

**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR
INFORMATION**

BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER
377th WEAPONS SYSTEM SECURITY SQUADRON (WSSS)
KIRTLAND AIR FORCE BASE (AFGSC)

WSSS SOP 31-101, Volume 2
17 May 2016

Security Forces

FLIGHTLINE SECURITY



COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY

ACCESSIBILITY: This publication is only available directly from the OPR.

RELEASABILITY: Access to this publication is restricted: this publication is classified Department of Defense (DoD) Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information/For Official Use Only (DCNI/FOUO). This publication may not be released to foreign nationals; requests for accessibility must be approved by the OPR.

OPR: 377 WSSS/S5

Certified by: 377 WSSS/CC
(Lt Col James K. Meier)

Supersedes: 377 WSSS SOP 31-101 Vol 2, 16 February 2016

[Pages: 37]

This 377 WSSS Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) implements Air Force Instruction (AFI) 31-101, *Integrated Defense* and establishes guidance governing the authority, procedures, responsibilities, duties, guidance, standards, tasks and requirements for all flight operations. This instruction establishes procedures and requirements regarding REFLEX DELTA operations, flightline security, downed aircraft security and additional aircraft security and response procedures. This publication does not apply to Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) Units. This publication does not apply to Air National Guard (ANG). Refer recommended changes and questions about this publication to the Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) using AF Form 847, *Recommendation for Change of Publication*; route AF Forms 847 from the field through the appropriate functional's chain of command. Ensure that all records created as a result of processes prescribed in this publication are maintained in accordance with Air Force Manual (AFMAN) 33-363, *Management of Records*, and disposed of in accordance with Air Force Records Information Management System (AFRIMS) Records Disposition Schedule (RDS) located at <https://www.mv.af.mil/afrims/afrims/afrims/rims.cfm>. See **Attachment 1** for a Glossary of References and Supporting Information.

**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR
INFORMATION**

Table of Contents

CHAPTER 1: REFLEX DELTA OPERATIONS

1.1. REFLEX DELTA Notification and Response	3
1.2. REFLEX DELTA Posting Requirements.....	6
1.3. Security Forces Responsibilities	7
1.4. Alert Crew Billets.....	7
1.5. Emergency Departure Procedures	8
1.6. Aircraft Entry Procedures.....	9

CHAPTER 2: FLIGHTLINE SECURITY OPERATIONS

2.1. General.....	12
2.2. Armament	13
2.3. Restricted Area Delineation	13
2.4. Special Tasking Missions	16
2.5. Flightline Photography/Unauthorized Photography.....	23

CHAPTER 3: DOWNED AIRCRAFT SECURITY AND RESPONSE PROCEDURES

3.1. Purpose.....	24
3.2. Responsibilities	24
3.3. Post Limit.....	24
3.4. Uniform/Equipment	24
3.5. Procedures.....	24

CHAPTER 4: ADDITIONAL AIRCRAFT SECURITY AND RESPONSE PROCEDURES

4.1. Security Incidents/Covered Wagons	27
4.2. Unauthorized Aircraft Movement/Anti-Hijacking Procedures.....	27
4.3. Unauthorized Airspace Incursion/Landing.....	28
4.4. Fuel Leak/Hazardous Material (HAZMAT) Incidents	29

ATTACHMENTS

Attachment 1. Glossary of References and Supporting Documents	30
Attachment 2. Security Acknowledgement Letter.....	34
Attachment 3. Reflex Delta Mission Commander Brief.....	35
Attachment 4. Ascot Security Briefing.....	37

CHAPTER 1

REFLEX DELTA OPERATIONS

1.1. REFLEX DELTA Notification and Response.

1.1.1. (DCNI) There are two types of REFLEX DELTA aircraft(s) common to KAFB. They are classified as “Alphas” and “Tangos”. Alpha refers to the USSTRATCOM’s Airborne Command Post (ABNCP) and Tango refers to the Navy’s Take Charge and Move-Out (TACAMO). In the event that Two-Person Control (TPC) material is present on the aircraft, a No-Lone Zone (NLZ) will be established. **Note:** The security needed for a REFLEX DELTA is dependent on the mission status of the aircraft.

1.1.2. (DCNI) Aircraft Arrival. Official notification of REFLEX DELTA aircraft arrival will come from the Kirtland Command Post (KCP).

1.1.3. (DCNI) The Site Security Control Center (SSCC) will be the primary control center responsible for all notifications, recall of additional personnel, and logistical requirements for receiving REFLEX DELTA aircraft. The Base Defense Operations Center (BDOC) will be the alternate control center.

1.1.3.1. (DCNI) Initial notifications from KCP will constitute a *request* to support a REFLEX DELTA mission. SSCC controllers should not confuse this *request* to support with *official approval* to support. Upon receiving a request, SSCC will immediately contact operations leadership and pass along pertinent information via the 377th Weapons System Security Squadron (WSSS) encryption matrix.

1.1.3.2. (FOUO) Operations leadership will contact all flight leaders with a mission notification and attempt to identify manning, duty position certification, or weapon certification shortfalls. SSCC controllers may be asked to aid with these notifications to flight leadership. Flight leaders must immediately plan and coordinate as needed to post additional personnel.

1.1.3.3. (DCNI) After all flight leaders have been notified and necessary manning adjustments have been projected and coordinated, operations leadership will notify the 377 WSSS Commander (CC) with GO/NO-GO notification for REFLEX DELTA support. The CC will notify the 377 Security Forces Group Commander (SFG/CC) who will then relay a GO/NO-GO decision back to the KCP.

1.1.3.4. (DCNI) If the KCP receives a “GO” notification from the SFG/CC, the KCP will contact SSCC a second time with an official notification/approval for the REFLEX DELTA mission. SSCC will then notify all applicable personnel via the 377 WSSS encryption matrix.

1.1.4. (DCNI) Each on-duty flight has the primary responsibility to man any REFLEX DELTA aircraft. If flights cannot support manning for REFLEX DELTA aircraft(s), flight leadership will contact 377 WSSS/S3 or S3O for additional manning and guidance. Upon notification of immediate or short-notice REFLEX DELTA arrival, recalled personnel will report immediately to the armory or, depending on notification information, report as directed for guardmount.

1.1.4.1. (DCNI) 377th Air Base Wing (ABW)/KCP, Bldg #20604, maintains the REFLEX DELTA kit. The REFLEX DELTA kit will contain:

1.1.4.1.1. Four (4) radios.

1.1.4.1.2. Six (6) radio batteries.

1.1.4.1.3. Twenty (20) pagers.

1.1.4.1.4. One (1) battery charging dock.

1.1.4.1.5. VA Gate remote opener.

1.1.5. (DCNI) Upon arrival on the parking apron, the Flight Commander (FCC) or Flight Chief (FC) will meet the REFLEX DELTA Mission Commander and brief him/her on the following utilizing Attachment 3:

1.1.5.1. Current Force Protection Condition.

1.1.5.2. Localized threat assessment.

1.1.5.3. Current Duress Words.

1.1.5.4. Current Alert Response Codes. **Note:** The numbers must differ from the Base Emergency Response Codes

1.1.5.5. Any other information pertaining to the security of the aircraft and surrounding area.

1.1.6. Additionally, obtain the following information from the Mission Commander:

**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR
INFORMATION**

1.1.6.1. (FOUO) Contact information for the Mission Commander (cell phone number, lodging building/room number) and place this information on the EAL.

1.1.6.2. (DCNI) Verify the presence of Positive Control Material (PCM) and Airborne Launch Control System (ALCS) critical components.

1.1.6.2.1. (DCNI) The Computer Generated Entry Authority List (CGEAL) will have a space to indicate when PCM or ALCS critical components were placed on the aircraft. The presence of these components requires PL 1 security and enforcement of the two-person control. Certified two-person control team members are identified with an “X” next to their name on the authenticated CGEAL.

1.1.7. (FOUO) If the FCC/FC is unavailable, the Flightline Area Supervisor (AS) will meet the Mission Commander and pass along/obtain the information identified in paragraphs 1.1.5. – 1.1.6.

1.1.8. (DCNI) An SF member, E-5 or above, will authenticate the REFLEX DELTA aircrew CGEAL.

1.1.8.1. (FOUO) Obtain four (4) copies to be distributed as follows:

1.1.8.1.1. 1 original for the REFLEX DELTA Entry Control Point (ECP).

1.1.8.1.2. 1 copy for the Aircraft External Security Response Team (ESRT).

