Part I Theories and definitions

1 Theories of globalization

Issues and origins

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Introduction: precursors, paradigms and problems

The theme of globalization has in the last three decades become the key topic of the social sciences. This outcome is even more true of the five years since the first edition of this Handbook was published. The continuing rise of China as a world power, the further globalization of terror and crises of economic globalization all play out across borders influencing every aspect of human life in every corner of the planet. Nevertheless globalization is probably more feared than understood. Unsurprisingly there are now a large number of major handbooks, companions and textbooks on the subject such as Frank Lechner and John Boli's *The Globalization Reader* (2004), Jan Nederveen Pieterse's *Global Future* (2000), George Ritzer's *The Blackwell Companion to Globalization* (2007), Saskia Sassen's *Sociology of Globalization* (2007), Bryan Turner and Habibul Khondker's *Globalization East and West* (2010), Robert J. Holtons's *Globalization and the Nation-State* (2011), Barry Axford's *Theories of Globalization* (2013) and Martin Albrow's *Global Age Essays on Social and Cultural Change* (2014). In addition, there has been much sociological interest in both the social instability caused by globalization in, for example, Ulrich Beck's *World Risk Society* (1999) and the radical uncertainties associated with financial crisis in Robert J. Holton's *Global Finance* (2012).

This *Handbook of Globalization Studies*, however, has a somewhat different focus, being not only an analysis of globalization as such, but also an overview and critical assessment of globalization as a field of study within the social sciences. The aim therefore is to provide an assessment of the analysis of globalization processes in political science, demography, cultural studies, film studies, sociology and so forth. As such this Handbook examines fields of considerable multi-disciplinary interest, such as global population movements and global migration, information technology and social inequality, as well as new areas of enquiry such as the complexity of international taxation, the rise of global Islamophobia and the various cultures of sexual life in Asia. It also attempts to take a balanced view of both the negative dimensions – global crime and environmental pollution – and the positive side – the spread of human rights and international law – of contemporary globalization.

While globalization studies have become in the twenty-first century a major field of inquiry, recognition of globalization started much earlier. For example, one legacy of Marxist sociology was recognition of the importance of international trade, economic imperialism, transnational corporations and capitalism as a world system of exploitation and production. Awareness of such global economic

institutions produced a number of schools and approaches whose research examined the structure of economic exploitation between the core and the periphery of capitalism. This focus eventually gave rise to the notion of 'underdevelopment' as a key feature of capitalist economic growth; that is Marxist economic sociology rejected the simple distinction between 'tradition' and 'modernity' in modernization theory and argued that capitalist growth at the core underdeveloped the periphery (or semi-periphery) through a network of exploitative relationships (Baran, 1957). This perspective was originally applied to the developmental problems of Latin America (Cardoso and Faletto, 1979; Frank, 1971) and more recently to the Orient more generally (Frank, 1998). This Marxist legacy, coupled with Polanyi's economic anthropology, underpinned a major academic development in understanding the global world around the work of Immanuel Wallerstein (1974) who developed 'world systems theory', initially on the basis of his research in Africa. Wallerstein's theory simply postulates that it is impossible to study the modern world successfully without recognizing the multiple connections between societies and the global processes that shape them, but the world systems approach has also emphasized the historical depth of these processes. Furthermore it has recognized that de-globalization can also take place in conjunction with major periods of recession and economic decline, and hence this approach is especially relevant today (Chase-Dunn, 2006).

While there were important early developments in theories of economic globalization, there were equally significant developments in the study of the cultural and political dimensions of globalization. To some extent, the analysis of the cultural and social dimensions of globalization was a reaction against the predominance of political economy in the social sciences. Although the study of globalization has been growing in importance since the 1990s, perhaps the key intervention in the popular literature came in the 1960s with the growth of communication research. In the study of communication and media, Marshall McLuhan (1964) made 'understanding the media' a major topic and developed the popular idea of a 'global village'. Research on communications and the media has ever since occupied a dominant position in the field (Castells, 1996). In comparative religious studies, growing awareness of global processes added weight to the conventional debate about religious fundamentalism. These cultural studies often painted a picture of the world in terms of major binary contrasts such as East and West. The struggle to understand the Orient also has a long history. In the late 1970s Orientalism as a largely implicit paradigm for Western research came under increasing critical scrutiny, giving way to greater awareness of the interconnectedness of human societies and their cultures (Said, 1978; Turner, 1978 and 1994). In historical research, historians such as Marshall G. S. Hodgson began to invent 'world history' as an alternative framework for the study of Islam in terms not of specific societies but by reference to Islam as a global movement. He came to see Islam as part of world history and from an ecumenical standpoint as a world cultural system. Political globalization has also been addressed by some influential studies of the consequences of globalization for democracy and civil society (Held, 1995; Keane, 2003). Political globalization involves the study of the institutionalization of international political structures, and the evolution of the European interstate system has given rise to 'both an increasingly consensual international normative order and a set of international political structures that regulate all sorts of interactions' (Chase-Dunn, 2006: 85). This development has been labelled as simply the growth of 'global governance' (Murphy, 1994).

In retrospect, it can be suggested in broad terms that globalization theory has gone through three stages of development from an early emphasis on the economic system, through a focus on culture and finally a concentration on its political dimensions, giving rise to debates about world governance and cosmopolitanism. These economic, political and cultural themes were outlined early on by Barrie Axford in *The Global System* (1995), which examined the axial features of globalization in terms of the world economic order, the world political order, the global military order and cosmopolitan cultures.

Axford's observation in 1995 that, while there has been much intellectual excitement about the concept of globalization, there has been little reliable or systematic empirical research on its core components and consequences, remains only partly valid. New empirical analysis has emerged over the last 20 years, in areas such as corporate power (Carroll, 2010), tax havens (Palan et al., 2010) social inequality (Walby, 2009; Piketty, 2014) and global football (Giulianotti and Robertson, 2009). This has included important qualitative studies of financial knowledge and the construction of finance markets (MacKenzie 2006), and the daily struggle for survival of the poor on the Indian sub-continent (Collins et al., 2009).

