



DoD MANUAL S-5210.41, VOLUME 3

(U) NUCLEAR WEAPON SECURITY MANUAL: DoD NUCLEAR WEAPON ENVIRONMENT-SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS

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Approved by: Arthur T. Hopkins, Principal Deputy Performing the Duties of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs

(U) Purpose: This manual is composed of several volumes, each containing its own purpose.

- (U) In accordance with the authority in DoD Directives (DoDD) 5134.08 and O-5210.41, this manual:
 - (U) Implements policy, assigns responsibilities, and prescribes mandatory procedures for the security of nuclear weapons.
 - (U) Describes DoD security policy, objectives, and concepts, and prescribes minimum security criteria for protecting nuclear weapons on alert, in storage, in maintenance facilities, in-transit, and in regeneration situations.

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- (U) Implements the Nuclear Security Threat Capabilities Assessment (NSTCA), including subsequent updates or replacement threat capabilities assessments (TCAs) as endorsed by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs (ASD(NCB)); provides security planning guidance; and describes security requirements for selected weapon configurations.
- (U) This volume assigns responsibilities and prescribes procedures applicable to specific nuclear weapon security environments.

REFERENCE ONLY

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SECTION 1: (U) GENERAL ISSUANCE INFORMATION

1.1. (U) APPLICABILITY. This volume:

a. (U) Applies to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Military Departments, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the DoD (referred to collectively in this issuance as the “DoD Components”).

b. (U) Does **not** abolish or abridge the authority or responsibility of a commander to apply different but equal (or more stringent) criteria and standards during emergencies. Such a change in standards does not abolish the requirement for maintaining U.S. control of nuclear weapons and components. Improvements to storage facilities requiring construction effort or procurement should be accomplished in accordance with Section 5 of Volume 1 and Section 3 of Volume 2 of this manual.

c. (U) Does **not** provide protection standards for nuclear command and control (NC2) facilities or special nuclear materials (SNM). Protection standards for NC2 facilities and SNM are provided by DoD Manual (DoDM) S-5210.92 and DoD Instruction O-5210.63, respectively.

d. (U) Pertains to all nuclear weapons, nuclear weapon systems, and nuclear components for which DoD Components have operational, maintenance, or custodial responsibility.

1.2. (U) POLICY. In accordance with DoDD 5210.41, it is DoD policy that:

a. (U) Nuclear weapons are assets vital to the security of the United States. Nuclear weapons require special protection because of their political and military importance, their destructive power, and the consequences of an unauthorized deliberate or inadvertent pre-arming, arming, launching, releasing, or detonation.

b. (DCNI) The central and overriding objective for nuclear weapon security is to **deny** an adversary unauthorized access to nuclear weapons. In instances where an adversary gains unauthorized access to nuclear weapons, commanders will take any and all actions necessary to regain control of the nuclear weapons immediately.

c. (U) The standards and criteria in this volume are the absolute minimums required to be implemented. Additional security measures may be required as dictated by threat, site configuration, topography, or operational considerations. Combatant Commands and Military Departments are expected to increase security protection as necessary and ensure continuity of efforts between nuclear weapon security and operational missions.

1.3. (U) CLARIFYING INFORMATION.

a. (U) Warning Statements.

(1) (U) *Information removed.*

(2) (U) *Information removed.*

(3) (U) The remaining paragraphs of this volume contain UNCLASSIFIED information, some of which is protected as DoD Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information (DCNI) in accordance with DoD Instruction 5210.83.

(a) (U) The decision to protect this information as DCNI is based on the determination that the unauthorized dissemination of such information could reasonably be expected to have an adverse effect on the health and safety of the public and the security of DoD nuclear weapons, components, and facilities.

(b) (U) Accordingly, users of this volume are prohibited from the unauthorized dissemination of DCNI contained herein regarding U.S. nuclear weapons security policy.

(c) (U) Guidance concerning the authorized release of DCNI information is found in DoDD 5230.11 and DoDD 5230.20.

b. (U) Descriptive Words. The language used in this volume includes:

(1) (U) Mandatory guidance that is directive in nature (e.g., use of the words “will” or “must”) and provides standards, measures, or actions that are required, and subject to inspection. An inability to meet the requirement in this manual necessitates a request for a deviation as provided for in Section 6 of Volume 2 of this manual.

(2) (U) Recommendations in this volume that, although not mandatory, provide a framework to support implementation of the mandatory guidance more fully but are not within the purview of this volume to mandate (e.g., use of the word “should”).

(3) (U) Enabling procedures that permit actions or measures within described parameters (e.g., use of the words “may” or “can”). These are not requirements, but are offered as possible actions or measures to take at the discretion of the responsible party.

SECTION 2: (U) RESPONSIBILITIES

2.1. (U) ASD(NCB). Under the authority, direction, and control of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)), the ASD(NCB):

- a. (U) Provides management oversight of the nuclear weapon security program.
- b. (U) Maintains and monitors prescribed nuclear security management processes.
- c. (U) Reviews the DoD Component implementation guidance for consistency and compliance with policy stated within this manual.
- d. (U) Conducts programmatic reviews and management audits of nuclear weapons security processes.

2.2. (U) DIRECTOR, DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY (DTRA). Under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(AT&L) and through the ASD(NCB), the Director, DTRA:

- a. (U) Conducts Defense Nuclear Surety Inspection Oversight on behalf of the CJCS in accordance with CJCS Instruction 3263.05A.
- b. (U) Conducts an annual DoD nuclear weapons security deviation analysis and provides a report of the analysis to the DASD(NM).

2.3. (U) DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (DIA). Under the authority, direction, and control of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and in accordance with DoDD 5105.21, the Director, DIA, annually reviews and updates relevant TCAs, as necessary.

2.4. (U) GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. The General Counsel of the Department of Defense reviews nuclear weapon security policy and guidelines for legal sufficiency.

2.5. (U) SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS. The Secretaries of the Military Departments who are involved with nuclear weapons in DoD custody and their associated systems or components, or who provide nuclear weapons support to designated Combatant Commanders or other DoD Component heads:

- a. (U) Implement this volume and make it part of their normal assurance and assessment process, including DoD Component Inspector General assessments as specified in Section 5 of Volume 2 of this manual.

b. (U) Use this manual, DoDD 5210.41, and the NSTCA as the primary nuclear weapon security planning references.

c. (U) Plan and program for the resources needed to properly execute the nuclear weapon security standard at all nuclear weapon locations and operating environments, in accordance with Section 3 of Volume 1 of this manual. Size, organize, train, arm, and equip location specific response forces (RF) and initial and subsequent backup forces (BF) to maneuver as tactical elements as a combined force capable of defeating an adversary force in those situations that threaten or affect the security of nuclear weapons.

d. (U) *Classified information removed.*

(1) (U) Weapons location.

(2) (U) The configuration in which the weapons are maintained (e.g., storage, transport, maintenance, on alert).

(3) (U) The nature and capabilities of potentially hostile forces.

(4) (U) The reliability and capabilities of personnel responsible for working with or protecting nuclear weapons.

e. (U) *Classified information removed.*

f. (U) Provide a security concept of operations for new or modernized security systems (e.g. electronic security system (ESS) or subsystem, entry control and circulation control system or subsystem, area protection system or subsystem, facility protection system or subsystem, weapon movement protection system or subsystem, security force composition, or response times) to the ASD(NCB) for review.

g. (U) Adhere to the minimum security criteria and standards for denying unauthorized access to nuclear weapons prescribed in this volume.

h. (U) Comply with the concepts and procedures, described in detail in this manual, for denying unauthorized access to nuclear weapons. Implement procedural requirements immediately.

i. (U) Take all necessary actions to maintain control of U.S. nuclear weapons and components in emergency circumstances, even if these actions do not meet the prescribed standards in this manual.

j. (U) May issue supplementary instructions, when necessary, to provide for unique requirements within their respective Departments. Two copies of any additional guidance issued by the Military Departments will be forwarded to the DASD(NM), under the ASD(NCB), through the CJCS, within 30 days of publication and after each subsequent change.

k. (U) Direct and ascertain compliance that improvements to storage facilities requiring construction effort or procurement are accomplished in accordance with Section 5 of volume 1 and Section 3 of Volume 2 of this manual.

l. (U) Provide operating units with access to commercially available modeling and simulation tools to validate local security plans.

2.6. (U) CJCS. The CJCS:

a. (U) Prescribes procedures for the conduct of the nuclear surety inspections as described in the CJCS Instruction 3263.05A.

b. (U) Provides nuclear weapon recapture and recovery guidance for lost, stolen, or missing nuclear weapons or nuclear components.

c. (U) Upon receipt, forwards to the DASD(NM) supplemental guidance to this volume issued by the Military Departments and Combatant Commands.

2.7. (U) COMBATANT COMMANDERS WITH NUCLEAR RESPONSIBILITIES. The Combatant Commanders with nuclear responsibilities:

a. (U) Support the full, applicable range of nuclear weapon security policy.

b. (U) Through the component commands, ensure physical security and protection against physical damage, misuse, and theft of nuclear weapons and nuclear components under their control.

c. (U) Coordinate the development of nuclear weapons security plans and procedures and provide resources to work with other organizations to recover lost, stolen, or missing nuclear weapons or nuclear weapon components.

d. (U) Advocate for emerging nuclear security requirements submitted by DoD organizations by giving due analysis and consideration to including these requirements in the integrated priority lists.

e. (U) May issue supplementary instructions, when necessary, to provide for unique requirements within their Command. Any supplemental instructions issued by the Combatant Commanders will be forwarded to the DASD(NM), through the CJCS, within 30 days of publication and after each subsequent change.

2.8. (U) COMMANDER, U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND (USSOCOM). The Commander, USSOCOM:

- a. (U) *Classified information removed.*
- b. (U) *Classified information removed.*
- c. (U) *Classified information removed.*
- d. (U) *Classified information removed.*
- e. (U) *Classified information removed.*
- f. (U) Has direct liaison authority with all organizations involved in order to facilitate mission support.
- g. (U) In coordination with the USD(AT&L) and the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, Department of Defense, defines funding requirements and responsibilities for USSOCOM support to DTRA in order to identify resource requirements and support the development of program decision memorandums.
- h. (U) In coordination with the USD(AT&L), specifies the capacity in which contractors may be used prior to each MIGHTY GUARDIAN exercise.

SECTION 3: (U) NUCLEAR WEAPON STORAGE, PROCESSING, AND MAINTENANCE FACILITY SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

3.1. (U) GENERAL. These additional or environmentally unique security system design requirements apply to nuclear weapons located in storage, processing, and maintenance facilities. In all cases, the requirements in Volumes 1 and 2 of this manual also apply unless specifically exempted. This Section does not apply to the Weapon Storage and Security System (WS3).

3.2. (U) CONCEPT.

a. (U) The nuclear weapons security standard (NWSS) will be met.

b. (U) Nuclear weapons will be stored, processed, and maintained in the most secure facilities possible and in the fewest locations that are operationally and logistically feasible. The most secure nuclear weapons facilities are those that incorporate an underground element in their design.

(1) (U) All new construction of nuclear weapon storage, processing, and maintenance facilities will incorporate an underground element in their design.

(2) (U) If this is not possible due to uniquely localized soil or water table constraints, newly constructed above-ground facilities must be significantly robust in design to provide essentially the same security system effectiveness as would be provided by a facility incorporating an underground element in their design.

(3) (U) For existing above-ground facilities, emphasis must be placed on adding robust security systems to current storage configurations to improve security system effectiveness or moving to a facility incorporating an underground design element.

3.3. (U) ABOVE-GROUND FACILITY PROTECTION SYSTEM. This Paragraph specifies additional standards for the facility protection system necessary to protect existing above-ground nuclear weapon facilities.

a. (U) **Facility Barrier Subsystem.** Maintenance and processing facilities that, due to safety considerations, do not meet the construction requirements in Military-Handbook 1013/1-A will not be used for permanent storage. If, however, it becomes absolutely necessary for temporary (less than 24 hours) storage during normal processing flow, the facility must either remain opened and manned, or closed and appropriately guarded in accordance with both Paragraph 3.3.e.(3) of Volume 1 of this manual and Paragraph 3.3.a. of Volume 2 of this manual.

(1) (U) In the absence of effective compensatory measures to deny access to maintenance and processing facilities, guard the maintenance or processing facility by at least one armed person who, while performing this duty, has no duties other than security.

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(2) (U) This person will be in a position to deny unauthorized access to the maintenance or processing facility and able to provide effective, directly aimed fire should it be required to repel potential intruders.

b. (DCNI) Delay and Denial Systems.

(1) (DCNI) The totality of perimeter physical security features, limited area interior delay features, on post security forces and facility physical security systems must provide a minimum 30 minute delay against the ability to achieve unauthorized access.

(2) (DCNI) Delay may consist of various technologies and physical impediments designed to complicate and increase adversary task time and allow sufficient time for security force response, interdiction and defeat before an adversary gains unauthorized access to a weapon.

(3) (DCNI) Planners will design the defensive strategy to maximize security force delay capabilities in combination with physical delay features.

(4) (DCNI) Final denial weapons fire is designed to be a last line of defense before unauthorized access to nuclear weapons. Final denial weapons fire systems, technology, or security forces, must use the capability to bring effective fire to bear at any point during an adversary attack. Typically, final denial weapons fire is positioned at facility entrances or at identified avenues of approach to exposed weapons.

3.4. (U) UNDERGROUND ELEMENT DESIGN FACILITY PROTECTION SYSTEM.

This segment describes additional requirements for nuclear weapons storage, processing, and maintenance facilities incorporating an underground element in their design.

a. (U) Area Protection System.

(1) (U) Boundary Barrier Subsystem. The legal boundary of the topside portion of the restricted area (restricted area level designated by the responsible Military Department) will be defined by a Military Department-designated perimeter boundary barrier subsystem.

(2) (U) Gates. The perimeter boundary barrier subsystem will have the minimum number of vehicular and pedestrian gates in accordance with operational requirements. Incorporate an automated entry control feature incorporating at least Level 1 identification authentication.

(3) (U) Warning System. The topside portion of the restricted area will be marked with Military Department-designated warning signs and positioned as directed in Military Department regulations and instructions. Sound amplification equipment is not required.

(4) (U) Airborne Assault Threats. Facilities incorporating an underground design element are exempt from the airborne assault obstacle requirement of Section 3 of Volume 2, of this manual.

(5) (U) Lighting. Lighting sufficient to maximize the use of extended detection, associated assessment systems, and closed circuit television (CCTV) is required. If the concept of operations is an unlighted site (as described in Paragraph 3.2.c.(1)(c) of Volume 2 of this manual) and the integrated system maximizes extended detection, associated assessment systems, and CCTV, then lighting is not required.

(6) (DCNI) Exterior Intrusion Detection System (IDS). A perimeter IDS is recommended for the topside areas of underground facility, especially if the terrain provides cover or concealment for intrusions. Install wide area extended detection and assessment systems to maintain situational awareness of the topside area approach routes and the surrounding terrain.

(7) (U) CCTV. CCTV capability will exist to survey the avenues of approach to the topside vehicle portal entrances and the entire loading dock area. Additionally, integrate an assessment system with the extended detection systems described in Paragraph 3.4.a.

b. (U) Facility Barrier Subsystem.

(1) (DCNI) Vehicle Barriers. Install anti-ram vehicle barriers at the entry and exit portals of the facility to prevent vehicle penetration of the facility and along the topside restricted area perimeter boundary to delay vehicle borne attacks.

(2) (DCNI) Facility Doors. The facility entrance doors will be a vault type door with retractable locking pins. Two vault type doors are required for each entry portal into the protected area of the facility. Entry portals will be kept to the minimum necessary to support the operational concept of the facility.

c. (U) Support Facility Criteria.

(1) (DCNI) The construction of vault doors and the entry control system for underground facilities far exceed standard above-ground Site Security Control Center (SSCC) entry door requirements.

(2) (DCNI) In those employment schemes where the SSCC is located in the underground portion of the facility, SSCC doors need not meet the above-ground SSCC entry door requirements.

(3) (DCNI) The system will contain a manual switch at the SSCC which, when activated, will close and secure all entry portal vault doors in sufficient time to prevent adversary penetration of the facility.

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d. (U) **Electronic Security System.** An integrated system of electronic sensors will be installed and procedures implemented to detect attempts to penetrate the facility weapon storage, processing, and maintenance exclusion areas (EAs) as well as facility entry portals and openings.

(1) (U) **Interior IDS.** Receive alarms from the interior IDS at the SSCC.

(2) (U) **Establish a redundant alarm display and control console capability and,** due to the increased protection provided in the design of underground facilities, consider locating it within the underground facility.

(3) (U) **To aid the RF,** a remote location is required to receive and display alarms (not a redundant control console) not acknowledged by the operators at the SSCC.

e. (U) Entry And Circulation Control.

(1) (U) **Designation of Exclusion, Limited, and Restricted Areas.**

(a) (U) The underground areas of the facility designed for storage or maintenance of nuclear weapons is an EA when nuclear weapons are present.

(b) (U) The underground portion of the facility bounded by the walls and beginning at a designated gate or barrier at either end of the entry and exit portal is a limited area.

(c) (U) The land area above the facility, including leading to the underground facility up to the gate or barrier designated in Paragraph 3.4.a.(2) will be designated as either a limited area or a restricted area and employ Military Department designated security measures to prevent unauthorized entry. Military Departments will decide security area designations for all other related areas and facilities and resource accordingly.

