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Security

**REMOTE TARGET ENGAGEMENT SYSTEM, T-250
DIGITAL FACILITY SYSTEM**

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This publication implements the 377th Security Forces Group (SFG) Remote Target Engagement System (RTES) T-250 Digital Facility System (DFS). This group instruction is applicable to all personnel within the 377th SFG to all It describes the responsibilities of the RTES operator, Flight Chief (FC)/Flight Commander (FCC), Entry Controller, Combat Arms (CA), and Electronic Security Systems (ESS) personnel. This operating instruction also covers the operation of the RTES Operator Console, System Enable Disable Switch (SEDS) Console, Remote Duress Disable (RDDS) Switch, and the Trainer/Simulator Console. This publication does not apply to Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) Units or to the Air National Guard (ANG). Refer recommended changes and questions about this publication to the OPR using AF Form 847, *Recommendation for Change of Publication*; route AF Forms 847 from the field through the appropriate functional chain of command. Ensure that all records created as a result of processes prescribed in this publication are maintained in accordance with Air Force Manual (AFMAN) 33-363, *Management of Records*, and disposed of in accordance with Air Force Records Information Management System (AFRIMS) Records Disposition Schedule (RDS). This publication may not be supplemented or further implemented/extended. Requests for waivers must be submitted to the OPR listed above for consideration and approval.

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CHAPTER 1

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

1.1 System Overview.

1.1.1. RTES is an enhancement of the overall security system for protecting critical assets. Their primary functions are to provide final denial fire, area denial, and deny unauthorized personnel from avenues of approach to restricted/limited/exclusion areas.

1.1.2. **(DCNI)** RTES is employed by system operators to locate, identify, target and engage an adversary attacking the Kirtland Underground Munitions and Maintenance Storage Complex (KUMMSC). Employment and operational direction of the RTES will be the responsibility of the Security Forces (SF) on-scene commander. Close attention will be paid to the effects of base operations when utilizing the RTES. Rules of Engagement (ROE) in this instruction will specify when and how the RTES functions are used.

1.2. (DCNI) System Description: The RTES employs the M240B machine gun with 200 rounds of 7.62mm linked armor piercing/tracer ammunition. The RTES consoles, and all the M240B machine guns associated with them are not tied into the Automated/Advanced Entry Control System (AECS). These weapons are mounted within ballistic shielded clamshells on three hardened towers dispersed within the controlled area and two platforms within the KUMMSC/limited area, covering the loading dock. The RTES is remotely operated from the operator console located in the RTES Room (#150) adjacent to the Site Security Control Center (SSCC). Each tower on topside is equipped with two weapon systems and associated cameras. The two towers located within the loading dock are both equipped with a weapon system and an associated camera. All tower locations with primary and secondary fields of fire can be found in attachment 2 of this document.

1.3. System Purpose.

1.3.1. The purpose of the RTES is to:

1.3.1.1. Provide final denial fire before hostile unauthorized access can be gained to controlled/restricted/limited/exclusion areas.

1.3.1.2. Achieve area denial fire of likely avenues of approach to controlled/restricted/limited/exclusion areas.

1.3.1.3. Mitigate identified vulnerabilities that require posting of armed SF IAW (DoD S-5210.41-M_AFMAN31-108V1, *Nuclear Weapons Security Manual*, Enclosure 6 Para 3.d.(4).)

1.4. Rules Of Engagement.

1.4.1. AFI 31-117, *Arming and Use of Force*, will be strictly adhered to during all operations of the RTES.

1.4.2. The RTES operator will enable the system in the following situations:

1.4.2.1. Initiation of a COVERED WAGON due to a direct threat to KUMMSC.

1.4.2.2. With proper authentication from the posted SCS, Area Supervisor (AS), FCC/FC or higher authority.

1.4.2.3. For pre-coordinated and authorized maintenance or during shift changeover/JRV/RV.

1.4.3. SF on scene commander is responsible for the overall employment of the RTES and will provide direction to the RTES operator. If available, positive identification should be made from a post or patrol that has line of sight prior to utilizing the weapon. A confirmed visual verification by an on-scene patrol will not deter the RTES operator from enabling and engaging hostile forces if threat to life or resources is imminent.