Yet, in other respects, globalization is often difficult to study empirically. This is sometimes because evidence is far better organized on a national rather than cross-border basis. This makes illegal or subterranean processes of immigration, people smuggling, tax evasion, sex tourism or terrorist networks very hard to pin down. In addition, it is to some extent easier to measure economic globalization through the growth of international trade or the size of multinational corporations than it is to grasp more intangible aspects of cultural globalization. While the measures economists study come readily to hand in financial terms, it is often difficult to identify appropriate measures of cultural globalization. There are some important exceptions such as George Ritzer's work in *The McDonaldization of Society* (1993), which does provide both qualitative and quantitative measures of cultural standardization. The study of global consciousness presents even greater problems. However, in his *The Origins of Global Humanitarianism*, Peter Stamatov (2013) examined the growth of anti-slavery among Jesuits in Latin America in the sixteenth century and among Quakers in New England and London in the eighteen century as a humanitarian consciousness that had a global reach. These anti-slavery groups developed a global advocacy system that stretched eventually from Europe to Africa and the New World. This study is one further reminder that the origins of globalization are not in the communications revolution of the twentieth century, but can be found in earlier religious movements.

In addition, while globalization studies have flourished, there is still little agreement about the nature of globalization and its overall direction. Although there has been much dispute over the definition of globalization, we need not concern ourselves too deeply over definitional disagreements at this stage. The problem of defining 'money' satisfactorily has not stopped the progress of economics any more than the absence of a wholly coherent notion of 'power' has inconvenienced the development of political science. There is, however, some consensus that globalization involves the compression of time and space, the increased interconnectivity of human groups, the increased volume of the exchange of commodities, people and ideas, and finally the emergence of various forms of global consciousness which, for the sake of brevity, we may simply call 'cosmopolitanism'. In this sense, Axford's comment that globalization remains a compelling idea in spite of definitional problems continues to be very apt.

There has also been much dispute about the historical origins of the notion of globalization, but it is clear that at least in sociology the early driving force in the development of globalization theories was dissatisfaction with the economic assumptions of world-systems theory, especially as this approach had been constructed by Wallerstein and his school. In economic terms, globalization had often been treated as simply another phase of the emergence of a capitalist world system, the principal causal mechanisms of which were the economic requirements of global trade and transnational corporations. Sociological theories of globalization attempted to establish the independent development of social and cultural forces contributing to the emergence of the world as a single place. The foundations of a specifically sociological approach to globalization had been established by a series of influential articles by Roland Robertson, but these were not finally published as a collection until 1992. At the same time, there was equal frustration with the unidimensional aspects of modernization theory and with the theoretical difficulties of so-called civilizational analysis.

Early formulations of globalization theory in the 1980s often assumed either that the process was equivalent to the inevitable enforcement of cultural standardization or that this form of global standardization in fact involved processes which were merely Americanization. In early sociological versions of globalization theory, as Tony Spybey notes in *Globalization and World Society* (1996: 48–52), the convergence thesis suggested that the world was moving towards a single model of industrial society and that model was indubitably American. George Ritzer (1993) had successfully employed Max Weber's notion of a general process of rationalization to write about McDonald's as a general process of global standardization in his 'McDonaldization'. The world development of Starbucks, McDonald's and KFC outlets was compelling evidence of American influence over popular culture and lifestyles. Clearly the United States has played a pivotal role in modern globalization, but it is too simplistic to describe the whole process of globalization as merely Americanization. The impact of Japan on management systems, car manufacture, cuisine, fashion and films would be one simple example of the influence of Asia on the rest of the world.

The development of globalization studies has also been characterized by either extreme pessimism or naïve optimism. With the final collapse of the Soviet system between 1989 and 1992, many social scientists welcomed the potential development of a peace dividend, the end of the Cold War and the prospect of global co-operation over trade, security and cultural exchange. Globalization was welcomed as the flowering of human rights and global peace, and political philosophers looked back towards the Enlightenment and Immanuel Kant's aspiration for world government and perpetual peace as a model of a future global civil society. The globalization of a rights regime offered the prospect of a more just world (Wasserstrom et al., 2000). However, an alternative voice also became influential at the time in international relations theory. In particular, Samuel Huntington's 'clash of cultures' article and later book sparked off a furious debate about the possibility of new conflicts around ethnicity and religion (Huntington, 1993 and 1996). After 9/11, the bombings in London, Madrid and Bali, terrorist attacks in Mumbai in 2008 and more recent attacks in Boston, Copenhagen and Paris, globalization studies took a more critical and pessimistic turn, with much more emphasis on the state, political borders and security. It is recognized that globalization also brings with it the globalization of violence, low-intensity conflicts, international crime and trafficking in people. Warfare has played a critical role in the process of globalization, but this issue rarely surfaces in debates about the origins and character of global

violence (Hirst, 2001). Optimistic visions of hyper-globalization talked about mobility across borders, the porous nature of societies and the decline of the nation state as key features of the global world. The contemporary security crisis, by contrast, produced a renewed interest in state activities in controlling migration and patrolling borders. It was clear that globalization could also result in the 'enclave society' creating new walls between communities (Turner, 2007a). In 2014 and 2015, with growing conflict between the West and Vladimir Putin's Russia over the Crimea and Ukraine, many commentators referred to a renewal of the Cold War. With Russian and Chinese naval operations planned to take place in the Mediterranean in 2015, there is much less optimism about a global peace dividend.

However we need to avoid simple dichotomies between optimism and pessimism, and also avoid simple assumptions that suggest globalization is only Americanization or that globalization is a recent historical phenomenon (Holton, 2011). More sophisticated discussions of the cultural dimensions of globalization have recognized the complexities of the process, emphasizing the interaction between local and regional politics and the broader social movements towards global integration, giving rise to a new dynamic between the local and the global. There has been a more general awareness of the importance of 'glocalization' (Robertson, 1995), or the interaction and merger between local cultures and global processes. Contemporary cultural theories recognize that standardization is a very unlikely (and certainly an unpromising) outcome of the global system, because the global/local dynamic will tend to produce a fluid and unstable hybridization of cultures. Anthropological research in particular has explored the cultural complexities of hybridity, glocalism (or 'global localization'), post-colonial cultures and continuing cultural imperialism without adopting either utopian expectations or a pessimistic nostalgia for a more traditional world (Wilson and Dissanayake, 1996).

Globalization also brings into the foreground the role of religion in the politics of global identity (Turner, 2013). From the point of view of cultural politics, globalization theory has somewhat neglected the obvious fact 'the world religions' have been globalizing forces long before the modern period. In the early modern period, Islam, mainly through the development of trade, developed into a world culture. The same is true for Christianity, which spread through missionary activity and often in tandem with Western colonial expansion in Africa and parts of Asia. Generally speaking, globalization theory, apart from the work of Roland Robertson (1992) and Peter Beyer (1994), has neglected the interaction between world religions and globalization, and the consequences of this cultural dynamic for global politics; other exceptions include *The Oxford Handbook of Global Religions* (Juergensmeyer, 2006). James Beckford's *Social Theory and Religion* (2003) also made an important contribution to the field, providing an entire chapter on 'Globalisation and religion', and in the introduction to *The Sage Handbook of Sociology of Religion* he correctly observed that since the mid 1980s religion 'presents major challenges and opportunities to social scientific explorations of globalisation' (Beckford and Demerath, 2007: 7). The growth of a global Muslim *ummah* or worldwide community through migration and the Internet is a further example of contemporary religious globalization (Mandaville, 2001).

