

XVI. Decentralized Bill of Liberties, Explanatory Article

"Now I know of only two methods of establishing equality in the political world; every citizen must be put in possession of his rights, or rights must be granted to no one."

~Alexis de Tocqueville

This is a chapter from a textbook on Decentralized law, which can be downloaded for free here:

<https://decentralizedlaw.org/book>

Immutable principles and a primary focus on securing individual liberty have formed the foundation of the best legal systems. There is no reason to depart from this. Establishing minimum liberties for individuals across all decentralized networks is the first step toward a more decentralized legal system.

Despite almost universal acknowledgment of human rights, controversy remains about what should be included in the concept. Naturally, there are wide variations in their codification, implementation, and result. This chapter first analyzes the historical development of rights—human rights in particular. It then examines how modern society enforces these rights and, finally, their relationship to a decentralized network of equals. This research reveals that we need a modern, universal list of essential liberties that is enacted independently of existing jurisdictions. The resulting Decentralized Bill of Liberties (DBoL), enacted on the blockchain, serves as the foundation of future (decentralized) legal systems.

§ 16.1. Rights

Grotius observed that all individuals have rights attached to their person as a form of property. Man is born a sovereign and free individual, capable of pursuing his interests without permission or assistance from the state or any other authority. But how did this concept evolve from the world of ideas to become one of the fundamental principles of law?

Kant's previously discussed authoritative work summarized what we now know as 'classical liberalism,' which dictated that all human beings must be treated as ends in themselves and never as means only. Philosopher and writer Roger Scruton (1944–2020) concluded that Kant meant that one's freedom to act must respect the freedom of others. No one can do as they please; rather, each person may exercise freedom only to the extent it does not limit the freedom of others. In describing rights as 'human' rather than 'civil,' we invoke the natural law and, with it, the universal principles that set limits to legislation in every place and time—a universal constraint on government. This individual sovereignty translates into law as a system of rights: the right to life, limb, and property; the right to proceed peacefully about one's purposes; the right to engage in lawful relations with others; and so on. For Kant, the concept of 'right' was secondary to that of duty. What gives reality to rights is a duty to respect them. One can claim rights only if one is

prepared to pay the price, which is the acceptance of the very same duties that one imposes upon others through one's own claim.¹

Hegel considered it imperative that we all should act as persons capable of rights and respect other persons likewise.² Moreover, in formal 'right,' there is no question of particular interests, of personal advantage or welfare, any more than there is of the particular motive behind personal volition, of insight and intention.³ The unconditional commands of abstract right are restricted, because of its abstractness, to the negative: 'Do not infringe upon personality and what personality entails.' The result is that there are only prohibitions in the sphere of right;⁴ rights protect the person but do not create anything for him. Moreover, they provide him with a duty binding to his will as they give substance to his own being.⁵ This duty provides him with liberation, firstly from natural impulses and secondly from indeterminate subjectivity devoid of actuality.⁶ It provides a predictable framework in which he can live his life. Human freedom is fulfilled when belonging to an ethical order.⁷ Within this order, he has rights in so far as he has duties and duties in so far as he has rights.⁸

Modern Rights

Salmond provided a useful starting point for understanding modern rights by first defining two closely related terms. The first is a wrong, which is an act contrary to the rule of right and justice. He distinguished between a moral wrong, being contrary to natural justice, and a legal wrong, being a violation of justice according to law.⁹ He pointed out that moral and legal standards often differ, though historically, effective legal systems have sought to align them.

The second concept closely associated with rights is duty. Salmond defined duty as an obligatory act whose opposite constitutes a wrong. Duties, like wrongs, are of two kinds, being either moral or legal. A moral or natural duty is an act the opposite of which would be a moral or natural wrong. A legal duty is an act the opposite of which would be a legal wrong. These two classes are partly coincident and partly distinct. A duty may be moral but not legal, or legal but not moral, or both at once.¹⁰

Salmond argued that rights emerge from the balancing of competing interests. Since the interests of men conflict with each other, it is impossible for all to receive rightful recognition. The rule of justice selects some for protection, and the others are rejected. The interests which receive recognition and protection from the rules of right are called rights. A right, he concluded, is any interest, respect for which is a duty, and the disregard of which is a wrong.¹¹ All that is right or wrong, just or unjust, is so by reason of its effect upon the interests of mankind, that is to say upon the various elements of human well-being, such as life, liberty, health, reputation, and the uses of

1 Scruton (2010), Chapter Seven, Enlightenment and Law, [Author: paragraph is the summary of the subchapter "Human Rights"].

2 Hegel (1820), First Part: Abstract Right, § 36.

3 Ibid., First Part: Abstract Right, § 37.

4 Hegel (1820), First Part: Abstract Right, § 38.

5 Ibid., Third Part: Ethical Life: § 148.

6 Ibid., Third Part: Ethical Life: § 149.

7 Ibid., Third Part: Ethical Life: § 153.

8 Ibid., Third Part: Ethical Life: § 155.

9 Salmond (1913), § 70. Wrongs.

10 Ibid., § 71. Duties

11 Ibid., § 72. Rights

material objects. Every wrong, therefore, involves some interest attacked by it, and every duty involves some interest to which it relates and for whose protection it exists.¹²

According to Salmond, liberties are the benefits which one derives from the absence of legal duties imposed upon oneself.¹³ The sphere of legal liberty is that sphere of activity within which the law is content to leave one alone. The term right is often used in a wide sense to include such liberty, but the interests of unrestrained activity, recognized and allowed by the law, constitute a class of legal rights clearly distinguishable from those which are already considered. Rights of the one class are concerned with those things which other persons ought to do; rights of the other class are concerned with those things which one may do for himself. The former pertains to the sphere of obligation or compulsion, the latter to that of liberty or free will.¹⁴

Salmond further introduced positive and negative rights. A positive right corresponds to a positive duty and stipulates that he on whom the duty lies shall do some positive act on behalf of the person entitled. A negative right corresponds to a negative duty and is a right that the person bound shall *refrain* from some act which would operate to the prejudice of the person entitled.¹⁵

Holland distinguished rights as those active against a definite person or persons or against all persons indefinitely. A right of the definite kind is a right *in personam*, of the indefinite kind a right *in rem*.¹⁶ Furthermore, he introduced primary rights, or rights antecedent, that stand on their own but need secondary rights, such as remedial or sanctioning rights, in support.¹⁷ Holland further observed rights existing either at rest or in motion. The latter means that a right might terminate its connection with the person in whom it resides, perhaps by being transferred or ceasing to exist due to an act.¹⁸

