



DeBridge – Solana Contracts

Solana Program Security Audit

Prepared by: Halborn

Date of Engagement: November 28th, 2022 – December 16th, 2022

Visit: Halborn.com

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DOCUMENT REVISION HISTORY

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|---------|-------------------------|------------|-----------------|
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| 1.2 | Remediation Plan Review | 01/12/2023 | Piotr Cielas |
| 1.3 | Remediation Plan Review | 01/12/2023 | Gabi Urrutia |

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EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW



1.1 INTRODUCTION

deBridge is a cross-chain interoperability and liquidity transfer protocol that allows decentralized transfer of assets between various blockchains. The cross-chain intercommunication of deBridge programs is powered by the network of independent oracles/validators which are elected by deBridge governance.

DeBridge engaged Halborn to conduct a security audit on their Solana programs beginning on November 28th, 2022 and ending on December 16th, 2022 . The security assessment was scoped to the programs provided in the [Solana Contracts](#) GitHub repository. Commit hashes and further details can be found in the Scope section of this report.

1.2 AUDIT SUMMARY

The team at Halborn was provided 3 weeks for the engagement and assigned a full-time security engineer to audit the security of the programs in scope. The security engineer is a blockchain and smart contract security expert with advanced penetration testing and smart contract hacking skills, and deep knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.

The purpose of this audit is to:

- Identify potential security issues within the programs

In summary, Halborn identified some improvements to reduce the likelihood and impact of multiple risks, which has been successfully addressed by DeBridge . The main ones are the following:

- Fees can negate the send amount.

DeBridge acknowledged this finding and confirmed that this is a feature and that this is expected behavior.

1.3 TEST APPROACH & METHODOLOGY

Halborn performed a combination of a manual review of the source code and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy in regard to the scope of the program audit. While manual testing is recommended to uncover flaws in business logic, processes, and implementation; automated testing techniques help enhance coverage of programs and can quickly identify items that do not follow security best practices.

The following phases and associated tools were used throughout the term of the audit:

- Research into the architecture, purpose, and use of the platform.
- Manual program source code review to identify business logic issues.
- Mapping out possible attack vectors
- Thorough assessment of safety and usage of critical Rust variables and functions in scope that could lead to arithmetic vulnerabilities.
- Finding unsafe Rust code usage (`cargo-geiger`)
- Scanning dependencies for known vulnerabilities (`cargo audit`).
- Local runtime testing (`solana-test-framework`)

RISK METHODOLOGY:

Vulnerabilities or issues observed by Halborn are ranked based on the risk assessment methodology by measuring the **LIKELIHOOD** of a security incident and the **IMPACT** should an incident occur. This framework works for communicating the characteristics and impacts of technology vulnerabilities. The quantitative model ensures repeatable and accurate measurement while enabling users to see the underlying vulnerability characteristics that were used to generate the Risk scores. For every vulnerability, a risk

level will be calculated on a scale of 5 to 1 with 5 being the highest likelihood or impact.

RISK SCALE - LIKELIHOOD

- 5 - Almost certain an incident will occur.
- 4 - High probability of an incident occurring.
- 3 - Potential of a security incident in the long term.
- 2 - Low probability of an incident occurring.
- 1 - Very unlikely issue will cause an incident.

RISK SCALE - IMPACT

- 5 - May cause devastating and unrecoverable impact or loss.
- 4 - May cause a significant level of impact or loss.
- 3 - May cause a partial impact or loss to many.
- 2 - May cause temporary impact or loss.
- 1 - May cause minimal or un-noticeable impact.

