

# RFC-008: Shamir Secret Sharing

**Status:** Implemented **Date:** January 2026 **Author:** Derrell Piper ddp@eludom.net **Implementation:** crypto-ffi.scm (shamir-split, shamir-reconstruct)

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## Abstract

This RFC specifies Shamir's Secret Sharing implementation for the Library of Cyberspace, enabling K-of-N threshold splitting and reconstruction of cryptographic keys and other secrets.

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## Motivation

Private keys are single points of failure:

- **Key loss:** Funds locked forever
- **Key theft:** Complete compromise
- **Key escrow:** Trust a third party?

Shamir's Secret Sharing provides:

1. **Threshold recovery:** Any K of N shares reconstruct
2. **Information-theoretic security:** K-1 shares reveal nothing
3. **Distributed custody:** No single holder
4. **Backup flexibility:** Geographic distribution

From Adi Shamir's 1979 paper "How to Share a Secret":

*Split a secret into N pieces such that any K pieces suffice to reconstruct, but K-1 pieces reveal absolutely nothing.*

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## Specification

### Share Record

```
(define-record-type <shamir-share>
  (make-shamir-share id threshold x y)
  shamir-share?
  (id share-id) ; Symbol: share-1, share-2, etc.
  (threshold share-threshold) ; K value
  (x share-x) ; X-coordinate (1 to N)
  (y share-y)) ; Y-coordinate (blob, same size as secret)
```

## Splitting a Secret

```
(shamir-split secret #!key (threshold 3) (total 5))
```

**Parameters:** - secret - Blob to split (any size, typically 32 or 64 bytes) - threshold - Minimum shares to reconstruct (K) - total - Total shares to create (N)

**Returns:** List of N shamir-share records

**Algorithm:** 1. For each byte of secret: - Generate K-1 random coefficients - Coefficient[0] = secret byte - Polynomial:  $f(x) = a + a x + a x^2 + \dots + a x^{K-1}$  2. Evaluate polynomial at  $x = 1, 2, \dots, N$  3. Package  $(x, f(x))$  pairs as shares

## Reconstructing a Secret

```
(shamir-reconstruct shares)
```

**Parameters:** - shares - List of at least K shamir-share records

**Returns:** Reconstructed secret blob

**Algorithm:** 1. Take first K shares 2. For each byte position: - Use Lagrange interpolation - Compute  $f(0)$  = secret byte 3. Assemble reconstructed secret

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## Galois Field Arithmetic

Operations performed in  $GF(2^8)$  with irreducible polynomial  $x^8 + x^4 + x^3 + x + 1$ :

```
(define gf256-primitive #x11b) ;  $x^8 + x^4 + x^3 + x + 1$ 
```

```
(define (gf256-mul a b)
  "Multiply in GF(2^8)"
  ...)
```

```
(define (gf256-inv a)
  "Multiplicative inverse in GF(2^8)"
  ...)
```

```
(define (gf256-poly-eval coeffs x)
  "Evaluate polynomial at x using Horner's method"
  ...)
```

$GF(2^8)$  ensures: - All operations stay within byte range - No overflow issues - Proper field properties (every non-zero element has inverse)

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## Usage Examples

### Basic Secret Splitting

```
(import crypto-ffi)

(sodium-init)

;; Create a 32-byte secret
(define secret (make-blob 32))
;; ... fill with secret data ...

;; Split into 5 shares, threshold 3
(define shares (shamir-split secret threshold: 3 total: 5))

;; Distribute shares to custodians
(print "Created " (length shares) " shares")
(print "Threshold: " (share-threshold (car shares)))
```

### Reconstruction from K Shares

```
;; Collect any 3 shares
(define collected (list share-1 share-3 share-5))

;; Reconstruct
(define reconstructed (shamir-reconstruct collected))

;; Verify
(if (equal? (blob->hex secret) (blob->hex reconstructed))
    (print "✓ Reconstruction successful!")
    (print "✗ Reconstruction failed"))
```

### Ed25519 Key Backup

```
;; Generate keypair
(define keypair (ed25519-keypair))
(define public-key (car keypair))
(define private-key (cadr keypair))

;; Split private key (5-of-7 for production)
(define key-shares (shamir-split private-key threshold: 5 total: 7))

;; Later: reconstruct and verify
(define recovered-key (shamir-reconstruct (take key-shares 5)))

;; Test: sign with recovered key
(define message "Test message")
```

```

(define signature (ed25519-sign recovered-key message))
(define valid? (ed25519-verify public-key message signature))

(if valid?
  (print "✓ Recovered key produces valid signatures!")
  (print "✗ Key recovery failed"))

```

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## Security Properties

### Information-Theoretic Security

With K-1 shares: - **No information** about secret is revealed - **Not computationally hard** - literally impossible - Even infinite compute power cannot break

This is because K-1 points determine infinitely many degree-(K-1) polynomials.