1.4.4. Once the RTES operator has received direction from the AS/on-scene commander, the SCS and RTES operator will turn on their respective SEDS keys to enable the system to open applicable clamshells as necessary. It is recommended that only one tower with the best tactical advantage be activated to avoid putting the other towers at risk of being damaged. If the threat is deemed hostile by the on-scene commander and the operator has received proper authorization, use of deadly force is authorized. The operator will select the respective tower, arm the system and eliminate the threat.

1.4.5. When the operator has enabled the system, the weapon will remain on safe until the operator is ready to engage an adversary.

1.4.6. The RTES operator will announce “weapons platform X up” to the Area Supervisor and SCS when any platform is selected, and will potentially be fired.

1.4.7. At no time will both the RTES and RF be redirected from final denial coverage at the same time during hostile situations. **NOTE: At no time will the RTES be enabled during flight, squadron or wing level exercises.**

CHAPTER 2

INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITIES

2.1. RTES Operators will:

2.1.1. One operator will remain within the confines of the RTES Room (#150) unless relieved by a certified operator.

2.1.1.1. Two operators will be posted for duty during each shift.

2.1.1.2. One operator may leave to utilize facilities at any time except when there is hostile activity.

2.1.1.3. When the RTES is inoperative, a two-person Cerberus-4/4a will be posted in the loading dock. Also, when there is a Department of Energy (DoE) mission, a four-man team will be comprised of the RTES operators and Cerberus-4/4a located in the loading dock.

2.1.2. Comply with the requirements of this instruction, Special Security Instructions (SSI), applicable supplements, and operator checklists.

2.1.3. Obtain a detailed briefing and changeover with the off-going RTES operator.

2.1.3.1. Changeover will consist of a visual inspection by the operator to ensure there are no line breaks, exposed wires, all monitors are functional, SSIs are in the room, console and surrounding room is kept clean, and all controls are functional.

2.1.4. Conduct JRV and routine verifications to ensure all RTES equipment is operating properly.

2.1.4.1. JRV Quick Reaction Checklist (QRC) # **H-1** will be conducted at the following times:

2.1.4.1.1. As operator(s) arrive on post.

2.1.4.1.2. Any time the system has been enabled or the weapon has been used.

2.1.4.1.3. Following start-up of the system.

2.1.4.1.4. After maintenance has been performed on any RTES component (arm, weapon, System Enablement/Disablement Switch, etc.).

2.1.4.1.5. Anytime the operator doubts the reliability of the RTES system.

2.1.4.2. RVs will be conducted in the following situations:

2.1.4.2.1. Once an RTES operator returns to the RTES room.

2.1.4.2.2. When there has been a change in the power source (i.e. switching from commercial to generator). Steps for completing RVs are defined in section 3.4 and in applicable QRCs.

2.1.5. Take inventory of all RTES equipment and report deficiencies or required work orders to the SCS. The Alarm Monitor will obtain the Job Control Number from the 898 MUNS Control Center and maintain the Air Force Technical Order (AFTO) Form 781a, *Maintenance Discrepancy and work document*. Notify the SCS of the names of the personnel making the corrective action.

2.1.6. If any component of the system fails, do not touch the System enable/disablement switch or touch screens due to safety reasons. **Exception: If the RTES is in use due to an attack, select another tower and continue under the direction of the SF on scene commander.**

2.1.7. Do not utilize the live RTES system for any exercises.

2.1.8. Operators will be armed IAW the Installation Defense Plan (IDP) Post Priority Chart.

2.2. Security Controller Supervisor will:

2.2.1. Act as the SEDS Panel Operator located at SCS Console.

2.2.2. Monitor the RTES operator when the system is enabled/disabled.

2.2.3. Annotate all work orders in the SF Blotter. Additionally, enter the names of the persons making the corrective action and the corrective action(s).