The risk level is then calculated using a sum of these two values, creating a value of 10 to 1 with 10 being the highest level of security risk.

| | | | | |
|----------|------|--------|-----|---------------|
| CRITICAL | HIGH | MEDIUM | LOW | INFORMATIONAL |
|----------|------|--------|-----|---------------|

- 10 - CRITICAL
- 9 - 8 - HIGH
- 7 - 6 - MEDIUM
- 5 - 4 - LOW
- 3 - 1 - VERY LOW AND INFORMATIONAL

1.4 SCOPE

Code repositories:

1. Project Name

- Repository: [Solana Contracts](#)
- Commit ID: [d9fba17ee028db017af601dccf33e82c48a8b251](#)
- Programs in scope:
 1. Debride ([programs/debridge](#))
 2. Debride Settings ([programs/settings](#))

Out-of-scope:

- third-party libraries and dependencies
- financial-related attacks

2. ASSESSMENT SUMMARY & FINDINGS OVERVIEW

| CRITICAL | HIGH | MEDIUM | LOW | INFORMATIONAL |
|----------|------|--------|-----|---------------|
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |

LIKELIHOOD

IMPACT

| | | | | |
|----------|--|--|--|--|
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| (HAL-01) | | | | |

| SECURITY ANALYSIS | RISK LEVEL | REMEDIATION DATE |
|--------------------------------------|---------------|------------------|
| HAL-01 - FEES CAN NEGATE SEND AMOUNT | Informational | ACKNOWLEDGED |



FINDINGS & TECH DETAILS



3.1 (HAL-01) FEES CAN NEGATE SEND AMOUNT – INFORMATIONAL

Description:

The `Debridge` programs allows users to send tokens to other chains with the `send` instruction. The `fix_fee`, `transfer_fee` and `execution_fee` charged to the user can be equivalent to the original amount of tokens sent, resulting in the `final_amount` of tokens the user receives on the other chain to be zero.

Code Location:

Listing 1: `programs/debridge/src/lib.rs` (Lines 120,129,133,138)

```

84 pub fn send(
85     ctx: Context<Sending>,
86     target_chain_id: [u8; 32],
87     receiver: Vec<u8>,
88     is_use_asset_fee: bool,
89     amount: u64,
90     submission_params: Option<SendSubmissionParamsInput>,
91     referral_code: Option<u32>,
92 ) -> Result<()> {
93     let mut transfer_builder = Box::new(events::TransferredBuilder
94     ↪ ::default());
95     transfer_builder.referral_code(referral_code);
96     {
97         let chain_address_len = ctx
98             .accounts
99             .bridge_ctx
100             .chain_support_info
101             .get_chain_address_len(&target_chain_id)?;
102         require!(
103             receiver.len().eq(&chain_address_len),
104             DebridgeErrorCode::WrongReceiverAddress,
105         );
106         require!(
107             submission_params

```

```

108         .as_ref()
109         .map(|param| param.fallback_address.len().eq(&
110             ↳ chain_address_len))
111         .unwrap_or(true),
112         DebridgeErrorCode::WrongFallbackAddress,
113     );
114 }
115 let fee_type = FeeType::new(is_use_asset_fee);
116 let send_fix_fee = Box::new(ctx.accounts.get_fix_fee_sender(
117     ↳ fee_type));
118 let send_transfer_fee = Box::new(ctx.accounts
119     ↳ get_transfer_fee_sender());
120 let process_execution_fee = Box::new(ctx.accounts
121     ↳ get_bridge_balance_changer());
122
123 let final_amount = ctx
124     .accounts
125     .get_amount_context(
126         ctx.accounts.send_token(amount)?,
127         submission_params
128         .as_ref()
129         .map(|params| params.execution_fee),
130         &target_chain_id,
131     )?
132     .take_fix_fee(send_fix_fee.add_pre_process(|fee| {
133         transfer_builder.collected_fee(fee);
134         Ok(())
135     })))?
136     .take_transfer_fee(|transfer_fee| {
137         transfer_builder.collected_transfer_fee(transfer_fee);
138         send_transfer_fee(transfer_fee)
139     })?
140     .process_amount_at_bridge(process_execution_fee)?
141     .take_execution_fee(|execution_fee| {
142         transfer_builder.execution_fee(execution_fee);
143     })
144     .amount();

```

Recommendation:

Validate that the final amount of tokens sent is not zero, if it is the transaction should fail.

