A Foundational Formalization of Grounded Arithmetic in Isabelle/Pure

BSc Thesis

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Abstract

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Introduction 1

1.1 Motivation: Recursive Definitions in Classical and Constructive Logic

We start with the simple observation that in logics of both classical and constructive tradition, there is a seemingly inherent lack of definitional freedom. That is, definitions must describe provably terminating expressions. The reason for these restrictions is that, without them in place, these logics would be inconsistent.

To see this for the case of classical logic, consider the definition

$$L \equiv \neg L.$$

Let us imagine that this is a valid definition in a classical logic (that is, a logic that at least has the law of excluded middle (LEM) and double negation elimination). If the logic allows us to deduce either of L or $\neg L$, the other can be decuded as well by unfolding the definition and making use of double negation elimination, making the logic inconsistent.

Thanks to the LEM, we can prove that L holds by contradiction.

Assuming $\neg L$, we can derive $\neg\neg L$ by unfolding the definition once and then L via double negation elimination. Since we derived both L and $\neg L$ from hypothetically assuming $\neg L$, a contradiction, this allows us to definitely conclude L.

What went wrong? The law of excluded middle forces a truth value on any term in classical logic, thus circular or non-sensical definitions such as $L \equiv \neg L$, for which no truth value can or should be assigned, cannot be admitted.

Constructive logics discard the law of excluded middle and are thus safe from a proof by contradiction like the one shown above. However, in intuitionistic tradition, lambda calculus terms are interpreted as proof terms, witnessing the truth of the proposition encoded by their type. Lambda functions of type $A \Rightarrow B$ are then interpreted as producing a proof of B given a proof of A, which however means that they must always terminate.

To see this, consider the following attempt at a definition of an (ill-founded) term of type $\forall \alpha.\alpha$, i.e., a proof of every proposition:

$$\text{prove\_anything} := \Lambda\alpha.\ \text{prove\_anything}\ \alpha$$

Here, the construct Λ is the type-level analogue of lambda abstraction: it abstracts over a type variable and substitutes it in the body. That is, if e has type T, then $\Lambda\alpha.e$ has type $\forall \alpha.T$.

If such a term were permitted in the logic, it would type-check as having type $\forall \alpha.\alpha$. Instantiating it at any type P yields a term of type P, i.e., a proof of P for arbitrary P, making every proposition in the logic trivially provable.

What went wrong this time? Functions in constructive logics represent logical implication. If a function has type $A \Rightarrow B$, the function must provide proof of B, that is, return a term $b : B$, given any term $a : A$. The function *witnesses* the implication of A to B. If the function does not terminate on an input however, this proof is not actually constructed and assuming the hypothetical resulting proof term leads to inconsistency.

1.2 Enter GD

Grounded deduction (GD) is a logical framework developed recently at EPFL and whose development was motivated by precisely the observation made above. The project aims to axiomatize a consistent (free from contradiction) formal system, in which arbitrary recursion in definitions is permitted and which is still as expressive as possible.

In Section 2.2, *Grounded Arithmetic* (GA), a first-order theory of arithmetic based on *grounded* principles, is fully formalized based on a formalization by the authors of GD [1].

To get an intuition of the ideas of GA, consider again the definition $L \equiv \neg L$ and how it behaves in GA, after already having discussed how it behaves in a classical logic. The definition $L \equiv \neg L$ is perfectly valid in GA. However, when trying to assign a truth value to it, i.e. to prove either L or $\neg L$, it is quickly apparent that this is not possible using the GA inference rules. For example, the derived contradiction rule in GA provides no help, as opposed to the classical version. The reason for this is an additional premise of $p \vee \neg p$, a circular proof obligation, since it asks for the very truth value assignment we are currently trying to prove. The truth value of L is not *grounded* in anything.

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash p \ \mathsf{B} \quad \Gamma \cup \{\neg p\} \vdash q \quad \Gamma \cup \{\neg p\} \vdash \neg q}{\Gamma \vdash p}$$

Similarly, many other inference rules in GA demand a *grounding* of the involved values as additional premises compared to their classical counterparts. The authors refer to these premises as *habeas quid* conditions.

There is an ongoing formalization project of GD/GA in the proof assistant Isabelle/HOL, which already yielded a consistency proof of the quantifier-free fragment of GD, showing great promise for GD as a reasoning framework. However, the other aim of GD is to show that it is also expressive and importantly, usable as a tool for formalizing mathematics itself. It is not clear whether *grounded* reasoning is feasible when aiming to formalize even basic arithmetic. The GA formalization in the mature HOL logic enables studying meta-logical properties such as consistency. However, it is not suitable for providing GD/GA as a tool for formal reasoning itself for a few reasons.

- Formalizing GD within a mature metalogic such as HOL adds the axioms of the metalogic to the trusted base of GD, which is undesirable from a meta-logical perspective.
- The logical primitives and axioms being embedded within the primitives of another logic (HOL in this case) makes reasoning within it contrived and needlessly complicated.
- A logic is developed largely for idealistic reasons; the authors believe its reasoning principles are the right ones for at least some domain. Formalizing such a logic within another rich logic means that its reasoning principles are simply embedded in the, likely very different principles, of the meta-logic, defeating that purpose.

It is thus highly desirable to formalize a foundational formal system like GD atop a very minimal reasoning framework.

This is exactly what Isabelle provides with the Pure framework: A minimal, generic logical calculus to formalize object logics on top of. Any object logic in Isabelle, including Isabelle/HOL, is formalized atop Pure.

This thesis aims to fully axiomatize GA in Pure, yielding essentially an interactive theorem prover Isabelle/GA, which can be used for formal reasoning based directly on the reasoning principles and axioms of GA. The next goal is to formalize large chunks of basic arithmetic to evaluate the feasibility of GA as a foundation of mathematical reasoning and provide tooling and proof automation to try and make *grounded* reasoning as small of an inconvenience over classical reasoning as possible.

Background 2

2.1 Isabelle/Pure

Isabelle provides a logical framework called *Pure*. It contains a minimal meta-logic, which is a typed lambda calculus with few additional connectives, some keywords to add types and constants to said calculus, and a structured proof language called Isar. Any object logic in Isabelle, for example the highly mature Isabelle/HOL fragment, are formalized atop *Pure*. Isabelle itself is implemented in the Standard ML (SML) programming language.

This subsection provides a formalization of the *Pure* calculus. Unfortunately, there is no single document that lays out the syntax, axioms, and derivation rules of the *Pure* calculus in their entirety. The following is an attempt at providing such a characterization, combining information from two Isabelle papers [2], [3] and the Isabelle reference manual [4].

2.1.1 Syntax of Pure

The core syntax of *Pure* is a typed lambda calculus, augmented with type variables, universal quantification, equality, and implication.

Propositions are terms of the distinct type `prop`. Propositions in *Pure* are thus terms and not types, like they are in type-theory based provers like Rocq or Lean.

Type Syntax

$$\tau ::= \alpha \qquad\qquad \text{type variable}$$
$$| \ \tau \Rightarrow \tau \qquad \text{function type}$$
$$| \ \text{prop} \qquad\quad \text{type of propositions}$$

Term Syntax

$$t ::= x \qquad\qquad\quad \text{variable}$$
$$| \ c \qquad\qquad\quad \text{constant}$$
$$| \ t \ t \qquad\qquad\ \text{application}$$
$$| \ \lambda x :: \tau.t \qquad\ \text{lambda abstraction}$$
$$| \ t \Longrightarrow t \qquad\quad \text{implication}$$
$$| \ t \equiv t \qquad\qquad \text{equality}$$
$$| \ \bigwedge x :: \tau.t \qquad \text{universal quantification}$$

The symbols used for implication, equality, and universal quantification are non-standard to leave the standard symbols free for object logics.

Even though *Pure* has type variables, it provides no construct to capture them as an argument, and thus also has no for-all type like the polymorphic lambda calculus System F.

2.1.2 Equality, Implication, and Quantification as Type Constructors

The connectives equality, implication, and universal quantification are all type constructors of the `prop` type with the following polymorphic type signatures.

$$\equiv \ :: \alpha \Rightarrow \alpha \Rightarrow \text{prop}$$
$$\implies \ :: \text{prop} \Rightarrow \text{prop} \Rightarrow \text{prop}$$
$$\bigwedge \ :: (\alpha \Rightarrow \text{prop}) \Rightarrow \text{prop}$$

The arguments of $\equiv$ are the two operands to compare, the arguments for $\implies$ are the sequent and consequent respectively, while the argument of $\bigwedge$ is a function from the type whose inhabitants are quantified over to the term that represents the body of the quantifier.

Since type variables denote only a single, albeit arbitrary, type, there is technically one instance of each polymorphic connective for every given type. For example, for any type σ, there is a constant $\underset{\sigma}{\equiv} \ :: \sigma \Rightarrow \sigma \Rightarrow \text{prop}$.

2.1.3 Deduction Rules

The operational semantics of the underlying lamdba calculus and its typing rules are standard and thus omitted. The following discusses the more interesting deduction rules, which make *Pure* a logical framework.

Relative to an object logic with a set of defined axioms A any axiom $\alpha \in A$ can always be derived, as can any assumption $\gamma \in \Gamma$.

Basic Rules

$$\frac{A \text{ axiom}}{\Gamma \vdash A} \quad \text{(Axiom)} \qquad\qquad \frac{A \in \Gamma}{\Gamma \vdash A} \quad \text{(Ass)}$$

The implication and universal quantification introduction and elimination rules are standard.

Implication Deduction Rules

$$\frac{\Gamma \cup \{A\} \vdash B}{\Gamma \vdash A \implies B} \quad (\implies I) \qquad\qquad \frac{\Gamma_1 \vdash A \implies B \quad \Gamma_2 \vdash A}{\Gamma_1 \cup \Gamma_2 \vdash B} \quad (\implies E)$$

Universal Quantification Deduction Rules

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash B(x) \quad x \text{ not free in } \Gamma}{\Gamma \vdash \bigwedge x.B(x)} \quad \left(\bigwedge I\right) \qquad\qquad \frac{\Gamma \vdash \bigwedge x.B(x)}{\Gamma \vdash B(a)} \quad \left(\bigwedge E\right)$$

For equality, besides the expected deduction rules corresponding to the equivalence relation properties, there are also deduction rules for equality of lambda abstractions and `prop`, the latter of which is defined as equivalence of truth values ($a \implies b$ and $b \implies a$).

Equality Deduction Rules

$$\frac{}{\Gamma \vdash a \equiv a} \quad (\equiv \text{Refl}) \qquad \frac{\Gamma \vdash b \equiv a}{\Gamma \vdash a \equiv b} \quad (\equiv \text{Sym}) \qquad \frac{\Gamma \vdash a \equiv b \quad \Gamma \vdash b \equiv c}{\Gamma \vdash a \equiv c} \quad (\equiv \text{Trans})$$

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash a \equiv b}{\Gamma \vdash (\lambda x.a) \equiv (\lambda x.b)} \quad (\equiv \text{Lam}) \qquad \frac{\Gamma \vdash a \implies b \quad \Gamma \vdash b \implies a}{\Gamma \vdash a \equiv b} \quad (\equiv \text{prop})$$

The λ-conversion rules facilitate equivalence reasoning for lambda abstractions. The rules are α-conversion, β-conversion and extensionality. The notation $a[y/x]$ expresses the substitution of x with y in a, that is, all occurences of x in a are replaced with y.

Lambda Conversion Rules

$$\frac{\text{y not free in } a}{\Gamma \vdash (\lambda x.a) \equiv (\lambda y.a[y/x])} \quad (\alpha\text{-Conv}) \qquad \frac{}{\Gamma \vdash (\lambda x.a)\ b \equiv a[b/x]} \quad (\beta\text{-Conv})$$

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash f\ x \equiv g\ x \quad \text{x not free in } \Gamma, f, \text{and } g}{\Gamma \vdash f \equiv g} \quad (\text{Ext})$$

Finally, the equivalence substitution rule:

Equivalence Elimination

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash a \equiv b \quad \Gamma \vdash a}{\Gamma \vdash b} \quad (\equiv E)$$

2.1.4 Formalizing Object Logics in Pure

An object logic in *Pure* is created by adding new types, constants and axioms. That is, the *Pure* logic is extended.

It is convention to define a new propositional type in an object logic, which is used as the type of propositions in the *object* logic, as opposed to the *meta* logic, which is *Pure*.

This is achieved using the typedecl keyword, which declares a syntactic type in the *Pure* calculus. This type has no known inhabitants or any other information yet.

$$\text{typedecl } o$$

Any information about o must be axiomatized. For example, the following declares typed constants disj and True and axiomatizes certain rules about them.

```
1  axiomatization                                          Isabelle
2    True :: ‹o› and
3    disj :: ‹o ⇒ o ⇒ o›   (infixr ‹∨› 30)
```

```
4 where
5   true:   ‹True›
6   disjI1: ‹P ⟹ P ∨ Q› and
7   disjI2: ‹Q ⟹ P ∨ Q› and
```

The axiomatized rules here simply state that True holds and that from either P or Q, $P \lor Q$ can be derived. Here, P and Q are implicitly universally quantified, ranging over all terms of type prop. That is, P and Q can be substituted for any term of the correct type (which is o for both P and Q here). Now, the type o has knows inhabitants and structure. However, Isabelle (or rather, *Pure*) cannot reason about it, because it cannot connect the type o meaningfully with its meta-theory. To resolve this, a judgment must translate from the object-level proposition type o to the meta-level type prop.

```
1 judgment                                              Isabelle
2   Trueprop :: ‹o ⟹ prop›  (‹_› 5)
```

The syntax annotation (‹_› 5) means that any term of type o is implicitly augmented with the Trueprop judgment. The very low precedence value of 5 ensures that the Trueprop judgment is only applied to top-level terms. For example, the term $x \lor \mathrm{True}$ is the same as Trueprop $(x \lor \mathrm{True})$ and both are of type prop due to the Trueprop predicate converting the formula to that type.

As you might have noticed, we have made use of this implicit conversion from o to prop already in the axiomatization block from earlier. That is, the Trueprop judgment must be declared before the axiomatization block, else the latter will just report a typing error.

Now, we can state and prove a first lemma in this tiny object logic, using the previously defined axioms.

```
1 lemma "x ∨ True"                                      Isabelle
2 apply (rule disjI2)
3 apply (rule true)
4 done
```

Applying disjI2 'selects' the second disjunct to prove, which results in the subgoal True, which in turn we can solve using the true axiom.

