



- D0zer AKA Decrazyo
- Work for Veritas Technologies
- Former software engineer
- Penetration tester / Exploit developer
- Offensive Security OSCP, OSCE, OSWE
- Keyboard enthusiast

Why?!



Good Enough

- ☑ Short key travel
- Wired (USB)
- Non-standard layout
- Membrane switches




Okay

- ☑ Standard layout
- Wired (PS2)
- Keys jam
- Membrane switches



Hot Garbage

- Non-standard layout
- Short range
- **区** Connection issues
- Chiclet keys
- Membrane switches
- Wears socks with sandals
- ▼ Takes candy from babies




- Wireless
- TKL / 87-key / 80%
- Trackpoint
- Mechanical switches
- Standard layout



Logitech Unifying Features

- Purpose built
- AES Encrypted*
- 6 devices 1 receiver
- Host-independent pairing
- Long range
- Quick reconnect

*only keystrokes are encrypted



Prior Research

- Travis Goodspeed
 - nRF24 pseudo-promiscuous mode
- Samy Kamkar
 - KeySweeper
- Marc Newlin
 - MouseJack, KeyJack, KeySniffer
- Matthias Deeg and Gerhard Klostermeier
 - Of Mice and Keyboards




What We Know About Unifying

Nordic Semiconductor hardware

- Receivers: nRF24LU1


Devices: nRF24LE1

- Enhanced Shockburst protocol
 - Packet based data link layer
- Most Unifying payload data
- AES-128-CTR encryption




K400r Keyboard PCB

Payload Structure




AES Encryption Overview

- Initialization vector (IV)
 - Nonce
 - Counter
- Encryption key
- Encrypt IV with key
- XOR with plaintext




AES Decryption Overview

- Similar to encryption
- Encrypt IV with key
- XOR with ciphertext




What We Don't Know About Unifying

- Nonce value
- How the IV is generated
- How the key is negotiated
- Plaintext value




Plan of Attack

- Modify receiver firmware
- Hijack AES interrupt
 - AESIRQ
- Wait for encrypted payload
- Read AES registers
 - AESKIN
 - AESIV
- Write AES key / IV to flash



Testing Hardware

- Unifying receiver
 - Easy to brick
- Crazyradio PA
 - Same chip
 - SPI Interface





RIP



Testing Hardware


- Unifying receiver
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 - Same chip
 - SPI Interface



Testing Hardware

- Unifying receiver
 - Easy to brick
- Crazyradio PA
 - Same chip
 - SPI Interface
- Bus Pirate
 - Read / write flash





- Flash modified firmware
- Pair a device
- Type something
- Dump flash







Success?

- Encryption key (AESKIN)
 25 8A 18 6E 6F 78 81 E5 C8 29 E5 B6 40 4A 23 D8
- Initialization vector (AESIV)
 B8 F7 6A ØE 2A A3 73 Ø4 67 ØD DD 49 F8 4C C1 61
- Values changes after every boot
- IV does not include the counter
- Firmware doesn't write to AESKIN and AESIV

Lets Ask Support

... "Is communication between a Unifying device an its associated receiver secure?"


- D0zer

"Its support it by 128-BIT AES ENCRYPTION"

- Logitech Support


Lets Ask Support

- ... "How do a device and a receiver negotiate a shared AES encryption key?"
 - D0zer
- ... "this is a LOGITECH pivate information, the only thing that i can tell you is that if you wanna use any of our products you need to use a software or hardware provide it from us."
 - Logitech Support





- Flash Crazyradio PA
 - Unifying receiver firmware
- Dump flash over SPI
 - Bus Pirate + Crazyradio PA
- Pair a device
- Dump flash again
- Compare flash dumps



Flash Dump

Before pairing

After pairing


```
6c10: 02 12 05 00 28 88 02 04 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
6c20: 03 fd 26 92 04 01 06 06 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
6c30: 03 fd 26 92 04 02 06 07 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
6c40: 20 07 14 40 16 04 02 01 0d 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
6c50: 30 9f 22 a5 75 1a 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00
6c60: 40 04 4b 33 33 30 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
7000: 00 fd 26 92 04 40 16 88 02 bc 66 6a a3 61 e6 33
```

Flash Dump


- 16 consecutive bytes
- AES key?
- Still need the nonce

After pairing

```
6c10: 02 12 05 00 28 88 02 04 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
6c20: 03 fd 26 92 04 01 06 06 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
6c30: 03 fd 26 92 04 02 06 07 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
6c40: 20 07 14 40 16 04 02 01 0d 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
6c50: 30 9f 22 a5 75 1a 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00
6c60: 40 04 4b 33 33 30 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
7000: 00 fd 26 92 04 40 16 88 02 bc 66 6a a3 61 e6 33
7080: 04 ff ff
```




