed or is observed on the ground within KAFB ensure the above notifications have been made. Do not tamper with or make contact with sUAS. Establish a safe cordon appropriate to size of suspicious object and exercise extreme caution. Maintain visual of object if applicable.

4.1.3.1. (FOUO) If the sUAS discharges any substance don a protective mask (M-50/MCU-2AP), move to a safe location up-wind, attempt to maintain visual, and notify WSSS/SSCC.

4.1.4. (FOUO) The Security Forces must be in a position to provide a high volume of fire able to be directed towards sUAS in order to disable it. Ensure positions do not hinder from defeating enemy ground forces if encountered.

4.2. Tasks.

4.2.1 (FOUO) The Albuquerque FAA Air Traffic Control Tower (FAA ATCT) personnel will notify KCP in the event an unauthorized violation of KAFB airspace occurs.

4.2.1.1. (FOUO) If the sUAS departs KAFB airspace the direction of travel will be given to KCP by the FAA and Albuquerque (ATRCC). The telephone number for the Air Route Traffic Control Center ATRCC is 505-856-4500.

4.2.2. (FOUO) The DFC will:

4.2.2.1. (FOUO) Develop procedures outlining specific actions required to support unmanned aerial systems denial/landing operations.

4.2.2.2. (FOUO) Provide Security Forces with guidance and training on ROE and security response tactics to be utilized.

4.2.2.3. (FOUO) Keep the EOC updated on all Security Forces actions.

4.2.3. (FOUO) WSSS/SSCC/SFS/BDOC will:

4.2.3.1. (DCNI) Implement immediate lockdown of KUMMSC.

4.2.3.2. (DCNI) Ensure Security Forces take up defensive fighting positions/final denial positions.

4.2.3.3. (FOUO) Initiate an SFG recall if sUAS is deemed hostile. Instruct personnel not to respond until directed by the IC. Personnel will remain on standby in the FBF formation area until dispatched or the situation terminates.

4.2.3.4. (DCNI) Detection and Warning. All personnel must be aware of the possibility of unmanned aerial systems and immediately notify

WSSS/SSCC/SFS/BDOC and KCP of all sUAS sightings within KAFB area to include the vicinity of KUMMSC, convoys, and SAAM aircraft.

4.2.3.5. (FOUO) Provide assistance to the IC as well as monitor direct IC Security Forces.

4.2.3.6. (DCNI) If KUMMSC, Protection Level 1 resource movements, SAAM aircraft and the flightline are simultaneously attacked, exposed resources will have the priority, followed by KUMMSC and then the flightline. Comply with Annex C for further guidance on flightline PL 1, 2, or 3 resources.

5. (FOUO) Civil Engineering and EOD Support will:

5.1. (FOUO) sUAS, refer to Annex A.

5.1.1. (FOUO) Provide support to the security operations contained within this plan. Support details identified in annexes, appendices, exhibits, tabs, or enclosures to this plan.

APPENDIX 11 TO ANNEX Z TO KAFB IDP 31-101

UNANNOUNCED ALARMS / DURESS PROCEDURES WITHIN THE KUMMSC EXCLUSION AREA.

REFERENCES: Refer to Basic Plan.

1. (FOUO) SITUATION: An unannounced alarm activation has occurred within the KUMMSC exclusion area.
2. (FOUO) SECURITY OBJECTIVE: To provide an immediate security response necessary to protect PL resources from damage, theft, loss, or destruction due to overt hostile action.
3. (FOUO) REPORTING AND ALERTING ACTION: Initiate Security Incident situation if affecting PL 1, 2, or 3 resources. If determined hostile, upgrade to a Covered Wagon situation and initiate FPCON Delta measures. Security Forces will be dispatched depending on the situation and the sector the incident occurs. KCP will be notified immediately.
4. (FOUO) EXECUTION:
 - 4.1. (FOUO) Concept of Operations:
 - 4.1.1. (DCNI) The 377 WSSS will:
 - 4.1.1.2. (DCNI) The AM will: for single alarms, acknowledge the alarm and conduct an IVA via close circuit television (CCTV). If there are no signs of unauthorized access, no penetration pattern, and no signs of tampering or opening of B-7 or B-14, the situation will be terminated and a sweep of the alarm point/area will not be necessary. **NOTE:** If the AM is not able to conduct an IVA the ISRT will be required to sweep the alarm point.
 - 4.1.1.2.1. (DCNI) The AM will: for alarms which create a penetration pattern, acknowledge the alarm and conduct an IVA via close circuit television (CCTV).
 - 4.1.1.2.2. (DCNI) The AM will: for unannounced tamper alarms, acknowledge the alarm and conduct an IVA. If there are 898 MUNS personnel inside the exclusion area and an unannounced tamper alarm is received from that exclusion area, the AM will instruct the 898 MUNS personnel to proceed to the interlock and lay on the ground.
 - 4.1.1.2.3. (DCNI) The AM will: for line fault messages, acknowledge the alarm and conduct an IVA. The AM will direct the responding ISRT to the affected sensor zone utilizing the graphics display monitor in conjunction with the hardware map, and have the ISRT trace the conduit from the sensor zone to the field distribution box (FDB) to look for signs of tampering.

