



**DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS AIR FORCE GLOBAL STRIKE COMMAND**

DoDS5210.41_AFMAN 31-108V2_AFGSCSUP_AFGSCSUPGM2014-01
16 December 2014

MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION

FROM: HQ AFGSC A4/7
841 Fairchild Ave, Suite 118B
Barksdale AFB LA 71110

SUBJECT: (U) Guidance Memorandum to AFMAN 31-108V2_AFGSCSUP, *Nuclear Weapon Security Manual: General Nuclear Weapon Security Procedures*

(U) This is a Guidance Memorandum (GM) immediately implementing changes to AFMAN 31-108V2_AFGSCSUP, *Nuclear Weapon Security Manual: General Nuclear Weapon Security Procedures*. Compliance with this memorandum is mandatory. To the extent its directions are inconsistent with other Air Force publications; the information herein prevails, in accordance with AFI33-360, *Publications and Forms Management*.

(U) In advance of the rewrite of AFMAN 31-108V2_AFGSCSUP, *Nuclear Weapon Security Manual: General Nuclear Weapon Security Procedures*, dated 21 February 2014, this GM provides a guidance change that is effective immediately.

(U) The directions of this memorandum become void after 365 days have elapsed from the date of this memorandum, or upon publication of an Interim Change or rewrite of the affected publication, whichever is earlier.

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Director, Logistics, Installations
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Attachment:
Guidance Changes

DISTRIBUTION:

1. HQ USAF/A4S
2. HQ AFSFC/SFN
3. AFGSC Associated Operational and Tactical units

To Deter and Assure

DoDS5210.41_AFMAN 31-108V2_AFGSCSUP_AFGSCSUPGM2014-01, 16 December 2014

(U) The below changes to DoDM S-5210.41-M_AFMAN 31-108, Volume 2, AFGSC Supplement, *General Nuclear Weapon Security Procedures*, Enclosure 3, dated 21 February 2014, are effective immediately.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.g.(7)(a) (Added)(AFGSC) Security Incident Response. If a security incident occurs at the site where a Treaty Team is conducting activities in compliance with U.S. requirements, team actions must continue as mandated by the Treaty. The team must not be delayed or denied entry/exit to a location. The lead SF official on site will coordinate response actions with the on-site Treaty Compliance Officer (TCO) before a show of force or armed response actions are visible. The TCO and lead SF official on site will exhaust all available means to resolve security incidents without escalation or further security response. If a credible threat or major security concern exists, normal operating procedures will be followed. All responding SF interaction with Treaty Team personnel will be in accordance with direction of the TCO.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.g.(7)(b) (Added)(AFGSC) During U.S. Treaty on-site inspections (example: New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty), post all SF Teams so as to remain as inconspicuous as terrain permits, but within a five minute response time to the site.

(U) The below changes to DoDM S-5210.41-M_AFMAN 31-108, Volume 2, AFGSC Supplement, *General Nuclear Weapon Security Procedures*, Enclosure 4, dated 21 February 2014, are effective immediately.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 4. (Added)(AFGSC) Application of the Nuclear Weapon Security Standard (NWSS)

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 4.a. (Added)(AFGSC) Assess, Final Denial, Control, Immediate Sufficient Duress, Assault, and Restore Government Control (AFCIA-R). The acronym AFCIA-R will facilitate decision making processes and aid in the application of decisive steps for AFGSC Security Forces personnel performing duties in support of nuclear weapons.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 4.a.(1) (Added)(AFGSC) Assess. Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force has achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear resources. The assessment phase is pivotal when determining what level of force to direct toward an adversary. Factors to assist assessment include; available terrain/concealment, camera systems (RVA), available helicopter units (with FLIR capability) and early detection via alarm indications (received by MCC).

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 4.a.(2) (Added)(AFGSC) Final Denial. The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining unauthorized access to nuclear weapons. Final denial fire is typically placed at storage structure entrances, identified avenues of approach, or at any weapon system access point. Final denial will be achieved by using weapon fire and may be used at any point during an attack. To the greatest extent possible, all forces should coordinate final denial fire to achieve interlocking and overlapping fields of fire.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 4.a.(3) (Added)(AFGSC) Control. The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in the defined battle-space. Suppressive fire directly on or in the vicinity of the enemy to disrupt hostile actions/advancement meets this intent. Suppressive fire can also be achieved through employment of a coordinated weapons mixture and creation of physical barriers to prevent an adversary from continuing advancement toward the resource.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 4.a.(4) (Added)(AFGSC) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD). Those actions, proportional to the threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in order to prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a nuclear weapon. ISD can be achieved through use of smoke, CS gas, stun grenade, weapon fire, or any other possible means to disrupt the adversary's actions.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 4.a.(5) (Added)(AFGSC) Assault. Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile persons in the area surrounding the nuclear weapon. Violence of action, coordinated efforts, and sound tactics on the part of the security force (SF, maintenance, helicopter integration, etc.) are paramount in this mission set.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 4.a.(6) (Added)(AFGSC) Restore Government Control. (See Chapter 6 of this enclosure.)

(U) *(Add New) 4.b. (Added)(AFGSC) Mission, Enemy, Terrain and Weather, Troops Available –Time Available, Civil Concerns (METT-TC)/Observations and Fields of Fire, Cover and Concealment, Obstacles, Key Terrain, Avenues of Approach (OCOKA). Additional tactical decision making considerations are listed in Table 4-1. Note: OCOKA analysis should be viewed from two perspectives: how the tactical decision maker can use the surrounding terrain to their advantage and how that same terrain can be used against them by an adversary.

(U) ***(Add New) Table 4-1** (Added)(AFGSC) **METT-TC/OCOKA**

	WORD	DESCRIPTION
M	Mission	What is your mission? Is it to deny access, provide final denial, control or suppress the enemy, conduct ISD, recapture, recover, or a combination? What is the current alarm status?
E	Enemy	What is the enemy situation? How many and what weapons/equipment are they using? Where is the enemy in the penetration timeline?
T	Terrain and Weather	What are the key terrain features around the area? Is snow, rain, or standing water going to affect deployment or visibility? Use the guidelines of OCOKA:
	O Observation and Fields of Fire	Is there ground that allows the commander observation of the enemy throughout his or her entire area of operations? Consider maximum effective weapons ranges for fields of fire and locate corresponding vantage points.
	C Cover and Concealment	Terrain that protects from direct or indirect fire and/or observation. Includes man-made structures (e.g. farming equipment, vehicles, silos, etc.) that may aid responding forces during the application of shoot, move and communicate.
	O Obstacles	Terrain features that will restrict or disrupt an attacker and/or protect friendly forces during assault maneuvers.
	K Key Terrain	Any area that seizure or retention affords a marked advantage to friend or foe.
	A Avenues of Approach	An air or ground route of an attacking force leading to its objective or key terrain in its path.
T	Troops Available	What troops do you have available right now and what will you have? What is their equipment, armament, capabilities, level of training?
T	Time Available	How much time is available to perform your required actions based on enemy situation?
C	Civil Concerns	Are civilians present? What are their actions/intentions?

