#### The state and notions of sovereignty creates a split a split between humanity and nature. Smith 11[[1]](#footnote--1)

This contest is political because human dominion over the Earth is not, as so many assume, just a theological idea(l) justified by biblical exegesis or a secular ideology unquestioningly assumed by (supposedly self-critical) **Western** philosophical **systems**. It is also should be **understood** both in Bruno Latour’s (1993; 2004, 239) “broader metaphysical sense,” as the explicit (but never fully achievable) modernist **division of the world into** two realms—**the human and** the **nonhuman**, subjects and objects, evaluatively driven politics and the supposedly apolitical, value-free, natural sciences, and so on—and constitutionally in the narrower political sense: the modern principle of national sovereignty, for example, presumes ecological sovereignty over a specific territory (Kuehls 1996). Ecologically speaking, **competing claims to** territorial **sovereignty,** such as those concerning an Arctic seabed now increasingly bereft of its protective ice cap, **are** all **about which state gets to decide how** and when these “natural **resources” are exploited**. Of course, states may also employ ecological rhetoric in staking their claims to be responsible stewards of nature. But making **such decisions**, even if they occasionally involve distinguishing between natural resources and nature reserves, is the defining mark of ecological sovereignty, and these decisions are premised on, and expressions of, the modernist metaphysical distinction between the decisionistic politics associated with (at least some) “properly human subjects ” and the objectification of nonhuman nature as a resource. The modern constitution and its overseer, the principle of ecological sovereignty, exemplify what Agamben (2004) refers to as the “anthropological machine”—the historically variable but constantly recurring manufacture of metaphysical distinctions to separate and elevate the properly human from the less-than-fully-human and the natural world. Contesting ecological sovereignty requires that we trace connections between such metaphysical distinctions and political decisions. It requires (to employ a somewhat hackneyed phrase) yet another Copernican revolution—a decentering, weakening, and overturning of the idea/ideology of human exceptionalism. We might say that any critique of political sovereignty failing to attend to these metaphysical distinctions will be ecologically blind, whereas any ecological critique of humanist metaphysics in political isolation will be empty. For example, past environmental critiques of human dominion and debates about the merits of Earthly stewardship (White 1967; Black 1970; Passmore 1974) may have been vital catalysts for the emergence of radical ecology, but they rarely of sovereignty intact, then we automatically and continually give shelter to the notion of ecological sovereignty, and all talk of changed ecological relations is ultimately hollow. Of course, few ecologists are going to protest if a sovereign nation decides to set aside an area as a nature reserve! But the point is that this decision, which divides and rules the world for ostensibly different purposes, is plausible only if the overarching authority to make (and adapt and reverse) such all-encompassing decisions is already presumed. It **presumes human dominion and assumes that the** natural **world is already**, before any decision is even made, fundamentally **a human resource**. This is, after all, both the contemporary condition that nature is being reserved (and yet not released) from, and the original condition of that mythic prepolitical “state of nature” (epitomized in Locke’s work) where a presumptive ecological sovereignty serves as the foundational premise for an emergent political sovereignty (see chapter 3). How paradoxical, then, that the decision to (p)reserve some aspects of ecology, to maintain it in what is deemed to be its natural state, has today associated with (at least some) “properly human subjects ” and the objectification of nonhuman nature as a resource. Either way, one might say, everywhere sovereignty declares nature free, it is already in chains. And metaphysically, ecologically, and politically speaking, the claims and chains of sovereignty are all encompassing: they encircle the world. In this sense, sovereignty is an antiecological and not, as its accompanying rhetoric and its modern environmental proponents (see chapter 7) sometimes suggest, a potentially ecological principle—at least if we understand ecology as something more than, and irreducible to, a human resource, and this is radical ecology’s (but certainly not only radical ecology’s) understanding. Another way of putting this, and one that fits with the analysis of sovereignty provided by thinkers as politically diverse as Carl Schmitt, Walter Benjamin, and Giorgio Agamben, is to say that the nature reserve is the exception that decisively proves the rule—in the sense of both making tangible the dominant ideological norm a resource, freed from human domination, only by being already and always included within the remit of human domination. And according to Agamben (2004, 37), **this troubling figure of exclusion/inclusion, this** “zone of indeterminacy,” **typifies the operation of** both **sovereignty and the anthropological machine**.

The 1AC’s silence is a loaded presence – their forgetting of the non-human world ensures the replication of prevailing anthropocentric power relations **Bell and Russell 2K[[2]](#footnote-0)**

For this reason, the various movements against oppression need to be aware of and supportive of each other. In critical pedagogy, however, **the exploration of questions** of race, gender, class, and sexuality has **proceeded** so far **with little acknowledgement of the** systemic **links between human** oppressions and the **domination of nature**. The more-than-human world and human relationships to it have been ignored, as if the suffering and exploitation of other beings and the global ecological crisis were somehow irrelevant. Despite the call for attention to voices historically absent from traditional canons and narratives (Sadovnik, 1995, p. 316), **nonhuman beings are shrouded in silence**. This silence characterizes even the work of writers who call for a rethinking of all culturally positioned essentialisms. Like other educators influenced by poststructuralism, we agree that there is a need to scrutinize the language we use, the meanings we deploy, and the epistemological frameworks of past eras (Luke & Luke, 1995, p. 378). To treat social categories as stable and unchanging is to reproduce the prevailing relations of power (Britzman et al., 1991, p. 89). What would it mean, then, for critical pedagogy to extend this investigation and critique to include taken-for-granted understandings of “human,” “animal,” and “nature”? This question is difficult to raise precisely because these understandings are taken for granted. **The anthropocentric bias in** critical **pedagogy manifests itself in silence** and in the asides of texts. Since it is not a topic of discussion, it can be difficult to situate a critique of it. Following feminist analyses, we find that **examples of anthropocentrism**, like examples of gender symbolization, **occur “in** those **places where speakers reveal** the assumptions **they think they do not need to defend, beliefs they expect to share** with their audiences” (Harding, 1986, p. 112). Take, for example, Freire’s (1990) statements about the differences between “Man” and animals. To set up his discussion of praxis and the importance of “naming” the world, he outlines what he assumes to be shared, commonsensical beliefs about humans and other animals. He defines the boundaries of human membership according to a sharp, hierarchical dichotomy that establishes human superiority. Humans alone, he reminds us, are aware and self-conscious beings who can act to fulfill the objectives they set for themselves. Humans alone are able to infuse the world with their creative presence, to overcome situations that limit them, and thus to demonstrate a “decisive attitude towards the world” (p. 90). Freire (1990, pp. 87–91) represents other **animals** in terms of their lack of such traits. They **are doomed to** passively **accept** the given, **their lives** “totally determined” because their decisions belong not to themselves but to their species. Thus **whereas humans** inhabit a “world” which they create and transform and from which they can separate themselves, for animals there is only habitat, a mere physical space to which they are “organically bound.” To accept Freire’s assumptions is to believe that humans are animals only in a nominal sense. We are different not in degree but in kind, and though we might recognize that other animals have distinct qualities, we as humans are somehow moreunique. We have the edge over other creatures because we are able to rise above monotonous, species-determined biological existence. Change in the service of human freedom is seen to be our primary agenda. Humans **are** thus **cast as active agents whose** very **essence is to transform the world** – as if somehow acceptance, appreciation, wonder, and reverence were beyond the pale. This discursive frame of reference is characteristic of critical pedagogy. **The human/animal opposition** upon which it rests **is taken for granted**, its cultural **and** historical specificity **not acknowledged. And therein lies the problem**. Like other social constructions, this one derives its persuasiveness from its “seeming facticity and from the deep investments individuals and communities have in setting themselves off from others” (Britzman et al., 1991, p. 91). **This becomes the normal way of seeing the world, and** like other discourses of normalcy, it limits possibilities of taking up and confronting inequities (see Britzman, 1995). **The primacy of the human enterprise is** simply **not questioned**. Precisely how an anthropocentric pedagogy might exacerbate the environmental crisis has not received much consideration in the literature of critical pedagogy, especially in North America. Although there may be passing reference to planetary destruction, there is seldom mention of the relationship between education and the domination of nature, let alone any sustained exploration of the links between the domination of nature and other social injustices. Concerns about the nonhuman are relegated to environmental education. And since environmental education, in turn, remains peripheral to the core curriculum (A. Gough, 1997; Russell, Bell, & Fawcett, 2000), anthropocentrism passes unchallenged. 1

Rights rhetoric creates a duality in which in the inhuman animal becomes a negative mirror for the normalization of inhuman violence. **Deckha 10**[[3]](#footnote-1)

Time for a new discourse **That the human/subhuman binary continues to inhabit so much of western experience raises the question of** the continuing relevance of **anthropocentric concepts (such as “human rights”** and “human dignity”) for effective theories of justice, policy and social movements. **Instead of fighting dehumanization with humanization, a better strategy may be to minimize the human/nonhuman boundary** altogether. The human specialness claim is a hierarchical one and relies on the figure of an Other – the subhuman and nonhuman – to be intelligible. The latter groups are beings, by definition, who do not qualify as “human” and thus are denied the benefits that being “human” is meant to compel. More to the point, however, a dignity claim staked on species difference, and reliant on dehumanizing Others to establish the moral worth of human beings, will always be vulnerable to the subhuman figure it creates. This figure is easily deployed in inter-human violent conflict implicating race, gender and cultural identities as we have seen in the context of military and police camps, contemporary slavery and slavery-like practices, and the laws of war – used in these situations to promote violence against marginalized human groups. **A new discourse** of cultural and legal protections **is required to address violence against** vulnerable **humans in a manner that does not privilege humanity** or humans, nor permit a subhuman figure to circulate as the mark of inferior beings on whom the perpetration of violence is legitimate. We need to find an alternative discourse to theorize and mobilize around vulnerabilities for “subhuman” humans. This move, in addressing violence and vulnerabilities, should be productive not only for humans made vulnerable by their dehumanization, but nonhumans as well.

#### The Western ideal of autonomy the aff uses is also anthroprocentric. **Goodman 11**[[4]](#footnote-2)

Yagelski calls this "the problem of the self," *“My argument here is that* **the prevailing Western sense of the self as an autonomous,** thinking **being that exists separately from the** natural or  physical **world is** really **at the heart of the** life-threatening **environmental problems we face**”. Further, **this view of a separate self supports a** world **view that places this self at the center** of the search for truth and the at the center of the universe, **it is anthropocentric**.

Furthermore, the medical field is independently anthro, it justifies the exploitation of plants for vaccines, and the extinction of other species to prevent humans from getting sick. Perrson ‘8**[[5]](#footnote-3)**

2.3.2. Medicine **Medical benefits are** sometimes **put forth as an important reason for preservation of species**. 37 **Many of the** medical **drugs we use** today **originate from plants**. 38 In the future, these numbers are believed to increase. Most plants have never been checked for medically useful substances, 39 **and we will probably find many new** medical **drugs among wild species**. 40 Can this account for at least part of why it is seen as morally problematic to contribute to the extinction of species? The situation seems to be very similar to the one we just discussed regarding food, and most of the aspects discussed in relation to food are also applicable here. One difference is that even though the human demand for medicine is large, it is probably not as large as the demand for food, which means that both the pros and the cons of referring to medical value are smaller in scope compared to when we refer to the value of species as sources of food as an explanation for why the causing of extinction is morally problematic from an anthropocentric instrumental point of view. Another difference is that even though many medical drugs originate in wild plants, the plants are in general not utilised in the manufacturing of drugs. 41 This diminishes some aspects, but not others. The domestication and competition aspects as well as the depletion aspect that we brought up in the previous sub-section are much less of a problem when we talk about medicine. Wild species are said to be at least as important as future sources of medical drugs as they are as future sources of food. This means that protecting the basis of future evolution will also be at least as important in the medical case as in the food case. I pointed out in the introduction that our intuitions tell us that it is prima facie wrong to contribute to extermination all things considered. This leaves room for saying that there may be cases when it is acceptable or even required to contribute to extermination. This is most salient **when we deal with species that carry human diseases, like** for instance **the** black **rat** (Rattus rattus), **the** malaria carrying **mosquito** (Anopheles maculipennis and other species in the Anopheles genus), **and of course the** malaria **parasites themselves** (a number of species of the genus Plasmodium) – not to mention several kinds of bacteria. On the other hand, according to the Millennium report, a larger diversity of wildlife probably decreases the spread of many wildlife pathogens to human beings. 42 If this is correct, **it means that** even though **the battle against diseases can** in some circumstances **be an argument in favour of exterminating certain species**, it can also be an argument in favour of preserving a generally high level of biodiversity

And, anthro is epistemically suspect. Alternative forms of knowledge production are key, which makes the alternative a pre-requisite. **Das 14**[[6]](#footnote-4)