American jurist Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld (1879–1918) synthesized these ideas into a model showing the interconnection of legal relationships like rights. Hohfeld argued that the term ‘rights’ tends to be used indiscriminately to cover what, in a given case, may be a privilege, a power, or an immunity rather than a right in the strictest sense.¹⁹ He defined a right as one’s “affirmative claim” against another and a privilege as one’s “freedom from the right or claim of another.” Similarly, a power is one’s “affirmative control” over a given legal relation against another, whereas an immunity is one’s “freedom from the legal power or control of another regarding some legal relation.”²⁰ He organized these concepts into a scheme of jural relations showing opposites and correlatives. For example, the opposite of a privilege is a duty.²¹

Understanding the specific meaning of a right is crucial for comprehending corresponding duties. Within this scheme, what we earlier discussed in the book as basic natural rights qualify as privileges, which Hohfeld equated with liberties.²² How do human rights compare?

12 Ibid., § 72. Rights

13 Ibid., § 75. Liberties.

14 Ibid., § 75. Liberties.

15 Ibid., § 80. Positive and Negative Rights.

16 Holland (1916), Chapter IX – the Leading Classification of Rights, III. Upon the limited or unlimited extent of the person of incidence.

17 Ibid., Chapter IX – the Leading Classification of Rights.

18 Ibid., Chapter X – Right at Rest and in Motion

19 Hohfeld, Wesley N., “*Fundamental Legal Conceptions - As Applied in Judicial Reasoning and other legal essays by Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld*,” (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1920, Edited by Walter Wheeler Cook), *Fundamental Jural Relations Contrasted With One Another*, page 36.

20 Ibid., Introduction, page 7.

21 Ibid., *Fundamental Jural Relations Contrasted With One Another*, page 36.

22 Ibid., *Fundamental Jural Relations Contrasted With One Another*, page 42.

§ 16.2. Human Rights

Human rights are the most widely known, accepted, and universal interpretations of natural rights. A leading figure in the push for human rights was Lauterpacht. As an international law authority, he played a vital role in defining the crimes with which the perpetrators of the Holocaust would be charged. One of Lauterpacht's key contributions was developing the legal concept of 'crimes against humanity'.²³ To restrict the government's ability to commit atrocities, he wrote *An International Bill of Human Rights* in 1945.²⁴ This work heavily influenced the concept of human rights and its future declarations and conventions.²⁵

Lauterpacht's analysis of law parallels the analysis provided in the first section of this book. He based his ideas of universal human rights on natural rights and natural law, observing the universal human law passed down since antiquity.²⁶ However, Lauterpacht was only one part of the broader movement in the 1940s working toward a system of equal rights for everyone. The push for global human rights had significant political backing as well.

American President Franklin D. Roosevelt represented one such force. His famous 'four freedoms' speech in 1941 advocated for humans "everywhere in the world" to have "freedom of speech and expression, freedom to worship God in his own way, freedom from want, and freedom from fear."²⁷ After Roosevelt's death in 1945, President Harry S. Truman appointed Eleanor Roosevelt, the former First Lady, as a delegate to the UN. She chaired the Commission on Human Rights (1946–

23 Vrdoljak, Ana Filipa, "Human Rights and Genocide: The Work of Lauterpacht and Lemkin in Modern International Law," (European Journal of International Law, Volume 20, Issue 4, November 2009, pages 1163–1194), <https://doi.org/10.1093/ejil/chp090>.

"Through these efforts he facilitated the realization of individual criminal responsibility in international law and the formal recognition and prosecution of crimes against humanity by the international community."

24 Lauterpacht, Hersch, "Human rights, the Charter of the United Nations and the International Bill of the Rights of Man : preliminary report / by H. Lauterpacht," (UN, New York, 12 May 1948), <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/564241?v=pdf>:

"It may be useful for the members of the Committee to have before them a Draft which embodies the ideas of an International Bill of Rights in a single document and which formulates the principles on which this Report is based. For these reasons I venture to incorporate, in this last Chapter of the Report, my own draft of a Bill of Rights in the hope that it may be of assistance to the International Law Association and to the Brussels Conference in making their own contribution to the subject. The present draft is based on that circulated at the Prague Conference and taken from my book entitled 'An International Bill of the Rights of Man'."

25 Hoffman, Stefan-Ludwig, "Human Rights in the Twentieth Century," (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2011), page 68:

"As suggested by A.W. Brian Simpson, the international legal academic Hersch Lauterpacht institutions in the area of human rights in the aftermath of World War II. He shrewdly used the International Law Society to ensure both the diffusion of his ideas among relevant national and international actors and the legitimacy of an organisation counting some 250 leading lawyers. At the UN, Lauterpacht has also been a central player, but in a somewhat indirect way. [...] the drafts supplied by the Foreign Office during the negotiation of the Universal Declaration were clearly marked by Lauterpacht's thinking."

26 Lauterpacht, Hersch, "An International Bill of the Rights of Man," (Oxford University Press, Aug 2013).
Ch.III The Law of Nature and the Inherent Rights of Man:

"It has been shown that the notion of the natural rights of man is of great antiquity and of significant continuity. It is now enshrined in the constitutional law of most States."

Ch.IV The Law of Nations, The Law of Nature, and The Inalienable Rights of Man:

"The intimate relation between the law of nature and the notion of the inherent rights of man has not been a one-way movement of ideas. It has been shown that, in their rise and in their growth, the doctrines of natural law owed as much to the ideas of the inalienable rights of man as the latter owed to the former. We can trace the same mutuality of influence in the relations of international law and the law of nature."

27 Roosevelt, Franklin D., "Annual Message to Congress on the State of the Union," January 6, 1941, in The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt. 1940 Volume (New York: MacMillan, 1941), 663–672.

1951) and played a major role in the drafting and adoption of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).²⁸

Lauterpacht argued that natural law required positive enactment. He expressed frustration that the initial work produced only a *declaration* of human rights rather than a legally binding *convention*. Assigning rights without corresponding remedies and state duties represented, according to him, a fundamental and decisive ethical flaw in the structure and conception of the UDHR.²⁹ Contrary to his fears, the UDHR proved highly influential, as many nations later enacted additional instruments that made these ideals binding to states. Currently, human rights constitute a well-established, widely recognized body of law.