This short introduction suffices for now, as we will later implement a much richer logic, Grounded Deduction, using these same basic constructs. We can clearly see that implementing an object logic in *Pure* actually extends *Pure*, in the sense that it adds new types and deduction rules. For example, our extension added a type and three symbols to the existing syntax of *Pure*. If we call the tiny logic formalized above *Pure'*, the following is its type and term syntax:

Type Syntax of Pure'

$$
\begin{aligned}
\tau \Coloneqq\ &\alpha && \text{type variable} \\
\mid\ &\tau \Rightarrow \tau && \text{function type} \\
\mid\ &\text{prop} && \text{type of propositions} \\
\mid\ &o && \text{type of object logic propositions}
\end{aligned}
$$

Term Syntax of Pure'

$$
\begin{aligned}
t \Coloneqq\ &x && \text{variable} \\
\mid\ &c && \text{constant} \\
\mid\ &t\ t && \text{application} \\
\mid\ &\lambda x :: \tau.t && \text{lambda abstraction} \\
\mid\ &t \Longrightarrow t && \text{implication} \\
\mid\ &t \equiv t && \text{equality} \\
\mid\ &\bigwedge x :: \tau.t && \text{universal quantification} \\
\mid\ &\text{True} && \text{o-typed true constant} \\
\mid\ &t \vee t && \text{o-typed logical or} \\
\mid\ &\text{Trueprop } t && \text{conversion function o to prop}
\end{aligned}
$$

Further, we can view the added axioms as new inference rules, with the explicit Trueprop function application.

$$
\frac{\Gamma \vdash \text{Trueprop } P}{\Gamma \vdash \text{Trueprop } P \vee Q}\ (\text{disjI1})
\qquad\qquad
\frac{\Gamma \vdash \text{Trueprop } Q}{\Gamma \vdash \text{Trueprop } P \vee Q}\ (\text{disjI2})
$$

$$
\frac{}{\Gamma \vdash \text{Trueprop True}}\ (\text{true})
$$

It is technically possible to avoid declaring a new proposition type for an object logic and instead use prop directly as the type of propositions. However, doing so means that the (object) logic immediately inherits the built-in connectives and deduction rules, such as implication ($\Longrightarrow$) and universal quantification ($\bigwedge$), and the sequent-style reasoning built into the kernel.

Such a structure reduces the control one has over the logic and keeps many reasoning principles implicit.

2.2 Grounded Arithmetic (GA)

This subsection provides a full characterization of GA, a first-order formalization of arithmetic based on the principles of GD. This is the fragment that is later formalized in Isabelle.

GA makes definitions first-class objects in the logic and allows arbitrary references of the symbol currently being defined or other, previously defined symbols, in the expanded term.

To prevent immediate inconsistency, GA must weaken other deduction rules commonly seen in classical logic. Specifically, GA adds a so-called *habeas quid* sequent to many inference rules. Intuitively, this means that in certain inference rules, a (sub)term must first be shown to terminate.

2.2.1 BGA Formalization

We start by formalizing the syntax and axioms of *Basic Grounded Arithmetic* (*BGA*), the quantifier-free fragment of GA, based on the formalization in [1]. This formulation later adds quantifiers by encoding them as unbounded computations in *BGA*, yielding full *GA*. This however requires a sophisticated encoding using Gödel-style reflection, i.e. encoding its own term syntax into natural numbers, which is out of scope for a formalization in *Pure*. Thus, we will later add quantifiers by simply axiomatizing them.

The primitive term syntax of BGA is the following.

BGA Primitive Term Syntax

$t ::= x$	variable
$\mid 0$	natural-number constant zero
$\mid \mathbf{S}(t)$	natural-number successor
$\mid \mathbf{P}(t)$	natural-number predecessor
$\mid \neg t$	logical negation
$\mid t \vee t$	logical disjunction
$\mid t = t$	natural-number equality
$\mid$ if t then t else t	conditional evaluation
$\mid d(t, ..., t)$	application of recursive definition

It is noteworthy that the GA term syntax mixes expressions that are natural numbers and expressions that are formulas into the same syntactic category. For example, the expression $S(x) = x \vee x$ is a valid term according to the syntax, despite the left-hand side shape clearly indicating a natural number, while the right hand side shape indicates a truth value.

Besides the primitives, other constants and logical connectives are defined as notational shorthands using the primitives.

Notational Shorthands

$$\begin{aligned}
\text{True} &\equiv 0 = 0 & &\text{true constant} \\
\text{False} &\equiv 0 = S(0) & &\text{false constant} \\
a \ \mathsf{N} &\equiv a = a & &\text{number type} \\
p \ \mathsf{B} &\equiv p \vee \neg p & &\text{boolean type} \\
p \wedge q &\equiv \neg(\neg p \vee \neg q) & &\text{logical conjunction} \\
p \to q &\equiv \neg p \vee q & &\text{implication} \\
p \leftrightarrow q &\equiv (p \to q) \wedge (q \to p) & &\text{biconditional} \\
a \neq b &\equiv \neg(a = b) & &\text{inequality}
\end{aligned}$$

The surprising shorthands are $a \ \mathsf{N}$ and $p \ \mathsf{B}$. The latter is a predicate over p deciding whether it is a binary truth value. In a logic with the law of excluded middle, $p \ \mathsf{B}$ would be a tautology for any p, but in a logic without it, it can be interpreted as a termination certificate for truth values. Similarly, $a \ \mathsf{N}$ can be interpreted as a termination certificate for natural number expressions. The shorthand itself is surprising, because if equality is reflexive, $a = a$ is true for any a. In GA however, equality is not reflexive as we will soon see, and a proof of $a = a$ is equivalent to a termination proof of the expression.

The syntax does not mean much without a set of axioms giving them meaning. We start with listing the propositional logic axioms.

In the following, Γ denotes a set of background assumptions. For completeness sake, the explicit structural rules governing this set of assumptions is listed here. Since Γ is a set, the usually explicit rules for permuting and duplicating assumptions are not needed.

Structural Rules

$$\frac{}{\Gamma \cup \{p\} \vdash p} \ (\text{H}) \qquad\qquad \frac{\Gamma \vdash q}{\Gamma \cup \{p\} \vdash q} \ (\text{W})$$

Propositional Logic Axioms

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash p}{\Gamma \vdash p \vee q} \ (\vee\,\text{I1}) \qquad \frac{\Gamma \vdash q}{\Gamma \vdash p \vee q} \ (\vee\,\text{I2}) \qquad \frac{\Gamma \vdash \neg p \quad \Gamma \vdash \neg q}{\Gamma \vdash \neg(p \vee q)} \ (\vee\,\text{I3})$$

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash p}{\overline{\overline{\Gamma \vdash \neg\neg p}}} \ (\neg\neg\,\text{IE}) \qquad \frac{\Gamma \vdash p \quad \Gamma \vdash \neg p}{\Gamma \vdash q} \ (\neg E) \qquad \frac{\Gamma \vdash \neg(p \vee q)}{\Gamma \vdash \neg p} \ (\vee\,\text{E1})$$

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash \neg(p \vee q)}{\Gamma \vdash \neg q} \ (\vee\,\text{E2}) \qquad \frac{\Gamma \vdash p \vee q \quad \Gamma \cup \{p\} \vdash r \quad \Gamma \cup \{q\} \vdash r}{\Gamma \vdash r} \ (\vee\,\text{E3})$$

Rules such as $\neg\neg$ IE with a double-line are bidirectional, i.e. they serve as both an introduction and elimination rule.

The propositional axioms are fairly standard, but inclusion of double negation elimination is notable, as this is common in classical logics, but omitted in computational logics.

Equality Axioms

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash a = b}{\Gamma \vdash b = a} \quad (= S) \qquad\qquad \frac{\Gamma \vdash a = b \quad \Gamma \vdash K\ a}{\Gamma \vdash K\ b} \quad (= E)$$

The equality axioms notably omit reflexivity. Symmetry of equality is an axiom, as is equality substitution in an arbitrary context K. Transitivity of equality can be deduced using equality substitution.

Natural Number Axioms

$$\frac{}{\Gamma \vdash 0\ \mathsf{N}} \quad (0I) \qquad \frac{\Gamma \vdash a = b}{\Gamma \vdash \mathbf{S}(a) = \mathbf{S}(b)} \quad (\mathbf{S} = IE) \qquad \frac{\Gamma \vdash a = b}{\Gamma \vdash \mathbf{P}(a) = \mathbf{P}(b)} \quad (\mathbf{P} = I)$$

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash a\ \mathsf{N}}{\Gamma \vdash \mathbf{P}(\mathbf{S}(a)) = a} \quad (\mathbf{P} = I2) \qquad \frac{\Gamma \vdash a\ \mathsf{N}}{\Gamma \vdash \mathbf{S}(a) \neq 0} \quad (\mathbf{S} \neq 0I) \qquad \frac{\Gamma \vdash c \quad \Gamma \vdash a\ \mathsf{N}}{\Gamma \vdash (\text{if } c \text{ then } a \text{ else } b) = a} \quad (?\,I1)$$

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash \neg c \quad \Gamma \vdash b\ \mathsf{N}}{\Gamma \vdash (\text{if } c \text{ then } a \text{ else } b) = b} \quad (?\,I2) \qquad \frac{\Gamma \vdash K\ 0 \quad \Gamma \cup \{x\ \mathsf{N},\ K\ x\} \vdash K\ \mathbf{S}(x) \quad \Gamma \vdash a\ \mathsf{N}}{\Gamma \vdash K\ a} \quad (\text{Ind})$$

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash a\ \mathsf{N} \quad \Gamma \vdash b\ \mathsf{N}}{\Gamma \vdash a = b\ \mathsf{N}} \quad (= \text{TI}) \qquad \frac{\Gamma \vdash c\ \mathsf{B} \quad \Gamma \vdash a\ \mathsf{N} \quad \Gamma \vdash b\ \mathsf{N}}{\Gamma \vdash \text{if } c \text{ then } a \text{ else } b\ \mathsf{N}} \quad (?\,\text{TI})$$

The natural number axioms are fairly close to the standard Peano axioms, with some notable exceptions.

The *grounding* equality is the $0I$ axiom, postulating that $0\ \mathsf{N}$, or, by unfolding the definition, $0 = 0$. Using the $S = IE$ axiom, $\mathbf{S}(a)\ \mathsf{N}$ can be deduced for any a for which $a\ \mathsf{N}$ is already known. The induction axiom ind has an additional premise of $a\ \mathsf{N}$, i.e. it requires proof that the expression induction is performed over is indeed a (terminating) natural number.

Conditional evaluation is a primitive in GA and its behavior must thus be axiomatized. The two inference rules correspond to the positive and negative evaluation of the condition, and they both require that the expression from the corresponding branch is shown to be terminating (i.e. $a\ \mathsf{N}$ and $b\ \mathsf{N}$ respectively). This additional premise prevents equalities of potentially non-terminating expressions to be deduced.

GROUNDED CONTRADICTION Although GA is not classical, a contradiction rule can be derived. The resulting inference rule has an additional $p\ \mathsf{B}$ premise not present in the classical version, which demands p is first shown to have a truth value. To get a feeling for the logic, we construct the proof explicitly in a natural deduction style derivation tree.

Theorem 1. *Grounded Contradiction*

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash p\ \mathsf{B} \quad \Gamma \cup \{\neg p\} \vdash q \quad \Gamma \cup \{\neg p\} \vdash \neg q}{\Gamma \vdash p}$$

Proof.

$$\dfrac{\dfrac{\Gamma \vdash p \;\mathsf{B}}{\Gamma \vdash p \vee \neg p}\;\mathsf{B}\text{ def} \qquad \dfrac{}{\Gamma \cup \{p\} \vdash p}\;\mathrm{H} \qquad \dfrac{\Gamma \cup \{\neg p\} \vdash q \quad \Gamma \cup \{\neg p\} \vdash \neg q}{\Gamma \cup \{\neg p\} \vdash p}\;\neg E}{\Gamma \vdash p}\;\vee\,\mathrm{E3}$$

∎

Grounded Implication Impliciation is not a primitive in GA, but rather the shorthand $a \to b \equiv \neg a \vee b$. From this definition, the classical elimination rule *modus ponens* can be derived. However, only a weakened introduction rule, with the now familiar additional *habeas quid* premise, can be derived.

> **Theorem 2.** *Modus Ponens*
>
> $$\dfrac{\Gamma \vdash p \quad \Gamma \vdash p \to q}{\Gamma \vdash q}\quad (\to E)$$

Proof.

$$\dfrac{\dfrac{}{\Gamma \cup \{q\} \vdash q}\;\mathrm{H} \qquad \dfrac{\dfrac{}{\Gamma \cup \{\neg p\} \vdash \neg p}\;\mathrm{H} \quad \dfrac{\Gamma \vdash p}{\Gamma \cup \{\neg p\} \vdash p}\;\mathrm{W}}{\Gamma \cup \{\neg p\} \vdash q}\;\neg E \qquad \dfrac{\Gamma \vdash p \to q}{\Gamma \vdash \neg p \vee q}\;\to\text{ def}}{\Gamma \vdash q}\;\vee\,\mathrm{E3}$$

∎

> **Theorem 3.** *Implication Introduction*
>
> $$\dfrac{\Gamma \vdash p \;\mathsf{B} \quad \Gamma \cup \{p\} \vdash q}{\Gamma \vdash p \to q}\quad (\to I)$$

Proof.

$$\dfrac{\dfrac{\dfrac{\Gamma \vdash p \;\mathsf{B}}{\Gamma \vdash p \vee \neg p}\;\mathsf{B}\text{ def} \quad \dfrac{\Gamma \cup \{p\} \vdash q}{\Gamma \cup \{p\} \vdash \neg p \vee q}\;\vee\,\mathrm{E2} \quad \dfrac{\dfrac{}{\Gamma \cup \{\neg p\} \vdash \neg p}\;\mathrm{H}}{\Gamma \cup \{\neg p\} \vdash \neg p \vee q}\;\vee\,\mathrm{I1}}{\Gamma \vdash \neg p \vee q}\;\vee\,\mathrm{E3}}{\Gamma \vdash p \to q}\;\to\text{ def}$$

∎

Definitional Axioms Finally, the axioms for definitions allow arbitrary substitution of a symbol with its definition body (and the other way around) in any context. The vector notation $\vec{a}$ denotes an argument vector for the defined function symbol.

