# ICPSR Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research

# **Arms Control Bureaucrats**

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### ARMS CONTROL BUREAUCRATS

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#### Part 1: Interview Respondents Variable 1; Study (2-arms control bureaucrats) Col. 1 Variable 2: Part (1-interview) Col. 2 Deck (1-raw data) Col. 3 Card (1 only) Col. 4 Variable 3: Respondent Number (001-026) Col. 5-7 Variable 4: Age Col. 8-9 Variable 5: Highest Degree Col. 10 1. bachelor 2. master 3. law 4. Ph.D. Variable 6: Field of Highest Degree Col. 11 1. engineering 2. soc. & behav. sci. 3. hard sci. & math 4. business 5. int'l. affairs education 7. other 8. operations research 9. humanities Wariable 7: Military Rank Col. 12-13 03 captain 04 major 05 lt. col. 06 col. 07 general - adm. Variable 8: FSO Class Col. 14-15 Variable 9: GS Grade Col. 16-17 Variable 10: Years of Service--Career Military Col. 18-19

Col. 20-21

Col. 22-23

Variable 11: Years of Service--Foreign Service

Variable 12: Years of Service--Civil Service

Variable	13:	Level of Organizational Posit	<u>ion</u>	Col.	24
	ACDA		State		
1. 2. 3. 4.	brandiv.	cer ch head dep. chief chief	officer department dir. of sm. o dep. dir. of lg. office	ffice	
6. 7.			dir. of sm. office dir. of lg. off. dep. asst. sec. asst. sec. under sec.		
	14: ACDA State			Col.	26
Variable (cod		Bureau nitted to protect respondents'	confidentiality)	Col.	27
		<u>Division (ACDA) - Office (Stat</u>	<del></del>	Col.	28
1. 2. 3.	SALT MBFR Test	Primary Issue Involvement  Ban than one		Col.	32
Variable	18:	Tenure in Present Position (mo	onths)	Col.	33-34
Variab1e	19:	Total Tenure in Arms Control F	Positions (Years)	Col.	35-36
Variable	20:	Feelings about Having Arms Cor	ntrol Position	Col.	37
2.	posit negat non-c				
Variable	21:	Commitment to Arms Control		Col.	38
				÷	
Variable Same		<pre>Importance of Arms Control /ariable 21.</pre>		Col.	39
Variable Same		Intellectual Interest in Arms Variable 21.	<u>Control</u>	Col.	40

 Variable 24: In Influential Position	Col. 41
Same as Variable 21.	
Variable 25: Perception of ACDA Influence Over Policy  1. mentioned as most influential 2. mentioned as influential 3. not mentioned 4. mentioned as not having influence 9. undecided	Col. 42
Variable 26: <u>Perception of State Influence Over Policy</u> Same as Variable 25.	Col. 43
Variable 27: Perception of Defence (OSD) Over Policy Same as Variable 25.	Col. 44
Variable 28: <u>Perception of Jt. Chiefs of Staff Over Policy</u> Same as Variable 25.	Col. 45
Variable 29: <u>Perception of NSC Staff Over Policy</u> Same as Variable 25.	Col. 46
Variable 30: <u>Perception of Other Influences Over Policy</u> <b>Sa</b> me as Variable 25.	Col. 47
Variable 31: Importance of Arms Control as Foreign Policy Issue  1. most important issue 2. important 3. importance only implied 4. importance not mentioned or implied 5. unimportant	Col. 48
Variable 32: <u>Basic Orientation to Arms Control</u> 1. enthusiastic 2. skeptical 3. not apparent	Col. 49
Variable 33: Attitude Toward Arms Control Changed While in Present Position  1. yes 2. no	Col. 50
Variable 34: Attitude Change Due to Experience in Postion  1. yes 5. no 6. not mentioned 7. "no" in Variable 33	Col. 51

Variable	35:	Attitude More Favorable	Col. 52	)
Same	e as	Variable 34.		
Variable	36:	Attitude More Optimistic	Col. 53	3
	more less			
6.	not i	mentioned		
7.	"no"	in Variable 34		
		More Knowledgable	Col. 54	ŀ
1. 7.		in Varable 34.		
Variable	33:	Reaction to SALT I Agreement	Col. 55	;
1.		rable without qualification		
		rable but prefer reductions rable but prefer less disparity between US & USSR	·	
4.	fayor	rable but 2 & 3 above		
		rable but with other qualifications vorable-prefer reductions		
		vorable-prefer reductions and equality in US & USSR	numbers	
Variable	39:	Preference for SALT II	Col. 56	5
		ctions 6. 1 & 3		
	equa <sup>1</sup>	lity 7. 1 & 2 & 3 itative limits 8. other		
4.	1 & 2	2 9. undecided		
. 5 <b>.</b>	2 & 3	3		
Variable	40:	Attitude Toward SALT Changed During Past Year	Col. 57	7
1.		optimistic about arms control		
2. 5.	no ci	knowledgable about arms control hange		
	othe			
Variable	41:	Preference on MBFR	Col. 58	3
		rs cuts 7. non-committal		
5.	oppos	ses cuts 9. undecided		
Variable	42:	Preference on Comprehensive Test Ban	Col. 59	)
1. 2.		r generally r with on-site inspection		
3.	favor	r with current verification means		
		se or skeptical committal		
		cided		
Variable	43:	Favors (fill in one from below) total defense expen	di-	
	•	tures as compared to recent years.	Col. 60	)
1. 2.	more less	3. about the same		
۷.	1677	9. undecided		