4.1.1.3. (DCNI) The WSSS/SSCC will: for a single alarm, dispatch the KUMMSC ISRT to Blast door B-7 or B-14 to assess for signs of tampering or opening. If there are no signs of tampering or opening at B-7 or B-14, and no signs of unauthorized access via the CCTV from the AM, the situation will be terminated and a sweep of the alarm point will not be necessary. If B-7 or B-14 are not open but there are signs of tampering, WSSS/SSCC will have the ISRT sweep the limited areas they are responsible for. However, if it is a single alarm without a penetration pattern and there are no signs of unauthorized access via CCTV, a sweep of the alarm point/area is still not necessary.

4.1.1.3.1. (DCNI) The WSSS/SSCC will: for unannounced tamper alarms, coordinate with 898 MUNS to break codes and dispatch the KUMMSC ISRT to sweep the alarm point. If 898 MUNS personnel are inside the exclusion area where the alarm generated from, the WSSS/SSCC will initiate two person extraction procedures per WSSS SOP 31-101 V1.

4.1.1.3.2. (DCNI) The WSSS/SSCC will: for alarms that create a penetration pattern i.e. (a PIR accompanied by a Balanced Magnetic Switch (BMS)), coordinate with 898 MUNS to break codes and dispatch the KUMMSC ISRT to sweep the alarm point. If 898 MUNS personnel are inside the exclusion area where the alarm generated from, the WSSS/SSCC will initiate two person extraction procedures per WSSS SOP 31-101 V1.

4.1.1.3.3. (DCNI) The WSSS/SSCC will: for line fault messages, coordinate with 898 MUNS to break codes and dispatch the KUMMSC ISRT to sweep the sensor area and trace the conduit from the alarm sensor area to the field distribution box for signs of tampering.

4.1.1.3.4. (DCNI) the WSSS/SSCC will: for multiple alarms that annunciate from a single sensor more than 60 times in two minutes, initiate a priority one work order.

4.1.1.4. (DCNI) The ISRT will: for a single alarm, respond to B-7 or B-14 to assess for signs of tampering or opening. If B-7 or B-14 are open, the ISRT will immediately make entry and sweep the area. If B-7 or B-14 are not open but there are signs of tampering, the ISRT will immediately sweep the limited areas they are responsible for. However, a sweep of the alarm point is not necessary providing it is a single alarm and there are no signs of unauthorized access via CCTV.

4.1.1.4.1. (DCNI) The ISRT will: for alarms which create a penetration pattern, sweep the alarm point/area.

4.1.1.4.2. (DCNI) The ISRT will: for tamper alarms, sweep the alarm point.

4.1.1.4.3. (DCNI) The ISRT will: for line fault message alarms, sweep the alarm point/sensor area, trace the conduit back to the field distribution box, and report and signs of tampering.

4.1.2. (DCNI) 898 MUNS will: Coordinate with WSSS/SSCC to break codes for unannounced alarms within the KUMMSC exclusion area which create a penetration pattern, tamper alarms or line fault message alarms. If the KUMMSC ISRT conducts a sweep of the alarm point with negative findings, a secondary sweep by a MUNS two person team is at the discretion of 898 MUNS. If the KUMMSC ISRT discovers signs of unauthorized access or unusual circumstances, a secondary sweep by a MUNS two person team will be required. If 898 MUNS personnel are within the exclusion area and a tamper alarm is received from that exclusion area, Security Forces sweeps and clears the area and then an 898 MUNS two person team will be required to sweep the area for unauthorized acts.

APPENDIX 12 TO ANNEX Z TO KAFB IDP 31-101

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (DoE) SAFEGUARD TRANSPORTER (SGT)
ARRIVAL/DEPARTURE, PRIORITY/NON-PRIORITY

REFERENCES: Refer to Basic Plan.