> **Definition Axioms**
>
> $$\dfrac{\Gamma \vdash s(\vec{x}) \equiv d(\vec{x}) \quad \Gamma \vdash K\;d(\vec{a})}{\Gamma \vdash K\;s(\vec{a})}\quad (\equiv E) \qquad\qquad \dfrac{\Gamma \vdash s(\vec{x}) \equiv d(\vec{x}) \quad \Gamma \vdash K\;s(\vec{a})}{\Gamma \vdash K\;d(\vec{a})}\quad (\equiv I)$$

2.2.2 GA with Axiomatized Quantifiers

As already mentioned, the creators of *GA* claim that quantifiers can be encoded into BGA using the powerful definitional mechanism [1], yielding full *GA* "for free". However, as this will not be feasible in the formalization within *Pure*, the following axiomatizes the quantifiers instead. The axioms correspond to the inference rules that would be derivable from encoded quantifiers [1].

Quantifier Axioms

$$\frac{\Gamma \cup \{x\ \mathsf{N}\} \vdash K\ x}{\Gamma \vdash \forall x.K\ x}\ (\forall I) \qquad\qquad \frac{\Gamma \vdash \forall x.K\ x \quad \Gamma \vdash a\ \mathsf{N}}{\Gamma \vdash K\ a}\ (\forall E)$$

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash a\ \mathsf{N} \quad \Gamma \vdash K\ a}{\Gamma \vdash \exists x.K\ x}\ (\exists I) \qquad\qquad \frac{\Gamma \vdash \exists x.K\ x \quad \Gamma \cup \{x\ \mathsf{N},\ K\ x\} \vdash q}{\Gamma \vdash q}\ (\exists E)$$

Besides the additional *habeas quid* premises, the quantifier axioms are standard.

Since the quantifiers are primitive here, they must be added to the primitive term syntax, yielding the full *GA* primitive term syntax.

GA Primitive Term Syntax

$t ::=$	x	variable
	0	natural-number constant zero
	$\mathbf{S}(t)$	natural-number successor
	$\mathbf{P}(t)$	natural-number predecessor
	$\neg t$	logical negation
	$t \lor t$	logical disjunction
	$t = t$	natural-number equality
	if t then t else t	conditional evaluation
	$d(t, ..., t)$	application of recursive definition
	$\forall x.t$	universal quantifier
	$\exists x.t$	existential quantifier

This set of axioms is now a full formalization of a grounded flavor of first-order arithmetic, which we just refer to as *GA* from now on.

Formalizing GA in Pure   3

This chapter aims to translate the full formalization of *GA* in Section 2.2 into Isabelle/ Pure. Formally, this means that *GA* is embedded into the *Pure* calculus, using it as a meta-logic. The typed lambda calculus *Pure* is fully characterized in Section 2.1. In the following, all types mentioned are part of the *Pure* type system. *GA* itself has no real (conventional) notion of types, although the 'inherited' types of *Pure* can also be interpreted as syntactic *GA* types.

3.1 Proposotional Axioms

We first declare a syntactic Isabelle type for truth values in *GA* o and a function to convert from o to the type of truth values of the *Pure* calculus prop, as explained in Section 2.1.4.

```
1  typedecl o                                                      Isabelle
2
3  judgment
4    Trueprop :: ‹o ⇒ prop›  (‹_› 5)
```

Now, we can declare constants disj and not, with the propositional axioms from Section 2.2.1.

```
1   axiomatization                                                 Isabelle
2     disj :: ‹o ⇒ o ⇒ o›  (infixr ‹v› 30) and
3     not :: ‹o ⇒ o› (‹¬ _› [40] 40)
4   where
5     disjI1: ‹P ⇒ P v Q› and
6     disjI2: ‹Q ⇒ P v Q› and
7     disjI3: ‹⟦¬P; ¬Q⟧ ⇒ ¬(P v Q)› and
8     disjE1: ‹⟦P v Q; P ⇒ R; Q ⇒ R⟧ ⇒ R› and
9     disjE2: ‹¬(P v Q) ⇒ ¬P› and
10    disjE3: ‹¬(P v Q) ⇒ ¬Q› and
11    dNegI: ‹P ⇒ (¬¬P)› and
12    dNegE: ‹(¬¬P) ⇒ P› and
13    exF: ‹⟦P; ¬P⟧ ⇒ Q›
```

This immediately introduces the infix notation $a \vee b$ for disj a b and $\neg a$ for not a, where `infixr` means that the provided syntax is an infix operator that associates to the right. The precedence of the ¬ operator is 40, it thus binds stronger than the ∨ operator with precedence 30.

In general, a rule in the natural deduction style formalization from Section 2.2 of the following shape:

$$\frac{\Gamma \cup A_1 \vdash P_1 \quad \Gamma \cup A_2 \vdash P_2 \quad ... \quad \Gamma \cup A_n \vdash P_n}{\Gamma \vdash C}$$

Is translated into the following shape in Isabelle:

```Isabelle
1  (A1 ⇒ P1) ⇒ (A2 ⇒ P2) ⇒ ... ⇒ (An ⇒ Pn) ⇒ C
```

Or, equivalently:

```Isabelle
1  ⟦A1 ⇒ P1; A2 ⇒ P2; ...; An ⇒ Pn⟧ ⇒ C
```

Potential background assumptions Γ do not need to be explicitly managed in Isabelle. What we consider a derivation, i.e. $\vdash$ in *GA* is just implication $\implies$ in Pure.

Theorems in this section that are explicitly presented in a *theorem block* keep using the natural deduction style to be consistent with Section 2.1 and Section 2.2. In this notation, deducability from assumptions is denoted $\vdash$, while in Isabelle the corresponding symbol is $\implies$, i.e. meta-level implication.

3.2 Natural Number Axioms

We declare a type `num` for natural numbers.

```Isabelle
1  typedecl num
```

Before the majority of natural number axioms, we define equality and some connectives derived from the primitives. We axiomatize equality with unrestricted substitution and symmetry. Equality is not just defined for `num`, but for any type `'a`, where `'a` is a generic type variable. As expected, equality is a binary infix operator associating to the left.

```Isabelle
1  axiomatization
2    eq :: ‹'a ⇒ 'a ⇒ o›  (infixl ‹=› 45)
3  where
4    eqSubst: ‹⟦a = b; Q a⟧ ⇒ Q b› and
5    eqSym: ‹a = b ⇒ b = a›
```

Transitivity can be proven using the substitution axiom.

```Isabelle
1  lemma eq_trans: "a = b ⇒ b = c ⇒ a = c"
2  by (rule eqSubst[where a="b" and b="c"], assumption)
```

However, transitivity is not a very useful lemma, as it just as efficient to directly use equality substitution.

Inequality, the **B** and **N** judgments, and other logical operators can now be defined in terms of the axiomatized primitives. Notably, **B** is explicitly typed at $o \Rightarrow o$, meaning that e.g. the term **S**(zero) **B** is rejected by the Isabelle parser, as it is not well-typed. Similarly, **N** is explicitly typed at num $\Rightarrow o$, only accepting an argument of type num.

```Isabelle
1  definition neq :: ‹num ⇒ num ⇒ o› (infixl ‹≠› 45)
2    where ‹a ≠ b ≡ ¬ (a = b)›
3  definition bJudg :: ‹o ⇒ o› (‹_ B› [21] 20)
4    where ‹(p B) ≡ (p ∨ ¬p)›
5  definition isNat :: ‹num ⇒ o› (‹_ N› [21] 20)
```

```
6    where "x N ≡ x = x"
7    definition conj :: ‹o ⇒ o ⇒ o› (infixl ‹∧› 35)
8      where ‹p ∧ q ≡ ¬(¬p ∨ ¬q)›
9    definition impl :: ‹o ⇒ o ⇒ o› (infixr ‹→› 25)
10     where ‹p → q ≡ ¬p ∨ q›
11   definition iff :: ‹o ⇒ o ⇒ o› (infixl ‹↔› 25)
12     where ‹p ↔ q ≡ (p → q) ∧ (q → p)›
```

As an example, all the introduction and elimination rules for conjunction $\wedge$ can be proven now:

```
1    lemma conjE1:                                              Isabelle
2      assumes p_and_q: "p ∧ q"
3      shows "p"
4    apply (rule dNegE)
5    apply (rule disjE2[where Q="¬q"])
6    apply (fold conj_def)
7    apply (rule p_and_q)
8    done
9
10   lemma conjE2:
11     assumes p_and_q: "p ∧ q"
12     shows "q"
13   apply (rule dNegE)
14   apply (rule disjE3[where P="¬p"])
15   apply (fold conj_def)
16   apply (rule p_and_q)
17   done
18
19   lemma conjI:
20     assumes p: "p"
21     assumes q: "q"
22     shows "p ∧ q"
23   apply (unfold conj_def)
24   apply (rule disjI3)
25   apply (rule dNegI)
26   apply (rule p)
27   apply (rule dNegI)
28   apply (rule q)
29   done
```

We can now axiomatize the `zero` constant and `pred` and `suc` functions. Compared to the formalization in Section 2.2, there is an additional axiom here stating $P(0) = 0$. This will allow stating some convenient lemmas later, for example that for any n with n N, $P(n) \leq n$.

```
1    Isabelle
```

```
2   axiomatization
3     zero :: ‹num›                           and
4     suc :: ‹num ⇒ num›      (‹S(_)› [800]) and
5     pred :: ‹num ⇒ num›     (‹P(_)› [800])
6   where
7     nat0: ‹zero N› and
8     sucInj: ‹S a = S b ⇒ a = b› and
9     sucCong: ‹a = b ⇒ S a = S b› and
10    predCong: ‹a = b ⇒ P a = P b› and
11    eqBool: ‹⟦a N; b N⟧ ⇒ (a = b) B› and
12    eqBoolB: ‹⟦x B; y B⟧ ⇒ (x = y) B› and
13    sucNonZero: ‹a N ⇒ S a ≠ zero› and
14    predSucInv: ‹a N ⇒ P(S(a)) = a› and
15    pred0: ‹P(zero) = zero› and
16    ind: ‹⟦a N; Q zero; ⋀x. x N ⇒ Q x ⇒ Q S(x)⟧ ⇒ Q a›
```

The following two crucial inference rules can be proven from these axioms, whose proof is given directly in the Isabelle formalization.

Theorem 4. *Natural Number Typing Rules*

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash a \text{ N}}{\Gamma \vdash \mathbf{S}(a) \text{ N}} \ \ (\mathbf{S} \text{ N}) \qquad\qquad \frac{\Gamma \vdash a \text{ N}}{\Gamma \vdash \mathbf{P}(a) \text{ N}} \ \ (\mathbf{P} \text{ N})$$

Proof.

```
1   lemma natS:                              Isabelle
2     assumes a_nat: "a N"
3     shows "S a N"
4   apply (unfold isNat_def)
5   apply (rule sucCong)
6   apply (fold isNat_def)
7   apply (rule a_nat)
8   done
9
10  lemma natP:
11    assumes a_nat: "a N"
12    shows "P a N"
13  apply (unfold isNat_def)
14  apply (rule predCong)
15  apply (fold isNat_def)
16  apply (rule a_nat)
17  done
```

∎

The constants True and False can now be defined as canonical truth and falsehood $\text{True} \equiv (0 = 0)$ and $\text{False} \equiv (S(0) = 0)$.

```
1 definition True                                                    Isabelle
2    where ‹True ≡ zero = zero›
3 definition False
4    where ‹False ≡ S(zero) = zero›
```

3.3 Grounded Contradiction

The grounded contradiction lemma proven as a derivation tree in Section 2.2.1.1 can now be proven in the Isabelle formalization.

> **Grounded Contradiction**
>
> $$\frac{\Gamma \vdash p \; \mathsf{B} \quad \Gamma \cup \{\neg p\} \vdash q \quad \Gamma \cup \{\neg p\} \vdash \neg q}{\Gamma \vdash p}$$

```
1  lemma grounded_contradiction:                                     Isabelle
2     assumes p_bool: ‹p B›
3     assumes notp_q: ‹¬p ⇒ q›
4     assumes notp_notq: ‹¬p ⇒ ¬q›
5     shows ‹p›
6  proof (rule disjE1[where P="p" and Q="¬p"])
7     show "p ∨ ¬p"
8        using p_bool unfolding GD.bJudg_def .
9     show "p ⇒ p" by assumption
10    show "¬p ⇒ p"
11    proof -
12       assume not_p: "¬p"
13       have q: "q" using notp_q[OF not_p] .
14       have not_q: "¬q" using notp_notq[OF not_p] .
15       from q and not_q show "p"
16          by (rule exF)
17    qed
18 qed
```

3.4 Syntax Translation for Natural Numbers

The axiomatized symbols for natural numbers are of the shape ($[SP]^+$ zero) as a regex. For example, `zero` and `S(S(P zero))` are natural numbers in this GA formalization. It would be better to use the familiar base 10 system, such that the user can write a base-10 number and it is correctly interpreted as the corresponding `num` expression by Isabelle. Luckily, Isabelle provides powerful syntax translation support.

The following snippet achieves this by first declaring an implicit conversion function from numerical tokens (resulting from user input) to the natural number type num. The annotation ("_") means it is applied to all such tokens implicitly. Then, an SML file called *peano_numerals.ML* provides the function *parse_gd_numeral*, which translates a number in base 10 to the num version (for example 3 to $\mathbf{S}(\mathbf{S}(\mathbf{S}(\mathrm{zero}))))$.

Finally, the command *parse_translation* specifies that the previously declared _gd_num constant performs the action specified by the *parse_gd_numeral* function.

```
1  syntax                                                              Isabelle
2    "_gd_num" :: "num_token ⇒ num"     ("_")
3
4  ML_file "peano_numerals.ML"
5
6  parse_translation ‹
7    [(@{syntax_const "_gd_num"}, Peano_Syntax.parse_gd_numeral)]
8  ›
```

As mentioned before, Isabelle is implemented mostly in (a dialect of) Standard ML (SML). The SML infrastructure of Isabelle is not meant to be completely abstracted away from the (advanced) user, but rather does Isabelle provide a rich API of SML functions and types, which is collectively referred to as Isabelle/ML. A syntax translation is precisely the kind of task that can be implemented in SML, hooking into the Isabelle implementation itself.

