



**DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
HEADQUARTERS AIR FORCE GLOBAL STRIKE COMMAND**

DoDS5210.41\_AFMAN31-108V3\_AFGSCSUP\_AFGSCGM2014-01  
16 December 2014

MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION

FROM: HQ AFGSC A4/7  
841 Fairchild Ave, Suite 118B  
Barksdale AFB LA 71110

SUBJECT: (U) Guidance Memorandum to AFMAN 31-108V3\_AFGSCSUP, *Nuclear Weapon Security Manual: Nuclear Weapon Specific Requirements*

(U) This is a Guidance Memorandum (GM) immediately implementing changes to AFMAN 31-108V3\_AFGSCSUP, *Nuclear Weapon Security Manual: Nuclear Weapon Specific Requirements*. Compliance with this memorandum is mandatory. To the extent its directions are inconsistent with other Air Force publications; the information herein prevails, in accordance with AFI33-360, *Publications and Forms Management*.

(U) In advance of the rewrite of AFMAN 31-108V3\_AFGSCSUP, *Nuclear Weapon Security Manual: Nuclear Weapon Specific Requirements*, dated 21 February 2014, this GM provides a guidance change that is effective immediately.

(U) The directions of this memorandum become void after 365 days have elapsed from the date of this memorandum, or upon publication of an Interim Change or rewrite of the affected publication, whichever is earlier.

LAWRENCE S. KINGSLEY, SES, DAF  
Director, Logistics, Installations  
and Mission Support

Attachment:  
Guidance Changes

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***To Deter and Assure***

## DoD Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information

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**(U) The below changes to DoDM S-5210.41-M\_AFMAN 31-108, Volume 3, AFGSC Supplement, *Nuclear Weapons Specific Requirements*, Enclosure 6, dated 21 February 2014, are effective immediately.**

**(U) \*(Replace)** 4.e.(4)(d) (Added)(AFGSC) Cameras will be installed at each MAF to enhance security and provide situational awareness through all around visual coverage of the MAF exterior. Each MAF camera system will consist of a mix of fixed and pan-tilt-zoom cameras with digital video recording capability.

**(U//DCNI) \*(Replace)** 5.c.(1)(b)3. (Added)(AFGSC) No human activity or threat is observed on or near the LF as determined by the recorded RVA video for the timeframe of a minimum of one minute prior to the OZ alarm as reported by the MCC.

**(U//DCNI) \*(Replace)** 5.c.(5)(a) (Added)(AFGSC) **Overview.** Following notification of a security alarm at an LF, the FSC and MSC will be able to determine human versus non-human presence and intent in order to determine the proper level of SF response. RVA equipment will be used for RVA only and will not be used to replace other inoperative equipment in the SCC or MSC. The FSC will be logged into RVA for the entirety of the shift and must notify the on-coming FSC of all documented RVA discrepancies in their primary and secondary flight areas at each shift changeover. If the LCC is configured to view RVA, MCC may view the RVA feed for situational awareness only. Access to RVA in the LCC will not change any MCC/FSC actions or responsibilities for nuclear security.

**(U//DCNI) \*(Add New)** 5.c.(5)(a)8. (Added)(AFGSC) Each wing will designate a Missile Field Physical Security Program Manager to monitor operability of MAF/LF RVA cameras, MIIDS, Blast Doors and IMPSS. Provide quarterly status updates to AFGSC/A7S.

**(U//DCNI) \*(Add New)** 5.c.(5)(c) (Added)(AFGSC) Notify AFGSC/A7S when a major loss of RVA function occurs (loss of observation capability of all LFs in one or more flight area(s) that prevents the primary FSC, alternate FSC and MSC from observing the LFs.

**(U//DCNI) \*(Add New)** 5.c.(5)(d) (Added)(AFGSC) **RVA Training Requirements.** Where fielded and operational, FSC and MSC controllers will be trained and have operational access to the RVA system prior to performing controller duties. Training will be formally documented in the individuals, AF Form 797, *Job Qualification Standard* and AF Form 623, *On-The-Job Training Record*.

**(U//DCNI) \*(Add New)** 5.d.(2)(a)2. (Added)(AFGSC) When declaring security situations, the MCC will use the appropriate number with letter or appropriate number with indications along with correct location and time of indications, in minutes and seconds. At sites with operational RVA, FSC/MS will review RVA video beginning a minimum of one minute prior to alarm annunciation in the LCC and relay additional information to responding forces as changes occur.

**(U//DCNI) \*(Add New)** 5.d.(2)(a)3. (Added)(AFGSC) Before declaring a security situation, the FSC will complete a real-time activity verification, view the LF identifier, and dispatch an SF response. Following these actions, the FSC will conduct a call back to the MCC to ensure dispatch/response requirements are valid. Any time the FSC is unsecure or unable to perform their duties, the MCC will declare the appropriate security situation to MSC and ensure security responsibilities are transferred.

**(U//DCNI) \*(Add New)** 5.d.(2)(a)4. (Added)(AFGSC) Each SFG will develop a local chart detailing which flight will dispatch forces if the FSC is unable to perform their duties. This chart will be based on response time considerations for the affected flight. Distribute chart to all SFG and OG agencies/assets as required.

**(U//DCNI) \*(Replace)** 5.d.(2)(b) (Added)(AFGSC) Upon declaration of a security situation, the MCC will pass the time stamp from the Security Line in the LF Status Display for security situation indications and the FSC will immediately direct a security response. At the same time the initial SF element is dispatched, a second SF element must also be dispatched to back up the initial team. Note: After SF determine the alarm is non hostile (via RVA or on-scene assessment by initial team), the second dispatch may be canceled.