(2) (U) **Entry Control Procedures.** Establish entry control procedures for entry to underground storage and maintenance facilities with sufficient redundancy such that a single failure in a door, device or automated entry control system (AECS) component does not compromise positive control. Install an AECS.

(3) (U) **Entry Control Criteria.**

(a) (U) Control entry into the above-ground area points.

(b) (U) Entry to the underground facility limited area will require physical authorization from a single and authorized individual located in the entry control point (ECP) or the SSCC. The AECS will not, by itself, allow entry into the limited area.

(c) (U) Initial entry to an unmanned EA will require unified action by two separate, authorized individuals: For systems that use an electronic access control system, entry of card and personal identity number (PIN) by two separate authorized team members will precede the actions of the two separate authorized individuals controlling entry to the EA. The electronic

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access control system will only verify identity and will not be capable of independently generating the signal to control the operation of portals that allow entry to the EA.

(d) (U) Establish procedures for proper identification of weapon movement and emergency response vehicles before granting entry. All other vehicles will be stopped and inspected before entering the loading dock area.

(e) (U) Except for nuclear weapon movement and emergency response vehicles, all passengers will exit the vehicle and proceed through the ECP as pedestrians. The vehicle driver will process through the ECP before inspection of the vehicle. Establish procedures for security response to and removal of the vehicle in the event the driver or vehicle is denied entry.

(f) (U) *Classified information removed.*

(g) (U) *Classified information removed.*

f. (DCNI) Security Force Requirements.

(1) (DCNI) Storage, processing, and maintenance facilities incorporating an underground design element are resistant to penetration attempts by unauthorized personnel via any avenue of approach other than the normal entry approaches to the facility.

(2) (DCNI) The above-ground areas of the facility can be routinely secured by a limited number of security force personnel; however, when vault doors that support the 30-minute delay of the facility security system are opened, or during weapon movement operations or emergencies, additional security forces that constitute an RF are required. When the RF is required, response times will not exceed 5 minutes.

(3) (DCNI) At all times, the BF must respond quickly enough to ensure denial of access to nuclear weapons.

(4) (DCNI) Additional subsequent follow-on BFs must respond quickly enough to ensure denial of access to nuclear weapons. Deploy these subsequent BFs as a whole, or incrementally in tactical units, as quickly as possible to ensure retention of control.

(5) (U) Assign a minimum of nine security force members for the above-ground area at the Kirtland Underground Munitions Maintenance Complex. The Military Service will provide supplementing guidance establishing the placement of these forces in support of the above-ground security of the facility.

SECTION 3: (U) NUCLEAR WEAPON STORAGE, PROCESSING, AND MAINTENANCE FACILITY
SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

(6) (U) *Classified information removed.*

(a) (U) *Classified information removed.*

(b) (U) *Classified information removed.*

(c) (U) *Classified information removed.*

(7) (U) Above-ground Area (U.S. Navy Limited Area Processing And Storage Complex (LAPSC)).

(a) (U) The U.S. Navy LAPSC above-ground area is contained within an existing limited area and therefore is provided the security benefits inherent in the protection of the limited area. No additional above-ground security forces beyond those already provided to the limited area are required.

(b) (U) The Military Departments will provide supplementing guidance establishing the placement of these forces in support of the LAPSC.

(8) (U) *Classified information removed.*

(a) (U) *Classified information removed.*

(b) (U) *Classified information removed.*

(c) (U) *Classified information removed.*

(9) (U) Above-ground Area (U.S. Air Force (USAF) Weapons Storage and Maintenance Facility).

SECTION 3: (U) NUCLEAR WEAPON STORAGE, PROCESSING, AND MAINTENANCE FACILITY
SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION

DoDMS-5210.41-V3, August 11, 2016

(a) (U) Assign a minimum of nine security force members for the above-ground area U.S. Air Force (USAF) Weapons Storage and Maintenance Facility.

(b) (U) The USAF will provide supplementing guidance establishing the placement of these forces in support of the above-ground security of the facility.

(10) (U) *Classified information removed.*

(a) (U) *Classified information removed.*

(b) (U) *Classified information removed.*

(c) (U) *Classified information removed.*

(11) (DCNI) Security forces are required to be armed with the appropriate weapons to support the mission.

(a) (DCNI) Arm all security personnel on duty inside the underground facility area with Military Department-approved rifles or shotguns at a minimum.

(b) (DCNI) Personnel whose duties preclude physically carrying a rifle or shotgun at all times (such as entry controllers (ECs) and assistant ECs) should be armed with a sidearm. In such instances, a shotgun or rifle must be immediately available (on post readily available) to each such person.

(c) (DCNI) Assigned supporting forces in the facility are a force multiplier and will be appropriately armed.

(d) (DCNI) The Military Departments will develop procedures to appropriately arm and equip supporting forces when nuclear weapons are in the loading dock area and during DoD weapon movement operations.

3.5. (U) SECURITY FORCE RESPONSE TIMES. Security forces must respond in enough strength and in time to prevent an adversary force from gaining unauthorized access to a nuclear weapon and, thus, meet the NWSS. For general minimum RF size and response times, refer to Section 7 of Volume 1 of this manual.

SECTION 3: (U) NUCLEAR WEAPON STORAGE, PROCESSING, AND MAINTENANCE FACILITY
SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION

DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION

DoDM S-5210.41-V3, August 11, 2016

a. (DCNI) Above and below ground security teams must respond to alarms immediately. Response time must not exceed 5 minutes.

b. (DCNI) When the facility is unsecured (e.g., the vault doors are open), the BF must respond immediately to ensure denial of access to nuclear weapons, but in not more than 30 minutes. When the facility is secured (e.g., vault doors are closed) and an assessment determines a response is needed, the BF must respond immediately to ensure denial of unauthorized access to nuclear weapons, but in not more than 60 minutes.

REFERENCE ONLY

SECTION 3: (U) NUCLEAR WEAPON STORAGE, PROCESSING, AND MAINTENANCE FACILITY
SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION

SECTION 4: (U) THE WEAPON STORAGE AND SECURITY SYSTEM

4.1. (U) GENERAL.

a. (U/DCNI) These requirements apply to the WS3 and sets forth security requirements for nuclear weapons located in a weapons storage vault (WSV).

b. (DCNI) Unless otherwise modified or exempted in this Section, the requirements in volumes 1 and 2 of this manual also apply.

c. (DCNI) The following physical security requirements from Volume 2 of this manual are exempted: dual fencing and gates, perimeter IDS, security perimeter and area lighting, airborne assault barriers, entry control facilities or gate house, and sound amplification equipment.

d. (DCNI) Any physical security upgrades added to WS3 sites and governed by Volume 2 of this manual, will comply with the guidelines in Section 5 of Volume 1 and Section 3 of Volume 2 of this manual.

4.2. (U) CONCEPT.

a. (U) *Classified information removed.*

b. (U) Maximum emphasis will be placed on guaranteeing denial of unauthorized access to nuclear weapons regardless of vault configuration (e.g., locked or unlocked).

c. (U) *Classified information removed.*

(1) (DCNI) Consider vault openings to support nuclear weapon or vault maintenance, vault recoding, weapons inventories, or weapon movement as routine openings. The frequency of openings must be minimized, but be at the discretion of the owning command. Routine vault openings or maintenance should be scheduled in combined monthly maintenance plans.

(2) (DCNI) Before initiating the vault unlocking sequence:

(a) (DCNI) Conduct an exterior sweep around the PAS and an interior purge of the PAS.

(b) (DCNI) Post an EC and an assistant EC to control entry to the PAS.

(c) (DCNI) Post a detection screen to provide early warning of potential stand-off threats against the PAS.

(d) (DCNI) Ensure that an RF is present in the immediate area; and that the augmentation force (AF) is formed, armed, and mobile before the vault is placed in access.

(3) (DCNI) The doors to the PAS will, within operational constraints, remain closed when maintenance is being performed on a weapon or a vault, or the vault is unlocked.

(4) (DCNI) When the weapon is outside the vault undergoing maintenance, employ denial systems to quickly provide nuclear weapon protection.

(5) (DCNI) Military Departments will develop procedures to ensure maintenance personnel are capable of immediately bringing the weapon maintenance procedure to a safe stopping point, and returning the weapon to the WSV or maintenance vehicle safe in time to meet the NWSS.

(6) (DCNI) Failing this, personnel will take whatever measures are necessary to ensure unauthorized access is denied.

d. (U) WSVs are installed in PASs that support daily NATO aircraft flying operations that most often do not involve nuclear operations. Establish procedures at each installation, and included in the installation integrated defense plan, to provide the highest level of security for the weapons while facilitating the operational needs of the host unit.

e. (DCNI) Nuclear security and custody operations are conducted by U.S. forces at U.S. main operating bases and by a joint U.S. and host-nation security force at munitions support squadron (MUNSS) locations supporting NATO dual-capable aircraft wings.

(1) (DCNI) At host-nation bases, U.S. forces perform the custody mission, and host-nation forces perform the security and force protection missions.

(2) (DCNI) Close cooperation is necessary to ensure the NWSS is met. The U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) will ensure appropriate plans and procedures are in place and custody and security operations are evaluated to comply with the NWSS.

4.3. (DCNI) SYSTEM DESCRIPTION. The WS3 consists of four major groups and associated subsystems and is designed to deny access. These include the vault control group, the code transfer group, the console group, and the monitor indicator group.

a. (U) The vault control group contains the WSV and the electronics and electrical connections to operate and monitor the WSV.

b. (U) The code transfer group utilizes electronically coded modules to access the WSV.

(1) (DCNI) Maintenance unlock codes allow the opening of 1 WSV, 1 time per code, after a minimum pre-determined delay of at least 30 minutes.

(2) (DCNI) Mass unlock codes allow the opening of every WSV on an installation, 1 time per code, after a minimum pre-determined delay of at least 30 minutes.

(3) (DCNI) Universal release codes (URC) allow the opening of every WSV on an installation without a time delay.

c. (U) The console group provides the communications and processing capabilities necessary to monitor the status of the vault sensors, junction boxes, and equipment boxes.

d. (U) The monitor indicator group allows the operator at the local and remote monitoring facilities (RMF) to assess alarms coming from WSVs through use of CCTV cameras and monitors.

4.4. (U) WS3 PHYSICAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS. The standards necessary to protect nuclear weapons stored in WSVs in PASs on U.S. and non-U.S. NATO air bases in Europe.

a. (U) **Topographic Features.** Vegetation within 10 meters (32.8 feet) of vaulted PASs will not exceed 8 inches (20.3 centimeter) in height.

b. (U) **PAS Lighting.** PAS exterior lighting will provide a minimum of 10 lux within 10 meters of the main apron doors. For USAFE PASs, the girders are considered part of the PAS door and any lighting measurements shall be taken from in front of the girders.

c. (U) **Vehicle Barriers.** Position permanent or temporary vehicle barriers on likely avenues of approach to prevent vehicles from inadvertently or intentionally penetrating the detection screen around a PAS containing an unlocked vault or exposed weapon(s).

d. (U) **Delay Features.** A combination of physical built-in delay and denial systems must achieve the effect of preventing unauthorized access to nuclear weapons. Physical delay must be greater than the maximum security force response time, and security force response times must be less than the maximum physical delay to permit interdictions prior to adversary access to the vault.

4.5. (U) PAS. The standards for the shelter protection system necessary to protect nuclear weapons located in WSVs within PASs. The components of the shelter protection system discussed here include the PAS barrier subsystem, the PAS detection subsystem, and criteria for support facilities.

a. (U) **Shelter Barrier Subsystem.**

(1) (DCNI) Shelter Protection Design Concept.

(a) (U) Keep doors, windows, and other openings in the PAS to the minimum number and size required. Design PAS structure components, including walls, roofs, floors, doors, windows, and other openings (e.g., ducts and conduits), to resist penetration.

(b) (U) Modification or replacement of security doors, doorframes, and thresholds will provide resistance to penetration equivalent to that of the PAS structure itself.

(2) (U) PAS Locking Systems.

(a) (U) Use at least 1, high-security padlock and latch as specified in Paragraph 3.3 of Volume 2 of this manual to secure vaulted PAS doors at U.S. main operating bases. USEUCOM coordinating instructions will address host nation PAS equivalency. An integrated locking device may be used, as appropriate. Control and safeguarding of the key(s) to the locks and locking devices will be provided in USEUCOM directives or instructions.

(b) (DCNI) Secure vaulted PAS doors at all times when not occupied.

b. (DCNI) WS3 URC Storage Security Measures. Security measures must ensure no single individual can access both the “A” and “B” URCs.

(1) (DCNI) “A” and “B” components must be stored in separate containers. Operating commands will develop and publish specific URC storage and security procedures.

(2) (DCNI) When present on an installation, URCs must be stored in an alarmed facility or 24-hour manned facility, with duress capability.

(3) (DCNI) Alarms will sound at a location separate from where the URC storage safe is located.

c. (U) Shelter Detection Subsystem.

(1) (DCNI) Concept. The WS3 system depends on an integrated system of alarms and assessment technologies to allow the security force to interdict intruders before gaining access to nuclear weapons. Each WS3 subsystem contributes to this effect. Each vault storage area (VSA) will have a wide area surveillance system that provides the U.S. control center at U.S. main operating bases and the host-nation security control centers at U.S. MUNSS sites the capability to view avenues of approach to PAS entry doors and areas surrounding vaulted PASs. U.S. monitoring facility operators at U.S. MUNSS sites will be provided a remote feed for situational awareness to the greatest extent allowable by host-nation laws.

(2) (U) Detection System Components.

(a) (U) Provide all vaulted PASs that temporarily or permanently house unattended nuclear weapons with an approved IDS. The system must be capable of detecting the physical opening of all entryways into and intruder movement within the structure.

1. (U) Employ point and motion intrusion detection sensors in combination to ensure intrusion detection.

2. (U) Fit control units with tamper detection devices and located inside the structures.

3. (U) Use this additional PAS sensor equipment to the maximum extent possible in order to ensure the highest possible level of effectiveness in detecting unauthorized entry.

4. (U) Place PAS sensors in access mode only when personnel are inside or have effective control of the PAS and can notify the security forces of any attempted unauthorized entry.

(b) (U) Alarm every PAS to provide a level of detection and assessment for nuclear-generated aircraft.

d. (DCNI) WS3 Sensor System Security Requirements. The WS3 sensor system electronically detects attempted and actual penetrations, openings, or tampering with a WSV or command, control, and communications system. Line supervision to detect any tampering with sensor system components and data transmission lines will be included. At non-U.S. NATO sites, alarm display monitors may be co-located in host-nation facilities but will be continually monitored and controlled by U.S. custody agents. U.S. custody agents will have primary control of the alarm display and control console panels and reset switches for all shelters where U.S. nuclear weapons are located.

(1) (U) Monitoring Facilities. Provide a local monitoring facility (LMF) and an RMF at each installation where a WS3 is installed. Locate the alarm display and control console equipment, assessment system monitors, and related controls for all PAS and WS3 delay and denial, detection, and surveillance equipment within each monitoring facility. Either the LMF or the RMF should be located within the SSCC.

(a) (DCNI) Primary WS3 monitoring is done at the LMF.

(b) (U) Provide the RMF, a remote, independent alarm display and control console with redundant display. The RMF must meet the minimum requirements of redundant an alarm display and control console in Volume 2 of this manual.

(2) (DCNI) Alarm Assessment Equipment. Provide a means by which the cause of all alarms generated at the WSV can be assessed in near real-time visually or remotely through electro-optical equipment imaging systems or other electronic devices.

(a) (DCNI) Use electro-optical equipment or imaging systems or other electronic devices and activate upon sensor alarm from a WSV.

(b) (DCNI) Integrate PAS and WSV alarm communication. Incorporate exterior alarm communication systems into the SSCC. All efforts will be made to consolidate alarm displays.

(3) (DCNI) Alarm Assessment. Establish procedures to enter PASs to assess alarms indicating tampering, forced entry, and all constant alarm messages.

(4) (U) *Classified information removed.*

(5) (DCNI) Compensatory Posting. Posting of security forces is not required for WSV sensor failure at sites where the WSV is down and locked and an additional two lines of detection exist within the PAS, provided those sensors have been maintained in accordance with the shelter certification and sensor testing requirements. For example, at locations where a WSV is installed in a PAS equipped with two levels of sensors (e.g., balanced magnetic switches and structure sensors) and both levels are operative and in the secure mode, posting of additional security forces is not required.

(6) (DCNI) Tamper Protection Testing. Test WS3 sensor equipment tamper detection devices, which themselves are protected by other adjacent sensor equipment, at least annually. Test all other tamper switches quarterly.

4.6. (U) ENTRY AND CIRCULATION CONTROL SYSTEM.

a. (U) Concept. Provide a system for controlling entry and circulation of authorized personnel and vehicles within the WS3 limited and EAs.

b. (U) Additional Two-Person Control Conditions for the WS3. For U.S. custodial units at non-U.S. NATO sites, non-U.S. individuals may be part (one of the two members) of a two-person team if:

(1) (U) They are authorized by applicable nuclear weapon system safety rules.