Remediation Plan:

ACKNOWLEDGED: The Debridge team acknowledged this finding.



MANUAL TESTING



In the manual testing phase, the following scenarios were simulated. The scenarios listed below were selected based on the severity of the vulnerabilities Halborn was testing the program for.

4.1 DENIAL OF SERVICE

Description:

The DeBrige program's `execute_external_call` instruction allows for blocks of instructions to be executed together, this is done through setting the external instructions' execution policy to `MandatoryBlock`. Tests were done to see if it was possible to create a block of external instructions that could cause a denial of service.

Results:

[illegible]

No code vulnerabilities were identified.

4.2 ACCESS CONTROL AND REGRESSION TESTING

Description:

In both the `Debridge` and `settings` program, new instructions were introduced and some updated to resolve access control vulnerabilities. These

were tested to confirm no new vulnerabilities were introduced and that the previous fixes resolved the issue.

Results:

[illegible]

No code vulnerabilities were identified.

4.3 UPDATING EXTERNAL CALL STORAGE AFTER CLAIM

After a user submits a `claim` if there are any instructions in the `external_call_storage` it should be locked and available for executors to execute the instructions. Testing was done to confirm that the lock works as intended and the user is unable to execute the `update_external_call` function.

[illegible]

No code vulnerabilities were identified.



AUTOMATED TESTING



5.1 AUTOMATED ANALYSIS

Description:

Halborn used automated security scanners to assist with the detection of well-known security issues and vulnerabilities. Among the tools used was `cargo-audit`, a security scanner for vulnerabilities reported to the RustSec Advisory Database. All vulnerabilities published in <https://crates.io> are stored in a repository named The RustSec Advisory Database. `cargo audit` is a human-readable version of the advisory database which performs a scanning on Cargo.lock. Security Detections are only in scope. All vulnerabilities shown here were already disclosed in the above report. However, to better assist the developers maintaining this code, the auditors are including the output with the dependencies tree, and this is included in the cargo audit output to better know the dependencies affected by unmaintained and vulnerable crates.

Results:

| ID | package | short description |
|-----------------------------------|-----------|--------------------|
| RUSTSEC-2020-0036 | time | Potential segfault |
| RUSTSEC-2021-0139 | ansi_term | Unmaintained |

5.2 UNSAFE RUST CODE DETECTION

Description:

Halborn used automated security scanners to assist with the detection of well-known security issues and vulnerabilities. Among the tools used was `cargo-geiger`, a security tool that lists statistics related to the usage of unsafe Rust code in a core Rust codebase and all its dependencies.

Results:

Metric output format: x/y

x = unsafe code used by the build

y = total unsafe code found in the crate

Symbols:

🔒 = No `unsafe` usage found, declares `#![forbid(unsafe_code)]`? = No `unsafe` usage found, missing `#![forbid(unsafe_code)]`