**(U//DCNI) \*(Add New)** 5.d.(2)(d) (Added)(AFGSC) Note: Courier Teams should not be separated from the material they are escorting unless their identity cannot be established, they are under duress, or the situation is potentially hostile. If separation from materials is required, notify the MCC as soon as the situation permits.

**(U//DCNI) \*(Replace)** 5.d.(2)(g) (Added)(AFGSC) Following termination of on-scene security response to LF alarms, all teams will back off the site and await reset actions from MCC.

**(U) \*(Delete)** 5.d.(2)(g)1. (Added)(AFGSC) Entire paragraph

**(U) \*(Delete)** 5.d.(2)(g)2. (Added)(AFGSC) Entire paragraph

**(U) \*(Delete)** 5.d.(2)(g)3. (Added)(AFGSC) Entire paragraph

**(U//DCNI) \*(Add New)** 5.d.(2)(h). (Added)(AFGSC) **LF Security/Guarding/Release.** The MCC will ensure proper security is in place (or released) as required. Teams awaiting arrival of the CAT must perform sentry patrolling duties. **Note:** SF/RF members may perform CAT duties while awaiting the arrival of the CAT. SFG/CC approval is required for RF members to relieve maintenance teams.

**(U//DCNI) \*(Add New)** 5.d.(2)(h)1. (Added)(AFGSC) MCC's must confer with the FSC and MSC to ensure all LF guarding requirements are met. MSC will provide a security recommendation and determine resources necessary to fulfill LF guarding requirements. MSC can also confirm (with MMOC) information regarding site configuration, operability and reliability (e.g., access barriers, alarm systems, etc.). The FSC will provide relevant flight area and site security information.

**(U//DCNI) \*(Add New) 5.d.(2)(h)2.** (Added)(AFGSC) CAT will notify the FSC prior to two-person CAT member entering rest status. FSC will notify the MCC and ensure proper guarding requirements are in place prior to any CAT member entering rest status.

**(U//DCNI) \*(Add New) 5.d.(2)(h)3.** (Added)(AFGSC) If the security system was activated by the CAT or TPC team and it did not reset, refer to appropriate security situation. **NOTE:** Prior to activation of the security system (e.g., activating OZ at an IZ Only site to attempt system resets), ensure two members of the CAT or TPC team are awake.

**(U//DCNI) \*(Add New) 5.d.(3)(a)1.** (Added)(AFGSC) For IZ alarms received in the secondary flight area, the MCC will contact MSC to determine if the IZ is authorized or has been reported. If the IZ has not been reported, the secondary MCC will ensure the primary MCC accomplishes appropriate security actions. If the IZ is not authorized and the primary MCC has not taken appropriate security actions, the secondary MCC will declare appropriate security situation(s) and take appropriate actions for the affected MAF and LF. The secondary MCC will assume automatic flight interrogations (AFI) for the affected flights and monitor for weapon system indications until notified by MSC that the MAF security situation is terminated.

**(U//DCNI) \*(Add New) 5.d.(3)(a)2.** (Added)(AFGSC) When a response team is in the process of completing a security strike or LF check at a site with a functioning alarm system (not previously requiring guarding) or at an LF requiring LF guarding IAW AFI 91-114, and no unauthorized personnel/objects are present, and a new security situation occurs in the flight area of equal or higher priority, the FSC/MSF will attempt to use any team within tactical response distance as a response element to visually assess the new security situation. If no other response element is available, the response team will back off site at the original LF after two good authentications. The MCC will initiate one SCNT in an attempt to reset the alarm system.

**(U//DCNI) \*(Add New) 5.d.(3)(a)2.a.** (Added)(AFGSC) If OZ and IZ reset, the MCC will then release the response element to strike the new security situation. When the additional security situation(s) is terminated with a complete reset of the security system, the response team will return to the original site and investigate the LF again.

**(U//DCNI) \*(Add New) 5.d.(3)(a)2.b.** (Added)(AFGSC) If OZ and/or IZ fail to reset, MCC will coordinate with MCC at the SCP to obtain permission to either release the posted response element or standby for an additional response element to become available.

**(U//DCNI) \*(Add New) 5.d.(3)(a)2.b.(1)** (Added)(AFGSC) If permission is granted, the response element will depart the site and strike the new security situation. MCC must ensure Dull Sword and EAP-STRAT Volume 16 actions are taken for the appropriate LF(s). When the additional security situation(s) is terminated with a complete reset of the security systems, the response element returns to the original site and investigates the LF again.

**(U//DCNI) \*(Add New) 5.d.(3)(a)2.b.(2)** (Added)(AFGSC) If permission is not granted, the nearest available SF response team must be dispatched to the additional LF(s).

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**(U//DCNI) \*(Add New)** 5.d.(3)(a)3. (Added)(AFGSC) SF may leave a site with no RS present to respond to a security situation (no matter what situation number is pending) at a site with an RS present if the FSC and MSC determine no other security elements are available. Prior to departing, they must provide two good authentications. Upon completion of the investigation and reset of the security systems with an RS, the responding security element will return to the site with no RS present to re-investigate the LF and reset the alarm system.

**(U//DCNI) \*(Add New)** 5.d.(3)(a)3.a. (Added)(AFGSC) If a SCNT is not accomplished and/or site security system is not reset, the MCC must ensure Dull Sword and EAP-STRAT Volume 16 actions are taken.

**(U//DCNI) \*(Replace)** 5.d.(5) (Added)(AFGSC) **Duress.** Duress includes passing and receipt of the current primary duress code and indications of non-compliance with established procedures (e.g., failure to report as prescribed, reporting incorrectly, using bogus or reversed call signs, team entering the wrong LF). Units will publish duress procedures in the IDP.