	Variable 44:	Favors (fill in one from below) expenditures for strategic nuclear weapons.	Col.	61
	Same as	Variable 43		
	Variable 45:	In the future, do you think the United States should be more, or less active in seeking arms control agreements with other countries than in the past?	Col.	62
	<ol> <li>disa</li> <li>unde</li> <li>agre</li> </ol>			
		The United States should launch a first-strike with nuclear weapons in some situations.	Col.	63
	Same as	Variable 45		
	·	The United States should seek a first-strike capability vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.  Variable 45	Col.	64
	Same as	variable 45		
		The United States should have more strategic weapons of all types than any other country.	Col.	65
	Same as	Variable 45		
	Variable 49:	The United States should have more of at least one of the following than any other country: launchers, warheads megatons.	<u>.</u> Col.	66
	Same as	Variable 45		
	Variable 50:	The United States should have an assured destruction capability in each of three separate weapons systems.	Col.	67
	Same as	Variable 45		
:	Variable 51:	The United States should have enough strategic weapons to deliver a highly destructive second-strike against any other country.	Col.	<b>6</b> 8
	Same as	Variable 45		
	Variable 52:	The United States should have enough nuclear weapons to do relatively more damage to another country than that country can do to the United States in a nuclear war.	<u>/</u> Col.	69
	Same as	Variable 45		
	Variable 53:	The United States should be willing to agree to multilatera (and/or bilateral) arrangements to limit increases in the number of strategic weapons.	l] Col.	70
	Same as	Variable 45		-

Variable 54: The United States should be willing to agree to multila (and/or bilateral) arrangements to reduce the present number of strategic weapons.  Same as Variable 45	col.	71
Variable 55: The United States should take unilateral measures to rethe present number of strategic weapons.  Same as Variable 45	Col.	72
Variable 56: If the United States took a small unilateral step to reits strategic weapons, the Soviet Union would probably respond by taking a similar step to reduce it strategic weapons.  Same as Variable 45	<del></del> -	73
Do you consider the deployment of each of the following desirable or undesirable? (Variables 57-63)  Variable 57: Trident  1. very desirable 2. desirable 3. undecided 4. undesirable	Col.	<b>7</b> 4
5. very undesirable  Variable 58: B-l Bomber  Same as Variable 57	Col.	75
Variable 59: Increased MIRV accuracy for greater hard-target capabil Same as Variable 57	lity Col.	76
Variable 60: Minuteman III  Same as Variable 57	Col.	77
Variable 61: <u>Poseidon</u> Same as Variable 57	Col.	78
Variable 62: Safeguard ABMs near ICBM sites (within limits of SALT I agreement)  Same as Variable 57	<u>Col.</u>	79
Variable 63: Safeguard ABMs near Washington (within limits of SALT I agreement)	<u>I</u> Col.	80
Same as Variable 57		

Part 2: OthersNot in Interview Sample (data collected from: Department of State, Biographic Register)	)epartment
Study (2-arms control bureaucrats)	Col. 1
Part (2-others, not interviewed)	Col. 2
Deck (1-raw data)	Col. 3
Card (1 only)	Col. 4
Subject number (027-088)	Col. 5-7
Repeat Variables 4-19	Col. 8-36
Part 3: Questionnaire Personality Scale	
Study (2-arms control bureaucrats)	Col. 1
Part (3-questionnaire personality scale)	Col. 2
Deck (1)	Col. 3
Card (1)	Col. 4
Subject number (001-026)	Col. 5-7
Variable 64: Most people who are not successful lack sufficient will power to succeed.	Col. 8
1. strongly disagree	
<ul><li>2. disagree</li><li>4. agree</li></ul>	
5. strongly agree	
Variable 65: Insults to one's honor should not be quickly forgotten.	Col. 9
Same as Variable 64	
Variable 66: One of the things young people need most is discipline from their parents.	Col. 10
Same as Variable 64	
Variable 67: Strong leaders are more important than laws and discussions in efforts to improve the country's situation.	Col. 11
Same as Variable 64	