⚠️ = `unsafe` usage found

Functions Expressions Impls Traits Methods Dependency

| | | | | | | |
|-----|-------|-----|-----|-----|----|---------------------------------|
| 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | ? | debridge-program 1.0.2 |
| 0/0 | 8/8 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | ⚠️ | anchor-lang 0.25.0 |
| 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | ? | anchor-spl 0.25.0 |
| 0/0 | 22/22 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | ⚠️ | bincode 1.3.3 |
| 0/0 | 1/1 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | ⚠️ | debridge-external-call 1.0.1 |
| 0/0 | 8/8 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | ⚠️ | anchor-lang 0.25.0 |
| 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | ? | anchor-spl 0.25.0 |
| 0/4 | 0/6 | 0/1 | 0/3 | 0/0 | ? | async-trait 0.1.59 |
| 0/0 | 22/22 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | ⚠️ | bincode 1.3.3 |
| 0/0 | 1/1 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | ⚠️ | bs58 0.4.0 |
| 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | ? | cfg-if 1.0.0 |
| 0/5 | 0/4 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | ? | derive_builder 0.11.2 |
| 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | ? | derive_builder_macro 0.11.2 |
| 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | ? | derive_builder_core 0.11.2 |
| 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | ? | darling 0.14.2 |
| 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | ? | darling_core 0.14.2 |
| 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | ? | fnv 1.0.7 |
| 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | ? | ident_case 1.0.1 |
| 0/0 | 15/15 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 3/3 | ⚠️ | proc-macro2 1.0.47 |
| 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | ? | quote 1.0.21 |
| 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 🔒 | strsim 0.10.0 |
| 0/0 | 69/69 | 3/3 | 0/0 | 2/2 | ⚠️ | syn 1.0.105 |
| 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | ? | darling_macro 0.14.2 |
| 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | ? | darling_core 0.14.2 |
| 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | ? | quote 1.0.21 |
| 0/0 | 69/69 | 3/3 | 0/0 | 2/2 | ⚠️ | syn 1.0.105 |
| 0/0 | 15/15 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 3/3 | ⚠️ | proc-macro2 1.0.47 |
| 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | ? | quote 1.0.21 |
| 0/0 | 69/69 | 3/3 | 0/0 | 2/2 | ⚠️ | syn 1.0.105 |
| 0/0 | 69/69 | 3/3 | 0/0 | 2/2 | ⚠️ | syn 1.0.105 |
| 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | ? | hex 0.4.3 |
| 0/0 | 5/5 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | ⚠️ | serde 1.0.149 |
| 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | ? | result-inspect 0.2.0 |
| 0/0 | 5/5 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | ⚠️ | serde 1.0.149 |
| 0/0 | 4/7 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | ⚠️ | serde_json 1.0.89 |
| 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | ? | thiserror 1.0.37 |
| 0/0 | 9/9 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | ⚠️ | debridge-settings-program 1.0.2 |
| 0/0 | 8/8 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | ⚠️ | anchor-lang 0.25.0 |
| 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | ? | anchor-spl 0.25.0 |
| 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | ? | const_env 0.1.2 |
| 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | ? | const_env_impl 0.1.2 |
| 0/0 | 15/15 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 3/3 | ⚠️ | proc-macro2 1.0.47 |
| 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | ? | quote 1.0.21 |
| 0/0 | 69/69 | 3/3 | 0/0 | 2/2 | ⚠️ | syn 1.0.105 |