**(U//DCNI) \*(Add New)** 5.d.(5)(a) (Added)(AFGSC) Each situation must be evaluated independently to determine if duress is applicable. Misauthentications or incorrect Visitor Control Numbers (VCN) are indications of unidentified or unauthorized personnel, not duress. Incorrect or missing dispatch information (after verifying with KCCC) indicates possible unauthorized or unidentified personnel attempting entry, not duress.

**(U//DCNI) \*(Add New)** 5.d.(5)(b) (Added)(AFGSC) If a team enters the wrong LF, declare the appropriate security situation for the duress indications. The MCC/FSC will request two authentications. The security situation may only be terminated by two good authentications from an armed and MEED-equipped SF team. Ensure a complete reset of the security system is accomplished prior to releasing team for the correct LF.

**(U//DCNI) \*(Add New)** 5.d.(6) (Added)(AFGSC) **Response Conditions (RC).** To provide an acceptable level of security, regardless of environment or security performance, the following standards apply. **NOTE:** RCs are independent of Travel Conditions (TC). A change in RC does not automatically change a TC and, conversely, a change in TC does not automatically change a RC. Units will develop local procedures to implement RCs.

**(U//DCNI) \*(Add New)** 5.d.(6)(1) (Added)(AFGSC) RC I. Normal conditions exist and LF(s) is/are accessible to SF.

**(U//DCNI) \*(Add New)** 5.d.(6)(2) (Added)(AFGSC) RC II. Weather or road conditions have affected response, or the ability to respond, to the LF(s) and the site(s) is/are not accessible. Respond to alarms in priority order as soon as possible, by any means available, to include utilizing helicopter support. All attempts to respond to the security situation(s) will be exhausted prior to declaring a site or sites in RC II. Each individual site will be assessed prior to implementing RC II. **NOTE:** SCNTs will not be commanded to a site in RC II status.

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**(U//DCNI) \*(Add New) 5.d.(6)(2)a.** (Added)(AFGSC) At least daily, periodic attempts will be made to respond to sites under RC II conditions.

**(U//DCNI) \*(Add New) 5.d.(6)(2)b.** (Added)(AFGSC) Use RVA, where available and operational, to periodically view (not to exceed one hour) those sites that cannot be reached during RC II.

**(U//DCNI) \*(Add New) 5.d.(6)(3)** (Added)(AFGSC) The Wing/CC, or designated representative (in writing), is authorized to approve RC changes.

**(U//DCNI) \*(Add New) 5.d.(6)(3)a.** (Added)(AFGSC) Requests for RC II must be originated by the security team responding to an LF. Upgrade of the current security situation requires re-evaluation of RC II.

**(U//DCNI) \*(Add New) 5.d.(6)(3)b.** (Added)(AFGSC) Re-evaluate RC II as weather conditions change.

**(U//DCNI) \*(Add New) 5.d.(6)(4)** (Added)(AFGSC) If an alarm penetration pattern is detected or the RVA indicates suspicious activity at an LF during RC II, SF will respond utilizing all available assets, including alert helicopters.

**(U//DCNI) \*(Add New) 5.d.(7)** (Added)(AFGSC) **Flight Time-Dispatch Response Matrix.** The flight matrix data will apply as response criteria for SF in individual flight areas. When filled in, the matrix will be DCNI. Use the nearest available SF response and the most direct route to the site when computing response times.

**(U//DCNI) \*(Add New) 5.d.(7)(a)** (Added)(AFGSC) Prepare a matrix for each flight area and review annually. Prepare copies for appropriate control centers and forward one copy each to 20 AF/A7 and AFGSC/A7S. Prepare additional matrices (as necessary) for flight areas where the primary response routes vary on a seasonal basis.

**(U//DCNI) \*(Add New) 5.d.(7)(a)1.** (Added)(AFGSC) Each matrix shall include:

**(U//DCNI) \*(Add New) 5.d.(7)(a)1.a.** (Added)(AFGSC) The flight MAF and each flight LF and the closest available flight MAF(s) for response to MAF security conditions and adjoining flight LFs for which the flight ART is responsible.

**(U//DCNI) \*(Add New) 5.d.(7)(a)1.b.** (Added)(AFGSC) Authorized/posted speed limits for each type of road, mileage of the primary route and the best available secondary/alternate route between each of the listed locations.

**(U//DCNI) \*(Add New) 5.d.(7)(a)1.c.** (Added)(AFGSC) The response time between each of the listed locations computed from the mileage figures listed and the appropriate speed limits authorized for the type of road surface involved. Asterisk each site with a response time greater than 30 minutes.

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**(U//DCNI) \*(Replace)** 6.b.(6)(e)3. (Added)(AFGSC) The FSC will verify valid dispatch information (expiration date, etc.) for teams arriving at LFs. If dispatch information is correct/matches, and duress is not indicated, MCC will grant LF entry.

**(U//DCNI) \*(Add New)** 6.b.(6)(e)7.d. (Added)(AFGSC) Note: Prior to second authentication, FSC or MCC should contact KCCC to verify the individual's name, rank, and index number.

**(U//DCNI) \*(Add New)** 6.b.(6)(e)7.g. (Added)(AFGSC) Note: Available MEED units may be transferred to another authorized member when their MEED unit fails (see para 6.b.(10)(b)5 of this enclosure).