The following are the contents of the *peano_numerals.ML* file, providing the translation logic from a string representation of a base-10 number to a num expression.

```
1   structure Peano_Syntax = struct                                        SML
2
3     fun nat_to_peano 0 = Syntax.const @{const_syntax "zero"}
4       | nat_to_peano n = Syntax.const @{const_syntax "suc"} $ nat_to_peano (n -
         1)
5
6     fun parse_gd_numeral _ [Free (s, _)] =
7           (case Int.fromString s of
8               SOME n => nat_to_peano n
9             | NONE => error ("Not a numeral: " ^ s))
10      | parse_gd_numeral _ _ = error "Unexpected numeral syntax"
11
12  end
```

The function Int.fromString is part of the Isabelle/ML API and tries to convert the input string to an (SML) Int. The translation from Int is then straightforward – 0 is translated to zero and n to $\mathbf{S}$ prepended to the recursive translation of n-1.

3.5 Quantifier Axiomatization

The quantifier axioms exactly implement the ones from the pen-and-paper formalization in Section 2.2.2, displayed again here for reference.

$$\frac{\Gamma \cup \{x\ \mathsf{N}\} \vdash K\ x}{\Gamma \vdash \forall x.K\ x} \quad (\forall I) \qquad\qquad \frac{\Gamma \vdash \forall x.K\ x \quad \Gamma \vdash a\ \mathsf{N}}{\Gamma \vdash K\ a} \quad (\forall E)$$

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash a\ \mathsf{N} \quad \Gamma \vdash K\ a}{\Gamma \vdash \exists x.K\ x} \quad (\exists I) \qquad\qquad \frac{\Gamma \vdash \exists x.K\ x \quad \Gamma \cup \{x\ \mathsf{N},\ K\ x\} \vdash q}{\Gamma \vdash q} \quad (\exists E)$$

A crucial detail is the explicit typing of the quantifiers at the type (num $\Rightarrow o) \Rightarrow o$. It makes the quantifiers range only over num, crucial as *GA* aims to be a first-order theory over the natural numbers. In a higher-order theory, the quantifiers would range over any type and be typed at $('a \Rightarrow o) \Rightarrow o$, where $'a$ is a generic type variable.

```
1  axiomatization                                          Isabelle
2    forall :: "(num ⇒ o) ⇒ o"  (binder "∀" [8] 9) and
3    exists :: "(num ⇒ o) ⇒ o"  (binder "∃" [8] 9)
4  where
5    forallI: "⟦⋀x. x N ⇒ Q x⟧ ⇒ ∀x. Q x" and
6    forallE: "⟦∀c'. Q c'; a N⟧ ⇒ Q a" and
7    existsI: "⟦a N; Q a⟧ ⇒ ∃x. Q x" and
8    existsE: "⟦∃i. Q i; ⋀a. a N ⇒ Q a ⇒ R⟧ ⇒ R"
```

3.6 Conditional Evaluation Axiomatization

Conditional evaluation cannot seem to be derived from primitives axiomatized so far and must thus be an axiomatized primitive itself.

The syntax of the conditional operator, with the desired shape of the application cond *a b c* being if *a* then *b* else *c*, seems complicated, but Isabelle is well-equipped to handle syntax like this, with the ability to specify the 'holes' in a syntax expression like in the following declaration. This type of notation is called mixfix in Isabelle, as it mixes infix and prefix notation.

Notably, the two branches of the operator and the return type are typed at the generic $'a$, indicating that the conditional operator in this formalization is polymorphic. Contrary to the pen-and-paper formalization in Section 2.2.1, this allows for returning truth values in a conditional evaluator (or any other type at that, for example functions of type num $\Rightarrow$ num), for example the constants True and False. Although these could be encoded with natural numbers just as well, this requires equality checks of a result and is less elegant. Due to the *habeas quid* premises of the two branching axioms, making the arguments of the syntactic construct generic is not sufficient, it just means that the parser won't reject a term such as if *c* then True else False. Since neither True N nor False N can be proven, this term cannot be 'reduced' using either condI1 or condI2. Thus, there are three additional axioms for conditional evaluation over values of type o, mirroring the ones for conditional evaluation over num, but with the *habeas quid* premise of B instead of N. Now, if True then True else False = True can be proven using the axiom condI1B.

```
1   consts                                                 Isabelle
```

```
2      cond :: ‹o ⇒ 'a ⇒ 'a ⇒ 'a› (‹if _ then _ else _› [25, 24, 24] 24)

3

4    axiomatization where
5      condI1: ‹⟦c; a N⟧ ⇒ (if c then a else b) = a› and
6      condI2: ‹⟦¬c; b N⟧ ⇒ (if c then a else b) = b› and
7      condT: ‹⟦c B; a N; b N⟧ ⇒ if c then a else b N› and
8      condI1B: ‹⟦c; d B⟧ ⇒ (if c then d else e) = d› and
9      condI2B: ‹⟦¬c; e B⟧ ⇒ (if c then d else e) = e› and
10     condTB: ‹⟦c B; d B; e B⟧ ⇒ if c then d else e B›
```

3.7 Definitional Mechanism Axiomatization

The axioms in the formalization in Section 2.2.1 don't make it entirely clear what the definitional operator with the symbol $\equiv$ is. It is not part of the primitive syntax, making it meta-logical, in the sense that it is outside the logical calculus. However, it is also a premise in the definitional axioms, implying it behaves like a proposition:

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash s(\vec{x}) \equiv d(\vec{x}) \quad \Gamma \vdash K \; d(\vec{a})}{\Gamma \vdash K \; s(\vec{a})} \; (\equiv E) \qquad \frac{\Gamma \vdash s(\vec{x}) \equiv d(\vec{x}) \quad \Gamma \vdash K \; s(\vec{a})}{\Gamma \vdash K \; d(\vec{a})} \; (\equiv I)$$

The most straightforward implementation of such a mechanism in Isabelle is to just treat it as any other logical connective. Its definition and axiomatization make it conceptually very similar to equality $=$.

Like equality, the definitional mechanism is polymorphic, allowing the left-hand side and right-hand side of the definition to be of any (albeit the same) type. The first axiom, called `defE`, is exactly the same as equality substitution, and allows the left-hand side of a definition (the *symbol*), to be substituted by its right-hand side (the *expansion*) in any context. Instead of symmetry, the second equality axiom, the definitional operator has the introduction axiom `defI`, which 'folds' a definition, i.e. replaces the right-hand side of a definition with the left-hand-side in any context.

```
1  axiomatization                                                      Isabelle
2    def :: ‹'a ⇒ 'a ⇒ o› (infix ‹:=› 10)
3  where
4    defE: ‹⟦a := b; Q b⟧ ⇒ Q a› and
5    defI: ‹⟦a := b; Q a⟧ ⇒ Q b›
```

This means that a definition $a := b$ is just another proposition of type o. For example is the sentence $3 = 0 \lor L := L$ a well-formed term of type o, as long as L is a previously declared constant.

However, with the current set of axioms, a statement of the shape $a := b$ cannot possibly be proven, as there is no rule that introduces the definitional operator. However, the 'truth' of a definition can be assumed, for example in the following lemma.

```
1  lemma                                                               Isabelle
```

```
2     assumes l_def: "l := 0"
3     shows "l = 0"
4  apply (rule defE[OF l_def])
5  apply (fold isNat_def)
6  apply (rule nat0)
7  done
```

The proof first unfolds the definition of l using the `defE` axiom, yielding the goal state $0 = 0$, which can be proven by folding the definition of N, resulting in 0 N, whose truth is postulated by the `nat0` axiom.

To get a 'globally visible' definition, the definition must be axiomatized. This does not axiomatize any properties about the defined symbol, it just axiomatizes the 'equivalence' of the left-hand side with the right-hand side, which, together with the axioms `defE` and `defI` means they can be substituted for each other in any context. The formalization of *GA* in Isabelle/HOL by the authors includes a consistency proof of the axioms given any fixed finite set of definitions [1]. Thus, axiomatizing definitions maintains consistency, as long as there is only a single definition per symbol.

3.8 Defining Arithmetic Functions in GA

Having axiomatized full *GA* in Isabelle/Pure, the next step is to define basic arithmetic functions and prove some lemmas about them.

The recursive definitions of the arithmetic functions are straightforward and correspond to case distinctions over the second argument (of zero and non-zero).

```
1   axiomatization                                                    Isabelle
2     add   :: "num ⇒ num ⇒ num"  (infixl "+" 60) and
3     sub   :: "num ⇒ num ⇒ num"  (infixl "-" 60) and
4     mult  :: "num ⇒ num ⇒ num"  (infixl "*" 70) and
5     div   :: "num ⇒ num ⇒ num"                    and
6     less  :: "num ⇒ num ⇒ num"  (infix "<" 50)   and
7     leq   :: "num ⇒ num ⇒ num"  (infix "≤" 50)
8   where
9     add_def:   "add x y  := if y = 0 then x else S(add x (P y))"        and
10    sub_def:   "sub x y  := if y = 0 then x else P(sub x (P y))"        and
11    mult_def:  "mult x y := if y = 0 then 0 else (x + mult x (P y))"    and
12    leq_def:   "leq x y  := if x = 0 then 1
13                              else if y = 0 then 0
14                              else (leq (P x) (P y))"                   and
15    less_def:  "less x y := if y = 0 then 0
16                              else if x = 0 then 1
17                              else (less (P x) (P y))"                  and
18    div_def:   "div x y  := if x < y = 1 then 0 else S(div (x - y) y)"
```

These definitions show the necessity of the predecessor function **P** in *GA*. The comparison functions $\leq$ and $<$ are defined to compute natural numbers, where 1 encodes truth and 0 falsehood. Note that the division function does not terminate for $y = 0$.

The functions $>$ and $\geq$ can now be defined in terms of $<$ and $\leq$.

```
1  definition greater :: "num ⇒ num ⇒ num" (infix ">" 50) where    Isabelle
2    "greater x y ≡ 1 - (x ≤ y)"
3
4  definition geq :: "num ⇒ num ⇒ num" (infix "≥" 50) where
5    "geq x y ≡ 1 - (x < y)"
```

A first property provable about the `less` function is that `x < 0` is always false, i.e. `x < 0 = 0`.

Theorem 5. *Less than zero is false*

$$\frac{\rule{3cm}{0.4pt}}{\Gamma \vdash x < 0 = 0}$$

Proof.

Unfolding the definition `less_def` using the `defE` axiom results in the goal state:

1. (if $0 = 0$ then 0 else if $x = 0$ then 1 else $\mathbf{P}(x) < \mathbf{P}(0)) = 0$

As the condition holds, applying the `condI1` axiom results in the goal state:

1. $0 = 0$
2. 0 N

These can both be discharged easily. The latter is the axiom `nat0` and the former is the unfolded version of this axiom, stated by the lemma `zeroRefl`.

```
1  lemma less_0_false: "(x < 0) = 0"                                Isabelle
2  apply (rule defE[OF less_def])
3  apply (rule condI1)
4  apply (rule zeroRefl)
5  apply (rule nat0)
6  done
```

∎

3.9 Termination Proofs

Due to the *habeas quid* premises of so many axioms, an expression like $a + b$ becomes truly useful only if $a + b$ N is provable. With the interpretation that a N is a termination certificate for a, a N $\implies b$ N $\implies a + b$ N is essentially a termination proof of the `add` function, conditioned on its operands also being terminating natural numbers themselves.

Theorem 6. *Termination of* `add`

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash x \; \mathsf{N} \quad \Gamma \vdash y \; \mathsf{N}}{\Gamma \vdash x + y \; \mathsf{N}}$$

Proof.

By induction over the second argument.

```
1    lemma add_terminates:                                        Isabelle
2      assumes x_nat: ‹x N›
3      assumes y_nat: ‹y N›
4      shows ‹add x y N›
5    proof (rule ind[where a=y])
6      show "y N" by (rule y_nat)
7      show "add x 0 N"
8        proof (rule defE[OF add_def])
9          show "if (0 = 0) then x else S(add x P(0)) N"
10           apply (rule eqSubst[where a="x"])
11           apply (rule eqSym)
12           apply (rule condI1)
13           apply (rule zeroRefl)
14           apply (rule x_nat)
15           apply (rule x_nat)
16           done
17       qed
18     show ind_step: "⋀a. a N ⟹ ((x + a) N) ⟹ ((x + S(a)) N)"
19       proof (rule defE[OF add_def])
20         fix a
21         assume a_nat: "a N" and BC: "add x a N"
22         show "if (S(a) = 0) then x else S(add x P(S(a))) N"
23           proof (rule condT)
24             show "S(a) = 0 B"
25               apply (rule eqBool)
26               apply (rule natS)
27               apply (rule a_nat)
28               apply (rule nat0)
29               done
30             show "x N" by (rule x_nat)
31             show "S(add x P(S(a))) N"
32               apply (rule GD.natS)
33               apply (rule eqSubst[where a="x+a"])
34               apply (rule eqSubst[where a="a" and b="P(S(a))"])
35               apply (rule eqSym)
36               apply (rule predSucInv)
37               apply (rule a_nat)
38               apply (fold isNat_def)
```

```
39              apply (rule BC)
40              apply (rule BC)
41            done
42          qed
43      qed
44 qed
```

∎

Termination proofs of subtraction and multiplication follow the same structure, as they also recurse to the immediate predecessor in the second argument. This recursive structure exactly mirrors induction over the corresponding argument, which is why these proofs are so straightforward, despite spelling them out at the axiom level at this point.

Things get a bit more interesting with the ≤ function, as it recurses in both arguments. The solution is to prove a stronger lemma, which universally quantifies over one argument, and then perform induction over the other argument.

Theorem 7. *Termination of* `leq`

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash x \; \mathsf{N} \quad \Gamma \vdash y \; \mathsf{N}}{\Gamma \vdash x \leq y \; \mathsf{N}}$$

Proof.