Parallax describes the apparent change in the direction of a moving object caused by alteration in the observer's position. In the graphic work of M.C. Escher, human faculties are similarly deceived and an impossible reality made plausible. While not strictly a scientific theorem, anthropocentrism, the assessment of reality through an exclusively human perspective, is deeply embedded in science and culture. **Improving knowledge requires abandoning anthro**pocentricity or, at least, acknowledging its existence. **Anthro**pocentrism's limits **derive from** the physical **constraints of** human **cognition** and specific psychological attitudes. Being human entails specific faculties, intrinsic attitudes, values and belief systems that shape enquiry and understanding. The human mind has evolved a specific physical structure and bio-chemistry that shapes thought processes. The human cognitive system determines our reasoning and therefore our knowledge. **Language**, logic, mathematics, abstract thought, **cultural** **beliefs**, history **and memories** create a specific human frame of reference, which **may restrict what we** can **know** or understand. There may be other forms of life and intelligence. The ocean has revealed creatures that live from chemo-synthesis in ecosystems around deep-sea hydrothermal vents, without access to sunlight. Life forms based on materials other than carbon may also be feasible. An entirely radical set of cognitive frameworks and alternative knowledge cannot be discounted. Like a train that can only run on tracks that determine direction and destination, **human knowledge may** ultimately **be constrained by** what **evolution** has made us. **Knowledge was** originally **driven by** the **need to master the** natural **environment** to meet basic biological needs—survival and genetic propagation. It was also needed to deal with the unknown and forces beyond human control. Superstition, religion, science and other belief systems evolved to meets these human needs. In the eighteenth century, medieval systems of aristocratic and religious authority were supplanted by a new model of scientific method, rational discourse, personal liberty and individual responsibility. But this did not change the basic underlying drivers. **Knowledge is** also **influenced by** human factors—**fear and greed**, ambition, submission and tribal collusion, altruism **and** jealousy, **as well as** complex **power relationships** and inter-personal group dynamics. Behavioural **science illustrates** the inherent **biases in human thought**. Announcing a boycott of certain "luxury" scientific journals, 2013 Nobel laureate Dr. Randy Schekman argued that to preserve their pre-eminence they acted like "fashion designers who create limited-edition handbags or suits…know[ing] scarcity stokes demand". He argued that science is being distorted by perverse incentives whereby scientists who publish in important journals with a high "impact factor" can expect promotion, pay rises and professional accolades. Understanding operates within these biological and attitudinal constraints. As Friedrich Nietzsche wrote: "every philosophy hides a philosophy; every opinion is also a hiding place, every word is a mask". **Understanding of fundamental issues remains limited.** The cosmological nature and origins of the universe are contested. The physical source and nature of matter and energy are debated. The origins and evolution of biological life remain unresolved. Resistance to new ideas frequently restricts the development of knowledge. The history of science is a succession of controversies—a non geo-centric universe, continental drift, theory of evolution, quantum mechanics and climate change. Science, paradoxically, seems to also have inbuilt limits. Like an inexhaustible Russian doll, quantum physics is an endless succession of seemingly infinitely divisible particles. Werner Heisenberg's uncertainty principle posits that human knowledge about the world is always incomplete, uncertain and highly contingent. Kurt Gödel's incompleteness theorems of mathematical logic establish inherent limitations of all but the most trivial axiomatic systems of arithmetic. Experimental methodology and testing is flawed. Model predictions are often unsatisfactory. As Nassim Nicholas Taleb observed: "You can disguise charlatanism under the weight of equations … there is no such thing as a controlled experiment." Challenging anthropocentrism does not mean abandoning science or rational thought. It does not mean reversion to primitive religious dogma, messianic phantasms or obscure mysticism. **Transcending anthro**pocentricity may allow new frames of reference expanding the boundary of human knowledge. It **may** allow human beings to think more clearly, consider different perspectives and **encourage possibilities outside** the **normal** range of experience and **thought**. It may also allow a greater understanding of our existential place within nature and in the order of things. As William Shakespeare's Hamlet cautioned a friend: "There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, than are dreamt of in your philosophy". But fundamental biology may not allow the required change of reference framework. While periodically humbled by the universe, human beings remain enamoured, for the most part, with the proposition that they are the apogee of development. But as Mark Twain observed in Letters from Earth: "He took a pride in man; man was his finest invention; man was his pet, after the housefly." Writing in The Hitchhikers' Guide to the Galaxy, the late English author Douglas Adams speculated that the earth was a powerful computer and human beings were its biological components designed by hyper-intelligent pan-dimensional beings to answer the ultimate questions about the universe and life. To date, science has not produced a conclusive refutation of this whimsical proposition. Whether or not we can go beyond anthropocentrism, it is a reminder of our limits. As Martin Rees, Professor of Cosmology and Astrophysics, at Cambridge and Astronomer Royal, noted: "Most educated people are aware that we are the outcome of nearly 4 billion years of Darwinian selection, but many tend to think that humans are somehow the culmination. Our sun, however, is less than halfway through its lifespan. It will not be humans who watch the sun's demise, 6 billion years from now. Any creatures that then exist will be as different from us as we are from bacteria or amoebae."

Anthroprocentrism is the root cause of all war and oppression, this card sights several warrants **Best 7[[7]](#footnote-5)**

While a welcome advance over the anthropocentric conceit that only humans shape human actions, the environmental determinism approach typically fails to emphasize the crucial role that animals play in human history, as well as how the human exploitation of animals is a key cause of hierarchy, social conflict, and environmental breakdown. A core thesis of what I call “animal standpoint theory” is that animals have been key driving and shaping forces of human thought, psychology, moral and social life, and history overall. More specifically, animal standpoint theory argues that the **oppression** of human over human **has** deep **roots in the oppression of human over animal**.  In this context, Charles Patterson’s recent book, The Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust, articulates the animal standpoint in a powerful form with revolutionary implications. The main argument of Eternal Treblinka is that the human **domination of animals**, such as it emerged some ten thousand years ago with the rise of agricultural society, **was the first** hierarchical **domination and laid the groundwork for patriarchy, slavery, warfare, genocide, and other** systems of **violence** and power. A key implication of Patterson’s theory is that human liberation is implausible if disconnected from animal liberation, and thus humanism -- **a** speciesist **philosophy that constructs a** hierarchal **relationship privileging** superior **humans** **over** inferior **animals** and reduces animals to resources for human use -- **collapses under** the weight of its logical **contradictions**.  Patterson lays out his complex holistic argument in three parts. In Part I, he demonstrates that animal exploitation and speciesism have direct and profound connections to slavery, colonialism, racism, and anti-Semitism. In Part II, he shows how these connections exist not only in the realm of ideology – as conceptual systems of justifying and underpinning domination and hierarchy – but also in systems of technology, such that the tools and techniques humans devised for the rationalized mass confinement and slaughter of animals were mobilized against human groups for the same ends. Finally, in the fascinating interviews and narratives of Part III, Patterson describes how personal experience with German Nazism prompted Jewish to take antithetical paths: whereas most retreated to an insular identity and dogmatic emphasis on the singularity of Nazi evil and its tragic experience, others recognized the profound similarities between how Nazis treated their human captives and how humanity as a whole treats other animals, an epiphany that led them to adopt vegetarianism, to become advocates for the animals, and develop a far broader and more inclusive ethic informed by universal compassion for all suffering and oppressed beings. The Origins of Hierarchy "As long as men massacre animals, they will kill each other" –Pythagoras It is little understood that the first form of oppression, domination, and hierarchy involves human domination over animals. Patterson’s thesis stands in bold contrast to the Marxist theory that the domination over nature is fundamental to the domination over other humans. It differs as well from the social ecology position of Murray Bookchin that domination over humans brings about alienation from the natural world, provokes hierarchical mindsets and institutions, and is the root of the long-standing western goal to “dominate” nature. In the case of Marxists, anarchists, and so many others, theorists typically don’t even mention human domination of animals, let alone assign it causal primacy or significance. In Patterson’s model, however, the **human subjugation of animals is the first form of hierarchy and** it **paves the way for** all **other systems of domination such as** include **patriarchy, racism, colonialism, anti-Semitism, and the Holocaust.** As he puts it, “**the exploitation of animals was the model** and inspiration **for** the **atrocities** people committed against each other, slavery and the Holocaust being but two of the more dramatic examples.”  Hierarchy emerged with the rise of agricultural society some ten thousand years ago. In the shift from nomadic hunting and gathering bands to settled agricultural practices, humans began to establish their dominance over animals through “domestication.” In animal domestication (often a euphemism disguising coercion and cruelty), humans began to exploit animals for purposes such as obtaining food, milk, clothing, plowing, and transportation. As they gained increasing control over the lives and labor power of animals, humans bred them for desired traits and controlled them in various ways, such as castrating males to make them more docile. **To conquer**, enslave, and claim **animals** as their own property, **humans developed** numerous **tech**nologies, **such as** pens, **cages**, collars, ropes, chains, and branding irons. The domination of animals paved the way for the domination of humans. **The sexual subjugation of women**, Patterson suggests, **was modeled after** the **domestication of animals, such that men began to control women’s reproductive capacity**, to enforce repressive sexual norms, and to rape them as they forced breeding in their animals. Not coincidentally, Patterson argues, **slavery emerged in the same region of the Middle East that spawned ag**riculture, and, in fact, developed **as an extension of animal domestication** practices. **In** areas like **Sumer, slaves were managed like livestock**, and males were castrated and forced to work along with females.  In the fifteenth century, when Europeans began the colonization of Africa and Spain introduced the first international slave markets, the metaphors, models, and technologies used to exploit animal slaves were applied with equal cruelty and force to human slaves. Stealing Africans from their native environment and homeland, breaking up families who scream in anguish, wrapping chains around slaves’ bodies, shipping them in cramped quarters across continents for weeks or months with no regard for their needs or suffering, branding their skin with a hot iron to mark them as property, auctioning them as servants, breeding them for service and labor, exploiting them for profit, beating them in rages of hatred and anger, and killing them in vast numbers – all these horrors and countless others inflicted on black slaves were developed and perfected centuries earlier through animal exploitation.  As the domestication of animals developed in agricultural society, humans lost the intimate connections they once had with animals. By the time of Aristotle, certainly, and with the bigoted assistance of medieval theologians such as St. Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, western humanity had developed an explicitly hierarchical worldview – that came to be known as the “Great Chain of Being” – used to position humans as the end to which all other beings were mere means.  Patterson underscores the crucial point that the domination of human over human and its exercise through **slavery, warfare, and genocide** typically **begin**s **with the denigration of victims**. But the means and methods of dehumanization are derivative, for speciesism provided the conceptual paradigm that encouraged, sustained, and justified western brutality toward other peoples. “Throughout the history of our ascent to dominance as the master species,” Patterson writes, “**our victimization of animals** has **served as the model** and foundation **for our victimization of each other. The study of** human **history reveals** the pattern: **first, humans exploit** and slaughter **animals; then**, they **treat** other **people like animals and do the same** to them.” Whether the conquerors are European imperialists, American colonialists, or German Nazis, western **aggressors engaged in wordplay** before swordplay, **vilifying their victims** – Africans, Native Americans, Filipinos, Japanese, Vietnamese, Iraqis, and other unfortunates – **with** opprobrious **terms such as “rats,” “pigs,”** “swine,” “**monkeys**,” “beasts,” **and “filthy animals**.”  **Once perceived as** brute beasts or **sub-humans** occupying a lower evolutionary rung than white westerners, **subjugated peoples were treated accordingly**; once characterized as animals, they could be hunted down like animals. The first exiles from the moral community, animals provided a convenient discard bin for oppressors to dispose the oppressed. The connections are clear: “For a civilization built on the exploitation and slaughter of animals, the `lower’ and more degraded the human victims are, the easier it is to kill them.” Thus, colonialism, as Patterson describes, was a “natural extension of human supremacy over the animal kingdom.” For just as humans had subdued animals with their superior intelligence and technologies, so many Europeans believed that the white race had proven its superiority by bringing the “lower races” under its command.  There are important parallels between speciesism and sexism and racism in the elevation of white male rationality to the touchstone of moral worth. **The arguments** European **colonialists used to legitimate exploiting Africans – that they were less than human** and inferior to white Europeans in ability to reason – **are the** very **same** justifications **humans use to** trap, **hunt**, confine, and kill **animals**. Once western norms of rationality were defined as the essence of humanity and social normality, by first using non-human animals as the measure of alterity, it was a short step to begin viewing odd, different, exotic, and eccentric peoples and types as non- or sub-human. Thus, the same criterion created to exclude animals from humans was also used to ostracize blacks, women, and numerous other groups from “humanity.” The oppression of blacks, women, and animals alike was grounded in an argument that biological inferiority predestined them for servitude. In the major strain of western thought, alleged rational beings (i.e., elite, white, western males) pronounce that the Other (i.e., women, people of color, animals) is deficient in rationality in ways crucial to their nature and status, and therefore are deemed and treated as inferior, subhuman, or nonhuman. Whereas the racist mindset creates a hierarchy of superior/inferior on the basis of skin color, and the sexist mentality splits men and women into greater and lower classes of beings, the speciesist outlook demeans and objectifies animals by dichotomizing the biological continuum into the antipodes of humans and animals. As racism stems from a hateful white supremacism, and sexism is the product of a bigoted male supremacism, so speciesism stems from and informs a violent human supremacism -- namely, the arrogant belief that humans have a natural or God-given right to use animals for any purpose they devise or, more generously, within the moral boundaries of welfarism and stewardship, which however was Judaic moral baggage official Christianity left behind.