(U) *Note: Continuous process/cycle evolves as the situation develops. The Incident Commander (IC) must continually update and assess variable factors of METT-TC based upon changes to ensure a mode of Aggressive Continuous Tactical Advancement is achieved.*

(U) ***(Add New) 4.c.** (Added)(AFGSC) **Size, Activity, Location, Unit, Time, Equipment (SALUTE) Report.** SALUTE reports are used to up channel/convey the most vital information regarding enemy activity. Additionally, SALUTE reports provide a site picture of the developing situation on the ground to responding units and leadership elements. Transmit these reports as rapidly as possible. The SALUTE report format in Table 4-2 is used to aid the observer in reporting essential elements.

(U) *(Add New) Table 4-2 (Added)(AFGSC) **SALUTE REPORT**

	WORD	DESCRIPTION
S	Size	The number of personnel seen or size of an object.
A	Activity	What the enemy was doing.
L	Location	Grid coordinates or reference from a known point including the distance and direction from a known point.
U	Unit	Any patches or clothing, distinctive signs or symbols, or identification (ID) numbers on vehicles.
T	Time	Time activity was observed.
E	Equipment	All equipment associated with the activity.

(U) *(Add New) 5. (Added)(AFGSC) **Application of AFCIA-R**

(U) *(Add New) 5.a. (Added)(AFGSC) **Nuclear Environments.** The concept of the AFCIA-R process is considered an on-scene commander or tactical decision maker's priority of work. Application of each tenant transcends nuclear environments. **It is important to note that in some cases, every facet of the process may not be used.** For example, after a team assesses a situation, they may determine access has not yet been gained, and are thus able to apply final denial weapon fire to stop forward movement of adversaries. While assaulting the area to physically occupy the ground and sweep/clear any other potential threats is still necessary, ISD and restoring government control of resources may not need to be applied.

(U) *(Add New) 5.a.(1) (Added)(AFGSC) For tactical planning to be truly effective, SF personnel must apply all of the factors that go into tactical decision making. Tactical decision making is a time competitive process that controls the tempo of the battle. Use the Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act loop (OODA Loop) to increase the opportunity for success. The cornerstone for mission success will be to achieve the goal or state of aggressive and continuous tactical advancement.

(U) *(Add New) 5.a.(1)(a) (Added)(AFGSC) SF personnel must first account for the factors associated with security response and operating/physical environment (METT-TC, OCOKA, AFCIA-R) as these factors will serve as the basis for the overall assessment. They must also have an accurate perspective and the proper battle space orientation in order to make clear assessments in relation to the nature of response.

(U) *(Add New) 5.a.(1)(b) (Added)(AFGSC) The course of action (COA) developed should be based upon the best and most accurate data that is available to them at the time. Time is critical and response decisions should be made as quickly and as accurately as possible. Use the cycle of Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act to gain momentum and increase the opportunity for success.

(U) *(Add New) 5.b. (Added)(AFGSC) While the application of the AFCIA-R process is a command wide standard, every tactical situation will determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to include actions, are used only as examples of how to apply the concept and are not authoritative in nature as specific actions upon contact.

(U) *(Add New) 5.b.(1) (Added)(AFGSC) Launch Facility

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(1)(a) (Added)(AFGSC) Assessing the Situation. Assessment may begin immediately using RVA in conjunction with an analysis of alarm types from both the topside and below ground portions of the LF. The FSC should relay (to responding SF teams) the number of personnel and vehicles on site and the site configuration at the time of the alarm or incident (e.g. secure, penned, open launcher) in order to ascertain the configuration of the B-Plug. If available, the FSC should contact any airborne assets conducting forward presence patrols to assist with aerial visual assessment.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(1)(b) (Added)(AFGSC) Hostile Situation. Once the situation has been assessed and is determined hostile, provide a SALUTE report to the responsible control center and attempt to determine the security of the site (open, closed, penetrated, breached, etc.). Site configuration and alarm status (OZ/IZ, PIGA, WALM, etc.) must be considered when determining how and when responding forces tactically advance toward the LF. However, regardless of site configuration, responding forces must take decisive tactical action against the hostile force.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(1)(b)1. (Added)(AFGSC) After stopping to assess the situation, the initial responding patrol should place a gunner in the turret of their armored vehicle and begin tactical movement toward the LF. Note: Consider weapon maximum effective ranges when moving to engage the hostile force.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(1)(b)1.a. (Added)(AFGSC) The initial response patrol should guide other responding units into vantage points utilizing OCOKA analysis to fully gain battle space advantage. Responding units should also assume that all avenues of approach and key terrain surrounding the objective are either covered by weapon fire or physically occupied by the enemy.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(1)(b)1.b. (Added)(AFGSC) Responding patrols should be mindful of approaching the site using the most predictable routes (i.e. the access road to the site, the cattle gates, and/or the LF entry gate). These routes are the most likely ambush locations. Responding patrols should approach the affected area using differing routes, angles, or vantage points. It may be necessary to drive around the exterior of the site to clear remaining dead space and/or to make entry to the LF topside by driving through the LF fence line.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(1)(b)2. (Added)(AFGSC) Final Denial Fire. Final denial fire is used to engage the enemy at likely avenues of approach to exposed weapons or at any weapon access point. Access points include: LF Personal Access Hatch (PAH), B-Plug, lowered environmental flaps on the Payload Transport (PT) van covering an open launcher, the launch tube, or any other identified breach point).

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(1)(b)3. (Added)(AFGSC) Control. The number of follow-on teams required to control the situation will be determined by the on-site Team Leader and the IC using METT-TC. Follow-on forces should make every effort to fully gain battle space advantage and posture teams to engage the adversary and/or provide suppressive fire enabling maneuver elements to gain an advantage.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(1)(b)4. (Added)(AFGSC) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD). Once the first responding team is on-site and has determined an access point exists, they must employ ISD in order to stop and or stall meaningful work by the adversary and prepare to assault. Based on METT-TC, it may be advisable to keep one member in the turret to provide final denial fire/suppression while the other member(s) tactically exit the vehicle to place ISD into the breach point. Note: If heightened alarms are received (e.g. PIGA LVL or WALM), SF must make every attempt to immediately assault the breach point and secure the weapon system.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(1)(b)4.a. (Added)(AFGSC) ISD will be used to disrupt and harass personnel that have gained access to the weapon. ISD must be employed as close to the threat as possible, meaning that if the hostile forces are in either of the Launcher Equipment Rooms (LER), ISD will be placed into the LER at the breach point (PAH, Blast Door, etc.). ISD will be achieved through the use of smoke grenades, CS gas, M-84 stun grenades, weapon fire and/or any other possible means to disrupt the adversaries operations.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(1)(b)5. (Added)(AFGSC) Assault. Recapture operations must commence immediately. Ideally, two or more friendly forces will complete this action, preferably a fire team. If only one individual is available, it may be appropriate to continue initiating ISD to thwart the adversaries' actions until additional forces arrive on scene to mount the assault. However, the on-site Team Leader/IC will determine the assault force size based upon the evolving tactical situation (e.g. one individual may be appropriate based upon the immediacy of the threat).