Against a background of economic and cultural analysis of globalization, there has been since 1995 a steady stream of publications on the political consequences and dilemmas of globalization. These political issues include the alleged erosion of or threat to national sovereignty and the decline of the nation state, the implications of Internet communication for democracy, the possibilities of cosmopolitan

democracy and finally the growth of reactive nationalist and ethnic politics in response to global development. One prominent question in political globalization is the tension between nation-state patterns of citizenship and the global impact of human rights legislation.

There is a consensus in contemporary political science that, as a result of globalization, the nation-state has *not* lost its significance (Calhoun, 2008), but it is equally clear that the nature of modern politics has changed irrevocably. The changing nature of the nation state has obvious implications for democracy and citizenship. For many political analysts, conventional approaches to citizenship cannot capture either the dangers or the opportunities made possible by the rise of a global system. Aihwa Ong has in a variety of publications argued that new and more flexible forms of citizenship that address the needs of transnational communities can be detected and has examined the cultural logics of transnational movements (Ong, 1999; Ong and Collier, 2004; Ong and Nonini, 1997). Ambiguities of and conflicts about identity arise from ethnic complexity in the global labour market, but, following Daniel Archibugi, David Held and Martin Kohler in *Re-imagining Political Community* (1998), there is greater conscious of the possibilities of a cosmopolitan democracy.

David Held has over a number of years attempted to analyse and understand the impact of globalization on democratic governance. His *Democracy and the Global Order* (1995) was an early and systematic attempt to conceptualize the impact of globalization on conventional patterns of democratic rule. For Held, there is a clear need to expand the sway of democracy through a new model of cosmopolitan governance to regulate the world order in favour of democratic accountability. With Archibugi and Kohler, he explored the principles of cosmopolitan democracy through a range of debates on universal rights, European unification, human rights, refugees and citizenship. The political programme of cosmopolitan democracy has become a major aspect of globalization studies and obviously central to overcoming the limitations of national citizenship.

The rise of cosmopolitanism – in part through the growth of cosmopolitan city, diasporic global cultures, global migration patterns and ensuing multiculturalism – has also taken place in a context of resurgent nationalism, ethnic cleansing and the anti-migration policies of right-wing political parties and movements. The migration policies of modern nation-states often reflect a nationalistic rhetoric that defines identity in terms of particularistic criteria, such as descent by (imputed) blood relationships. The conflict over citizenship entitlement with respect to descent versus residence has been a major policy issue in contemporary Europe. Rainer Baubock has, over a number of years, made an important contribution to our understanding of the dilemmas and issues surrounding citizenship, political membership and migration. In his *Transnational Citizenship* (1994) he developed a political analysis of the challenge to traditional definitions of citizenship from mass migration, the growth of transnational organizations and regional integration. As a concept ‘transnational citizenship’ identifies three key issues in the expansion of social citizenship beyond the national framework: the tension between the normative principles of liberal democracy and the exclusionary practices of nation-states; the emergence of interstate citizenship (such as the European Union); and finally the development of human rights as an element of international law, albeit with fairly limited powers of enforcement. We need to consider the ways in which states might become more open and liberal in accepting migrants as citizens through naturalization, the extension of citizenship rights to non-citizens and the admission of immigrants.

These issues of entry, membership and participation raise basic questions about identity, loyalty and obligation (Axtman, 1996). When and under what circumstances would cosmopolitan citizens identify with communities, states or global associations (Holton, 2009)? Although there has been much talk about universal citizenship and cosmopolitan democracy, postmodern and feminist political theory has attacked abstract notions of universal justice within the conventional paradigm of liberal political theory. Whereas the politics of universalism has sought the equalization of rights, the politics of difference seeks to recognize the unique identity of actual social groups and individuals. For postmodern philosophers, universalism undermines or contradicts the possibility of local or grounded authenticity. The argument in favour of recognizing fundamental differences between individuals has been articulated as a defence of group-differentiated rights in the context of feminist and multicultural politics. These criticisms of the legacy of the Enlightenment are somewhat without foundation and Chase-Dunn's counter-argument looks highly reasonable when he says that Enlightenment ideas have 'never been a major cause of exploitation and domination. Rather, it was the military and economic power generated by capitalism that made European hegemony possible' (Chase-Dunn, 2006: 96–97).

Behind the issue about globalization, there is therefore a debate about the history and moral standing of modernity and progress. For some sociologists such as Niklas Luhmann (1990), globalization is the (accidental) consequence of the structural differentiation of Western society that is a consequence of structural modernization and 'institutional upgrading' (to use the language of Talcott Parsons). The implication is that the pattern of globalization is general and relatively uniform. The arguments of sociologists such as Robertson have, by contrast, both denied that globalization comes after modernization and emphasized the uneven quality of 'globality' (through the tensions between the local and global) in the notion of 'glocalization' (Robertson, 1995). Perhaps the core issue in the debate (which in turn impacts on questions of identity, loyalty and commitment) is whether globalization produces cultural standardization in terms of a single and uniform global village or whether globalization, through the processes of adaptation and simulation, results in cultural hybridity. In this respect, the conclusions of Albrow are plausible in suggesting that 'the multiplication and diversification of worlds rather than the homogenization and hybridization better express the dominant forms of cultural relations under globalized conditions' (1996: 149). In turn, this multiplication of life-worlds raises a question about the capacity of political systems to recognize, embrace and ultimately manage such global diversity within a political framework that requires a certain level of loyalty and obligation to match the rights and immunities of modern citizens. The danger is that global forms of political and religious fundamentalism will develop to counteract, and possibly nullify, the possibility of cosmopolitan diversity. Perhaps this prospect is the real peril of the clash of civilizations. Axford (1995: 190–94), building on the work of Robertson, articulates this relationship between fundamentalism and cosmopolitanism as a response to the post-Cold War pessimism of Huntington's version of international relations theory with its focus on 'the dynamics of fault line wars' (Huntington, 1996: 266–98). Again the issue is whether modernization produced a greater need for specific political identities (through a process of 'essentialization') in the form of the national citizen or whether globalization goes beyond modernity to create new cosmopolitan identities that are not grounded in national grand narratives. The pessimistic view is that modernization went along with the creation of ethnic minorities in a process of 'minoritization' (Mufti, 2007). The optimistic view is that globalization creates opportunities for a

cosmopolitan imagination (Beck, 2006). These questions in various critical but productive ways take the debate about citizenship well beyond the traditional framework of social citizenship in a national framework of ethnic homogeneity.