1. (FOUO) SITUATION: Department of Energy (DoE) vehicle, Safeguard Transport (SGT), has been pre-announced for arrival or departure, priority or non-priority

2. SECURITY OBJECTIVE: To provide support for the protection of DoE assets for inbound and outbound missions.

2.1. Concept of Operations. Containment actions will require 360 degree security using all available on-duty Security Forces and non-security forces for pre-announced SGT's. If the arrival or departure is considered priority, an additional post will be posted IAW Enclosure 1 to Appendix 2 to Annex C to KAFB IDP 31-101, Loading Dock Operations.

2.2. Tasks.

2.2.1. The 898 MUNS will:

2.2.2. (FOUO) Notify or confirm notification of:

2.2.2.1. (FOUO) MUNS SVA.

2.2.2.2. (FOUO) Briefing time.

2.2.2.3. (FOUO) Courier/SSAN/Cred Number.

2.2.2.4. (FOUO) SST/SGT Trailer Numbers.

2.2.2.5. (FOUO) Number of Vehicles/Personnel entering KUMMSC (if known).

2.2.2.6. (FOUO) Vehicles.

2.2.2.7. (FOUO) Personnel.

2.2.2.8. (FOUO) Ensure MASO or MASO representative will be present at V1AA if required by 898 MUNS.

2.2.2.9. (FOUO) Ensure MUNS escort official is on scene.

2.2.2. The WSSS/SSCC will:

2.2.2.1. (DCNI) Verify the courier/commander's information via the DOE Courier List. If there are discrepancies, notify 377 WSSS/S3O or 377 WSSS/S3.

2.2.2.2. (DCNI) If directed, contact DOE SECOM at 845-6952 to verify courier personnel.

2.2.2.3. (DCNI) Relay information to ECP and brief them to pass information on to Scorpion-1, Area Supervisor.

2.2.2.4. (DCNI) Fifteen minutes prior to a SGT arrival, dispatch a topside patrol to V1AA to stand-by.

2.2.2.5. (DCNI) Direct KUMMSC Area Supervisor to contact ECP to obtain courier information, and relay information to Scorpion-2.

2.2.2.6. (DCNI) Ensure 15/5 identified and armed, to include additional forces (Scorpion-6).

2.2.2.7. (DCNI) Direct Cerberus-2/3 to sweep from B-1/2 interlock out into and throughout Brandt Hall. Once B-5/6 are closed, position themselves at the B-7/14 interlock area.

2.2.2.8. (DCNI) Direct Cerberus-1 and the SVA to initiate sweeps of the Loading Dock.

2.2.2.9. (DCNI) Dispatch Cerberus-1 to ECP after Loading Dock sweeps is complete, and Scorpion-1 into the topside controlled area to standby for arrival or departure of SGT.

2.2.2.10. (DCNI) Dispatch Patrols to V1AA and V1B.

2.2.2.11. (DCNI) Instruct ECP to go into lockdown 15 minutes prior to movement.

2.2.2.12. (DCNI) Notify Munitions Control, KCP and 377 WSSS/S3O.

2.2.3. ARRIVAL:

2.2.3.1. The WSSS/SSCC will:

2.2.3.1.2. (DCNI) Ensure the Courier Commander's status is verified, and ensure all personnel and vehicles are vouched for.

2.2.3.1.3. (DCNI) Ensure, if vehicles have not been under constant surveillance, a search is conducted of the exterior of the vehicle.

2.2.3.1.4. (DCNI) Ensure that once all SGT vehicles are in the topside controlled area, Scorpion-1 will verify Courier Commander's status and verify Courier Commander's credentials utilizing the DOE Courier list along with the pre-note received from the ECP.

2.2.3.1.5. (DCNI) Ensure Cerberus-1, KEC and MUNS escort officials verify all DOE personnel and complete an AF FM 1109.

2.2.3.1.6. (DCNI) Ensure, after EC-1 is secured, Cerberus-1 verifies the pins have been dropped on V-5/6.

2.2.3.1.7. (DCNI) Ensure Cerberus-1 verifies that D-13 is chained and secured.

2.2.3.1.8. (DCNI) Ensures the Alarm Monitor keeps B-2/4 secure and opens B-5/6.

2.2.3.1.9. (DCNI) Ensures after the download is complete, MC-2, special function, is initiated and the resource will be moved into Brandt Hall.