Human rights, Donnelly explained, are literally the rights that one has because one is human. The use of 'rights' in this context has two central moral and political senses: the first is rectitude, something being right (or wrong), and the second is entitlement, when something is owed to you or belongs to you in particular.³⁰ Exercise, respect, enjoyment, and enforcement are four principal dimensions of the practice of human rights,³¹ making them a dynamic set of rights.

According to Donnelly, human rights are equal rights: one either is or is not a human being. Each has the same human rights as everyone else (or none at all). Moreover, he emphasized that human rights are inalienable. Inalienability does not mean that rights are absolute or can never be overridden by other considerations. Human rights, he said, are inalienable because one cannot stop being human, no matter how badly one behaves or how barbarously one is treated. Moreover, they are universal rights, in the sense that today we consider all members of the species *Homo sapiens* 'human beings' and thus holders of human rights.³²

Man's moral nature, Donnelly continued, serves as the source of human rights. Human rights are needed not for life but for a life of dignity—a life worthy of a human being. People who enjoy human rights live richer and fuller lives. The UDHR, like any list of human rights, specifies minimum conditions for a dignified life. Human rights entitle people to social changes that fulfill the moral vision of human nature. Human rights thus can be seen as a self-fulfilling moral prophecy.³³

While human rights norms have been largely internationalized and thus restrict the nation-state, their enforcement remains almost exclusively national. The human rights strategy to control state power has two main dimensions: negative and positive. Negatively, it prohibits states—both operating individually and collectively—from interfering in citizens' personal, social, and political lives. The positive enforcement of human rights requires the state to provide certain goods, services, opportunities, and protections.³⁴ Thus, Donnelly argued, a state that does no active harm itself is not enough. The state must also protect individuals against abuses by other individuals and private groups. Donnelly concluded that since the intrusive and coercive powers of the state have

28 Caroli, Betty Boyd, "*Eleanor Roosevelt – American diplomat, humanitarian and first lady*," (Britannica, Last updated July 24, 2024), accessed on Sep 11, 2024, <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Eleanor-Roosevelt>.

29 Lauterpacht (1950), 17. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, page 421.

30 Donnelly (2013), Part I. Toward a Theory of Human Rights – 1. The Concept of Human rights, page 7.

31 Ibid., Part I. Toward a Theory of Human Rights – 1. The Concept of Human rights, page 8.

32 Ibid., Part I. Toward a Theory of Human Rights – 2. Special Features of Human Rights, page 10.

33 Ibid., Part I. Toward a Theory of Human Rights – 3. Human Nature and Human Rights, page 16, [Author: with legal positivism moral reasoning shifted from the flesh-and-blood individual to the abstract ideal. Here lies a subtle, but important distinction. As demonstrated by the Graph of Liberty, human beings are either equal under the law, or they are not. Modern ideology posits that human beings can only be equal if arbitrary abstract goals are met. Such goals exist not in reality but rather in the heads of the advocates, and generally consist of ever moving goalposts. Human beings can never achieve equality under such metrics].

34 Ibid., Part I. Toward a Theory of Human Rights – 6. The State and International Human Rights, page 34.

grown to now frightening (technological) dimensions, an emphasis on controlling the state continues to make immense political sense.³⁵

Lauterpacht classified three categories of human rights. The first category consists of personal rights. These have traditionally formed part of the bills of rights within the state. They include the right to life and inviolability of the person; freedom of speech, opinion, religion, association, and assembly; sanctity of the home and secrecy of correspondence; freedom from arbitrary arrest; proper safeguards in criminal trials; equality before the law; and freedom from discrimination on account of religion, race, ethical origin, and political opinion.³⁶

The second category contains political rights. Examples are the fundamental right of man to government by consent—the right to be governed by persons freely chosen by the people.³⁷ While this ideal is a practical reality in Western countries, democratic rule is not universal; there are kingdoms, such as in Saudi Arabia, and communist regimes, such as in China.

The third category covers social and economic rights. During Lauterpacht's time, there was a wide and growing acceptance of the view that personal and political freedom is impaired—if not rendered purely nominal—unless its enjoyment is made practicable by a reasonable guarantee of social and economic freedom.³⁸ This idea has firmly taken hold within the discourse on human rights since the 1968 Proclamation of Tehran.³⁹ Examples of social and economic rights range from social security, fair working conditions, education, health care, and housing.

Declaring social and economic rights as human rights has not been without controversy. People living outside Western Europe—in nations with different economic structures and cultural traditions—know that these rights remain meaningless for most of the world's population. In fact, subjecting the wider society to individual rights—especially positive ones—conflicts with the cultural traditions of most societies worldwide.⁴⁰ Therefore, this final category of rights represents a form of idealism. Combined with the second category, these rights codify an ideal of social organization existing only in a limited number of countries.

Human Rights Enforcement

Human rights have gained remarkable worldwide acceptance. As Donnelly observed, virtually all states consider internationally recognized human rights to be a firmly established part of international law and politics, and virtually all cultures, regions, and leading worldviews participate in an overlapping consensus on these internationally recognized human rights.⁴¹ Despite the cultural, political, regional, and economic diversity of the contemporary world, there is near universal agreement on not only the existence but also the substance of internationally recognized

35 Ibid., Part I. Toward a Theory of Human Rights – 6. The State and International Human Rights, page 35.

36 Lauterpacht (1950), Part III- Section 1, 3. The Contents of the Bill of Rights, page 280-281.

37 Ibid., Part III- Section 1, 3. The Contents of the Bill of Rights, page 281.

38 Ibid., Part III- Section 1, 3. The Contents of the Bill of Rights, page 284.

39 Proclamation of Teheran, Final Act of the International Conference on Human Rights, Teheran, 22 April to 13 May 1968, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 32/41 at 3 (1968), accessed on October 2025, <http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/instree/l2ptchr.htm>:

“13. Since human rights and fundamental freedoms are indivisible, the full realization of civil and political rights without the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights is impossible. The achievement of lasting progress in the implementation of human rights is dependent upon sound and effective national and international policies of economic and social development;”

40 Author: the chapter on natural law demonstrates that Chinese, Hindu, Islamic, and Orthodox traditions prioritize religious and societal harmony above individual positive rights.