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(1)(b)5.a. (Added)(AFGSC) Entering the LER through the PAH must be achieved if individuals have gained access to the below ground portions of the LF. Entry should be controlled, aggressive and violent. The team should clear both floors of the LER prior to clearing the launch tube. This process and tactics must be rehearsed as frequent as possible.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(1)(b)5.b. (Added)(AFGSC) Once the initial assault team has entered the breach point, topside suppression forces must continue to maintain contact with the assault force. If contact (i.e., radio, telephonic, voice, hand and arm signals, etc.) is lost with the assault force for other than momentary lapses and the status of the assault operation is unknown (assault successful, failed, etc.) the IC will prepare an additional assault team, re-initiate the assault and eliminate any lingering threat. This will be a continuous process until the resource is secured and the threat is neutralized.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(1)(b)5.b.(1) (Added)(AFGSC) SF units will develop local tactics, techniques and procedures for situations involving loss of communication between suppression and assault elements to mitigate confusion between responding forces.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(1)(b)5.c. (Added)(AFGSC) If no access point exists for members to perform ISD (e.g. access was gained during penetrated site maintenance operations and the adversary has executed a B-plug raise to seal themselves in the LER), responding SF will implement a containment posture. SF will cordon the affected area and initiate reporting measures as outlined in LIRPs.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(1)(b)6. (Added)(AFGSC) Re-supply ammunition and backfill casualties as soon as possible.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(1)(c) (Added)(AFGSC) Post Hostility Operations. See Chapter 6 of this enclosure for post-hostility operations.

(U) *(Add New) 5.b.(2) (Added)(AFGSC) **Weapon Storage Area**

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(2)(a) (Added)(AFGSC) Assessing the Situation. Assessment is a continuous, layered process that applies both inside and outside of the WSA. Internal and external patrols play a crucial role in assessment by conducting routine and random patrolling, facility checks, K-9 detection sweeps and vehicle/personnel inspections. Additionally, multiple sensor platforms and cameras provide real time detection and assessment capable of detecting unauthorized access to the perimeter internal facilities/structures. Munitions Squadron (MUNS) personnel also play a crucial role in assessment by maintaining vigilance and reporting any suspicious activity. Upon discovery of suspicious activity (regardless of the method of detection), personnel should immediately sound the alarm.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(2)(b) (Added)(AFGSC) General Considerations. Special attention and planning should be used for the employment of forces and integration with the Remote Targeting Engagement Systems (RTES) to ensure final denial is achieved for all resources. In the WSA environment, the IC is the on-duty Flight Chief and the Tactical Commander (TC) is the Response Force Leader (RFL) posted within the WSA, also referred to as the Area Supervisor (AS). The IC will maintain overall command and control of the incident, but will normally delegate tactical execution of all denial/recapture actions to the AS.

(U) *(Add New) 5.b.(2)(b)1. (Added)(AFGSC) If the situation is determined to be non-hostile (e.g. protesters) provide a SALUTE report to the responsible control center and ensure forces follow guidelines for the Use of Force as outlined in Air Force Instruction 31-117, *Arming and Use of Force for Air Force Personnel*.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(2)(b)2. (Added)(AFGSC) Consider the potential that non-hostile situations could turn hostile without warning, or simply be a diversion for a hostile attack on another portion of the WSA. Position adequate forces between unauthorized personnel and resources, challenge, place at a disadvantage, and remove them from the area as necessary.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(2)(c) (Added)(AFGSC) Hostile Situation. Once the situation has been assessed and is determined hostile, provide a SALUTE report to the responsible control center and attempt to determine the security of the site (open, closed, breached, etc.). Site configuration must be considered when determining how and when responding forces tactically advance toward the affected area. However, regardless of site configuration, responding forces must take decisive tactical action against the hostile force.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(2)(c)1. (Added)(AFGSC) Assessment continues throughout all phases of AFCIA-R, the AS must continually re-assess each situation and re-adjust forces to neutralize hostilities.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(2)(d) (Added)(AFGSC) Final Denial Fire. Upon initiation of suspected hostilities, the AS will implement locally developed final denial Courses of Action (COAs) to immediately establish 360° security on all resources located within the WSA. Additionally, the AS will request formation and immediate dispatch of the IBF and follow-on forces, as needed. RTES will be used to the maximum extent possible as the primary method of providing effective final denial fire to the entrances of all structures and facilities containing nuclear resources. If RTES is not operational for any reason, then specifically designated members of the RF shall be positioned (mounted or dismounted) in defensive fighting positions to bring effective final denial fire to the entrances of all structures and facilities containing nuclear resources. All forces must understand their roles and responsibilities to ensure denial of access is achieved and must be prepared to immediately recapture the resource(s) if denial fails.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(2)(e) (Added)(AFGSC) Tactics. The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions which can be used against the adversary:

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(2)(e)1. (Added)(AFGSC) RTES. Using RTES to achieve final denial in the WSA frees the RF for tactical employment by the Area Supervisor (AS). On-duty MUNS personnel, should be directed to arm and post personnel in internal final denial positions. Armed munitions personnel fall under the tactical control of the security forces tactical commander. The RF should be positioned between enemy personnel and nuclear resources. This includes locations where patrols can monitor avenues of approach and establish a base of fire to suppress the enemy and/or halt the enemy advance. Consider establishing Final Protective Lines (FPL) that take advantage of existing security features (e.g. a FPL along a fence line the adversary must climb/breach).

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(2)(e)2. (Added)(AFGSC) As Initial Back up Forces (IBF) and follow-on forces arrive, use them to form a flanking/maneuver element to assault enemy positions while the RF remains in place between the enemy and the resource(s).

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(2)(e)3. (Added)(AFGSC) When establishing any formation, modifications may have to be made based on METT-TC. Consideration must be given to the size and scope of the attack to avoid over commitment of forces. Ideally, the base of fire should consist of belt fed weapons (M-240, M-249, etc.). However, use caution to avoid cross-fire situations and ensure all avenues of approach and escape are covered by fire.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(2)(e)4. (Added)(AFGSC) Units will develop site defense plans for the WSA to counter potential attacks as identified in the Local Threat Capabilities Assessment (LTCA).

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(2)(e)5. (Added)(AFGSC) Control. If the hostile force gains access to the resource(s), either through an insider threat or external attack, the responding force must be

able to suppress the adversary and prevent hostile forces from leaving the area with the resource. Control will be established as close to the resource(s) as possible. In the instance of a breach to a storage structure, control will be established at the breach point.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(2)(e)5.a. (Added)(AFGSC) Monitor avenues of approach to the WSA and block all avenues of escape. Lock down entry control points to prevent entry/exit to the WSA. The AS shall continue to employ forces as needed until the threat is neutralized. All back-up force teams may be incrementally deployed to supplement on-scene SF personnel in assault actions, as required by the situation. Use interlocking fields of fire and continue to provide denial of access to nuclear resources.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(2)(e)5.b. (Added)(AFGSC) Ensure nonessential personnel remain in non-affected facilities until the situation is stabilized. Lock down facilities, initiate full accountability of personnel, maintain vigilance and sound the alarm if any situation arises in or around these non-affected areas.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(2)(e)6. (Added)(AFGSC) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD). Once the first responding team is on scene and has determined entry has occurred, they must employ ISD in order to stop and/or stall meaningful work by the adversary and prepare to immediately assault the storage structure or maintenance facility. ISD measures should focus on rendering the threat incapable of continuing their acts to gain access, steal, sabotage or tamper with the resource. RTES may be used to assist in ISD operations (e.g., placing fire directly into the affected storage structure or maintenance facility through breaches/openings). ISD can be achieved through the use of smoke grenades, CS gas, M-84 stun grenades, weapon fire or any other possible means to disrupt the adversaries' operations.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(2)(e)7. (Added)(AFGSC) Assault. The AS must immediately form an assault team from the RF and direct them to the affected facility/structure to initiate the recapture. The assault team will secure an entry point and/or breach, if necessary. Forces should assault through the affected area with emphasis on neutralizing all adversaries and ultimately regaining control of the resource. Tactical decisions concerning the method of recapture should be based on METT-TC and resources/personnel available. Once assault operations begin, they must continue until complete, and will rely upon speed and aggressive action to quickly return the resource to government control. When conducting the assault, team members must be vigilant in considering booby traps, trip wires, and improvised explosive devices (IED).