Defining globalization

Many of the problems of definition are discussed in the modern sociological literature such as Ulrich Beck's *What Is Globalization?* (2000). Although definitions of globalization are contested, the following points must be taken into account. Internationalization and transnationalization are not the equivalent of globalization. There were major changes in the 1970s (in finance, computing and economics), in the 1980s (the fall of organized communism and the end of the Cold War) and in the early twenty-first century (the terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers, the London underground and Mumbai) that intensified the process of globalization, but it is important to be sensitive to other historical events such as the Treaty of Westphalia or the discovery of America in shaping globalization. It is important to look beyond merely economic causes of globalization in order to examine and include the impact of world religions. It is probably also valuable to remain sceptical as to the actual degree of economic globalization (Hirst and Thompson, 1996). While economic internationalization has certainly taken place, these developments do not necessarily constitute economic globalization and very few transnational corporations operate at a genuinely global level. In defining globalization, we must avoid other forms of crude reductionism in treating globalization as a uniform process or by treating it as simply an aspect of hegemonic Americanization and finally we should recognize that anti-globalization is ironically also an expression of globalization. We must also look beyond modernization theory in our accounts of the global world. Martin Albrow in *The Global Age* (1996) recognized the difficulties in providing a precise and convincing definition of globalization, but warned against the nostalgic view that conventional notions of modernity are sufficient to capture the changes taking place in globalization.

Although there is no accepted definition of globalization, we can, following James Beckford (2003: 119), define some of its main contours:

1. the growing frequency, volume and interrelatedness of cultures, commodities, information and peoples across both time and space;
2. the increasing capacity of information technologies to reduce and compress time and space (giving rise to notions such as the global village);
3. the diffusion of routine practices and protocols for processing global flows of information, money, commodities and people;
4. the emergence of institutions and social movements to promote, regulate, oversee or reject globalization;
5. the emergence of new types of global consciousness or ideologies of globalism that give some expression to this social interconnectedness such as cosmopolitanism.

In terms of these various definitions of globalization, there is some justification in claiming that some approaches have overstated the economic nature of globalization (in terms of free trade, neo-liberalism,

financial deregulation, integrated production and management systems) to the neglect of its social, cultural and political characteristics. From a sociological perspective, we need to examine globalization as the interconnectedness of the world as a whole and the corresponding increase in reflexive, global consciousness. Concepts like 'globalism' and 'globality' can usefully refer to the cultural conditions of globalization. As we have already observed, sociologists have claimed that globalization produces a complex interaction between the local and the global. These interactions or glocalization often result in complex hybrid cultures. There is also controversy in defining the field as to the consequences of globalization – either standardization such as McDonaldization versus cultural and social hybridity. There are consequently two highly contradictory views of globalization, between Ritzer's view of global culture (McDonald's is a world without surprises) and Beck's account of risk society (a world of contingency and complexity). We also need to attend to the various dimensions of globalization and their causal priority: economic and technological (global markets); informational and cultural (global knowledge); legal and political (human rights and globalization of democratic institutions); and the globalization of health and illness.

Before 9/11, the mood of much sociology towards this emerging world was optimistic. More recent writing has begun to emphasize militarism, war, terrorism, slavery, drugs and crime as equally important dimensions of global processes (Turner, 2007b). There is also recognition of the extent of global slavery in the modern world economy (Bales, 1999). The economic crisis of 2008–9, the credit crunch, and the growth of global recession have also forced social scientists to re-assess the shape and development of globalization. In contemporary globalization literature, there is therefore an important division between utopian versions of globalization that perceive important opportunities for global justice, human rights and cosmopolitanism, dystopian versions that emphasize the destruction of local cultures, the dominance of consumerism and the growth of international terrorism and crime, and revolutionary conclusions such as Hardt and Negri's *Empire* (2000). Global consumerism has also been criticized by George Ritzer. In his early work on McDonaldization, he had examined the negative force of rationalization on a variety of modern institutions, but he has gone further in *The Globalization of Nothing* (2003) to argue that globalization empties out culture and that global cultures are devoid of value; globalization offers us nothing. We might think of this development as a process of global gouging in which deeply rooted cultures and traditions are disembedded and devalued.

Risk, modernity and global consciousness

Some key issues around the question of modernity emerge repeatedly in the analysis of global society: what if anything has changed decisively with globalization and can conventional forms of sociology adequately conceptualize these changes? Is the concept of 'late modernity' sufficient to describe these developments? Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens have both in different ways influenced the sociology of globalization, which they understand in terms of a theory of reflexive modernization. It is often difficult to distinguish between their theories and there is in general considerable overlap between their publications. Beck published *Risk Society* in Germany in 1986 and the English translation appeared in 1992. Giddens's principal contribution to globalization theory was originally *The Consequences of Modernity* (1990) which developed theoretical ideas from *The Nation State and Violence* (1985). These

early publications were followed by attempts to address globalization directly such as his *Runaway World* (1999). Emotions and subjectivity are also influenced by processes of globalization. Giddens followed Beck and Beck-Gernsheim's *The Normal Chaos of Love* (1990), which was eventually translated in 1995, in his *The Transformation of Intimacy* (Giddens, 1992).

What does their work have in common? Neither Giddens nor Beck subscribed to the idea of 'postmodernity' as an account of the contemporary world but instead they developed ideas about late or high modernity in which global modernity is defined as a more radical version of modernity. Globalization deepens and intensifies modernity. Both are concerned to describe the experience of globalization at the level of the individual and also to analyse large-scale structural changes. Risk society is the modernization of modernity that is a radicalization and intensification of modernity's key characteristics. Risk is seen to be endemic to modernization and this risky environment consequently places a special emphasis on the importance of expert systems. Indeed Beck argues that risk creates a new type of reflexivity, which is an ongoing process of scrutiny, assessment and evaluation.

Beck's work was based on his earlier industrial sociology and on environmental debates in Germany (such as pollution in the Black Forest). Criticisms of this early work included the claim that: (1) he tends to confuse risk and hazard, and in fact does not define risk; (2) he does not clearly demonstrate its late modern features; and (3) he fails to analyse the complex interaction between risk, regulation and surveillance. We can note the growth of surveillance systems in response to risk and indeed the rise of an audit society appears to be a necessary consequence of increased risk (Power, 1997). Systems of verification and accounting appear to be inevitable consequences of an auditing culture. In support of Beck's position, it is based on real empirical research rather than theoretical speculation. It clearly identifies the negative and indeed catastrophic features of globalization and his theories are very relevant to environmental politics. Finally, he has a programme of political action, not being content merely to describe the problems of risk society. More recently he has developed his understanding of globalization by developing the idea of cosmopolitanism as a progressive culture of global society (Beck, 2006, 2008 and 2009; Beck and Grande, 2007).

