Semester Project – Automn 2023

Between decideable logics: ω-automata and infinite games

With 31 Illustrations

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Remaining to be done

Introduction

Artificial neural networks are famously vulnerable to adversarial attacks [Szegedy et al., 2013, Goodfellow et al., 2014, Chen et al., 2021].

Check the papers

- defense, autoencoders
- universal, transferable attacks

Contents

Conventions

Throughout this document we adopt a set of conventions and notations.

- We use $A \subset B$ to say A is included, not strictly in B and $A \subsetneq B$ if this inclusion is strict.
- $\mathcal{X} \subset \mathbb{R}^n$ is the set in which datapoints live.
- $\mathcal{Y}$ is a space of labels, which will most of the time be categorical, i.e. $\mathcal{Y} = \{0, 1\}$ or $\mathcal{Y} = \{\text{cat}, \text{dog}, \text{boat}\}$.
- We use $\mathcal{D}$ for datasets. For unlabelled datasets, $\mathcal{D} \subset \mathcal{X}$. For labelled datasets, $\mathcal{D} \subset \mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{Y}$.
- Loss functions are denoted by $\mathcal{L}$.
- We write $\|\cdot\|$ for the euclidean norm on $\mathbb{R}^n$, and $\|\cdot\|_p$ for the p-norm on $\mathbb{R}^n$. As a reminder, for $x \in \mathbb{R}^n$, $\|x\|_\infty = \max_{i=1}^n |x_i|$.

1 Attacking classifiers

The common knowledge is that neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial attacks and adversarial attacks are easy to find [Szegedy et al., 2013, Goodfellow et al., 2014, Chen et al., 2021]. The first thing I wanted to do was to verify this in practice. Can I easily attack any classifier outside of the well defined confines of a classroom or a paper for which a lot of work was put into?

Add motivation for why I choose this (philo, impact)

1.1 Setup

I used three different models and datasets throughout this project. The code of every experiment is available at `https://github.com/ddorn/autoencoder-attacks`.

MNIST The smallest dataset I used is the MNIST dataset [LeCun et al., 1998], with a small convolutional classifier acheiving 98.8 % accuracy implemented in pytorch [Oikarinen, 2021].0

CIFAR-10 The second dataset is the CIFAR-10 dataset [Krizhevsky, 2009], with a convolutional classifier acheiving 92.8% accuracy [Germer, 2022].



Figure 1: The first 9 test images of the MNIST dataset (left) the CIFAR-10 dataset (right). The confidence of the classifier is shown in parenthesis.

ImageNet The third dataset is ImageNet [Deng et al., 2009], with a ResNet-50 classifier achieving 77 % top-1 accuracy [He et al., 2015].

1.2 Fast gradient sign method

The simplest attack is the fast gradient sign method (FGSM) [Goodfellow et al., 2014]. This attack requires only one forward and one backward pass through the network to

Figure 2: The first 9 test images of the ImageNet dataset. The confidence of the classifier is shown in parenthesis.

find a small perturbation of an image that can (potentially) fool the classifier.

What is small? We usually constrain the norm of the perturbation to a small value ε. The norm used can be the l_∞ norm, for $\varepsilon = 10/255$ or $\varepsilon = 4/255$ are common values, or the l_0, l_1 or l_2 norm. Clearly the four norms produce different constrains, and should be chosen depending on the context:

- l_∞ is a natural choice, and corresponds to changing each pixel value by at most ε.
- Using the l_0 norm means to change at most ε pixels. This can be one-pixel attacks [Su et al., 2017], attacks that change a small number of pixels, or patch attacks [Brown et al., 2017].
- l_1 and l_2 constraints can be used when it is fine if some pixels are completely changed, but not too many are changed a lot.

The fast gradient sign method is an untargeted attack, meaning that the goal is to find a perturbation that changes the prediction of the classifier, but not to force the classifier to predict a specific label. It is defined as follows.

Definition 1.1. Let f be a classifier and $x \in \mathcal{X}$ an input. The **fast gradient sign method** is the attack that computes

$$x_{\text{FGSM}} = x + \varepsilon \cdot \text{Sign}(\nabla_x \mathcal{L}(f(x), y))$$

where $\mathcal{L}$ is the loss function used to train f, and ε is the desired l_∞ norm of the perturbation.

We show an example of the attack on the first test image for each of the datasets, with the top 5 categories shown in Figure 3, Figure 4 and Figure 5.



Figure 3: Examples of the FGSM attack.



Figure 4: Examples of the FGSM attack.



Figure 5: Examples of the FGSM attack.

The attack seems to not work for the image from MNIST, but works well on the one from CIFAR10 and ImageNet. Is it the case for all images?