**(U//DCNI) \*(Add New)** 6.b.(6)(e)7.i.(2)(a) (Added)(AFGSC) If one periodic authentication is incorrect, request a second authentication from the same team member. Prior to the second attempted authentication, the FSC or MCC should verify the individuals name, rank, index and generator number with the AFGSC Form 246. If two misauthentications are received from the same team member, refer to the appropriate security situation. If good authentications are received from the team, reestablish authentication intervals.

**(U//DCNI) \*(Add New)** 6.b.(6)(e)7.i.(2)(b) (Added)(AFGSC) If a team fails to make contact at the prescribed time, the MCC or FSC will attempt contact. If contact is established, request authentications as appropriate. If authentications are correct, reestablish reporting periods. If contact is not established, refer to appropriate security situation.

**(U//DCNI) \*(Add New)** 6.b.(6)(e)7.i.(2)(c) (Added)(AFGSC) Upon termination of security situation and personnel are in the LER with the B-Plug raised, the MCC will pass the first four letters of encrypted text of the maintenance Team Chief's or Assistant Team Chief's authenticator. In turn, the maintenance Team Chief or Assistant Team Chief will pass the last four letters of their encrypted text, from the same code page, back to the MCC through the SIN line. If the SIN line is inoperative, the MCC relays through the FSC to the in-place security at the LF, who will in-turn relay it to the maintenance team via PAS or manual method.

**(U) \*(Replace)** 6.b.(6)(e)7.i.(6) (Added)(AFGSC) **Emergency Water Intrusion Survey (EWIS) Team.** When the unit experiences a heavy snowfall, the Wing/CC may direct EWIS procedures. When manpower limitations prevent the unit from dispatching a two-person MEEDs equipped EWIS team, the Wing/CC may authorize one-member EWIS teams to enter LFs to survey snow melt conditions. The Wing/CC must compare the importance of this check to the threat of a lone individual on an LF. One-member EWIS trips are not authorized to enter the LSB. If an IZ situation occurs at a site manned by a one-member EWIS trip, immediately dispatch a security response element. The dispatching agency identifies these trips as "One-member EWIS team" in the Remarks block of the AFGSC Form 246. Perform one-member EWIS entry and exit as follows:

**(U) \*(Add New)** 6.b.(6)(e)7.i.(6)(a) (Added)(AFGSC) Prior to LF entry at an unmanned LF by one-member EWIS teams, the team member will pass proper dispatch information and authenticate. After good authentication, the MCC allows entry. The team may not remain on the LF for more than 30 minutes after an initial OZ alarm. If team has not backed off site within 30 minutes, the

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MCC will declare the appropriate security situation. If contact is established after security declaration, direct EWIS member to withdraw and/or remain off site pending arrival and investigation by an SF team.

**(U) \*(Add New) 6.b.(6)(e)7.i.(6)(b)** (Added)(AFGSC) One-member EWIS teams will exit the LF after completing the survey and request security system reset. After complete security system reset, the EWIS team member receives permission to depart. If the OZ does not reset properly, the MCC will declare appropriate security situation. Direct the EWIS member to remain off site pending SF team arrival.

**(U//DCNI) \*(Replace) 6.b.(7)(a)** (Added)(AFGSC) When a team arrives at the MAF gate, they must pass the FSC their Trip Number, Team Chief's name and rank, and number of personnel. The FSC will verify valid dispatch information (trip number, name, expiration date, etc.) against an AFGSC Form 246/MADO/EAL. If dispatch information is correct/matches, and duress is not indicated, the FSC will grant MAF entry and notify the MCC. Vehicle radios or the gate phone are the standard methods of passing dispatch information. All individuals will proceed directly to the SCC office for positive identification. The FSC will re-verify individuals based on issued credentials or credentials identified on the valid AFGSC Form 246/MADO/EAL.

**(U//DCNI) \*(Replace) 6.b.(7)(d)** (Added)(AFGSC) **Helicopter Entry/Withdrawal.** Helicopter crews are permitted to conduct landings on manned LFs and outside the fenced-in vicinity of manned/unmanned LFs. Helicopter pilots will contact the MCC/FSC and request permission to land on the LF. The MCC/FSC coordinates permission to land with the on-site team chief, or assistant team chief (at the direction of the team chief). The on-site team chief, or assistant team chief (at the direction of the team chief), must advise the FSC of the helicopter arrival. For landings inside the LF fence, personnel must remain aboard the helicopter until cleared by the MCC.

**(U//DCNI) \*(Add New) 6.b.(7)(d)1.** (Added)(AFGSC) During unplanned landings with no trip information, allow helicopter crews escorted entry to above ground facilities. In these cases, contact helicopter operations for crew identification.

**(U//DCNI) \*(Add New) 6.b.(7)(d)2.** (Added)(AFGSC) If the helicopter must depart the LF prior to security system reset (e.g., low fuel, deteriorating weather, etc.), the MCC will release the helicopter, accomplish a single SCNT in an attempt to reset the security system, and dispatch an SF team to investigate the site and return it to original configuration. Do not declare a security situation for this event. The MCC must ensure Dull Sword and EAP-STRAT Volume 16 actions are taken for the appropriate LF.

**(U//DCNI) \*(Add New) 6.b.(7)(d)3.** (Added)(AFGSC) For MAF helicopter entry, aircrews will land and pass dispatch information along with other authorized teams via radio or the MAF gate phone. If the landing pad is inside the MAF fence, the helicopter crew and all teams on board will pass dispatch prior to exiting the aircraft.

**(U//DCNI) \*(Replace) 6.b.(7)(e)5.** (Added)(AFGSC) The FSC may unlock the elevator shaftway door for emergency situations involving life or limb or for security situations involving the security



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or reliability of the LCC (e.g., duress from LCC). Searches of escorted personnel and passing a VCN prior to this procedure are not required. Obtain or reestablish a VCN after the emergency or security situation is resolved. Ensure personnel not authorized unescorted entry are escorted by authorized personnel.