Giddens defines globalization (1990: 64) as 'the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa'. More complexly, he describes the dynamic of globalization in terms of three processes: time–space distantiation, disembedding and reflexivity. His theory of globalization depends on a juxtaposition between four elements – the economic production of commodities, the surveillance and control mechanisms, the organization of violence and the extraction of resources from the environment. As a result, he describes four key institutions of modernization – capitalism, surveillance, military power and industrialism (transformation of the environment). These are in turn used to describe four dimensions of globalization – the world capitalist economy, nation-state systems, world military order and the international division of labour. Four high-risk consequences of global modernity flow from this analysis – the collapse of economic growth mechanisms, the growth of totalitarian power, nuclear conflict and finally ecological disaster.

These assumptions can be criticized on the grounds that we need a more complex periodization of globalization that takes into account long-term changes. World-system theorists, such as Wallerstein and

Chase-Dunn, argue that some processes of globalization are relatively recent, but they also claim that some aspects of globalization have been in the making for almost six hundred years. Trade during the Spanish Empire from the fifteenth century clearly made a contribution to the foundations of globalization by, for example, creating trading ports and introducing new commodities into Europe. Frank and Gills (1993) trace globalization back 5000 years. Much depends here on how much impact the luxury end of long-distance trade is thought to make on broader patterns of social change. World historians, meanwhile, have gone further in developing more subtle accounts of phases in the historical development of globalization, constructed around empires, population movement and world religions as well as trade (Hopkins, 2002). The rise and fall of empires and nation-states provides an important historical backdrop to contemporary globalization (Kennedy, 1988).

Giddens has had relatively little to say about historical and cultural aspects of globalization such as world religions. It is also not clear whether reflexivity refers to individuals or systems or both. In the approach adopted by Beck and Giddens, traditional society is, implicitly at least, non-western, and furthermore these traditional societies are not reflexive – would this judgement do justice to Confucian China, medieval Islamic Spain or classical Greece? In short, in Giddens's sociology his 'undifferentiated account of the experience of modernity is based on a universalisation of the western experience' (Loyal, 2003: 127) and consequently he fails to engage genuinely with what Pierre Bourdieu calls 'reflexive sociology', which is constantly critical of the institutional position on which it stands (Bourdieu, 1990; Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992; Shusterman, 1999).

If we compare Beck and Giddens with Bourdieu, the latter has a much stronger sense of what we would call the ethnography of the global–local encounter and a clear sense of the human miseries created by the global labour market, especially in terms of migrant experiences. Bourdieu (1999) had a better grasp of the problem of a global sociology from the perspective of marginal, dispossessed communities. Because Giddens and Beck have a weak sense of the anthropology of globalization, their work contains nothing about the ongoing destruction of aboriginal communities (for example in South America) and the resulting destruction of natural habitat that appears to be an inevitable outcome of globalization, and in general they do not engage effectively with the developing world. They have little to say about the place of Asia in the debate about emerging global cultures. Bourdieu became a profound critic of neo-liberalism because of its negative effects on public life and defended an alternative internationalism. Giddens's arguments contributed to the emergence of third-way politics, but these ideas became compromised eventually by the disappointments surrounding the legacy of the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair. Bourdieu remained relatively sceptical about the possible reform of mainstream political life and exhibited a fairly intense dislike for the United States and condemned the use of the media to promote the popularity of political figures.

Media and the information revolution

There are many theories about the causation of globalization. However, perhaps the most influential has been concerned to understand the spread of information technology, especially the Internet and its impact on finance, economic development, education and the military. As we have already noted, Marshall McLuhan in the 1960s anticipated contemporary debates in his *Understanding Media* (1964).

He argued that electronic systems of information delivery would abolish time and space; hence we are all living in a village. What are the implications of global knowledge for the economy, social networks and higher education? What the implications of new forms of pedagogy for technologies of the self?

The principal issue in the debate about the globalization of the media and information concerns their implications for a global civil society and democracy. The implications of global communication are contradictory. There are at least two contradictions. On the one hand, it creates expanded opportunities for the growth of civil society, and at the same time it creates commercial opportunities for trivialization and standardization. The aim of the commercial global media is largely to entertain, rather than educate, the public. It creates mass audiences in which the lowest common denominator determines the quality of production. The mass media are consistent with passive rather than active citizenship, because news broadcasting in particular is rarely critical or comprehensive. The second contradiction is that such media systems democratize communication, because they can overcome the issue of access (despite the digital divide), but they also corrode and contaminate the conditions by which communications can be made valuable, worthwhile and authoritative. Democratic politics have not been served adequately by the commercial media since the education of the citizen is not regarded as a priority of most broadcasting (Crick, 2000).

As we have seen, Giddens and Beck treat globalization as a recent development that was associated with the growth of the Internet and as the ‘modernization of modernity’ or ‘reflexive modernity’. Our argument is that the causes of globalization are much older and deeper, and the theoretical sources for understanding it are consequently much richer. Because the computerization of knowledge and the growth of the media are crucial developments, let us consider three social theorists in more detail who have explored information technology, the knowledge society, computerization and their effects on power/knowledge.

In this regard, Marshall McLuhan (1911–80) is in fact a much neglected social theorist. Influenced by Wyndham Lewis’s manifesto in 1911 called *Blast*, McLuhan set up the Centre for Culture and Technology in Toronto to study the social effects of new technologies. Because his works were popular and much quoted in the popular press, they were often dismissed by academic sociologists such as Daniel Bell for allegedly trivializing the issues. His catch-phrases – ‘the medium is the message’ and ‘the global village’ – offered an imaginative understanding of the social implications of print and electronic media as modes of communication, and he came to be regarded as the father of the electronic age. His media theory and the idea of the global village imaginatively captured important technological changes and their implications for teaching in universities and for education in general. He insisted that text-based knowledge required pedagogic techniques that had become obsolete in the electronic era of global communication. Technologies he argued are extensions of the body. If the book is an extension of the eye, then information media are an extension of the nervous system. We can plausibly develop a Foucauldian framework for McLuhan by asking what forms of ‘technologies of the self’ are produced by different media of knowledge and information? Media globalization for McLuhan brings to an end the linear time of modernity and creates new possibilities of time and space through information technology. The metaphor of the web to describe electronic communication illustrates perfectly well how the linear reality of the book gives way to the multiple possibilities of the web.