41 Donnelly (2013), Part II. 6. The Relative Universality of Human Rights, page 94.

human rights.⁴² No other ideal has come even close to such widespread international endorsement by both governments and movements of political opposition across the globe.⁴³

There are currently six core international human rights treaties: two covenants, plus the conventions on racial discrimination, women's rights, torture, and the rights of the child. Each had in early 2012, on average, 172 signatory parties—this 88 percent ratification rate is strikingly high in contemporary international law.⁴⁴ Additionally, various expert committees monitor human rights implementation. Beyond global agreements, regional variations exist. The foremost examples are likely Europe's Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which covers mostly civil and political rights, and the European Social Charter, which addresses economic and social rights in considerable detail.⁴⁵ Other examples of regional human rights instruments are the 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and the 2004 Arab Charter of Human Rights, which entered into force in 2008, establishing an Arab Human Rights Committee.⁴⁶

With such general and widespread acceptance of human rights, why would anything need to be added? There are, however, a few issues with modern human rights—especially when looking from a 'decentralized' perspective.

Human Rights Shortcomings

The first issue is that human rights represent a codification of ideology, not liberty. As extensively discussed in this book, Western legal tradition directly shaped the current human rights order. But the world has changed in the meantime. When the UDHR was written, Europe was still the center of the world, and a large part of the world existed as subjected colonies. With the ambition to order the world for all, it was logical to think the world should become more like Europe. But as the chapter on natural law demonstrated, other cultures value other forms of legal order. The notion that the entire world could or should mirror Western Europe is unrealistic. Other nations do not desire this model. Regardless, Western-based international institutions continue to intervene in global affairs to achieve this ideal, both within and beyond their borders, and human rights legislation provides them with the moral and legal tools to do so.

This Western universality creates a second problem: it devalues alternative ways of living. Other ways of organizing society are considered, at best, a work in progress. Societies have to be nudged and manipulated until they act in line with what is deemed universal. Nations choosing their own path risk involvement in their local political affairs, being hit with economic sanctions, seeing their legitimate governments overthrown, and even suffering military invasions.

The modern cosmopolitan human rights advocate is no longer hindered by fixed universal and unchanging values but dances like a leaf on the winds of social and scientific novelties. Western thought went from a careful and humble exploration of that which is universal and making it the foundation of society to inventing increasingly exotic ideas and declaring them universal afterwards. Today's advocates are quick to express a problem as a human rights issue. Indeed, human rights law continues to gain international attention and strives to keep up pace with rapid social changes. This is, of course, getting it backwards. Basic human rights should reflect human

42 Ibid., Part II. 6. The Relative Universality of Human Rights, page 95.

43 Ibid., Part I, 4, 3. Moral Theory, Political Theory, and Human Rights, page 62.

44 Ibid., Part II. 6. The Relative Universality of Human Rights, page 95.

45 Ibid., Part IV, 11, Regional Human Rights Regimes, page 173.

46 Ibid., Part IV, 11, Regional Human Rights Regimes, page 178.

nature and provide a timeless legal foundation rather than serve as a political enforcement tool for contemporary social ideologies. Social reform advocates rarely consider that societies with ancient roots might not be eager to change their way of life to accommodate 'universal' standards and social norms nobody had heard of five years ago.

Philosophical Tension

From a philosophical perspective, modern human rights are all over the place. They occupy various categories in the Hohfeldian graph; they can be privileges, rights, powers, or immunities. They include both positive and negative rights and contain rights in rest and in motion. Most of all, they include rights that depend on enforcing unequal duties at both individual and state levels.

Traditionally, natural rights contained no entitlements. Entitlements benefit the one at the expense of the other. To fulfill an entitlement, one must apply force. Nowadays, entire generations have been raised with no notion of where their entitlements end and the rights of others begin. It is perfectly fine to secure entitlements in civil laws of an existing state, based on the social contract and governed by democratic procedures. The social safety net comes to mind. Health care and education facilitated by the state serve as other examples. However, such positive rights are never universal and cannot be considered natural.⁴⁷ After all, they depend on a specific government enforcing an unequal division of rights and duties. Unfortunately, it is an illusion to think that the world can be made equal by making the laws unequal. On such a fundamental level, the only way humans can truly be equal is in having the exact same rights and duties—equality in law. Moreover, unequal rights and duties cannot exist on a decentralized network without a government to enforce them. Here, equality is enforced by code.

The idea of natural rights that go beyond the power of contemporary government has stood at the center of Western civilization since its inception. After Bentham's legal reforms, a new concept emerged: law as a policy tool for those in power. The modern human rights movement, consequently, mixes contradicting objectives: the protection of inalienable natural rights and the subjection to powerful entities seeking utopia. These centrifugal forces tear at the fabric of the nation-state, currently the only level where rights are enforced and adjudicated.

The solution now is the same as in Roman times: liberty. Liberty is not to anyone's detriment. When rights are properly understood as liberties, governance does not rely on the initiation of force but merely ensures protection from it.

Codification and Enforcement Gaps

Modern interpretations of human rights reveal a fundamental contradiction about the origin of these rights. The vehement opposition to natural law leads to the conclusion that government is the source of all law. If human rights originated from the UN and EU, they would cease to exist if these institutions disappeared—an absurd notion. Natural and human rights declarations and conventions are not the source of rights but an attempt to formalize the rules for an orderly human society. Institutions simply interpreted and codified pre-existing ideas (each with different nuances).

⁴⁷ Author: Defining that which is not free as free in law does not make it free, it just distorts reality. It creates two categories of people: those that make use of the right, and those that have to bear the cost of it. Instead of uniting, it divides—and thus can never be claimed to be equal or universal. Moreover, they require an authority to make that which is unequal, equal.

The first example to consider is the U.S. Bill of Rights. Despite its lasting influence on American and global society, the Bill of Rights primarily addresses US-specific concerns, containing clauses uniquely American. Moreover, they are a mix of both natural and civil rights, and as such, they are not a list of universal natural rights.⁴⁸ Moreover, the Founding Fathers left out certain liberties so elemental to human existence that they could not have imagined future regulators transgressing against them (such as technology-enforced restrictions of property and transactional rights). On the flip side, they are a clear example of direct acceptance of natural law in the Constitution and the hearts and minds of the American people. It continues to positively influence American society through the legal system and acts as a moral compass for its citizens. The fact that Americans have a unique document codifying liberty at the center of their society highlights the fact that most countries do not have one. At the same time, the obsession with individual rights and the controversies stemming from them gave America the reputation of being a country of out-of-control litigation. That American rights are now defined far beyond basic liberties is not helpful for this exercise either.