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(2)(e)7.a. (Added)(AFGSC) Special consideration must be given to the maintenance facilities in regard to resource location. In a storage structure or aircraft, space is confined and teams can normally conduct an assault and/or clearing operation directly to the resource. In maintenance facilities, there are often multiple bays capable of containing multiple resources as well as numerous administrative offices and storage areas. In both the Maintenance and Inspection Facility (M&I) and the Integrated Maintenance Facility (IMF), the primary objective is recapture of the bay(s) containing nuclear resources. These active bays should be assaulted, searched and cleared first and all administrative areas second.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(2)(e)7.b. (Added)(AFGSC) As the assault team clears the active bays, ensure an SF member is posted on any door leading from the active bay into the administrative areas or secure and pin these doors as the team advances past them. Once the active bays are cleared, leave an appropriate amount of personnel in place to secure the bays and advance the assault team to clear all administrative areas in the facility.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(2)(e)7.c. (Added)(AFGSC) If the assault team breaches and enters the maintenance facility through an administrative area, that area will be bypassed to get to the active bays first. If manning is available, post SF personnel in the bypassed area until the assault team can return and clear it. Otherwise, be mindful of rear security and move directly to the active bays.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(2)(e)7.d. (Added)(AFGSC) Once the assault team reaches the resource(s) and have neutralized any hostilities in the immediate area, post at least one SF to secure the resource(s). This is determined by the assault force leader and dictated by the number of resources, their distance apart, etc. The remaining members of the assault team will continue the assault.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(2)(e)7.e. (Added)(AFGSC) As hostile/unidentified personnel are encountered, they will be detained or eliminated based on subject actions. All personnel encountered (dead or alive) will be handcuffed and quickly searched (patted down) for weapons. The SF team will remove any weapons and keep them secured by armed SF personnel. All personnel encountered will be removed from the immediate area via the most direct route, while not taking them past the resource(s) if at all possible. Personnel will be detained and given a more thorough search once removed from the area. **Note:** The presence of an IED in the vicinity of (or attached) to a nuclear resource, or hazardous damage to the resource, shall not preclude the expedited assault.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(2)(e)7.f. (Added)(AFGSC) MUNS personnel may be armed with shotguns and/or M-4 rifles to provide final denial inside the structure or facility at the time of assault. Establishing local procedures to integrate MUNS personnel into assault actions is crucial to help prevent fratricide.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(2)(e)7.f.(a) (Added)(AFGSC) When possible, prior to initiating an assault, have an appropriate command center (Central Security Control/Local Display Area Operator) make contact with MUNS Control and notify them that an assault is about to occur. MUNS Control can then make contact with MUNS personnel in the affected facility/structure to inform them the SF assault force is entering (without giving it away to the adversary).

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(2)(e)7.f.(b) (Added)(AFGSC) The assault team must consider that MUNS personnel may have neutralized the adversary or may have been incapacitated, or the adversary and MUNS personnel could still be engaged at the time of the SF assault. Additionally, MUNS personnel may not be able to differentiate between an SF assault and an adversary attempting to gain access to their structure or facility. It is incumbent upon SF and MUNS to develop specific local assault procedures to include authentication/recognition techniques.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(2)(e)7.g. (Added)(AFGSC) Regardless of the situation, the assault teams' first priority is to regain control of the resource(s) at all costs. Every effort should be made to identify MUNS personnel during the assault, but these actions should not deter the assault team from taking the rapid action necessary to secure the resource(s) and neutralize any threats.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(2)(e)7.h. (Added)(AFGSC) At this point in recapture operations, SF personnel must assume responsibility for the resource(s) and account for any and all personnel within the affected area. MUNS personnel whose security status and whose identity cannot be immediately ascertained must be detained and removed from the affected area. This action is necessary to ensure security of the resource(s), protection of the SF team(s), and to determine if any of the MUNS personnel were involved in the hostile attack as an insider. However, if MUNS personnel were successful in their efforts to achieve final denial and have been properly verified/authenticated, SF personnel may focus their attention, efforts, and resources elsewhere.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(2)(e)7.i. (Added)(AFGSC) Joint training and exercises conducted with MUNS personnel are critical. During an actual assault, it is very unlikely MUNS personnel will be able to hear any commands given by the assault team. If MUNS personnel know what to expect and how to identify an SF assault, they will know what actions to take to increase their chances of survival and prevent friendly fire casualties.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(2)(e)7.j. (Added)(AFGSC) If contact (i.e. radio, telephonic, voice, hand and arm signals, etc.) is lost with the assault force for other than momentary lapses and the status of the assault operation is unknown (assault successful, failed, etc.) the AS will prepare an additional assault team re-initiate the assault and eliminate any lingering threat. This will be a continuous process until the resource is secured and the threat is neutralized.

(U) *(Add New) 5.b.(2)(e)8. (Added)(AFGSC) Re-supply ammunition and backfill all casualties as soon as possible.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(2)(f) (Added)(AFGSC) Post Hostility Operations. See Chapter 6 of this enclosure for post-hostility operations.

(U) *(Add New) 5.b.(3) (U) (Added)(AFGSC) **Off-Installation Convoy**

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(3)(a) (Added)(AFGSC) General Considerations. Off-Installation convoys travel with an organic main body (Convoy Commander, Payload Transporter, Lead and Trail Escort), 17-Person RF, 15-Person Initial Back-up Force (IBF), and 15-Person Follow-On Back-Up Force (FBF). Additionally, each movement is supported by at least one helicopter which transports a portion of the RF (weather permitting). Due to the distances traveled away from the main base and minimal delay features on the transport vehicle, forces must be proficient in immediate denial of access to the interior portions of that vehicle. Specific leadership responsibilities are identified below.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(3)(b) (Added)(AFGSC) Chain of Command. During normal operations, the chain of command and flow of Command and Communication (C2) will be from the