1.1.8.1.3. 1 copy for the Mission Commander.

1.1.8.1.4. 1 copy for SSCC.

1.1.8.1.5. 1 copy for BDOC.

1.1.8.2. (FOUO) Pen and ink annotations are authorized for changes to the PCM and ACLS portions of the CGEAL.

1.1.8.3. (FOUO) Deletions can be made by using pen and ink changes to the existing CGEAL.

1.1.8.4. (FOUO) Additions may be made by providing separate EALs.

1.1.8.5. (FOUO) Individuals with interim PRP Certification can be used for a “Two-Person Control Team.” These individuals will be identified with a double asterisks “**” in the TPC column. **Note:** Interim Certified personnel can only be used as a Two-Person Control Team member if the other team member is fully certified with no restrictions.

1.1.8.6. (FOUO) Requesting agencies must produce an updated version of the EAL if at any time the original EAL becomes difficult to use.

1.1.9. (DCNI) The aircrew will secure the aircraft (with a numbered seal) before leaving the pad/ramp. The AS will ensure the seal number is relayed to SSCC to be documented in the blotter.

1.1.10. (DCNI) The Mission Commander, via SSCC, will be notified of any incident which involves the security of the REFLEX DELTA.

1.2. REFLEX DELTA Posting Requirements.

1.2.1. (DCNI) Four (4) additional SF personnel are required for PL 1 REFLEX DELTA aircraft. For call-signs, refer to Kirtland AFB Integrated Defense Plan (KAFB IDP) 31-101. **Note:** The presence of Two-Person Control (TPC) material aboard an unoccupied aircraft requires two-person control outside the aircraft and will require SF personnel to be Personnel Reliability Program (PRP) certified.

1.2.1.1. (FOUO) Provide one (1) Entry Controller (EC) to provide immediate internal response to the aircraft, as long as entry control point surveillance is maintained.

1.2.1.2. (FOUO) Provide one (1) Close Bound Sentry (CBS), dedicated to immediate response to the restricted area and able to maintain boundary surveillance.

1.2.1.3. (FOUO) Provide a two-person External Response Team (ESRT) capable of responding immediately to defeat the adversary before any negative effect against the resource occurs.

1.2.1.4. (DCNI) Provide an Area Supervisor (AS) for the designated area.
Note: The posted Flightline AS will act as the Area Supervisor for all REFLEX DELTA aircraft.

1.2.1.5. (DCNI) Provide additional REFLEX DELTA CBSs as needed when two (2) or more REFLEX DELTA aircraft are present and collocated.

1.2.2. (DCNI) When two (2) or more REFLEX DELTA aircraft are present, the plane will be collocated (parked next to each other) at parking location D10 within the Restricted Area. A single rope line will split the two areas.

1.2.2.1. (DCNI) The EC will be responsible for controlling entry into the restricted area. Remember, the restricted area will be its own No-Lone Zone (NLZ), and personnel from one (1) aircraft will not be authorized into the other area unless authorized personnel escort them.

1.2.3. (DCNI) During increased FPCONs (Charlie or higher), five (5) extra SF personnel are required for ABNCP and TACAMO aircraft.

1.2.3.1. (DCNI) REFLEX DELTA Security Response Team (SRT) leader and member.

1.2.3.2. (DCNI) REFLEX DELTA Alert Crew Billets EC.

1.2.3.3. (DCNI) Two REFLEX DELTA Alert Crew Billets CBSs.

1.3. Security Forces Responsibilities.

1.3.1. (DCNI) Unless the ABNCP and TACAMO aircraft arrive for transient purposes and do not require PL 1 security and PRP, SF are required to provide continuous PL 1 aircraft security for both the ABNCP and TACAMO aircraft.

1.4. Alert Crew Billets.

1.4.1. (FOUO) Prior to Alert Crew arrival. Ensure a sweep of the Alert Crew billets (Bldg #917) has been completed prior to aircrew arrival. **Note:** If an explosive detection capable Military Working Dog (MWD) team is not available, the Flightline ESRT will conduct the sweep of the building. This is not a tactical sweep; patrols will be looking for obvious contraband or explosive items. All rooms and cabinets must be searched. Use the master key provided by the lodging staff (located in the east side billeting front desk, Bldg #22016) to conduct the sweep. Notify SSCC when sweep has been initiated and completed.

1.4.1.1. (FOUO) After the crew has accepted security of the crew billets, the Flightline ESRT will make periodic security checks of the building (not to

exceed every two (2) hours). **Note:** Checks of the facility will be documented in the SSCC blotter.

1.4.2. (DCNI) Prepare to receive Alert Crew in FPCON Charlie and higher: Alert Crew Billets EC will stay at the laundry room door and control entry into the building and Alert Crew Billets CBSs will post as indicated in paragraph 1.4.2.2.2..

1.4.2.1. (DCNI) When the crew bus arrives, the EC for Bldg #917 will contact the Mission Commander and direct him/her to their room, #454. The REFLEX DELTA SRT will contact the REFLEX DELTA lodging representative and advise him/her of the location of the front desk.

1.4.2.2. (DCNI) REFLEX DELTA SRT Leader will brief the Airborne Emergency Action Officer (AEAO) and the Mission Commander on the following:

1.4.2.2.1. (FOUO) The Alert Crew Billets EC will control entry and exit through the west entrance door. **Note:** Limited entry can be permitted through the laundry room door. Personnel requesting entry through this door must ring the doorbell to notify the EC.

1.4.2.2.2. (FOUO) The SF Alert Crew Billets CBS will be posted outside Bldg #917. Alert Crew Billets CBS Leader's area of responsibility will be from the SW corner of the building to the NE corner along the east side of the building. Alert Crew Billets CBS member's area of responsibility will be from the NE corner of the building to the SW corner along the west side of the building. **Note:** During increased FPCONs, the combination to the doors will not be briefed or provided to any crew members.

1.5. Emergency Departure Procedures.

1.5.1. (DCNI) SF Response. Responding SF will not interfere with the taxiing or launch of an alert aircraft, unless there is a positive confirmed indication of duress. If for any reason a responding patrol cannot meet their response time or get to their response destination, notify SSCC immediately. **Note:** Emergency departure procedures will remain in effect until the aircraft either departs (taxies) or shuts engines down.

1.5.1.1. (DCNI) Upon official notification from KCP to SSCC of an emergency departure, REFLEX DELTA Entry Controller will immediately move the GOV adjacent to the Alert Crew parking location and return to the nose of the A/C to pass the Alert Response Code to all of the responding crewmembers. The area SRT will immediately respond to the Randolph gate to expedite entry into the flightline. Once Alert Crew enters the flightline, SRT will prevent any unauthorized entry into the flightline until vehicle gate is closed.

**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR
INFORMATION**

1.5.2. (DCNI) Alert Response Code Use. The Alert Response Code will be used to expedite entry of alert crewmembers.

1.5.2.1. (DCNI) REFLEX DELTA Entry Controller will use the Alert Response Code at the nose of the A/C to expedite entry. Alert Response Code will be passed to every crewmember responding to the A/C.

1.5.2.2. (FOUO) If an incorrect response is received, the vehicle will be stopped and the individual providing the incorrect response will be removed from the vehicle and separated from the other occupants. They will be afforded the opportunity to indicate duress and their identity will be verified using the authenticated CGEAL and their Common Access Card. If everything is in order and no duress is indicated, allow entry.

1.6. Aircraft Entry Procedures.

1.6.1. ABNCP Aircraft.

1.6.1.1. (DCNI) REFLEX DELTA crew members will be granted entry into the Close-In Security (CIS) area by use of an authenticated CGEAL supported by an identification credential check.

1.6.1.1.1. (DCNI) Whenever Positive Control Material (PCM), Volatile Keying Assembly (VKA), Portable Storage Unit (PSU) or Code Processor Equipment (CPE) is aboard the aircraft; the interior of the aircraft becomes a No-Lone Zone (NLZ).

1.6.1.1.2. (DCNI) When the NLZ is in effect, all vehicles/equipment entering the CIS area must be searched.

1.6.1.1.3. (DCNI) When the aircraft is closed or sealed, the NLZ is from the exterior of the aircraft out to the red line of the restricted area boundary around the aircraft. Entry can be granted to personnel with an "X" in the "two-person control team" column of the CGEAL.