The alternative is to reject the anthroprocentrism of the AFF and endorse the voluntary global suicide of humanity by universally choosing to not reproduce. – that solves. **Kochi and Ordan 8[[8]](#footnote-6)**

For some, guided by the pressure of moral conscience or by a practice of harm minimisation, **the appropriate response to** historical and contemporary **environmental destruction is** that of action guided by **abstention**. For example, one way of reacting to mundane, everyday complicity is the attempt to abstain or opt-out of certain aspects of modern, industrial society: to not eat non-human animals, to invest ethically, to buy organic produce, to not use cars and buses, to live in an environmentally conscious commune. Ranging from small personal decisions to the establishment of parallel economies (think of organic and fair trade products as an attempt to set up a quasi-parallel economy), **a typical** modern form of action **is** that of a **refusal to be complicit in** human **practices that are** violent and **destructive**. Again, **however**, at a practical level, **to what extent are such acts** of nonparticipation **rendered banal by** their **complicity in other actions**? In a grand register of violence and harm the individual who abstains from eating non-human animals but still uses the bus or an airplane or electricity has only opted out of some harm causing practices and remains fully complicit with others. One response, however, which bypasses the problem of complicity and the banality of action is to take the non-participation solution to its most extreme level. In this instance, **the only way to truly be non-complicit** in the violence of the human heritage **would be to opt-out altogether**. Here, then, the modern discourse of reflection, responsibility and action runs to its logical conclusion – **the** global **suicide of humanity – as a free-willed** and ‘final **solution**’. While we are not interested in the discussion of the ‘method’ of the global suicide of humanity per se, one method that would be the least violent is that **of humans choosing to no longer reproduce**. [10] The case at point here is that the global **suicide of humanity would** be a moral act; it would **take humanity out of the equation** of life on this earth **and remake the calculation for the benefit of everything nonhuman**. While suicide in certain forms of religious thinking is normally condemned as something which is selfish and inflicts harm upon loved ones, the global suicide of humanity would be the highest act of altruism. That is, **global suicide would involve** the **taking of responsibility for the** destructive **actions of** the **human s**pecies. By eradicating ourselves **we end** the long process of **inflicting harm upon other species** and offer a human-free world. If there is a form of divine intelligence then surely the human act of global suicide will be seen for what it is: a profound moral gesture aimed at redeeming humanity. **Such** an act **is a**n offer of **sacrifice to pay for past wrongs** that would usher in a new future. Through the death of our species we will give the gift of life to others. It should be noted nonetheless that our proposal for the global suicide of humanity is based upon the notion that **such a radical action needs to be voluntary** and not forced. In this sense, and **given the likelihood** of such an action not being agreed upon, **it operates as a** thought **experiment** which may help humans **to** radically **rethink what it means to participate in modern**, moral **life** within the natural world. In other words, **whether or not** the act of global **suicide takes place might** well **be irrelevant. What is** more **important is the** form of critical **reflection** that an individual needs to go through **before coming to the conclusion that** the **global suicide** of humanity is an action that **would be worthwhile.** **The point** then of a thought experiment that considers the argument for the global suicide of humanity **is** the attempt **to outline** an anti-humanist, or **non-human-centric ethics**. Such an ethics attempts to take into account both sides of the human heritage: the capacity to carry out violence and inflict harm and the capacity to use moral reflection and creative social organisation to minimise violence and harm. Through the idea of global suicide **such** an ethics **reintroduces a** central **question** to the heart of moral reflection: **To what extent is the value** of the continuation of **human life worth the** total **harm inflicted upon the life of** all **others?** Regardless of whether an individual finds the idea of global suicide abhorrent or ridiculous, this question remains valid and relevant and will not go away, no matter how hard we try to forget, suppress or repress it

The Role of the ballot is to vote for the debater that best rejects anthropocentric thought. This is best…

1. Critiquing anthropocentrism in educational settings is key to opening up possibilities for new forms of thought, and crucial to the ability to move past opression. **Bell and Russell 2k**[[9]](#footnote-7)

We come to critical pedagogy with a background in environmental thought and education. Of primary concern and interest to us are relationships among humans and the “more-than-human world” (Abram, 1996), the ways in which those relationships are constituted and prescribed in mo- dern industrial society, and the implications and consequences of those constructs. As a number of scholars and nature advocates have argued, the many **manifestations of the** current **environmental crisis** (e.g., species extinction, toxic contamination, ozone depletion, topsoil depletion, climate change, acid rain, deforestation) **reflect** predominant Western **concepts of nature**, nature **cast as** mindless matter, **a** mere **resource to be exploited** for human gain (Berman, 1981; Evernden, 1985; Merchant, 1980). **An ability to respond** adequately to the situation therefore **rests**, at least in part, **on a willingness to critique** prevailing **discourses about nature** and to consider alternative representations (Cronon, 1996; Evernden, 1992; Hayles, 1995). To this end, poststructuralist analysis has been and will continue to be invaluable.¶ It would be an all-too-common mistake to construe the task at hand as one of interest only to environmentalists. We believe, rather, that disrupting the social scripts that structure and legitimize the human domination of nonhuman nature is fundamental not only to dealing with environmental issues, but also to examining and challenging oppressive social arrangements. The exploitation of nature is not separate from the exploitation of human groups. Ecofeminists and activists for environ- mental justice have shown that forms of domination are often intimately connected and mutually reinforcing (Bullard, 1993; Gaard, 1997; Lahar, 1993; Sturgeon, 1997). Thus, **if** critical **educators wish to resist** various **oppressions**, part of **their project must entail calling into question**, among other things, **the** instrumental exploitive **gaze through which** we **humans distance ourselves** from the rest of nature (Carlson, 1995).¶ For this reason, the various movements against oppression need to be aware of and supportive of each other. In critical pedagogy, however, the exploration of questions of race, gender, class, and sexuality has proceeded so far with little acknowledgement of the systemic links between human oppressions and the domination of nature. The more-than-human world and human relationships to it have been ignored, as if the suffering and exploitation of other beings and the global ecological crisis were somehow irrelevant. Despite the call for attention to voices historically absent from traditional canons and narratives (Sadovnik, 1995, p. 316), nonhuman beings are shrouded in silence. This silence characterizes even the work of writers who call for a rethinking of all culturally positioned essentialisms.¶ Like other educators influenced by poststructuralism, we agree that there is a need to scrutinize the language we use, the meanings we deploy, and the epistemological frameworks of past eras (Luke & Luke, 1995, p. 378). To treat social categories as stable and unchanging is to reproduce the prevailing relations of power (Britzman et al., 1991, p. 89). What would it mean, then, for critical pedagogy to extend this investigation and critique to include taken-for-granted understandings of “human,” “animal,” and “nature”?¶ This question is difficult to raise precisely because these understandings are taken for granted. **The anthropocentric bias** in critical pedagogy manifests itself in silence and in the asides of texts. Since it is not a topic of discussion, it can be difficult to situate a critique of it. Following feminist analyses, we find that examples of anthropocentrism, like examples of gender symbolization, occur “in those places where speakers reveal the assumptions they think they do not need to defend, beliefs they expect to share with their audiences” (Harding, 1986, p. 112).¶ Take, for example, Freire’s (1990) statements about the differences between “Man” and animals. To set up his discussion of praxis and the importance of “naming” the world, he outlines what he assumes to be shared, commonsensical beliefs about humans and other animals. He defines the boundaries of human membership according to a sharp, hier- archical dichotomy that establishes human superiority. Humans alone, he reminds us, are aware and self-conscious beings who can act to fulfill the objectives they set for themselves. Humans alone are able to infuse the world with their creative presence, to overcome situations that limit them, and thus to demonstrate a “decisive attitude towards the world” (p. 90).¶ Freire (1990, pp. 87–91) represents other animals in terms of their lack of such traits. They are doomed to passively accept the given, their lives “totally determined” because their decisions belong not to themselves but to their species. Thus whereas humans inhabit a “world” which they create and transform and from which they can separate themselves, for animals there is only habitat, a mere physical space to which they are “organically bound.”¶ To accept Freire’s assumptions is to believe that humans are animals only in a nominal sense. We are different not in degree but in kind, and though we might recognize that other animals have distinct qualities, we as humans are somehow more unique. We have the edge over other crea- tures because we are able to rise above monotonous, species-determined biological existence. Change in the service of human freedom is seen to be our primary agenda. Humans are thus cast as active agents whose very essence is to transform the world – as if somehow acceptance, appreciation, wonder, and reverence were beyond the pale.¶ This discursive frame of reference is characteristic of critical pedagogy. The human/animal opposition upon which it rests is taken for granted, its cultural and historical specificity not acknowledged. And therein lies the problem. Like other social constructions, this one derives its persuasiveness from its “seeming facticity and from the deep investments individuals and communities have in setting themselves off from others” (Britzman et al., 1991, p. 91). This **becomes the normal way of seeing the world**, and like other discourses of normalcy, **it limits possibilities** of taking up and con- fronting inequities (see Britzman, 1995). The primacy of the human enter- prise is simply not questioned.¶ Precisely how an anthropocentric pedagogy might exacerbate the en- vironmental crisis has not received much consideration in the literature of critical pedagogy, especially in North America. Although there may be passing reference to planetary destruction, **there is seldom mention of the relationship between education and the domination of nature**, let alone any sustained exploration of the links between the domination of nature and other social injustices. Concerns about the nonhuman are relegated to environmental education. And since environmental education, in turn, remains peripheral to the core curriculum (A. Gough, 1997; Russell, Bell, & Fawcett, 2000), anthropocentrism passes unchallenged.1¶ p. 190-192

#### 2. As a judge, you are an educator and have an obligation to reject oppression.

**Smith ’13**[[10]](#footnote-8)

“It will be uncomfortable, it will be hard, and it will require continued effort but the necessary step in fixing this problem, like all problems, is the community as a whole admitting that such a problem with many “socially acceptable” choices exists in the first place. Like all systems of **social control**, the reality of racism **in debate is constituted by** the singular **choices that** institutions, **coaches**, and students **make** on a weekly basis. I have watched countless rounds where competitors attempt to win by rushing to **abstractions** to **distance the conversation from the** material **reality** that black **debaters** are forced to **deal with every day.** One of the students I coached, who has since graduated after leaving debate, had an adult judge write out a ballot that concluded by “hypothetically” defending my student being lynched at the tournament. Another debate concluded with a young man defending that we can kill animals humanely, “just like we did that guy Troy Davis”. **Community norms** would **have competitors** do intellectual gymnastics or **make up rules to accuse** black **debaters of breaking to escape hard conversations** but as someone who understands that experience, **the only constructive strategy is to acknowledge the reality of the oppressed**, engage the discussion from the perspective of authors who are black and brown, **and** then find strategies to **deal with the issues at hand.** It hurts to see competitive seasons come and go and have high school students and judges spew the same hateful things you expect to hear at a Klan rally. **A student should not**, when presenting an advocacy that aligns them with the oppressed, **have to justify why oppression is bad. Debate is not just a game, but a learning environment with liberatory potential.** Even if the form debate gives to a conversation is not the same you would use to discuss race in general conversation with Bayard Rustin or Fannie Lou Hamer, that is not a reason we have to strip that conversation of its connection to a reality that black students cannot escape. Current **coaches** and competitors alike **dismiss concerns of** racism and **exclusion, won’t teach other students anything** about identity in debate **other than** how **to shut down** competitors who engage in **alternative** styles and **discourses**, and refuse to engage in those discussions even outside of a tournament setting. A conversation on privilege and identity was held at a debate institute I worked at this summer and just as any theorist of privilege would predict it was the heterosexual, white, male staff members that either failed to make an appearance or stay for the entire discussion. No matter how talented they are, we have to remember that the students we work with are still just high school aged children. **If those who are responsible for participants and** the creation of accessible **norms won't risk a better future** for our community, **it becomes harder to explain to students who look up to them why risking such an endeavor is necessary.”**

3. Paradigm wars are over and the K won---scholarly consensus supports the necessity of epistemic and ontological questions as prerequisites to policy action Kurki 11**[[11]](#footnote-9)**,

This assessment by Thomas Biersteker in 1989 would surely shock many in the discipline of IR today. It would seem as if **most** **theorists** now do **actively reflect on their own philosophical presuppositions**, and that some of them, in fact, do so rather excessively. 7 Yet, this development is a hard-gained one, and a positive one. What is, again, the significance of the increased acceptance of the importance of philosophical reflection in the study of world politics? **Philosophical reflection is about** gaining understanding of **how knowledge is generated** and structured **and** what **its relationship** is **to its producer**, their social context and society at large. It is about understanding the role and structure of scientific or social knowledge: how it is constructed; what objects exist in its purview; and why and how we do (or do not) come to know our objects in specific ways. This might seem a rather abstract interest; and indeed, for many, ‘meta-theoretical’ or ‘philosophy of science’ research remains a rather abstract theoretical sub-field narrowly engaged in detailed debates on epistemology, causation or prediction. Philosophically informed IR research can, however, be much more than this. Indeed, for many of its promulgators, **philosophical research has** arguably **been** a very **politically** and socially **important**, as well as potentially influential, field of study. While most philosophically inclined analysts acknowledge that **meta-theory** is not **everything in IR**, most argue it **is of crucial significance** in the discipline. 8 This is because **it shapes** in crucial ways **how we** come to **understand the world, evaluate claims** about it **and**, indeed, **interact with it**. **Depending on whether we are a positivist or a post-structuralist**, **we** seek different kinds of data, ask different kinds of questions and come to **engage with actors differently in ‘international politics’** (which is also conceived of in different ways). 9 To use Patrick Jackson’s language: philosophical wagers matter. 10 Philosophical research is not only of significance in IR scholarship, of course. It is worth remembering that some of the most well-known philosophers of science had at the heart of their inquiries questions of values and politics. Thus, Popper and Kuhn, for example, were socially and politically driven philosophers of science; and sought through their philosophical frameworks to influence the interaction of scientific practice and societal power structures. 11 The same stands for logical positivists in the social sciences. Biersteker describes this well: European and American scholars embraced logical positivist, scientific behavioralism in the post-war era in part as a reaction against fascism, militarism, and communism. They were reacting against totalizing ideologies and sought a less overtly politicized philosophical basis for their research. Their liberalism stressed toleration for everything except totalizing ideologies, and their logical positivist scientific approaches provided what they viewed as a less politicized methodology for the conduct of social research.12 Murphy’s detailed study of the rise of behaviouralist peace studies confirms the same; the rise, in a specific context, of a specific type of meta-theoretical argumentation, which is deployed to a social and, in fact, ‘political’ effect in order to criticise recent social dynamics and to change the world in a preferable direction. 13 There is, even when it is sidestepped by scientists or philosophers themselves (as in the case of behaviouralists), a ‘politics’ to the philosophy of science, in the sense that meta-theoretical concerns are tied up with concrete social and political debates and struggles and specific normative and political visions of both science and society, even if in indirect ways.14 This ‘political’ edge of philosophical debate has not been absent in IR scholarship, and arguably it was precisely the political role of philosophies of science that critical international theory was ‘invented’ to deal with. It is important to bear in mind that when **meta-theory** emerged as an important sphere of study within IR theorising in the late 1980s and early 1990s, it was **moved to the centre ground of IR research** by a selection of key critical thinkers who politicised this area. Cox, Ashley, Ashley and Walker, Hoffman, Linklater and Steve Smith, 15 for example, argued vehemently in favour of the necessity for IR to consider its philosophy of science underpinnings **because of the** **political effects that epistemological and ontological decisions IR theorists make have on their concrete research and resultant policy proposals**. Indeed, in a famous line, Steve Smith called his epistemological work the most political of his career.16