Convoy CC, to the Convoy Flight Chief (CFC), to the leaders of the RF, FBF, and/or IBF. To the fullest extent possible the RF, IBF, and FBF leaders will down channel and communicate with teams/ personnel assigned to their element(s). In order to ensure seamless tactical control during hostilities or attacks directed at the convoy, the CFC will immediately assume C2 throughout the duration of the tactical situation. The Convoy CC will coordinate with the applicable security control centers, command posts and any other agencies as local needs dictate, to assist with response from external forces. Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) will be developed for other teams (RF, IBF, and FBF) in the event the Convoy CC and/or CFC become combat ineffective. Redundancy in C2 will ensure continuity of tactical control, response, and notifications to security control centers, command posts, etc.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(3)(c) (Added)(AFGSC) Actions on Contact. All members of the convoy must understand their roles and responsibilities to ensure denial of access is achieved and must be prepared to immediately recapture the resource(s) if denial fails. If the PT van is attacked, the Convoy CC/CFC must determine the nature of the attack and direct the response, as appropriate. If the PT van is not disabled, all efforts will be focused in maintaining mobility and directing/escorting the PT van to a safe area. If the PT van is disabled and is no longer mobile, all forces must concentrate efforts to maneuver into positions to apply the principles of AFCIA-R as expeditiously as possible. If initial denial operations fail, ISD will be applied until the assault can be initiated. In addition, the CFC should take up a position based on METT-TC allowing for survivability and effective command and control. The Convoy CC/CFC will balance the urgent need to maneuver out of the proximity of the kill-zone with the need to establish and maintain immediate final denial fire/ISD.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(3)(d) (Added)(AFGSC) Assessing the Situation. Assessment is a continuous process which begins prior to the initiation of an off-base convoy through completion (debrief, after action review, data/intelligence collection, etc.). Whether suspicious activity along the route or an actual overt attack is encountered, personnel assigned to this mission must understand their roles and responsibilities to ensure denial of access is achieved and/or are prepared to recapture the interior of the transport vehicle.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(3)(d)1. (Added)(AFGSC) Convoy Forces must develop a system to ensure all security personnel assigned to the movement can maintain overall situational awareness. This includes the ability to report/relay the location of suspicious activity and to understand the relationship of the suspicious activity to the resource (e.g., transmitting mile markers/check points, traveling speeds and directions).

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(3)(d)2. (Added)(AFGSC) All personnel must remain vigilant to their surroundings and operating environment. In order to gain an accurate picture or assessment of danger areas (e.g. railroad crossings, high traffic areas, over passes, key terrain, abandoned or broken down vehicles or objects along the route of travel) the convoy has several tools at their disposal for identification and assessment of items that raise suspicion. Some of these tools include but are not limited to: Forward reconnaissance teams, Office of Special Investigation Agents, helicopters (if equipped with a FLIR or transporting an Advanced Designated Marksman [ADM]/Airborne Fire Team [ABFT]) and any other forward deployed elements organic to the missile complex.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(3)(d)3. (Added)(AFGSC) Upon recognition of attack indications, the team with the most accurate situation report/assessment should relay this information to the Convoy CC/CFC as soon as possible. Depending upon the situation, the Convoy CC/CFC may direct the airborne fire team to scan the affected area for any signs of adversarial re-attack or advancement toward the resource. To the fullest extent practical, all situational updates/developments, to include locations of forces, should be relayed/echoed to all convoy response force personnel.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(3)(d)4. (Added)(AFGSC) SF will maneuver to positions advantageous to the overall assessment of the tactical situation and battle space. This position should be the most advantageous to allow forces to rapidly place final denial fire around the PT.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(3)(d)4.a. (Added)(AFGSC) Consider tactical placement that allows for the immediate employment of belt-fed weapons, as well as assessment/observation, to best determine enemy locations/intentions.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(3)(e) (Added)(AFGSC) Final Denial Fire. Upon identification of suspected hostilities, the lead and trail escort teams must maneuver as quickly and efficiently as possible to establish a position for final denial fire. The Convoy CC/CFC must ensure response forces quickly attain the most advantageous position(s) available to secure a 50 meter/360-degree kill-zone surrounding the PT, and dominate/positively control this area by accurate, lethal weapons employment.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(3)(e)1. (Added)(AFGSC) Personnel should deploy into positions (mounted or dismounted) that will exploit the maximum effective range of their weapon(s). SF members must aggressively and tactically maneuver into positions close enough to allow them to get “eyes-on” the resource, provide 360 degree coverage, and to maintain situational awareness of the resource and surrounding area.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(3)(e)2. (Added)(AFGSC) Control. If unauthorized personnel attempt to enter the designated 50 meter “kill zone” near the resource, they will be immediately engaged by weapon fire from any team. The Convoy CC/CFC will direct team movements to perform ISD, assault threat locations, and/or perform disabling actions to the PT.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(3)(e)3. (Added)(AFGSC) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD). If access to the interior of the PT trailer has been achieved; the Convoy CC/CFC must initiate ISD, provide detailed fire control orders/measures and direct forces to engage from all directions (360 degree coverage). Simultaneously, prepare forces for an immediate assault. Proper application of fire control orders will ensure ISD is maintained in preparation for an effective assault.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(3)(e)4. (Added)(AFGSC) Assault. The Convoy CC/CFC must immediately form an assault team from available forces and direct them to the resource to initiate the recapture. Once assault operations begin, they must continue until complete, and will rely upon speed and aggressive action to quickly return the resource to government control. When conducting

the assault, team members must be vigilant in considering booby traps, trip wires, and improvised explosive devices.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(3)(e)4.a. (Added)(AFGSC) In the event an assault is unsuccessful, it may be appropriate to resume ISD to thwart the adversaries' actions until additional forces arrive in a position to mount the next assault. However, the CFC will determine the assault force size based upon the evolving tactical situation.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(3)(e)4.b. (Added)(AFGSC) If contact (e.g. radio, telephonic, voice, hand and arm signals, etc.) is lost with the assault force for other than momentary lapses and the status of the assault operation is unknown, the Convoy CC/CFC will prepare an additional assault team, re-initiate the assault and eliminate any lingering threat. This will be a continuous process until the resource is secured and the threat is neutralized.

(U) *(Add New) 5.b.(3)(e)5. (Added)(AFGSC) Re-supply ammunition and backfill all casualties as soon as possible.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(3)(f) (Added)(AFGSC) Post Hostility Operations.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(3)(f)1. (Added)(AFGSC) Establish and improve area/boundary security by using ropes, stanchions, and/or any other available materials. Formally establish the boundary area and limit entry/exit to a single entry control point. Post sufficient Close Boundary sentries (CB), Close-In sentries (CI), and ensure an authorized missile maintenance representative is designated as the SVA. Make a plan in the event the resource(s) must be moved (as determined by EOD or higher authority). **Note:** This area/boundary security is not an NDA.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(3)(f)2. (Added)(AFGSC) If appropriate, the Wing Commander *may* establish a National Defense Area (NDA) around the recaptured resource(s). However, the FBI may assume primary control of the resource and the adjacent area by declaring a crime scene, negating the need for an NDA. The decision to establish an NDA should be made jointly by the Wing Commander and the FBI Special Agent in Charge (SAC). Additionally, once requested by the Attorney General and approved by the Secretary of Defense, Title 18 USC Section 831 allows the FBI to protect and control the asset utilizing DoD forces, as well as allowing the FBI to utilize DoD forces in furtherance of their investigation (law enforcement capacity), without running afoul of *posse comitatus*.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(3)(f)3. (Added)(AFGSC) See Chapter 6 of this enclosure for **additional** post-hostility operations.