(2) (U) Appropriate arrangements exist between the United States and the host nation. Meet a reliability assurance program (RAP) and training requirements as specified in those arrangements.

c. (DCNI) Limited and EA Entry Control. Effective control of entry, exit, and internal movement of personnel, material, and vehicles through established ECPs and within limited and EAs is required. Normally, only personnel certified through a U.S. RAP (or host nation equivalent programs) will be permitted unescorted entry into limited and EAs or will perform escort duties within EAs. Whenever such entry may afford access to a nuclear weapon, the two-person rule will apply.

(1) (U) The U.S. commander responsible for the weapon(s) may permit unescorted entry into limited and exclusion areas to host nation military personnel on duty at non-U.S. NATO sites who have an operational or security responsibility for the respective nuclear weapon system (for example, host nation pilots, aircraft crew chiefs, loaders, security forces), are certified in a host-nation equivalent RAP, and have the appropriate security clearance.

(2) (U) Escort all personnel not otherwise specified.

(3) (U) When a nuclear weapon is present in a locked vault, the insides of the walls, lid, and bottom of the vault define the limited and exclusion area boundary.

(4) (U) When a vault is unlocked or weapons are exposed, establish larger limited and EAs. In this case, the physical structure of the PAS is used to define the limited and EA. If the PAS doors must be opened due to operational constraints, define the limited and EA and physically mark the ECP. Unless required for the operation being performed, close and secure alternate points of entry (e.g., rear exhaust doors). However, if operational requirements dictate, reduce the EA to a smaller area.

(5) (U) Within operational constraints, all PAS doors will remain closed and secured from the inside when the PAS is occupied, any time a loaded vault is unlocked, or a weapon is exposed inside the PAS.

(6) (U) Except as a temporary expedient for weapon movement operations and other special circumstances, entry and exit from limited and exclusion areas will be at a single point and by one person or driver and vehicle at a time. Military Departments will provide the appropriate procedures.

(7) (U) When nuclear-weapon-loaded aircraft are accepted by the assigned pilot, the escort prohibition against EA escorts being tasked to perform any other functions (see Paragraph 3.5.b.(3)(a) of Volume 2 of this manual) is not applicable. The pilot may function as the EA escort.

d. (U) VSA Entry and Circulation Control. At a minimum, institute the following procedures for entry and circulation control at VSAs:

- (1) (U) Controlled picture badge system or entry control or entry authorization roster.
- (2) (U) Visitor escort system.
- (3) (U) Duress system.
- (4) (U) Inspection.

4.7. (U) WS3 SECURITY RF REQUIREMENTS. In addition to security forces assigned to protect assigned aircraft, the security RF required to support the WS3 includes:

a. (DCNI) Security Response Team (SRT). A two-person SRT is required in addition to any patrols required by aircraft system security standards.

b. (DCNI) RF. An RF of at least 15 security force members when a WSV is unlocked or weapons are outside a vault for maintenance, transportation purposes, or other situations where access delay is not ensured.

c. (DCNI) BF. Other forces as required by local threat or theater requirements. In NATO, the term AF (a force of not less than 30 people) is used to describe the initial BF as prescribed in this manual and the term reinforcing capability (RC) is used to describe subsequent BFs.

d. (DCNI) Exercises. Exercise the RF, when formed, at least weekly. Forming the RF solely to conduct a weekly exercise is not required. If the RF has not exercised for 7 days, an exercise must be conducted before a routine nuclear operation. Exercise the AF and BF as required by Section 7 of Volume 1 of this manual.

4.8. (U) SECURITY FORCE RESPONSE TIMES. Security forces must respond in enough strength, and in time, to meet the NWSS.

a. (DCNI) SRT. Initial response to WS3 alarms must be immediate, not to exceed 5 minutes. Employ sufficient SRT teams in each VSA to meet this requirement.

b. (DCNI) RF. When required (e.g., a WSV is unlocked), tactically deploy RF elements to immediately bring final denial fire on the access points to the PAS(s) or to an exposed weapon. All remaining elements of the RF must respond immediately, a time not to exceed 5 minutes. The RF must be formed, armed, and mobile before unlocking a WSV.

c. (DCNI) AF. The AF must be formed, armed, and mobile before a WSV being placed in access. When a WSV is unlocked or a weapon is exposed, elements of the AF will be tactically employed to ensure an immediate response capability not to exceed 5 minutes in support of the RF.

(1) (DCNI) At all other times, the AF must respond within 30 minutes. Subsequent follow-on teams (RC) must respond quickly enough to ensure denial of unauthorized access to nuclear weapons, but in not more than 40 minutes when vaults are unlocked and weapons are exposed and 60 minutes at all other times.

(2) (DCNI) Deploy subsequent teams (RC) as a whole, or incrementally in tactical units, as quickly as possible to retain control.

d. (DCNI) RC. Nuclear units will maintain the capability to continuously reinforce the AF until the situation is resolved. Deploy these forces as a whole, or incrementally in tactical units, as quickly as possible to ensure retention of control.

4.9. (U) BILINGUAL WARNING SYSTEM. To accommodate bilingual situations at non-U.S. NATO sites, develop and use a system of communicating to user and host-nation forces responsible for security at these sites.

4.10. (U) ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS. Additional requirements are included in Allied Command Operations Directive 80-6, USEUCOM Instruction 6801.01

SECTION 5: (U) LAND-BASED NUCLEAR MISSILE SYSTEMS

5.1. (U) GENERAL. These requirements provide additional or environmentally unique security standards and criteria for land-based nuclear missile systems. Unless exempted or modified by this Section, the requirements of Volumes 1 and 2 of this manual are also applicable to land-based nuclear missile systems.

5.2. (U) CONCEPT. Because of the dispersed nature of the land-based nuclear missile system, maximum reliance is placed in physical security systems to achieve the NWSS until the arrival of security forces. Physical security technology for this environment must employ robust delay and denial capabilities.

a. (U) Secured Launch Facility (LF). Any time a nuclear weapon is present, the LF is considered secure if the "A" and "B" circuit combination are not passed, the launcher closure door and fast rising secondary door (FRSD) are closed and locked, and all ESS ISS alarms are functional and have reset.

b. (DCNI) Unsecure LF. Any time a nuclear weapon is present, the LF is considered unsecure when the launcher closure door locking pin is unlocked, the locking pin cannot be verified or access can be gained to the locking pin due to the removal of the metal cover plate during forced entry procedures. The LF remains unsecure until all physical barriers have been returned to their closed and locked positions.

c. (DCNI) Penetrated LF. Any time a nuclear weapon is present, the LF is considered penetrated any time the "A" and "B" circuit combination have been passed or the "A" and "B" circuits are unsecure. The LF remains penetrated until the FRSD is closed and locked ("A" and "B" circuit combination locks).

5.3. (U) SECURITY PLANNING.

a. (U) Military Departments will formulate and publish unique security procedures and plans to safeguard missile weapon systems in their Military Department directives.

b. (U) Wing commanders will prepare security plans for missile complexes. In this regard, every LF must have its own plan for defense due to the unique nature of time, terrain, and civilian planning factors. On-scene commanders and supervisors must have access to the defense plans for each LF in their area of responsibility. They will also be available to responding BFs, helicopter units, and security control centers at appropriate missile alert facilities (MAF) and missile security control. LF defense plans will include:

(1) (U) Multiple pre-selected and sighted firing positions for all generic security force weapons.

(a) (U) Firing positions must be identified and provided to helicopter crews for increased fire control while operating in the objective area.

(b) (U) Plans for indirect fire weapons will include, at a minimum, range, azimuth, and elevation for placing effective fire on the LF topside.

(2) (U) Counter-sniper plans to neutralize the sniper threat.

(3) (U) Location of safe helicopter landing zones.

c. (U) Planning will consider the unique nature of missile systems to ensure adequate flexibility is developed to meet varying operational and threat situations. It will consider the possibility of diversionary attacks and account for those LFs that are most vulnerable.

d. (U) Missile field security plans will contain the telephone numbers of the civilian law enforcement agencies and the telephone numbers of the 24-hour dispatch point for each jurisdiction in which missile LFs and missile alert facilities are located.

(1) (U) Conduct prior planning and coordination to ensure support in the event of an emergency situation.

(2) (U) Planning will include consideration of jurisdictional authority, response capability, type of service (e.g., fire, medical, rescue, police) and numbers of personnel that can respond to various types of emergencies (minor to catastrophic).

5.4. (U) AREA PROTECTION SYSTEM.

a. (U) **Boundary Barrier Subsystem.** The boundary barrier subsystem consists of:

(1) (U) LF perimeter boundary fencing.

(2) (U) LF area warning systems (e.g., warning signs).

b. (U) **Perimeter Boundary Fencing.**

(1) (U) Concept. LF perimeter boundary fencing will:

(a) (U) Identify physical limits of the site, deter unauthorized entry, and define the point at which intruders may be subject to deadly force. Fences also serve as the legal demarcation barrier and identify the inside of the fenced area as the Military Department-designated restricted area when the LF is closed and secured and the limited area boundary when the LF is open or penetrated.

(b) (U) Create a physical and psychological deterrent to unauthorized entry.

(c) (U) Limit ingress and egress of personnel and vehicles to specified control points to facilitate identification and control procedures.

(d) (U) Permit efficient entry of authorized personnel and equipment.

(2) (U) Requirements. Define the LF boundary by a single, 7 foot (2.13 meter) high chain link fence with a 15-inch (38 centimeter) long outrigger with three strands of barbed wire installed along the top of the fence.

c. (U) Clear Zones. LFs do not require clear zones. However, vegetation inside the fenced-in area will not exceed 8 inches (20.3 centimeter) in height.

d. (U) Area Lighting Subsystem.

(1) (U) Concepts and Specifications

(a) (U) MAF Lighting. Provide security lighting to discourage unauthorized entry and create a psychological deterrent to potential intruders; facilitate the detection of intruders approaching or attempting to gain entry into these areas by enhancing observation of the perimeter boundary; facilitate apprehension or neutralization should persons attempt to penetrate the site; and enhance the efficient performance of other security functions, such as personnel and vehicle control during periods of darkness and reduced visibility.

1. (U) At a minimum, provide MAFs lighting that illuminates the entry point and approaches to the MAF support building.

2. (U) When commercial power is interrupted, place emphasis on minimizing the time the perimeter or site illumination is lost with a goal of no lost illumination.

3. (U) Consider the lighting system, the backup power source, and any interface equipment as a complete system.

(b) (U) LF Lighting. Under normal conditions when LFs are unmanned or there is no alarm assessment equipment in use, there is no requirement to light the site(s). However, a capability must exist to illuminate the entry point, launcher door, and nearby areas when needed.

(2) (U) Lighting System Controls. Install LF lighting controls to enable activation by the missile combat crew or by the security forces on site.

e. (U) Support Facility Criteria.

(1) (U) General Guidance. Planners responsible for design or modification of facilities normally associated with supporting missile field operations will consider all aspects necessary to optimize security, safety, and efficiency. Construct permanently manned security forces facilities to prevent exposure to adverse weather, including temperature extremes.

(2) (U) SSCC. Monitor each missile flight area by an SSCC. The SSCC will provide overall control of security force personnel and monitor the security and activity of LFs, weapon movements, and other security activities in their assigned AOR. The SSCC responds to alarms as relayed by the missile combat crew and monitors the remote visual assessment system at the

LFs in their AOR as well as adjacent missile flight areas when operational control is transferred to that SSCC.

(3) (U) **Security Vehicle Protection.** Provide facilities for all static security force alert vehicles to afford protection from inclement weather, theft, and other harassing acts of sabotage, including obscuring from direct sight of an adversary employing small arms.

5.5. (DCNI) ESS. LFs are in relatively isolated locations and at comparatively lengthy distances from support bases. The LFs are hardened to protect against an attack and offer significant delay features. The above-ground portions of a secured LF are therefore not required to be routinely secured by on-site security forces because of these attributes.

a. (DCNI) Detection. Although a perimeter security system is not required, install an integrated system of electronic sensors, assessment devices, remote visual assessment systems, and procedures to remotely assess and determine the cause of an alarm in near-real time and detect:

(1) (DCNI) The presence and movement of personnel and vehicles on the above-ground area of the LF from which attempts can be made to damage or penetrate the underground portions of the LF.

(2) (DCNI) Attempts to penetrate the LF EA from below ground.

b. (U) Alarms.

(1) (DCNI) Receive alarms from IDS at either the responsible launch control, security control, or both control centers.

(2) (DCNI) Primary and remote alarm display and control consoles are required. For existing weapons systems, the primary console is located in the launch control center (LCC) responsible for the LFs under its control and the remote console is located in a separate LCC.

(a) (DCNI) The missile combat crew will alert the security force to respond to security alarms.

(b) (DCNI) For new missile security systems, locate the primary alarm display and control console at the SSCC with a remote display within the LCC or at some other Military Department-approved location.

(c) (DCNI) If the primary alarm display and control console is located with the security force, communicate alarm responses to the missile combat crew.

(3) (DCNI) If alarms require repeaters to properly transmit alarms to alarm display and control consoles, harden and secure these repeaters against tampering.

c. (DCNI) Alarm Assessment and Response.

(1) (DCNI) The SSCC will monitor remote visual alarm assessment equipment. Initial alarm assessments will be made using this equipment. View and assess video capture and playback.

(a) (DCNI) Alert an armed security force element to respond to any outer zone (OZ), inner zone (IZ), or OZ IZ alarm activation while the visual alarm assessment and video playback review is being conducted.

(b) (DCNI) For OZ only alarms, once the OZ alarm assessment is completed and the assessment shows there is no human activity or threat on or near the site and the OZ alarms have reset, cancel the armed security force element response.

(c) (DCNI) In all other cases, security forces must respond and oversee an on-scene assessment.

(2) (DCNI) The LF alarm assessment capability is exempt from the electro-optical assessment capability manned assessment post requirement of Paragraph 3.4.n.(1) of Volume 2 of this manual.

d. (U) System Tests. Test alarm systems monthly either by causing an actual alarm or performing a self-test, if available.

e. (U) Inoperative or Deactivated System(s). When both elements of the ESS is inoperative or deactivated (i.e., IZ and OZ), at least two armed RAP-certified persons will be present at each LF where a reentry system or reentry vehicle is present. If one portion of the security system is operative (i.e., IZ or OZ) one armed RAP-certified person and the operative portion of the security system can fulfill this security requirement. Personnel dedicated to the security mission of the LF will not be assigned additional duties that detract from their security functions.

5.6. (DCNI) ENTRY AND CIRCULATION CONTROL SYSTEM. Provide a system for controlling entry and circulation of authorized personnel and vehicles within the limited and exclusion areas.

a. (DCNI) Entry Control. Establish procedures to control entry, exit, and internal movement of personnel, material, and vehicles through established ECPs within limited and EAs with sufficient redundancy such that a single point of failure does not compromise security.

(1) (DCNI) EAs. Designate the underground area of the LF, which allows access to the warhead, and the interior of the payload transporter van when weapons are present, an EA. Only personnel certified through a RAP will be permitted unescorted entry into EAs or perform escort duties within EAs.

(2) (DCNI) Limited Areas. When the LF is open or penetrated or a transportation vehicle carrying a nuclear weapon is within the fenced area of the LF, the area(s) inside the LF perimeter fence will be designated a limited area. This limited area may contain one or more EAs.

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(a) (DCNI) Coding and transmission of information pertinent to authorized entry to LF(s) will be in accordance with the provisions of Volumes 1-4 of DoD Manual (DoDM) 5200.01.

(b) (DCNI) Except for emergency circumstances, entry to and exit from LF limited areas will be at a single point.

(c) (DCNI) Change annually, at a minimum, authenticators, combinations, and codes used in the LF entry system or immediately in the event of suspected compromise.

(d) (DCNI) Transmit information essential for authorized entry to the LF in a manner that prevents compromise.

(e) (DCNI) The fenced-in area of the LF is normally unmanned when the LF is secured and closed. Therefore, the missile support base will accomplish identification and authorization of personnel visiting such facilities. The missile combat crew members or security force personnel at an MAF will verify entry authorization with the security force operational command center before allowing entry to the fenced in area of an unmanned LF.

(f) (DCNI) Physical control of entry to the fenced-in area of the LF by security forces is not required. Provide the responsible LCC and SSCC information regarding such visits, including personnel identification, time, purpose, and duration of the visit.

(g) (DCNI) Accomplish a system of verification of authorization to enter LFs at the support base before issue of entry information.

b. (DCNI) Entry Control Criteria.

(1) (DCNI) Maintain EA entry control information under a split knowledge "A" and "B" concept. To support the "A" and "B" concept, control access to the hardened locking systems by two code changeable combination locks. Handle the combinations to these built-in, non-removable locks as SECRET. Any erroneous or unauthorized manipulation of the combinations will generate an alarm at the responsible MAF.

(2) (DCNI) Require unified action by two separate individuals at the MAF, and two separate, individuals at the missile LF, before release of information that would permit entry to the secured and closed LF EA.

(3) (DCNI) Lock all LF gates with padlocks or electronic locking devices.

(4) (DCNI) A controlled picture badge or exchange badge system is not required for unescorted entry to the missile system limited or EAs.

c. (U) Vehicle Entry and Control.

(1) (U) When the LF is secured and locked, the top side fenced-in area of the LF is a restricted area (level designated by the USAF) and vehicle and personnel entry and circulation control is prescribed by Headquarters USAF directives.