#### 4. The more specific the education, the shorter its shelf-life – we should focus on framing questions **Echevarr 5**[[12]](#footnote-10)

Accordingly, history faces stiff competition for curriculum space from other disciplines—the political and behavioral sciences, for instance—all of which claim (more or less dubiously) to be more relevant to the task of preparing military leaders to address contemporary challenges. **The issue of relevance**, for instance, while a favorite criterion of curriculum developers, **is** often **overplayed**. As a general rule, **the greater the relevance of** any particular **knowledge, the shorter its shelf-life.** Moreover, **the problems that plague history** and allow it to be abused **are** essentially **epistemological in nature, and** thus **afflict the political** and behavioral **sciences** as well.2 Therefore, while this article focuses on the troubles underlying history, it should not be construed as an argument for replacing history with another equally troubled discipline. On the contrary, despite the faults that will be discussed here, history has much to offer. But not in the way traditionally thought.

5. Fiat is illusory and we’ll never be policy makers, so how we orient ourselves in a broad context to the rest of the world is the only thing we can carry out of the round to actually change the world in a productive fashion.

#### More links

**Kantianism**

Kantianism is anthropocentric. **Sivil 1** writes[[13]](#footnote-11)

While **Kant** did not deny that animals suffer, he **did deny that animals are** persons. Persons in this sense are understood as rational, autonomous beings, **capable of** formulating and **pursuing their own conceptions of the good**. His rule-based **deon**tology **assumed that only human beings have the ability to think rationally and, therefore, have moral standing.** Having interests in ourselves as rational beings amounted to the view that only the interests and well-being of humans count morally. Accordingly, **it was accepted that non-persons could** be used to **suit the purposes of human beings, yet it was wrong to use a person only as a means** to fulfill another person’s end, because they should always (also) be recognised as being ends in themselves. Thus human beings were viewed as superior to the rest of the non-human natural world.

**Blackness**

Their focus on liberation requires re-affirmation of a distinction between “human” and “animal” – re-entrenches specieism. **Kim 9**[[14]](#footnote-12)

**Dyson gives a** perfunctory **nod to the animal** question and **then turns to focus on** the issue of true moral significance and urgency: **racism**. It is **as if defending the humanity of Black people requires reaffirming the animality of animals, their categorical subordination**. Similarly, feminist Sandra **Kobin asks why Vick was treated more harshly than** professional **athletes who beat their wives** and girlfriends, writing: “Beat a woman? Play on; Beat a dog? You’re gone” (Kobin 2007). Kobin does not critique dog fighting for its promotion of masculinist violence or show any appreciation of the fact that women and animals are both victims of male violence. Instead, she bristles at the idea that dogs might be valued more than women and insists that women are the victims that really matter. **What is troubling** about the racial persecution narrative advanced by Vick’s defenders **is not that it is wrong** per se **but that it** subsumes, **deflects, and** ultimately **denies** the other moral question being raised, **the animal question**. Its response to the interdependency of Blackness and animalness in the white imagination is not to deconstruct both notions but rather to vigorously affirm that Blacks are human and therefore deserving of better treatment than animals. **It** is a narrative that **embraces an ideology of human supremacy in the name of fighting white supremacy** and sees no contradiction in this position. It is as if Dyson and Kobin are saying that people of color and women have the most at stake in reinscribing the impassable line between humans and animals, whereas these groups may in fact have the most at stake in its erasure. Most humans are unaccustomed to thinking about how their politics reinscribe notions of human superiority over all other species, but the notion of species-free space is as improbable as that of race-free space. **Categories of difference saturate our thinking,** our **discourse**, our experience, **and** our **actions.**

**I-Law**

ILaw is currently speciesist and commodifies nature. **Natarajan 12**[[15]](#footnote-13)

Can international law overcome past failures and address the urgent needs of those on the frontline of environmental crises? The primary barrier to sustainable development is a dominant development paradigm dependent on an infinite increase in economic growth, consumption, and production. While of Western origin, this paradigm now has almost universal influence. Western understandings of development come from value systems with deep cultural and historical roots and are difficult to change. Transformation requires, first, a better understanding of the problem and, second, viable alternatives. i) International law as the problem On the first point, while international lawyers have focused on disciplinary solutions to environmental challenges, less attention is devoted to uncovering the role of international law in creating unsustainable patterns of behaviour. Environmental issues have been relegated to the specialised field of IEL. However, **harmful assumptions about the environment lie at the heart of i**nternational **law concepts** such as sovereignty, development, property and human rights. For instance, **sovereignty** assumes certain types of control and productive use of land – a requirement that **has had significant consequences for** the range of **decisions in which postcolonial states engage. I**nternational **law** and its **institutions have** also **played an important part in** universalising and **normalising an idea of development** and political economy **wedded to** the **infinite exploitation of** natural **resources. Conceptions of property** in international law**, such as the public-private distinction and** the notion of **the commons, reflect** a particular **understanding of nature where selective aspects are commodified. The anthropocentricity of i**nternational **law**, most easily identifiable **in** the powerful **discourse of human rights**, also **plays a part in limiting** disciplinary **responses to ecological crises.** Unpacking some of these assumptions may help us think our way out of destructive development patterns.

### DnG

### Much of Deleuze and guattarian theory is based on the ideals of making animals. This act is inherently wrong as it constrains us into the anthropological machine and human-nature delineation. **Iveson 13**[[16]](#footnote-14)

Moreover, we can see that what have been thus divided are not “actual” nonhuman animals. The categories denote, that is to say, neither a zoological classification nor even what for Deleuze and Guattari constitutes the reality of nonhuman animals, as we shall see. Rather, **the three categories represent the three possible ways in which nonhuman animals might be treated** [traité], **that is, in which they might be constituted in relation to humans:** a dog can be treated as a pack, a panther can be treated as a “pet” or as a model. In short, **Oedipal, State, and demonic are not three ways of being-animal, but rather three ways in which humans may produce other animals. We are** thus **contained within an (actual** or virtual) **human domain, constrained within the anthro-tropo-logical machine** of human recognition and of the proper and improper ways of re-presenting a nonhuman being. Whether that is as a “pet” or as a “pack,” this exceptional tropological function, this uniquely **human capacity to constitute something as something, is itself symptomatic of an all too familiar human-animal discontinuity founded upon the possession of language being awarded to human animals alone.**

### Psychoanalysis

#### The method of psychoanalysis excludes animals from its discussion. This exclusion reentrenches the idea that humans are dominant over nature. **Beaulieu 11**[[17]](#footnote-15)

It is no surprise then if psychoanalysis and its familialo-humanistic approach become some of the main targets of Deleuze and Guattari‘s conception of animality. Before going any further**, let us first recall Freud‘s analysis of the Wolf** Man‘s neurotic childhood dreams, **the Rat** Man‘s obsessive thoughts, **and Little Hans**‘ phobic relations to horses. For Freud, **wolves, rats, and horses all have a familial and personal symbolic value**as he identifies them with family members, the primal scene, and personal sexual drive. Furthermore, Freud is convinced that the recognition of these animal figures as familial characters is the first step towards accomplishing the goal of resolving OEdipal conflicts. **A similar devaluation of the animal character can befound in** the writings of Jacques **Lacan**, who, in a very classical and traditional way, defines the animal by its lack of language thus impeding its experience of the mirror stage, the subject of signifier, etc. (Lacan, 2007: 75-81 and 671-702). In sum, for Freud and Lacan, **the animal must sit on the floor, not lie on the psychoanalyst‘s couch. The animal in psychoanalysis has an inferior status**. Even for Jung, who partially de-oedipianized it, the animal remains an occurrence in the imagination (dream, fantasies, etc.) that does not reach concrete reality (Deleuze & Guattari, 2005: 235-238). **Thus, psychoanalysis fails in truly conceiving of animality or of maintaining an ―animal relationship with animals**‖ that would allow the specificity of animality to be recognized. Instead, it favors a de-hierarchization of the connections between the realms of the living and sees this as a condition necessary for experiencing the becomings-animal.

**Bio-pol**

Civil society is fundamentally opposed to animals, and the human-animal divide is the foundation of modern biopolitics. **Wadiwel 8**[[18]](#footnote-16)

**The civil political sphere** – that space where human public politics occurs, where ‘the political is declared,’ often through government, representation, measured participation and the ballot - **has** inherent **limitations that frustrate** the project of **ending violence towards animals. Animals are** “by nature” always, at best, **secondary entities, not due** the **political agency** that is naturally **bestowed** up**on humans**. In this way a perceived fundamental differentiation undermines any claim for equivalent political agency between human and non human, and assures that animals, even if granted consideration, will always be owed a lesser degree of responsibility. These limitations very clearly underpin animal welfare approaches, which seek to minimise animal suffering without necessarily changing the frameworks of violence and power that perpetuate this suffering. For example, the notion that slaughter houses are tolerable once perceived pain is eliminated. Animal rights approaches often fare better in this regard by seeking to demonstrate the existence of unjustifiable speciesism in order to guarantee equal protections. One of their principle arguments is that the life that is held by both non human and human animals alike has an intrinsic value. Yet rights approaches themselves face constraints that reproduce the same fundamental differentiation – the gap – between human and non human. For instance, in the “life boat case,” Tom Reagan stops short of agreeing that the death of an animal would constitute the same harm as the death of a human (2004: 324). Recent work by the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben (see 1998, 1999 and 2004) provides an opportunity to consider the place of animals within politics from a different standpoint than other approaches, such as animal rights or animal welfare interventions. Agamben’s focus on the concept of biopolitics, his attention to the relationship of politics to violence and to legitimation and the relation between the human and the non human, make his work worthy of analysis by those interested in the violence perpetrated by humans against non human animal life, even if Agamben’s own conclusions are themselves not aimed at finding solutions to these problems (see Wadiwel, 2003). While this approach differs from animal rights or welfare strategies in that it focuses concern on the nature and meaning of politics itself and its relationship to animality (Agamben understands **the political sphere** as a space that **aims to exclude animal life as its primary activity**), this approach does not seek to promote action within the terms of the civil political space. Rather it challenges the very boundaries of this space itself. Thus, although Agamben is no champion of animal rights or welfare, his philosophy offers a different way to conceptualise “the problem of the animal.” The term “biopolitics” is taken from Michel Foucault’s description of the contemporary focus of power towards biological life, its vicissitudes, its requirements, and its essence. An example of the effect of biopower within contemporary government is the focus upon meeting the broad biological needs of human populations: today government concerns itself with the deployment of resources for education and training, public health, the facilitation of relationships and organisations, fertility and “family” planning, the management of the economy, and the generalised financial well being of populations. Where Foucault treats biopolitics as a relatively modern form of rationality, tied closely with the emergence of government and the disciplines, Agamben suggests that the connection between biopower and the political space is much more significant and enduring. According to Agamben, **biological life is given** both **place** and meaning **within** the domain of **sovereignty through** its position of **vulnerability in relation to** sovereign **power**. Following Walter Benjamin, Agamben defines the life constituted by exception as “bare life,” which he identifies as the “bearer of the link between life and law” (1998: 65). **Bare life represents life** contained **within** the “zone of indistinction” or **the sovereign** ban, a life which is neither constituted by law, nor by divine justice, **where it is licit for sovereign power to “kill without committing homicide** and without celebrating a sacrifice” (83). It is **for this reason** that Agamben insists in his definition of ‘bare life,’ that **sovereignty constitutes life within the context of** a **power over life and death**: in Agamben’s words “human life is included in the political order in being exposed to an unconditional capacity to be killed” (85). Biopolitical rationales become inseparable from the exceptional character of sovereign power, since the constitution of the political sphere itself necessarily entails the constitution of life (181). Thus, in so far as political sovereignty in the Western tradition defines itself through the capture of biological life, it is biopolitical in origin. Further, Agamben suggests that this view of political sovereignty assists to resolve the apparent tension between Foucault’s two apparently divergent foci of study: namely, “political techniques” associated with the State and government and “technologies of the self” relating to the disciplines and individuated power (5). In Agamben’s insistence that biopolitics is synonymous with the whole history of politics in the West, he identifies a process that unites the activity of state sovereignty with the evolution of individuated forms of biological control. Agamben remarks: “It can be said that the production of a biopolitical body is the original activity of sovereign power. In this sense, biopolitics is at least as old as the sovereign exception” (6). Not only does **Agamben** identify closely the relation between biology and the political sphere, but he also **identifies this** process **as constitutive of the human / animal divide**. In The Open: Man and Animal, Agamben states: “In our culture, **the** decisive **political conflict, which governs every other conflict, is** that **between** the **animality and** the **humanity** of man. **That is to say**, in its origin **Western politics is** also **biopolitics**.” (Agamben, 2004: 80). I should be clear here that is not controversial in itself that Agamben should consider animal life within his understanding of biopolitics. After all, Foucault himself was aware of the long philosophical connection between human life and that of animals that gave shape to biopower: thus Foucault states “modern man is an animal whose politics places his existence as a living being in question” (Foucault, 1998: 143). But what is interesting in relation to Agamben’s understanding is that the contestation between human and animal should figure as defining of biopolitics itself, rather than a mere feature. Biopower (or politics in the West) is, before any thing else, a question of determining the distinction between human and animal. What interests me in Agamben’s pronouncements– if we hold them as true - is the possibility not merely of telling a history of biopolitics as the history of politics in the West, but tracing the genealogy of the relationship between the human, the animal and thus the biopolitical. There is an opportunity to revisit the “primal” scenes of Western public politics in order to draw attention to the curious recurrence of the animal within the development of the human political subject, and highlighting the fact that this subject is mapped by threshold points which although operate to formally exclude animal life, also intersect, and are grounded in, the animal. **It is** after all **no coincidence**, as I shall discuss, **that Aristotle describes “[hu]man” as** the political animal; that entity that finds its home within the polis; **an animal** that is at once an animal, yet is also **beyond other animals due to its** natural **residence within political community. This** construction of the human political subject **illustrates the** necessary **biopolitical connection of the human to** its **animal** bare **existence** – its biological soul if you like – that speaks and yet does not speak at the same time as the fully formed human subject. The animal arrives as a necessary burden to the human political subject, the connection to biological life it cannot seem to shake, and in many respects, the destiny that it inescapably returns to. Below, I provide three fragments on the animal from the classical age. These fragments are not intended to provide definitive statements on the positions of these thinkers on animals. Rather they intend to highlight the curious positioning of the animal with respect to the human, and the implication of this co-deportment for politics in the Western tradition. Thus, the fragments I look at are in many respects taken for what they are; the question I pose throughout is why they are positioned in the way that they are, and in what way do they illustrate something about the intersection of animal and human life, and its relationship to politics. These intertwinings are significant, as they indicate the historical existence of an active process of dividing between the human and the animal, a process that simultaneously defines the frontiers of the civil political space. And the flow on from this intersection, as I shall discuss in the conclusion to this paper, are the inherent limitation of engaging with the civil political space when this same sphere maintains as a principle of its operation a primary exclusion of non human animal life.