By induction over the second argument in the strengthened proposition $\forall x. \; x \leq y \; \mathsf{N}$.

```
1  lemma leq_terminates:                                      Isabelle
2    shows "x N ⇒ y N ⇒ x ≤ y N"
3  proof -
4    have H: "y N ⇒ ∀x. x ≤ y N"
5    proof (rule ind[where a="y"], simp)
6      show "∀x'. x' ≤ 0 N"
7        apply (rule forallI)
8        apply (rule defE[OF leq_def])
9        apply (rule condT)
10        apply (rule eqBool)
11        apply (assumption)
12        apply (rule nat0)
13        apply (rule natS)
14        apply (rule nat0)
15        apply (rule eqSubst[where a="0"])
16        apply (rule eqSym)
17        apply (rule condI1)
18        apply (rule zeroRefl)
19        apply (rule nat0)+
20        done
21      show "⋀x. x N ⇒ (∀xa. xa ≤ x N) ⇒ (∀xa. xa ≤ S(x) N)"
```

```
22      proof -
23        fix x
24        assume H: "∀xa. xa ≤ x N"
25        show "x N ⇒ ∀xa. xa ≤ S(x) N"
26          proof (rule forallI)
27            fix xa
28            show "x N ⇒ xa N ⇒ xa ≤ S(x) N"
29              apply (rule defE[OF leq_def])
30              apply (rule condT)
31              apply (rule eqBool)
32              apply (assumption)
33              apply (rule nat0)+
34              apply (rule natS, rule nat0)
35              apply (rule condT)
36              apply (rule eqBool)
37              apply (rule natS, assumption)
38              apply (rule nat0)+
39              apply (rule eqSubst[where a="x" and b="P S x"])
40              apply (rule eqSym, rule predSucInv, assumption)
41              apply (rule forallE[where a="P xa"])
42              apply (rule H)
43              apply (rule natP, assumption)
44              done
45         qed
46       qed
47    qed
48    then show "x N ⇒ y N ⇒ x ≤ y N"
49      by (rule forallE)
50 qed
```

∎

Although the key ideas of the proof are straightforward – the strengthening of the proposition in line 4 and applying induction over the second argument on line 5 are only one line each – this is clouded by a lot of effort to discharge the *habeas quid* premises and other simple things like replacing a $\mathbf{P}(\mathbf{S}(x))$ with x in a subexpression. The latter currently requires an appication of equality substitution, an application of equality symmetry, and then applying the `predSucInv` axiom.

This issue is tackled in Section 4, where a lot of proof automation and tactics are introduced to simplify reasoning.

The next goal is to prove termination of the division function. This poses two new challenges.

1. The function does not terminate for y = 0.
2. The recursive pattern is does not mirror induction, i.e. it does not recurse to the immediate predecessor.

The former is solved relatively easily. One option is to add $\neg y = 0$ as an explicit assumption to the termination proof. Another, more elegant, option is to restate the theorem in the following way: $x \math: \mathsf{N} \Longrightarrow y \math: \mathsf{N} \Longrightarrow \mathrm{div} \ x \ \mathbf{S}(y) \math: \mathsf{N}$. Now, it holds for any natural numbers x and y.

To solve the second problem, a strong induction lemma needs to be proven first. This then allows assuming the induction hypothesis for any $y' \leq y$ when proving the statement for $\mathbf{S}(y)$.

The only difference to the induction axiom is that the hypothesis in the induction step is stronger – instead of $K \ x$ it is now $\bigwedge y. \ y \leq x = 1 \Longrightarrow K \ y$ (in Isabelle notation) or $y \leq x = 1 \vdash K \ y$ (in natural deduction style notation).

> **Theorem 8.** *Strong Induction*
>
> $$\frac{\Gamma \vdash a \ \mathsf{N} \quad \Gamma \vdash K \ 0 \quad \Gamma \cup \{x \ \mathsf{N}, \ \{y \ \mathsf{N}, \ y \leq x = 1\} \vdash K \ y)\} \vdash K \ \mathbf{S}(x)}{\Gamma \vdash K \ a}$$

Proof.

By induction over a in the strengthened object-level proposition $\forall x. \ (x \leq a = 1) \longrightarrow K \ x$.

```
1   lemma strong_induction:                                          Isabelle
2     shows "a N ⇒ Q 0 ⇒ (⋀x. x N ⇒ (⋀y. y N ⇒ y ≤ x = 1 ⇒ Q y) ⇒ (Q S(x))) ⇒ Q
      a"
3   proof -
4     have q: "a N ⇒ Q 0 ⇒ (⋀x. x N ⇒ (⋀y. y N ⇒ y≤x = 1 ⇒ Q y) ⇒ (Q S(x))) ⇒
5               ∀x. (x ≤ a = 1) → Q x"
6       apply (rule ind[where a="a"], assumption)
7       apply (rule forallI implI)+
8       apply (rule eqBool, rule leq_terminates, assumption)
9       apply (rule nat0, rule natS, rule nat0)
10      proof -
11        fix x
12        show "x N ⇒ x ≤ 0 = 1 ⇒ Q 0 ⇒ Q x"
13          apply (rule eqSubst[where a="0" and b="x"], rule eqSym)
14          apply (rule leq_0, assumption+)
15          done
16        show "a N ⇒ x N ⇒
17                Q 0 ⇒
18                (⋀x. x N ⇒ (⋀y. y N ⇒ y ≤ x = 1 ⇒ Q y) ⇒ Q (S x)) ⇒
19                ∀xa. xa ≤ x = 1 → Q xa ⇒
20                ∀xa. xa ≤ (S x) = 1 → Q xa"
21          apply (rule forallI implI)+
22          apply (rule eqBool, rule leq_terminates, assumption)
23          apply (rule natS, assumption)
24          apply (rule natS, rule nat0)
25          proof -
```

```
26            fix xa
27            assume xa_nat: "xa N"
28            assume hyp: "∀x'. x' ≤ x = 1 → Q x'"
29            assume step: "(⋀x. x N ⇒ (⋀y. y N ⇒ y ≤ x = 1 ⇒ Q y) ⇒ Q (S x))"
30            assume xa_leq_sx: "xa ≤ S x = 1"
31            have H: "xa ≤ x = 1 → Q xa"
32              by (rule forallE[where a="xa"], rule hyp, rule xa_nat)
33            show "x N ⇒ Q xa"
34              apply (rule disjE1[where P="xa ≤ x = 1" and Q="¬ xa ≤ x = 1"])
35              apply (fold GD.bJudg_def)
36              apply (rule eqBool)
37              apply (rule leq_terminates)
38              apply (rule xa_nat, assumption)
39              apply (rule natS, rule nat0)
40              apply (rule implE[where a="xa ≤ x = 1"])
41              apply (rule H)
42              apply (assumption)
43              proof -
44                assume xa_not_leq_x: "¬ xa ≤ x = 1"
45                have xa_eq_sx: "x N ⇒ xa = S x"
46                  apply (rule leq_suc_not_leq_implies_eq)
47                  apply (rule xa_nat, assumption)
48                  apply (rule xa_not_leq_x)
49                  apply (rule xa_leq_sx)
50                  done
51                have q_sx: "x N ⇒ Q S(x)"
52                  apply (rule step)
53                  apply (assumption)
54                  apply (rule implE)
55                  apply (rule forallE)
56                  apply (rule hyp, assumption+)
57                  done
58                show "x N ⇒ Q xa"
59                  apply (rule eqSubst[where a="S x" and b="xa"])
60                  apply (rule eqSym)
61                  apply (rule xa_eq_sx, assumption)
62                  apply (rule q_sx, assumption)
63                  done
64              qed
65          qed
66      qed
67      assume step: "(⋀x. x N ⇒ (⋀y. y N ⇒ y≤x = 1 ⇒ Q y) ⇒ (Q S(x)))"
68      show "a N ⇒ Q 0 ⇒ Q a"
69        apply (rule implE[where a="a ≤ a = 1"])
70        apply (rule forallE[where Q="λx. (x ≤ a = 1) → Q x"])
```

```
71          apply (rule q)
72          apply (assumption+)
73          apply (rule step)
74          apply (assumption+)
75          apply (rule leq_refl)
76          apply (assumption)
77          done
78  qed
```

∎

It is necessary to use the object level connectives (i.e. $\forall$ instead of $\bigwedge$ and $\longrightarrow$ instead of $\implies$) in the stronger proposition induction is performed over, since the induction axiom only works over expressions of type $\mathbf{o}$ (i.e. the object-level truth value type) and not of type prop (which the meta-level connectives $\implies$ and $\bigwedge$ are defined on). Thus, applying the *GA* induction axiom on the corresponding meta-level proposition $\bigwedge x.\ (x \le a = 1) \implies K\ x$ would not work. It is simply a type error.

The idea of this proof is again very straightforward, but spelling it out using the axioms is lengthy and challenging.

Using the strong induction lemma, termination of the division function defined earlier can be proven.

Theorem 9. *Termination of* `div`

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash x\ \mathsf{N} \quad \Gamma \vdash y\ \mathsf{N}}{\Gamma \vdash \mathrm{div}\ x\ y\ \mathsf{N}}$$

Proof.

By strong induction over the second argument.

```
1   lemma div_terminates:                                          Isabelle
2     shows "x N ⇒ y N ⇒ div x S(y) N"
3   apply (rule strong_induction[where a="x"], assumption)
4   apply (rule defE[OF div_def], simp)
5   proof -
6     fix x
7     assume hyp: "⋀ya. ya N ⇒ ya ≤ x = 1 ⇒ (div ya (S y) N)"
8     show "x N ⇒ y N ⇒ div (S x) (S y) N"
9       apply (rule defE[OF div_def])
10      apply (rule condT, simp)
11      apply (rule hyp, simp+)
12      done
13  qed
```

∎

This proof is much shorter than the previous ones despite significantly higher complexity. The magic lies in the `simp` method, which invokes the simplifier. This theorem was proven much later than the previous termination proofs and using a lot of automation. The simplifier applies numerous previously proven lemmas (which are omitted from this document) here, for example to automatically solve the base case of div 0 $\mathbf{S}(y)$ N.

Section 4 goes into how automation is introduced into an axiomatized logic such as *GA* in *Pure*.

The authors of *GA* place a lot of emphasis on primitive recursion as a 'benchmark' for the expressivitiy of *GA*. Namely, they proved that all primitive recursive functions can be expressed and proven terminating in *GA*. While such a proof is out of reach for this formalization, it is more fitting for this formalization to show that *GA* can actually go beyond that. The Ackermann function is famously not primitive recursive [5]. With the tooling from Section 4, a termination proof of the Ackermann function is surprisingly simple to spell out in *GA*, using the standard approach of nested induction.

Consider the following standard definition of the Ackermann function in *GA*.

```
1  axiomatization                                                      Isabelle
2    ack :: "num ⇒ num ⇒ num"
3  where
4    ack_def: "ack x y := if x = 0 then y + 1
5                         else if y = 0 then ack (P x) 1
6                         else ack (P x) (ack x (P y))"
```

> **Theorem 10.** *Termination of* `ack`
>
> $$\frac{\Gamma \vdash x \ \mathsf{N} \quad \Gamma \vdash y \ \mathsf{N}}{\Gamma \vdash \mathrm{ack}\ x\ y\ \mathsf{N}}$$

Proof.

By nested induction and by using a helper lemma.

The outer induction ranges over the second argument and proves the stronger statement $\forall n.\ \mathrm{ack}\ m\ n\ \mathsf{N}$.

```
1   lemma [simp]: "n N ⇒ ack 0 n = n + 1"                              Isabelle
2   by (unfold_def ack_def, simp)
3
4   lemma "n N ⇒ m N ⇒ ack m n N"
5   apply (rule forallE[where a="n"])
6   apply (induct m)
7   apply (rule forallI, simp)
8   apply (rule forallI)
9   proof -
10    fix x z
11    show "x N ⇒ ∀y. ack x y N ⇒ z N ⇒ ack (S x) z N"
```

```
12      apply (induct z)
13      apply (unfold_def ack_def)
14      apply (subst rule: condI2, simp)
15      apply (subst rule: condI1, simp+)
16      apply (rule forallE[where a="1"], simp)
17      apply (rule forallE[where a="1"], simp)
18      apply (subst rule: condI1, simp+)
19      apply (rule forallE[where a="1"], simp)
20      apply (rule forallE[where a="1"], simp)
21      apply (unfold_def ack_def)
22      apply (subst rule: condI2, simp+)
23      apply (subst rule: condI2, simp+)
24      apply (rule forallE, simp)+
25      apply (rule forallI, simp+)
26      apply (rule forallE, simp)
27      done
28  qed
```

∎

Tooling for Isabelle/GA   4

Having implemented *GA* in *Pure* effectively obtained an interactive theorem prover we term *Isabelle/GA*, based on the axioms of *GA*. In its current state however, *Isabelle/GA* is not a very useful theorem prover. There is no proof automation, no term rewriting, and no easy way to formalize higher level mathematics. Users can only reason about natural numbers and only using axioms or previously proven lemmas, leading to highly verbose and cumbersome proofs, as seen in Section 3.

This chapter aims for making *Isabelle/GA* more usable as a proof assistant and, towards that end, introduces various methods for simpler and cleaner reasoning, a simple auto-solver, and most importantly, compatibility with the powerful simplifier built into *Pure*. The goal is to mostly hide the axiomatic system of *GA* behind abstract proof methods found in existing theorem provers and allow proofs to focus on their main idea, rather than being about mapping to specific axioms and discharging *habeas quid* premises.

4.1 (Un)folding (Recursive) Definitions

The first methods we implement are the `unfold_def` and `fold_def` methods, which take the name of a definition (:=) and (un)fold it once in the current goal state.

Example usage:

```isabelle
1  apply (unfold_def mult_def)
2  apply (fold_def mult_def)
```

This corresponds exactly to:

```isabelle
1  apply (rule defE[OF mult_def])
2  apply (rule defI[OF mult_def])
```

The method names are intentionally similar to the existing `unfold` and `fold`, which (un)fold an (non-recursive) Isabelle definition.

The implementation in SML is as follows:

```sml
1    structure Unfold_Def =
2    struct
3      fun fold_def_method thm_name ctxt =
4        SIMPLE_METHOD' (fn i =>
5          let
6            val defI_thm = Proof_Context.get_thm ctxt "defI"
7            val target_thm = Proof_Context.get_thm ctxt thm_name
8          in
9            CHANGED (resolve_tac ctxt [defI_thm OF [target_thm]] i)
10         end)
11
12     fun unfold_def_method thm_name ctxt =
```

```
13      SIMPLE_METHOD' (fn i =>
14        let
15          val defE_thm = Proof_Context.get_thm ctxt "defE"
16          val target_thm = Proof_Context.get_thm ctxt thm_name
17        in
18          CHANGED (resolve_tac ctxt [defE_thm OF [target_thm]] i)
19        end)
20  end
21
22  val _ =
23    Theory.setup
24      (Method.setup @{binding unfold_def}
25        (Scan.lift Args.name >> Unfold_Def.unfold_def_method)
26        "Unfold a definition using defE"
27      )
28
29  val _ =
30    Theory.setup
31      (Method.setup @{binding fold_def}
32        (Scan.lift Args.name >> Unfold_Def.fold_def_method)
33        "Fold a definition using defI"
34      )
```

The Isabelle/ML infrastructure is well-equipped to handle such method definitions and multiple components of the provided infrastructure are visible in the snippet:

1. **Parsing**: `Args.name` parses an identifier and the `>>` combinator passes the parsed argument on to the defined method.
2. **Tactic Combinators**: `resolve_tac` simply applies the given list of theorems (in this case a singleton list) to subgoal `i` of the given `context`. `CHANGED` takes a tactic and succeeds if and only if its argument tactic changed the goal state. That is, if there was no definition to fold/unfold, the method fails, even if the theorem application itself succeeds.
3. **Method registration**: `Method.setup` sets up the defined method at the given binding. `SIMPLE_METHOD'` converts a value of type int $\Rightarrow$ tactic (usually a function applying a tactic to the `i`'th subgoal, where `i` is ita argument) to a method.