**(U//DCNI) \*(Add New) 6.b.(7)(e)6.** (Added)(AFGSC) For re-entry, personal recognition may be used provided the same FSC that verified identification for initial entry is still on duty and the team requesting reentry did not leave the MAF.

**(U) \*(Add New) 6.b.(10)(a)** (Added)(AFGSC) Access to “A” and “B” MECS material must be controlled by the appropriate control group at all times. One person may not have access to both “A” and “B” side MECS material. MEED material cannot be stored with material of the opposite control group.

**(U) \*(Add New) 6.b.(10)(l)1.e.** (Added)(AFGSC) Note: MCCs (other than the primary), can assist as operationally necessary.

**(U) \*(Add New) 6.b.(10)(l)3.b.** (Added)(AFGSC) All escorted personnel listed on the EAL will remain under positive control of the escort official at all times.

**(U) \*(Add New) 6.b.(10)(l)3.b.(3)** (Added)(AFGSC) **Photography, Video and Audio Recordings.** Official Air Force photography, filming and audio recordings of MAFs, LCCs, LFs, Missile Procedures Trainers (MPT), and other training facilities, are permissible (except anything that exposes sensitive Communications Security (COMSEC) and/or classified material and equipment originating from National Security Agency (NSA), to include any unofficial recordings). OG/CC, MXG/CC and SFG/CC, or designated representatives, will jointly determine what constitutes official or unofficial photography. The FSC and MCC will be notified of the authorized photography prior to photography team’s arrival at the LF/MAF and an authorization letter must be made available upon request. Standards for the use of photographic equipment are delineated in Technical Order (T.O.) 21M-LGM30F-12, *Safety and Electromagnetic Interference Provisions*.

**(U) \*(Add New) 6.b.(10)(l)7.** (Added)(AFGSC) **PRP Suspension.** This is an action to relieve a member from PRP related duties without formal decertification as outlined in DoD 5210.42R/AFMAN 10-3902.

**(U) \*(Add New) 6.b.(10)(l)7.a.** (Added)(AFGSC) Exclude personnel under suspension from having access to nuclear weapons, nuclear weapon systems or critical components, and deny them unescorted entry to limited and exclusion areas and no-lone zones.

**(U) \*(Add New) 6.b.(10)(l)7.b.** (Added)(AFGSC) The individual's PRP certifying official or designated representative must inform the unit's initiating and dispatch agencies of the period of suspension and notify KCCC to remove the AFGSC Form 245 from the active files until member is reinstated. KCCC ensures all FSCs who have EALs or AFGSC Forms 246 with the individual listed are notified of the PRP action. The FSC will call back to KCCC to validate information and notify MCC of the change(s).

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(U) **\*(Add New)** 6.b.(10)(l)7.b.(1). (Added)(AFGSC) The AFGSC Form 245 must be retained in KCCC in a separate suspense file until the CC or designated representative reinstates the member. Immediate destruction of the AFGSC Form 245 due to PRP suspension is not required unless directed by the individuals' Certifying Official or designated representative. If not reinstated by the end of the suspense period, KCCC will contact the individuals' certifying official or designated representative to determine the individual's status prior to removing and destroying the AFGSC Form 245 according to disposition instructions in Air Force RDS, ***Air Force Records Disposition Schedule***.

(U) **\*(Add New)** 6.b.(10)(l)7.c. (Added)(AFGSC) Upon reinstatement to PRP duties, the Certifying Official or a designated representative notifies KCCC. KCCC then returns the AFGSC Form 245 to the active files.

(U) **\*(Add New)** 6.b.(10)(l)8. (Added)(AFGSC) **PRP Decertification.** Temporary or permanent decertification of an individual who has an AFGSC Form 245 on file at KCCC requires the individual's Certifying Official or designated representative, to immediately remove access to nuclear weapons, nuclear weapon systems or critical components.

(U) **\*(Add New)** 6.b.(10)(l)8.a. (Added)(AFGSC) Inform KCCC, the unit's initiating and dispatch agencies and other agencies as appropriate. The KCCC controller verifies the decertification with the Certifying Official or designated representative and destroys the individual's AFGSC Form 245. In the case of temporary decertification, the AFGSC Form 245 may be placed in a temporary inactive status in lieu of being destroyed. If permanently decertified, cancel the individual's MECS authenticator. If the individual is recertified under PRP, the AFGSC Form 245 will be re-accomplished following the procedures for initial issue.

(U) **\*(Add New)** 6.b.(11) (Added)(AFGSC) **Exercises.** Personnel conducting exercises are not taking control of the LF. Exercise termination requires a single authentication from the team that initiated the exercise. Termination of the alarm situation requires authentications by two MEEDS equipped security personnel. Personnel conducting exercises that involve the activation of LF security systems to generate a response must keep the affected LF under observation until the arrival of the security response element(s).

(U) **\*(Add New)** 6.b.(11)(a) (Added)(AFGSC) All personnel must protect the no-notice intent of these exercises to ensure that the human element in the security system is tested. Do not conduct exercises when FPCON CHARLIE or DELTA has been implemented. For LF/MAF exercises that will extend beyond the fence onto private property, contact MSC to ensure landowner or tenant permission to occupy their property in advance of exercises.

(U) **\*(Add New)** 6.b.(11)(b) (Added)(AFGSC) Posted SF will not remove magazines during exercises. Strictly adhere to proper weapons safety contained in AFI 31-117, AFMAN 31-222, and AFMAN 31-229.

