# Debaseonomics - incentivizers

## **Security Code Review**

https://twitter.com/VidarTheAuditor - 5 January 2021



### **Overview**

#### **Project Summary**

Project Name	Debaseonomics			
Description	Debaseonomics is a combination of Debase, a flexible supply token, working together with Degov, a governance token working together to solve issues faced by similarly designed tokens. 100% of the tokens are distributed through staking and "stabilizer pools" to promote fairness and decentralization.			
Platform	Ethereum, Solidity			
Codebase	https://github.com/debaseonomics/incentivizers			
Commits	commit 03da13d68de62e62cea6075e80a674123f5b79ef			


## **Executive Summary**

The codebase was found well defined, has proper access restrictions where needed, includes very good comments throughout a code. We have run extensive static analysis of the codebase as well as standard security assessment utilising industry approved tools.

We have found no significant issues during our review.

## **Architecture & Standards**

Architecture of the stabiliser pool is shown below. It uses the same pool concept as other Debase pools contracts.



## **Findings**

Number of contracts: 2 (+ 0 in dependencies, + 0 tests)

Number of assembly lines: 0

Use: Openzeppelin-Ownable, Openzeppelin-SafeMath

Use: Openzeppelin-Ownable, Openzeppelin-SafeMath, Openzeppelin-ERC20 ERCs: ERC20							
Name	# functions	ERCS	ERC20 info	Complex code	Features		
Incentivizer	31			No	Send ETH     Tokens interaction		

## **Static Analysis Findings**

#### High issues:

Reentrancy:

```
Recentrancy in Incentivizor.exit() (contracts/Degov-Eth-Incentivizor/Incentivizor.sol#385-358).

External calls:

- withdraw(balanceOf(esg.sender)) (contracts/Degov-Eth-Incentivizor/Incentivizor.sol#386)

- returndate = address(token).functionCall(data,SefeERC28; low-level call fniled) (node_modules/eopenzeppelin/contracts/token/E

RC28/SefeERC28.sol#29)

- y.safeTransfer(msg.sender.emount) (contracts/Degov-Eth-Incentivizor/Incentivizor.sol#377)

- (success,returndata) = target.coll(value: value)(data) (node_modules/eopenzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#119)

- getReward() (contracts/Degov-Eth-Incentivizor/Incentivizor.sol#387)

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- (success, returndata) = target.call(value: value)(data) (node_modules/eopenzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#119)

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- rewardPerTokenStord = rewardPerToken() (contracts/Degov-Eth-Incentivizor.sol#389)

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- rewards(msg.sol#380)

- getReward() (contracts/Degov-Eth-Incentivizor/Incentivizor.sol#389)

- getReward() (con
```

[Manual Check] As the getReward() function already have nonReentrant check, the exit() function should be protected as well.

After manually checking, it does not posses any risks based on our analysis. Not an issue.

#### Medium issues:

Divide before multiply:

In general, it's usually a good idea to re-arrange arithmetic to perform multiplication before division, unless the limit of a smaller type makes this dangerous.

[Manual Check] It does not possesses significant risks for the contract.

#### Low/Informational issues

#### Reentrancy:

```
Reentrancy in Incentivizer.getReward() (contracts/Degov-Eth-Incentivizer/Incentivizer.sol#340-353):

External calls:

- debase.safeTransfer(msg.sender,rewardToClaim) (contracts/Degov-Eth-Incentivizer/Incentivizer.sol#348)

State variables written after the call(s):

- rewardDistributed = rewardDistributed.add(reward) (contracts/Degov-Eth-Incentivizer/Incentivizer.sol#351)
```

[Manual Check] As the getReward() function already have nonReentrant check, the exit() function should be protected as well.

## **Dynamic Tests**

We have run fuzzing/property-based testing of Ethereum smarts contracts. It was using sophisticated grammar-based fuzzing campaigns based on a contract ABI to falsify user-defined predicates or Solidity assertions.

We found no high level issues.

#### **Automatic Tests**

We have checked the comprehensive test scripts. They validate the functionality of the contracts. All run successfully.

```
Degov/Eth Incentivizer
      Initial settings check
         Reward token should be debase
Pair token should be degov lp
Policy should be policy contract
Duration should be correct
   Basic Operation
      User/Pool Lp Limits

    User cant stake more than user 1p 1imit once (40ms)
    User cant stake more than user 1p 1imit when combined with previous user stakes (425ms)

      When Pool is disabled
              Should not be able to stake
Should not be able to withdraw
      When Pool is enabled
When pool is not rewarded balance

    ✓ Should be able to stake (205ms)
    ✓ Should have correct stake balance
    ✓ Should be able to withdraw (182ms)

          When pool is rewarded balance
              For a single user
Simple Usage
                    Claiming Maximum Balance

Should have claimable % equal to % of debase sent after reward period has elapsed
Should transfer correct amount of debase on get reward (242ms)
   Operation Under Rebases
       Simple Operation

Its reward Rate should not change after rebase
Should be able to stake (184ms)
Should be able to withdraw (179ms)
Should earn rewards
Should emit a transfer event when rewards are claimed (198ms)

             egative Rebase

Its reward Rate should not change after rebase

Should be able to stake (234ms)

Should be able to withdraw (182ms)

Should earn rewards
                                         transfer event when rewards are claimed (202ms)
       Claim maximum Balance
         Positive Rebase
                 Should have claimable % equal to % of debase sent after reward period has elapsed Pool balance should be zero after get reward (271ms)

    Should have claimable % equal to % of debase sent after reward period has elapsed
    Pool balance should be zero after get reward (247ms)
```

## **Deployment & Contract Ownership**

The contracts are not deployed yet.

They should be deployed within current security context including multi-sig wallet and governance structure.

## Disclaimer

While best efforts and precautions have been taken in the preparation of this document, the author assume no responsibility for errors, omissions, or for damages resulting from the use of the provided information. We do not guarantee the security of a smart contract or set of smart contracts and does not guarantee against attacks. One review on its own is not enough for a project to be considered secure; that state can only be earned through extensive peer review and extensive testing over an extended period of time.

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