4.2 Configuring the Simplifier

Pure already contains a simplifier. The rewrite rules it uses are theorems of the shape:

$$\texttt{complicated\_expression} \equiv \texttt{simple\_expression}$$

That is, the *Pure* simplifier works on meta-level equations. When invoked, the simplifier tries to match the left-hand side of any rewrite equation in any subexpression and rewrites it to the right-hand side of the equation.

The simplifier uses theorems tagged with [simp] as its rewrite rules. Its exact inner workings are not of interest here, but it is highly sophisticated and sublinear in the number of rewrite rules.

The first problem with using the simplifier in GA is that the axioms allow deriving object-level equality ($=$), but not meta-level equality ($\equiv$). Either, GA needs its own simplifier, or it needs to seek 'compatibility' of object equality with meta equality.

The simple solution is to add an axiom to convert object equality to meta equality:

Equality Reflection Axiom

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash a = b}{\Gamma \vdash a \equiv b}$$

This inference rule is not provable from either the *Pure* axioms or the GA axioms, which is why it needs to be axiomatized. Using it for rewrites however is completely safe, as any such rewrite can be achieved using the existing `eqSubst` axiom.

That is, the following lemma is provable in GA, and thus the axiom is admissible:

Theorem 11.

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash a = b \quad \Gamma \vdash K\ b}{\Gamma \vdash K\ a}$$

Proof.

By equality substitution.

```
1  lemma "a = b ⇒ Q b ⇒ Q a"                              Isabelle
2  apply (rule eqSubst[where a="b" and b="a"])
3  apply (rule eqSym)
4  apply (assumption+)
5  done
```

∎

If the simplifier proves a theorem, having substituted a term b for a (due to a meta-equality theorem), the proof of the original theorem (with no substitution) can be constructed using the above theorem and the equality $a = b$. Since the simplifier constructs the meta-equality from exactly such an equality $a = b$, no new theorems of type `o` can be proven from this axiom.

If a rewrite theorem (that is, a theorem tagged with [simp]) has any premises, the simplifier only rewrites if it can discharge all its premises. Thus, a key step in configuring the simplifier for GA is to provide a competent solver that can discharge a wide range of commonly occuring premises such that the simplifier can apply more rewrites. Precisely such a solver is engineered in Section 4.3. For now, we already assume its existence at `GDAuto.gd_auto_tac` and use it in the following SML structure that configures the simplifier for GA. It achieves two main objectives:

1. Convert object equality theorems to meta equality theorems on the fly.
2. Set the solver for the simplifier.

```sml
1   structure GD_Simp =
2   struct
3     fun convert_eq_to_meta_eq th: thm = th RS @{thm eq_reflection}
4
5     fun match_object_rule th trm =
6       case trm of
7         Const (@{const_name GD.eq},  _) $ _ $ _  => [convert_eq_to_meta_eq th]
8       | _ => []
9
10    fun th_to_meta_eq_th _ th =
11      case Thm.concl_of th of
12        Const (@{const_name Pure.eq}, _) $ _ $ _ => [th]
13      | Const (@{const_name GD.Trueprop}, _) $ x => match_object_rule th x
14      | _ => []
15  end;
16
17  let
18    val gd_solver =
19      Raw_Simplifier.mk_solver "GD_solver" GDAuto.gd_auto_tac
20    fun set_solver ctxt =
21      Raw_Simplifier.setSolver (ctxt, gd_solver)
22    fun set_ssolver ctxt =
23      Raw_Simplifier.setSSolver (ctxt, gd_solver)
24    fun configure ctxt =
25      ctxt
26      |> Simplifier.set_mksimps GD_Simp.th_to_meta_eq_th
27      |> set_solver
28      |> set_ssolver
29  in
30    Theory.setup (Simplifier.map_theory_simpset configure)
31  end;
```

Now, theorems with either a top-level meta equality ($\equiv$) or object equality ($=$) can be tagged with [simp] and the simplifier will use them to rewrite subexpressions when invoked.

For example when invoking the simplifier from the following goal state:

1. $a\ \mathsf{N} \Longrightarrow x\ \mathsf{N} \Longrightarrow x * \mathbf{P}(\mathbf{S}(a))\ \mathsf{N}$

```isabelle
1  apply (simp)
```

The new goal state is:

1. $a\ \mathsf{N} \Longrightarrow x\ \mathsf{N} \Longrightarrow x * a\ \mathsf{N}$

The simplifier used the axiom `predSucInv` stating $a\ \mathbf{N} \Longrightarrow \mathbf{P}(\mathbf{S}(a))\ \mathbf{N} = a$ to rewrite $\mathbf{P}(\mathbf{S}(a))$ to a. This is because the `predSucInv` axiom was retroactively tagged with [simp].

4.3 A Subgoal Solver for *GA*

The main idea of the subgoal solver is very simple – keep a set of lemmas of the following structure that should always be applied if the current subgoal matches their consequent:

$$\texttt{simple\_premise} \Longrightarrow \texttt{complicated\_consequent}$$

Since this is not an equality, it cannot be applied to a subexpression. It can only be applied like a normal theorem, when the consequent actually matches the current goal. The instantiated premise(s) then become(s) the new goal. If there is no premise, the goal is solved immediately, and if there are multiple premises, the number of subgoals increases, but they are expected to be easier to solve than the consequent.

Some example lemmas that are suitable:

```
1 lemma [auto]: "x N ⇒ ¬ S(x) = 0"                              Isabelle
2 lemma natS [auto]: "a N ⇒ S a N"
3 lemma conjI [auto]: "p ⇒ q ⇒ p ∧ q"
4 lemma true [auto]: "True"
5 lemma true_bool [auto]: "True B"
6 lemma neq_bool [auto]: "a N ⇒ b N ⇒ (a ≠ b) B"
7 lemma if_trueI [auto]: "c ⇒ if c then True else False"
```

As can already be seen in this set of lemmas, the solver uses theorems with the [auto] tag.

The solver works in the following way.

1. Fetch the theorems with the [auto] tag using the function `Named_Theorems.get`.
2. Perform one iteration of the solver: Try to solve the current subgoal with the assumptions in context, else try to solve it with any other assumptions carried around in the simplifier context, or else try to apply any of the theorems tagged with [auto]. The iteration succeeds if and only if the goal state changed.
3. Recursively call another iteration on all new subgoals resulting from step 2, but succeed overall even if the recursive call fails. That is, the solver succeeds if at least one iteration succeeds.

The solver is extremely simple by design. It is easy to get stuck in a loop for the simplifier, which is why its subgoal solver should be simple, predictable, and most importantly, terminating. The solver tactic could be even more concise by using the `REPEAT_ALL_NEW` tactic combinator, which implements precisely the recursive structure of `solver_tac`. However, `REPEAT_ALL_NEW` is not bounded, which resulted in unpredictably occurring infinite loops of the simplifier when using it in the solver. Thus, it was replaced by this explicit recursion with a bound on the number of iterations.

The iteration bound is controlled by a global attribute in Isabelle and can be modified if necessary. The default value is 6, which has proved sufficient for all automated proofs in the GA formalization, while still maintaining acceptable performance. The `auto` solver can also be invoked directly. However, it is less powerful than the simplifier on its own, as it

does not apply the [simp] rewrite rules and does not rewrite subexpressions. When invoking `auto` directly, an optional argument can be supplied to override the iteration bound for that invocation only.

```sml
1   val gd_auto_depth_limit =                                    SML
2     Attrib.setup_config_int @{binding gd_auto_depth_limit} (K 6)
3
4   fun TRY' tac i = TRY (tac i)
5
6   structure GDAuto =
7   struct
8     fun uncond_rules ctxt = Named_Theorems.get ctxt @{named_theorems auto}
9
10    fun solver_tac _    0 = K no_tac
11      | solver_tac ctxt k =
12        let
13          val tac = assume_tac ctxt ORELSE'
14                    resolve_tac ctxt (Simplifier.prems_of ctxt) ORELSE'
15                    resolve_tac ctxt (uncond_rules ctxt)
16
17          val one_iter = CHANGED o tac
18          val recurse = solver_tac ctxt (k-1)
19        in
20          one_iter THEN_ALL_NEW TRY' recurse
21      end
22
23    fun gd_auto_tac ctxt i =
24      let
25        val fuel = Config.get ctxt gd_auto_depth_limit
26      in
27        CHANGED (REPEAT (CHANGED (solver_tac ctxt fuel i)))
28      end
29  end
30
31  val parse_nat =
32    Scan.optional (Scan.lift Parse.nat >> SOME) NONE
33
34  val _ =
35    Theory.setup (
36      Method.setup @{binding auto}
37        (parse_nat >> (fn opt_n => fn ctxt =>
38          let
39            val ctxt' = (case opt_n of NONE => ctxt | SOME n => Config.put
                 gd_auto_depth_limit n ctxt)
40          in
41            SIMPLE_METHOD' (GDAuto.gd_auto_tac ctxt')
```

```
42          end))
43        "Simple proof automation for GA"
44     )
```

There is not much to gain in trying to prune the set of rewrites at each point for the solver, since it only applies unconditional rewrites that are always the 'right choice', i.e. it doesn't perform a proof search.

The power of the solver comes not from its sophistication, but from a wealth of useful theorems that are added to its set of facts. With this simple solver (and a rich set of theorems tagged [auto] and [simp] respectively), the simplifier becomes capable of solving many kinds of subgoals entirely. For example, the termination proof of the multiplication function used to exactly mirror the one for the addition function from Section 3.9. With the new solver, almost everything can be solved by the simplifier. In particular, no manual reasoning to solve any *habeas quid* premises is required.

```
1   lemma mult_terminates [auto]:                          [Isabelle]
2      shows ‹x N ⇒ y N ⇒ mult x y N›
3   proof (rule ind[where a=y])
4      show "y N ⇒ y N" by simp
5      show "x N ⇒ mult x 0 N"
6        by (unfold_def mult_def, simp)
7      fix a
8      show "a N ⇒ x N ⇒ mult x a N ⇒ mult x (S a) N"
9        by (unfold_def mult_def, rule condT, simp+)
10  qed
```

The lemma is itself immediately tagged [auto], such that the simplifier becomes even more powerful in subsequent proofs.

4.4 Conditional Rewrites

The `auto` solver exclusively applies assumptions and unconditional rewrites. However, it would be desirable to have a means to declare certain lemmas as conditional rewrites. This can mean multiple things, for example could there be a theorem that should only be applied by an automatic solver if some of its premises can be automatically solved, or a theorem should be applied entirely for proof search, i.e. it is generally uncertain whether applying it is productive towards solving the subgoal.

- An example for the former is the following lemma:

  ```
  1 lemma "¬c ⇒ b N ⇒ d N ⇒ b = d ⇒ (if c then a else b) = d"    [Isabelle]
  ```

  If the current goal is of the shape of the consequent and the first three premises can be solved, the goal should be reduced to the fourth premise, $b = d$. Solving only the first premise is not sufficient, since b and d could be of type o, in which case b N and d N would not be solvable and the following lemma should have been applied instead:

  ```
  1 lemma "¬c ⇒ b B ⇒ d B ⇒ b = d ⇒ (if c then a else b) = d"    [Isabelle]
  ```

- A simple example for the latter kind would be the `eqSym` axiom. A goal might be solvable after applying it, but it generally does not simplify the goal:

```
1  eqSym: "a = b ⇒ b = a"                                          Isabelle
```

4.4.1 Using `simp` for conditional rewrites

The first approach towards conditional rewrites is to use the simplifier. Since it only applies a rewrite if it can solve all premises, it is a natural choice for conditional rewriting. It is also highly efficient, much more so than any custom solution anyone could hope to implement single handedly.

This approach works very well for lemmas like the following:

```
1  lemma [simp]: "c ⇒ (if c then True else b) = True"             Isabelle
2  lemma [simp]: "¬c ⇒ (if c then a else True) = True"
3  lemma suc_pred_inv [simp]: "x N ⇒ ¬ x = 0 ⇒ S P x = x"
```

The amount of complexity that can be moved into solving a premise is arbitrary. For example does the simplifier try to rewrite $\mathbf{P}(x) \leq \mathbf{P}(y)$ to 1 if the premises x N, y N, and $x \leq y = 1$ can be solved by the `auto` solver (and recursive simplification on the subgoals) when trying to apply the following lemma. However, $x \leq y = 1$ might be just as difficult to solve as $\mathbf{P}(x) \leq \mathbf{P}(y) = 1$.

```
1  lemma leq_monotone_pred [simp]:                                 Isabelle
2    assumes x_nat: "x N"
3    assumes y_nat: "y N"
4    assumes H: "x ≤ y = 1"
5    shows "P x ≤ P y = 1"
```

There are some key limitations to note for using the simplifier for conditional rewrites:

1. Adding too many rules like `leq_monotone_pred` (with low probability of the solver succeeding in solving its premises) to the simpset makes the performance of the simplifier deteriorate quickly, as it essentially ends up performing a proof search.
2. If the premise and consequent can have the same instantiation, the simplifier **will** run into an infinite loop. For instance, tagging the `eqSym` axiom with [simp] makes it enter an infinite loop on every invocation immediately.
3. The simplifier always tries to solve all premises and does not support reducing the goal to one or more premises (to be solved manually or by another tactic).
4. The simplifier operates on equalities only. While this is largely solved by the `auto` solver, it can only do unconditional applications.

Point (1) suggests moving low-probability-of-success rewrites to a different tool, but points (2), (3), and (4) ask for a different approach altogether.