The second example is the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFR). This is a positivist document that tries to meticulously codify rights as granted by the EU. There are no clear immutable rights, and the document is subject to ongoing specification, addition, and amendment. The CFR lays out what is and is not liberty, maintains periodical updates, and contains a long list of exemptions on basic rights.⁴⁹ This results in a complex document that is not easily understood by the average person. The CFR stands for the modern European interpretation of human rights and includes many positive rights. As such, the CFR's concept of rights is not natural, universal, or readily applicable in other parts of the world. Moreover, the European Centre for Law and Justice (ECLJ) discovered that multiple judges on the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR)—the highest court adjudicating European human rights issues—have connections to George Soros's Open Society Foundations, which also funds most of the NGOs bringing cases before the court.⁵⁰ Unsurprisingly, the EU human rights institutions have not been able to protect EU citizens from invasive international policies and seems unable to balance the interests of various parties—for example, the rights of citizens versus illegal aliens.

Finally, we have the UDHR and various other international law instruments. It is written as a top-down document that establishes the UN as the guarantor of human rights, protecting individuals from nation-states. While it is significant that these rights achieved global recognition and acceptance, they include a weak spot: the UN itself, along with its specialized agencies and policies, cannot be 'impaired' by the human rights in their covenants.⁵¹ As written in the UDHR,

48 "U.S. Constitution," (Cornell Law School), accessed on Aug 8, 2024, <https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution>, [Author: take for example the 2nd amendment, right to bear arms; 6th amendment, jury trial; 12th amendment, election of the president].

49 "Document 12012P/TXT, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 2012/C 326/02," (European Union, October 26, 2012), accessed on Aug 8, 2024, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:12012P/TXT>

50 "ECLJ, NGOs and the Judges of the ECHR 2009 – 2019," (European Center for Law and justice, February 2020), <https://eclj.org/ngos-and-the-judges-of-the-echr?lng=en>, page 2:
 "This report shows that at least 22 of the 100 permanent judges who have served on the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) between 2009 and 2019 are former officials or collaborators of seven NGOs that are highly active before the Court."

"The Open Society network [Author: George Soros] is distinguished by the number of judges linked to it and by the fact that it funds the other six organisations mentioned in this report."

51 "International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights," (1966), Art. 46:
 "Nothing in the present Covenant shall be interpreted as impairing the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and of the constitutions of the specialized agencies which define the respective responsibilities of the

“these rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.”⁵² According to its own treaties, individual rights are secondary to UN policies. Given that the UN and its specialized organizations aim to increasingly get involved in policymaking, this is problematic. This way, human rights are only guaranteed by IOs until it matters. The water gets even muddier when the UN declares its policies themselves as obligations derived from human rights and therefore duties on all states.⁵³ Natural rights were meant to protect individual autonomy from state interference; instead, they now justify global policies that erode both individual and state sovereignty.

It was Lauterpacht who argued that nation-states were “the insurmountable barrier between man and the law of mankind.”⁵⁴ According to him, democracy is not an absolute safeguard of freedom. This safeguard must lie outside and above the state.⁵⁵ The law of nature must supply, as it has done in the past, much of the spiritual basis and much of the political inspiration of that elevation of the rights of man to a legal plane superior to the will of sovereign states.⁵⁶ He went as far as arguing that international society must secure inalienable human freedoms as an indispensable condition of the peace of the world.⁵⁷ In his vision, an international legal order would be installed by democratic states to ensure that natural law is enforced.

Ironically, the resulting supranational forces have themselves become threats to both rights and sound government. This is a turning point in history. Governments across the world have subjected themselves to international institutions and begun neglecting basic human rights in response to various crises—real or imagined. At the same time, threats to individual rights have become increasingly profound and defused. Individual liberty no longer comes under pressure from states alone—the debt-based financial system, international NGOs, intergovernmental organizations, big business, scientific fundamentalism, and cross-border technology all play a part. As threats to liberty evolve, so must the tools that protect it. The dignity of the individual requires protection not just from other individuals but, more pressingly, from states and their supranational derivatives. Therefore, a bill of rights is needed that exists independently of the institutions threatening liberty. A bill that goes beyond any single state is not the codification of ideology, does not treat individuals as a means to an end, and exists separately from supranational governing layers. Blockchain technology has proved that this can be done for a financial system. Can it be done with law as well?

various organs of the United Nations and of the specialized agencies in regard to the matters dealt with in the present Covenant.”

52 “Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” (United Nations, 217 (III) A, Paris, 1948), <http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/>, Art 29 (3).

53 UN, “Frequently Asked Question on Human Rights and Climate Change, Fact Sheet No. 38,” (United Nations, Human Rights, Office of the High Commissioner, New York and Geneva 2021), page 30: “States, as primary duty bearers, have a positive obligation to mitigate climate change and ensure that all persons have the necessary capacity to adapt to its consequences. The responsibility of States to respect, protect and fulfil all human rights for all, in accordance with Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter of the United Nations, also applies to populations outside their territories.”

54 Lauterpacht (1950), page 77.

55 Ibid., page 123.

56 Ibid., page 126.

57 Ibid., page 78.

§ 16.3. A Renewed Call for Liberty

“Liberty consists not only in the right granted, but in the power given to man to exercise, to develop his faculties under the empire of justice, and under the protection of the law.”

~Frédéric Bastiat

What we need is a foundational legal framework independent of bureaucracies and political whims and wishes. One that lives in the hearts and minds of people around the world, just as the Bill of Rights lives in the hearts and minds of Americans. A framework of liberties embraced by all as owed to them by society and accepted as duty owed to others.

Each historical document of liberty addressed the needs of its specific time and place. The English Magna Carta allowed the English barons to extract authority from the king. The U.S. Bill of Rights similarly focused on the rights of American citizens. The UDHR established the UN and other global institutions as powerful central arbitrators to help prevent the horrors of war, thus focusing mainly on limiting the absolute rights of modern nation-states. Now the future demands a phase of global integration free from both all-powerful states and the unaccountable institutions that supplant them. Decentralized technology allows us to envision this legal system and build it from the bottom up. Why not start with a foundational legal document enacted on the blockchain that establishes minimum liberties for individuals across all decentralized networks?

Law emerges when individuals form collectives to protect both individual and shared interests. Liberties establish the scope of actions within the collective legal framework. Without this ability for individuals to act, there would be no legal system. Just as blockchain base layers ensure equal access in financial systems despite diverging interests, the codification of basic liberties ensures equal protection in society. The merger of the ideas of liberty with liberty-enhancing technologies appears intuitively logical. There are, however, limitations.