1.6.1.1.4. (DCNI) When the aircraft is open, the NLZ transfers to the interior of the aircraft and entry into the alert ABNCP aircraft is the responsibility of the Two-Person Control Policy Team inside the aircraft.

1.6.1.1.4.1. (FOUO) Sole Vouching Authority (SVA).

Normally the senior member of the first Two-Person Control or Two-Person Control Policy Team to arrive at the aircraft will assume SVA responsibilities. The SVA may relinquish SVA duties to any individual listed on the CGEAL. This transfer of

authority must be accomplished in a face-to-face manner with the EC. Only one (1) SVA can be present in the NLZ at a time.

1.6.1.1.5. (FOUO) Kirtland Air Force Base personnel will be escorted at all times by members of the aircrew and/or operations team while inside the CIS area.

1.6.2. TACAMO Aircraft.

1.6.2.1. (DCNI) TACAMO crew members will be granted entry into the restricted area by use of an authenticated CGEAL supported by an identification credential check.

1.6.2.2. (FOUO) Kirtland Air Force Base personnel are authorized unescorted entry into the restricted area as long as the aircraft is secured. If the aircraft is open, members of the aircrew or operations team must escort host base support personnel while they are inside the restricted area.

1.6.3. Emergency Entry Procedures.

1.6.3.1. (FOUO) For verified emergencies, personnel who respond to the flightline restricted/controlled areas under emergency conditions such as Fire Department (FD), Medical, Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) and SF will be granted entry without delay. The Flightline ESRT Leader is responsible for verifying an emergency exists and overseeing surveillance of personnel entering under emergency conditions.

1.6.3.2. (FOUO) All emergency response vehicles (e.g., FD, Medical, EOD, and SF) will be granted entry through the use of the Emergency Response Code (ERC). The AS will account for the number of personnel/vehicles entering the RAs, and then allow them to proceed.

1.6.3.3. (FOUO) The Albuquerque Ambulance Service (AAS) is responsible for medical responses. AAS will be escorted by an on-duty 377 SFS patrol and will respond to the first available ECP. **Note:** AAS will be preannounced and will not use the ERC.

1.6.3.4. (FOUO) The EC, CBS, and ISRT will respond and establish a 360-degree security perimeter around the aircraft. All SF personnel will authenticate with responding agencies using the ERC.

1.6.3.4.1. (FOUO) Individuals using the ERC will be given only one (1) chance to authenticate. If an incorrect response is received, the vehicle will be stopped and the individual providing the incorrect response will be removed from the vehicle and separated from the other occupants. They will be afforded the opportunity to indicate duress and their identity will

**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR
INFORMATION**

be verified through SSCC by contacting the appropriate agency to vouch for individuals. If everything is in order and no duress is indicated, they will be allowed to proceed.

1.6.3.5. (DCNI) REFLEX DELTA EC and CBS must ensure an accurate accountability of responding emergency personnel/vehicles entering the RA is maintained.

1.6.3.5.1. (FOUO) When the emergency has been terminated, all responding personnel will be logged in on an AF Form 1109, *Visitor Register Log*. Personnel and vehicles will be subject to normal processing procedures (i.e., all hand-carried items searched, all vehicles searched, and logged out of the area on the AF Form 1109). **Note:** If an ambulance needs to expedite transporting to the hospital, a 377 SFS patrol will escort the vehicle to the hospital and accomplish the search and complete the AF Form 1109.

1.6.3.6. (FOUO) For unknown emergencies/responses, immediately notify SSCC and verify that an emergency exists prior to allowing entry. Once the emergency is confirmed, emergency entry procedures apply.

CHAPTER 2

FLIGHTLINE SECURITY OPERATIONS

2.1. (FOUO) General. The 377 ABW Transient Ramp encompasses aircraft parking aprons Bravo and Delta. The 58th Special Operations Wing (58 SOW) Ramp is Apron Echo and the 150th Special Operations Wing (150 SOW) apron is called the New Mexico Air National Guard (NMANG) Ramp. The 377 ABW Transient Ramp and Hot Cargo Pads (HCP) are numbered 2-5. See paragraph 2.3. below for area descriptions and delineations. Posted patrols provide direct support for all transient aircraft arriving at Base Operations to include Special Airlift Assignment Missions (SAAM), Distinguished Visitors (DV), Defense Courier, Royal Air Force, and Type II missions.

2.1.1. (FOUO) Internal Security Response Teams (ISRTs). Each restricted area containing a PL resource will have an ISRT responsible for responding to any incidents involving PL resources. The ISRT will remain within the restricted area boundary anytime PL3 or higher aircraft are present, unless properly relieved. When no PL aircraft are present ISRTs will remain within the flightline RA, unless authorized by the AS, FCC/FC or higher authority, but will maintain response requirements. An ISRT will be posted at HCPs 2-5 anytime PL 3 or higher aircraft are present. ISRTs will provide an immediate armed response (not to exceed three (3) minutes) to all incidents involving PL aircraft within their areas.

2.1.2. (FOUO) External Security Response Team (ESRT). The ESRT is the AS and is responsible for security operations on the flightline. The ESRT will provide an immediate armed response (not to exceed 5 minutes) to all incidents involving PL aircraft on the flightline, HCPs, and/or within other temporary restricted areas.

2.1.3. (FOUO) All SF members posted on the flightline must have a serviceable AF 1199 with the appropriate open areas. Any personnel, not armed and posted for duty, with the appropriate open area may serve as an escort official for that area. The areas of the flightline are:

2.1.3.1. 150 SOW NMANG: Open area 19 (open area 20 for 150 NMANG Command Post access).

2.1.3.2. 58 SOW: Open area 4.

2.1.3.3. 377 ABW Transient Ramp: Open area 6.

2.1.3.4. Hot Cargo Pad (HCP) 5: Open area 9.

2.1.4. (DCNI) All flightline patrols are part of the Initial Back-up Force (IBF) response for the Kirtland Underground Munitions Maintenance and Storage Complex (KUMMSC) and are responsible for rapid response to incidents involving PL 1 resources as directed by the FCC, FC, and/or SSCC, or BDOC (when acting as security control center). When directed, all responding patrols will respond to KUMMSC immediately, without being properly relieved, for all real world and exercise events; with the exception of REFLEX DELTA post and patrols.

2.1.5. (FOUO) If an AF 1199 is discovered during Restricted Area badge checks that cannot be distinguished (e.g. faded photograph or information scratched off) or damaged to the extent recognition/identification is not possible, it will be confiscated and the bearer will not be granted unescorted entry into the Restricted Area. If confiscated, an AF Form 52, *Evidence Tag*, will be accomplished and the receipt will be issued to the member. The member will be instructed to take the AF Form 52 receipt to their badge issuing authority. Turn in the confiscated AF 1199 to S3O for further disposition.

2.2. (FOUO) Armament.

2.2.1. (FOUO) All ISRTs and ESRT will be armed in accordance with the Integrated Defense Plan (IDP) Post Priority Chart.

2.3. Restricted Area Delineations.

2.3.1. (FOUO) 377 ABW Transient Ramp. Area 6, located west of parking ramp Echo, south of parking ramp Charlie, east of Airfield Operations, and north of taxiway Bravo to include Bravo and Delta ramps and the helipads located to the west of Hangar 1000. **Note:** The helipads are located within the Controlled Movement Area (CMA) and are off limits without prior approval through/direct contact with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) tower. There are eight (8) ECPs to this area. They are located as follows:

2.3.1.1. ECP #14: On the west perimeter adjacent to Bldg #377.

2.3.1.2. ECP #15: On the west perimeter directly in front of Bldg #376.

2.3.1.3. ECP #16: On the west perimeter approximately 100 feet north of the Presidential Gate.

2.3.1.4. ECP #17: On the west perimeter directly adjacent to the Presidential Gate.

2.3.1.5. ECP #18: On the west perimeter adjacent to Bldg #333 (Base Operations).

2.3.1.6. ECP #19: On the south perimeter at taxiway gap Bravo 5 and Delta ramp intersection.

2.3.1.7. ECP #20: On the south perimeter at taxiway gap Mike 2 and Delta ramp intersection.

2.3.1.8. ECP #21: On the south perimeter at taxiway gap Bravo 6 and Delta ramp intersection.

2.3.2. (FOUO) 58 SOW Restricted Area. Area 4, located west of Fire Station 2, south of Bldgs #1017 and #1018, east of the 377 ABW Transient Ramp Restricted Area, and north of Taxiway Alpha to include Echo ramp, Hangars 1000, 1001, 1002, bldg 985, 986, 979, portions of Bravo 4-5 parking apron, and the hangar floor portion (not including offices) of Bldg #1037 (Fuels Shop). There are twenty (20) ECPs to this area. They are located as follows:

