RFC-013: TLA+ Formal Specification

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Abstract

This RFC specifies the use of TLA+ (Temporal Logic of Actions) for formal specification and model checking of Cyberspace protocols, ensuring correctness before implementation.

Motivation

Running code is necessary but not sufficient:

- **Tests check examples:** Not all possible executions
- **Reviews check logic:** Not all interleavings
- **Bugs hide in corners:** Race conditions, edge cases

TLA+ provides:

1. **Precise specification:** Mathematical description of behavior
2. **Model checking:** Exhaustive state space exploration
3. **Proof capability:** Formal verification of properties
4. **Design tool:** Find bugs before writing code

From Lamport:

> *If you're thinking without writing, you only think you're thinking.*

Specification

TLA+ Overview

TLA+ describes systems as state machines:

```
VARIABLES state, messages, decisions

Init ==
  /\ state = [n \in Nodes |-> "idle"]
```

```
  /\ messages = {}
  /\ decisions = {}

Next ==
  \/ Propose(...)
  \/ Prepare(...)
  \/ Commit(...)
  \/ Decide(...)

Spec == Init /\ [][Next]_<<state, messages, decisions>>
```

Safety Properties

Invariants that must always hold:

```
TypeOK ==
  /\ state \in [Nodes -> {"idle", "prepared", "committed"}]
  /\ messages \subseteq Message
  /\ decisions \subseteq Value

Agreement ==
  \A n1, n2 \in Nodes:
    (decisions[n1] # {} /\ decisions[n2] # {}) =>
      decisions[n1] = decisions[n2]
```

Liveness Properties

Temporal properties about progress:

```
Termination ==
  <>(\A n \in Nodes: decisions[n] # {})

EventualConsistency ==
  []<>(\A n1, n2 \in Nodes: state[n1] = state[n2])
```

Cyberspace Protocol Specifications

Threshold Signatures (RFC-007)

```
---------------------------- MODULE ThresholdSig ----------------------------
EXTENDS Integers, FiniteSets

CONSTANTS Signers, Threshold, Script

VARIABLES signatures, verified
```

```
Init ==
  /\ signatures = {}
  /\ verified = FALSE

Sign(s) ==
  /\ s \in Signers
  /\ s \notin {sig.signer : sig \in signatures}
  /\ signatures' = signatures \union
       {[signer |-> s, script |-> Script, valid |-> TRUE]}
  /\ verified' = verified

Verify ==
  /\ Cardinality({sig \in signatures : sig.valid}) >= Threshold
  /\ verified' = TRUE
  /\ UNCHANGED signatures

Next ==
  \/ \E s \in Signers: Sign(s)
  \/ Verify

\* Safety: Never verify with insufficient signatures
Safety ==
  verified => Cardinality({sig \in signatures : sig.valid}) >= Threshold

\* Liveness: If enough sign, eventually verify
Liveness ==
  (Cardinality(Signers) >= Threshold) => <>(verified)

=============================================================================
```

Audit Trail (RFC-003)

```
---------------------------- MODULE AuditTrail ----------------------------
EXTENDS Integers, Sequences

CONSTANTS Actors, Actions

VARIABLES log, sequence

Init ==
  /\ log = <<>>
  /\ sequence = 0

Append(actor, action) ==
```

```
  /\ actor \in Actors
  /\ action \in Actions
  /\ sequence' = sequence + 1
  /\ log' = Append(log, [
       seq |-> sequence',
       actor |-> actor,
       action |-> action,
       parent |-> IF sequence = 0 THEN "genesis" ELSE log[sequence].hash
     ])

\* Invariant: Chain integrity
ChainIntegrity ==
  \A i \in 1..Len(log)-1:
    log[i+1].parent = log[i].hash

\* Invariant: Monotonic sequence
MonotonicSequence ==
  \A i \in 1..Len(log)-1:
    log[i+1].seq = log[i].seq + 1

================================================================================
```