Hard-Coded Limitations

Decentralized technologies differ from traditional administrative systems. They are accessed and used individually and voluntarily. With cryptocurrencies, only the owner of the key has access to the funds. Any right requiring one group to pay for the other, however noble the agenda, cannot be enforced. The crypto industry gravitates toward full property and transactional rights. There is no collectivism in decentralized networks, unless by consent. There is no rearranging or transferring of rights and duties. It is a fascinating blueprint of humanity where people act in their self-interest while being integrated under a set of rules into mutually beneficial cooperation. The DBoL must align with this reality. Any other approach cannot work.

In a decentralized system with equal access, people are either equal or not. This binary outcome feels intuitively just but is surprisingly absent from the modern discourse on rights, which divides the entire world into regulators and regulated, grantors and beneficiaries, and various arbitrary groups with conflicting demands upon each other. Now we can finally aim for a legal foundation that is equal at its base layer. A system where all human beings are free in right, with corresponding duties to protect the same rights in others—not idealistic but realistic equality.

The other technological outcome of a blockchain-based legal system is the inability of any central authority to set rules or interfere with the system. It is, by design, an equal system where key holders express their free will without intermediaries. Everyone can freely participate and be

responsible for the consequences. Nobody answers to others or holds rights that depend on others. There can be no limitation of rights by third parties for ulterior objectives or personal gain. This is the most equal legal foundation ever created—the equality is hard-coded and not subjected to institutional ambitions, political processes, or contemporary fancies.

The Case for a Decentralized Bill of Liberties

Technology is uniting humanity in novel ways. Bitcoin demonstrated that neither financial intermediaries are needed to facilitate electronic transactions nor central banks to provide a monetary system. While blockchains primarily record transactions, they can store text as well. Decentralized networks could create and publish law. Replacing central authority with consent offers a revolutionary perspective on law-making.

Open-source technology, particularly cryptocurrency networks like Bitcoin, introduces a powerful new approach to preserving liberty. These systems operate through code rather than law, avoiding centralized control and ownership structures that could be subject to regulatory capture. This technological framework embodies natural rights principles, where duties reciprocally derive from the recognition of others' rights rather than from external regulation.

But without an enforcing authority, how can a bill of rights published on a blockchain serve to protect individual liberty? According to Hayek, formulations of individual rights “impress upon the public mind” the value of liberty and make it “part of a political creed which the people will defend even when they do not fully understand its significance.”⁵⁸ So the DBoL can serve as a compass and provide a foundation on which to build further decentralized legal systems. It provides participants in this industry (and beyond) with a tool to assess behavior, regulations, and technologies. The DBoL thus establishes a moral framework from which a code of conduct can be derived. Users can ask themselves, “Do my actions or technology violate someone’s rights?” If they do, then one indirectly chips away at one’s own liberty. Regardless of short-term benefits, one pays the price by living in a more corrupt society. Moreover, once people align with these principles, they gain an objective tool to evaluate the behavior of all institutions—from state authorities and corporations to DAOs, NGOs, (central) banks, multinational organizations, and especially IOs. Moreover, these standards can be read by both humans and machines, making them a possible input for AI and smart contracts.

The DBoL can inspire citizens of countries without a bill of rights by providing a blueprint for bottom-up implementation—an alternative to the unrealized promise of international instruments. The DBoL can function like a ‘prenuptial agreement’ to the social contract, establishing clear boundaries between what is transferred to collective rule and what remains under individual control. This arrangement divides governance into two distinct spheres: immutable foundational principles that protect individual rights and liberty and flexible operational systems that allow for the natural evolution of the law.

It is a well-established fact that states include both international and private standards in their national legislation, so why wouldn’t they include decentralized ones? Moreover, the DBoL could provide an anchor during times of political turmoil caused by shifts in monetary systems⁵⁹ or ineffective, authoritarian, or insolvent governments. The lack of geographical boundaries works

58 Hayek (1960), page 217.

59 Author: for example during transitions from a debt- to an asset based monetary system.

favorably: decentralized networks expand this jurisdiction across humanity. Many of these networks are now working on universal money, so why not do the same with universal law?

When establishing a social smart contract⁶⁰—whether a DAO, network state, or other Decentralized Law instrument—entities can ‘call’ upon the DBoL during the creation process. The DBoL and other legal standards could become an integrated part of SCBs or Decentralized Legal Systems (as explained later in the book). When uploaded as a smart contract on the blockchain, the DBoL can serve both blockchain projects and AI as an objective legal standard. Similar to how smart contract software ‘calls’ libraries of code, smart legal contracts can call law libraries of legal principles. Accepting these and other standards could become a prerequisite for doing business in a given industry.

The DBoL could help replace immature desires for freedom in cyberspace with mature liberty in law. It could help redirect attention away from democracy and voting systems that have dominated discussions in the crypto space. Democracy is the ruling form best able to express the collective will while posing the smallest threat to liberty. Democracy cannot be an end in itself, since it is merely a system for streamlining the essence of what truly matters: the rights and duties associated with living in a particular society. The core necessity of a just society is not democracy but liberty.

How should decentralized liberties ideally be interpreted? The ideal example comes from international tax law. Due to the complexities of international taxation, individuals investing abroad may face tax liability in two countries on the same income. To prevent this, countries establish tax treaties that limit taxation to one country. As a result, taxpayers pay taxes only once. Tax treaties protect the rights of individuals and limit the taxing rights of states. They do not grant rights to tax authorities, and they cannot limit the rights of taxpayers. Taxpayers are free to apply this tool to ensure their rights. The DBoL and other human rights documents function similarly: they limit the authority of states and IOs over the individual. In turn, they cannot be used to claim rights over individuals or to use protective duties as an excuse to curb other rights. This establishes the DBoL as a tool to facilitate free will while preventing individuals from becoming a means to an end.

The primary characteristic of decentralized networks is the absence of a central authority. What is accepted by the members becomes ‘law’ for all to follow. In line with this reality, the DBoL’s influence depends solely on its acceptance by the people—it stands or falls on its own. The people can follow the DBoL voluntarily. They can include it in their dispute settlement and enforcement systems. They can call on the DBoL to demand justice and make it a central theme of their (civil) governance systems or use it to assess the legitimacy of civil or international law.