2.2.4. The SCS will notify ESS and CTS of any work orders opened/closed. ESS/CTS response times are outlined in Attachment 9 located in 377 WSSS SOP 31-101, Vol 4. *KUMMSC AECS*.

2.2.5. Notify the AS, FC/FCC when a work order has been opened/closed.

2.3. The KUMMSC Entry Controller will:

2.3.1. Maintain control over the RDDS.

2.3.2. Monitor the radio for signs of duress from inside SSCC/RTES Room. Also, initiate the RDDS switch enable upon passive or active duress upon the RTES Controller

(AECS duress switch activation/failing to acknowledge radio/verbal duress) or as directed by higher authority.

2.4. The Security Controller will:

2.4.1. Monitor all alarms and activations of the RTES control room or towers/loading dock.

2.4.2. Dispatch to any unannounced alarm activation involving any RTES systems or components.

2.5. Area Supervisor will:

2.5.1. Ensure posts/patrols are implementing temporary compensatory measures until permanent compensatory measures are in place or the work order has been closed.

2.5.2. Employ RTES to gain a tactical advantage over adversaries.

2.6. Flight Chief/Flight Commander will:

2.6.1. Become familiar with the requirements of AFI 31-101, *Integrated Defense (FOUO)*, AFI 31-117, 377 SFG Tactical Assault Guide (TAG), AFMAN 31-108, *Nuclear Weapon Security Manual*, and applicable supplements.

2.6.2. Evaluate the operators on their use of the RTES system, knowledge of local procedures, and response to hostile situations by conducting area exercises. (Ensure flight RTES certified operators are given opportunity to use the RTES Simulator to maintain skills.).

2.7. 377 SFG/Security Support Squadron/CA will:

2.7.1. Conduct maintenance on the M240B machine guns in accordance with the applicable technical order and commercial manuals.

2.7.2. Change out M240B machine guns as necessary. Change out the M240B drive spring for each weapon at least quarterly in conjunction with a routine inspection.

2.7.3. **(FOUO)** Zero all M240B machine guns at a full distance range from 350 meters prior to the weapon system being mounted.

2.7.4. Respond upon request from CTS personnel in the event a M240B machine gun needs to be unloaded, loaded, or the weapon itself is damaged during work orders.

2.7.5. Clear expended casings and links from all RTES platforms prior to the RTES Operator closing clamshells after firing the weapon system.

2.8. Electronic Security Systems/Cyber Transport Systems.

2.8.1. ESS will act as System Administrators for the RTES.

2.8.2. Conduct sensor testing of all alarms associated with RTES in accordance with DoD S-5210.41-M-V2_AFMAN 31-108, *Nuclear Weapon Security Manual*, V2 Enclosure 3.

2.8.3. Respond upon request from CTS personnel in the event a M240B machine gun needs to be unloaded, loaded, or the weapon itself is damaged during work orders.

2.8.4. If a failure of the system affects the platform or the remote electronics, CTS will notify the standby CA personnel.

2.9. ESS NCO will:

2.9.1. Coordinate preventive maintenance scheduling with appropriate agencies.

2.9.2. Develop a tailored local training program for RTES system operators. Training may be conducted on-duty, in a formal classroom environment or a combination of both.

2.9.2.1. Initial Certification:

2.9.2.1.1. Initial Certification is conducted after an individual completes local training but before performing duties as an RTES Operator.

2.9.2.2. Trainees:

2.9.2.2.1. Trainees pursuing initial RTES Operator certification can perform duties and operate the RTES system under the direct supervision of a Duty Position Evaluation – certified RTES Operator.

2.9.2.2.2. The trainee must have initiated training documentation for the duty position (AF Form 623A, *On the Job Training Record*) prior to beginning hands on training. **NOTE:** At no time will the trainee be left alone to operate the RTES.

CHAPTER 3

Operation of the RTES

3.1. Normal Start-up/Shut-down Operations: The RTES is designed to operate continuously, including across shift changes, and other than maintenance purposes there is no reason to shut down the system.