### Share Independence

Each share is uniformly random: - Looks like random bytes - No correlation between shares - Safe to store on untrusted media

### Threshold Guarantee

Exactly K shares required: - K shares: reconstruction succeeds - K-1 shares: no information - K+1 shares: still works (overdetermined)

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## Threshold Selection Guidelines

Use Case	Threshold	Total	Rationale
Personal backup	2-of-3	Simple recovery	
Team key	3-of-5	Majority required	
Organization root	5-of-7	Supermajority	
Hardware ceremony	7-of-11	High assurance	
Paranoid	11-of-15	Maximum distribution	

### Considerations

- **Availability:** Higher K = harder to recover
  - **Security:** Lower K = easier to collude
  - **Geography:** Consider time zones for ceremonies
  - **Succession:** What if custodians unavailable?
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## Share Distribution

### Physical Security

Share 1: Safe deposit box (Bank A)  
Share 2: Home safe  
Share 3: Attorney's vault  
Share 4: Trusted family member  
Share 5: Offshore location

### Digital Storage

Share 1: Hardware security module  
Share 2: Air-gapped laptop  
Share 3: Encrypted USB (passphrase protected)  
Share 4: Paper printout (secure location)  
Share 5: Tattoo (not recommended)

### Geographic Distribution

- Different jurisdictions
  - Different failure domains
  - Different time zones (for ceremonies)
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## Verification Without Reconstruction

For periodic verification that shares are intact:

```
;; Each custodian verifies their share  
(define (verify-share share expected-id expected-threshold)  
  (and (eq? (share-id share) expected-id)  
        (= (share-threshold share) expected-threshold)  
        (= (blob-size (share-y share)) expected-length)))
```

Full reconstruction should be rare: - Key rotation ceremonies - Emergency recovery - Succession events

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## Integration with Threshold Signatures

Two complementary approaches:

### Shamir for Key Backup (This RFC)

Private key → split → N shares  
Recovery: K shares → reconstruct → use key

## Multi-Signature for Governance (RFC-007)

N parties → N keys → N signatures

Verification: count valid ≥ K

**Use Shamir when:** - Backing up existing keys - Emergency recovery scenarios  
- Single key must be reconstructable

**Use Multi-Sig when:** - Ongoing governance decisions - Need audit trail of who signed - Asynchronous authorization

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## Security Considerations

### Threats Mitigated

Threat	Mitigation
Key loss	Any K shares recover
Single compromise	Need K colluding
Insider attack	Distribute to independent parties
Coercion	Geographic/jurisdictional diversity

### Threats Remaining

Threat	Notes
K colluding parties	Fundamental limitation
Poor share storage	Operational security
Side channels during reconstruction	Use secure environments
Weak random generation	Use libsodium

## Operational Security

1. **Generation:** Air-gapped machine, secure random
2. **Distribution:** Out-of-band verification
3. **Storage:** Encrypted, physically secure
4. **Reconstruction:** Secure room, witnesses
5. **Destruction:** Secure wipe after use

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## Implementation Notes

### Dependencies

- libsodium - Secure random number generation
- srfi-4 - u8vectors for byte manipulation

## Performance

- Split:  $O(N \times K \times \text{secret\_length})$
- Reconstruct:  $O(K^2 \times \text{secret\_length})$
- $\text{GF}(2)$  operations:  $O(1)$  per byte

## Limitations

- Secret size: Arbitrary (but typically  $\leq 64$  bytes)
  - Share count: Practical limit  $\sim 255$  (byte x-coordinates)
  - Threshold:  $2 \leq K \leq N$
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## References

1. Shamir, A. (1979). How to share a secret. Communications of the ACM.
  2. Blakley, G. R. (1979). Safeguarding cryptographic keys.
  3. Beimel, A. (2011). Secret-Sharing Schemes: A Survey.
  4. NIST SP 800-57. Recommendation for Key Management.
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## Changelog

- **2026-01-06** - Initial specification
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**Implementation Status:** Complete **Test Status:** Passing (test-shamir.scm)  
**Field Arithmetic:**  $\text{GF}(2)$