So I take the three classifiers, a thousand test images from each dataset, compute the gradient of the loss with respect to the input image and add $\varepsilon = 10/255$ times the sign of the gradient to the image. This gives a thousand adversarial images for each task and we can see the accuracy of the clean versus the adversarial images in Figure 6.



Figure 6: Confidence of the three classifiers in the correct label of a 1000 test images before and after an FGSM attack with $\varepsilon = 10/255$. The black line corresponds to no change in confidence.

We can see that, on agregate, it works very well on ImageNet and CIFAR10, and less well on MNIST. This can likely be attributed to the fact that images from CIFAR10 and ImageNet are larger than MNIST and with three color channels instead of one. The larger size allows for more ways to find a path towards the decision boundary. The sizes can be found in Table 1.

	MNIST	CIFAR10	ImageNet
Clean accuracy	98.9 %	92.8 %	77.2 %
Accuracy $\varepsilon = 4/255$	98.8 %	87.2 %	50.2 %
Accuracy $\varepsilon = 10/255$	98.8 %	76.8 %	28.2 %
Image size	$1 \times 28 \times 28$	$3 \times 32 \times 32$	$3 \times 256 \times 256$[1]

Table 1: Top-1 accuracy before and after FGSM attack on a thousand images.

Check that the footnote is on the same page as the figure

1.3 Iterated projected gradient descent

1.4 Universal and transferable attacks

1.5 Comparision

Conclusion Competition [Kurakin et al., 2018]

[1] ImageNet has images of different sizes, but were resized and croped to 256×256. This is different from the original paper [He et al., 2015] which used 224×224 images, but the classifier still acheives good accuracy. This design choice comes from the fact that the autoencoder used in the next section cannot take images smaller than 256×256.

2 Attacking autoencoders

Autoencoders have been suggested as a defense mechanism against adversarial attacks [?, ?, ?].

2.1 Autoencoders

Autoencoders where introduced by [Hinton and Salakhutdinov, 2006] as a way to learn a low dimensional representation of data. They are a class of neural networks that are trained to reconstruct their input, and are composed of two deep neural network, an encoder and a decoder with a bottleneck in between as shown in Figure 7.



Figure 7: Overview of the autoencoder architecture

The **encoder** takes an high dimensional data point as input, processes it through a series of layers, usually fully connected layers or a residual network [He et al., 2015] in the case of visual data, and outputs a low dimensional representation of the input.

The **decoder** takes the low dimensional output of the encoder and processes it similarly through a series of layers, and outputs a high dimensional reconstruction of the input.

The **bottleneck** is not a layer, but rather the middle of the autoencoder, where the activations are the lowest number of dimensions.

Training Autoencoders are trained to reconstruct their input, that is, they learn the identity function. The loss is a natural metric on the data space, such as the mean squared error for real valued data.

Definition 2.1. The **reconstruction loss** for an autoencoder f on an input $x \in \mathcal{X}$ is

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{recon.}}(x) = \|x - f(x)\|^2$$

To prevent overfitting and to perform a directly useful task, an autoencoder can be train to reconstruct a noisy or corrupted version of the input.

Definition 2.2. The **denoising loss** for an autoencoder f on an input $x \in \mathcal{X}$ is

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{denoising}}(x) = \|x - f(x + \varepsilon)\|^2$$

where ε is a random vector of the same dimension as x, of white noise whose variance is an hyperparmeter of the training setup.

Note that the denoising loss is stochastic, as it depends on the random vector ε. In practice, we use the compute the loss on one sample of ε per input.

Variational autoencoders An specific kind of autoencoders intruduced by are variational autoencoders (VAE). Technically, they are not very different from regular autoencoders, but they come from a different background than data compression. Indeed, the hope is that VAEs model the process from which the data was generated. Oftentimes, we expect a datapoint (for instance the image of a leaf) to be determined only by *a few* variables (for instance, the species of the tree, its age, the season, the angle at which the picture was taken etc.). We will call P, the vector of those few variables that generate the datapoint.

ref intro VAE

The encoder of a VAE tries to find some representation of P and outputs two vectors, μ and σ instead of one, which are interpreted as the mean and the variance of the prior on P, which is assumed to be a normal distribution.

The variable $P \sim \mathcal{N}(\mu, \sigma)$ are then sampled and fed to the decoder that tried to reconstruct what should be generated from the underlying variables. The decoder thus tries to model the process that generated the dataset and outputs a distribution Q over the data space.

Definition 2.3. Let f be a VAE and $x \in \mathcal{X}$ a datapoint. It loss on x is composed of two terms, the **likelyhood loss** and the **regularisation loss**.