2.3.2.1. ECP #6: Vehicle gate on the east perimeter adjacent to Fire Station 2.

2.3.2.2. ECP #7: Pedestrian Gate on the northeast perimeter adjacent to parking spot Foxtrot 7.

2.3.2.3. ECP #7A: Vehicle gate on the north perimeter northwest of Hangar 1002.

2.3.2.4. ECP #8: Pedestrian Gate on the north perimeter between Hangars 1001 and 1002.

2.3.2.5. ECP #9: Pedestrian Gate on the north perimeter adjacent to the northeast corner of Hangar 1001.

2.3.2.6. ECP #9A: Vehicle gate on the north perimeter adjacent to the northeast corner of Hangar 1001.

2.3.2.7. ECP #9B: Vehicle gate on the north western corner of Hangar 1001

2.3.2.8. ECP #10: Pedestrian Gate on the north perimeter between Hangars 1000 and 1001.

2.3.2.9. ECP #10A: Pedestrian Gate on the northeast corner of Hangar 1000.

2.3.2.10. ECP #10B: Pedestrian Gate on the north end of Hangar 1000.

2.3.2.11. ECP #10C: Pedestrian Gate on the northwest corner of Hangar 1000.

2.3.2.12. ECP #11: Pedestrian Gate on the north perimeter adjacent to the northwest corner of Hangar 1000.

**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR
INFORMATION**

2.3.2.13. ECP #11A: Vehicle gate on the north perimeter adjacent to the northwest corner of Hangar 1000.

2.3.2.14. ECP #12: On the northwest perimeter adjacent to parking spot A4 at the taxiway gap leading to the Randolph Gate.

2.3.2.15. ECP #13: On the south perimeter at taxiway gap Alpha 9.

2.3.2.16. ECP #24: Pedestrian entrance south of bldg. 985

2.3.2.17. ECP #25: Pedestrian entrance south of bldg. 986.

2.3.2.18. ECP #26: Vehicle gate south of bldg. 979 on Randolph Ave.

2.3.2.19. ECP #27: Vehicle gate south of bldg. 484.

2.3.2.20. ECP #28: Vehicle gate south of bldg. 482.

2.3.3. (FOUO) 150 SOW NMANG Restricted Area. Area 19, located west and south of Randolph Avenue, east of the 58 SOW Restricted Area, and north of Taxiway Alpha. There are five (5) ECPs to this area. They are located as follows:

2.3.3.1. ECP#1: On the northeast perimeter adjacent to Bldg #1030/“Barn 1.”

2.3.3.2. ECP#2: On the north perimeter just north of parking spot Charlie 1.

2.3.3.3. ECP#3: On the northwest perimeter adjacent to parking spot Alpha 1.

2.3.3.4. ECP #4: On the west perimeter adjacent to parking spot Alpha 6.

2.3.3.5. ECP#5: On the southwest perimeter at taxiway gap Mike 6.

2.3.4. (DCNI) Hot Cargo Pads 2, 3, 4 and 5. HCPs 2, 3, 4, and 5 are designated and posted as restricted areas only when PL aircraft are present. When logistics aircraft containing PL 1 resources are located in the area, a temporary restricted area will be established and marked by appropriate restricted area and ECP signs. PL 2 or 3 aircraft located on HCPs 2, 3, 4 and 5 are not required to be roped off however; special task missions will require additional equipment (e.g., ropes, stanchions and ECP signs).

2.3.4.1. (DCNI) HCPs will be designated as restricted areas whenever PL resources are present. Area 9 on the AF Form 1199, *Computer Generated Restricted Area Badge*, along with a properly authenticated EAL or crew orders will be required for entry when PL 1 resources are located on the pad or other properly marked restricted areas. Credentials identified in DoD S-5210.41M_Air Force Manual 31-108, Volume 2, AFGSCSUP *Nuclear*

Weapon Security Manual: General Nuclear Weapon Security Procedures, 21 February 2014, for Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) will be honored.

2.3.4.2. (DCNI) The HCP is normally located at the east end of the flightline at Pad 5 but may be relocated to the alternate HCP for aircraft loaded with conventional explosives.

2.3.4.3. (DCNI) The alternate HCP parking location for aircraft is the bend in the taxiway at Pad 5. Use of the alternate HCP must be approved by the 377 ABW/CC or designated representative for PL 1 resources.

2.4. Special Tasking Missions.

2.4.1. (DCNI) Type I Actions. In the event of a short notice Type I aircraft, 150 ANG ISRT, 58 SOW ISRT, Flightline ESRT, Transient Ramp ISRT, and FCC/FC will be dispatched to the appropriate pad to initiate security operations until the arrival of recalled personnel. SSCC will contact BDOC to have 377 SFS patrols respond and assist with security. As a minimum, actions will be:

2.4.1.1. (FOUO) Ensure sufficient ropes and stanchions are in place at the pad. They can be found in the connex located at Pad 5.

2.4.1.2. (FOUO) Conduct a security sweep of the pad prior to arrival of the aircraft.

2.4.1.3. (FOUO) In the event the aircraft should reach the pad before the entire response force is in place, the senior SF representative on-scene will brief the courier/aircraft commander on the status of SF. Additionally, the aircrew will maintain security responsibility for the aircraft until all SF units are in place.

2.4.1.4. (DCNI) For Type I operations, KAFB personnel are authorized entry into these areas based on EALs authenticated by the aircraft courier and SF. The aircrew may use a home station AF Form 1199 and set of crew orders will be obtained for use as an EAL. An SF member in the grade of E-5 or above will authenticate the EAL for transient PL aircraft.

2.4.2. Type II Security Requirements.

2.4.2.1. For aircraft arriving Type II, Entry Control procedures will be initiated once the aircrew/aircraft arrives at the pad.

2.4.2.1.1. (FOUO) Once the aircraft has arrived at the pad and the engines have been shut down, an SF member will meet the aircrew and complete a Security Acknowledgement Letter (SAL) (See Attachment 2). The aircrew or SF member (if requested by the

**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR
INFORMATION**

aircrew) will control entry into the area.

2.4.2.1.2. (FOUO) The aircrew is responsible for providing a copy of an EAL (crew orders, inspectors' orders, or itinerary) even if the aircraft is staying for only a short period of time. A SF member in the grade of E-5 or above will authenticate the EAL for transient PL aircraft.

2.4.2.1.3. (FOUO) When Type II designated aircraft are on the HCP, an ISRT will be present to respond immediately not to exceed three (3) minutes.

2.4.2.1.4. (FOUO) If aircrew members depart the aircraft, it is the responsibility of FCC/FC to obtain an EAL, Security Acknowledgment Letter (SAL) (See Attachment 2), and itinerary, if possible, from the aircrew/commander, prior to their departure. The letter will outline any security measures to be taken during the absence of the aircrew. Additionally, the aircrew courier will secure the aircraft before leaving the pad/ramp with a numbered seal if they want the aircraft sealed. Ensure the seal number, the SAL, the EAL, itineraries and phone number of where the aircrew can be reached for emergencies are sent to SSCC. The aircraft arrival information and seal number will be recorded in the 377 WSSS blotter.

2.4.2.1.5. (DCNI) If the aircraft arrives Type II and departs Type I, FCC/FC will be responsible for obtaining/issuing all pertinent information from the aircraft commander (e.g., itinerary, Security Acknowledgment Letter, authenticating EAL, and ensuring the aircraft is sealed). All information will be forwarded to SSCC immediately. **Note:** Seal numbers can be transmitted via landline. **THE SEAL WILL BE VERIFIED AT EVERY SHIFT CHANGE.**

2.4.2.1.6. (FOUO) Entry control procedures will be terminated when the aircrew accepts full responsibility of the aircraft and cargo. Normally, this will occur just prior to aircraft departure.

2.4.3. Security Acknowledgement Letter (SAL).

2.4.3.1. (FOUO) The SAL is a means of transferring security responsibility to SF. The SAL is only required when the crew is not at the aircraft. The SAL will be completed in duplicate and only the Flightline AS or FCC/FC will sign in the designated space. FCC/FC will ensure:

2.4.3.2. The courier keeps the original copy of the SAL.

2.4.3.3. A copy of the SAL, EAL, and itinerary are given to SSCC.

2.4.4. Securing Presidential, Senior Executive (SENEX), Specifically Designated Special Air Mission (SDSAM) and Special Airlift Assignment Mission (SAAM) aircraft.