- AES in software?
- Everything is in RAM!
- Dump RAM
- Pair a device
- Type something
- Dump RAM again
- Compare RAM dumps



How to Dump RAM

- Bootloader?
- We don't need no stinkin' bootloader
- SPI flashing bypasses the bootloader
- Hijack execution at the bootloader
- Dump RAM to flash
- Dump flash over SPI like before



Before pairing

After pairing and typing

Before pairing

After pairing and typing

Encrypted keystroke packet

Before pairing

After pairing and typing

```
      0260:
      00
      00
      01
      02
      03
      02
      D9
      FD
      04
      6A
      6D
      33
      33
      BC
      88

      0270:
      9E
      16
      E6
      6D
      40
      A3
      FF
      00
      FF
      FF
```

Encrypted keystroke packet

Before pairing

After pairing and typing

Encrypted keystroke packet

Before pairing

After pairing and typing

Encrypted keystroke packet

Success!

Initialization vector

04 14 1D 1F 27 28 0D 05 67 4F 29 0A 0D 13 26 0E

Encryption key


02 D9 FD 04 6A 6D 33 33 BC 88 9E 16 E6 6D 40 A3

Encrypted payload

82 92 B3 D3 D6 D2 93 E0

Decrypted payload

00 00 00 00 00 00 00 C9



key

RAM after pairing (encryption key)
 02 D9 FD 04 6A 6D 33 33 BC 88 9E 16 E6 6D 40 A3

Flash after pairing
 FD 26 92 04 40 16 88 02 BC 66 6A A3 61 E6 33 38

RAM after pairing (encryption key)
 D9 FD 04 6A 6D 33 33 BC 88 9E 16 E6 6D 40 A3


Flash after pairing (obfuscated encryption key)
 FD 26 92 04 40 16 88 02 BC 66 6A A3 61 E6 33 38

- RAM after pairing (encryption key)
 D9 FD 04 6A 6D 33 33 BC 88 9E 16 E6 6D 40 A3
- RAM before pairing (bitmask)
 FF 00 FF FF 00 AA FF FF 00 FF FF AA FF FF

Flash after pairing (obfuscated encryption key)
 FD 26 92 04 40 16 88 02 BC 66 6A A3 61 E6 33 38

- RAM after pairing (encryption key)
 02 D9 FD 04 6A 6D 33 33 BC 88 9E 16 E6 6D 40 A3
- RAM before pairing (bitmask)
 FF 00 FF FF 00 AA FF FF 00 FF FF AA FF FF
- Bitwise XNOR
 02 26 FD 04 6A 92 66 33 BC 88 61 16 E6 38 40 A3
- Flash after pairing (obfuscated encryption key)
 FD 26 92 04 40 16 88 02 BC 66 6A A3 61 E6 33 38

Bitwise XNOR
 02 26 FD 04 6A 92 66 33 BC 88 61 16 E6 38 40 A3



Bitwise XNOR
 02 26 FD 04 6A 92 66 33 BC 88 61 16 E6 38 40 A3











BB:0A:DC:A5:75






BB:0A:DC:A5:75












It Gets Worse

- Typical AES-128 key space
 2¹²⁸ = 340282366920938463463374607431768211456 keys
- Key space minus 4 bytes from known RF address 296 = 79228162514264337593543950336 keys
- Minus 2 more bytes from predictable receiver product ID $2^{80} = 1208925819614629174706176$ keys
- Minus 2 more bytes from predictable device product ID $2^{64} = 18446744073709551616$ keys

How Bad is This?

	Typical AES-128	Weakened AES-128
Key space	34028236692093846346337 4607431768211456 keys	18446744073709551616 keys
Cracking speed w/ 3.8GHz i7-10700K	300000000 keys/sec	300000000 keys/sec
Cracking time	35967610236020047296568 years	1949 years
Age of the universe	13800000000 years	13800000000 years



POLICE POLICE?

ow much you can save: DOOX) 555-5555

DER MAANENT

ENCRYPTION GRAPHIC

-u monthly payment: \$56.63



House & Home Insurance

coverage with Somestate. It's worth another look

Polici Po


welling Protection \$269.067

Other Structures Personal Property \$269,067 Liability \$13,454

Guest \$188,347

\$300,000

Deductible Amount \$5,000



Doar John

s been a whi


NOTE: Eligible Allstate discounts may lower this payment.

Call me at (XXX) XXX-XXXX Plus, my agen





Next Steps



- Receiver firmware
- Enhanced security

- Build keyboard
- Unifying library
- TMK, QMK, ZMK, BlueMicro



Thank You

Questions?

Email – decrazyo@gmail.com

Discord – @decrazyo

https://github.com/decrazyo/logihack

https://github.com/decrazyo/unifying