Bitcoin started with a piece of code on the computer of an anonymous software developer. Only afterward did it enter the imagination of the people. Every law began as an idea written on paper. When Martin Luther nailed his Ninety-five Theses to the church door in Wittenberg in 1517, he sparked the breakup of the Catholic church—then the world’s most powerful organization with

60 Author: the term Social Smart Contract has been used before, for example by: Democracy Earth, “*The Social Smart Contract, An open source white paper*,” (Democracy Earth, Version 0.1: September 1st, 2017), accessed on October 25, 2024, <https://democracy.earth/>. Unfortunately, the paper does not define what a social smart contract is. In fact, both the terms ‘smart contract,’ or ‘smart social contract’ are not mentioned in the paper. This is not uncommon. A social contract is an ‘agreement among equal individuals to establish rights and duties under a form of government.’ A social smart contract can then be ‘a smart contract establishing rights and duties among equal individuals under a form of government by using blockchain technology.’

supreme authority over Europe.⁶¹ So far, blockchain technology has been the most promising social revolution of the twenty-first century. Posting a Decentralized Bill of Liberties on the blockchain is a logical next step. There it will live forever: immutable, decentralized, and available for everyone to apply to their lives as they see fit.

“The authority of the Constitution derived not from its authors, but from the people who ratified it: As the instrument came from them, it was nothing more than the draft of a plan, nothing but a dead letter, until life and validity were breathed into it, by the voice of the people...”
~James Madison (Founding Father of the U.S. Constitution)

Methodology

“Liberty is the only thing you cannot have unless you are willing to give it to others.”
~William Allen White


The next order of business is coming up with a list of liberties. The major distinction we must make is between positive rights depending on third parties and negative rights protecting against third parties. If we wish to get to the core of natural rights, we cannot include positive rights. First, positive rights require positive enactment: they must be established by a state, by civil law, or by consent. Positive laws are secondary, not primary, rights. Moreover, there cannot be natural rights that divide groups into categories such as providers and beneficiaries: natural rights apply equally. If we are free and equal by nature, we must believe in negative rights. Any positive rights would have to be provided by a legitimate government or grounded in consensual arrangements, such as the Consensus Jurisdiction elaborated on in a future chapter.

Taking all this into account, a bill of rights for blockchain systems requires several key characteristics. First, it can only consist of primary rights that divide equal interests, with respect for these rights being a duty for all. Second, the absence of coercion mandates selecting negative rights that facilitate the expression of free will. Third, it must restrict itself to rights of a universal character and in rem (against all). Fourth, these rights must remain non-transferable (in rest). Finally, given these requirements, it must avoid the broad term rights, instead focusing specifically on what the Hohfeldian system defines as privileges—better understood as liberties.

Graph of Liberty

To provide a more practical and visual understanding, I conceptualized the Graph of Liberty. In this case, it represents a society of sixteen people. Inside this framework, each individual has the same rights and duties. Within their square, individuals have full autonomy to act—it represents their liberty.

Expressing liberties in a graph reveals a few central concepts. First, liberties are bordered with and restricted by the rights and duties of others. Moreover, liberties are equal, or they are not liberties.



61 “Ninety-five Theses – work by Luther,” (Encyclopedia Britannica), accessed May 7, 2024, <https://www.britannica.com/event/Ninety-five-Theses>

Next, when liberty is the same for everybody, no group of people—including, and perhaps especially, a democratic majority—can make amendments to this frame in their own favor.

And finally, when rights and duties are divided equally among all people, the same principles apply to any two individuals. This insight allows us to assess which of the myriad rights is a true liberty.

Drafting a List of Liberties

Each liberty has to be written in a way that the relation between individuals is a mutual duty of respect. The goal is to develop a modern, universal, and practical interpretation of natural rights, not to solve all possible riddles and complications of human life. Individuals, legislators, and courts interpret specific circumstances according to local customs.

Natural liberties exist prior to any legal arrangements, and therefore, their level of detail is minimal. Thomas Aquinas already observed that the more general a precept of natural law is, the more likely it is to be known by a greater number of people. The more particular a precept of the natural law is, the more likely it is that a particular individual will get it wrong. The greater the detail, the more likely it will be that people disagree about what the natural law requires.⁶²

A simple set of liberties serves another purpose: unsophisticated audiences must be able to understand them for it to have value. Liberties are limited general principles that apply to all human beings. Therefore, the bill must be easily translatable into different languages.

How can we achieve this? Luckily, the foundation of fundamental rights is well established. Governments worldwide have enacted numerous bills of rights. How though, can we extract a set of liberties that can reasonably be considered universal? We must not forget the criticism of the legal positivists: law cannot be a set of arbitrary subjective preferences embellished with a claim to a higher power. One solution is to examine empirically the currently most widely accepted form of human rights: international law. As discussed, various treaties have garnered worldwide acceptance. Accomplished legal minds drafted these treaties. Governments and individuals across various times, ideologies, and cultures have almost universally accepted these guiding principles. Basing our list on these well-established principles eliminates both the need to reinvent the wheel and the risk of creating an arbitrary wish list of rights influenced by subjective beliefs and interpretations. Donnelly provided an excellent overview of internationally recognized human rights. His work summarizes those principles that are found in the UDHR and codified in international treaties.⁶³ This overview forms a base list of almost universally accepted human rights and can be comfortably relied upon.

Next, the DBoL required a selection of rights from this list that qualified as equal liberties. This was made possible by comparing them to the requirements established previously. The Graph of Liberty aided this analysis. First, envisioning a society of two people revealed if rights stood on their own or depended on third parties. This exercise helped select those negative rights that are equal and at rest. Next, extrapolating the rights to a society encompassing all people in the human family determined if the rights retained their meaning—a right to free health care sounds appealing but simply does not exist in most of the world. This helped me select the rights that are both universal and in rem. Finally, removing rights whose creation depends on civil laws or international

62 “*St. Thomas Aquinas on the Natural Law*,” (Aquinas Online), accessed on May 7, 2024, <https://aquinasonline.com/natural-law/>

63 Donnelly (2013), page 27: TABLE 2.1 INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED HUMAN RIGHTS, [Author: I verified this list against the legal instruments mentioned].

institutions completed the analysis. After all, at the fundamental natural law layer, no institutions exist to provide benefits—nor do they in decentralized networks. Moreover, ideals and public goals cannot play a role in the most foundational division of rights and duties of equals since they appear only after humans have organized themselves.