(2) (U) The fenced-in area of the LF is designated a limited area when the LF is penetrated or unlocked or a payload transporter with a nuclear weapon is present.

(3) (U) Permit only vehicles necessary to support missile or mission support activities to enter the LF limited area.

(4) (U) Privately owned vehicles will not be permitted into LF limited areas.

(5) (U) All vehicles will be inspected by security forces, escort officials, or authorized operations and maintenance teams before entry and exit from an LF limited area. Vehicles may be inspected at the support base by authorized dispatched teams before departure and permitted on-site without further inspection if the vehicles are kept under continuous surveillance by an authorized team member from initial inspection until arrival at the LF fenced area. This condition will be verified to the SSCC or LCC before gaining entry to the site.

(6) (U) Emergency vehicles involved in an actual response are not required to be inspected before entering a LF, but will remain under the surveillance of security, crew, or maintenance personnel. Before departure, conduct an inspection of all vehicles for unauthorized material and contraband.

(7) (U) Military maintenance vehicles, material-handling vehicles or equipment, and security vehicles parked at the LF need not have keys removed or be immobilized provided the area is attended.

d. (U) Personnel Entry Control.

(1) (U) Restrict entry to missile LFs to personnel who have a valid need to enter the area. Entry by personnel who are not authorized entry on a normal basis must be approved by the wing commander.

(a) (U) The wing commander may delegate this authority only to the operations and maintenance group commanders. The authority cannot be further delegated.

(b) (U) Entry authorizations, entry periods, and locations to be entered must be specified by the wing commander on a case-by-case basis.

(c) (U) Escort all persons not authorized unescorted entry authority to LF limited and EAs when the conditions of an unsecure or penetrated site have been met.

(2) (U) Escorted persons will not bring hand-carried items into missile LFs unless specifically authorized by the wing commander. The wing commander may authorize escorted persons to bring the minimum required hand-carried items necessary into an LF on a case-by-case basis. Inspect escorted persons' hand-carried items by security personnel upon entering and departing the limited area.

(3) (U) When the LF is penetrated or unlocked or a payload transporter vehicle with a weapon is present, EA inspections of persons and items may be conducted at the entry point of the LF fenced-in area.

(4) (U) Training facilities should be used for familiarization visits unless unusual circumstances prohibit their use.

5.7. (DCNI) SECURITY FORCE RESPONSE TIMES. Security forces must always arrive in sufficient time and with enough force to prevent an adversary force from gaining unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.

a. (U) Secured LFs. See Paragraph 5.2.a. for an explanation of secured LFs.

(1) (DCNI) Response to alarms at LFs with operational and certified remote virtual assessment (RVA). Security force elements (armed, radio-, and code-equipped security team) will be dispatched to alarms coming from unmanned LFs and arrive no later than 30 minutes from alarm indications. At the same time the initial element is dispatched, a second element (armed, radio-, and code-equipped security team) must also be dispatched to back up the initial element and will arrive within 45 minutes.

(a) (DCNI) If the RVA information reveals no human activity or threat and the alarm resets, the security response can be terminated.

(b) (DCNI) If the RVA information reveals human activity or threat, immediately dispatch the RF. The RF will arrive no later than 60 minutes from alarm indications. The BF will be dispatched concurrently with the RF and arrive no later than 75 minutes from alarm indications. Deploy subsequent BFs as a whole, or incrementally in tactical units, as quickly as possible to ensure denial of access.

(2) (DCNI) Response to alarms at LFs with RVA known to be unavailable or unreliable.

(a) (DCNI) Security force elements (armed, radio-, and coded-equipped security team) must respond to alarms coming from unmanned LFs in no more than 30 minutes. At the same time the initial element is dispatched, a second element (armed, radio-, and code-equipped security team) must also be dispatched to back up the initial element and will arrive within 45 minutes.

(b) (DCNI) Once the first element arrives and determines the alarm is non-hostile, the second dispatch may be cancelled. If contact is lost with the first responding element or threat is reported, dispatch the RF.

(c) (DCNI) If one of the initial response teams identifies human activity or a threat on or near the site, dispatch the RF. The RF will arrive no later than 60 minutes from alarm indications.

(d) (DCNI) Dispatch the BF concurrently with the RF and arrive no later than 75 minutes from alarm indications. Deploy subsequent BFs as a whole, or incrementally in tactical units, as quickly as possible to ensure denial of access.

b. (DCNI) Unsecure and Penetrated LFs. See Paragraphs 5.2.b. and 5.2.c. Once maintenance activities have been completed and the conditions for an unsecure or penetrated LF no longer exists (e.g. physical barriers verified to be returned to their locked position) a security forces team (armed, radio-, and code-equipped security team) will remain as the responsible security team until proper operation of the security system has been verified. All other security forces personnel may be released.

(1) (DCNI) Security for a penetrated LF with an operational FRSD.

(a) (DCNI) A two-person security team protected by an armored vehicle must be positioned to bring immediate final denial fire to bear on entrances to below-ground portions of the LF, payload transport van doors, or exposed weapons, and activate the FRSD. Additionally, another two-person security force team protected by an armored vehicle will be positioned to defend the site.

(b) (DCNI) When dispatched, the RF must arrive quickly enough to ensure denial of access to the nuclear weapon(s), within 60 minutes. When dispatched, the BF must arrive quickly enough to ensure denial of access to the nuclear weapon(s), within 75 minutes. Deploy subsequent BFs as a whole, or incrementally in tactical units, as quickly as possible to ensure denial of access.

(2) (DCNI) Security for an unsecure LF, or penetrated LF without an operational FRSD. In addition to the two-person security team, an RF must be positioned to defend the site. A BF must arrive quickly enough to ensure denial of access to the nuclear weapon(s), but in not more than 45 minutes. Deploy subsequent BFs as a whole, or incrementally in tactical units, as quickly as possible to ensure denial of access.

c. (DCNI) Tactical RF. A tactical RF is a required 24-hour alert team dedicated to the recapture and recovery of nuclear assets which serves as an available BF. The Military Departments will dictate specific organization, tactics, techniques, and procedures in their directives.

5.8. (DCNI) HELICOPTER SUPPORT. Intercontinental ballistic missile security forces will have access to air transportation in order to quickly respond to nuclear security events at dispersed locations. Local helicopter units will ensure sufficient armed helicopters and crews are maintained to provide the capability to insert a BF in support of emergency security operations and provide fire support. Provide and maintain helicopter support facilities to facilitate this capability. The Military Department's directives will include helicopter support planning and compensatory factors for instances when helicopters are not available.

SECTION 6: (U) SUBMARINE NUCLEAR WEAPON SYSTEM SECURITY

6.1. (U) GENERAL. This Section provides security standards and criteria for the protection of nuclear weapons located within a strategic weapons facility (SWF) AOR and nuclear weapons deployed on submarines, inside and outside the SWF AOR. Unless otherwise specified by this Section, requirements specified in Volumes 1 and 2 of this manual will apply.

6.2. (DCNI) CONCEPT. The concept for the protection of nuclear weapons will take a security in-depth approach, which includes and integrates base, waterfront, and shipboard security as a mutually supporting layered defense to ensure the NWSS is met.

a. (U) Navy nuclear weapon environments are: weapon storage areas (WSAs), waterfront restricted areas (WRA), on-base weapon movements, SSBN submarines, and SSBN surface transits.

b. (DCNI) When nuclear weapons are located on naval bases, they will be maintained in the most secure facilities available when not deployed on SSBNs.

c. (DCNI) When an SSBN armed with nuclear weapons is in home port, designate the submarine, surrounding waterway, and landmass a WRA.

d. (U) *Classified information removed.*

e. (DCNI) As identified in Paragraph 3.5.b.(1)(d) of Volume 2 of this manual, the EA extends upward from the upper-most surfaces of the missile's equipment section (aft equipment section deck), along the interior of the missile tube, to the interior of the closed missile muzzle hatch. When the missile muzzle hatch is open, the EA will expand, including the immediate area surrounding the open hatch. A buffer zone will be established immediately adjacent to the expanded EA while the missile muzzle hatch is open. The open muzzle hatch buffer zone will be maintained until the missile muzzle hatch is closed. Whenever a missile muzzle hatch is open or unalarmed, sufficient compensatory measures will be taken to protect the integrity of the EA.

f. (DCNI) Establish buffer zones adjacent to EAs any time entry into the EA is anticipated or required. This includes the opening or intended opening of a missile tube muzzle hatch of a mated missile, or the opening of or entry into other EAs designated by Military Department directives.

(1) (U/DCNI) Directives issued by the Military Department may designate additional EAs or controlled access areas within an SSBN.

(2) (U/DCNI) Include security instructions and requirements while performing missile tube access door maintenance or any time an umbilical access door cover is removed, in supplemental directives issued by the Military Department. Temporary openings into the interior

of a missile tube, with missiles installed, within the below deck structure of the SSBN, provided there is no access to the upper-most surfaces of the missile's equipment section, do not require the presence of an armed sentry provided the ship's security force is aware of the opening and two-person control is enforced.

g. (DCNI) SSBNs armed with nuclear weapons will ensure an armed sentry and associated brow security system provides access control at the brow. Specifics of the brow security system and requirements for the posting of additional armed sentries will be in accordance with directives issued by the Secretaries of the Military Departments.

h. (DCNI) Identify SSBN surface transit zones in plans indicating areas where SSBNs entering or leaving port are restricted in their ability to tactically maneuver. When SSBNs loaded with nuclear weapons are in these designated areas, provide an armed surface escort. Conduct security for near port surface operations in accordance with the Military Department's established directives.

i. (U) *Classified information removed.*

(1) (U) *Classified information removed.*

(2) (U) *Classified information removed.*

j. (DCNI) SSBN commanding officers (COs) will ensure that WRA security forces are aware of shipboard conditions that affect the security posture and weapon vulnerability at the waterfront such as open missile muzzle hatches and deficiencies associated with the brow security system.

k. (DCNI) The directives issued by the Secretaries of the Military Departments will assign specific responsibility regarding security for nuclear weapons loaded on SSBNs in port and underway. Missile tubes containing nuclear weapons will remain locked with attendant alarms and guards at all times unless authorized logistics, maintenance, operations, or inspections require otherwise. In the absence of the protection provided by the stowage conditions detailed in this paragraph, establish an EA (or EAs) with attendant physical security measures.

6.3. (U) PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS.

a. (U) COs responsible for nuclear weapon security in the WSA, for on-base nuclear weapon movements, within WRAs, for surface transit of SSBNs, and aboard SSBNs will have a written security plan. Such planning will consider the flexibility required to meet varying operational and threat situations while at sea and in port.

b. (U) Planning objectives must meet the requirements of NWSS. These include:

(1) (U) Preventing unauthorized entry into limited and EAs;

(2) (U) Assuring detection, identification, interception, and prevention of unauthorized access to nuclear weapons;

(3) (U) Implementing entry control with sufficient redundancy so that a single failure does not compromise positive control;

(4) (U) Controlling authorized entries into limited and exclusion areas;

(5) (U) Assuring quick entry of emergency forces (e.g., damage control parties, explosive ordnance disposal personnel, and security forces);

(6) (U) Protecting against incapacitating agent attacks;

(7) (U) Overseeing continuous boundary detection and assessment;

(8) (U) Managing shipboard reaction forces and a designated RF.

c. (DCNI) Security planning will consider threats described in Volume 1 of this manual, local TCAs, and Military Department threat assessments.

(1) (U/DCNI) Coordinate security plans for SSBNs armed with nuclear weapons in port, as appropriate, to ensure that agencies who may be involved in assisting in the protection of nuclear weapons are aware of their responsibilities.

(2) (U/DCNI) Formally review security plans at least annually and update if necessary as threats change and emerge.

d. (DCNI) In designing security plans and procedures, commanders responsible for the protection of nuclear weapons must consider the reduced distances and low visibility of potential threats.

e. (U) The SWF CO will be the designated commander assigned to coordinate all WSA nuclear weapon security plans, on-base nuclear weapon transportation plans, and WRA physical security procedures. The SWF CO will liaise with adjacent and supporting commands and that provide any portion of the layered defense to ensure a coordinated integration of forces is established and the NWSS is met. The Secretaries of the Military Departments will designate the commander responsible to coordinate all SSBN on-board nuclear weapon security plans and all near port security operations plans. Coordination will meet the requirements set forth in Paragraph 5.2.c. of Volume 1 of this manual.

f. (U) Command and control of nuclear weapon security forces and ESS will meet the requirements set forth in Volumes 1 and 2 of this manual and as modified:

(1) (U) WSA, WRA, and On-Base Weapon Movement Operations. The SWF CO will be the commander who is designated to exercise day-to-day operational control of the security forces for the WSA, WRA, and on-base nuclear weapon movement operations. The SWF COs will ensure that the SSBN COs are aware of any threats, changes in WRA security posture or security systems that may affect the security posture on the SSBN.

(2) (U) Shipboard. Each SSBN CO is ultimately responsible for the security of nuclear weapons aboard his ship. The standards in this manual will in no way limit a commander's authority or obligation to use all necessary means and take all appropriate actions in defense of the nuclear weapons under his control. When in port, SSBNs will coordinate with the SWF to guarantee an integrated and mutually supporting layered defense is provided and ensure the NWSS is met. SSBN COs will ensure that the SWF CO is aware of any shipboard conditions that affect the security posture on the SSBN.

(3) (DCNI) Duress System. Use a covert duress system (active or passive) to provide a means of alerting the security force that assistance is required. Modify verbal duress codes whenever compromise is suspected, and, at a minimum, every 6 months to prevent compromise, and will be unique to nuclear weapons security. SSBNs on patrol will modify duress codes whenever compromise is suspected, and, at a minimum, every 9 months.

6.4. (U) SECURITY AREAS.

a. (DCNI) WSA. Establish a WSA on each installation where nuclear weapons will be stored and maintained. The WSA is a limited area as described in Volume 2 of this manual and is subject to the requirements stipulated in the applicable requirements of Section 3 of this Volume. Security for the area will meet or exceed the requirements established in Volumes 1 and 2 of this manual, and as described in this Section.

(1) (U) Area Protection System. Components for the area protection system include the boundary barrier subsystem, boundary detection system, boundary assessment system, area lighting system, and an area command and control system.

(a) (U) Boundary Barrier Subsystem. Identify the WSA perimeter and bound by a perimeter barrier. Refer to Volume 2 of this manual for specific requirements.

1. (U) Install vehicle barriers along likely avenues of vehicular approach to the WSAs.

2. (U) ECPs will be provided with active physical barriers to prevent high-speed unauthorized entry, (e.g., pop-up type barriers) that can be activated from the adjacent or affected ECP. Such controls should also be capable of being activated from the affected area SSCC. Deploy these barriers in such a manner so that there is no clear path of entry.

(b) (U) Natural topography (hills, cliffs, ditches, waterways, swamps) and forestation (large trees) can be used in the planning to serve as vehicle barriers. The maximum speed of the vehicle (including the limits imposed by natural topography) and the size of the vehicle will be used to establish the design criteria for the barrier.

(c) (U) Boundary Detection System. A perimeter IDS, in accordance with the requirements in Volume 2 of this manual, will protect the WSA perimeter. The system may be modified so that:

1. (U) The 2 lines of detection required in Volume 2 of this manual for the perimeter of the WSA, and if used at the WRA, may be connected to the IDS monitoring system through a shared command, control, and display system. Two separate command and control systems are not required.

2. (U) At the primary ECP, the requirement for two separate sensor systems using different technologies is not applicable if the ECP is manned 24/7.

(d) (U) Area Command and Control System. If the SSCC of the WSA and WRA have the capability of monitoring the other's security systems and the SSCC has interoperable communications with all security forces, then the requirement for a remote independent alarm display and control console identified in Volume 2 of this manual is met.

(2) (U) ESS.

(a) (U) The alarm center and the RF are considered located at the same place within the WSA when they are within the same building or complex of buildings.

(b) (DCNI) Interior sensor equipment. Provide all permanent structures and facilities that temporarily or permanently house unattended nuclear weapons, nuclear weapon components, or alert nuclear weapon delivery systems an approved intrusion detection system.

1. (DCNI) The system must be capable of detecting the physical opening of all entryways into the structure and the specific area within the structure containing the nuclear weapon, as well as intruder movement within the specific area of the structure containing the nuclear weapon.

2. (DCNI) Lock and alarm all alarm control units associated with the structure interior IDS with tamper switches or devices that annunciate at the alarm panels.

3. (DCNI) In those legacy facilities whereby the control unit is located other than inside the EA IDS protection zone, implement additional measures and include in the site security plan.

4. (DCNI) All alarms coming from legacy control units located outside the EA will require immediate armed response both to the control unit and the controlled facility(s).

(3) (U) Security Force Utilization.

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(a) (DCNI) Security forces will meet the requirements identified in Section 3 through 7 of Volume 1 of this manual, unless modified herein. Security forces must respond with sufficient strength, and in time, to meet the NWSS. In order to deny unauthorized access, position security forces to immediately bring effective fire to bear on approaches to areas containing nuclear weapons.

(b) (U) Base security force staffing on post validations conducted in accordance with the directives of the applicable Military Department, and be manned at 100 percent of validated staffing. COs are authorized to realign and reassign security forces as necessary to maintain the NWSS.