Daniel Bell developed the idea of post-industrialism in the 1960s and published this theory in his *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society* (1974) to describe a society in which the 'axial principle' involved the production of theoretical knowledge, the dominance of the service sector over manufacturing, the pre-eminent role of the research university in organizing and developing scientific innovations for industry, the growth of a new and powerful managerial class and the centrality of professional and technological occupations in the economy and occupational structure. Bell's work anticipated the debate about the globalization of knowledge and the dominance of IKE (information and knowledge economy) in the globalization of production. Universities are increasingly combined into global consortia that compete for science investment, postgraduate markets and international recognition. Most universities now have a globalization strategy or 'mission statement' in which they proclaim their desire to compete globally, to recruit staff and students worldwide and to create an image, ethos and reputation that are global. The globalization of management degrees, especially the MBA, and accountancy courses illustrates the competition for status and dominance in the accreditation of business professionals.

The globalization of knowledge has, however, created serious problems for those universities who saw their mission predominantly in terms of serving the local community. Research design and investment are often no longer part of a national strategy, because research professorships for example are often sponsored by large corporations, which are not primarily concerned with the local relevance of knowledge. In conjunction with these changes, the relationship between universities, states and society is also changing. At least 60 per cent of fundamental research now takes place outside the university system through research institutions that are housed in the corporate sector. Much research is conducted in association with private companies and this relationship can often seriously influence the way in which research results are published and developed. As state funding of universities declines, university faculties become increasingly dependent on (often short-term) funding from industry. Only the most prestigious private universities such as Harvard have been able to increase income through investing endowment income and donations using specialist financial advisors (Piketty 2014). Universities are also increasingly subject to globalized management systems that demand detailed accounting, transparency and surveillance. Even the architecture of the academic workplace can be influenced by these developments such as the use of shared spaces ('hot desks' and open-plan offices) in academic departments and the emphasis on the university mission statement, which inevitably says that the university has a global mission and perspective. With the globalization of neo-liberal ideas and values, the student is often seen as a customer and faculties are divisions that are subject to compliance audits.

J.-F. Lyotard (1924–98) was influential in the development of the idea of the post-modernization of knowledge, which he deployed to describe the impact of computerization on knowledge and authority in the university. New systems of knowledge would be reflexive, fragmentary and post-disciplinary. Lyotard used Bell's notion of post-industrialism to take the argument one step further. How could knowledge be effectively legitimized in a computerized society? Lyotard's postmodern questioning of legitimate knowledge (such as scepticism about what he called 'grand narratives' such as democracy and Enlightenment) raised questions about the forms of authority that a knowledge society will require. Linearity was the main organizing principle of the age of print. Print requires linear learning techniques, separate disciplines and a clear hierarchy of authority. Professorial authority is a decisive example of such a system in which professors closely guarded the authority of their respective disciplines. The idea

of queuing is a further illustration of linearity in the print age. Learning often involved an apprenticeship system in which young scholars queued to work their way through a master's programme to become accredited scholars. In contrast, webs and nets are principles of organization in global knowledge societies, in which access and exit can have many different points in the net. There are no linear or necessary principles of pedagogy – no accumulation, hierarchy or structure. Students are encouraged to mix and match. Plagiarism and simulation can no longer be easily or seriously monitored and authorship is often difficult to determine. Hence these educational systems in the contemporary knowledge society are typically post-disciplinary (Turner, 2003). Postmodern global classification would appear to be characterized by its incompleteness and instability, because categories are fluid and unstable. Knowledge is endlessly self-referential and randomness is present insofar as entry and exit points are arbitrary.

Web knowledge creates critical problems of authority – how to protect knowledge sites from theft, vandalism, fraud and force. Hence there are serious problems about the feasibility of global knowledge parks in new information systems. Insofar as we move from book cultures to a paperless global economy, how can the authenticity of knowledge be secured and underpinned? New systems that are not based on print knowledge will require new types of social systems and innovative technologies of the self. Despite these problems, there is also an argument that globalization helps to democratize knowledge. For example, Google is digitalizing millions of books from the collections of many major research libraries and these volumes will be available to download for free. While it is consistent with Enlightenment principles to make books available within the public domain, how can we protect the interests of authors? One measure is contained in the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 which supports copyright for the life of the author plus 70 years. However, most books published in the twentieth century have not yet come into the public domain and 1 January 1923 is the date when most books are subject to copyright. While Google's aims are laudatory – making knowledge accessible to the public – these legal settlements will give Google considerable power and will limit the scope of competition.

The globalization of knowledge is driven by the contradictions and competition by the conflicting interests of three elites: military, business and academics (Castells, 1996, 1997 and 1998). Some of the major developments in this field include: the emergence of ubiquitous mobile telecommunications and computing links; the consolidation of electronically integrated, global financial markets; the expansion of an interlinked, cohesive capitalist economy; the shift in the labour force from primary and manufacturing industries to knowledge, information and communication industries; and the emergence of 'real virtuality' in the hyper-texting of cultural and economic relations (Turner and Rojek, 2001). Network society was created by the competition between the elites who sought to control the new communication systems: military, business and academic. Business elites wanted to keep websites open and free in the interests of the free expansion of business and academics wanted free access to information for research reasons. While military and government elites would prefer some regulation of networks, business and academic pressure groups for very different reasons want open access. While the net creates opportunities for heterogeneous movements from global Nazi sites to women's co-operatives,

Castells argues optimistically that the net embraces two values, horizontal free communication and self-directed networking. His recent work *Networks of Outrage and Hope* (2012), draws on this argument in producing an anatomy of networked protest in the internet age.

America and empire

One persistent criticism of the theory of globalization is that globalization is in essence Americanization. This counter-argument has in recent years taken a more interesting turn, namely a debate about the existence and nature of the American Empire. This perspective has taken on a more urgent aspect as a consequence of the American intervention into Afghanistan and Iraq. What is the nature of empire in the modern world? Let us consider another analysis of America in Michael Mann's *Incoherent Empire* (2003). He claims that, especially after the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s, America has become an imperial power, and possibly the only viable global power. For Mann, the American empire is not threatened by the rise of another power or by the classical problem of over-stretched and over-extended resources. The new empire is challenged by uneven, ineffective and inappropriate power resources resulting in imperial incoherence and a failure of foreign policy. The unresolved problems of Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran and North Korea are the legacy of the Bush administration's aggressive but less than successful foreign policy.