(U) **\*(Add New)** 6.b.(11)(c) (Added)(AFGSC) **Security Reaction Exercises (SRE).** The SFG/CC establishes a program to selectively exercise SF elements and identifies, in writing, individuals

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authorized to conduct SREs. Design exercises to measure the effectiveness of the security reaction system and the competency of the personnel involved. Personnel conducting these exercises, such as Flight CCs/Chiefs, must coordinate with MSC who will be prepared to notify the MCC and WCP to prevent an exercise situation from being up-channeled as an actual event. MSC will act as a trusted agent. Staff Assistance Visits (SAV) and Inspector General (IG) visits will have team members in MSC and are exempt from the coordination requirements of this paragraph and do not require prior notice.

**(U) \*(Add New) 6.b.(11)(d) (Added)(AFGSC) No-Notice Security Evaluation Program.** The SFG/CC and OG/CC must develop a realistic evaluation program designed to test each facet of the security reaction system. The interface must be objectively tested from alarm annunciation with the MCC through termination of the security situation with the ART. Personnel with advanced knowledge of pending no-notice security evaluations will not share this knowledge with any agency (e.g., MCCs, FSCs, ARTs) subject to the evaluation.

**(U) \*(Add New) 6.b.(11)(d)1. (Added)(AFGSC)** The SFG/CC authorizes, in writing, individuals who may conduct no-notice evaluations of the security reaction system. The SFG/CC, in coordination with the OG/CC and MX/CC must develop a written, no-notice program that provides for an "end-to-end" test of the missile security response system. The procedures may include participation of all parties involved in operations, maintenance, and security of ICBM resources. Personnel conducting these exercises must coordinate with appropriate personnel/agencies to prevent exercises from being reported as an actual event. Document results of these exercises and cross-feed information with all wing agencies involved.

**(U) \*(Add New) 6.b.(11)(e) (Added)(AFGSC)** Missile operations evaluators from the unit Operations Standardization and Evaluation Division (OGV) may accomplish periodic reviews of crew disks and logs and will coordinate with SF Stan/Eval to request review of SF blotters to complement joint SF and operations no-notice evaluations at LFs, SF no-notice evaluations at LF in concert with OGV evaluation of MCC in LCC, and SF no-notice evaluations with OGV topside at MAF or in adjacent LCC.

**(U//DCNI) \*(Replace) 6.d.(3)(a)3. (Added)(AFGSC) "A" Circuit Lockout.** If an "A" circuit lockout is suspected, notify the FSC, MSC and the MCC immediately. Available "A" side SF personnel will attempt to unlock the "A" circuit. If these attempts are unsuccessful, declare an "A" circuit lockout. With the concurrence of KCCC, the FSC passes the current, previous three, and next three combinations via MEEDs to the SET. The SET, in conjunction with the maintenance Team Chief, will attempt to open the "A" circuit. In addition, the FSC will pass the current, previous three, and next three combinations of any other LFs that have been penetrated within that specific flight area that day.

**(U//DCNI) \*(Add New) 6.d.(3)(a)3.a. (Added)(AFGSC)** The FSC will ensure combinations are changed at these LFs as soon as practical. Simultaneously, the FSC passes to KCCC the page number, edition and seven line numbers of the USNAL 45A that contains the current, previous three, and next three combinations for the LF involved. Provide these combinations to

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MMOC/KCCC to obtain a combination computer listing. This data will be given to the maintenance team preparing for dispatch to correct the lockout.

**(U//DCNI) \*(Add New) 6.d.(3)(a)3.b.** (Added)(AFGSC) If entry is gained, install a new combination prior to leaving the LF unguarded. Void all combinations passed during this procedure. Coordinate with USNAL 45A duplicate register holders to ensure combinations are deleted.

**(U//DCNI) \*(Add New) 6.d.(3)(a)4.** (Added)(AFGSC) **“B” Circuit Lockout.** If a “B” circuit lockout is suspected, notify the MMOC, MCC, FSC and MSC immediately. Available maintenance personnel will attempt to unlock the circuit. With the concurrence of KCCC, the MCC passes the current, previous three, and next three combinations via MEEDs to the Team Chief who will attempt to open the “B” circuit. Provide these combinations to MMOC/KCCC to obtain a combination computer listing. This data will be given to the maintenance team preparing for dispatch to correct the lockout. After entry is gained, install a new combination prior to leaving the LF unguarded. Void all combinations passed during this procedure. Coordinate with USNAL 45B duplicate register holders to ensure combinations are deleted.

**(U//DCNI) \*(Add New) 6.d.(3)(a)5.** (Added)(AFGSC) **Handling Procedure During Suspected Lockouts.** Use the following procedures when handling and disposing of sample “A” and “B” circuit combination listings developed by computer during suspected lockouts:

**(U//DCNI) \*(Add New) 6.d.(3)(a)5.a.** (Added)(AFGSC) Listings generated which comprise the past three, current and next three combinations from the USNAL 45 combination register are controlled as USNAL 45 material (SECRET/NOFORN) and destroyed when the lockout is cleared. The list will not be stored on a magnetic medium, computer diskette, or tape.

**(U//DCNI) \*(Add New) 6.d.(3)(a)5.b.** (Added)(AFGSC) Take positive steps to ensure no combination from the sample computer list is installed on the site which had the lockout and coordinate with all USNAL 45 duplicate register holders to ensure used combinations are deleted.