4.4.2 Extending the `auto` Solver with Conditional Rewrites

Problem (4) asks for an extension of the `auto` solver to also handle conditional rewrites, which also solves problem (3). Thus, the next approach was to add another tag [cond] for lemmas intended to be used as conditional rewrites and let the `auto` solver use such a tagged theorem for rewriting if it can solve its first premise. Since any number of premises can be 'encoded' into the first premise by simply conjoining them ($\wedge$), conditioning on solving the first premise is sufficient.

Some lemmas that can be handled using this approach and not by the simplifier:

```
1  lemma [cond]: "a ⇒ a B"                                              Isabelle
2  lemma [cond]: "¬a ⇒ a B"
3  lemma [cond]: "((c B) ∧ (a N) ∧ (b N)) ⇒ if c then a else b N"
4  lemma [cond]: "((c B) ∧ (a B) ∧ (b B)) ⇒ if c then a else b B"
```

Especially the booleanness conditions a B are vital to solve effectively in the subgoal solver of the simplifier, since they are common *habeas quid* premises in *GA*. The first two lemmas effectively do a proof search and try to solve for both the positive and negative case.

The last two lemmas are equivalent to the axioms `condT` and `condTB`, just with the three premises conjoined into one, such that the `auto` solver only applies them if all three are solved. These lemmas show the limitations of using exclusively the simplifier for automation, since this lemma cannot be expressed as an equality. One would expect that the following lemmas could be used by the simplifier:

```
1  lemma [simp]: "c B ⇒ a N ⇒ b N ⇒ if c then a else b N = True"       Isabelle
2  lemma [simp]: "c B ⇒ a B ⇒ b B ⇒ if c then a else b B = True"
```

However, due to the extraordinarily syntactic nature of equality in *GA*, these propositions are not provable. `True` is defined as the canonical truth $0 = 0$ in *GA* and True $= a$ cannot be derived for any a, as there is no axiom that allows deriving equality of equalities (in particular, no reflexivity axiom).

With these lemmas presented so far, the approach is the following. Previously, the `auto` solver was designed to apply a theorem if it is the single canonical way to solve a goal of a certain shape. The conditional extension now added the capability of trying multiple different solution strategies to definitely solve a goal. For examle, if premise c can be solved, the goal c B is solved completely and no new subgoals are generated. There is however another category of lemmas that can be integrated with the conditional extension to the `auto` solver. Namely, trying different solution strategies to reduce the current goal to a new subgoal that is likely easier to solve. For example the following lemmas implement this strategy for reducing if c then a else b constructs:

```
1  lemma [cond]: "(¬c ∧ (b N) ∧ (d N)) ⇒ b = d ⇒ (if c then a else b) =   Isabelle
   d"
2  lemma [cond]: "(c ∧ (a N) ∧ (d N)) ⇒ a = d ⇒ (if c then a else b) = d"
```

With this extension, the simplifier gets an even more competent subgoal solver, providing another boost to proof automation. Problems (3) and (4) of the initial approach of using only the simplifier are now solved and the two approaches coexist.

The additions in the `auto` implementation are straightforward. The required additions are
highlighted:

```sml
1   val gd_auto_depth_limit =
2     Attrib.setup_config_int @{binding gd_auto_depth_limit} (K 6)
3
4   fun TRY' tac i = TRY (tac i)
5
6   structure GDAuto =
7   struct
8
9     fun uncond_rules ctxt = Named_Theorems.get ctxt @{named_theorems auto}
10    fun cond_rules   ctxt = Named_Theorems.get ctxt @{named_theorems cond}
11
12    fun solver_tac _     0 = K no_tac
13      | solver_tac ctxt k =
14        let
15          fun apply_and_solve_subgoal i th =
16            match_tac ctxt [th] i
17            THEN SOLVED' (solver_tac ctxt (k-1)) i
18          fun cond_tacs i =
19            FIRST (map (apply_and_solve_subgoal i)
20              (cond_rules ctxt))
21          val tac = assume_tac ctxt ORELSE'
22                    resolve_tac ctxt (Simplifier.prems_of ctxt) ORELSE'
23                    resolve_tac ctxt (uncond_rules ctxt) ORELSE'
24                    cond_tacs
25          val one_iter = CHANGED o tac
26          val recurse = solver_tac ctxt (k-1)
27        in
28          REPEAT_ALL_NEW one_iter
29      end
30
31    fun gd_auto_tac ctxt i =
32      let
33        val fuel = Config.get ctxt gd_auto_depth_limit
34      in
35        CHANGED (REPEAT (CHANGED (solver_tac ctxt fuel i)))
36      end
37  end
38
39  val parse_nat =
```

```
40    Scan.optional (Scan.lift Parse.nat >> SOME) NONE
41
42  val _ =
43    Theory.setup (
44      Method.setup @{binding auto}
45        (parse_nat >> (fn opt_n => fn ctxt =>
46          let
47            val ctxt' = (case opt_n of NONE => ctxt | SOME n => Config.put
                 gd_auto_depth_limit n ctxt)
48          in
49            SIMPLE_METHOD' (GDAuto.gd_auto_tac ctxt')
50          end))
51        "Simple proof automation for GD logic"
52    )
```

There is one massive problem with this `cond` extension however, namely that problem (1) of the simplifier approach is made even worse here. The `auto` solver is the subgoal solver of the simplifier and it now performs quite a bit of proof search, and a completely unoptimized one at that, which makes the performance of the simplifier suffer.

4.4.3 Circumventing Weak Equality

The automation boost the `cond` extension from the previous Section 4.4.2 provides is satisfactory, but it slowed down the simplifier significantly. Although computationally the same problem, moving the rudimentary proof search capabilities of the `cond` extension from the `auto` solver into the simplifier itself should be much faster, simply due to its (presumably) more efficient implementation.

Although an equality like the following (which the simplifier could use as a rewrite rule) does not hold in GA:

```
1  lemma "¬c ⇒ b N ⇒ d N ⇒ ((if c then a else b) = d) = (b = d)"    Isabelle
```

The following proposition is provable:

```
1  lemma "¬c ⇒ b N ⇒ d N ⇒ (if c then a else b) = d ↔ b = d"    Isabelle
```

Adding a conversion axiom from $\leftrightarrow$ to $\equiv$ makes such lemmas usable as rewrites for the simplifier.

> **Iff Reflection Axiom**
>
> $$\frac{\Gamma \vdash a \leftrightarrow b}{\Gamma \vdash a \equiv b}$$

If-and-only-if ($\leftrightarrow$) is effectively an equality for propositions of type `o`, since object equalities ($=$) are not derivable for them (only for expressions of type `num`). It is unclear whether it is admissible. However, the following theorem shows that, while for admissibility the theorem

$a \leftrightarrow b \implies K\ b \implies K\ a$ would be required, the following inference rule that very closely resembles the axiom itself is readily provable in *GA*.

Theorem 12. *Iff Trueprop Reflection*

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash a \leftrightarrow b}{\Gamma \vdash (\text{Trueprop } a) \equiv (\text{Trueprop } b)}$$

Proof.

Using the `equal_intr_rule` *Pure* axiom, derive both $a \implies b$ and $b \implies a$.

```
1  lemma "a ↔ b ⟹ (Trueprop a) ≡ (Trueprop b)"          Isabelle
2  apply (rule Pure.equal_intr_rule)
3  apply (unfold iff_def)
4  apply (rule implE, rule conjE1, assumption+)
5  apply (rule implE, rule conjE2, assumption+)
6  done
```

∎

The same proof does not work when trying to prove `iff_reflection`, since the *Pure* `equal_intr_rule` only works for meta equalities ($\equiv$) where both sides are of type `prop`, whereas in `iff_reflection`, the two sides are of type `o`.

The proof of the theorem shows that the `iff_reflection` axiom is essentially an object-level version of the meta level `equal_intr_rule`, which allows deriving equality $\equiv$ when $a \implies b$ and $b \implies a$ can be derived. While the simplifier could in principle work with lemmas of the shape Trueprop $a \equiv$ Trueprop b, the left-hand side never matches any subterm in a *GA* expression, as it is of type `prop`, while *GA* terms are of type `o` or `num`. The admissibility of the axiom might be provable meta-logically by induction over the inference rules of *GA*, but *Pure* is not sufficiently strong as a meta-logic to do so, as it does not have an (meta-level) induction scheme.

The new axiom allows restating most of the lemmas previously tagged with [cond], such that the simplifier can rewrite them. An example is the following lemma:

```
1  lemma [cond]: "a < b = 1 ⟹ a N ⟹ b N ⟹ ¬ a = b"          Isabelle
```

Which was subsequently restated and reproven as:

```
1  lemma [simp]: "a < b = 1 ⟹ a N ⟹ b N ⟹ ¬ a = b ↔ True"          Isabelle
```

In fact, this is more powerful, since even subexpressions can be rewritten using the latter.

While all lemmas intended for conditional rewriting can be reformulated as biconditional, not all such reformulated propositions can actually be proven. The reason is the *habeas quid* premise of the derivable implication introduction rule in *GA*, which requires proving the antecedent of the implication boolean (B). This is not possible for example in the following lemma:

```
1  lemma [cond]: "((c B) ∧ (a N) ∧ (b N)) ⟹ if c then a else b N"          Isabelle
```

While it can be restated as:

```
1  lemma [simp]: "((c B) ∧ (a N) ∧ (b N)) ⇒ if c then a else b N ↔
   True"
```
`Isabelle`

Proving this proposition requires showing that (if c then a else b N) B, which is equivalent to solving the halting problem in GA, as it requires proving that the proposition a N is decidable in general. Thus, rewrites of this shape remain in the domain of the `cond` extension of the `auto` solver.

The configuration of the simplifier needs to be extended in order for it to correctly apply biconditional theorems. The minimal additional logic is hightlighted in green:

```
1   structure GD_Simp =                                              SML
2   struct
3     fun convert_eq_to_meta_eq th: thm = th RS @{thm eq_reflection}
4     fun convert_iff_to_meta_eq th: thm = th RS @{thm iff_reflection}
5
6     fun match_object_rule th trm =
7       case trm of
8         Const (@{const_name GD.eq},  _) $ _ $ _  => [convert_eq_to_meta_eq th]
9
10        | Const (@{const_name GD.iff},  _) $ _ $ _ => [convert_iff_to_meta_eq th]
11      | _ => []
12  ...
```

4.4.4 Proof Search

The initial approach of using the simplifier to handle conditional rewrites maybe unsurprisingly ended up being the most effective solution, although it did take an extension to make better use of it. The reason is its sophistication and efficient implementation, which makes it hard to beat even though it is not designed to be used for even rudimentary proof search. An approach that might provide additional value over the setup constructed in this section is a true proof search (implemented on top of the simplifier, and not as its subgoal solver). However, since a naive implementation is exponential in the number of theorems in the rewrite set, this requires a sophisticated datastructure to search for applicable rules in order to be tractable at the very least. This might be a valuable addition to the tooling of GA, but has not been implemented yet for two reasons.

- An efficient implementation is a significant time investment and seemed out of the scope for this thesis.
- The automation with the existing setup was surprisingly effective and a real proof search for the sake of better proof automation never seemed exceptionally desirable.

4.5 Manual Substitution

Finally, if the simplifier is not powerful enough to solve all premises of a theorem that would actually be the right one to apply, a simple substitution command that allows rewriting

(including subexpressions) with a specific theorem and solving some of its premises manually is very helpful.

For example, consider the following goal state reached by an invocation of the simplifier.

1. $x \; \mathsf{N} \Longrightarrow x' \; \mathsf{N} \Longrightarrow$ (if $\mathbf{S}(x') =$
   0 then 0 else if cpx $x' = 0$ then $\mathbf{S}(\text{cpy } x')$ else $\mathbf{P}(\text{cpx } x')$) N

Another invocation of `simp` fails.

```
1  apply (simp)                                                    Isabelle
```

The simplifier is not able to take the second branch of the top-level conditional, since to do this rewrite, it would have to show that the second branch terminates, i.e. show that it is N, which it is unable to do.

Now, a command like the following would come in very handy:

```
1  apply (subst rule: condI2)                                      Isabelle
```

This performs the rewrite and leaves the unsolved premises as new subgoals, resulting in the goal state:

1. $x \; \mathsf{N} \Longrightarrow x' \; \mathsf{N} \Longrightarrow$ (if cpx $x' = 0$ then $\mathbf{S}(\text{cpy } x')$ else $\mathbf{P}(\text{cpx } x')$) N
2. $x \; \mathsf{N} \Longrightarrow x' \; \mathsf{N} \Longrightarrow$ (if cpx $x' = 0$ then $\mathbf{S}(\text{cpy } x')$ else $\mathbf{P}(\text{cpx } x')$) N

Here, the same goal appears twice, since the premise of the `condI2` rule, to show the second branch terminates, precisely coincides with the remaining goal after substituting the second branch for the entire conditional.

Without the `subst` command, the `condI2` theorem couldn't have been applied directly, since the substituted conditional is a subexpression; it would have had to be preceded by an equality substitution and an application of equality symmetry first (which is more or less what the `subst` command does). Thus, the `subst` command is a convenient way of manually advancing the proof when the simplifier gets stuck.

In fact, more occurences of `eqSubst` applications can be replaced by a more convenient method. Consider the following goal state.

1. $x \; \mathsf{N} \Longrightarrow x' \; \mathsf{N} \Longrightarrow \neg(\mathbf{P}(x') = \mathbf{P}(\mathbf{S}(x))) \Longrightarrow \neg(\mathbf{P}(x') = x)$

So far, this was solved the following way:

```
1  apply (rule eqSubst[where a="P S x" and b="x"])                 Isabelle
2  apply (simp)
```

Where the simplifier solves the first resulting subgoal after the equality substitution $\mathbf{P}(\mathbf{S}(x)) = x$ automatically and then the second subgoal by assumption.

The `eqSubst` axiom itself should be hidden and the rewrite should be done automatically with a simple:

```
1  apply (subst "P S x = x")                                       Isabelle
```

This is not a huge difference, but it makes the proof cleaner.

The `subst` command thus has two different modes of operating, one accepting a theorem name (which is expected to have a top-level equality) and using it to rewrite a match for the left-hand side to the right-hand side, concluding the first subgoal with the theorem itself, and the other accepting an equality itself, which it uses to rewrite, and then tries to solve using the simplifier.