(c) (U) COs will ensure plans are developed and maintained regarding the deployment of the BF. Plans will include designation, organization, and utilization of off-duty security personnel for subsequent BFs

(d) (U) Security force training and exercises will be conducted to ensure that forces are able to maintain the NWSS. In particular, COs will ensure that the planning and execution of force-on force-exercises are conducted in accordance with the directives of the applicable Military Department.

(4) (U) Entry Control. Entry to WSAs and EAs will be controlled at all times. Only persons whose duties require access and who have been granted appropriate authorization will be allowed unescorted entry into WSAs and EAs.

(a) (U) AECS may not be used to control entry into the WSA or an EA. Only security personnel certified under a RAP will be used to grant access to a WSA or EA. Alarms generated by the AECS, such as unauthorized entry, attempts at unauthorized entry, communications failures, tampers, etc., must be displayed at the SSCC as part of the IDS.

(b) (U) An Electronic Personnel Identification System (EPIS) may be used to determine the identification of personnel requesting entry to a WSA or an EA. Such a system will use either a card reader with a PIN or a card reader with a biometric recognition system to determine the identification of an individual. The EC may use this data to grant entry.

1. (U) An EPIS may be used to record entries and departures.

2. (U) If used, an EPIS must be integrated into the WSA ESS.

3. (U) Alarms generated by the AECS, such as unauthorized entry, attempts at unauthorized entry, communications failures, tampers, etc., must be displayed at the SSCC as part of the IDS.

b. (DCNI) WRA. Establish a WRA for the protection of SSBNs armed with nuclear weapons. The WRA must encompass all SSBN primary mooring facilities, dry docks, and surrounding waterways at home ports used for the maintenance or logistic support of vessels armed with nuclear weapons.

(1) (U) WRA. A WRA is a Level 3 restricted area as prescribed in the Military Department's directives and amplified in this Section.

(2) (U) Area Protection System. The area protection system components and requirements of Volumes 1 and 2 apply to the WRA. In addition to those area protection requirements, identify the WRA perimeter and bound by land and waterside perimeter barriers. The boundary barrier and detection subsystem requirements in Volume 2 of this manual do not apply to the land and water interface provided the land and water interface affords continuous separation, continuity of detection (which may include human observation) in all conditions of visibility, a means for assessment above the waterline in all tidal conditions and continuity of delay between the landside and waterside perimeters.

(a) (DCNI) Landside Barriers. Landside barriers will consist of perimeter fencing to identify landside boundaries and vehicular barriers installed at each likely avenue of approach.

(b) (U) Perimeter. A perimeter fence will be installed to define the landside perimeter of the WRA in accordance with Paragraph 3.2 of Volume 2 of this manual for fencing requirements with the following exceptions:

1. (U) Topping. Nuclear sites employing a sensor technology which prohibits placement of outriggers on the alarmed fence, will install outriggers at 45 degree angles in a "Y" configuration on the animal control fence.

2. (U) Perimeter Drainage Openings. For environments which prohibit employing dual phenomenology boundary sensor systems, the Military Services may utilize one sensor system incorporated in reinforced barriers.

(c) (U) Clear Zone.

1. (U) Landside boundary perimeter clear zones will be a minimum of 60 feet (18.3 meters) wide. If 2 fences are used, then the clear zone will extend a minimum of 20 feet (6.1 meters) beyond the outer fence, a minimum of 20 feet (6.1 meters) between the fences, and a minimum of 20 feet (6.1 meters) inside the inner fence. If a single fence is used, then the clear zone will be a minimum of 30 feet (9.1 meters) on either side of the fence.

2. (U) Vegetation that hinders IDS and assessment systems, or provides concealment will be eliminated.

3. (U) Light poles, fire hydrants, ESS boxes, electrical transformers, etc., in the clear zone that do not aid the intruder by providing cover, concealment, or an aid to defeating intrusion sensors or the perimeter fence are permitted.

4. (U) Vehicle barriers are permitted in the inner clear zone provided they are accounted for in the site's security plan.

(d) (U) Install vehicle barriers along likely avenues of vehicular approach to the WRA. Natural topography (hills, cliffs, ditches, waterways, swamps) and forestation (large

trees) can be used in the planning to serve as vehicle barriers. The maximum speed of the vehicle (including the limits imposed by natural topography) and the size of the vehicle will be used to establish the design criteria for the barrier.

(e) (U) ECPs will be provided with active physical barriers to prevent high-speed unauthorized entry, (e.g., pop-up type barriers) that can be activated from the adjacent or affected ECP. Such controls should also be capable of being activated from the affected area SSCC. Deploy these barriers in such a manner so that there is no clear path of entry.

(f) (U) Warning Signs. Post restricted area warning signs around the WRA, both landside and waterside, as required by the Military Department's directives.

(g) (U) Area Command and Control System. If the SSCC of the WSA and WRA have the capability of monitoring the other's security systems and the SSCC has interoperable communications with all security forces, then the requirement for a remote independent alarm display and control console identified in Section 8 of this Volume is met.

(3) (U) ESS. The requirements for ESS in Volume 2, Section 3 of this manual apply to the WRA.

(4) (DCNI) Waterborne Barriers. Install waterside perimeter barriers to protect SSBNs armed with nuclear weapons moored in the WRA. Waterborne barriers may also include natural barriers, such as land masses, that preclude the access of waterborne vessels to the WRA. Ground vegetation may be retained; however, keep it trimmed to permit efficient use of wide area detection, tracking, and surveillance systems and preclude easy concealment of intruders.

(a) (DCNI) Outer waterway barriers or port security barriers will be installed to separate the WRA from other waterways and prevent waterborne vessels from approaching moored SSBNs armed with nuclear weapons.

(b) (DCNI) Near port security barriers must be installed and used at all times when SSBNs armed with nuclear weapons are moored except when moored in the Explosive Handling Wharf or Dry-Dock.

(5) (U) Perimeter Detection Systems.

(a) (DCNI) Provide detection systems for both the landside and waterside of the WRA. The WRA design will be a fully integrated detection system composed of landside and waterside components.

(b) (DCNI) The waterside security system will be an integrated, multiple-sensor security system with the ability to detect, assess, and mitigate threats to DoD assets, including the threat posed by swimmers below and at the surface.

(c) (DCNI) Both the landside and waterside detection systems must be able to operate effectively in adverse weather conditions.

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(d) (DCNI) Fully integrate the perimeter detection system integrated with the security force concept of operations. Alarms must annunciate in the WRA SSCC.

(e) (DCNI) Establish nuisance alarm rate and false alarm rate rates for the waterside detection system in Military Service-level directives. The rates will meet the intent of only Paragraphs 3.4.o.(1) and 3.4.o.(2) of Volume 2 of this manual.

(f) (U) The cause of an alarm generated by the perimeter detection system will be assessed in near-real time; either visually or remotely; through an electro-optical imaging system, by manned security posts, by SRT, by Harbor Security Boats, or by other means. Use of electro-optical imaging systems (e.g., CCTV, low light-level television, infrared, thermal imagery) is encouraged.

(6) (U) Security Forces.

(a) (U) WRA Security Forces Composition. Support the WRA with an integrated security force, which meets the requirements in Volume 1 and 2 of this manual and the requirements in this Section. The security force must be organized, trained, and equipped to maintain the NWSS. Security forces providing WRA security will not come from SSBN ship's company; rather, they must be full-time security professionals with no other duties or responsibilities. Coordinate and control WRA security force functions from a single SSCC established within the WRA.

(b) (U) Training and Exercises. Conduct a joint security force exercise annually or more frequently as deemed necessary, to exercise the coordinated SWF/SSBN security plan. Provide results and lessons learned from these exercises to nuclear weapons-capable SSBN COs for incorporation into security plans. When deemed appropriate, include host installation security forces in the exercise.

(7) (U) Entry and Circulation Control.

(a) (U) Entry to the WRA will be controlled at all times. Only persons whose duties require access and who have been granted appropriate authorization will be allowed unescorted entry to the WRA.

(b) (U) Permit only vehicles necessary to sustain SSBN or support command activities to enter the WRA. Privately owned vehicles will not be permitted entry.

(c) (U) A personnel identification and control system will be used to ensure that only authorized persons are permitted entry. Badges or credentials used to control entry will incorporate methods or procedures that hinder the ability to produce fraudulent entry credentials.

(d) (U) An electronic access control system may be used to control entry into and departure from the WRA. That system will record entries and departures.

(e) (U) If an electronic access control system is not used, a manual personnel identification and control system will be used for entry control to the WRA. All personnel entering the WRA must present a photo identification badge approved by the SWF CO to use for

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entry into the WRA. Only persons with badges that indicate authorized entry levels for the WRA will be given unescorted access. All others will be escorted.

(f) (U) If an electronic access control system is not used, an access list that contains the names of personnel authorized unescorted entry will be available at each ECP that controls entry or exit to the WRA.

(g) (U) Use visitor entry and departure logs at each WRA ECP. Visitors will be logged in and out at all times.

(h) (U) When a secondary access control point within the primary area protection system is deemed necessary, these facilities will meet the specific requirements of Volume 2 of this manual for each function the access control point will perform.

(i) (U) Use a brow security system onboard SSBNs armed with nuclear weapons. The brow security system will provide a secure environment for armed topside watch standers to control personnel entry to the SSBN.

(8) (U) Facility, Personnel, and Equipment Inspections.

(a) (U) Perimeter Inspections. At least weekly, there will be a thorough check of all WRA fences, lights, clear zones, and gates. Additionally, at least once each day, the on-duty supervisor will make a physical inspection of the WRA. Maintain records of these checks for 12 months.

(b) (U) Vehicle Inspections.

1. (U) The purpose of a vehicle inspection is to identify anything that appears not to belong or is out of place. Inspections are to focus on searching for weapons, bulk explosives, and improvised explosive devices. Inspection procedures will ensure that readily accessible spaces on the vehicle, as prescribed by the Military Department, that are large enough and likely to be used for the concealment of weapons or explosives, are examined.

2. (U) All vehicles must be inspected before entering the WRA unless the vehicle has been under constant observation by waterfront security force personnel since its last inspection and all vehicles exiting the WRA are subject to security inspections. Entry control and inspection procedures may be modified to facilitate entry and exit during the response to an actual emergency or related training exercise. Implement measures to compensate for the modification to normal procedures.

(c) (U) Vessel Inspections.

1. (U) The purpose of a vessel inspection is to identify anything that appears not to belong or is out of place. Inspections are to focus on searching for weapons, bulk explosives, and improvised explosive devices. Inspection procedures will ensure that spaces on the vessels that are large enough and likely to be used for the concealment of weapons or explosives are examined.

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2. (U) All non-U.S. commissioned vessels and non-security force vessels must be inspected before entering the WRA unless the vessel has been under constant observation by WRA or transit protection security force personnel during its departure outside the WRA. Vessels exempt from this inspection requirement are:

a. (U) Designated allied vessels.

b. (U) U.S. Coast Guard vessels engaged in SSBN escort operations or providing interim security.

c. (U) Vessels originating inside the WRA which provide support operations for submarine movement provided they maintain communications with waterfront security forces throughout the transit and do not stop en-route to rendezvous with inbound submarines.

3. (U) Access to the WRA by any waterborne vessel will be coordinated with the waterfront security force commander or designated representative.

(d) (U) Personnel Inspections.

1. (U) The purpose of a personnel inspection is to identify anything that appears not to belong or is out of place. Inspections are to focus on searching for unauthorized materials such as weapons, explosives, and hazardous materials.

2. (U) All personnel and their hand-carried items entering and exiting the WRA are subject to security inspections. Conduct random personnel inspections daily.

c. (DCNI) On-Base Nuclear Weapon Movement. Nuclear weapon movement includes transportation of weapons both inside and outside of the WSA. On-base nuclear weapon movements will be by the most secure transportation vehicles available and will meet the requirements for on-base movements described in Section 9 of this volume.

(1) (U) General. Except as modified in this Section, meet the requirements for on-base weapon movements identified in Volume 2 of this manual and Section 9 of this volume.

(a) (U) The weapon movement commander, normally the courier, will be in command of all weapon movements. The weapon movement commander will be assisted by a tactical weapon movement commander. The assigned security force personnel will report to the tactical weapon movement commander, who in turn reports to the weapon movement commander. The tactical weapon movement commander may be a commissioned officer or Military Department prescribed senior non-commissioned officer.

(b) (U) Each vehicle carrying a nuclear weapon will be staffed by a driver, who is not required to be armed, and at least one armed security guard or armed Security Support Force personnel.

(2) (U) Movement within the WSA.

(a) (U) For weapon movement within the WSA, additional security precautions will be needed. Such precautions should include a combination of: patrolling and sweeping of the area within and outside the WSA; deploying security personnel; notifying fixed security posts; shielding or masking of the weapon from outside observation; and use of ballistic-hardened containers. Security force personnel and vehicles are not required to accompany the weapon movement if the route has been swept, secured, and the movement is under constant observation. Additionally, security forces will coordinate movement plans with DOE security forces, when present.

(b) (U) Before moving a nuclear weapon from its storage structure or other secured facility, a visual inspection of the WSA and adjacent property must be conducted. This examination may be conducted from manned towers, using electronic surveillance devices, or by security force patrols. The results of these inspections must be provided to the courier before moving the weapon from its protected structure.

(c) (U) Posted security force personnel will be notified before moving a nuclear weapon within the WSA and informed to maintain high alert until the weapon is secured in its storage structure.

(d) (U) All movements of nuclear weapons that occur outside of a storage, maintenance, or mating building and where the route has not been swept, secured, and under constant observation will be accompanied by at least two armed security personnel.

(e) (U) Within the WSA, each vehicle carrying a nuclear weapon will be staffed by a driver, who is not required to be armed, and at least one armed security guard or armed Security Support Force personnel.

(f) (U) The RF will be alerted that a move is being conducted and will be ready to respond to meet the requirements of Volume 2 of this manual.

(3) (U) Movement between the WSA and WRA.

(a) (U) Before moving a nuclear weapon from the WSA, a visual inspection of the weapon movement route must be conducted the day of the mission. This examination may be conducted from manned facilities along the route, using electronic surveillance devices, or by security force patrols. The results of these inspections must be provided to the courier before moving the weapon from its protected structure.

(b) (U) Posted security force personnel will be notified before moving a nuclear weapon outside the WSA.

(c) (U) RF will be alerted that a move is being conducted and will be positioned to meet response requirements specified in Section 7 of Volume 1 of this manual.

(d) (U) Weapon movement routes on base will meet specific requirements for route clear zones:

1. (U) Weapon movement routes will be cleared of trees that are large enough and close enough to the weapon movement route that, if felled, they could extend across the route and be used to hinder movement of transport and security vehicles unless the removal of such trees would compromise the integrity of the weapon movement route and surrounding area to the point of being unusable.

2. (U) An area on either side of the movement route should be clear of vegetation and underbrush that can be used by an adversary for cover and concealment. The cleared area should be no less than 75 yards on either side of the outer edge of the weapon movement route surface.

d. (DCNI) Nuclear Weapons Onboard SSBNs. Once nuclear weapons are loaded onboard SSBNs, additional security requirements apply. SSBN COs are responsible for all nuclear weapons aboard their ship.

(1) (U) SSBN Brow. A brow security system will separate SSBNs armed with nuclear weapons from the pier. The brow security system is an integral part of the SWF WRA area protection for an SSBN. Manning of the brow and the associated security operations will be considered part of the ship's security responsibilities. SWF COs will provide a layer of defense oriented around nuclear weapon defense to support those responsibilities. COs of SSBNs armed with nuclear weapons will maintain custodial responsibility for those weapons and will ensure effective entry control procedures are established. This control will be maintained at all times through the execution of written procedures and supervision of security forces controlling such entry.

(2) (U) NWSS for Armed SSBNs. The CO of an SSBN armed with nuclear weapons is responsible for all NWSS associated with operations organic to the SSBN. SSBN NWSS area protection while in homeport WRA is the responsibility SWF CO. NWSS for near-port transits and out-of-homeport port visits are addressed in other areas of this manual.

(3) (U) Locking Systems.

(a) (DCNI) Design locking systems as complete and compatible systems; apply locks and hasps or internal locking systems to doors, hatches, and frames so that each element is operationally compatible and structurally equivalent with the entire unit, thereby providing a uniform degree of resistance to forced entry.

(b) (U) Key and lock requirements established in Volume 2 do not apply to SSBNs. SSBN keys to nuclear weapon EAs and operating keys are controlled in a different way:

1. (U) Keys. Designate keys as sensitive and controlled and marked as
SECRET.

2. (U) Accountability. Maintain continuous accountability of keys.

3. (U) Custodian. Appoint a key and lock custodian to ensure the proper custody and handling of keys and locks used on SSBNs.

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4. (U) Key Control Register. Maintain a key and lock control register to identify keys for each lock and their current location and custody.

5. (U) Key Audits. Audit keys and locks at least monthly.

6. (U) Key Inventory. Inventory keys with each change of custodian.

7. (U) Key Removal. Do **not** remove keys to currently installed locks from the SSBN.

8. (U) Key Containers. Protect operational (working) keys, spare keys, and locks in a secure container when not needed for authorized operational purposes.

9. (U) Master Keying. Master keying of nuclear weapons sensitive keys is prohibited.

10. (U) Key Destruction. The destruction of keys will be controlled and accomplished by two individuals and will include the verification by the key and lock custodian and recorded.

11. (U) Lock Changes. Re-cylinder locks in accordance with Military Service directives.