3.1.1. Power-on the RTES console.

3.1.1.1. Wait until the initial “splash screen” appears on the touch screen monitor.

3.1.1.2. View diagnostics and report errors to ESS/CTS personnel.

3.1.2. Powering off the Console: If the RTES program is shut down inadvertently or for maintenance, the following steps will re-boot the Operator Console:

3.1.2.1. RTES operator will perform a diagnostics check.

3.1.2.2. RTES operator presses “Exit Kiosk” button.

3.1.2.3. Then, follow normal shut down procedures for a Microsoft Windows-based computer.

3.1.3. Any time the system needs to be shut down, contact ESS.

3.1.4. Power-off the RTES console only if absolutely necessary and deemed credible by either ESS or SCS.

3.2. (DCNI) Emergency Shut-Down: In the event of smoke or fire inside the SSCC or evacuation of KUMMSC, the RTES operator will shut down the RTES prior to evacuation.

3.2.1. The operators will shut down the system and ensure the keys are maintained with the operators.

3.3. How to conduct a JRV:

3.3.1. Conduct a hardware test by touching the hardware test button on the touch screen. The hardware test function will ensure all equipment that the operator interfaces with works properly. If the equipment does not work then open the appropriate work order.

3.3.2. The SCS and RTES operator will enable the system utilizing step 3.5.

3.3.3. The SCS will notify the Entry Control Point (ECP) that the RTES operator will be conducting a JRV. The ECP will receive an audible alarm once the system is enabled.

3.3.4. The RTES operator for every shift will open all clamshells and verify that all weapons automatically queue to their final denial position by comparing the touch screen with the appropriate checklist. If the final denial lines do not match Attachment #2, open up a work order.

3.3.5. The RTES operator will select each tower in turn and will check the pan and tilt functions of each weapon system. This will be done by moving the weapon to the extreme left, right, up and down. Care must be taken not to sweep the weapon across personnel and assets. At no time will the operator track non-hostile personnel/assets with the live system. The RTES operator will check the wide angle, infrared and scope to verify that all cameras are focused and working properly. If the weapon fails to operate correctly the RTES operator will inform the SCS and open a work order.

3.3.6. After checking each weapons pan and tilt function the operator will close that weapons clamshell before moving on to the next weapon system. The operator will ensure the clamshell fully closes and the weapon shows closed on the operator console. If the weapon fails to operate correctly, contact the SCS and initiate a work order.

3.3.7. Have the SCS press the O-Stop buttons to verify operability.

3.3.8. Once all clamshells have been closed, the RTES operator will disable the system.

3.3.9. The RTES operator will verify the operator console is not showing any error messages. If the console shows any error messages, the RTES operator will contact the SCS and initiate a work order.

3.3.10. The RTES operator will notify SCS the JRV is complete and report any discrepancies. The SCS will record the JRV in the SF blotter.

3.4. How to Conduct RVs:

3.4.1. Conduct a hardware test by touching the hardware test button on the touch screen. The hardware test function will ensure all equipment the operator interfaces with works properly. If the equipment does not work then open the appropriate work order.

3.4.2. The RTES operator will verify the operator console is not showing any error messages. If the console shows any error messages, the RTES operator will contact the SCS and initiate a work order.

3.4.3. The RTES operator will notify SSCC that the RV is complete and report any discrepancies. The SCS will record the RV in the SF blotter.

3.5. How to Enable RTES:

3.5.1. The RTES operator and the SCS enable RTES by turning the SEDS keys to "SYSTEM ENABLE". The red ENABLED light will indicate the system is activated in

conjunction with the red background of the RTES monitor. The RTES touch screen background turns red and the camera and weapon shot selection buttons appear.

3.6. When to Enable RTES:

3.6.1. The SCS determines if the threat is credible and briefs the appropriate Internal Security Response Team and AS. The AS will determine if a response from RTES is warranted. When to enable the RTES is defined in section 1.4, ROE.