2.2.3.10. (DCNI) MC-2, special function, will be secured and the 15/5 RF will be released. After B-7/14 are secured, facility lockdown will be terminated.

2.2.3.2. Scorpion-1 will:

2.2.3.2.1. (DCNI) Notify WSSS/SSCC/ECP of convoy status to include the number of personnel and vehicles.

2.2.3.2.2. (DCNI) Authenticate and request EC-1, special function.

2.2.4. RON (Remain Overnight):

2.2.4.1. (DCNI) MUNS and SF representative will conduct a verification of the trailers and seal numbers.

2.2.4.2. SCS will:

2.2.4.2.1. (DCNI) Ensure that the SGT(s) are properly connected to the RCU (Remote Control Unit) with a connection test to ensure verification.

2.2.4.2.2. Notify KCP and 377 WSSS/S3O.

2.2.4.2.3. Release 15/5 RF as applicable.

2.2.5. DEPARTURE:

2.2.5.1. SCS will:

2.2.5.1.1. Ensure Cerberus-1 verifies the pins at V-5/6 are raised.

2.2.5.1.2. Ensure Cerberus-1 and KEC have all personnel signed out on the AF Form 1109.

2.2.5.1.3. (DCNI) Direct ECP to open V1AB after Cerberus-1 authenticates for EC-2, special function, and it has been secured with the SGT on topside in the controlled area through V-8.

2.2.5.1.4. (DCNI) Once SGT has departed controlled area through V1AB, notify KCP and all posts and patrols to resume normal operations.

2.2.6. (DCNI) IF SGT IS UNABLE TO BE PARKED IN THE LOADING DOCK:

2.2.6.1. (DCNI) Topside patrols will proceed to KUMMSC GOV Parking area to meet with SGT.

2.2.6.2. (DCNI) Recall will be conducted for 15/5 if not parked in the Loading Dock.

2.2.6.3. (DCNI) MUNS and SF representative will conduct a joint search of SGT.

2.2.6.4. (DCNI) Erect ropes/stanchions are put in place around the SGT and an ECP sign is posted.

2.2.6.5. (DCNI) The DOE courier vouches for the interior of the SGT.

2.2.6.6. (DCNI) 15/5 RF is established for the SGT.

2.2.6.7. (DCNI) 2 hour SGT checks are initiated.

APPENDIX 13 TO ANNEX Z TO KAFB IDP 31-101
STAND-OFF ATTACK PROTECTION MEASURES

REFERENCES: Refer to Basic Plan.

1. **SITUATION:** (DCNI) For potential attack/launch positions outside federal or U.S. jurisdiction, a combination of obscuration and hardening techniques may be used. Efforts shall be undertaken to cover these areas by surveillance and coordination with local law enforcement as needed. The enemy may use stand-off weapons against PL 1 resources.
2. **SECURITY OBJECTIVE:** Mitigate potential enemy stand-off attacks.
3. **REPORTING AND ALERTING ACTION:** Initiate Security Incident situation if affecting PL 1, 2, or 3 resources. If determined hostile, upgrade to a Covered Wagon situation and initiate FPCON Delta measures. Security Forces will be dispatched depending on the situation and the sector the incident occurs. KCP will be notified immediately.
4. **EXECUTION:** Specific stand-off security measures for nuclear weapon systems depend on the weapon configuration. Weapons are maintained in storage below ground or in-transit to Hot Cargo Pad-5 for convoy operations.

4.1. Concept of Operations:

4.1.1. (DCNI) KUMMSC: KUMMSC is located underground and substantially constructed to resist penetration attempts by unauthorized personnel via any avenue of approach other than the normal approaches to the facility. Maintenance operations and inner area movements are conducted below ground. During normal operations, a minimum of four armed security forces are posted below ground and a minimum of eight are posted topside.

4.1.1.2. Two random one hour patrols per shift will be conducted by topside security forces. Additional FP measures in support of PL 1 security will be conducted by the 377 SFS. One K9 walking patrol will be conducted a topside check once per day.

4.1.2. Convoys: A convoy route VA study shall be conducted for each established convoy route. Review and update annually, or upon major route changes. A convoy mission rehearsal will be conducted by the Convoy Commander and reviewed/updated annually.

4.1.2.1. Prior to inbound or outbound convoy movements, Convoy CC will direct initiation of primary and alternate route sweeps prior to completion of download operations.