Let us examine these four sources of power that form the analytical framework of Mann's approach. In military terms no power has the capacity to challenge or confront American superiority, despite the build-up of military investment in China and Russia. After the end of the Vietnam War in 1975, the Powell doctrine said that America should intervene overseas with overwhelming military force and minimal US casualties. The Iraq and Afghan invasions were based on this doctrine, but Mann notes that rogue states, terrorist attacks and guerrilla wars pose military problems for which American technical superiority has few relevant answers. The casualties of modern conflict are civilian not military, and nuclear shields are no defence against 9/11 strikes or Madrid bombings. American military casualties in Iraq may be unacceptable to the American public, but they are dwarfed by civilian Iraqi casualties and displaced populations. Paradoxically America does not have an enemy that is sufficiently sophisticated in technical terms with which it could appropriately engage.

In the economic sphere, Mann argues that the neoliberal revolution to free global trade has clearly worked in favour of US interests. While America has championed free trade as the mechanism for economic growth, no society has in fact ever achieved economic success on the basis of today's neo-liberal strategies. From the perspective of economic history, liberal strategies only work after a country has grown economically through protectionism by successfully taxing imports and subsidising exports – Germany and Japan being the primary examples. While America has reaped rewards from these global neo-liberal policies, it was not able directly to regulate the competing economies of the European Union, Japan or China. Worse still, the poverty and inequality produced by neo-liberalism create social conditions in which oppression, resistance and terrorism flourish. Neo-liberalism is the cause not the cure, to use Joseph Stiglitz's (2002) expression, of 'globalization and its discontents'. The economic crisis of 2008–9 has in any case raised serious questions about the underlying philosophy of deregulation and many of the major economies used Keynesian strategies of quantitative easing to re-energize market

mechanisms. The policy domain however remains divided between quasi-Keynesians and neo-liberal ideologues who have reaffirmed de-regulation and cuts to public spending in unpopular austerity programs in much of Europe.

In terms of political power, America has failed in foreign policy terms, because it cannot effectively secure the loyalty of its client states. For example, Ariel Sharon, the former Prime Minister of Israel, operated independently, often undermining the 'road map' for peace that America regarded as a necessary step towards solving the Middle East crisis. More recently, Prime Minister Netanyahu openly challenged President Obama's Middle East strategy especially with respect to a deal with Iran. Many of the political leaders of 'old Europe', especially the French government before the election of President Nicolas Sarkozy, remained recalcitrant. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have so far given America and its allies tentative political control over Kabul and Baghdad, but it is often difficult to get the full co-operation of Pakistan. After the capture and killing of Bin Laden, Pakistan has further distanced itself from American foreign policy goals. Finally, it is difficult for America to win an ideological war, because modern forms of communication, such as the global net, are deregulated and devolved. The UN remained unconvinced by arguments regarding Iraqi WMD and the legality of intervention. The American liberal press may well have been originally uncritical of the Iraq war, but global information sources about the war remained open. Furthermore, media outlets such as the Qatari-owned al-Jazeera, and *al-Quds*, the Palestinian newspaper, ensured that what Chalmers Johnson (2000), borrowing from CIA jargon, called the 'blowback effects' of American policy have been well publicized. Modern democracies find it difficult to fight sustained wars, because the body-bag count will sooner rather than later undermine public confidence. The global growth of political Islam and radical fundamentalism is in part the unintended consequence of the imperial incoherence of modern America.

The argument that globalization is simply Americanization can in fact assume a more interesting form. If America were to suffer a rapid economic crisis and downturn, the effects on the global economy would be expected to be very profound. The Global Financial Crisis that began in 2008 showed that the financial crisis centred on Wall Street and financial institutions did indeed have far-reaching consequences for the global system. Capital markets dried up as radical uncertainty undermined confidence and trust. The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and the US government's bailout of financial institutions and motor vehicle corporations were part of a process that saw the value of equity markets and pensions decline rapidly as unemployment increased (Holton, 2012). The British economy, in which the City of London has been a dominant element, was also severely compromised by these global problems.

Elsewhere, however, the impact of the US-driven financial crisis of 2008-9 was less significant. China for example, while suffering from a short-term slackening in American demand, continued to grow stimulated by a mix of domestic factors including increased capital investment, exchange rates favourable to exports, and debt finance. The largely autonomous dynamic of very recent Chinese economic history is further reflected during the mid-2015 stock market crash in China, arising in part from an unchecked domestic asset price boom and poor financial regulation. The participation of China and Japan in the global economy is not then predicated on Americanization. China's economic autonomy is reflected in largely internal sources of growth. At the time of writing (mid 2015), the negative global impact that China's financial crisis is having on the US and the rest of the world

reinforces the argument that the USA is not the only major economy capable of engendering widespread consequences for the rest of the world.

China and Japan continue to invest in American Government bonds allowing US budget deficits and quantitative easing to support recovery. Notwithstanding current crises and volatility, China, and to a lesser extent India, represent important global competitors to the US, whose economic pre-eminence is now very far from hegemonic. What is less clear is how far the creative destruction inherent in global capitalism will play out at a regional level in the twenty-first century.

Many interpretations of America as a global power draw on Marxist theories of imperialism to understand the post-communist and post-colonial world. However, early Marxist theories of 'unequal development' that emphasized core–periphery differences and explained the lack of development in the South in terms of the extraction of a surplus to the North have become increasingly untenable. While underdevelopment theory might have made some sense of the economic plight of societies such as Burma and Bangladesh, it does not provide a useful framework to understand the success of Singapore, South Korea and Japan. Export-driven industrialization by many Asian societies appears to be a successful strategy, while Latin America remained in economic terms relatively stagnant through much of the second half of the twentieth century. With the ongoing ramifications of the Global Financial Crisis and austerity, there is now a strong temptation to interpret the present in terms of the destructive nature of the capitalist system, though the mechanisms involved vary between business crises of overproduction and under-consumption and finance-centred processes of reckless lending fuelled by cheap money and deregulation.

One clear trend in the long-term evolution of the global economy (Piketty 2014), is the shift in sources of output from Western countries to Asia and the BRIC economies of Brazil, Russia, India and China. At the same time, expectations remain high in the West, and especially the USA, that decades of rising consumption can be sustained through cheap money and expanding real incomes. With the slow decline of industrial manufacturing, low domestic investment, an inflated housing market founded on cheap mortgages and increasing income inequality, it remains doubtful that a culture of private consumption, based on rising real incomes, can any longer be sustained. Meanwhile at an individual level, there has been the creation of a credit-card culture that has in turn given rise to widespread personal indebtedness (Pieterse, 2008). Growing social inequality is accompanied by the rise of a permanent underclass, child poverty and worse health outcomes for Americans than comparable groups in other countries (Wolf and Aron, 2013).