3.7. Locating Threat.

3.7.1. To locate the threat from the platform, press the “platform icon,” or swipe 50% or more of the “platform monitor.” The weapon and cameras will begin to move and aim at that platform’s Primary Direction of Fire (PDF). Each tower is assigned its own PDF by programmed default.

3.7.2. The RTES operator will notify the AS which tower is currently selected by calling out “WEAPONS PLATFORM X UP” over the radio. This allows the AS to know the status of the RTES at all times and deploy appropriately.

3.7.3. Track and acquire targets by viewing the monitor to the right of the touch screen and utilize controls to verify target on the main screen.

3.8. Arming and Firing the RTES.

3.8.1. The RTES operator presses the red ARM mechanical button beneath the touch screen. After approximately two seconds, both the button on the RTES Arming Panel and clamshell icon on the touch-screen will light red.

3.8.2. It is important for the RTES Operator at this time to determine the best approach for engaging the target successfully. If the target is moving, either the tracking method of engagement, or the ambush method of engagement should be used. Whether the target is stationary or moving, the operator should evaluate distance to the target and wind, speed and direction from the tower and aim appropriately.

3.8.3. **(FOUO)** The topside weapons are sighted for a 350 meter zero. This means if the target is approximately 350 meters from the tower, the crosshairs of the scope shall be placed at the center of mass on the target.

3.8.4. Select the number of shots by using the “Shot” button on the touch screen, there are three selections, Single Fire, Burst Fire, and Full Auto.

3.8.5. Grasp the hand controller with both hands, placing each index finger on its respective firing button.

3.8.6. Pan and tilt the weapon and operate the camera zoom to acquire the threat.

3.8.7. Set the crosshairs on the target aim point.

3.8.8. Press and hold the trigger enable button located on the top left of the hand controller. To fire the weapon, press and hold the trigger button located on the top right of the hand controller. This will fire the weapon for the number of rounds selected. If Auto is selected the weapon will fire a two-second burst. If the trigger button is not depressed for the entire two seconds, the entire burst will not be accomplished.

3.8.9. When the RTES operator is assessing the engagement, the operator may select different platform cameras to determine if the threat was neutralized.

3.8.10. If the threat was not neutralized (or additional threats appear), repeat steps above. (3.8.4.-3.8.9.)

3.8.11. In the event additional hostilities are expected, press “Close All Clamshells” to safeguard the weapons until needed.

3.8.12. If a weapon was fired and hostilities have ceased, DO NOT press the “Close All Clamshells” until maintenance has been completed and CA has removed all brass from inside.

3.9. Safing and Disarming the RTES.

3.9.1. The operator will push the “Weapon Safe” button to disarm the selected platform.

3.9.2. The operator may also deselect the tower in use by selecting another platform to disengage the weapon. The newly selected tower will not be armed until the ARM mechanical button is pushed.

3.9.3. Press “Close All Clamshells” touch screen button.

3.9.4. The SCS will turn the SEDS key switch to disable.

3.9.5. SCS will notify CTS, ESS, and CA to inspect all towers for any damage. CA will ensure that all guns are reloaded.

CHAPTER 4

SAFETY AND DURESS OF THE RTES

4.1. Safety Requirements.

4.1.1 The primary safety feature of the RTES is the dual-system authorization/enablement concept. The RTES will always be disabled. DO NOT enable the system unless for a JRV, maintenance or when directed by ESS personnel, AS, or competent authority.

4.1.2. If during maintenance operations a critical malfunction occurs that could damage the system or harm personnel (such as clamshell closing on maintenance personnel), the SEDS operator will immediately press the Emergency-Stop (E-stop) button. The E-stop will disable all power to the RTES tower and remain disabled until the E-stop is returned to its normal state.

4.1.3. The RTES operator will maintain in constant contact with ESS/CTS personnel via a voice speaker system in each tower. This system is a two way intercom that allows maintenance personnel to direct the RTES operator during maintenance operations. If trouble is indicated by ESS/CTS personnel the SEDS operator will immediately press the E-stop button.