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{vae}}(x) = \underbrace{\mathbb{P}(x \mid f(x))}_{\text{likelyhood loss}} + \underbrace{D_{\text{KL}}(P \,||\, \mathcal{N}(0,1))}_{\text{regularisation loss}}$$

Remark. The KL divergence is a measure of how different two distributions are. In this case, it is used to measure how far the prior on P is from the standard normal distribution.

$$D_{\text{KL}}(P \,||\, Q) = \int_{\mathcal{X}} P(x) \log \frac{P(x)}{Q(x)} \, \mathrm{d}x$$

Here we can use the fact that both P and Q are n-dimensional normal distributions to compute the KL divergence in closed form.

$$D_{\text{KL}}(\mathcal{N}(\mu, \sigma) \,||\, \mathcal{N}(0,1)) = \frac{-1}{2n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \left(1 + \log \sigma_i^2 - \mu_i^2 - \sigma_i^2\right)$$

Say why KL is used

2.2 Setup

I used three different autoencoders, one for each dataset and classifier.

MNIST On the MNIST dataset, I trained a small convolutional autoencoder with a bottleneck of size 3, which has reconstructs the images with an average per-pixel error of ???.

add error rate

CIFAR-10 On the CIFAR-10 dataset, I trained a medium convolutional autoencoder with a bottleneck of size ???, which has reconstructs the images with an average per-pixel error of ???.

add error rate

ImageNet On the ImageNet dataset, I used `stabilityai/sd-vae-ft-mse`, a pre-trained autoencoder from StabilityAI [Stability AI, 2023] with ??? parameters. It has a bottleneck of size ??? and reconstructs the images with an average per-pixel error of ???.

add error rate

2.3 Autoencoders as a defense mechanism

Autoencoders can be used to prevent adversarial attacks against classifier by prepocessing images through the autoencoder. The setup is shown in Figure 8.



Figure 8: Autoencoder used as a defense against adversarial attacks

The hope is that an adversarial perturbation of the input will not pass through the bottleneck of the autoencoder, and thus will not be able to fool the classifier. Indeed, the bottleneck is small, and therefore information constrained, so we expect to the autoencoder to not faithfully reconstruct patterns that it has never seen during training. In particular, we expect the latent respresentation of an adversarial input to be the same as the representation of the original input, and thus the autoencoder should reconstruct the original input when fed the adversarial one.

Maybe add a plot for distance between latent representations of clean vs adversarial

Passing the adversarial images from Table 1, through the autoencoder, we can see that the autoencoder lessens the visual noise on the images as seen in Figure 9. This

happens both because the images is compressed then decompressed, and because the autoencoders were trained to reconstruct noisy images.



Figure 9: Examples of the autoencoder defense.

Passing the image through the VAE also recovers most of the accuracy of the classifiers, as seen in **??**. However, the base accuracy, on clean images is reduced by a few percent (about 10 % for MNIST and 3 % for ImageNet). This is an instance of the tradeoff between accuracy and robustness.

However, this is a very simple baseline defense, which relies on the attacker not knowing about the autoencoder, or not having access to it, and there are attacks that work even in this case.

More sophisticated defenses can be designed, and many have been proposed. One can randomly pick an autoencoder from a pool of autoencoders, add noise to the input, take the median of output of many autoencoders, or use other compression metrics such as JPEG or reducing the precision of the image.

Add reference to the paper that does this

		Autoencoder	
		Without	In front
MNIST	Clean accuracy	98.9 %	89.1 %
	Accuracy $\varepsilon = 4/255$	98.8 %	88.9 %
	Accuracy $\varepsilon = 10/255$	98.8 %	89.0 %
ImageNet	Clean accuracy	77.2 %	74.7 %
	Accuracy $\varepsilon = 4/255$	50.2 %	72.7 %
	Accuracy $\varepsilon = 10/255$	28.2 %	69.7 %

Table 2: Accuracy of the classifier on the original and autoencoded images.

In any case, even if security through obscurity might work, it goes against Kerckhoffs's principle [Kerckhoffs, 1883], which states that a system should be secure even if the attacker knows everything about it, except the secret key. There is not a nice concept of a secret key here, but considering the autoencoder as a secret key is not a good idea, as an autoencoder is too big, with too much information about the world to be considered secret.

2.4 Attacking through autoencoders

Attacking the composition of an MNIST autoencoder and classifier

Attacking the composition of ImageNet autoencoder and classifier

2.5 Attacking the autoencoder

Attacking the ImageNet autoencoder to produce a very different image

3 Phase transition: norm detection

Conclusion

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