4.1.2.2. Post Sunport Liaison to conduct a joint sweep of active runways and taxiways 30 minutes prior to aircraft arrival.

4.1.2.3. Post Watchdog to conduct observation over the airfield and address overflight/airborne threats to convoy/routes, PAD operations and surrounding areas, member immediately report suspicious activity to WSSS/SSCC.

APPENDIX 14 TO ANNEX Z TO KAFB IDP 31-101
REMOTE TARGET ENGAGEMENT SYSTEM (RTES)

REFERENCES: 377 SFG OI 31-113

1. (U) SITUATION: The RTES is a state-of-the-art system designed to provide support for final access denial to facilities with high-value assets. The RTES is remotely operated from an operator workstation. The RTES employs the M240 series weapon with 200 rounds of 7.62mm. belt-linked Armor Piercing. ammunition.

2. (U) MISSION: The RTES is employed to provide final denial fire, protect entrances, and avenues of approach to KUMMSC and the KUMMSC Two-Person area. When used in conjunction with existing delay, detection, and assessment systems and security forces, the RTES significantly increases the overall security of PL 1 nuclear resources.

3. (DCNI) EXECUTION: The RTES is employed to locate, identify, target and engage an adversary attacking KUMMSC. Employment and operational fire control of the RTES will be the responsibility of the security forces area supervisor.

3.1. (DCNI) Concept of Operation: The RTES is primarily utilized as a final denial weapon for structure and avenues of approach within the WSA. The area supervisor must keep in mind the limited amount of ammunition loaded for each weapon.

3.2. (DCNI) Once a threat towards KUMMSC has been detected, the RTES operator will open either one or all of the RTES clamshells. It is recommended that only the tower with the best field of fire be opened to reduce the risk of the remaining towers being disabled. The operator will locate and identify the threat. If other towers need to be opened to provide a more advantageous field of fire, it can be done at this time. If the threat is deemed hostile by the operator, and the use of deadly force is authorized, the operator will arm the selected tower and engage the threat. AFI 31-117, *Arming and Use of Force by Air Force Personnel*, and AFMAN 31-222, *Air Force Use of Force Manual*, will be strictly adhered to during all RTES operations.

3.3. (DCNI) In the event that Cyber Transport Systems (CTS) maintenance personnel determine maintenance actions require the need for the weapons to be placed in the "SAFE" mode, Combat Arms personnel will be required to respond within 1 hour of the Priority 1 work order being opened.

4. (DCNI) ROE (ROE):

4.1. (DCNI) The RTES operator will remain alert to any threat concerning avenues of approach to the WSA, the immediate perimeter and the immediate area surrounding the storage structures and maintenance facilities. Anytime a CW or potential hostile threat is observed, the area supervisor or higher authority will declare "FINAL DENIAL." Declare FINAL DENIAL only when a credible threat exists.

4.1.1 (DCNI) While security forces are responding, the RTES operator and the Redundant Display Area Operator (RDAO) will enable the weapon system.

4.1.2 (DCNI) For an immediate threat, the operator will select the required weapon platform on the touch screen to open the clamshell, and locate and identify the target. The operator will announce "TOWER X UP" to the area supervisor.

4.1.3 (DCNI) If the target displays any hostile activity (carrying or firing a weapon, planting explosives, etc.) arm and fire the weapon.

4.1.4 (DCNI) While the primary use of the RTES is for close in defense of nuclear structures, it can also be used to eliminate threats outside of the area. The RTES thermal targeting capability is able to locate, identify, and target threats outside the WSA and pinpoint these targets utilizing its tracers.

4.1.5 (DCNI) Final denial will initially be achieved with RF patrols per approved COAs. The area supervisor may have one RTES operator cover one "Final Denial" coverage area, allowing the area supervisor to redeploy those SF initially set-up to cover that area.

4.1.5.1 (DCNI) RTES operators are also designated as part of the "15 in 5" during PNAF and Safe guard Transport missions. They will be paired with a two-person team that will be posted in the loading dock. They will immediately respond to security situations by employing their primary weapons system (i.e., RTES).

4.1.5.2 (DCNI) In cases where the RTES is destroyed, fails or ammunition becomes fully expended during combat; each operator will maintain individual call signs, deny access to PL 1 resources by use of their secondary weapons system (M-4/M-9) and adhere to tactical direction given by the AS/on-scene commander. Once either Romeo-1 and/or Romeo-2 can no longer effectively employ the RTES, he/she may only operate alone for as long as it takes to join with an existing SRT or FT.