4.1.4. With the exception of real world contingencies, the operator will only open the clam shells during authorized and coordinated maintenance. The maintainer will lock out the operator on that particular RTES tower to ensure the operator cannot close the clam shell or engage the trigger. As soon as maintenance is completed, the maintainer will allow the operator access to that tower, close the clam shell, and check the diagnostics to ensure everything is still working properly. Disable the RTES via the SEDS console as soon as all maintenance has been completed.

4.1.5. During JRVs, the SCS and Entry Controller will maintain readiness to disable the RTES if the need arises.

4.2. Duress Procedures.

4.2.1. **(DCNI)** The SCS will act as the SEDS Operator. The responsibility of the SEDS Operator is to act as part of the 2-person concept in activating RTES. In the event the RTES operator performs an unauthorized function while the system is active, the SCS has system disable control via the E-Stop button/O- Stop buttons. The system will remain disabled until the E-Stop/O-Stop is returned to its normal state.

4.2.2. **(DCNI) Duress in the SSCC:** If there is duress in the SSCC or the RTES operator is performing an unauthorized action in coordination with the SCS, the KUMMSC Entry Controller has system disable control via the RDDS. The RTES will be

disabled until the RDDS is returned to its normal state. ***NOTE: The RTES may need to be rebooted since the RDDS removes all electrical power to the remote electronics.***

CHAPTER 5

SIMULATOR OPERATIONS

5.1 The RTES Simulator.

5.1.1. The RTES trainer console is located in the WSSS Squadron Operations Building #27494, Room R-1.

5.1.2. **(DCNI)** The RTES simulator allows the operator to remain proficient with the system. It has eight scenarios the operator can perform. The simulator accurately depicts the interior and exterior of KUMMSC to provide as much realism as possible.

5.1.3. The RTES simulator does not require the SCS to activate the system.

5.1.4. The operator may exit the scenario and view the statistics of rounds fired and enemy kills at any time.

5.1.5. The simulator will be used by 377 SFG/Standardization and Evaluations (SFMQ) section personnel to certify and evaluate an individual's ability to remain qualified on the RTES. FC/FCC can coordinate through ESS to gain access to this room for their certified RTES operators to train when needed.

5.2. Certification.

5.2.1. Must be a SFmember with a response force leader certification at a minimum.

5.2.2. Take and pass RTES training course conducted by ESS.

5.2.3. Must pass with 80% on written/verbal 377 SFG/SFMQ.

5.2.4. Practical will be conducted on simulator by 377 SFG/SFMQ. Trainees must pass four (4) scenarios out of (8) and not miss any critical steps.

5.3. Uncertified personnel.

5.3.1. Uncertified individuals may not operate any portion of the system unless in Phase II training and under the supervision of a certified RTES controller, ESS NCOIC or SFMQ.

CHAPTER 6

SYSTEM AND SYSTEM COMPONENT FAILURES

6.1 Work Order Priorities: The following briefly describes the work order priorities and maintenance response times. For a complete list of work order priorities and compensatory measures refer to Attachment #5 and #6 of this instruction.

6.1.1. (DCNI) Priority 1: CTS maintenance and/or CA personnel will respond within 1 hour. Once CTS maintenance and/or CA personnel arrive on scene the RTES operator will give them an in-depth briefing of the problem. CTS and CA will report to their respective duty shops to get any tools and equipment needed to perform their maintenance duties.

6.1.2. (DCNI) Priority 2: CTS maintenance and/or CA personnel will respond within 24 hours. Follow the same procedures listed in Para. 6.1.1.

6.1.3. (DCNI) Priority 3: CTS maintenance and/or CA personnel should respond by the next duty day, but not later than 72 hours after the malfunction is reported.

6.2. Opening Work Orders.

6.2.1. All work orders will be annotated in the SF Blotter and the AFTO Form 781a, *Maintenance Discrepancy and Work Document*. The Remote Display Area Operator (RDAO) and Local Display Area Operator (LDAO) will maintain a copy of the RTES AFTO Form 781a as well.