Outcomes and Additions

The original overview listed thirty-seven human rights that governments worldwide have agreed upon. Applying the methodology reduced the list to twenty-eight liberties. These I divided into ten categories of liberties and a list of prerequisites for a just legal system. The resulting bill consists of universally accepted rights already ratified by most states in the world. It satisfies both the concepts of natural and positive law because the list is defensible both philosophically and empirically. Furthermore, it extracts natural rights that are independent of religious doctrine and subjective morality, drawing instead upon timeless principles generally accepted as fair and just.

Still, to make the list suitable for the twenty-first century, cosmetic adjustments were needed. Rather than inventing categories of liberties, small additions were made to existing ones. In the article on life and liberty (Art. 1), the concept of bodily integrity and a safeguard against medical and scientific experimentation were included. This idea springs from the widely recognized Nuremberg Code, the world's response to the horrible treatment of prisoners during the Holocaust. It established the principle that no person should be subjected to medical and scientific experiments without consent.⁶⁴ The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights codified this principle as follows: "no one shall be subjected without his free consent to medical or scientific experimentation."⁶⁵

The second addition addresses the article on slavery and servitude and pertains to the continuous revelations about sexual misconduct perpetrated by people of influence.⁶⁶ Although every civilized nation's criminal code prohibits sexual violence and exploitation, for some reason, human rights treaties have not specifically included these offenses. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, article 6, prohibits the sexual exploitation of women.⁶⁷ However, sexual exploitation victimizes not only women, and sexual violence takes many forms. Art. 9 addresses this since these behaviors represent a grave violation of liberty (especially when conducted in an organized form).

Technology has introduced threats to liberty that those in the analog age could not have foreseen. Art. 3 adds privacy as a broad right since the need for privacy extends beyond correspondence—to areas such as data protection, for example. Art. 5 followed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to ensure free speech applies regardless of medium.⁶⁸ From the same

64 "Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10," (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949, Vol. 2, pp. 181-182. Washington, D.C.):
"The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential."

65 "International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights," (1966), Article 7:
"No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without his free consent to medical or scientific experimentation."

66 Author: in recent years many prominent entertainers and political figures have been discredited by accusations of sexual misconduct, both in the United States and in Europe.

67 "Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women," (United Nations General Assembly, Adopted 18 December 1979), Article 6:
"States Parties shall take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to suppress all forms of traffic in women and exploitation of prostitution of women."

instrument, the right of free exchange of goods and services was extracted.⁶⁹ Both property rights in general and transactional rights in particular form the foundation of a free and just society. Both have come under stress through (forced) intermediation and externally imposed policy objectives. Art. 6 addresses this situation.

Finally, Art. 2, given technology's vital role in modern society, expands on the right to participate in scientific advances to include technological ones as well. In addition, Art. 7, concerning the right to free assembly, was phrased broadly to cover all forms of (technological) association. Moreover, to emphasize the immediate application of these liberties rather than their contingency on hypothetical future enforcement, the DBoL replaces the 'shall be' terminology used in the conventions with more precise modal verbs. The resulting bill paves the way toward a digital age with a perfectly reasonable set of liberties that maintain the essence of human rights enacted globally.

Decentralized Enactment

The DBoL was published on February 27, 2025, on the Ethereum blockchain.⁷⁰ Explanations of its use are found on GitHub.⁷¹ A PDF version of the DBoL was published on the InterPlanetary File System under its author's name and an open-source license.⁷² This was done because of lessons learned from the Bitcoin protocol; its author's anonymity enabled nefarious actors to claim they were the inventors. Australian Craig Wright was notoriously successful in this regard (for a while). His copyright claims resulted in a stream of lawsuits against anyone involved in the open-source development of the technology and caused significant damage to the community. Many years and numerous court cases passed before it was established that he was not Satoshi Nakamoto.⁷³ Sadly, these kinds of disputes over authorship are not isolated events: even the earlier cited Nuremberg Code became the subject of such controversy once widely adopted.⁷⁴

68 "International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights," (1966), Article 19:

"1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.

2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice."

69 "International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights," (1966), Article 1:

"2. All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence."

70 "Contract 0xd7150425FE924f1e5D4d650AEBaA6365b1CB7dA," (Etherscan, Feb-27-2025 07:05:23 AM UTC), <https://etherscan.io/address/0xd7150425FE924f1e5D4d650AEBaA6365b1CB7dA#code>

71 "Decentralized Bill of Liberties," (Github, March 7, 2025), accessed on March 12, 2025,

<https://github.com/decentralized-law/bill-of-liberties>

72 "Decentralized Bill of Liberties," (IPFS, February 27, 2025), accessed on March 12, 2025,

<https://ipfs.io/ipfs/bafkreictr35gzfbpfvgjisui3k3pm2nms4h3mx2hlyezxfjc2kca2f34du>

73 CRYPTO OPEN PATENT ALLIANCE vs. CRAIG STEVEN WRIGHT, [2024] EWHC 1198 (Ch), The High Court of justice, Business and Property Courts of England and Wales, Intellectual Property List (ChD), 20th May 2024, page 227 (926):

"Overall, in my judgment, (and whether that distinction is maintained or not), Dr Wright's attempts to prove he was/is Satoshi Nakamoto represent a most serious abuse of this Court's process. The same point applies to other jurisdictions as well: Norway in particular. Although whether Dr Wright was Satoshi was not actually in issue in Kleiman, that litigation would not have occurred but for his claim to be Satoshi. In all three jurisdictions, it is clear that Dr Wright engaged in the deliberate production of false documents to support false claims and use the Courts as a vehicle for fraud. Despite acknowledging in this Trial that a few documents were inauthentic (generally blamed on others), he steadfastly refused to acknowledge any of the forged documents. Instead, he lied repeatedly and extensively in his attempts to deflect the allegations of forgery."

74 Shuster, Evelyne, "Fifty Years Later: The Significance of the Nuremberg Code," (Engl J Med 1997;337:1436-1440, VOL. 337 NO. 20, November 13, 1997).

In addition, and as the chapter on tokenization explained, any published work is subject to copyright law. The author owns the copyright to this work by law, regardless of opinion. Only by claiming full ownership of this work now and appropriately licensing it with an open-source license can it be ensured that people can use it without restrictions now and in the future.

“Victory has a thousand fathers, but defeat is an orphan.”

~John F. Kennedy

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