2.4.4.1. Presidential Aircraft Security.

2.4.4.1.1. (FOUO) Presidential Aircraft Security Requirements. The 377 SFG, WSSS or SFS must:

2.4.4.1.1.1. (FOUO) Establish a temporary restricted area consisting of rope, cones, stanchions, restricted area signs and entry control point signs for each aircraft.

2.4.4.1.1.2. (FOUO) Establish a temporary restricted area consisting of rope, cones, stanchions, restricted area signs and entry control point signs for age equipment and presidential aircraft fuel supplies if space in existing restricted areas is unavailable.

2.4.4.1.1.3. (FOUO) Ensure that, at a minimum, four (4) light-all units for each aircraft are available. **Note:** Light-all units should be placed facing the resource.

2.4.4.1.1.4. (FOUO) Ensure two (2) light-all units for each presidential fuel supply area as a minimum.

2.4.4.1.1.5. (FOUO) Provide a portable radio and a vehicle or sentry shelter to each EC.

2.4.4.1.1.6. (FOUO) Provide two (2) CBSs, for close boundary surveillance, and fuel security for each restricted area. They will be posted at the rear of each aircraft. **EXCEPTION:** Provide only one CBS for C-37, C-20 and C-40 aircraft upgraded to Presidential status due to the smaller size of the aircraft.

2.4.4.1.1.7. (FOUO) Provide one (1) two-person ESRT. They must provide an immediate response, not to exceed five (5) minutes.

2.4.4.1.1.8. (FOUO) Ensure all Aerospace Ground Equipment (AGE) is inspected with an explosives detection dog team or a qualified EOD team before using it.

2.4.4.1.1.9. (FOUO) Inspect all vehicles and equipment prior to aircraft arrival and inspect all vehicles requesting entry after the aircraft has landed.

2.4.4.1.2. (FOUO) Presidential Aircraft Security Procedures. The 377th Maintenance Group (MXG) Maintenance Operations (MXO) e-mails itineraries for all DV visits to the Flightline Constable daily. In the event of a Presidential Aircraft visit, the Transient Ramp ISRT will meet all arriving transient aircraft and obtain an EAL. FCC/FC will meet the aircraft to determine/provide needed security. Flightline ESRT will ensure sufficient ropes, stanchions, ECP and restricted area signs are posted around the aircraft and fuel supplies in accordance with paragraphs 2.4.4.1.1.1. and 2.4.4.1.1.2. above. SSCC will contact airfield management for all required light-all units in accordance with paragraphs 2.4.4.1.1.3. and 2.4.4.1.1.4. above.

2.4.4.1.2.1. (FOUO) Security personnel assigned to the Presidential Airlift Group (PAG) coordinate security activities for arrival and departure with United States Secret Service (USSS) personnel and maintain security responsibility for controlling entry to aircraft during all facets of the presidential flight. The Chief of Presidential Aircraft Security (CPAS) or senior Presidential Aircraft Security (ASNCO) will coordinate security activities with USSS personnel during mission situations. Only personnel designated by the CPAS will perform entry control and supervision.

2.4.4.1.2.2. (FOUO) These aircraft will park in the 377 ABW transient ramp (open area 6), on the east side of Base Operations, so maintenance personnel and transient ramp ISRT can closely monitor the area.

2.4.4.1.2.3. (FOUO) The Presidential pilot approves all aircraft cargo, except for personal baggage of crewmembers and passengers. USSS and White House Transportation Agency representatives inspect and approve all personal and hand carried articles of passengers before loading. All aircrew baggage will be inspected during all facets of the mission.

2.4.4.1.3. (FOUO) Photography of Presidential Aircraft. Exterior photographs of aircraft are not permitted unless approved by the Commander, Presidential Airlift Group. Interior photographs of presidential aircraft suites and offices are prohibited without permission of the Director of White House Military Office. Presidential aircraft commanders must authorize any photographs of the remainder of the interior of the aircraft, including the conference room. **Note:** Crew members must take proper precautions to prevent inadvertent release of classified materials or information if photographs are taken.

2.4.4.1.4. Physical Security Exercises. Physical security exercises will not be conducted two (2) hours before a Presidential mission arrival, while

Presidential aircraft are temporarily located on the installation, or within two (2) hours of departure of a Presidential aircraft.

2.4.4.2. Senior Executive (SENEX) Aircraft Security.

2.4.4.2.1. (FOUO) SENEX Aircraft Security Requirements. The 377 SFG, WSSS, or SFS must establish/provide the same requirements for Presidential aircraft security listed in paragraph 2.4.4.1. with the following exceptions.

2.4.4.2.1.1. (FOUO) Baggage and Cargo Security. Aircraft commanders approve cargo and non-personal baggage before loading.

2.4.4.2.1.2. (FOUO) Home station SF personnel will always accompany SENEX aircraft, regardless of the length of the mission, to provide security supervision and entry control.

2.4.4.2.1.3. (FOUO) 377 SFG, WSSS, or SFS must provide boundary surveillance (CBS) when requested by aircraft commanders. When requested, boundary surveillance will consist of one (1) SF member with an M9 as a minimum.

2.4.4.2.1.4. (FOUO) The 377 SFG, WSSS, or SFS must ALWAYS provide an ESRT as listed in paragraph 2.4.4.1.1.7. above.

2.4.4.3. SDSAM Aircraft Security.

2.4.4.3.1. (FOUO) SDSAM Aircraft Security Requirements. The 377 SFG, WSSS, or SFS must establish/provide the same requirements as for Presidential aircraft security listed in paragraph 2.4.4.1. above with the following exceptions.

2.4.4.3.1.1. (FOUO) The 377 SFG, WSSS, or SFS must provide one (1) CBS posted with an M4 as a minimum at the rear of the aircraft for boundary surveillance.

2.4.4.3.1.2. Home station SF personnel will always accompany SDSAM aircraft regardless of the length of the mission to provide security supervision and entry control.

2.4.4.3.1.3. AGE Security. Visually inspect AGE equipment before allowing entry to aircraft restricted areas.

2.4.4.4. SAAM Aircraft Security.

2.4.4.4.1. SAAM Aircraft Security Requirements. The 377 SFG, WSSS, or SFS must establish/provide the same requirements as for SDSAM aircraft security listed in paragraph 2.4.4.3.1. above with the following exceptions:

2.4.4.4.1.1. While off home station, aircraft crewmembers will provide security and entry control during short stops unless home station SF are assigned to the mission.

2.4.4.4.1.2. (FOUO) If aircraft remains on base (while off home station) for extended periods, the 377 SFG, WSSS, or SFS must provide one EC (when requested by the aircraft commander) and an ESRT capable of responding immediately, not to exceed five (5) minutes, unless home station SF accompany the mission.

2.4.4.4.2. (DCNI) Detailed guidance for Type I and Type II aircraft is located in 377 WSSS SOP 31-101 Vol 3, *Prime Nuclear Airlift Force/Convoy Security*.

2.4.5. Test Aircraft.

2.4.5.1. Every effort will be made to park the aircraft in an existing restricted area to take advantage of the security in that area.

2.4.5.2. A hangar, fenced-in, or lighted area will be used if a restricted area is not available.

2.4.5.3. Owner/user personnel will provide internal controls during duty hours.

2.4.5.4. (FOUO) SFs will conduct periodic checks, not to exceed two (2) hours, of the aircraft and provide armed response within five (5) minutes.

2.4.6. ASCOT

2.4.6.1. On- duty flight commander or Flight Chief will meet ASCOT security team and provide Security Brief to the RAF Security detail. All pertinent information will be briefed IAW Attachment 4.

2.4.6.2. If storage space is available and requested, all weapons from the British military will be stored below Building 20221 in the 377 SFS Armory. 377 WSSS Security Forces will escort British Military to the armory for courtesy storage. If a RAF shift change is required during the duration of the mission, all weapons issued to British Military will be signed out of the armory on an AF Form 1297 *Temporary Issue Receipt*.

**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR
INFORMATION**

At no time will escorting patrol take possession of British Military firearms during weapons transfer.

2.4.6.3. The 377 WSSS External Security Response Team will issue radios to British Military Security personnel at the aircraft parking spot upon arrival. All radios issued to British Military will be signed out on an AF Form 1297 *Temporary Issue Receipt*.