6.2.2. For safety reasons, if any component of the system fails, do not touch the SEDS or touch screens. **Exception: If the RTES is in use due to a threat or attack on KUMMSC, select another tower and continue under the direction of the SF on scene commander.** Immediately notify SCS of the failure and the SCS will open a work order via Munition Control. If the failure affects the platform of the remote electronics, SCS will notify the stand-by CA personnel. SCS will notify ESS personnel of all RTES work orders.

6.3. Closing Work Orders.

6.3.1. The RTES operator enters the names of the persons completing the work and the corrective action on the AFTO Form 781a. The RTES operator will notify SCS when the work has been completed, identify the names of the persons who completed the work and the corrective actions taken.

6.3.2. The SCS will notify the AS, FC/FCC and ESS personnel that the work order has been closed.

6.3.3. The SCS will enter the names of the persons making corrective action and the corrective action(s) taken in the SF Blotter.

6.4. Work order Tracking Procedures.

6.4.1. The SCS will notify ESS of any work orders opened/closed during the course of duty day. Priority 2 and 3 work orders opened or closed during the no-duty hours will be reported to the ESS no later than the next duty day. Priority 1 work orders opened or closed during no-duty hours will be reported to ESS and CA standby personnel immediately.

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ATTACHMENT 1

GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION

References

AFI 31-101, *Integrated Defense* (FOUO) IC #3, 3 February 2016
AFI 31-117, *Arming and Use of Force by Air Force Personnel*, 2 February 2016
AFMAN 33-363, *Management of Records*, 1 March 2008
DoD 5210.41M, AFMAN 31-108V1/V2/V3 AFGSC SUP *Nuclear Weapons Security Manual: Nuclear Weapon Specific Requirements*, 7 March 2013
KAFB IDP 31-101 IC #1, *Integrated Defense Plan*, 9 March 2016
Air Force Technical Order 31S9-4-135-2, Change #3, 31 March 2015

Prescribed Forms

No forms are prescribed by this publication

Adopted Forms

AF Form 797, *Job Qualification Standard Continuation/Command JQS*
AFTO Form 781A, *Maintenance Discrepancy and Work Document*
AF Form 53, *Security Force Desk Blotter*
AF Form 623A, *On the Job Training Record*

Abbreviations and Acronyms

AECS - Advanced Entry Control System
AFMAN - Air Force Manual
AFRIMS - Air Force Records Information Management System
AFTO - Air Force Technical Order
ANG - Air National Guard
AS - Area Supervisor
CA - Combat Arms
CTS - Cyber Transport Systems
DCNI – Department of Defense Controlled Nuclear Information
DFS - Digital Facility System
DOD - Department of Defense
DOE - Department of Energy
ECP - Entry Control Point
ESS - Electronic Security Systems
E-STOP - Emergency Stop Button
FOUO - For Official Use Only
FC - Flight Chief
FCC - Flight Commander
IDP - Installation Defense Plan
JRV - Joint Routine Verification

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION

KUMMSC - Kirtland Underground Munitions and Maintenance Storage Complex

LDAO - Local Display Area Operator

OPR - Office of Primary Responsibility

PDF - Primary Direction of Fire

QRC - Quick Reaction Checklist

RDAO - Remote Display Area Operator

RDDS - Remote Duress Disable Switch

RDS - Records Disposition Schedule

REC - Remote Electronics Cabinet

ROE - Rules of Engagement

RTES - Remote Target Engagement System

RV - Routine Verification

SCS - Security Control Supervisor

SFG - Security Forces Group

SSCC - Site Security Control Center

SEDS - System Enable-Disable Switch

SF - Security Forces

SFMQ - Security Forces Standardization and Evaluations

SSI - Special Security Instruction

TAG - Tactical Assault Guide

UPS - Uninterruptible Power Supply

Terms

ARMED - A weapon is armed in the RTES by pressing the WEAPON ARMED button on the RTES Arming Panel. Prior to this action, SEDS must be enabled, and a platform must be selected.

DISABLE - RTES is disabled when the SEDS switch is turned to the “DISABLE” position by the SEDS Operator. Pressing the E-stop or RDDS will accomplish the same purpose.