Contemporary analyses of the social and economic dilemmas of the West are in some respects built on the foundation of Bell's brilliant *The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism* of 1976 in which he studied the tensions between the traditional asceticism required by capitalist economic production and the new hedonism that appeared to be required by modern consumerism. America in the Greenspan era enjoyed falling personal taxation, a flow of easy credit and inflated real estate values. However, America's economic prosperity was not based on real gains in personal income, increases in labour productivity, growing domestic investment or technological improvements but on a strategy of borrowing against the future. There was a growing gap between the financial sector and what economists have come to call 'the real economy'.

The combination of a huge internal budget deficit and the structural problems revealed in the Global Financial Crisis has also brought into question the capacity of America to continue to exercise the largely unchallenged predatory hegemony that it had imposed in the second half of the twentieth century. Historians, such as Niall Ferguson in his *Colossus* (2004), have argued that the world system needs a global policeman. With the eventual collapse of the British Empire around the time of the First World War, America emerged at the end of the Cold War as the hegemonic guardian of the international order. For some political scientists, hegemonic America is capable of reform and repair, but hegemonic stability cannot be sustained indefinitely and in any case it produces a concentration of power that eventually prevents a clear and intelligent analysis of contemporary difficulties. Economic and global decline can produce an opportunism that is too ready to engage in risky imperial adventures and it can bring about a serious erosion of accountability. These aspects of decline were all too clearly illustrated by the Pentagon papers, the Iran–Contra episode, Watergate and the intelligence debacles in the preparation for the Iraq invasion. It is difficult to predict whether the fiscal crisis of the US state coupled with the Global Financial Crisis and decline of American economic power will be translated into declining global political leadership.

Conclusion: cosmopolitan sociology

There has been much discussion of a borderless world and of the decline of the nation-state (Urry, 2000). In association with these arguments, there has been, as we have seen, a sustained interest in the prospects of cosmopolitanism (Appiah, 2006; Beck, 2006 and 2008; Holton 2009). What little research we have suggests most people have very strong subjective ties with their local town, city or region and nation, but they do not exhibit strong cosmopolitanism (Savage et al., 2005). At best, cosmopolitanism is a minority position, though it may in many cases be combined with localism, as in the adage ‘think globally act locally’.

Yet with the current crisis around global terrorism, increasing flows of refugees and illegal immigration, there is a growing emphasis on the regulation of migration and the management of political borders. In the USA, the credit crunch has given rise to calls for greater regulation of immigration and especially illegal immigration. In contemporary Europe, EU nations are, at the time of writing, contemplating military action against people-smugglers in Libya to stop trans-Mediterranean flows of North African and Middle Eastern would-be refugees.

In recent research therefore on democracy and territory, arguments against the general notion of increasing or unrestricted mobility have emerged in the literature on globalization. In particular as a consequence of 9/11 and the acts of terrorism in Bali, Madrid, London, Istanbul and Mumbai, governments have begun to reconsider their policies towards visa restrictions and open borders. Globalization theory has given greater recognition to the fact that ‘territory and re-territorialization’ are a major form of social organization and ordering (Newman, 2006: 183). The causes of re-territorialization include the development of policies of securitization, the global terrorist threat to civil society, the re-emergence of racialism and nationalist hostility towards migrants and foreign workers, the fear of an epidemic of infectious disease and mounting hostility towards multiculturalism and cosmopolitan values. Racism in Europe and elsewhere remains a significant aspect of public life and there is a general sense

that multiculturalism as a liberal policy is in trouble. Public opinion continues to associate immigrants with crime, poverty, prostitution, disease and lawlessness. Low trust in any society produces a general sense of the offensive character of juvenile crime and vandalism. This image of incivility is generally associated with migrant communities, especially with the young men who are dislodged and alienated from the host society. By the late 1980s one-third of the prisoners in Belgium, Switzerland and France came from foreign and ethnic minority communities. As a result, the demand for new policies to control migration has become a common feature of European politics.

In the contemporary world, societies that are in the grip of such anxieties are evolving new forms of social enclosure. There is emerging in these low-trust societies a 'paradigm of suspicion' (Shamir, 2005) in which a variety of persons are thought to be dangerous and disruptive, and hence their movements need to be contained and regulated. Sociologists need to re-conceptualize globalization not as a system of endless and uncontrolled liquid mobility but as a system that also produces 'closure, entrapment and containment' (Shamir, 2005: 199). These new risk-management systems have global consequences. Freedom of movement is a resource, and the rights and capacities for mobility are unequally distributed in society. Hence there is a 'mobility gap' that is parallel to the 'information gap' and the 'digital divide'. Finally, there has been some evolution of these systems from their basic forms (walls, dykes and fences) to more complex and sophisticated systems (involving the use of forensic medicine and bio-profiling) (Turner, 2007a). But what is perhaps more remarkable is the persistence of these traditional forms of 'immurialization' into the modern period including, for example, Guantanamo Bay, which perfectly illustrates the issues of political sovereignty and 'bare life' in an emergency (Butler, 2006). Given the problems of security and terror, the growing political emphasis on securitization will throw a dark shadow over the aspiration to cultivate a cosmopolitan consciousness and may in turn limit the prospects of further democratization. We shall return to these problems in the final chapter of this collection.

We can now summarize our general orientation to Globalization Studies.

Globalization is not one but many processes, and hence it is difficult to have a single theory. There are multiple globalizations at work. In any case, globalization has contradictory effects and therefore it is unwise to have a general view about the outcomes of global developments. The globalization of disease is clearly unwelcome. Social science has tended to side with critics of globalization but most people enjoy the Internet, iPhones, travel and a more diverse diet. Conceptually we need to distinguish between internationalization and globalization. It turns out that evidence of globalization is in fact often internationalization. Too much attention is given by sociologists to culture and media. Political economy draws attention to the constraints of economic conditions and limits utopian ideas. Criticisms of neo-liberalism tend to ignore market realities. There are real limits to how far you can spend your way out of trouble. Critics of globalization as neo-liberalism tend to treat scarcity as a conspiracy of elites.

We also note various gaps in modern treatments of the subject. For example sociology has neglected globalization of law (such as human rights and legal pluralism). We have argued that globalization is not Americanization. However we cannot ignore the continuing importance of nation states (for example in global politics). The general mood of Globalization Studies in 2015 is pessimistic and for good reason – environmental crises, the collapse of Middle East States, growing tension between Europe and Russia, Chinese influence in the Pacific and much more. However, we follow Albert O. Hirschman (2013) in

believing in possibilism. In his discussion of Latin America his view was that small changes can have beneficial effects. This argument can be applied more generally to globalization and the possibility of global reform.

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