2.4.6.4. On-duty British Security personnel will operate on channel 8, the primary Security frequency. Their call sign will be ASCOT 1. The alternate Security frequency (377 WSSS Site Security Control Center (SSCC)) will be channel 9. The primary and alternate frequencies for the 377 SFS Base Defense Operations Center (BDOC) will be channels 1 and 2.

2.4.6.5. Security Forces flightline patrols will provide courtesy checks on unsecured British Military Aircraft parked on Pad 5 for extended periods of time when RAF Security personnel are not present. These checks will not exceed four (4) hours.

2.4.6.6. During ASCOT OST Operations, A 377 WSSS patrol will sweep Pad 5 no later than two (2) hours before mission execution.

2.4.6.7. Security Forces will remove barricades between the flightline and Pad 5 for aircraft transit and also block the South Gate Road.

2.4.6.8. 377 WSSS will provide one individual to be a liaison between Air Force Security Forces and OST during ASCOT operations. The liaison will remain with the OST on-scene commander at all times during Priority 1/2 missions.

2.4.6.8.1. The liaison will be required to carry a radio to stay in contact with SSCC, Kirtland AFB access gates, and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Tower for contingencies (via landline).

2.4.6.9. During ASCOT movements, Security Forces will provide backup response forces to the aircraft when requested by the OST on-scene commander.

2.4.6.10.(DCNI) In the event the backup forces response force is needed, the on-duty Security Forces backup force for KUMMSC will respond to the tactical needs of the senior OST commander. If a contingency requiring backup forces is simultaneously occurring at KUMMSC, the backup force's primary response will be to KUMMSC.

2.4.6.11. Any hostile acts directed at PL-1 resources requiring dispatch

**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR
INFORMATION**

of the primary backup force will generate an immediate SFG recall. All recalled personnel will respond to back-fill friendly forces (SF or OST) as directed by on-scene commanders.

2.5. Flightline Photography/Unauthorized Photography.

2.5.1. (FOUO) Photography (digital, film, video, etc.) of restricted areas containing PL resources is prohibited, unless the photographer has on his/her person a Photography Authorization Letter. This letter must be authenticated by an E-5 or above assigned to the 377 SFG. Submit all Photography Authorization Letters to the Flightline Constable 377 WSSS/S3 for authentication in person or via e-mail.

2.5.2. (FOUO) Owner/user agencies may pre-designate personnel within their units authorized to take photos, or escort photographers, on a long-term basis. Personnel with long-term photography authorization must be in accordance with the requirements in paragraph 2.5.1., Owner/user agencies will review long-term photography authorization letters annually to ensure accuracy and/or provide updated letters as changes occur.

2.5.3. In addition to requirements identified in paragraph 2.5.1., Photography Authorization Letters intended to accommodate single-events or other short-term activities must contain specific dates/times for which it is to be in effect and must include an expiration date and time.

2.5.4. All personnel with Photography Authorization must have unescorted entry authority for the area they will be photographing or under escort by someone with applicable unescorted entry authority.

2.5.5. EXCEPTION: Photography of transient PL 2 or higher resources [such as President of the United States (POTUS), REFLEX DELTA, SAAM, etc.] is prohibited unless prior permission is granted by the aircrew CC, or designated representative.

2.5.6. Unauthorized Photography Procedures. Individuals who are taking photographs on the flightline without a photo authorization letter will be detained and escorted out of the restricted area. All detained personnel will be turned over to the responding 377 SFS patrolman. Procedures will be the same for personnel outside of the restricted area if they are able to be detained.

CHAPTER 3

DOWNED AIRCRAFT SECURITY AND RESPONSE PROCEDURES

3.1. Purpose. This instruction establishes the procedures for personnel assigned security duties for downed rotary/fixed wing aircraft.

3.1.1. (FOUO) Commanders Intent. The S3O, S3, or CC will be personally involved in all downed aircraft scenarios. SF will depart the installation as soon as possible to avoid delay with all required equipment (As listed in paragraph 3.4 below). Prior to departure ensure the response team has approval from the 377 ABW/CC (via KCP) and 377 WSSS/CC (377 WSSS/S3 in the event CC is unavailable).

3.2. (FOUO) Responsibilities. A minimum of two (2) SF personnel, to include one (1) Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO), will be posted unless directed otherwise by S3O or higher authority.

3.3. (FOUO) Post Limits. The area immediately adjacent to the downed aircraft, but not to exceed 50 meters from the resource except in cases of emergencies or as needed to conduct communication status checks with SSCC. The NCO may adjust posting, depending on the circumstances.

3.4. Uniform/Equipment.

3.4.1. (FOUO) SF personnel posted on a downed aircraft will have all equipment required for daily posting and will be armed with a M4 and M9. Personnel will take a downed aircraft bag maintained in the S3 storage closet (the keys are located in the KUMMSC armory). Members will obtain a unit SAT phone from the KUMMSC armory. Equipment will be accounted for and signed out via AF Form 1297, *Temporary Issue Receipt*, prior to being posted. The downed aircraft bags are sealed and accounted for on AF Form 1473, *Gun Equipment Room Inventory*. Once the mission is complete, the bag will be returned to Bldg #27494 for inventory and replacement of any used items prior to being returned to the storage closet.

3.5. Procedures.

3.5.1. Security Forces Actions.

3.5.1.1. The SSCC will be notified by KCP of a downed aircraft that cannot return to KAFB. Notifications coming directly from the 58 SOW Wing Operating Center (WOC) will be re-directed to the KCP after receiving unofficial notification. Ensure 377 ABW Safety is notified through the KCP and/or standby person, after normal duty hours (846-3777).

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR
INFORMATION

3.5.1.2. The SSCC will notify FCC/FC of the situation. Ascertain from the on-duty flight chief if there are any extra personnel on flight. If there are no stand-by personnel, contact S3 staff for additional personnel. Ensure proper chain-of-command notifications are made as quickly as possible in accordance with approved checklists. **Note:** For on-base downed aircraft, contact BDOC and request a police patrol dispatched to the crash site immediately.

3.5.1.3. Determine if there are any stand-by vehicles. **Note:** If stand-by vehicles are available, ensure they are inspected in accordance with AF Form 1800, *Operator's Inspection Guide and Trouble Report*, and prepare them for possible deployment (i.e. full tank of gas, spare tire, jack, lug wrench, fluid levels, etc.). If there are no standby vehicles, contact the 377 WSSS/S4V, Vehicles NCO or the 377 SFG/S4V.

3.5.1.4. SSCC will notify the S3, S3O and S5 of the situation and advise them of the status of extra personnel and vehicles. They will designate personnel for posting, if required. These personnel, when notified, will respond to the KUMMSC armory for downed aircraft equipment issue.

3.5.1.5. SSCC will coordinate with the 58 SOW WOC, 846-0160, or appropriate agency for directions to the downed aircraft (to include grid coordinates).

3.5.1.6. SSCC, as needed, should contact the S4 to arrange equipment issue and 377 WSSS/S4V or 377 SFG/S4V personnel if vehicle support is needed. Use the recall roster during non-duty hours. If SF members will be driving to the location of the downed aircraft, an off road capable (4x4) vehicle will be used.

3.5.1.7. SSCC, ensure 58 SOW has made contact the local law enforcement agency responsible for the area where the downed aircraft is located. SSCC will provide the response team with the contact information of the local law enforcement agency and 58 SOW will notify the law enforcement agency of the situation and that USAF SF will be armed in the area.

3.5.1.8. Responding personnel will await arrival of transport at a location designated by the FCC/FC. The location will be the KUMMSC Armory or 58 SOW, Bldg #1020.

3.5.1.9. Individuals designated as members of the follow-on element will report to the KUMMSC Armory and receive a safety and use of force briefing from the on-duty FCC/FC.

3.5.2. (DCNI) National Defense Areas (NDA). In the event an aircraft crashes off-base, and/or certain PL aircraft must make an unscheduled landing at a civilian airport or other unplanned emergencies occur, it may be necessary to establish an NDA.