ENABLE - RTES is enabled by the SEDS switch being turned to the “ENABLE” position by both the RTES and the SEDS operators. This is the first step in allowing a weapon to be fired.

Remote Duress Disable Switch - This switch is in a remote location from the RTES Operator Console, SEDS Console and the Training/Simulator Console. If pressed, the RDDS shuts down power to all remote platforms.

RTES Consoles “States” - RTES Consoles are determined to be in one of two states. For the Operational Console, Standby State provides a Diagnostics Mode and Operational State provides full control of the mounted weapons. For the Trainer/Simulator Console, when the SEDS switch is “DISABLED”, the Simulator mode is available. When the SEDS switch is “ENABLED”, the

Simulator mode goes away, and the RTES Training platform is under direct control of the Operator.

SAFED - The state of the weapon when the gun safety actuator has engaged the weapon safety on a platform. A weapon cannot be fired in the “WEAPON SAFED” mode.

SEDS E-Stop - The SEDS E-Stop produces an emergency stop. It stops clamshell motion and disables the trigger actuator on all platforms and disables pan and tilt motion.

ATTACHMENT 2


RTES PRIMARY/SECONDARY DIRECTION OF FIRE

Table A2.1. RTES Primary/Secondary Direction Of Fire.

Tower	Primary Direction Of Fire	Secondary Direction Of Fire	RTES Coverage
Tower 1, Platform 1	V1AA	N/A	Towers 2&3
Tower 1, Platform 5	Golf Sector	N/A	Towers 2&3
Tower 2, Platform 7	V2	N/A	Towers 1&3
Tower 2, Platform 6	Foxtrot Sector	N/A	Towers 1&3
Tower 3, Platform 3	V8	N/A	Towers 1&2
Tower 3, Platform 2	Hotel Sector	N/A	Towers 1&2
Loading Dock REC 4	V5	B1&B2	REC 8
Loading Dock REC 8	V6	B1&B2	REC 4


ATTACHMENT 3
TOUCH SCREEN ICONS

Figure A3.1. Touch Screen Indicators.



ATTACHMENT 4
TOUCH SCREEN INDICATORS

Figure A4.1. Touch Screen Indicators.



ATTACHMENT 5

(DCNI) EQUIPMENT MALFUNCTION/WORK ORDER PRIORITY LISTING

(DCNI) Table 5.1. Equipment Malfunction/Work Order Priority Listing

	Equipment Malfunction	Notes	P1	P2	P3
1	Failed Hardware Test				X
2	Error on system displayed on a single Operator Console w/o a weapons platform degrade				X
3	All Operator consoles INOP		X		
4	SEDS Console		X		
5	Single Weapons Platform INOP	1			X
6	All Weapons Platforms INOP	1	X		
7	Remote Duress Disable (RDD) Switch				X
8	Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS)				X
9	Targeting cameras inoperative (Scope, Wide Angle, Thermal)	1			X
10	Platform camera inoperative				X
11	Trainer Console/Server/Weapons Platform				X
12	Trainer Console/Server				X

NOTE 1: CA will respond when requested by CTS/ESS.

ATTACMENT 6

(DCNI) EQUIPMENT MALFUNCTION/COMPENSATORY MEASURES

Table A6.1. (DCNI) Equipment Malfunction/Compensatory Measures

	Equipment Malfunction	Notes
1	Failed Hardware Test	1
2	Error on system displayed on a single Operator Console	1
3	All Operator consoles INOP	0
4	SEDS Console	0
5	Single Weapons Platform INOP	0
6	All Weapons Platforms INOP	0
7	RDD Switch	0
8	Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS)	0
9	Targeting cameras inoperative (Scope, Wide Angle, Thermal)	0
10	Platform camera inoperative	0
11	Trainer Console/Server/Weapons Platform	0
12	Trainer Console/Server	0
13	Simulator PTZ INOP	0

NOTE 0: No Compensatory Measures required.

NOTE 1: Utilize the other RTES Operator Console already manned by Romeo-1/2.