**(U//DCNI) \*(Add New) 6.d.(3)(c)** (Added)(AFGSC) The “A” circuit and the “B” circuit are not classified when:

**(U//DCNI) \*(Add New) 6.d.(3)(c)1.** (Added)(AFGSC) Valid MECS combinations are removed, circuits have been removed from their normal locked positions on site and declared unserviceable by maintenance personnel, or physically removed from an operational LF for replacement, repair, modification, or for use as a training aid when the installed combination has been removed.

**(U//DCNI) \*(Add New) 6.d.(3)(c)2.** (Added)(AFGSC) Forced entry procedures have been accomplished, provided the MECS combination has been removed and/or deleted from the USNAL 45.

**(U//DCNI) \*(Replace)** 7.d.(4)(e) (Added)(AFGSC) The SET must be positioned to defend the site and immediately activate the Fast Rising B-Plug. All SF performing SET duties will be trained in procedures necessary to raise and lower the B-Plug.

**(U//DCNI) \*(Add New)** 7.d.(4)(g). (Added)(AFGSC) Each SET will routinely use binoculars and thermal imaging devices to conduct 360-degree exterior sweeps. Sweeps will be conducted prior to operation of the A circuit and randomly while the site is still penetrated. Additionally, each SET will wear protective vests and helmets from the time they are authorized onto the LF until the time they are released.

**(U//DCNI) \*(Add New)** 7.d.(4)(h). (Added)(AFGSC) In circumstances where a potential threat exists, one SET will be stationed at one of the activation points in a position to immediately perform a B-Plug RAISE command should it be necessary. The SET will coordinate with maintenance personnel to ensure the access shaft is clear of all personnel, tools, and equipment in the event of a B-Plug RAISE command.

**(U//DCNI) \*(Add New)** 7.d.(4)(h)1. (Added)(AFGSC) In circumstances where a hostile action is imminent, immediately perform a B-Plug RAISE command and notify FSC.

**(U//DCNI) \*(Add New)** 7.d.(4)(i). (Added)(AFGSC) Maintenance teams that are occupying the equipment room of an LF where the B-Plug has been raised due to a potential threat, hostile action, or PAS alarm, must determine the situation is not, or is no longer, hostile prior to lowering the B-Plug. Once the threat is neutralized, the MCC will pass the first four letters of encrypted text of the maintenance Team Chief's or Assistant Team Chief's authenticator. In turn, the maintenance Team Chief or Assistant Team Chief will pass the last four letters of their encrypted text, from the same code page, back to the MCC through the SIN line. If the SIN line is inoperative, MCC will relay through the FSC to the in-place security at the LF. The in-place security will relay with the maintenance team via PAS or manual method.

**(U//DCNI) \*(Add New)** 7.d.(4)(j). (Added)(AFGSC) LF Withdrawal. When the last team withdraws from site, they ensure seals, circuits, hatches, grills, and gates are properly in place, secured and locked. Maintenance teams should not be delayed from departing LFs in the event seals are not immediately available.

**(U//DCNI) \*(Add New)** 7.d.(5)(c). (Added)(AFGSC) Emergency Maintenance. SF may perform critical emergency maintenance tasks as directed by MMOC and IAW AFI 21-202V1\_AFGSCSUP, *Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) Maintenance Management*. Emergency maintenance tasks are defined as environmental control system resets, and primary power system resets that would result in damage to equipment if not accomplished in minimum time. MMOC should request ART support through MCC from the nearest MAF in concurrence with MSC. These tasks must be specifically authorized and under the direct control of MMOC.

**(U//DCNI) \*(Replace)** 7.d.(7). (Added)(AFGSC) Personal Alarm System (PAS). Topside security sentries posted in support of maintenance activity at an LF with RS present will use the PAS. If one is not available, LFs may be penetrated with Wing/CC authority. Maintenance should

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not be delayed while waiting to replace an inoperative PAS. The following procedures are applicable when PAS is used:

**(U//DCNI) \*(Add new)** 7.d.(7)(a) (Added)(AFGSC) Prior to initial entry to the launcher, the alarm system is activated. The transmitter is attached to the body of the patrolling topside sentry.

**(U//DCNI) \*(Add new)** 7.d.(7)(b) (Added)(AFGSC) The entire receiver unit will be taken below ground by maintenance personnel and the transmitter will remain topside with SET personnel. Valid PAS alarms require immediate SF response. Units will develop local procedures to test the PAS while the site is penetrated and ensure procedures are in place to mitigate false alarm activations.

**(U//DCNI) \*(Add new)** 7.d.(7)(c) (Added)(AFGSC) All MECS qualified personnel requiring access to exclusion areas of the LF and SF personnel performing SET duties will be trained on the operational use of the PAS.

**(U//DCNI) \*(Add new)** 7.d.(7)(d) (Added)(AFGSC) Ensure a minimum safe separation distance of three feet is maintained between the transmitter and any electro-explosive device. The transmitter will never be taken below ground.

**(U//DCNI) \*(Add New)** 7.d.(7)(e) (Added)(AFGSC) MWs require 45 operational PAS units to facilitate mission accomplishment. Report PAS status listing operational and non-operational units in DRRS.

**(U//DCNI) \*(Add New)** 7.d.(8) (Added)(AFGSC) A Circuit Cannot Be Secured. When only the A circuit cannot be closed or locked, the maintenance team reporting the failure must close and lock as much of the operational portions of the launcher personnel access system as possible. The B circuit combination will be placed on its safe number. The maintenance team must remain on-site until relieved by a CAT (or RF members, if approved). RF members will not be used to relieve maintenance teams unless an emergency condition exists and only with approval of the SFG/CC, or designated representative. The MXG/CC, or designated representative, will initiate the request.