3.5.2.1. (DCNI) NDAs are established when necessary to secure PL 1, 2, or 3 resources located off the installation on lands not under the jurisdiction or administration of, or in the custody of, Department of Defense (DoD) or a military department of DoD. 377 ABW/CC is the only person authorized to establish a NDA (377 ABW/CV may establish an NDA if contact cannot be made with 377 ABW/CC). The size of the NDA must be reasonably related to what is needed to protect the resource. Make the perimeter of the NDA with temporary barriers and Air Force Visual Aid 31-102, Restricted Area Sign-National Defense if available. To the maximum extent possible, the consent and cooperation of the landowner should be sought when establishing an NDA. If hostile and/or terrorist actions were involved, SSCC will contact AFOSI to have the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) respond and assume control. All personnel entering the area will be logged onto the AF Form 1109. SSCC will accomplish a blotter entry and notifications unless otherwise directed by 377 WSSS/S3O or higher.

3.5.2.2. (FOUO) Rules of Engagement (Use of Deadly Force). All personnel must make every effort short of using deadly force to halt unlawful entry, loss of resources or similar acts. Personnel working around these resources must be thoroughly familiar with guidelines set forth in AFI 31-117 and KAFB IDP 31-101. A Rules of Engagement briefing will be given by the FCC/FC or above prior to departure to the area.

3.5.2.3. To the greatest degree possible notify and allow civilian authorities to handle civilian arrest and detention. If local civil authorities are not present, military personnel may detain violators or trespassers. Work with the JA office to release violators and trespassers to proper authorities as soon as reasonably practical.

3.5.2.4. In the event of a radio communication loss the SF member will try to regain communication via satellite phone. If contact still cannot be made, one (1) member can leave the immediate area to attempt to regain communication, this member should stay within visual range of the other member and the resource. In the event of an extreme emergency, team members may leave the immediate area to regain communication, however as soon as information is relayed ensure expedited return to the resource.

3.5.3. Media Personnel Procedures. For an aircraft accident resulting in a complete base response, all media personnel will be directed to the Incident Command Post, which will be located in the general vicinity of the ECP. If the media should approach with questions as to what has happened, refer them to the Public Affairs/Information Office (846-5991).

3.5.4. The only personnel authorized to be in the area will be aircrew, maintenance, medical, fire department, SF, and any other person(s) the on-scene commander authorizes.

**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR
INFORMATION**

CHAPTER 4

ADDITIONAL AIRCRAFT SECURITY AND RESPONSE PROCEDURES

4.1. Security Incidents/Covered Wagons.

4.1.1. (FOUO) A Security Incident is an unclassified message relayed by restricted area owner/user personnel or SF to SSCC, BDOC or KCP of an unusual incident possibly hostile, affecting PL 1, 2, or 3 resources.

4.1.1.1. (FOUO) Once an ISRT identifies a Security Incident, the offending individuals will be challenged, escorted out of the restricted area and placed at a disadvantage away from PL resources. The ISRT will contact SSCC and relay all pertinent information.

4.1.1.2. (FOUO) The Flightline ESRT will respond and take custody of the suspects until arrival of responding SFS patrolman. Once ESRT takes custody, all affected ISRT units will complete a 100% purge of their areas of responsibility.

4.1.1.3. (FOUO) The Installation Commander has delegated authority to terminate Security Incidents to the on-duty FCC/FC. Upon termination, SSCC will notify KCP.

4.1.2. (FOUO) A Covered Wagon report is an unclassified up-channel telephone report sent up to SSCC, BDOC or KCP of an unusual incident probably or actually hostile, affecting PL 1, 2, or 3 resources has occurred at an installation or dispersed site.

4.1.2.1. (FOUO) The on-duty FCC/FC or higher authority can request the termination of the Covered Wagon through SSCC. SSCC will request through KCP the Installation Commander, or designee to terminate the Covered Wagon.

4.2. Unauthorized Aircraft Movement/Anti-Hijacking Procedures.

4.2.1. The 58 SOW WOC, 150 SOW Command Post (CP), or 377 MXS/MXO will notify SSCC in the event of an unannounced aircraft movement or a suspected or actual hijacking.

4.2.2. (FOUO) The Flightline ESRT will assume control of the initial response force as Incident Commander (IC) until the arrival of a senior-ranking SF member. The designated IC for all unauthorized aircraft movement/anti-hijacking incidents is the senior ranking SF representative on-scene.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR
INFORMATION

4.2.2.1. (FOUO) Once SSCC has notified all posts and patrols of an unauthorized aircraft movement or possible aircraft hijacking; SSCC will up-channel all required reports (e.g., Security Incident/Covered Wagon to the KCP and continually update KCP on status of situation). SSCC will coordinate with fire department and maintenance to block off all pad and taxiway accesses to prevent aircraft from leaving the installation.

4.2.2.2. (FOUO) Deadly force is only authorized if hostile intent is presented or if ordered by competent authority to disable the aircraft. In the event of an attempted theft or hijacking it may, as a last resort, become necessary to disable the aircraft to stop the theft or hijacking attempt. If this occurs, SF will take the action necessary to disable the aircraft with minimum danger to crew members, passengers, and the aircraft. Authority and direction to take the disabling action will come from the security IC or higher authority. Any action requiring the use of firearms to disable an aircraft should be directed or authorized by the on-duty FCC/FC or higher authority.

4.3. Unauthorized Air Space Incursion/Landing.

4.3.1. (FOUO) The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) control tower will attempt to make radio contact with unidentified/unannounced aircraft sighted within KAFB restricted airspace and direct its flight path away from the area.

4.3.2. (FOUO) If the aircraft fails to depart the area and continues inbound, the FAA control tower will warn the aircraft of the potential use of deadly force by military personnel.

4.3.3. (FOUO) Should the aircraft land near, but outside the clear zone (30 feet from the RA) of an NDA or restricted area, it will be kept under surveillance until a determination can be made as to hostile/non-hostile intent, or it departs the immediate area. SF will attempt, by whatever means possible, to have the pilot approach their position to explain their presence; however, SF must not leave the protection of cover to approach the aircraft.

4.3.4. (FOUO) Should the aircraft land within or adjacent to the clear zone of the NDA or restricted area, it will be surrounded and an attempt will be made to contain all personnel within the aircraft by means of voice instruction (e.g., bull horn, Public Address (PA) system, etc.). Warnings concerning the use of deadly force will be announced. Emergency situations (fire or medical) will be dealt with on a case-by-case basis by the IC.

4.3.5. (FOUO) Should the aircraft attempt to land on the flightline anywhere near PL aircraft parking areas, all personnel working on the flightline will strategically place vehicles, pieces of equipment, and/or other available obstacles as barriers to prevent the aircraft from landing in or near these areas.

**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR
INFORMATION**

4.3.6. (FOUO) If, after a landing, intruders comply with instructions, remove them from the aircraft and the restricted area. No attempt should be made to question intruders pending the arrival of AFOSI, FBI, or civil law enforcement.

4.3.7. (FOUO) In the event hostile actions are encountered, SF will use all means available to neutralize the situation, including the use of deadly force.

4.3.8. Actions for reporting and responding to an Unmanned Aerial System (UAS), refer to KAFB IDP.

4.4. (DCNI) Fuel Leak/Hazardous Material (HAZMAT) incident.

4.4.1. In the event of a fuel leak or HAZMAT incident on or around a PL aircraft, notify SSCC and establish a cordon around the affected area. The Flightline ESRT will serve as the IC until the arrival of the FCC/FC. The responding Fire Chief will be the overall on-scene commander for the incident. Have SSCC contact 58 SOW Maintenance Operations Center (MOC), 377 MXS Airfield Management Operations or 150 SOW WOC to reposition any other aircraft that are in the affected area.