(c) (U) Nuclear weapon security guards (NWSGs) assigned to protect nuclear weapons will not be issued keys to locked or protected spaces that they are safeguarding.

(4) (U) ESS.

(a) (DCNI) All ships capable of transporting or using nuclear weapons, excluding ships that are to be used for emergency purposes only, will have a security alarm installed which alerts security personnel to intrusion or attempted intrusion into the EA.

(b) (U) The surveillance and interlock system installed on SSBN missile tube access doors will meet the security alarm system requirements of this Section.

(5) (U) Entry Control Procedures.

(a) (DCNI) Entry Control Criteria.

1. (DCNI) Entry control to moored SSBNs armed with nuclear weapons will be the responsibility of the SSBN CO and controlled by the brow security system or EC (topside watch stander). Efforts will be made to restrict personnel access to SSBNs armed with nuclear weapons to a single brow.

2. (U//DCNI) Use a brow security system to preclude persons from gaining access to SSBNs without the expressed permission of the controller. In the event a second brow is required, access controls will be required for that brow as well.

3. (DCNI) SSBN force commanders will prescribe additional security measures when muzzle hatches are open on launch tubes containing nuclear weapons. If service brows are utilized, implement additional security measures to preclude unauthorized access.

(b) (U) EAs.

1. (U) Once a two-person rule team has entered an EA together (to establish the two-person rule requirement within the EA), all other entry will be by one person at a time. Design procedures so that no single individual is afforded the opportunity to gain lone entry to an EA.

2. (U) Establish and maintain entry control procedures to EAs to ensure identification of personnel before admission. At a minimum, use the following a common access card; Military Service or civilian identification card containing a photograph; a formal entry authorization list signed by the CO; a visitor escort system; and a duress system.

3. (U) For EAs where the same entry list is used for more than one control point, the CO may authorize, in writing, a subordinate to certify on each page of each copy that the list is a true copy of the entry list that the CO has approved and signed. Keep the original entry list in a centrally located area. Where one or more EAs exist, establish entry control procedures at each EA.

4. (U) Inspect all hand-carried items by NWSGs for prohibited and contraband items before allowing entry to and exit from the EA.

(6) (U) SSBN Security Force Composition.

(a) (DCNI) Security Forces. COs will select and train personnel from the ship's company for nuclear weapon security force duties. Screen nuclear weapon security force personnel into a RAP in accordance with DoDM 5210.42. The Military Department directives will further define the requirements for the selection and training of personnel for nuclear weapon security force duties.

(b) (U) Nuclear Weapon Security Force on Duty. The nuclear weapon security forces on duty will be those guards posted to provide additional protection for nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon systems when EAs are not present. SSBN force commanders will ensure that nuclear weapon security plans are met. This will include the posting of armed security forces required to meet nuclear security, nuclear weapon system safety rules, and to provide immediate static and roving protection of critical nuclear weapon areas in the event reaction forces are needed to be armed, and respond to a security violation. Posted security force personnel will not be tasked to perform any function unrelated to the security mission while on duty.

(c) (DCNI) NWSG Requirements. Assign and post NWSGs to detect and prevent unauthorized entry or intrusion into EAs. At a minimum:

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1. (DCNI) Guard unmanned EA perimeters by two or more perimeter NWSGs. If physically capable of doing so, the two NWSGs may be assigned to protect multiple openings (e.g., multiple frame bay openings that are each visible and reasonably close together).

2. (DCNI) Guard manned EAs by one or more NWSGs. Provide additional security by formal entrance controls and by authorized personnel enforcing the two-person rule within the area.

a. (DCNI) Man the EA ECP by one NWSG stationed within a buffer zone. Establish buffer zones at the designated EA ECP any time entry to an EA is anticipated or required.

b. (DCNI) Post one perimeter NWSG at each temporary barrier and opening in permanent structure boundary (e.g., doors, hatches, frame bay openings) that could afford unauthorized entry or intrusion into the EA. If physically capable of doing so, the NWSG may be assigned to protect multiple openings (e.g., multiple frame bay openings that are each visible and reasonably close together). In addition to his or her primary duty of entry control, and where physical conditions allow, the ECP NWSG may function concurrently as a perimeter NWSG for the perimeter within his or her immediate visual range as long as it does not inhibit his or her ability to maintain perimeter security requirements.

(d) (U) Verification Interval. Verify the performance and well-being of posted perimeter and ECP NWSGs at 30 minute intervals.

(7) (U) Shipboard Reaction Forces.

(a) (DCNI) Security Alert Team (SAT). A SAT consists of two or more trained personnel, assigned by name or billet, capable of being armed and arriving together at the affected nuclear weapon security area immediately, or as soon as possible, but not longer than 5 minutes after receipt of a security violation alert announcement.

(b) (DCNI) Backup Alert Force (BAF). BAF consists of three or more trained personnel, assigned by name or billet, capable of being armed and assisting the SAT within 10 minutes after receipt of a security violation alert announcement.

(c) (DCNI) Reserve Force. The reserve force consists of teams of six or more trained personnel, assigned by name or billet, capable of being armed and assisting the SAT and BAF within 15 minutes after receipt of a security violation alert announcement.

(d) (DCNI) AF. AFs are separate from the reaction forces, and consist of any available additional armed and trained personnel capable of assisting the reaction force. The CO will determine the number of personnel assigned to the AF and a minimum response time.

(8) (U) Security Force Training.

(a) (U) In addition to any training received before assignment to nuclear weapons security duties, and before performing nuclear weapon security force duties except in training or

under instruction status, personnel assigned to the shipboard nuclear weapon security force will receive specialized security training.

(b) (U) Specialized training will consist of appropriate training lectures, required reading, on-the-job training, and a Military Department directed qualification or certification program.

(c) (U) Certify nuclear weapon security force training, qualification, and proficiency by a security force proficiency certifying official, designated in writing by the CO for this purpose.

(d) (U) Conduct drills, unit force-on-force exercises, proficiency watches, watch stander seminars, and supervisory monitoring to ensure that nuclear weapon security personnel are thoroughly proficient in all aspects of entry control procedures, security plans, and emergency plans. When testing personnel, actions must be characterized by realism and timeliness. Tests using hoaxes, ruses, or deception that could be interpreted as enemy or other hostile action are prohibited.

(e) (U) The minimum number of training exercises for reaction forces will be:

1. (U) At least once per week, not to exceed 10 days while in port.
2. (U) At intervals, not to exceed 30 days, while underway.
3. (U) SSBNs undergoing ship's restricted availability or extended refit period may modify the weekly requirement to monthly when weapons are off-loaded. Drill the nuclear weapon security RF within 7 days of the weapons being reloaded.
4. (U) SSBNs armed with nuclear weapons in foreign ports may waive nuclear weapon security training exercises in those instances where such activity would unduly arouse local concern. When such port visits are anticipated, COs will ensure that nuclear weapon security forces are briefed on the specific differences in the security environment about to be entered, compensatory measures that will be implemented, and other security duties relevant to the port.
5. (U) During underway periods that would preclude use of the ship's announcing system, or the running of drills (e.g., "Ultra Quiet"), the CO may waive the 30-day drill requirement. This waiver must be in writing and filed on board until the next formal inspection.

6. (U) Training exercises be held at least once every 30 days for the AFs.

(9) (U) Security Force Weapons and Equipment. For shipboard security, tailor the weapons and equipment for security personnel to the particular SSBN armed with nuclear weapons and determined by such factors as local physical environment, local threat assessment, size of area to be protected, number and dispersion of EAs, and ease or difficulty in maintaining surveillance of EAs.

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(a) (U) Provide weapons from small arms lockers, which provide effective firepower for the threat or task at hand, as determined by on-board security supervisors, to security forces. Security planning considerations and procedures will provide reasonable assurance that security force personnel have ready access to their weapons and associated ammunition.

(b) (U) Prescribe arming and weapons selection and use in SSBNs armed with nuclear weapons in the Military Department's directives. Security plans and policy will meet the NWSS. Security force roving patrols onboard SSBNs armed with nuclear weapons may be issued less-than-deadly force weapons as their primary duty weapon only during underway operations in a submerged status.

(c) (U) Prescribe protective equipment for nuclear weapon security forces onboard SSBNs (armed with nuclear weapons) by the Military Department's directives.

1. (U) At a minimum, reaction forces will have immediate access to small arms and ammunition, a ballistic vest, helmet, respiratory protective mask, and other available equipment appropriate for effective response.

2. (U) When a SSBN is in port, topside watch standers will have the ability to fight in a low visibility environment, through the use of night vision aids.

3. (U) Address immediate access and authorized night vision aids in the Military Department's supplemental directives.

e. (DCNI) Surface Transit of SSBNs. Provide SSBNs armed with nuclear weapons conducting surface transits entering or leaving port, and brief stops for personnel and logistics, armed surface escorts when restricted in their ability to tactically maneuver. SSBN armed surface escorts are not in direct support of nuclear weapon security and are not required to be in a RAP. Such escorts may be provided by U.S. Navy or other uniformed Federal Government agencies.

(1) (U) Supplemental directives issued by the Military Department will be developed in coordination with the Supported Commander in accordance with the Unified Command Plan, including the identification of applicable environments where the SSBN is considered restricted in its ability to tactically maneuver.

(2) (U) Required Capabilities.

(a) (U) *Classified information removed.*

(b) (DCNI) SSBN and escorts, as required, will provide a layered defense during the surfaced transit.

(c) (DCNI) SSBN and escorts, as required, will be capable of detecting potential adversaries or threats through the use of organic and remote sensors along the transit route as available.

SECTION 6: (U) SUBMARINE NUCLEAR WEAPON SYSTEM SECURITY

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(d) (U) SSBN and escorts, as required, will incorporate moving delay measures to assess and interdict contacts to determine intent along the transit route.

(e) (DCNI) SSBN and escorts, as required, will incorporate appropriate weaponry to engage, stop, or destroy hostile adversaries.

(f) (DCNI) When SSBN escorts are required, escorts will:

1. (U) Provide an overt physical deterrent through the use of sufficient vessels and weapons along the transit route.

2. (DCNI) Provide a means to decrease threat avenues of approach and lines of sight to the SSBN.

3. (DCNI) Conduct primary communications with the SSBN via encrypted, classified means. SSBN escorts will have secondary and tertiary means of communication with the surfaced SSBN. When a means of encrypted, classified communications is not available, operational security will be stringently enforced in unclassified communications.

SECTION 7: (U) NUCLEAR FORCE REGENERATION

7.1. (U) GENERAL.

a. (U) These security requirements apply to operational situations when aircraft-based nuclear forces are ordered to regenerate to alert status or where forces are reestablished to an operational status. Unless otherwise specified, requirements listed in Volumes 1 and 2 of this manual will apply.

b. (U) Exposed weapons and delivery systems on alert or in operational situations are attractive targets. Screen weapons that are in close proximity to military reservation boundaries or public and otherwise uncontrolled roads, from view to the fullest extent possible. Accomplish such obscuration so that the security force's view of the clear zones is not impeded. Newly constructed or designated alert areas will be in areas sufficiently removed from boundaries and uncontrolled roads to ensure that hazards to weapon systems inherent in such areas are minimized.

7.2. (U) NUCLEAR ALERT AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS.

a. (U) **Threat Considerations.** The mere fact that nuclear force regeneration was ordered indicates a severe threat condition, including open hostilities. Local plans will include both peacetime threats as described in the DIA and locally tailored threat assessment and wartime threats.

b. (U) **Designation of Security Areas.** Designate alert aircraft areas that contain nuclear weapons paired with aircraft delivery systems limited areas. Designate the area bounded by the aircraft exterior and, if necessary, the area surrounding the aircraft no closer than 10 feet and no further than 60 feet from any exterior point of the aircraft an EA to allow access to the aircraft, weapons, or critical launch control equipment.

(1) (U) Aircraft located inside an aircraft shelter or hanger may not allow a minimum of 10 feet. In such cases, the Military Service will determine the no closer than distance.

(2) (U) In such cases, the Military Service will also ensure procedures are established which allow sentries responsible for enforcing the aircraft EA controls to identify and interdict threats within the space constraints imposed by the shelter dimensions.

c. (U) **Space Priority.** Where aircraft alert facilities or areas will not accommodate both nuclear weapon-laden aircraft and nuclear support aircraft, such as tankers required to be on alert, nuclear weapon-laden aircraft will have priority.

d. (U) Physical Security Requirements.

(1) (DCNI) Identify temporary limited and EAs with warning signs, ropes, tapes, stanchions, cones, or similar markers if permanent areas are not established. Additional sentries

or patrols, administrative controls, temporary lighting, and other security measures must be used to compensate for the lack of permanent limited or EA physical security aids required by this manual.

(a) (DCNI) Although it is understood that physical security aids for temporary limited or EAs may represent a prohibitive cost, the intent is that nuclear weapons be provided a standard level of security that meets the NWSS at all times, regardless of their location and whether they are temporarily or permanently located therein.

(b) (DCNI) The construction and use of basic physical security aids should be implemented and the use of already established permanent restricted areas (when available) with attendant security aids (such as permanent aircraft restricted areas) should be used to leverage the protection afforded.

(c) (DCNI) The use of temporary or relocatable physical security aids is encouraged in those situations where permanent systems are not available.

(d) (DCNI) The absence of permanent physical security aids (see Paragraphs 3.4.c.(1) - 3.4.c.(5). of Volume 1 of this manual) requires temporary compensatory measures, establish and approve these temporary measures in accordance with the requirements of Section 6 of Volume 2 of this manual.

(2) (U) Use hardened or semi-hardened aircraft shelters when available.

e. (U) Entry Control Procedures.

(1) (U) Establish procedures to ensure authorized entry to limited and exclusion areas. Identification of all personnel before entry is required. Where the entry control requirements of this Section are more stringent than those in Volume 2 of this manual, the requirements of this Section will take precedent.

(2) (U) Only permit vehicles necessary to support aircraft or mission-support activities to enter the limited area.

(3) (U) Inspect all escorted personnel upon entry and exit of the limited area perimeter. All inspections will include, at a minimum, a visual scan of the individual's person and an inspection of all hand-carried items. Nuclear weapon movement operations into or out of the limited and EA are exempted from this requirement provided the provisions of Paragraph 3.5.h.(5) of Volume 2 of this manual are met.

(4) (U) Inspect all vehicles moving in or out of the limited area to preclude the presence of unauthorized personnel, prohibited items, and contraband (e.g., weapons and explosives). Nuclear weapon movement operations into or out of the limited and EA are exempted from this requirement provided the provisions of Paragraph 3.5.h.(5) of Volume 2 of this manual are met.

(5) (U) Before the introduction of nuclear weapons, purge the aircraft and EA boundary of unauthorized personnel. Establish EA entry control and close-in and close-boundary protection will be in position.

f. (U) Security Forces Requirements. In order to deny access, security forces must be positioned to immediately bring effective fire to bear on the entire limited area perimeter. Additionally, security force close-in sentries must be capable of bringing immediate final denial fire on access points to nuclear-loaded aircraft and exposed weapons.

g. (DCNI) Security Forces Response Times. Security forces must respond immediately and in enough strength to meet the NWSS

(1) (DCNI) The RF must be capable of responding quickly enough to defend threatened nuclear-laden aircraft or exposed weapons and to deny unauthorized access, in not more than 5 minutes.

(2) (DCNI) The initial BF must respond quickly enough to ensure denial of access to nuclear weapons, but in no more than 15 minutes. Subsequent follow-on BFs must respond quickly enough to ensure denial of access to nuclear weapons, but in no more than 30 minutes. Deploy additional follow-on BFs as a whole, or incrementally in tactical units, as quickly as possible to ensure retention of control.

REFERENCE ONLY

SECTION 8: (U) PRIME NUCLEAR AIRLIFT FORCE (PNAF)

8.1. (DCNI) GENERAL. These procedures apply to securing nuclear cargo, weapons and special nuclear material transported on PNAF missions. These security measures will also apply to aircraft of other U.S. Government departments, Military Departments, and air carriers transiting U.S. installations.

a. (U) Pre-arrival and Departure Planning. Units will receive a series of nuclear airlift support messages before any scheduled missions.

(1) (U) Place an emphasis on minimizing the amount of ground time at in-transit locations.

(2) (U) Examples of procedures that reduce ground time include reducing weapon exposure times, transferring custody at the WSA or PAS vice the aircraft where possible, performing aircraft maintenance and servicing operations before beginning weapon movements, and controlling as much ground around the resource as possible.

(3) (U) Keep occurrences of nuclear-loaded aircraft remaining overnight to the absolute minimum.

b. (U) Threat Assessment and Planning. Upon notification of an impending PNAF mission, wing commanders must conduct a mission-specific PNAF local threat assessment as part of the process of preparing for the mission.

(1) (U) One of the greatest vulnerabilities for a protected resource is when it is in transit. Stand-off attack is one of the greatest threats.

(2) (U) Security forces commanders must ensure aggressive sweeps are conducted out to the farthest adversary targeting opportunity (as allowed by local jurisdiction), of areas where a stand-off attacker could garner cover and concealment.

(3) (U) In coordination with civil or host-nation authorities, they must also dominate the area within the ground to air threat envelope when indicated by local threat analyses.

(4) (U) Coordinate with local civil authorities, and include procedures in the integrated base defense plan, whereby local police help mitigate off-base, stand-off attack scenarios.