(U) *(Add New) 5.b.(4) (Added)(AFGSC) **On-Installation Convoy**

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(4)(a) (Added)(AFGSC) General Considerations. On-Installation convoys are supported by a 15-Person RF and a 15-Person IBF. The IBF shall be capable of responding to any emergency in the convoy to ensure denial of access in no longer than 15 minutes. Subsequent BFs must respond quickly enough to ensure denial of access to nuclear weapons but in

no more than 30 minutes. In the on-installation convoy environment, the Convoy CC is the on-duty Flight Chief (FC) and the TC is the Convoy Response Force Leader (CRFL). The FC will maintain overall command and control of the incident, but will normally delegate tactical execution of all denial/recapture actions to the CRFL.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(4)(b) (Added)(AFGSC) Assessing the Situation. Assessment is a continuous, layered process that applies to the entire convoy route to include both limited areas where the convoy will transition. It begins prior to initiation and continues until the completion of each movement. Convoy patrols play a crucial role in assessment by conducting initial sweeps of convoy areas, and route sweeps prior to the movement. Posted Traffic Control Points (TCPs) maintain route integrity and monitor avenues of approach to the convoy. K-9 detection and stand-off mitigation add additional layers of security intended to detect suspicious activity at the maximum distance from the route as possible. Upon discovery of suspicious activity (regardless of the method of detection), personnel should immediately sound the alarm.

(U) *(Add New) 5.b.(4)(b)1. (Added)(AFGSC) If the situation is determined to be non-hostile, provide a SALUTE report to the responsible control center and ensure forces follow guidelines for the Use of Force as outlined in Air Force Instruction 31-117, *Arming and Use of Force for Air Force Personnel*. Proceed to the nearest safe area, return to the point of origin or continue to the destination as directed by the FC. Use alternate routes if necessary.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(4)(b)2. (Added)(AFGSC) Consider the potential that non-hostile situations could turn hostile without warning, or simply be a diversion for a hostile attack.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(4)(b)3. (Added)(AFGSC) Assessment continues throughout all phases of AFCIA-R, the FC/CRFL will continually re-assess the situation and adjust response to neutralize hostilities.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(4)(c) (Added)(AFGSC) Final Denial Fire. Upon initiation of suspected hostilities, the FC will implement locally developed COAs to protect the resource(s). Ideally, a weapon movement under attack should proceed to the nearest safe area, return to the point of origin, or continue to the destination as directed by the FC. If the weapon movement cannot proceed to a designated safe area for any reason, then actions must be immediately implemented to establish 360° security on all resources and request formation and immediate dispatch of the IBF and follow-on forces. All members of the convoy must understand their roles and responsibilities to ensure denial of access is achieved and must be prepared to immediately recapture the resource(s) if denial fails.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(4)(c)1. (Added)(AFGSC) The RF should be positioned between enemy personnel and resources, where patrols can monitor avenues of approach and establish a base of fire to suppress the enemy and/or halt the enemy advance.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(4)(c)2. (Added)(AFGSC) As IBF and follow-on forces arrive, use them to form a flanking/maneuver element to assault enemy positions while the RF remains in place as the base of fire element between the enemy and the resource(s).

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(4)(c)3. (Added)(AFGSC) When establishing any formation, modifications may have to be made based on METT-TC. Consideration must be given to the size and scope of the attack to avoid over commitment of forces. Ideally, the base of fire should consist of belt fed heavy weapons (M-240, M-249, etc.). However, use caution to avoid cross-fire situations and ensure all avenues of approach and escape are covered by fire.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(4)(c)4. (Added)(AFGSC) Drive the tow vehicle(s) out of the kill zone and/or return the resource(s) to a secure location under cover from the base of fire. Keep a blocking force between hostile elements and the tow vehicle(s). Make every attempt to remain mobile and moving toward a position/location affording a more secure posture.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(4)(c)5. (Added)(AFGSC) If the convoy is forced to halt, immediately establish 360° security on the resource(s) and set up a strong and aggressive base of fire. Specifically designated members of the convoy shall be in a position (mounted or dismounted) to bring effective final denial fire to the resource(s). MUNS personnel will provide additional close-in security for the resource(s) as directed by the FC/CRFL.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(4)(c)6. (Added)(AFGSC) Units should develop defense plans for convoys to counter potential attacks as identified in the LTCA.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(4)(c)7. (Added)(AFGSC) Control. If the hostile force gains access to the resource(s), whether through an insider threat or external attack or both, the responding force must be able to suppress the adversary and prevent hostile forces from leaving the area with the resource. Units will develop and exercise (if possible) local SOPs used to disable trailers and tow vehicles. Control will be established as close to the resource(s) as possible.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(4)(c)8. (Added)(AFGSC) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD). If access to the resource/trailer has been achieved, the FC/CFRL will direct forces to engage from all directions and to disable the tow vehicle/trailer while simultaneously preparing forces for an immediate assault. If at all possible, weapon fire should be directed away from the resource itself. Proper application of fire control orders will ensure ISD is maintained in preparation for an effective assault.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(4)(c)9. (Added)(AFGSC) Assault. The FC must immediately form an assault team and direct them to the resource to initiate the recapture. Once assault operations begin, they must continue until complete, and will rely upon speed and aggressive action to quickly return the resource to government control. When conducting the assault, team members must be vigilant in considering booby traps, trip wires and improvised explosive devices.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(4)(c)9.a. (Added)(AFGSC) Once the team reaches the resource(s) and have neutralized any hostilities in the immediate area, post at least one SF to secure the resource(s). This is determined by the assault force leader and dictated by the number of resources, their distance apart, etc. The remaining members will continue the assault.

(U) ***(Add New)** 5.b.(4)(c)10. (Added)(AFGSC) Re-supply ammunition and backfill all casualties as soon as possible.

(U//DCNI) ***(Add New)** 5.b.(4)(d) (Added)(AFGSC) Post Hostility Operations. See Chapter 6 of this enclosure for post-hostility operations.

(U) ***(Add New)** 5.b.(5) (Added)(AFGSC) **Bomber Generation/Prime Nuclear Airlift Force (PNAF)**

(U//DCNI) ***(Add New)** 5.b.(5)(a) (Added)(AFGSC) General Considerations. Bomber generation/PNAF areas are supported by a 15-Person RF and a 15-Person IBF. The IBF shall be capable of responding to any emergency in the convoy to ensure denial of access in no longer than 15 minutes. Subsequent BFs must respond quickly enough to ensure denial of access to nuclear weapons but in no more than 30 minutes. Mitigating the standoff threat to bomber generation/PNAF areas remains a high priority, and proper execution of extended protection is critical to prevent an adversary from disrupting operations. In the bomber generation environment, the IC is the on-duty Flight Chief and the AS is the Response Force Leader (RFL) posted within the bomber generation/PNAF area. The IC will maintain overall command and control of the incident, but will normally delegate tactical execution of all denial/recapture actions to the AS.

(U//DCNI) ***(Add New)** 5.b.(5)(b) (Added)(AFGSC) Assessing the Situation. Assessment is a layered approach during bomber generation/PNAF operations, beginning at the resource(s) and working out toward the maximum effective range of adversary weapons. Personnel posted in support of extended detection are likely to be first to detect suspicious activity and are responsible for monitoring avenues of approach out to stand-off effective weapon ranges. All members of the generation area must remain vigilant to any suspicious activity and sound the alarm if any hostile situation should arise.