JAMES K. MEIER, Lt Col, USAF
Commander

ATTACHMENT 1

GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION

References

AFI 31-101, *Integrated Defense (FOUO)*, 08 October 2009, IC3, 03 February 2016

AFMAN 33-363, *Management of Records*, 01 March 2008

KAFB Integrated Defense Plan 31-101 IC1, 9 March 2016

AFI 31-117, *Arming Use of Force by Air Force Personnel*, 02 February 2016

DoD S5210.41M_AFMAN 31-108, V1/V2/V3 *Nuclear Weapons Security Manual*, 7 March 2013, AFGSCSUP 21 February 2014

Prescribed Forms

No forms are prescribed by this publication

Adopted Forms

AF Form 52, *Evidence Tag*

AF Form 847, *Recommendation for Change of Publication*

AF Form 1109, *Visitor Register Log*

AF 1199, *Computer Generated Restricted Area Badge*

AF Form 1297, *Temporary Issue Receipt*

AF Form 1473, *Gun Equipment Room Inventory*

AF Form 1800, *Operator's Inspection Guide and Trouble Report*

Abbreviations and Acronyms

AAS – Albuquerque Ambulance Services

ABW – Air Base Wing

AEAO – Airborne Emergency Action Officer

AFI – Air Force Instruction

**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR
INFORMATION**

AGE – Aerospace Ground Equipment

ALCS – Airborne Launch Control System

AS – Area Supervisor

ASNCO – Aircraft Security Non-Commissioned Officer

BDOC – Base Defense Operations Center

CBS – Close Boundary Sentry

CC – Commander

CGEAL – Computer Generated Entry Authority Listing

CPAS – Chief, Presidential Aircraft Security

CPE – Code Processing Equipment

DV – Distinguished Visitor

EAL – Entry Authority Listing

EC – Entry Controller

ECP – Entry Control Point

EOD – Explosive Ordnance Disposal

ESRT – External Security Response Team

FBI – Federal Bureau of Investigation

FC – Flight Chief

FCC – Flight Commander

FD – Fire Department

FW – Fighter Wing

HAZMAT – Hazardous Materials

HCP – Hot Cargo Pad

IBF – Initial Back-up Force

**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR
INFORMATION**

IOTV – Improved Outer Tactical Vest

IC – Incident Commander

IDP – Installation Defense Plan

ISRT – Internal Security Response Team

KCP – Kirtland Command Post

KAFB – Kirtland Air Force Base

KUMMSC – Kirtland Underground Munitions Maintenance Storage Complex

LBE – Load Bearing Equipment

LBV – Load Bearing Vest

MFR – Memorandum for Record

MOC – Maintenance Operations Center

MRE – Meals Ready to Eat

MSG – Mission Support Group

MWD – Military Working Dog

MXG – Maintenance Support Group

NDA – National Defense Area

NLZ – No-lone Zone

NMANG – New Mexico Air National Guard

OSI – Office of Special Investigation

PA – Public Address

PAG – Presidential Airlift Group

PCM – Positive Control Materials

PL 1 – Protection Level 1

**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR
INFORMATION**

PL 2 – Protection Level 2

PL 3 – Protection Level 3

POTUS – President of the United States

PRP – Personnel Reliability Program

PSU – Portable Storage Unit

S3 – Operations Officer

S3O – Operations Superintendent

SAL – Security Acknowledgement Letter

SAAM – Special Airlift Assignment Mission

SDSAM – Specifically Designated Special Assignment Mission

SENEX – Senior Executive Mission

SF – Security Forces

SFS – Security Forces Squadron

SFG – Security Forces Group

SOW – Special Operations Wing

SSCC – Site Security Control Center

SSI – Special Security Instruction

TACAMO - Take Charge and Move Out

VKA – Volatile Keying Assembly

WOC – Wing Operations Center

WSSS – Weapons System Security Squadron

ATTACHMENT 2**Security Acknowledgement Letter**

Date _____

REPLY TO ATTN OF: Senior On-Duty Security Force Official

SUBJECT: Security Acknowledgment Letter

TO: Courier Officer (Check only one (1) paragraph.)

() 1. I understand the nature of the cargo aboard aircraft number _____ and will provide security that meets the requirements of DOD Directive 5210.41-M-(C); (Air Force: AFI 31-101; Army: AR 50-5; Navy: OPNAVENST C5510.83 (C)). No one, except the aircrew on the attached orders, will be allowed to enter the aircraft unless there is an emergency that endangers the aircraft or personnel. Allow emergency personnel immediate entry and notify the aircraft commander or courier officer immediately. The restricted area around the aircraft is a no-lone zone when the aircrew is not present. Seal# _____

(Name, Rank, Duty Title, and Signature) (Organization) (Time and Date)

() 2. I will provide at least one (1) full-time guard for aircraft number _____. No one except the aircrew on the attached orders will be allowed to enter the aircraft, unless there is an emergency that endangers the aircraft or personnel. Allow emergency personnel immediate entry and notify the aircraft commander or courier officer immediately. The aircraft interior (is) (is not) a no lone zone. Seal# _____

(Name, Rank, Duty Title, and Signature) (Organization) (Time and Date)

() 3. I will provide at least one (1) full-time guard for aircraft number _____. Persons on the attached list(s) may be allowed into the aircraft. Anyone not on the list(s) will be escorted by someone who is listed, except in an emergency. The escort official must remain with the person being escorted. Seal# _____

(Name, Rank, Duty Title, and Signature) (Organization) (Time and Date)

() 4. I will provide frequent checks by security forces for aircraft number _____. Persons on the attached list(s) may be allowed into the aircraft. Anyone not on the list(s) will be escorted by someone who is listed, except in an emergency. The escort official must remain with the person being escorted and ensure the aircraft is resealed according to AFR 31-101. Seal# _____

(Name, Rank, Duty Title, and Signature) (Organization) (Time and Date)

() 5. This aircraft is a protection level _____ resource. I will provide frequent checks by security forces for aircraft number _____. Seal# _____

(Name, Rank, Duty Title, and Signature) (Organization) (Time and Date)

**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR
INFORMATION**

ATTACHMENT 3

REFLEX SECURITY BRIEFING

**Instructions: Before Aircraft arrival, complete all pertinent information. Upon arrival, read entire Reflex Security Briefing to Aircraft Commander and provide a copy of the document before departing the area.*

☐ 1. Threat Assessment

FPCON: _____

Threat Level: _____

☐ 2. Available Security Forces

- One Entry Controller (EC), One Close Bound Sentry (CB), and an Internal Security Response Team (ISRT) are dedicated to the aircraft. These forces are located: EC: _____, CB: _____, and ISRT: _____ A response force that is positioned on the flight line maintains capability to response to the aircraft in case of emergency. **Note EC, CB, and ISRT positions on attached map.*

☐ 3. Duress

- Current Duress Words (Primary, Alternate, Exercise)

P: _____ A: _____ E: _____

☐ 4. Alert Response Codes

- Note: Different than current base Emergency Response Codes P: _____ A: _____
- When responding during an Alert Response, proceed to the ECP (nose of the aircraft) and use the ARC for expedited entry.

☐ 5. Gate Codes

- Presidential _____
- Randolph _____

☐ 6. ID Key Personnel and contact information

Flight Commander/Chief: _____ 846-8309

Flightline Constable: SSgt Ford - 846-0713

SSCC: Guardian - 846-1478

Operations Officer: Capt Cornier - 846-2179

Operations Superintendent: MSgt Blanco - 853-1472

☐ 7. Important Phone Numbers and Control Centers (Nearest phone located at Base Ops)

KCP: 846-3777 (COMM) 6-0686 (STU III)

SSCC: 846-1478

BDOC: 846-7913

Radio Frequencies: Primary: 8 Alternate: 9
☐ 8. Location of Base Operations Bldg #333 (REFLEX only)


DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR
INFORMATION

☐ 9. Directions to Crew Billets Bldg #917

Proceed out Randolph Gate, Bldg #917 is located ¼ mile on left.

☐ 10. Any Security Concerns at this time?

Ramp Configuration



**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR
INFORMATION**

ATTACHMENT 4

ASCOT SECURITY BRIEFING

**Instructions: Before Aircraft arrival, complete all pertinent information. Upon arrival, read entire ASCOT Security Briefing to Aircraft Commander and provide a copy of the document before departing the area.*

☐ 1. Threat Assessment

FPCON: _____

Threat Level: _____

☐ 2. Local Security Posture/Locations of Posted Response Forces

- ASCOT: One Internal Security Response Team will be posted on the aircraft while it is downloading (Type 1 only). A response force that is positioned on the flight line maintains the capability to respond to the aircraft in case of emergency.

☐ 3. Duress

- ASCOT: Aircrew preferred Visual Duress Signal (i.e. full flaps down etc...)? _____

☐ 4. ID Key Personnel and contact information

Flight Commander/Chief: _____ 846-8309

Flightline Constable: SSgt Ford - 846-8266

SSCC: Guardian - 846-8309

Operations Officer: Capt Cornier - 846-2179

Operations Superintendent: MSgt Blanco - 853-1472

☐ 7. Important Phone Numbers and Control Centers (Location of nearest phone)

KCP: 846-3777

SSCC: 846-1478

BDOC: 846-7913

Radio Frequencies: Primary: 8 Alternate: 9
☐ 8. EVAC Points/Actions _____

☐ 9. Any Security Concerns at this time?

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR
INFORMATION