| | | | | | | |
|-----|---------|-------|-----|-------|---|------------------------------------|
| 0/0 | 9/9 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 🔴 | debridge-settings-program 1.0.2 |
| 0/0 | 8/8 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 🔴 | anchor-lang 0.25.0 |
| 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | ? | anchor-spl 0.25.0 |
| 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | ? | const_env 0.1.2 |
| 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | ? | const_env_impl 0.1.2 |
| 0/0 | 15/15 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 3/3 | 🔴 | proc-macro2 1.0.47 |
| 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | ? | quote 1.0.21 |
| 0/0 | 69/69 | 3/3 | 0/0 | 2/2 | 🔴 | syn 1.0.105 |
| 0/0 | 1/1 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 1/1 | 🔴 | debridge-submission 1.0.1 |
| 0/0 | 7/7 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 🔴 | borsh 0.9.3 |
| 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | ? | hex 0.4.3 |
| 1/1 | 16/18 | 1/1 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 🔴 | log 0.4.17 |
| 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | ? | num-integer 0.1.45 |
| 0/0 | 6/12 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 🔴 | num-traits 0.2.15 |
| 0/0 | 15/15 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 🔴 | rand 0.7.3 |
| 0/0 | 5/5 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 🔴 | serde 1.0.149 |
| 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 🔒 | sha3 0.10.6 |
| 0/0 | 0/12 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 🔒 | zkp-u256 0.2.1 |
| 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | ? | crunchy 0.2.2 |
| 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | ? | hex 0.4.3 |
| 0/0 | 0/72 | 0/3 | 0/1 | 0/3 | ? | itertools 0.9.0 |
| 0/0 | 14/14 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 🔴 | either 1.8.0 |
| 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | ? | no-std-compat 0.4.1 |
| 0/0 | 0/49 | 0/6 | 0/0 | 0/3 | ? | spin 0.5.2 |
| 0/0 | 6/12 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 🔴 | num-traits 0.2.15 |
| 0/0 | 4/14 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 🔴 | parity-scale-codec 1.3.7 |
| 4/4 | 295/295 | 2/2 | 1/1 | 5/5 | 🔴 | arrayvec 0.5.2 |
| 0/0 | 5/5 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 🔴 | serde 1.0.149 |
| 4/4 | 717/721 | 6/6 | 0/0 | 27/27 | 🔴 | bitvec 0.17.4 |
| 0/0 | 14/14 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 🔴 | either 1.8.0 |
| 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | ? | radium 0.3.0 |
| 0/0 | 5/5 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 🔴 | serde 1.0.149 |
| 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 4/4 | 0/0 | 🔴 | byte-slice-cast 0.3.5 |
| 0/0 | 5/5 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 🔴 | serde 1.0.149 |
| 0/0 | 15/15 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 🔴 | rand 0.7.3 |
| 0/0 | 5/5 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 🔴 | serde 1.0.149 |
| 1/4 | 47/150 | 1/1 | 0/0 | 3/3 | 🔴 | getrandom 0.1.16 |
| 2/2 | 932/974 | 13/13 | 0/0 | 27/29 | 🔴 | heapless 0.7.16 |
| 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | ? | mpl-token-metadata 1.4.3 |
| 0/0 | 5/5 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 🔴 | serde 1.0.149 |
| 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | ? | signature-verifier 0.0.0 |
| 0/0 | 8/8 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 🔴 | anchor-lang 0.25.0 |
| 0/0 | 22/22 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 🔴 | bincode 1.3.3 |
| 2/2 | 932/974 | 13/13 | 0/0 | 27/29 | 🔴 | heapless 0.7.16 |
| 1/1 | 16/18 | 1/1 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 🔴 | log 0.4.17 |
| 0/0 | 5/5 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 🔴 | serde 1.0.149 |
| 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 🔒 | sha3 0.10.6 |
| 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 🔒 | spl-associated-token-account 1.1.2 |
| 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | ? | spl-token 3.5.0 |
| 0/5 | 0/4 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | ? | derive_builder 0.11.2 |
| 2/2 | 932/974 | 13/13 | 0/0 | 27/29 | 🔴 | heapless 0.7.16 |
| 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | ? | result-inspect 0.2.0 |
| 0/0 | 5/5 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 🔴 | serde 1.0.149 |
| 0/0 | 6/6 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 🔴 | serde-hex 0.1.0 |
| 0/0 | 4/4 | 0/0 | 1/1 | 0/0 | 🔴 | array-init 0.0.4 |
| 1/1 | 15/15 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 🔴 | nodrop 0.1.14 |
| 0/0 | 5/5 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 🔴 | serde 1.0.149 |
| 2/2 | 348/348 | 4/4 | 1/1 | 13/13 | 🔴 | smallvec 0.6.14 |
| 0/0 | 0/6 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/1 | ? | maybe-uninit 2.0.0 |
| 0/0 | 5/5 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 🔴 | serde 1.0.149 |
| 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | ? | signature-verifier 0.0.0 |
| 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 🔒 | spl-associated-token-account 1.1.2 |
| 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | 0/0 | ? | spl-token 3.5.0 |



THANK YOU FOR CHOOSING

 **HALBORN**