(U//DCNI) ***(Add New)** 5.b.(5)(b)1. (Added)(AFGSC) If the situation is determined to be non-hostile, provide a SALUTE report to the responsible control center and ensure forces follow guidelines for the Use of Force as outlined in Air Force Instruction 31-117, *Arming and Use of Force for Air Force Personnel*.

(U//DCNI) ***(Add New)** 5.b.(5)(b)2. (Added)(AFGSC) Consider the potential that non-hostile situations could turn hostile without warning, or simply be a diversion for a hostile attack on another portion of the area. Position adequate forces between unauthorized personnel and nuclear resources, challenge, place at a disadvantage, and remove them from the area.

(U//DCNI) ***(Add New)** 5.b.(5)(b)3. (Added)(AFGSC) Assessment continues throughout all phases of AFCIA-R, the AS will continually re-assess the situation and adjust response to neutralize hostilities.

(U//DCNI) ***(Add New)** 5.b.(5)(c) (Added)(AFGSC) Final Denial Fire. Upon initiation of suspected hostilities, the AS will implement locally developed final denial COAs to immediately establish 360 degree security on all resources located within the generation area and request

formation and immediate dispatch of the IBF and follow-on forces, as needed. Specifically designated members of the RF shall be positioned (mounted or dismounted) to bring effective final denial fire to all aircraft containing nuclear resources. All forces must understand their roles and responsibilities to ensure denial of access is achieved and must be prepared to immediately recapture the resource(s) if denial fails.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(5)(c)1. (Added)(AFGSC) The RF should be positioned between enemy personnel and resources, where patrols can monitor avenues of approach and establish a base of fire to suppress the enemy and/or halt the enemy advance.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(5)(c)2. (Added)(AFGSC) As IBF and follow-on forces arrive, use them to form a flanking/maneuver element to assault enemy positions while the RF remains in place between the enemy and the resources and provides base of fire actions.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(5)(c)3. (Added)(AFGSC) When establishing any formation, modifications may have to be made based on METT-TC. Consideration must be given to the size and scope of the attack to avoid over commitment of forces. Ideally, the base of fire should consist of belt fed heavy weapons (M-240, M-249, etc.). However, use caution to avoid cross-fire situations and ensure all avenues of approach and escape are covered by fire.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(5)(c)4. (Added)(AFGSC) Units should develop site defense plans for the generation area to counter potential attacks as identified in the LTCA.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(5)(c)5. (Added)(AFGSC) Control. Monitor avenues of approach to the generation area and block all avenues of escape. Lock down entry control points to prevent entry/exit to the area. All back-up force teams may be incrementally deployed to supplement on-scene SF personnel in assault actions, as required by the situation. Use interlocking fields of fire and continue to provide denial of access to nuclear resources.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(5)(c)5.a. (Added)(AFGSC) Special consideration must be given to mitigate the potential for an adversary to remove a nuclear laden aircraft. Consider placing large vehicles in front of the nose or landing gear. **Note:** Due to the C-17's ability to move backwards, ensure a vehicle is positioned at the front and rear of the aircraft. If necessary, aircraft can be disabled by directing weapon fire into the engines or landing gear, or by removing the pin on the aircraft's front landing gear. Additionally, vehicles can be positioned to seal off any escape routes the aircraft could use to taxi (this includes the use of maintenance vehicles or heavy equipment). Consider having the Fire Department use vehicles to block taxiways.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(5)(c)6. (Added)(AFGSC) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD). Once hostile forces have gained access to a resource, responding forces must suppress the adversary and halt them from continuing meaningful work. ISD measures must focus on rendering the threat incapable of continuing their acts to gain access, steal, sabotage or tamper with the resource. If the aircraft is located within a hanger or dock, apply ISD in a similar method as employing ISD to a structure or facility in the WSA. Simultaneously prepare forces for an immediate assault.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(5)(c)7. (Added)(AFGSC) Assault. The AS must immediately form an assault team and direct them to the affected hanger/aircraft to initiate the recapture. The assault team will secure an entry point and/or breach, if necessary. Forces should assault through the affected area with emphasis on neutralizing all adversaries. In general, the teams should stay on line and clear all areas prior to moving forward. Tactical decisions concerning the method of recapture should be based on METT-TC and resources/personnel available. Once assault operations begin, they must continue until complete, and will rely on speed and aggressive action to quickly return the affected weapons to government control. When conducting the assault, team members must be vigilant in considering booby traps, trip wires, and improvised explosive devices.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(5)(c)7.a. (Added)(AFGSC) Once the team reaches the resource(s) and have neutralized any hostilities in the immediate area, post at least one SF to secure the resource(s). This is determined by the assault force leader and dictated by the number of resources, their distance apart, etc. The remaining members will continue the assault.

(U) *(Add New) 5.b.(5)(c)8. (Added)(AFGSC) Re-supply ammunition and backfill all casualties as soon as possible.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 5.b.(5)(d) (Added)(AFGSC) Post Hostility Operations. See Chapter 6 of this enclosure for post-hostility operations.

(U) *(Add New) 6. (Added)(AFGSC) Post Hostility Operations (Follow-on Actions to Secure the Resource).

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 6.a. (Added)(AFGSC) **Restore Government Control.** Physically regain possession of resources and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum of two personnel are positioned to control entry to the affected area (as determined by the on-scene commander).

(U) *(Add New) 6.a.(1) (Added)(AFGSC) If at any time the custodial agency loses control of and/or unauthorized access to the weapon system has occurred for any length of time, the weapon system is deemed an IND. In the event a nuclear weapon is deemed an IND, a two person concept team is not required (as outlined in CJCSI 3261.01B, *Recapture and Recovery of Nuclear Weapons*). However, continue to control entry (two personnel) to the affected area and allow access to competent authority (i.e. FBI or EOD) as required.

(U) *(Add New) 6.b. (Added)(AFGSC) **Conduct Search/Sweep.** Ultimately, the goal of search and sweep operations is to ensure the incident site is safe. Inspections to detect damage or to conduct render safe actions cannot proceed until search and sweep operations are complete by security forces. This action may be split into two phases.

(U) *(Add New) 6.b.(1) (Added)(AFGSC) Phase one (initial sweep). The objective of the initial sweep is to clear the immediate area surrounding the resource of any lingering hostilities or threats (weapons, explosives, booby traps etc.) to the weapon system or responding forces.

(U) ***(Add New)** 6.b.(2) (Added)(AFGSC) Phase two (back sweep). The objective of the back sweep is to visually inspect the weapon system for obvious signs of damage or tampering, gather intelligence and to identify potential evidence. During the back sweep, security forces will conduct a more detailed inspection of the area(s) to include a search of all suspects (dead or alive) and areas in which the suspect(s) had immediate access. Note: Refer to Local Integrated Response Plan (LIRP) for additional information/actions.

(U//DCNI) ***(Add New)** 6.b.(3) (Added)(AFGSC) Upon the arrival of the senior EOD representative, advise of the status and location of any known Improvised Explosive Devices (IED). Develop contingency plans to mitigate IEDs if the nuclear weapon must be moved (determined by EOD or higher authority). Once EOD has declared the nuclear weapon(s) safe and ready to move, proceed through a cleared area or corridor as directed.

(U) ***(Add New)** 6.c. (Added)(AFGSC) **First Aid.** Provide first aid and make arrangements for medical treatment/evacuation of all casualties, regardless of friend or foe while preserving the scene in its original state as best as possible. Pre-identify a casualty collection point(s) to expedite/organize the treatment of individuals.