### Queer Theory

#### Queer Theory fails to include the ‘non-human’ within their advocacy for social change. They ignore the conditions of factory life that causes bare life for the nonhuman animal subgroup. **Wuthmann 11**[[19]](#footnote-17)

**Discussions surrounding** what should be cared about and **what can be considered living** and worthy of moral attention **are centered around the debates of animal ethics, rights, and community formation. This thesis begins to illuminate the borders and walls that exist between disciplines (e.g. the natural sciences, queer theories, feminist ethics-of-care, and animal studies**) that **mirror the boundaries humans construct** between our lives and our deaths. While some would argue that nonhuman animals are merely animate machines that respond to stimuli, others would argue against such a view as cold and rational, favoring instead a more inclusive and less rigid circle of moral value. Humans have expanded the discussions and writings of death by exploring its ramifications in the ways that we grieve. Language is limited and oppressive in its inability to grasp the realities of the intra-connections of human life within a larger world formation. Practices such as **factory farming, animal testing, and animal exhibition** rely upon the non- or **misrepresent**ation of **animal suffering and experience**. The **anthropocentrism** and speciesism **within** certain ethics of representation, especially **queer theories, leads to the objectification** and disavowal **rather than the inclusion of animal others as individuals in relation to each other and within a community**. Rather than rely upon a sado-humanist framework of subjectivity, rights, and becoming, we can move outside of purely rationalist accounts that fail to describe and take account of animal lives and work to improve the lives of animals and others around us.

### Critical Pedagogy

#### Feminism ignores the structural delineations between humans and nature. **Bell and Russell 2k**[[20]](#footnote-18)

It would be an all-too-common mistake to construe the task at hand as one of interest only to environmentalists. We believe, rather, that **disrupting the social scripts that structure and legitimize the human domination of nonhuman nature is fundamental not only to dealing with environmental issues, but also to examining and challenging oppressive social arrangements**\. The exploitation of nature is not separate from the exploitation of human groups. Ecofeminists and activists for environmental justice have shown that forms of domination are often intimately connected and mutually reinforcing (Bullard, 1993; Gaard, 1997; Lahar, 1993; Sturgeon, 1997). Thus, if critical educators wish to resist various oppressions, part of their project must entail calling into question, among other things, the instrumental exploitive gaze through which we humans distance ourselves from the rest of nature (Carlson, 1995). For this reason, the various movements against oppression need to be aware of and supportive of each other. In critical pedagogy, however, **the exploration of questions of race, gender, class, and sexuality has proceeded** so far **with little acknowledgement of the systemic links between human oppressions and the domination of nature**. The more-than-human world and human relationships to it have been ignored, as if the suffering and exploitation of other beings and the global ecological crisis were somehow irrelevant. Despite the call for attention to voices historically absent from traditional canons and narratives (Sadovnik, 1995, p. 316), **nonhuman beings are shrouded in silence. This silence characterizes even the work of writers who call for a rethinking** of all culturally positioned essentialisms.

### Oil

#### The never-ending search for oil makes spills inevitable— we will keep trying to solve. Irvine 09[[21]](#footnote-19)

**Because we all use oil and other petroleum products, we all share the blame for making birds and marine animals vulnerable to oil spills. It is easy to point at the oil companies. But they are merely extracting and delivering a product we all demand** in greater amounts, and at prices we deem affordable. Ac**cidental spills will inevitably occur**, and **some of these will be on a major scale. In a spill, we face a moral imperative to remedy the damage for which we are responsible**. How to remedy the damage without causing more-intentionally or otherwise-is the next big question. **We make birds and animals vulnerable by moving petroleum across the globe.** The least we can do is ensure that our efforts to save them do not also put them at risk.

### Race/Gender

#### The 1ac’s attention is on exposing discriminatory assumptions but the attention needs to be towards the exploitation of the nonhuman world. **Fox 95**[[22]](#footnote-20)

Moving on to illustrate the assumption of human self-importance in the larger scheme of things, we can see that this **assumption** shows through, for example, **in those prescientific views** that **saw humans as dwelling at the center of the universe**, as made in the image of God, **and as occupying a position well above the “beasts**” and just a little lower than the angels on the Great Chain of Being. And while the development of modern science, especially the Copernican and Darwinian revolutions, swerved to sweep these views aside – or at least those aspects that were open to empirical refutation – it did no such thing to the human-centered assumptions that underlay these views. Francis **Bacon** for example, **saw science as “enlarging the bounds of Human Empire”; Descartes** likewise **saw it as rendering us the “masters and possessors of nature**.” Approximately three and a half centuries later, Neil Armstrong’s moon walk – the culmination of a massive, politically directed, scientific and technological development effort – epitomized both the literal acting out of this vision of “enlarging the bounds of Human Empire” and the literal expression of its anthropocentric spirit: Armstrong’s moon walk was, in his own words at the time, a “small step for him but a “giant leap for Mankind.” Back here on earth, **we find that even those philosophical, social**, and political **movements of modern times most concerned with exposing discriminatory assumptions have typically confined their interests to the human realm**, that is, to issues to do **with imperialism, race, socioeconomic class, and gender. When attention is finally turned to the exploitation by humans of the nonhuman world, our arguments for the conservation and preservation of the nonhuman world continue to betray anthropocentric assumptions. We argue that nonhuman world should be conserved or preserved because of its use value to humans** (e.g., its scientific, recreational, or aesthetic value) rather than for its own sake or for its use value to nonhuman beings. **It cannot be emphasized enough that the vast majority of environmental discussion** – whether in the context of public meetings, newspapers, popular magazines, reports by international conservation organizations, reports by government instrumentalities, or even reports by environmental groups – **is couched with these anthropocentric terms of reference**. Thus even **many of those who deal most directly with environmental issues continue to perpetuate**, however unwittingly, **the arrogant assumption that we humans are central to the cosmic drama**; that, essentially, the world is made for us. John Seed, a prominent nonanthropocentric ecological activist, sums up the situation quite simply when he writes, “**the idea that humans are the crown of creation, the source of all value, the measure of all things, is deeply embedded in our culture and consciousness.”**

## AT: Perm

### AT: Perm do both

#### The aff is the exact kind of compromised politics that we kritik – they cannot both reject their anthropocentric discourse when simultaneously doing a plan that takes nature as a commodity

#### the perm at best is severance which is an independent reason to reject the aff

### Cards (insert into analytics if needed)

#### All the neg has to do is win the link argument – if the aff links that means they are promoting the anthropocentric mindset, means they can’t solve the K and perm is impossible.

Papadopoulos 10(Dr. Dimitris Papadopoulos, teaches politics, culture and organization at the School of Management, University of Leicester. 2010, ephemera, Vol. 10 “Insurgent posthumanism”, http://www.ephemerajournal.org/contribution/insurgent-posthumanism)

It is true that left politics have largely ignored the complexity and unpredictability of the entanglement between a deeply divided society and that of a deeply divided nonhuman world. The principle avenue for social transformation, at least in the main conceptualisations of the political left[[3]](http://www.ephemerajournal.org/contribution/insurgent-posthumanism" \l "_ftn3" \o "), passes through seizing the centres of social and political power. The dominant motivation for left politics after the revolutions of 1848 (and definitely since 1871) has been how to conquer institutional power and the state. Within this matrix of radical left thinking the posthumanist moment becomes invalidated, subsumed to a strategy focused solely on social power. But here I want to argue that a post-humanist gesture can be found at the heart of processes of left political mobilisations that create transformative institutions and alternatives. This was the case even when such moves were distorted at the end, neutralised or finally appropriated into a form of left politics solely concerned with institutional representation and state power. What such an appropriation conceals is that a significant part of the everyday realities put to work through radical left struggles have always had a strong posthumanist character through their concentration on remaking the mundane material conditions of existence beyond and outside an immediate opposition to the state. In what follows I will try to excavate this posthumanist gesture from the main narratives of radical left political struggles along the following three fault lines: the first is about the exit from an alienated and highly regulated relation to the material, biological and technological realms through the making of a self-organised common world – a move from enclosed and separated worlds governed by labour to the making of ecological commons. A second posthumanist move is one that attacks the practice of politics as a matter of ideas and institutions and rehabilitates politics as an embodied and everyday practice – an exit from the representational mind to the embodiment of politics. Finally, the third, involves the decentring of the human subject as the main actor of history making. History is a human affair but it is not made (only) by certain groups of humans – a move towards a post-anthropocentric history.

#### The perm either links or it severs because the affs anthropocentric view dominates how we view the world and in both senses are a reason to reject the perm.

Goodman **11** (Benny Goodman – Professor of Sociology, Plymouth University -- Transformation for health and sustainability: “consumption is killing us” – 2011)

It is arguably the case that the anthropocentric view dominates in Western thought, making us incapable of making the interconnections between the stars, the external cosmos of the myriad galaxies, the internal human physiological cosmos, the ecosphere, the biosphere, and ourselves. We then delude ourselves when we think that we are separate entities, that we are able to control for our own benefit that which we are actually a part of. Thus we have triumphed over nature controlling it for our own ends resulting in the magnificence of cities such as New York, which have become our own natural habitat. This comes at a cost. We are unable to see systemically, inter-connectedly or interdependently. The separation between humanity and ecosphere is complete within consumer capitalism in its delivery of the dreams of avarice.