Byzantine Consensus (RFC-011)

```
--------------------------- MODULE PBFT ---------------------------
EXTENDS Integers, FiniteSets

CONSTANTS Nodes, f, Values

ASSUME Cardinality(Nodes) >= 3*f + 1

VARIABLES
  view,
  prepares,
  commits,
  decisions

Init ==
  /\ view = 0
  /\ prepares = [n \in Nodes |-> {}]
  /\ commits = [n \in Nodes |-> {}]
  /\ decisions = [n \in Nodes |-> {}]

PrePrepare(primary, v) ==
  /\ primary = Leader(view)
```

```
  /\ v \in Values
  /\ \A n \in Nodes:
       prepares' = [prepares EXCEPT ![n] = @ \union {[view |-> view, value |-> v]}]
  /\ UNCHANGED <<view, commits, decisions>>

Prepare(n, v) ==
  /\ [view |-> view, value |-> v] \in prepares[n]
  /\ Cardinality({m \in Nodes : [view |-> view, value |-> v] \in prepares[m]}) >= 2*f + 1
  /\ commits' = [commits EXCEPT ![n] = @ \union {[view |-> view, value |-> v]}]
  /\ UNCHANGED <<view, prepares, decisions>>

Commit(n, v) ==
  /\ [view |-> view, value |-> v] \in commits[n]
  /\ Cardinality({m \in Nodes : [view |-> view, value |-> v] \in commits[m]}) >= 2*f + 1
  /\ decisions' = [decisions EXCEPT ![n] = {v}]
  /\ UNCHANGED <<view, prepares, commits>>

\* Safety: Agreement
Agreement ==
  \A n1, n2 \in Nodes:
    (decisions[n1] # {} /\ decisions[n2] # {}) =>
      decisions[n1] = decisions[n2]

================================================================================
```

Model Checking Process

1. Write Specification

Define state machine and properties.

2. Configure Model

```
CONSTANTS
  Nodes = {n1, n2, n3, n4}
  f = 1
  Values = {v1, v2}
```

3. Run TLC Model Checker

```
$ tlc PBFT.tla
TLC2 Version 2.18
...
Model checking completed. No errors found.
```

```
  States explored: 847293
  Distinct states: 12847
```

4. Analyze Counterexamples

If property violated, TLC shows trace:

```
Error: Invariant Agreement is violated.
Trace:
  State 1: <Initial>
  State 2: PrePrepare(n1, v1)
  State 3: Prepare(n2, v1)
  ...
  State 12: decisions = [n1 |-> {v1}, n2 |-> {v2}]  << VIOLATION
```

Integration with Implementation

Specification → Implementation

```
TLA+ Spec          Scheme Implementation
-----------        ---------------------
VARIABLES state    (define-record-type <state> ...)
Init ==            (define (init) ...)
Action(x) ==       (define (action x) ...)
Invariant          (assert (invariant? state))
```

Runtime Assertions

```scheme
(define (append-audit! entry)
  ;; TLA+ invariant: MonotonicSequence
  (assert (> (entry-sequence entry)
             (entry-sequence (last-entry))))
  ;; TLA+ invariant: ChainIntegrity
  (assert (equal? (entry-parent entry)
                  (entry-hash (last-entry))))
  ;; Proceed with append
  ...)
```

PlusCal (Algorithmic TLA+)

Higher-level syntax that compiles to TLA+:

```
--algorithm ThresholdSign {
  variables signatures = {}, verified = FALSE;

  process (signer \in Signers)
  {
    sign:
      signatures := signatures \union {self};
  }

  process (verifier = "v")
  {
    verify:
      await Cardinality(signatures) >= Threshold;
      verified := TRUE;
  }
}
```

Benefits

Aspect	Without TLA+	With TLA+
Design	Informal, ambiguous	Precise, mathematical
Bugs	Found in testing/production	Found before coding
Confidence	“Seems to work”	“Proven correct”
Documentation	Natural language	Executable specification
Maintenance	Risky changes	Verify changes

Limitations

- **State explosion:** Large state spaces take time
- **Learning curve:** TLA+ is different
- **Abstraction gap:** Spec ≠ implementation
- **Finite models:** Cannot check infinite systems directly

Mitigations: – Symmetry reduction – Abstraction – Proof for infinite cases

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References

1. Lamport, L. (2002). Specifying Systems: The TLA+ Language.
2. Lamport, L. (2009). The PlusCal Algorithm Language.
3. Newcombe, C., et al. (2015). How Amazon Web Services Uses Formal Methods.
4. TLA+ Tools: https://lamport.azurewebsites.net/tla/tools.html

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Changelog

- **2026-01-06** – Initial specification

Implementation Status: Proposed **Tool:** TLA+ / TLC Model Checker **Target Protocols:** RFC-003, RFC-007, RFC-011