(5) (U) Operations Security (OPSEC) must be reviewed and enhanced where applicable when coordinating with the local law enforcement authorities.

c. (DCNI) Type I Aircraft Security. Provide Type I aircraft security for PNAF aircraft carrying nuclear weapons. Type I security will include:

(1) (DCNI) EC and Aircraft Boundary Sentries. Post sufficient boundary sentries to provide security at the aircraft and comply with the two-person rule. Post an EC to control entry in and out of the established limited and exclusion area(s) as applicable.

SECTION 8: (U) PRIME NUCLEAR AIRLIFT FORCE (PNAF)

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(a) (DCNI) Post two boundary sentries at the aircraft if it is not parked within an existing restricted area that contains nuclear resources. Only one boundary sentry is required if the aircraft is parked in an existing restricted area that contains nuclear resources. Sentry posting locations may be varied as necessary to meet mission needs.

(2) (DCNI) Dedicated SRT and Area Supervisors (AS). Post one internal SRT and a full-time dedicated AS. They may be counted as part of the RF.

(3) (DCNI) External SRT. Maintain an external SRT response capability.

(4) (DCNI) RF and BF. The RF and BF (as described in Volumes 1 and 2 of this manual) must be armed, equipped, and assembled 30 minutes before PNAF arrival and will remain in place until at least 30 minutes after departure. This is to ensure coverage for early arrivals or return to base scenarios.

(5) (U) Entry Control Procedures. Proper definition of limited and EAs is critical. Normally, when weapons are present, the limited area is prescribed as the area inside the cordoned area encompassing the aircraft and the EA is prescribed as the interior of the aircraft. Military Departments will describe the various limited and EA variations, depending on configuration, in their directives. The variable nature of limited and EA boundaries in this environment require more stringent application of personnel and vehicle inspections than is required by Volume 2 of this manual. Where the requirements of this Section are more stringent than those in Volume 2 of this manual, the requirements of this Section will take precedent.

(a) (DCNI) The EC must possess an entry authority list of authorized unescorted entry. The courier and a security forces representative will authenticate all entry authority lists. The courier must identify and brief the EC on those personnel who are authorized escort officials.

(b) (DCNI) Security forces must inspect all individuals and their hand-carried possessions for contraband or prohibited items upon entering and leaving the limited area.

(c) (DCNI) Vehicles will be sanitized by removing all nonessential personnel and checking for explosive materials. After sanitization, vehicles will be secured and observed at all times.

(d) (DCNI) Before loading nuclear cargo on an empty aircraft, the courier must ensure all nonessential personnel and hazardous materials are removed. Use explosive-detector dog teams where and when available to sanitize aircraft before initiating nuclear weapon on-load procedures.

d. (U) On- and Off-Load Security Procedures.

(1) (DCNI) Establish Type I security immediately upon aircraft parking and before on-load of nuclear resources and be maintained as long as nuclear resources are located in or around the aircraft.

(2) (DCNI) Once all nuclear resources are off-loaded and contained within the WSA(s) or WSV security areas, the courier may direct downgrade of security. This will depend on crew rest requirements and the interval between aircraft load operations.

(3) (DCNI) During the on-load and off-load process, expose weapons for the minimum time necessary. To minimize weapons exposure, couriers and unit weapons custodians will complete the weapon transfer and accountability paperwork in the most secure area possible.

e. (U) Arrival and Departure Procedures.

(1) (DCNI) Traffic will be controlled along all avenues of approach during aircraft taxi. Security forces must sweep runways and taxiways before aircraft arrival and departure.

(a) (DCNI) Secure and observe the designated route until taxi is complete.

(b) (DCNI) Position elements of the RF and BF to oversee the landing, takeoff and taxi routes and respond immediately should the aircraft become threatened during ground movement operations.

(c) (DCNI) In recognition that each installation taxi and runway environment is unique, installation integrated defense plans will include procedures to ensure the intent to provide immediate RF and BF support to a taxiing Type I aircraft is met.

(d) (DCNI) Security elements will meet the aircraft as it taxis off the runway and follow the aircraft to its parking location in order to delay and deny high-speed approaches to the aircraft.

(e) (DCNI) In cases where the runways or taxiways are outside the legal jurisdiction of the security force (e.g., co-use of civilian airport runway), the security force will coordinate with the host security or law enforcement agency to follow the procedures in this paragraph.

(f) (DCNI) Incorporate OPSEC procedures as part of this coordination process.

(2) (DCNI) Ensure a means to communicate directly between the aircraft and the security force is established during aircraft taxi operations. The intent is to allow the security forces and aircrew to coordinate actions in the event of a hostile action.

(3) (DCNI) The courier team will not initially deploy outside the aircraft upon arrival. Only an aircrew member and the flight engineer or a spotter will initially deplane for arrivals. The courier will deplane after receiving feedback from these individuals and verify security is in place. Security forces should provide the courier with a radio to monitor and coordinate actions in the event of a hostile action.

(4) (DCNI) In the final stages of pre-departure, an aircrew member, or spotter maintenance crew chief may work alone outside the aircraft, and will normally be the only person outside during engine start. This is permissible as activities are under aircrew surveillance.

f. (DCNI) Courier Briefing. The Secretaries of the Military Departments will develop procedures to brief the weapons courier before the courier accepting guard security as adequate for nuclear weapon operations. At a minimum, the courier brief will include a concise, mission-specific threat assessment and local security and protection posture, locations of all posted sentries and RF, and the locally developed duress code unique to the PNAF mission. Other pertinent missions' related information will be briefed by the senior on-scene Military Department representative.

(1) (DCNI) Ensure all security forces vehicles receive thorough threat sanitization before PNAF arrival and remain under security forces control throughout the duration of the mission.

(2) (DCNI) Verify the courier's identity against the notification message.

(3) (DCNI) Ensure all security forces are tactically prepared 30 minutes before arrival and maintain that posture until 30 minutes after the aircraft has departed the installation. Military Departments will prescribe security force operating procedures.

g. (DCNI) Courier Responsibilities. The aircrew courier will coordinate with the on-scene security representative for required support. If the aircrew courier decides security is not adequate and deficiencies cannot be corrected, the aircraft will depart.

h. (DCNI) Establishing Areas. Park PNAF aircraft in an existing permanent restricted area if possible. If temporary restricted areas are necessary, at a minimum, use an elevated rope and stanchion barrier and post restricted area signs along the boundary and at the ECP. Lighting is required to illuminate the ECP and approaches to the aircraft.

i. (DCNI) Weapon Arrival and Departure Procedures at the Aircraft. Weapon movement operation vehicles will not be delayed from entering limited and EAs to identify personnel or inspect vehicles. This entry authority is based on prior inspections and subsequent authentication by the movement commander. Military Departments will establish procedures outlining implementation of this requirement.

j. (DCNI) Sealing Aircraft. Couriers must seal all doors and hatches of a nuclear-laden aircraft before they depart the area. Couriers must also ensure the under floor access hatch on a C-17 is locked as well as sealed. The seals are intended to provide a visual indication of entry to the aircraft to the security force and returning courier.

(1) (DCNI) The AS, accompanied by an aircrew two-person rule team, must verify the seal numbers, record the crew door seal number, and relay it to the applicable security forces control center.

(2) (DCNI) After seal verification is completed and the certified two-person team departs, security forces will monitor the restricted area and EA.

(3) (DCNI) The aircraft commander or the weapon courier must inform controllers at the applicable security forces control center or the installation command post of their location, including billeting and dining locations.

(4) (DCNI) Once sealed, initial entry to the restricted area will only be permitted to an authorized aircrew two-person rule team. This information must have been previously relayed to the EC. The AS must accompany the aircrew two-person rule team to make sure all seals are intact and the crew door seal number is the same as the one recorded.

k. (DCNI) Logistics Aircraft Movement of Limited Life Components (LLCs), Trainers, and Aircraft Sanitization. Aircraft may also transport SNM, LLC, weapon trailers, or other nuclear-related cargo. Such cargo may be transported via DoD, DOE, or other U.S. Government-chartered aircraft.

(1) (DCNI) Nuclear airlift support messages will specify the type and quantity of SNM, LLC, or other material onboard the aircraft. SNM categories are prescribed in DoDM 5210.92.

(2) (DCNI) SNM Category I receives Type I security. All other SNM categories, LLCs, and all weapon trainers (EXCEPT B61 Type 3E trainer) receive Type II security. B61 Type 3E trainers are treated as classified equipment and protected accordingly.

l. (DCNI) Rehearsals. Conduct rehearsals of PNAF contingency operations (e.g., recapture and recovery, EA and aircraft emergency entry, Broken Arrow, overt attack) involving multifunctional participation within 48 hours of scheduled Type I mission arrivals and departures. These rehearsals may satisfy the RF and BF exercise requirements found in Paragraph 7.1.e. of Volume 1 of this manual and may also satisfy the requirements of Paragraph 7.3.e. of Volume 1 of this manual (force-on-force) provided they entail a force-on-force scenario using a simulated engagement system.

m. (U) Type II Aircraft Security Requirements. Provide Type II aircraft security for PNAF aircraft carrying applicable categories of nuclear-related cargo. Type II security consists of:

(1) (DCNI) An armed security force member or crew member to control entry into the aircraft, unless it is parked in an existing permanent restricted area with attendant entry control processors and procedures.

(2) (DCNI) An appropriately armed two-member response team, capable of responding within 5 minutes.

8.2. (U) SECURITY FORCE RESPONSE TIMES. Security forces must respond with enough strength, and in time, to defeat an adversary force attempting to gain unauthorized access to a nuclear weapon.

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- a. (DCNI) Dedicated SRTs must respond to support PNAF aircraft immediately. During aircraft taxi operations, those elements of the RF and BF dedicated to support the operation must respond immediately.
- b. (DCNI) When required, the RF must be positioned to provide final denial fire capability and support engaged forces immediately.
- c. (DCNI) The initial BF must respond quickly enough to ensure denial of access to nuclear weapons, but in not more than 15 minutes. Subsequent follow-on BFs must respond quickly enough to ensure denial of access to nuclear weapons, but in not more than 30 minutes. Deploy additional follow-on BFs as a whole, or incrementally in tactical units, as quickly as possible to ensure retention of control.

REFERENCE ONLY

SECTION 9: (U) NUCLEAR WEAPON MOVEMENTS

9.1. (U) ON-INSTALLATION NUCLEAR WEAPON MOVEMENTS.

a. (U) Objective. Nuclear weapons are best protected when they are secured in permanent facilities; therefore, they should be removed only when absolutely necessary. These requirements apply to the protection of nuclear weapons during any movement not conducted in response to an increased state of readiness or wartime emergency.

b. (DCNI) Transportation Protection System Components.

(1) (DCNI) There will be times when it is absolutely necessary to move weapons within or outside of the permanent limited area. Establish procedures to ensure that additional protection is afforded nuclear weapons and nuclear components during exercises, operations, and logistics activities that involve the movement of nuclear weapons. Although security during these operations is increased, the potential for increased adversary surveillance and standoff attack is also heightened.

(2) (DCNI) The period spent outside protected storage must be the absolute minimum to ensure mission accomplishment. Security emphasis should be on obscurity, OPSEC, patrolling possible adversary off-site observation and standoff firing points (for outside the continental United States locations, as allowed by host-nation Status of Forces Agreements) weapon movements departing the site, and minimizing weapon exposure time.

(3) (DCNI) Movement Protection Within Limited Area. For weapon movement within the limited area, additional security precautions are needed. Such precautions should include a combination of: patrolling and sweeping of the area within and outside the site; deploying security personnel; notifying fixed security posts; shielding or masking of the weapon for ballistic protection; and use of ballistic-hardened containers. Potential standoff attack locations and adversary pathways along the movement route will be identified and controlled by the security force before initiating the move. An armed security force member must accompany a nuclear weapon movement inside the limited area unless modified elsewhere in this Volume.

(a) (DCNI) All preparation actions at the weapon movement initiation and destination points should be performed in a secure environment, unobservable to the adversary.

(b) (DCNI) Intra-area movements should be conducted as discreetly as possible to lower the OPSEC signature and disrupt possible adversary surveillance activities.

(4) (DCNI) Movement Protection Outside the Limited Area. During nuclear weapon movements, provide enclosed ballistic protection. Take appropriate measures to provide denial against any attempt to gain access to the weapon(s).

(a) (DCNI) Employ applicable additional measures as described in Paragraph 9.1.b., such as patrolling and sweeping the area outside the site, shielding or masking of the weapon

from outside observation, use of hardened containers and protective covers for ballistic protection, and use of protected and hardened transport vehicles or trailers.

(b) (DCNI) Portable tactical sensors placed alongside routes where foliage cannot be removed, but could hide adversaries, is another measure to be considered.

c. (U) General. When nuclear weapons must be exposed as dictated by operational or emergency requirements, keep their movement to the absolute minimum and travel through heavily populated areas should be avoided. They will be moved by the safest and most secure means possible. In all cases, maintain control.

d. (U) Planning Considerations.

(1) (U) Formulate and brief emergency plans and procedures to all personnel involved with the movement.

(2) (U) Before any transportation operation commences, the responsible commander will conduct a movement-specific risk and vulnerability assessment and ensure recapture and recovery plans are in place to support the movement. (See Volume 1 of this manual for guidance and considerations.)

(3) (U) Review all known and potential hazards

(4) (U) Review relevant DIA and localized scenarios and current intelligence estimates of the threat and local threat relating to:

(a) (U) Point of origin.

(b) (U) Routes, stops en-route, and destination of the movement.

(c) (U) The type and means of shipment.

(d) (U) The availability of security resources.

(e) (U) The source and availability of emergency assistance.

(f) (U) OPSEC indicators and countermeasures.

e. (U) Command and Control.

(1) (U) The responsible commander will plan and supervise all phases of weapon movements.

(2) (U) The tactical movement commander will be a full-time security force officer or senior non-commissioned officer (as designated by the responsible Military Department). This person is responsible for the security of the weapon movement.

(a) (U) At non-U.S. NATO bases, a U.S. custodial agent will be the tactical movement commander. That person may be a U.S. non-commissioned officer and is responsible for ensuring U.S. control of the nuclear weapon while in transit.

(b) (U) The U.S. tactical movement commander must work closely with the host-nation security force.

(3) (U) Before a movement of nuclear weapons, the command immediately responsible for responding in the event of any accident or incident involving security of the weapon(s) during all phases of the movement will be notified and will acknowledge its responsibility.

(4) (U) Maintain an encoded communication capability, with multi-frequency capability, between the responsible commander (through a communications control center), the individual in charge of the movement, and security personnel.

f. (U) Information Control. OPSEC is critical. There will be formal, written procedures for close control of all information concerning planned and actual movements of nuclear weapons on and off military reservations. At a minimum, classify all information that would reveal a movement is planned or scheduled Confidential.

(1) (U) Handle information concerning times, routes, and destinations on a strict need-to-know basis and controlled as appropriate and in accordance with applicable classification guidance. Limit dissemination, display, and access to information concerning impending or actual movements to the minimum essential personnel to support the mission.

(2) (U) During all types of movement, make progress reports (in such a manner so as not to reveal the purpose of the movement, speed and direction, its current location, or the identity of the route or final destination) to a control center tasked with plotting the progress of the movement and initiating a response in case of alarm or loss of communication. Make such reports at least every 15 minutes.

g. (U) Malfunctions, Hazardous Conditions, Accidents, and Incidents.

(1) (U) If a malfunction occurs, or if a hazardous condition is detected, all personnel will immediately assist in taking appropriate corrective action.

(2) (U) If a nuclear weapon is damaged during movement, including loading and unloading, or if a weapon is involved in a fire, stop the operation and evacuate all nonessential personnel to a safe distance, and implement the appropriate emergency procedures. Refer to Section 4 of Volume 2 of this manual for details on security requirements during nuclear weapon incidents.

h. (U) Other General Movement Considerations. Nuclear weapons will not be subjected to adverse environments. Avoid excessive handling of nuclear weapons and components during movement operations.

9.2. (U) PERSONNEL.

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a. (U) Security forces personnel will be under the tactical control of the tactical movement commander.

b. (U) Base the number of security personnel assigned upon the number of nuclear weapons involved, the associated hazards, the relevant DIA and localized TCA scenarios, the current estimates of threat to the movement, the particular type and means of shipment, and all other relevant factors. General requirements for the security force personnel are:

(1) (U) Certify U.S. security escorts and sentries controlling entry to areas containing nuclear weapon transport carriers in a RAP; other members of the movement security force must have a minimum Secret clearance. In NATO, security force members must possess a minimum of a CONFIDENTIAL clearance.

(2) (U) Train security personnel in accordance with Volume 1 of this manual and use the degree of force necessary to preclude unauthorized access to, or seizure of, any area containing nuclear weapons or vehicle(s) transporting nuclear weapons; and to prevent damage, loss, or compromise of a nuclear weapon. This training will be determined by the Military Department and appropriately documented.

(3) (U) Employ a sufficient number of personnel to ensure the protection of the weapons being moved throughout the movement and to provide adequate relief in order that fatigue will not diminish their effectiveness.

(4) (U) In order to facilitate command and control, equip security force personnel with portable communication equipment in addition to fixed equipment organic to weapon carriers and supporting conveyances.