(U//DCNI) ***(Add New)** 6.c.(1) (Added)(AFGSC) Refer to the LIRP for additional actions concerning the removal of dead and wounded individuals from the area. Personnel (both friendly and enemy) whom have suffered wounds that result in obvious death and therefore pose no inherent threat to security should remain in place. Administer first aid and buddy care as needed. Avoid moving any personnel past or near any resources or IEDs. Medevacs/ambulance units will not approach the area until all sweeps of the area are complete and the area is deemed secure. It may be necessary to transport wounded individuals to an identified casualty collection point. Depending upon the overall security integrity of the affected area, available airborne units may be used to transport critically injured personnel to the nearest and most capable medical facility.

(U) ***(Add New)** 6.d. (Added)(AFGSC) **Detain suspects or offenders at the scene.** Once detained, secure suspects/offenders in a vehicle or area and continue securing the scene. If requested by the FBI, transfer custody of detained persons as soon as possible.

(U) ***(Add New)** 6.e. (Added)(AFGSC) **Establish a Crime Scene (if appropriate).** Secure the scene by using security forces (or other responsible persons) to keep bystanders away and to keep witnesses, suspects, and victims outside of the affected area. If required, redirect traffic to prevent any disturbance of the scene until a complete examination is made. The IC, through coordination with local and/or installation law enforcement, will establish an entry control point (ECP) as well as a control center in accordance with the Incident Command Structure, DoDM 3150.08. *Nuclear Accident Response Procedures (NARP) Manual* and the LIRP. The ECP shall be used to help control access and limit entry to the area.

(U//DCNI) ***(Add New)** 6.e.(1) (Added)(AFGSC) Limit entry to a single ECP and post an entry controller with an AF Form 1109 to account for all personnel entering/exiting the area. Maintain 360-degree coverage of the area.

(U) ***(Add New)** 7. (Added)(AFGSC) **Vehicle Considerations For Recapture and Recovery**

(U) ***(Add New)** 7.a. (Added)(AFGSC) **General.** RF vehicles provide mobility and may also provide a level of cover and/or concealment. Armored vehicles provide additional ballistic protection and increase the survivability of responding forces during recapture and recovery operation. Armored vehicles are not impenetrable and present a larger target for enemy forces. When arriving at the scene of an incident, position the vehicle where it will best serve the team.

(U) ***(Add New)** 7.a.(1) (Added)(AFGSC) When using the vehicle for cover, place the engine block towards the threat and exit the vehicle on the side away from the threat. Turrets should be used if at all possible.

(U) ***(Add New)** 7.b. (Added)(AFGSC) If possible, use armor to facilitate/conduct ISD and continuous tactical advancement (cover) and to transport advancing assault forces. It is permissible to use your vehicle as a weapon to engage enemy personnel in situations where deadly force is authorized.

(U) ***(Add New)** 7.c. (Added)(AFGSC) At night, ensure that the headlights of the vehicle do not illuminate RF members who are trying to remain concealed. Additionally, the brightness may also reduce the night vision capability of friendly forces.

(U) ***(Add New)** 7.d. (Added)(AFGSC) Balance the need to tactically or hastily reposition vehicles with the need to reduce engine/vehicle noise. Turning off the engine may help responding forces use voice communications and allow forces to assess the situation by hearing what is taking place in the surrounding environment (without moving from the cover/concealment of the vehicle).

(U) ***(Add New)** 7.e. (Added)(AFGSC) Adversaries may possess anti-armor capability; refer to the most current Nuclear Security Threat Capabilities Assessment (NSTCA) for detailed information.

(U) ***(Add New)** 8. (Added)(AFGSC) **Helicopter Employment**

(U//DCNI) ***(Add New)** 8.a. (Added)(AFGSC) **Recapture and Recovery Exercises.** Recapture and recovery operations involving multiple helicopter supported missions will be exercised quarterly. Using multiple aircraft exercise scenarios during wing monthly recapture recovery exercises is highly encouraged.

(U//DCNI) ***(Add New)** 8.b. (Added)(AFGSC) **Tactical Insertions.** Helicopters provide a unique three dimensional element to maneuver within the battle space. This ability to maneuver provides SF the ability to apply rapid actions against a threat enabling the overall accomplishment of the objective. Insertions can be used to supply mass, over watch, or a distinct capability at a determined area (e.g. advanced designated marksmen, breacher).

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 8.b.(1) (Added)(AFGSC) Premature commitment of the ABFT/TRF will negate the ability of the aerial team to respond and interdict the resource departing the tactical battle space. Conversely, if the ABFT is not employed in a timely manner, their effects are not used as a disruptive force to thwart the adversary's momentum/advances. The need to provide rapid final denial fire or if access has already been gained, the need to employ ISD actions must be considered when determining ABFT employment.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 8.b.(2) (Added)(AFGSC) The helicopter will attempt to maintain situational awareness of all fleeing vehicles. If there are no airborne TRF teams, additional aircraft will attempt to extract any available SF teams for pursuit operations.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 8.c. (Added)(AFGSC) **Tactical Extraction.** Forces supporting operations can provide tactical maneuver within the battle space. Ground forces requesting tactical reposition should be trained on how to identify a hasty landing zone as well as how to tactically on-load the aircraft. (Refer to AFTTP 3-1.H-1, Attachment 4, for specific TTPs.)

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 8.d. (Added)(AFGSC) **Helicopter Vehicle Interdiction (HVI)/Ground Interdiction.** In the event the resource cannot be contained, the helicopter will provide pursuit operations IAW AFTTP 3-1.H-1, Chapter 7, and employ methods to recapture. This effort will be coordinated between recapture forces and the aircraft commander. The effectiveness of the helicopter in these operations depends upon its configuration and SF compliment. Recapture and recovery can be executed via two methods; HVI and/or Security Forces Ground Interdiction.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 8.d.(1) (Added)(AFGSC) HVI. During certain situations the helicopter may be the best means to stop an escaping vehicle using aerial gunnery tactics. Once the vehicle is stopped, the aircraft can insert security forces to neutralize the threat and restore government control of the asset. This tactic is ideally suited for open terrain where the ability to find a choke point is limited. Although helicopters can execute this as a single aircraft, a two ship configuration is preferred due to the ability to mass forces.

(U//DCNI) *(Add New) 8.d.(2) (Added)(AFGSC) Ground Interdiction. Under certain conditions, the best option may be to insert an SF team and initiate a vehicle ambush. In this situation, the helicopter can be used to locate a choke point to facilitate a counter-attack/ambush. However, once employed, ground interdiction may become inflexible to enemy evasive maneuvers. SF will execute IAW authorized rules of force/engagement in order to restore government control.

(U) The below changes to DoDM S-5210.41-M_AFMAN 31-108, Volume 2, AFGSC Supplement, *General Nuclear Weapon Security Procedures*, Enclosure 7, dated 21 February 2014, are effective immediately.

(U) *(Add New) 3.a. (Added)(AFGSC) In instances where higher headquarters levies new requirements which cannot be met upon publication effective date, AFGSC will take the lead on drafting deviations and coordinating with local commanders to ensure unit specific anomalies and/or preferences are addressed.