**(U//DCNI) \*(Add New)** 7.d.(9) (Added)(AFGSC) B-Plug Cannot be Secured. When the B-Plug cannot be closed and locked, immediately notify security forces. The maintenance team reporting the failure must close and lock as many of the operational portions of the launcher personnel access system as technical data permits. If all portions of the B-Plug cannot be closed and locked, the B-plug is considered inoperative and a full RF (15/5) is required. For LFs that are identified as penetrated for maintenance purposes due to inoperative B-Plugs, a full RF is required and authentication requirements will follow procedures identified for manned LFs. The A circuit combination will be placed on its safe number. The team must remain on site until relieved by a CAT (or RF members, if approved). RF members will not be used to relieve maintenance teams unless an emergency condition exists and only with approval of the SFG/CC, or designated representative. The MXG/CC, or designated representative, will initiate the request.

**(U//DCNI) \*(Add New)** 7.d.(10) (Added)(AFGSC) A Circuit and B-Plug Cannot be Secured. When both the A circuit and B-Plug cannot be secured, immediately notify security forces. The maintenance team reporting the failure must close and lock as much of the system as technical data permits. Access to the Launcher Closure and PAH apron area must be controlled by a Two-Person Concept team in this situation. The maintenance team must remain on site until relieved by a CAT (or RF members, if approved). RF members will not be used to relieve maintenance teams unless an emergency condition exists and only with approval of the SFG/CC, or designated representative. The MXG/CC, or designated representative, will initiate the request.

**(U//DCNI) \*(Add New)** 7.d.(11) (Added)(AFGSC) Launcher Closure Door Cannot be Secured. When the launcher closure door cannot be closed, locked, or the maintenance team chief cannot verify the lock pin is in the locked position (visually verified mechanically closed) or access can be gained to the locking pin due to the removal of the metal cover plate during forced entry procedures at LFs with RS present, the maintenance team reporting the failure must close and lock as much of the system as possible. Access to the Launcher Closure apron area and PAH must be controlled by a Two-Person Concept team in this situation. Additionally, the RF must remain in place.

**(U//DCNI) \*(Add New)** 7.d.(12) (Added)(AFGSC) Launcher Closure Door Destructive Break-In. The RF must be in place prior to cutting through the steel plate above the launcher closure lock pin any time an LF with an operational RS launcher closure requires destructive break-in procedures per T.O. 35M37-4-12, *Forced Entry Procedures for Secondary Door Lockout, LF Personnel Access System*. The RF must remain posted until the plate is welded back into place. **NOTE:** RF is not required to be in-place during concrete removal.

**(U//DCNI) \*(Add new)** Table 3.2., (Added)(AFGSC) LF Security Requirements (with Maintenance Teams), B-Plug Maintenance, Also applies when the B-Plug must be manually raised/lowered even when maintenance is not the reason for penetration.

**(U//DCNI) \*(Add new)** 8.b. (Added)(AFGSC) Units must develop procedures so MSC can track all penetrated sites and their associated security support elements. Helicopter units should provide security support (including security sweeps) prior to/during, penetrated site and open launcher operations.

**(U//DCNI) \*(Add new)** 8.b.(3)(a) (Added)(AFGSC) If an LF does **not** have an operational Fast Rising B-Plug (FRBP), a full RF (15/5) is required. IAW DATSD/NM memorandum (14 Oct 14), sites with an operational FRBP are not required to post a complete RF while the site is penetrated.

**(U//DCNI) \*(Add new)** 8.b.(3)(a)1. (Added)(AFGSC) Moveable barriers (e.g. star barriers, cabling, etc.) will be positioned to block the access road as a line of demarcation, to assist in determining intent by vehicles or personnel approaching the LF on the access road.

**(U//DCNI) \*(Add new)** 8.b.(3)(a)2. (Added)(AFGSC) Each security team (includes the SET) will have a vehicle that provides ballistic protection (armored).

**(U//DCNI) \*(Add new)** 8.b.(3)(b) (Added)(AFGSC) During FRBP penetrated site operations, the SET will be positioned near the Personnel Access Hatch (PAH) with one member in the vehicle (with ballistic protection) at all times with the Site Activation Remote Controller (SARC). Periodically position a SET member in the turret scanning terrain and avenues of approach.

**(U//DCNI) \*(Add new)** 8.b.(3)(b)1. (Added)(AFGSC) During the hours of daylight, two SF members (SET) will be inside the fenced in area of the LF topside armed with a belt fed weapon, and two SF will be deployed within five minutes of the LF.

**(U//DCNI) \*(Add new)** 8.b.(3)(b)2. (Added)(AFGSC) For penetrated LFs that continue into the hours of darkness, every effort will be made to post a minimum of six SF personnel positioned to defend the site and bring immediate fire to bear on the boundary of the LF fenced-in area, in addition to the SET.

**(U//DCNI) \*(Add new)** 8.b.(3)(b)3. (Added)(AFGSC) For maintenance that originates during the hours of darkness, a minimum of six SF personnel **will** be positioned to defend the site and bring immediate fire to bear on the boundary of the LF fenced-in area, in addition to the SET. Note: The SET will be inside the fenced in area of the LF topside armed with a belt fed weapon.

**(U)** The below changes to DoDM S-5210.41-M\_AFMAN 31-108, Volume 3, AFGSC Supplement, *Nuclear Weapons Specific Requirements*, Enclosure 10, dated 21 February 2014, are effective immediately.

**(U//DCNI) \*(Add new)** 1.d. (Added)(AFGSC) Note: For this enclosure, Deception in Support of OPSEC meets the spirit and intent of “tactical deception”.