**Fiating the plan means adopting a frame of mind. Anthropocentrism cannot be abolished through the state – only a complete shift without the state can solve**

Bonnett 02 [Michael, lecturer at University of Cambridge, He is widely published in the field of philosophy of education and is currently writing a book on the philosophy of environmental education. He is also exploring the values implicit in modern information and communications technology and their impact on thinking and understanding, “Sustainability as a Frame of Mind-and How to Develop It,”

The Trumpeter 18.1, http://trumpeter.athabascau.ca/index.php/trumpet/article/view/115/120]//AA

So, why recommend the move from policy to frame of mind? There are two main reasons. The first has been well rehearsed elsewhere,[2](#2) and refers to arguments that demonstrate that despite its broad appeal (indeed, in many ways because of it) the notion of sustainable development as a policy is highly problematic, being heavily contested and subject to internal contradictions and severe epistemological difficulties. The second reason is more positive. At the heart of any notion of education for sustainable development must lie a certain frame of mind involving some idea of a right relationship with nature, since without this a severely impoverished notion of human utility would become the criterion of sustainability. Focusing on this “nature-orientated” frame of mind offers the possibility of both contributing to the clarification of sustainable development as an idea, and of identifying something which is of great educational importance in its own right, for in many ways our underlying relationship with nature defines both ourselves and our relationship with the world as a whole.[3](#3) What, then, are the key features of sustainability as a frame of mind? The following seem central. It involves a genuine (poetic) receptive-responsive openness to, and concern for, nature conceived in its most general sense as the non-human, self-originary aspects of the world. Of course, nature can be conceived in numerous ways—such as “the great order of things” (whether it be conceived in biophysical or spiritual terms), as wilderness, as that which is innate, as that which is wholesome (natural), and so forth—but it seems to me that informing our paradigmatic senses of nature is the notion of that which is other in the sense of being experienced as somehow self-arising. In this sense nature is construed less as an objective realm than as a dimension of human awareness—understood as independent of the human will, but not necessarily unaffected by it.[4](#4) For example, in the case of our own bodies—which clearly can be affected by our choices and actions—we maintain our health by working with powers of which we are not the author and that are beyond our ability to transform. There is a nature, an integrity, recognized as external to our will with which we have to find a harmony. It is neither purely anthropocentric nor bio-centric in essence. Recognizing that the non-human (as well as the human) only shows up in the context of human concerns and practices, nature is thus human-related but neither human-authored nor at human disposal. This places humankind authentically as neither the lord of beings nor as something simply to be subsumed to some greater ecological whole, but as the occasioner of things and thus bearing certain responsibilities towards them which also constitute an element of our own good. Though it cannot matter in the slightest to biophysical nature whether humankind survives—some equilibrium will always be established, with or without us—nature only has significance in that space which is human consciousness, or its equivalent. Thus, there is an important sense in which sustainability as a frame of mind is not a bolt-on option but an integral element of authentic human awareness. Though now fairly systematically overridden, it is internal to the very event of being conscious at the human level. For example, it is rooted in the notion of truth and its centrality to human being. Truth—as our awareness of things disclosing themselves and our sense of the fittingness of the language which both facilitates and expresses this (le mot juste)—lies at the heart of human consciousness. In constituting a celebration of what is, relatively unsubverted by external instrumental motives, the pure sustaining nature of consciousness in this mode is also the essence of sustainability as a concern to let things be (as they are in themselves, including their cultural dimensions)—truly to safeguard, to preserve, to conserve. Clearly, this is quite a different sense of sustainability to that which seeks to sustain in order to have ready to hand a resource that may be required for some further development (such as economic growth). Its development will require, above all, a radical re-evaluation and re-positioning of the calculative motives and understandings that dominate modern Western consciousness and society. That is to say that it will require the development of (and partly a retrieval of) a different metaphysics. Otherwise we risk the likelihood of preoccupying pupils with symptoms masquerading as causes. (For example, measuring pollutant levels and devising scientific remedies rather than addressing the underlying motives and conceptions embedded in social practices which give rise to pollution.) Only a thorough—if gradual—disruption of currently prevalent motives can clear a space for a more poetic re-appropriation of nature and of ourselves. Now if such an account is to serve as a basis for thinking about how to develop sustainability as a frame of mind, certain elements in it require further elaboration and refinement. First, poetic should not be equated with passive. We appropriate nature and ourselves not only through abstract reflection and aesthetic contemplation, but in our making and in the intimate details of our sundry daily transactions with our environment. Some aspects of this point will be developed below in a discussion of the notion of attentiveness, but it also means that while the impact of particular—in a sense, elevated—experiences may be seminal, poetic response is also constituted by day-to-day practices and action strategies which implicitly reflect the desire to disclose, conserve, and safeguard things, to respect the intuitions provided by sensuous contact, and to properly acknowledge natural rhythms and processes. Second, this account takes issue with the notion of seeking a frame of mind that will bring about sustainability, on the grounds that such an approach makes the frame of mind subservient to some highly contentious further goal. Rather, it invites us to consider that sustainability can itself be conceived as a frame of mind—and one which is of the essence of human being and, therefore, of human well-being. Obviously, this opens it to the criticism that we do not know whether the frame of mind advocated would, in fact, bring about ecological sustainability. But the central point here is that if sustainability as a frame of mind is essential to human flourishing, its desirability is not ultimately dependent on whether it will lead to ecological sustainability. (Though given its fundamental motive to reveal and safeguard things in their own nature, it is difficult to think that it would not at least contribute to this.) Rather, its achievement, in some degree, is what gives point to the achievement of ecological sustainability and, as such, should define its character. Without it, sustained human life would be so impoverished as to be of little worth—either to itself or in its revealing of nature. Third, it seems to me that one of the issues that this account raises is the notion of an environmental ethic—its character, its justification, and its transmission in an educational context. For example, should we be seeking to articulate an ethic towards nature as a whole, which in some way either parallels or is an extension of, say, the ethic of respect for persons? On the view expressed in this paper, the character of any such environmental ethic would differ from traditional ethics because it would have a different metaphysical basis: it would deal with open, many-faceted, mysterious things rather than pre-defined, tightly categorized, thoroughly knowable objects; that is, it would work in, create, and sustain a world revealed in this way. In a number of ways, Freya Mathews expresses something of this in her emphasis on a self-realizing “ecocosm” as the ground of human existence,[5](#5) and so too, does Richard Smith (if I understand him rightly) with his focus on the idea of “attentiveness” in human perception.[6](#6) But, in my view, while both approaches are valuable for what they criticize, they suffer a certain weakness in what they assert: they make unsubstantiated assumptions about certain key values; that is, their accounts involve a tacit environmental ethic. Taking each in turn, and very briefly, Matthews’ notion of the “ecological self” which identifies with the rest of the cosmos as a system of nested, self-realizing entities, of which it is a product and by which it is sustained, advocates a strong, indeed, submersing, sense of interconnectedness with nature and feeling of eros towards it. This is claimed to be a logical extension of our natural self-love once we recognize “the involvement of wider wholes in our identity,”[7](#7) and thus we are held to flourish when we live in a way that affirms the eco-system in which we are nested and all others flourish. On my reading of Smith, he understandably wishes to avoid the mysticism involved in views such as this while retaining something of the essence of their attitude towards nature. He speaks of “attentiveness” as a mode of relating to things in which the demands of “the insistent, selfish ego” are put aside and in which we exercise patience and are determined to see things justly—qualities exhibited by the craftsman who has developed a feel for his material. In such attentiveness, according to Smith, the small contingent details of ordinary life and the natural world are properly respected—in a certain sense, loved. Such attunement with the world requires no mystical merging of mind with nature but involves acting in accordance with the internal goods of an activity, that which constitutes the genuine mutual flourishing of self and nature. Now it seems to me that there are valuable insights in both of these accounts, but that ultimately they succeed only if we subscribe to the unsubstantiated values that are implicit in them. In my view, in the first case we should not so subscribe, and in the second we should—when their origins are revealed. The problem with Matthews’ view is that despite the semblance of strong eco-centrism, ironically, it is only plausible on an anthropocentric base. The reason for this is simple: There is no state of the ecosystem that favours all its constituents. The flourishing of some involves the decline of others, and her argument can constrain us only to identify with those parts of the greater whole which we perceive to support us and not, for example, the malaria bacillus or the HIV virus. Smith’s more phenomenological view has the problem of showing why “attentiveness” should respond to some simpatico with nature rather than other “internal goods” of an activity, such as the sense of elegance of battery farming as a solution to the problem of efficient food production. What is needed here is, I believe, the kind of metaphysical underpinning that the view which started this paper attempts to provide, namely, a poetic apprehension in which that which is currently withdrawn is allowed to show itself, where the inchoate and the strange (as central elements of nature as the self-originary) are acknowledged and allowed to stand, and we participate in things in their many-sidedness and intrinsic mystery. This contrasts starkly with that attitude of mind in which everything is subjected to the quest for total (and therefore sightless) transparency through complete objective classification, such that things in their sheer presencing are constantly turned into mere instances of more general categories. Something of this might be put to us by, say, Van Gogh’s painting of the rush seat chair. Here we are invited to experience the chair not merely as an instance of something you sit on, or a chair of a certain sort as in a catalogue, but as this chair in its own immediacy, its unique and vibrant standing there, into which we may be drawn and in which we may participate. Parallel (and further) points could be made about his sunflowers, the cornfield, the trees outside Saint Remy Asylum, and others. The environmental ethic we seek must be one in which perception and action become apt to things themselves. An ethic not of rules but of receptive response, where discernment is given priority over definition. So how might sustainability as a frame of mind best be developed? Looking at the school curriculum as a whole, Stables and Scott have suggested that it would be a mistake to attempt to erect sustainability as an additional cross-discipline entity based on some implausible holistic conception of an appropriate frame of mind and its developmental needs.[8](#8) They prefer a more piecemeal, post-modern approach which eschews any such grand narrative in favour of developing sustainability within the perspectives that existing school disciplines have to offer. Given that we are not in a position to regenerate the education system (including teachers’ expertise and attitudes) from scratch, this would also seem to be far more realizable in practice. However, in the light of the points made above, the following two reservations arise. First, is not this within-discipline approach susceptible to an unhelpful conservatism? Does it take proper account of the danger of motives inherent in a discipline (including its own critical procedur es) which (remembering that many disciplines were rooted in a cultural milieu whose dominant aspiration was to conquer and exploit the natural world), may be covertly hostile to nature and therefore set up eco-problems in a way that conceals its own contribution to them. This will hardly be exposed by reflexive techniques within that discipline. The “primary agenda of the discipline” sometimes may need to be altered. Second, does not the within-discipline account trade on an ambiguity? Its plausibility as a realistic approach rests in playing to the established loyalties and strengths of practitioners within the disciplines, but “ examining the various ways in which each discipline construes, and has construed, the human-nature relationship”[9](#9) sounds to have more the character of a meta-disciplinary examination. This is likely to be just as unfamiliar and uncomfortable for subject-loyal teachers as an external education for sustainability framework. It is, of course, an interesting point as to how far a particular discipline may incorporate its own meta enquiry, but it is rarely a feature of disciplines as taught at school. To criticize a within-disciplinary approach in this way, however, is not to be committed to some holistic (in the sense of globalizing) alternative, as is perhaps sometimes assumed, with varying degrees of plausibility, by the idea of cross-curricular themes. (It also carries with it the danger of a certain eco-fascism.) It is true that many eco-related (including our understandings of nature) issues occur and must be dealt with in a piecemeal way, there being no obvious overarching objective logic to link them. From the perspective that I am developing, this is an entirely healthy state of affairs—genuine openness to situations is not enhanced by seeking to impose all-embracing systematic conceptualizations. Precisely the opposite. Nonetheless, a certain underlying posture, a certain frame of mind, which can lend such piecemeal understandings and actions a certain consistency, is required. There is a certain ethical holism in the sense that they can be sensed as somehow fitting and compatible—as, say, might be involved in feeling anger at both the assault of a young child and the vandalism of an insignificant tree. It may be argued that there is a converse ethical holism involved in anthropocentrism—exemplified in extreme form by the Nazi goal of dominating both humans and nature.[10](#10) Parallel reservations about conditioning by inherent values can be voiced in relation to the democratic approach to teaching environmental issues advocated by the Environment and School Initiatives program (ENSI).[11](#11) This long-running European project is opposed to teachers promoting environmentalist attitudes (environmentalism), advocating instead that pupils exercise their own rationality through practically addressing local environmental issues in collaboration with their local community, thus developing what can be called action competence. The problem with this is the faith put in rationality, and it arises at two levels. First, can education afford to be procedurally neutral when so many other powerful influences in modern western society are not? In a social-economic-political climate that privileges consumerism and the free market how pure is the rationality of pupils and other agents in local decision-making likely to be? Indeed, (and this is the second point) are there not motives and values embedded in rationality itself that prejudice the perception and evaluation of environmental issues and which may actually be a (now invisible) contributor to the environmental problem? In the light of the critiques of Heidegger and others, many have come to appreciate that modern rationality is itself not neutral: it expresses certain aspirations towards the world, notably to classify, explain, predict, assess, control, possess, and exploit it. Arguably, it is precisely the ascendancy of such rationality that has led to our current environmental predicament. (A rationality, by the way, that can be perceived to be instantiated in the new global medium for thinking and the broadcast of understanding—networked hypermedia. But that is a further argument!) The upshot of such points is to cast a shadow over ENSI’s highly democratic strategy. They also invite the further question of the adequacy of even pure rationality to address environmental issues, which frequently involve

### AT: Anthropocentrism Inevitable

**Our ethic is driven by powerful biological imperatives for emapthy across the species line. Evolutionary forces challenge the inevitability of the anthropocentric mindset—hold their inevitability claims suspect  
Olson 7** (Gary Olson is a Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science at Moravian College, 10/16/2007, “NEUROSCIENCE AND MORAL POLITICS: Chomsky’s Intellectual Progeny”, Bennett Gilliam)