9.3. (U) MOVEMENT SECURITY REQUIREMENTS. The tactical movement commander will ensure that the following security requirements are met:

a. (U) Use only military-owned or -leased vehicles for weapons movement. Inspect all vehicles to be loaded for possible sabotage and sanitize by removing all nonessential personnel and hazardous materials. Establish and maintain appropriate entry control of sanitized vehicles.

b. (U) The weapons carrier and supporting vehicles will meet the highest standards of reliability in order to minimize the probability of breakdown en-route.

c. (U) Once sanitized, establish an EA around the weapon carrier and its prime mover whenever it is stopped, parked, or being loaded or offloaded.

d. (U) Take precautions to protect nuclear weapons from small arms fire. These precautions include (all as applicable) concealment by use of covers, obscurity devices, protective containers, active patrol, and observation of approaches and potential firing points.

e. (U) A minimum of one armed security or support force member will ride in each motor vehicle carrying a nuclear weapon. Such a vehicle, or movement of such vehicles, will be preceded by and followed by at least one security vehicle.

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f. (U) Each security vehicle will contain at least one armed security or support force member in addition to the armed driver.

g. (DCNI) Support weapon movements by an RF of at least 15 personnel capable of responding to any emergency in the movement in sufficient time as to ensure the NWSS is met. The force need not be in the movement, but will be in continuous communication, via encoded communications, with the individual in charge of the movement and the communications control center.

h. (DCNI) An initial BF will be capable of responding to any emergency in the movement to ensure denial of access in no longer than 15 minutes. Subsequent BFs must respond quickly enough to ensure denial of access to nuclear weapons but in no more than 30 minutes. Deploy additional BFs as a whole, or incrementally in tactical units, as quickly as possible to ensure the NWSS is met.

i. (DCNI) As DASD(NM)-validated improvements are made that increase delay and guarantee denial, Military Departments may petition the DASD(NM) to increase security force response times or reduce security force numbers.

j. (U) The individual in charge of the movement will maintain communications with a communications control center and with all vehicles in the movement, with the RF, and the BF(s). These communications will be encoded and have multi-frequency capability. In NATO, the U.S. tactical movement commander will also maintain communications with the host-nation security force.

9.4. (U) OFF-INSTALLATION NUCLEAR WEAPON MOVEMENTS.

a. (U) **General.** In addition to the requirements outlined in Paragraphs 9.1. - 9.3., the following requirements will also apply to off-installation nuclear weapon movements.

b. (U) **Personnel.** For all off-installation movements, designate a commissioned security force officer the movement commander and assign responsibility for the security of the movement. A minimum RF of 17 personnel will accompany each off-base movement. All personnel in the movement are under the tactical control of the tactical movement commander regarding the security, movement, and route of travel of the movement.

c. (U) **Additional Off-Installation Movement Security Requirements.** The tactical movement commander will ensure the following security requirements are met:

(1) (U) Inspect all vehicles to be loaded for possible sabotage and sanitized by removing all nonessential personnel and hazardous materials. Establish and maintain appropriate entry control of sanitized vehicles.

(2) (U) Specific security force requirements are provided in Paragraph 9.3.

(3) (U) Make communications and status checks for off-installation movements at least every 15 minutes.

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(4) (DCNI) Riot control equipment, exclusive of riot control agents unless authorized, will be available to escort personnel for movements off military property if circumstances indicate the possible need for such equipment.

(5) (DCNI) Civilian law enforcement coordination, along the route, must be included in every movement's planning cycle to ensure local law enforcement's ability to respond, liaise, and facilitate the safety and security of the movement. Every effort must be made to include federal law enforcement support to ensure the safety and security of the movement and provide liaison to local law enforcement agencies.

(6) (U) Use a helicopter escort with armed security forces aboard during the off-base movement of nuclear weapons. Maintain constant communications between the helicopter, a communications control center, and the individual in charge of the movement throughout the movement. The helicopter in support of movement operations will be armed and able to provide fire support to the tactical movement commander.

(a) (U) Wing commanders may specifically waive this requirement for safety of flight issues, but must compensate for the absence of helicopter support with additional ground based, four-person team(s).

(b) (U) Commanders must ensure mission requirements outweigh the increased risk incurred if moving nuclear weapons without helicopter support is necessary.

(7) (U) The transport vehicle or trailer will provide the following security capability:

(a) (U) *Classified information removed.*

(b) (U) *Classified information removed.*

(c) (U) *Classified information removed.*

(d) (DCNI) The transportation security system, upon attack or halt, must provide enough delay to provide the security force the ability to deny unauthorized access to the adversary.

(U) GLOSSARY

G.1. (U) ACRONYMS. (The acronyms in this Glossary are UNCLASSIFIED)

AECS	automated entry control system
AF	augmentation force
AOR	area of responsibility
AS	area supervisor
ASD(NCB)	Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense Program
BAF	backup alert force
BF	backup force
CCTV	closed circuit television
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CO	commanding officer
DASD(NM)	Deputy Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters
DCNI	DoD Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DoDD	DoD Directive
DoDM	DoD Manual
DOE	Department of Energy
DTRA	Defense Threat Reduction Agency
EA	exclusion area
EC	entry controller
ECP	entry control point
EPIS	Electronic Personnel Identification System
ESS	electronic security system
FRSD	fast rising secondary door
IDS	intrusion detection system

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IZ	inner zone
LAPSC	Limited Area Processing and Storage Complex
LCC	launch control center
LF	launch facility
LLC	limited life component
LMF	local monitoring facility
MAF	missile alert facility
MUNSS	munitions support squadron
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NC2	Nuclear Command and Control
NSTCA	Nuclear Security Threat Capabilities Assessment
NWSG	Nuclear Weapon Security Guard
NWSS	Nuclear Weapons Security Standard
OPSEC	operation security
OST	Office of Secure Transportation
OZ	outer zone
PAS	protective aircraft shelter
PIN	personal identification number
PNAF	Prime Nuclear Airlift Force
RAP	reliability assurance program
RC	reinforcing capability
RF	response force
RMF	remote monitoring facility
RVA	remote virtual assessment
SAT	Security Alert Team
SNM	special nuclear materials
SRT	security response team
SSBN	ship, submersible, ballistic, nuclear
SSCC	Site Security Control Center

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SWF	strategic weapon facility
TCA	threat capabilities assessment
URC	universal release code
USAF	U.S. Air Force
USD(AT&L)	Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
USEUCOM	U.S. European Command
USSOCOM	U.S. Special Operations Command
VSA	vault storage area
WRA	waterfront restricted area
WS3	Weapon Storage and Security System
WSA	weapon storage area
WSV	weapon storage vault

G.2. (U) DEFINITIONS. Unless otherwise noted, these terms and their definitions are for the purpose of this issuance. The definitions in this section are UNCLASSIFIED.

access. Close physical proximity to a nuclear weapon in such a manner as to allow the opportunity to tamper with or damage a nuclear weapon.

authorized access. Close physical proximity within the nuclear weapon exclusion area obtained through proper control measures to accomplish a specific authorized mission(s).

unauthorized access. Close physical proximity to a nuclear weapon in such a manner as to allow the opportunity to tamper with or damage a nuclear weapon. In the absence of positive control and preventative measures, presence within the exclusion area constitutes unauthorized access. Possession or use of stand-off weapons or systems from outside the exclusion area does not constitute close physical proximity.

AECS. An automated entry control system where no man-in-the-loop is required to authorize access.

AF. A force of not fewer than 30 persons available to reinforce deployed security forces. The AF is employed in the USEUCOM AOR.

alert area. A designated land-based area where delivery systems containing nuclear weapons are located and are postured for immediate reaction.

armed. Equipped with a loaded firearm. A firearm is considered loaded when a magazine is inserted into the magazine well in bolt-operated weapons, or ammunition is physically attached to the weapon in a manner preparing the firearm for immediate use.

BF. A security force of 15 or more personnel (unless otherwise stated), appropriately armed and equipped, whose primary duty is to provide augmentation to the RF and on-duty security force during those situations that threaten or affect the security of the nuclear weapons concerned. Security force personnel must comprise the initial BF.

Subsequent follow-on BFs may include appropriately trained and equipped combat support specialists (e.g., RED HORSE combat engineers, EOD technicians, special operations forces).

As a final resort, additional BFs may contain non-security force military personnel (support forces or units) that are trained, equipped, and capable of emergency security operations.

buffer zone. An area adjacent to nuclear weapons EAs. The U.S. Navy establishes these areas any time entry into an EA is anticipated or required.

clear zone. An area within the storage site perimeter and around the boundary of the storage site free of all obstacles, topographical features, and vegetation exceeding a specified height. The clear zone is designed to facilitate detection and observation of an intruder, to deny protection and concealment to an intruder, to maximize effectiveness of security force weapons, and to reduce the possibility of surprise attack. Clear zones must consist of an area 30 feet (9.1 meters) inside (inner clear zone) and outside (outer clear zone) the site perimeter fence. For areas using two fence systems, the clear zone must consist of 30 feet (9.1 meters) outside the outer fence, the entire area between the fences, and 30 feet (9.1 meters) inside the inner fence.

custody. Defined in Joint Publication 1-02.

deadly force. Force which a reasonable person would consider likely to cause death or serious bodily harm.

defeat. The response by trained and equipped forces to immediately and, if necessary, violently defeat an opposing adversarial force that is attempting to or has gained unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.

delay. The effect achieved by physical features, technical devices, or security measures and forces that impede an adversary from gaining unauthorized access to a nuclear weapon.

denial. The effect achieved by security systems or devices that prevent a potential intruder or adversary from gaining unauthorized access to a nuclear weapon.

detect. The determination that an unauthorized action has occurred or is occurring; detection includes sensing the action, communicating the alarm to a control center, and assessing the alarm. Detection is incomplete without assessment.

deviation. A nonstandard condition that varies from established security criteria, further categorized as either a technical, temporary, or permanent deviation. Deviations do not always equate to system vulnerabilities.

duress. The immediate, sufficient actions, proportional to the threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in order to prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a nuclear weapon.

duress system. A method by which personnel who are authorized entry into exclusion areas, along with those who authorize entry into or escort visitors into limited or exclusion areas can covertly communicate a situation of duress to a security control center or other operating, maintaining, or security personnel, who will then notify a security control center.

ESS. That part of physical security concerned with the safeguarding of personnel and property by use of electronic systems. These systems include, but are not limited to: IDS, AECS, and VSA.

exclusion area. A designated area that immediately surrounds one or more nuclear weapon(s). Normally, the boundaries of the area are the walls, floors, and ceiling of a structure or are delineated by a permanent or temporary barrier. In the absence of positive preventive measures, unauthorized access to the exclusion area constitutes unauthorized access to the nuclear weapon(s).

EPIS. An electronic system where personnel identifying information is displayed for a man-in-the-loop to verify identity of personnel requesting access. The guard will use information displayed to determine whether access is authorized.

facility. Any configuration where a nuclear weapon is located, such as a magazine, maintenance and inspection facility, ICBM LF, or WS3 vault.

final denial fire. The ability of the security forces to place effective fire on the entrances to facilities or platforms containing nuclear weapons. The intent is to deny an adversary unauthorized access.

IDS. That portion of the ESS designed to detect the entry or attempted entry of a person(s) into the area protected by the system.

immediate. Occurring or accomplishing without loss of time and without any regard to factors that will inhibit full initiation of action.

inspection. At a minimum, a visual inspection of persons, hand carried items, and readily accessible areas of vehicles and equipment. As applied to the inspection of personnel, vehicles and equipment, an inspection is designed to detect unauthorized persons (vehicle and equipment inspections) and readily detectable prohibited and contraband materials (person, vehicle, and equipment inspections).

integrated defense. The integration of multidisciplinary active and passive, offensive and defensive capabilities employed to mitigate potential risks and defeat adversary threats to DoD operations.

intra-area movement. The movement of nuclear weapons or nuclear components by a non-combat vehicle within the secure environment of a storage or alert area.

limited area. A designated area immediately surrounding one or more exclusion areas. Normally, the area is between the boundaries of the exclusion area(s) and the outer or inner barrier or boundary of the perimeter security system.

LLC. A weapon component that deteriorates in some respect over time, and must be replaced periodically during weapon stockpile life. Principal classes of LLCs are reservoirs, neutron generators, and parachutes.

lumen. A unit of luminous flux equal to the light emitted in a unit solid angle by a uniform point source of one candle intensity.

lux. A unit of illumination equal to the direct illumination on a surface that is everywhere one meter from a uniform point source of one candle intensity or equal to one lumen per square meter.

Military Department. Defined in Joint Publication 1-02.

NC2. The exercise of authority and direction by the President; as Commander in Chief of the U.S. Armed Forces, through established command lines, over nuclear weapon operations of military forces; as Chief Executive over all government activities that support those operations; and as Head of State over required multinational actions that support those operations.

near-real time. That period of time between notification of an event (such as an alarm) and the assessment of the event. The time should be as close to instantaneous as possible.

NSTCA. A DIA-led intelligence community assessment of the capabilities and intentions of a variety of actors to gain unauthorized physical access to a U.S. nuclear weapon. The NSTCA forms the cornerstone of threat planning for nuclear security systems until updated or superseded. As the NSTCA is updated or superseded, implementing guidance for the new intelligence product(s) will be provided by DASD(NM).

nuclear weapon movement. The transport of nuclear weapons by any appropriate noncombat delivery vehicle.

nuclear weapon system. One or more nuclear weapons that are on or physically attached to their delivery platform, in combination with all related equipment, materials, services, and personnel required for self-sufficiency. A nuclear weapon system is distinct and different from an NC2 system.

operational risk. The risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed processes, people, and systems or from external events or the uncertainty surrounding adversary threats against nuclear weapons.

permanent deviation. The approved continuation of a nonstandard condition that varies from an established security standard and creates vulnerability for the security system, thereby requiring compensatory measures. (Previously called an exception.)

PNAF. The fleet of aircraft and associated personnel that transport nuclear weapons or nuclear-related components, material, or cargo.

RC. A force dedicated to continuously reinforce the AF until the situation is resolved. The RC concept is utilized in the USEUCOM AOR.

recapture. Actions taken to regain control of a U.S. nuclear weapon within the boundaries of a storage or operational site, weapon movement route, facility, or military installation where it has been seized by a hostile force or unauthorized person.

recovery. Actions taken to locate, if necessary, and to regain control of a U.S. nuclear weapon outside the boundaries of a storage or operational site, weapon movement, facility, or military installation, from where it has been lost, removed, or seized by a hostile force or unauthorized person(s).

restricted area. Defined in Joint Publication 1-02.

RF. A sufficient number of security force members (15 or more, unless otherwise stated) sized, armed, equipped, designed, and organized to tactically maneuver in defense of a nuclear weapon(s) and capable of defeating an adversary force before they can gain unauthorized access to a nuclear weapon. The RF provides initial or follow-up response to those situations that threaten or affect the security of the nuclear weapons concerned. Security force members in fixed guard posts are not part of the RF.

risk. Defined in Joint Publication 1-02.

security forces. Those designated persons whose duties are to protect nuclear weapons.

security system. A system composed of intrusion detection and assessment systems, entry control, physical barriers, fences, storage structures, delay mechanisms, denial devices, security forces, and the support personnel assigned to work in and around nuclear weapons.

site. Any location where nuclear weapons are stored, maintained, or on operational alert.

small arms. Light infantry weapons and ball ammunition smaller than .50-caliber.

SRT. A quick response element of at least two armed persons, equipped in accordance with applicable Military Department direction, dedicated to the protection of nuclear resources and normally tasked with patrolling the protected area and providing the initial response to alarms and detected threats. SRTs may come together to form a fire team. They normally have a mix of

weapons, including automatic weapons and grenade launchers, to provide a variety of suppressive capabilities.

standoff attack. A deliberate and hostile action using long-range weaponry directed against nuclear weapons from outside the protected zone.

two-person control. The close surveillance and control of materials at all times by at least two authorized persons, each capable of detecting incorrect or unauthorized procedures with respect to the task to be performed and each familiar with established security requirements.

two-person rule. Defined in Joint Publication 1-02.

Type I aircraft security. Transport aircraft carrying nuclear weapons.

Type II aircraft security. Transport aircraft carrying nuclear-related cargo, or aircraft that are sanitized before loading nuclear resources.

VSA. The area containing WS3 vaults in Europe.

vulnerability assessment. Defined in Joint Publication 1-02.

WRA. Restricted area encompassing submarine waterfront mooring facilities at SSBN home ports.

WSA. The area within the boundary fence, or outer boundary fence where two are installed, where nuclear weapons are located.

zone or sector. A group of alarm sensors that normally includes multiple sensors or consists of sensor points from a larger area that is divided into smaller subdivisions. The purpose of sensor zones or sectors is to permit selective access to some related groups of sensors while maintaining other groups of sensors in a secure mode and to permit identification of a specific boundary from which an alarm is activated.

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¹ This document may be obtained from HQ USEUCOM/ECJ5-W, Unit 30400, APO AE 09131.

² This document is classified and has limited distribution. DoD personnel direct questions to authors of the document.

³ This document is classified. DoD personnel direct questions to Defense Technical Information Center, 8725 John J. Kingman Road, Ft. Belvoir, Virginia, 22060-6218.

⁴ This document may be obtained from the Defense Technical Information Center, 8725 John J. Kingman Road, Ft. Belvoir, Virginia, 22060-6218.