The nonprofit Edge Foundation recently asked some of the world’s most eminent scientists, “What are you optimistic about? Why?” In response, the prominent neuroscientist Marco Iacoboni cites the proliferating experimental work into the neural mechanisms that reveal how humans are “wired for empathy.” Iacoboni’s optimism is grounded in his belief that, with the popularization of scientific insights, these recent findings in neuroscience will seep into public awareness and “. . . this explicit level of understanding our empathic nature will at some point dissolve the massive belief systems that dominate our societies and that threaten to destroy us.” (Iacoboni, 2007, p. 14). While there are reasons to remain skeptical (see below) about the progressive political implications flowing from this work, a body of impressive empirical evidence reveals that the roots of prosocial behavior, including moral sentiments such as empathy, precede the evolution of culture. This work sustains Noam Chomsky’s visionary writing about a human moral instinct, and his assertion that, while the principles of our moral nature have been poorly understood, “we can hardly doubt their existence or their central role in our intellectual and moral lives.” (Chomsky, 1971, n.p., 1988; 2005, p. 263). The emerging field of the neuroscience of empathy parallels investigations being undertaken in cognate fields. Some forty years ago the celebrated primatologist Jane Goodall observed and wrote about chimpanzee emotions, social relationships, and “chimp culture,” but experts remained skeptical. A decade ago, the famed primate scientist Frans B.M. de Waal (1996) wrote about the antecedents to morality in *Good Natured: The Origins of Right and Wrong in Humans and Other Animals*, but scientific consensus remained elusive. All that’s changed. As a recent editorial in the journal *Nature* (2007) put it, it’s now “unassailable fact” that human minds, including aspects of moral thought, are the product of evolution from earlier primates. According to de Waal, “You don’t hear any debate now.” In his more recent work, de Waal plausibly argues that human morality—including our capacity to empathize—is a natural outgrowth or inheritance of behavior from our closest evolutionary relatives. Studies have shown that empathy is present in very young children, even at eighteen months of age and possibly younger. In the primate world, Warneken and colleagues at the Max Planck Institute at Leipzig, Germany, recently found that chimps extend help to unrelated chimps and unfamiliar humans, even when inconvenienced and regardless of any expectation of reward. This suggests that empathy may lie behind this natural tendency to help and that it was a factor in the social life of the common ancestor to chimpanzees and humans at the split some six million years ago (*New Scientist*, 2007; Warneken and Tomasello, 2006). It’s now indisputable that we share moral faculties with other species (de Waal, 2006; Trivers, 1971; Katz, 2000; Gintis, 2005; Hauser, 2006; Bekoff, 2007; Pierce, 2007). Pierce notes that there are “countless anecdotal accounts of elephants showing empathy toward sick and dying animals, both kin and non-kin” (2007, p. 6). And recent research in Kenya has conclusively documented elephant’s open grieving/empathy for other dead elephants. We know from neuroscientific empathy experiments that the same affective brain circuits are automatically mobilized upon feeling one’s own pain and the pain of others. Through brain imaging, we also know that separate neural processing regions then free up the capacity to take action. As Decety notes, empathy then allows us to “forge connections with people whose lives seem utterly alien from us” (Decety, 2006, p. 2). Where comparable experience is lacking, this “cognitive empathy” builds on the neural basis and allows one to “actively project oneself into the shoes of another person” by trying to imagine the other person’s situation (Preston, in press), Preston and de Waal (2002). Empathy is “other directed,” the recognition of the other’s humanity. Cohen and Rogers, in parsing Chomsky’s critique of elites, note that “Once an unjust order exists, those benefiting from it have both an interest in maintaining it and, by virtue of their social advantages, the power to do so.” (Cohen, 1991, p. 17) (For a concise but not uncritical treatment of Chomsky’s social and ethical views, see Cohen, 1991.) Clearly, the vaunted human capacity for verbal communication cuts both ways. In the wrong hands, this capacity is often abused by consciously quelling the empathic response. When de Waal writes, “Animals are no moral philosophers,” I’m left to wonder if he isn’t favoring the former in this comparison. (de Waal, 1996b, n.p.) Third, for many people the basic incompatibility between global capitalism and the lived expression of moral sentiments may become obvious for the first time. (Olson, 2006, 2005) For example, the failure to engage this moral sentiment has radical implications, not the least being consequences for the planet. Within the next 100 years, one-half of all species now living will be extinct. Great apes, polar bears, tigers and elephants are all on the road to extinction due to rapacious growth, habitat destruction, and poaching. These human activities, not random extinction, will be the undoing of millions of years of evolution (Purvis, 2000). As Leakey puts it, “Whatever way you look at it, we’re destroying the Earth at a rate comparable with the impact of a giant asteroid slamming into the planet. . .” And researchers at McGill University have shown that economic inequality is linked to high rates of biodiversity loss. The authors suggest that economic reforms may be the prerequisite to saving the richness of the ecosystem and urge that “. . . if we can learn to share the economic resources more fairly with fellow members of our own species, it may help to share ecological resources with our fellow species.” (Mikkelson, 2007, p. 5) While one hesitates imputing too much transformative potential to this emotional capacity, there is nothing inconsistent about drawing more attention to inter-species empathy and eco-empathy. The latter may be essential for the protection of biotic communities. Decety and Lamm (2006, p. 4) remind us that “. . . one of the most striking aspects of human empathy is that it can be felt for virtually any target, even targets of a different species.” Fourth, equally alarming for elites, awareness of this reality contains the potential to encourage “destabilizing” but humanity-affirming cosmopolitan attitudes toward the faceless “other,” both here and abroad. In de Waal’s apt words, “Empathy can override every rule about how to treat others.” (de Waal, 2005, p. 9) Amin (2003), for example, proposes that the new Europe be reframed by an ethos of empathy and engagement with the stranger as its core value. The diminution of empathy within the culture reduces pro-social behavior and social cohesiveness. Given the dangerous centrifugal forces of ethno-nationalism and xenophobia, nothing less than this unifying motif will suffice, while providing space for a yet undefined Europe, a people to come.

## Block

### AT: Anthropocentrism Good – Disease

#### Biodiversity is key to preventing pathogens from morphing to humans

Perrson ‘8 [2008, Erik Persson is a philosophy professor at Lunds University, What is Wrong with Extinction: The Answer from Anthropocentric Instrumentalism, “Anthropocentric Instrumentalism,” http://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?func=downloadFile&recordOId=961058&fileOId=975952]

2.3.2. Medicine Medical benefits are sometimes put forth as an important reason for preservation of species. 37 Many of the medical drugs we use today originate from plants. 38 In the future, these numbers are believed to increase. Most plants have never been checked for medically useful substances, 39 and we will probably find many new medical drugs among wild species. 40 Can this account for at least part of why it is seen as morally problematic to contribute to the extinction of species? The situation seems to be very similar to the one we just discussed regarding food, and most of the aspects discussed in relation to food are also applicable here. One difference is that even though the human demand for medicine is large, it is probably not as large as the demand for food, which means that both the pros and the cons of referring to medical value are smaller in scope compared to when we refer to the value of species as sources of food as an explanation for why the causing of extinction is morally problematic from an anthropocentric instrumental point of view. Another difference is that even though many medical drugs originate in wild plants, the plants are in general not utilised in the manufacturing of drugs. 41 This diminishes some aspects, but not others. The domestication and competition aspects as well as the depletion aspect that we brought up in the previous sub-section are much less of a problem when we talk about medicine. Wild species are said to be at least as important as future sources of medical drugs as they are as future sources of food. This means that protecting the basis of future evolution will also be at least as important in the medical case as in the food case. I pointed out in the introduction that our intuitions tell us that it is prima facie wrong to contribute to extermination all things considered. This leaves room for saying that there may be cases when it is acceptable or even required to contribute to extermination. This is most salient when we deal with species that carry human diseases, like for instance the black rat (Rattus rattus), the malaria carrying mosquito (Anopheles maculipennis and other species in the Anopheles genus), and of course the malaria parasites themselves (a number of species of the genus Plasmodium) – not to mention several kinds of bacteria. On the other hand, according to the Millennium report, a larger diversity of wildlife probably decreases the spread of many wildlife pathogens to human beings. 42 If this is correct, it means that even though the battle against diseases can in some circumstances be an argument in favour of exterminating certain species, it can also be an argument in favour of preserving a generally high level of biodiversity

### AT: We Must Help Animals

#### The aff representation conforms to the idea that the animal only needs to be “rescued” when it is convenient for people

**Irvine 09** (Leslie Irvine is an associate professor at the University of Colorado Boulder where she teaches sociology and how it relates to animals and gender roles, “Filling the Ark: Animal Welfare in Disaster”, 5/28/2009)

In addition to the issues of cleaner energy, the discussion of how to reduce the harm to birds and animals through exposure to oil raises the broader question of what we should do for wildlife in disasters of other kinds. With oil spills, where we are clearly at fault, some intervention is ethical, provided it follows the guidelines and procedures developed by professional rehabilitators. In most spills, rescue efforts should focus on endangered or threatened species: in others, the victims [are] should be euthanized. As I point out in Chapter 3, when large amounts of time, labor, and money going to saving birds and animals who will soon die despite our efforts-or because of them [our efforts]-we have to question our motives. The discussion of what to do for afflicted birds and animals often involves politics and public relations, rather than strictly humanitarian actions. The sea otters in the Exxon Valdez spill are a case in point. Public outcry forced action, even though no plan was in place for the otters before the spill. Millions of dollars went into a highly publicized attempt to "rescue" a few hundred animals. Many died while being "rescued," and many others did not survive long after being released. Had the spill affected a species with a lower "cuteness" factor, thus lower on the socio-zoologic scale, the pleas would not have been so loud or so frequent. Moreover, Exxon most likely would not have poured so much money into a species that would not have bolstered its public image the way the sea otters did.

### AT: local environments resilient

#### Humans are thrashing the environment at incredible levels, the Aleutian Island Ecosystem is an empiric example. The chain destruction reaction is massive. Empirics prove that humans destroy even remote ecosystems

**Bender 3** (Frederic L. Bender is the author of “The Culture of Extinction: Towards the Philosophy of Deep Ecology”, published in 2003, the book from whence this card came, on pages 55-58. He also holds the following degrees: Professor of Philosophy. BS, Polytechnic University of New York; MA, PhD, Northwestern University. He further teaches at the University of Colorado at Colorado Springs. Need I say more?) I

ndicative of ocean ecosystems' vulnerability is the recent collapse of the Aleutian Island ecosystem, one of the world's most remote areas." Until recently, this subarctic ecosystem based on vast undersea kelp forests supported immense numbers of smelt, shrimp, king crabs, sea otters, and sea lions. Suddenly, in the mid-1990s, the marine mammals vanished (ibid.). Now sharks, pollock, and sea urchins dominate waters once brimming with seals, otters, and king crab. Marine ecologist Jim Estes, who has studied the Aleutian ecosystem for thirty years, says no one "has ever seen a decline of this magnitude in such a short period of time over such a large geographic area" (ibid.). In the 1980s as many as one hundred thousand sea otters inhabited the Aleutians. Yet by the year 2000, only about six thousand remained, according to aerial surveys—a rate of decline that researchers say is unprecedented for any mammal population in the world. Scientists could find neither signs of disease, famine, nor reproductive failure. It turned out that the otters had become prey for orcas, with whom they had previ­ously lived in harmony. All of a sudden, though, the orcas—who nor­mally feed on sea lions and seals—began preying heavily on otters. The reason was that the population of harbor seals and Steller sea lions—the world's biggest sea lions—dropped sharply in the late 1980s. By 1992 otters were the only plentiful marine mammals left in Aleutian waters for orcas to eat. With far fewer otters to prey upon them, sea urchin popula­tions exploded, eating almost all the kelp. Sea urchins now cover the ocean floor. As late as 1993, the Aleutian kelp forests were twenty feet deep; today they are found only right by the shoreline, in water too shallow for urchins. When the thick, leafy undersea forests vanished, so did most of the rockfish, snails, starfish, and other creatures that used the kelp for food, shelter, and breeding grounds. Local seabirds, notably puffins and kittiwakes, also are hurting from lack of fish (ibid.). For years, scientists puzzled over the cause of the Aleutian collapse. Now they believe that the key event occurred in 1977, when the average temperature of the Gulf of Alaska suddenly rose by two degrees Celsius due to global warming. The warmer water would have caused the plankton at the base of the food chain to disappear, with tiny copepods and krill probably following soon afterward. Deprived of their food, the shrimp, crab, and smelt fishes, such as capelin and herring, vanished next. Soon they were replaced by an explosion of the cod and pollock popula­tions. By the mid-1980s, the seal and sea lion populations collapsed, since to survive the winters, their young needed the smelt, which have high fat content. Without seals and sea lions, the orca had to shift their diet to sea otters and, since sea otters are much smaller than seals or sea lions, the orca had to eat them in large numbers to survive. To top it off, as the water warmed, the salmon population boomed, drawing in sharks, who feed not only on salmon, but on seals. Competition for seals also forced the orca to shift predation to sea otters. Thus, in less than twenty years, the Aleutian ecosystem, formerly teeming with life, has collapsed, its marine mammals on the verge of extinction. Opportunistic species such as pol­lock, sharks, orcas, and Homo colossus thrive on the chaos, at least tem­porarily. Though once-thriving crab fisheries collapsed in the late 1970s, the new species attracted large fishing trawlers, which harvest millions of tons of pollock and cod a year (ibid.).

### AT: People take precedence

#### Either an organism is sentient or is not – we cannot be sentient if the animal is not

**Kirkwood 97(James K. Kirkwood, june 1997, Universities Federation for Animal Welfare and Humane Slaughter Association, UK, “The Distribution of the Capacity for Sentience in the Animal Kingdom”)**

My view about animal welfare is in line with the sentiment behind the agreement reached by the European Heads of State at their Amsterdam Summit in June 1997 (see above), though it is not, as I will discuss later, in line with what it actually says. For me, concern for an animal’s welfare is concern for its feelings – concern for the quality of its life as it experiences it. (Here and throughout I use ‘feelings’ as shorthand for conscious/subjectively experienced feelings, likewise by ‘feel’ I mean consciously/subjectively feel.) Thus, it seems to me that welfare is: ‘The balance, now or through life, of the quality of the complex mix of subjective feelings associated with brain states induced by various sensory inputs and by cognitive and emotion processes’ (Kirkwood, 2004a). I think it is helpful, in this way, to reserve the use of the word ‘welfare’ to address feelings rather than using it to include health also. How an animal feels can be influenced by its state of health and by its environment, so these are of course often central to the subject of animal welfare, but it seems to me that there is much to be gained and nothing to be lost by keeping the meanings of the terms health and welfare distinct in this way. To be sentient is to have the capacity to feel (in the sense defined above) something. Except in deep sleep or some pathological states, the lives of most of us humans are characterized by many kinds of feelings. Some of these, including sights, sounds, tastes, warmth and cold, and the various sensations arising from touch, are associated with our external sensors. Others are assoc- iated with internal sensors that provide our brains with information about the states of our bodies. The latter include general, non-localized or only vaguely localized feelings such as exhaustion, malaise or ecstasy, and localized feelings such as aches and pains. In addition, we experience a spectrum of feelings associated with the thoughts and emotions that may be prompted either by the inputs from these internal and external sensing devices, or (it seems) by the constant internal conversations – some conscious, some subconscious – of our brains. For example, fear (or, in others, delight) may be induced by a glimpse of a snake beside one’s unshod foot, and feelings of sorrow or joy may be evoked by music or by remembering sad or happy events. It is conceivable (though I struggle with the notion) that the kind of multi- faceted sentience that we experience – symphonic is a good word to describe it – may have sprung suddenly into existence from non-sentient ancestors. For example, some genetic change may have resulted in a crucial alteration in the organization, the patterns of communication, among brain modules, which resulted in the emergence of sentience. If this conferred a significant evolutionary advantage, then it might have spread rapidly through the descendent population of our ancestors. Such a scenario would be consistent with the views of those who believe that the current scientific evidence is that sentience is limited to humans only, or to humans and perhaps a very few other species (see, for example, Kennedy, 1993; Bermond, 1997; Macphail, 1998). The other, and perhaps more likely pattern of events than this non-sentient to symphonic sentience in one step hypothesis, is that our kind of symphonic sentience evolved in stages from an earlier, simpler, ‘solo’ version. The first sentient organism may have been consciously aware of only one sense – one aspect of sight, for example (our conscious vision is formed from the coordin- ated activity of many distinct and separate brain modules that each handle specific tasks to do with, for example: colour, recognition of particular objects, position, distance and movement). This faculty for conscious awareness might then have been commandeered by evolution to enhance (if that is what it does) other aspects of vision, and then have been further applied to other senses such as hearing and taste, and then to cognitive and emotional processes also. I am not suggesting that this may actually have been the sequence in which various senses and neuronal processes came under the spotlight of consciousness – it might have happened in the reverse order – but only that there may have been a stepwise development in the range of phenomena that could be accessed within consciousness. As stated above, to be sentient is to have a feeling of something. This implies that the phenomenon of sentience either exists or it doesn’t: that an organism either is sentient or it isn’t. How could this discrete presence or absence be consistent with the gradual process of evolution? There is no problem THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE CAPACITY FOR SENTIENCE 13 envisaging gradation in the intensity of a feeling – pain can vary from a barely discernible to a very severe sensation – but it is much harder to see how the very capacity to be aware of pain could be other than either present or absent. You either feel something, no matter how slightly, or you don’t – it is hard to conceive a halfway stage here. This may well be an important issue – the explanation of which might prove revealing – but it is not one that can be pursued further in this paper. Brains work by passage of information among hierarchical assemblages of neurons. Perhaps sentience evolved with a slight change, by chance, in organization that resulted in a small assemblage of cells ‘recognizing’ patterns of activity of the previously insentient brain design. Envisaged in this way, sentience may indeed depend upon a specific form of neuronal organization that either is present or not, but it may have started with changes that involved very few cells in the first instance. This leads on to the subject of this paper, which is the distribution of the capacity for sentience in the animal kingdom. It is appropriate to begin this with a brief review of the animal kingdom and of who or what is and is not currently included within it.

#### This rejection enables an understanding of the species-being. That solves the ethical contradiction of their species-level oppression. **Hudson 4**[[23]](#footnote-21)

We are all equally reduced to mere specimens of human biology, mute and uncomprehending of the world in which we are thrown. **Species-being**, or “humanity as a species,” **may require this recognition to move beyond** the pseudo-essence of the religion of **humanism**. Recognizing that what we call “the human” is an abstraction that fails to fully describe what we are, we may come to find a new way of understanding humanity that recuperates the natural without domination. The bare life that results from expulsion from the law removes even the illusion of freedom. Regardless of one’s location in production, **the threat of losing** even **the fiction of citizenship** and freedom **affects everyone***.* This may create new means of organizing resistance across the particular divisions of society. Furthermore, **the concept of bare life allows us to gesture toward a** more **detailed**, concrete **idea of what species-being may look like**. Agamben hints that in the recognition of this fact, that in our essence we are all animals, that we are all living dead, might reside the possibility of a kind of redemption. Rather than the mystical horizon of a future community, the passage to species-being may be experienced as a deprivation, a loss of identity. **Species-being is** not merely a positive result of the development of history; it is equally **the absence of** many of **the features of “humanity”** through which we have learned to make sense of our world. It is an absence of the kind of individuality and atomism that structure our world under capitalism and underlie liberal democracy, and which continue to inform the tenets of deep ecology. The development of species-being requires the collapse of the distinction between human and animal in order to change the shape of our relationships with the natural world. A true species-being depends on a sort of reconciliation between our “human” and “animal” selves, a breakdown of the distinction between the two both within ourselves and in nature in general. Bare life would then represent not only expulsion from the law but the possibility of its [the law’s] overcoming. Positioned in the zone of indistinction, no longer a subject of the law but still subjected to it through absence, what we equivocally call “the human” in general becomes virtually indistinguishable from the animal or nature. But through this expulsion and absence, we may see not only the law but the system of capitalism that shapes it from a position no longer blinded or captivated by its spell. The structure of the law is revealed as always suspect in the false division between natural and political life, which are never truly separable. Though clearly the situation is not yet as dire as Agamben’s invocation of the Holocaust suggests, we are all, as citizens, under the threat of the state of exception. With the decline of the nation as a form of social organization, the whittling away of civil liberties and, with them, the state’s promise of “the good life” (or “the good death”) even in the most developed nations, with the weakening of labor as the bearer of resistance to exploitation, how are we to envision the future of politics and society?

### AT: Utilitarianism Good

#### Utilitarianism cant address the issues of equity and distributive justice

Liu PHD University of Pennsylvania 2000 (Dr. Liu, PHD @ University of Pennsylvania, writes 2000 [Environmental Justice Analysis: theories, methods and practice, 2000 ISBN:1566704030, p.20-21])

However, its strengths are also its weaknesses. Its quantifications techniques are far from being simple, straightforward, and objective. Indeed, they are often too complicated to be practical. They are also to flexible and subject to manipulation. They are impersonal and lack compassion. More importantly, they fail to deal the issue of equity and distributive justice. Seemingly, you cannot get fairer than this. In calculating benefits and costs, each person is counted as one and only one. IN other words, people are treated equally. For Mill, “justice arises from the principle of utility”. Utilitarianism in concerted only the aggregate effect, no matter how the aggregate is distributed. For almost all policies, there is an uneven distribution of benefits and costs. Some people win, while others lose. The Pareto optimality would is almost nonexistent. A policy’s outcome is Pareto optimal if nobody loses and at least one person gains.

#### Utilitarianism policies result in inequality

Liu PHD University of Pennsylvania 2000 (Dr. Liu, PHD @ University of Pennsylvania, writes 2000 [Environmental Justice Analysis: theories, methods and practice, 2000 ISBN:1566704030, p.20-21])

Besides these ridiculous policy implications in the United States and in the world, the logic underlying Summers’ proposal represents “cultural imperialism,” the capitalist mode of production and consumption, and “a particular kind of political-economic power and its discriminatory practices” (Harvey 1996:368). Except for its beautiful guise of economic logic, the proposal is nothing new to those familiar with the history. The capitalistic powerhouses in Europe practiced material and cultural imperialism against countries in Africa, America, and Asia for years. They did it by raising the banner of trade and welfare enhancement. They did it through guns and powder. Of course, they had their logic for exporting opium to Canton (Guangzhou) in China through force. Now, we see a new logic. This time, it is economic logic and globalization. This time, the end is the same, but the means is not through guns and powder. Instead, it is political-economic power. This example illustrates clearly the danger of using the utilitarian perspective as the only means for policy analysis. Fundamentally, the utilitarian disregards the distributive justice issue altogether and espouses the current mode of production and consumption and the political-economic structure, without any attention to the inequity and inequality in the current system. Even worse and more subtly, it delivers the philosophy of “it exists, therefore it’s good.” However, “just because it sells, doesn’t mean we have to worship it” (Peirce 1991).

#### Their mentality to sacrifice anything and everything to avoid war causes ontological damnation—the impact is hell on earth

**Zimmerman 94**, (Professor of Philosophy at Tulane), 1994 (Michael, Contesting the Earth’s Future, p. 104).

Heidegger asserted that human self-assertion, combined with the eclipse of being, threatens the relation between being and human Dasein.53Loss of this relation would be even more dangerous than a nuclear war that might "bring about the complete annihilation of humanity and the destruction of the earth."54This controversial claim is comparable to the Christian teaching that it is better to forfeit the world than to lose one's soul by losing one's relation to God. Heidegger apparently thought along these lines: it is possible that after a nuclear war, life might once again emerge, but it is far less likely that there will ever again occur an ontological clearing through which such life could manifest itself. Further, since modernity's one-dimensional disclosure of entities virtually denies them any "being" at all, the loss of humanity's openness for being is already occurring.55Modernity's background mood is horror in the face of nihilism, which is consistent with the aim of providing material "happiness" for everyone by reducing nature to pure energy.56The unleashing of vast quantities of energy in nuclear war would be equivalent to modernity's slow-motion destruction of nature: unbounded destruction would equal limitless consumption. If humanity avoided nuclear war only to survive as contented clever animals, Heidegger believed we would exist in a state of ontological damnation: hell on earth, masquerading as material paradise. Deep ecologists might agree that a world of material human comfort purchased at the price of everything wild would not be a world worth living in, for in killing wild nature, people would be as good as dead. But most of them could not agree that the loss of humanity's relation to being would be worse than nuclear omnicide, for it is wrong to suppose that the lives of millions of extinct and unknown species are somehow lessened because they were never "disclosed" by humanity.

### AT: Cede the Political

#### Environmental revolutions are effective at making change

Best 6 (Steven Best, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Texas El Paso, 2006, “Revolutionary Environmentalism: An Emerging New Struggle for Total Liberation”)

Revolutionary environmentalism is based on the realization that politics as usual just won’t cut it anymore. We will always lose if we play by their rules rather than invent new forms of struggle, new social movements, and new sensibilities. The defense of the earth requires immediate and decisive: logging roads need to be blocked, driftnets need to be cut, and cages need to be emptied. But these are defensive actions, and in addition to these tactics, radical movements and alliances must be built from the perspective total liberation. A new revolutionary politics will build on the achievements of democratic, libertarian socialist, and anarchist traditions. It will incorporate radical green, feminist, and indigenous struggles. It will merge animal, earth, and human standpoints in a total liberation struggle against global capitalism and its omnicidal grow-or-die logic. Radical politics must reverse the growing power of the state, mass media, and corporations to promote egalitarianism and participatory democratization at all levels of society – political, cultural, and economic. It must dismantle all asymmetrical power relations and structures of hierarchy, including that of humans over animals and the earth. Radical politics is impossible without the revitalization of citizenship and the re-politicization of life, which begins with forms of education, communication, culture, and art that anger, awaken, inspire, and empower people toward action and change

### AT: Inevitable

#### Persistance is key to overcoming the divide between human and nature that some consider “inevitable”

Kochi and Ordan ‘8 [Tarik Kochi & Noam Ordan, “An Argument for the Global Suicide of Humanity” borderlands volume 7, number 3, 2008, https://www.academia.edu/4205491/An\_Argument\_for\_the\_Global\_Suicide\_of\_Humanity]

Both liberal and social revolutionary models thus seem to run into the same problems that surround the notion of progress; each play out a modern discourse of sacrifice in which some forms of life and modes of living are set aside in favour of the promise of a future good. Caught between social hopes and political myths, the challenge of responding to environmental destruction confronts, starkly, the core of a discourse of modernity characterised by reflection, responsibility and action. Given the increasing pressures upon the human habitat, this modern discourse will either deliver or it will fail. There is little room for an existence in between: either the Enlightenment fulfils its potentiality or it shows its hand as the bearer of impossibility. If the possibilities of the Enlightenment are to be fulfilled then this can only happen if the old idea of the progress of the human species, exemplified by Hawking’s cosmic colonisation, is fundamentally rethought and replaced by a new form of self-comprehension. This self-comprehension would need to negate and limit the old modern humanism by a radical anti-humanism. The aim, however, would be to not just accept one side or the other, but to re-think the basis of moral action along the lines of a dialectical, utopian anti-humanism. Importantly, though, getting past inadequate conceptions of action, historical time and the futural promise of progress may be dependent upon radically re-comprehending the relationship between humanity and nature in such a way that the human is no longer viewed as the sole core of the subject, or the being of highest value. The human would thus need to no longer be thought of as a master that stands over the non-human. Rather, the human and the non-human need to be grasped together, with the former bearing dignity only so long as it understands itself as a part of the latter.

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