This is implemented in the following SML code, which works as follows:

1. Parses either a theorem name or a term, whichever succeeds.
2. If the argument is a theorem name, it fetches the theorem and extracts the left-hand side and right-hand side of its top-level equality (assuming it is of the expected shape), instantiates the `eqSubst` theorem with those extracted terms, and then finally applies it. Then, it applies the `eqSym` axiom to flip the equality from the first subgoal, which can then be resolved by the passed theorem itself.
3. If the argument is a term, the code extracts the left-hand side and right-hand side of its top-level equality (assuming it is of the expected shape), instantiates the `eqSubst` theorem with those extracted terms, and then finally applies it. Then, it tries to solve the resulting first subgoal (the equality itself) by applying the simplifier.

```sml
1   datatype input = AsThm of thm | AsTrm of term          SML
2
3   structure GD_Subst =
4   struct
5     fun strip_asms t =
6       case t of
7         @{term "(==>)"} $ _ $ t' => strip_asms t'
8       | _ => t
9
10    fun get_lhs_rhs_of_eq t =
11        case t of
12          @{term "(Trueprop)"} $ t'                  => get_lhs_rhs_of_eq t'
13        | Const (@{const_name GD.eq}, _) $ lhs $ rhs => (SOME lhs, SOME rhs)
14        | _                                          => (NONE, NONE)
15
16    fun get_eq (AsTrm t)   = let val (l, r) = get_lhs_rhs_of_eq t in (r, l) end
17      | get_eq (AsThm thm) = get_lhs_rhs_of_eq (strip_asms (Thm.prop_of thm))
18
19    fun eq_subst_tac input ctxt =
20      case (get_eq input) of
21        (SOME pat, SOME rhs) =>
22          let
23            val l = (Thm.cterm_of ctxt pat)
24            val r = (Thm.cterm_of ctxt rhs)
25            val eqSub = Proof_Context.get_thm ctxt "eqSubst"
26            val eqSub' =
27              Drule.infer_instantiate' ctxt
28              [SOME r, SOME l]
```

```
29              eqSub
30          in
31            resolve_tac ctxt [eqSub']
32          end
33        | (_,_) => K no_tac
34
35    fun gd_subst_tac (AsThm thm) ctxt =
36      let val eqSym = Proof_Context.get_thm ctxt "eqSym" in
37        (eq_subst_tac (AsThm thm) ctxt) THEN'
38        resolve_tac ctxt [eqSym] THEN'
39        resolve_tac ctxt [thm]
40      end
41    | gd_subst_tac (AsTrm trm) ctxt =
42      (eq_subst_tac (AsTrm trm) ctxt) THEN'
43      (fn i => TRY (SOLVED' (Simplifier.asm_full_simp_tac ctxt) i))
44
45  end
46
47  val parse_subst_args : input context_parser =
48    (Scan.lift (Args.$$$ "rule" |-- Args.colon) |-- Attrib.thm >> AsThm)
49    || (Args.term >> AsTrm)
50
51  val _ =
52  Theory.setup
53      (Method.setup @{binding subst}
54      (parse_subst_args >>
55        (fn inp => fn ctxt => SIMPLE_METHOD' (GD_Subst.gd_subst_tac inp ctxt)))
56      "Substitute using the given theorem name or term."
57  )
```

4.6 Case Distinction

What is missing so far is a good way to do case distinction over natural numbers and truth values. The foundation for these case distinctions is given by the following two lemmas.

> **Theorem 13.** *Cases Bool*
>
> $$\frac{\Gamma \vdash q\ \mathsf{B} \quad \Gamma \cup \{q\} \vdash p \quad \Gamma \cup \{\neg q\} \vdash p}{\Gamma \vdash p}$$

Proof.

By the 'case distinction' axiom `disjE1` using the fact that $q \vee \neg q$ by $q\ \mathsf{B}$.

```
1   lemma cases_bool:                                          Isabelle
2     assumes q_bool: "q B"
```

```
3     assumes H: "q ⇒ p"
4     assumes H1: "¬q ⇒ p"
5     shows "p"
6   apply (rule disjE1[where P="q" and Q="¬q"])
7   apply (fold bJudg_def)
8   apply (rule q_bool)
9   apply (rule H)
10  apply (assumption)
11  apply (rule H1)
12  apply (assumption)
13  done
```

■

Theorem 14. *Cases Nat*

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash x \; \mathsf{N} \quad \Gamma \cup \{x = 0\} \vdash K \; 0 \quad \Gamma \cup \{y \; \mathsf{N}, \, x = \mathbf{S}(y)\} \vdash K \; \mathbf{S}(y)}{\Gamma \vdash K \; x}$$

Proof.

By the 'case distinction' axiom `disjE1` using the fact that $x = 0 \lor \neg(x = 0)$ and using the helper lemma `num_nonzero`, stating that $a \; \mathsf{N} \Longrightarrow \neg(a = 0) \Longrightarrow \exists x. \; a = \mathbf{S}(x)$

```
1   lemma cases_nat: "x N ⇒ (x = 0 ⇒ Q 0) ⇒ (∧y. y N ⇒ x = S(y) ⇒ Q    Isabelle
    S(y)) ⇒ Q x"
2   apply (rule disjE1[where P="x = 0" and Q="¬ x = 0"])
3   apply (fold bJudg_def, simp)
4   apply (subst "0 = x", assumption)
5   apply (rule existsE[where Q="λc. x = S(c)"])
6   apply (rule num_nonzero)
7   proof -
8     fix a
9     show "(∧y. y N ⇒ x = S y ⇒ Q (S y)) ⇒ a N ⇒ x = S a ⇒ Q x"
10      by (subst "S a = x", assumption)
11  qed
```

■

Using these theorems, the job of the `cases` method is very simple – parse the argument and decide which theorem to apply:

```
1   datatype input = BoolCaseTac of term | NatCaseTac of term    SML
2
3   structure GDCases =
4   struct
5
6   fun try_inst_thm ctxt t th =
```

```
7     let val ct = Thm.cterm_of ctxt t in
8       try (fn th => Drule.infer_instantiate' ctxt [SOME ct] th) th
9     end
10
11  fun gd_bool_cases_tac ctxt x =
12    case (try_inst_thm ctxt x @{thm cases_bool}) of
13      SOME th => resolve_tac ctxt [th]
14    | NONE    => K no_tac
15
16  fun gd_nat_cases_tac ctxt x =
17    case (try_inst_thm ctxt x @{thm cases_nat}) of
18      SOME th => resolve_tac ctxt [th]
19    | NONE    => K no_tac
20
21  fun gd_cases_tac ctxt input =
22    case input of
23      BoolCaseTac t   => SIMPLE_METHOD' (gd_bool_cases_tac ctxt t)
24    | NatCaseTac t    => SIMPLE_METHOD' (gd_nat_cases_tac ctxt t)
25
26  val parse_cases_args : input context_parser =
27    (Scan.lift (Args.$$$ "bool" |-- Args.colon) |-- Args.term >> BoolCaseTac)
28    || (Args.term >> NatCaseTac)
29
30  val _ =
31    Theory.setup
32      (Method.setup @{binding cases}
33        (parse_cases_args >> (fn inp => fn ctxt => gd_cases_tac ctxt inp))
34        "case analysis")
35
36  end
```

4.7 Induction Method

Although there is an induction axiom, this is another opportunity to make *GA* consistent with the sorts of commands/methods a user would expect of a proof assistant and provide a method that wraps the axiom application.

Instead of applying the axiom:

```
1 apply (rule ind[where a="x"])                                    Isabelle
```

The `induct` method is applied:

```
1 apply (induct x)                                                 Isabelle
```

And instead of the strong induction lemma:

```
1  apply (rule strong_induction[where a="x"])                    Isabelle
```

A flag can be passed to the `induct` method:

```
1  apply (induct strong x)                                       Isabelle
```

For much of this thesis, Isabelle proofs were presented in apply-style scripts. However, Isabelle also provides a structured proof language called *Isar*, which aims for emulating natural language proofs and overall better legibility compared to apply-style scripts. One nice feature of *Isar* are named cases; The premises of a theorem can be named and when applying it, the subgoals (and their respective assumptions) are bound to a case name that can be invoked with the following general syntax:

```
1   proof (method_name)                                          Isabelle
2     case (case_1_name case_1_arg_1 ...)
3       show ?case
4       ...
5   next
6     case (case_2_name case_2_arg_1 ...)
7       show ?case
8       ...
9   ...
10  qed
```

For example, the goal is to be able to provide the following syntax for applying induction:

```
1  proof (induct y)                                              Isabelle
2    case Base
3      show case?
4      ...
5  next
6    case (Step xa)
7     ...
8  qed
```

Precisely this functionality is provided by the following SML implementation of the `induct` method:

```
1   structure GD_Induct =                                        SML
2   struct
3     val induct_thm = @{thm ind}
4     val strong_induct_thm = @{thm strong_induction}
5
6     fun try_inst_thm ctxt t th =
7       let val ct = Thm.cterm_of ctxt t in
8         try (fn th => Drule.infer_instantiate' ctxt [SOME ct] th) th
9       end
10
```

```
11    fun closes_first_prem ctxt i th st =
12      let
13        val tac =
14        DETERM (
15          resolve_tac ctxt [th] i
16          THEN ((SOLVED' (assume_tac ctxt)) i)
17        )
18      in
19        Option.isSome (Seq.pull (tac st))
20      end
21
22    fun apply_tac tac st =
23      let
24        val res = DETERM tac st
25      in
26        case Seq.pull res of
27          SOME (st', _) => st'
28        | NONE => raise THM ("tactic failed", 0, [st])
29      end
30
31    fun induct_tac strong t =
32      CONTEXT_SUBGOAL (fn (_, i) => fn (ctxt, st) =>
33      let
34        val th  = if strong then strong_induct_thm else induct_thm
35        val th' = try_inst_thm ctxt t th
36        val tac =
37          case th' of
38            SOME th'' => DETERM (match_tac ctxt [th''] i)
39          | NONE      => no_tac
40        val st' = apply_tac tac st
41        val (spec, _) = Rule_Cases.get th
42        val cases_prop = Thm.prop_of (Rule_Cases.internalize_params st')
43        val cases = Rule_Cases.make_common ctxt cases_prop spec
44        val post_tac = TRY (SOLVED' (assume_tac ctxt) i)
45      in
46        CONTEXT_CASES cases post_tac (ctxt, st')
47      end)
48
49    fun gd_induct_method (strong, t) _ =
50      Method.CONTEXT_METHOD (K (induct_tac strong t 1))
51  end
52
53  val parse_induct_args =
54    Scan.lift (Scan.optional ((Args.$$$ "strong") >> K true) false)
55    -- Args.term
```

```
56
57  val _ =
58    Theory.setup
59      (Method.setup @{binding induct}
60      (parse_induct_args >> GD_Induct.gd_induct_method)
61      "Apply rule ind with where a = <term>"
62    )
```

4.8 A Case Study: Proving Strict Monotonicity of `cpy`

The following case study reviews the tooling and automation introduced in this section by presenting a proof of strict monotonicity for the `cpy` function, which extracts the second component of a *Cantor pair* and is central in Section 5.

The `cpy` function itself is not important here, but the proof is a great example of how the few methods introduced in this section make up the majority of commands used in a proof and are a huge step up compared to the axiom level reasoning required before this chapter.

```
1   lemma cpy_strict_mono [simp]: "x N ⇒ cpy (S x) < (S x) = 1"        Isabelle
2   proof (induct strong x)
3     case Base
4       from Base show ?case
5         by (unfold_def cpy_def, simp)
6   next
7     case (Step xa)
8       fix y
9       assume hyp: "∧y. y N ⇒ y ≤ xa = 1 ⇒ cpy (S y) < (S y) = 1"
10      from Step show ?case
11        apply (unfold_def cpy_def, simp)
12        apply (cases bool: "cpx (S xa) = 0")
13        apply (simp add: cpx_suc)+
14        apply (cases bool: "cpx xa = 0")
15        apply (simp add: cpx_suc cpy_suc)+
16        apply (subst "S P xa = xa", simp)
17        apply (rule cpx_nz_arg_nz, simp)
18        apply (rule le_monotone_suc)+
19        apply (rule hyp, simp)
20        done
21  qed
```

Encoding Inductive Datatypes in GD   5

With *Isabelle/GD* now being a more convenient proof assistant, the next goal is to make it easier to extend the domain of discourse beyond just natural numbers. Modern proof assistants, like *Isabelle/HOL* or Rocq, contain fancy definitional mechanisms that allow for easy definition of things like inductive datatypes, recursive predicates, infinitary sets, and so on.

These definitional packages are effectively *theory compilers*, as they take a simple high-level definition, like an inductive datatype declaration, and map it to definitions, axioms, and automatically proven lemmas, encoding the high-level definition in lower-level existing primitives.

The goal of this chapter is to take the key steps towards such a definitional mechanism for inductive datatypes in *Isabelle/GA* and encode them into the existing natural number theory. That is, any inductive datatype should be definable and conveniently usable without adding any axioms.

The roadmap towards this lofty goal is as follows:

- Formalize enough basic number theory to be able to define cantor pairings and the key properties about them.
- Manually encode an inductive datatype into the natural numbers using the cantor pairing infrastructure from the first step. Define a type membership predicate, define the constructors as cantor pairings of their arguments and prove the necessary lemmas (such as all constructors being disjoint, the type membership predicate returning true for all values of the constructors, induction over the datatype, and so on).
- Plan out a semantic type system embedded within the single syntactic type of num in *Pure* and introduce tooling for it.
- Write a definitional package that parses an inductive datatype declaration and compiles it into the necessary definitions, lemmas, and accompanying proofs.

5.1 Next

- cantor pairing formalization; cantor pairing and projection functions recursive formalizations and mutual termination proofs; key theorems
- add some key theorems for arithmetic that were proven, or at least give a number to get an idea.

Before:

```
1   lemma cons_is_list:                                          Isabelle
2     assumes n_nat: "n N"
3     assumes xs_list: "is_list xs"
4     shows "is_list (Cons n xs)"
5   apply (rule eqSubst[where a="True"])
6   apply (unfold_def is_list_def)
7   apply (rule eqSym)
```

```
8   apply (rule condI2BEq)
9   apply (gd_auto)
10  apply (rule n_nat)
11  apply (rule list_nat)
12  apply (rule xs_list)
13  apply (gd_auto)
14  proof -
15    show "(if Cons n xs = Cons n xs ∧ is_list xs ∧ (n N) then True else False)
      = True"
16      apply (rule condI1B)
17      apply (rule conjI)+
18      apply (fold isNat_def)
19      apply (rule cons_nat)
20      apply (rule n_nat)
21      apply (rule list_nat)
22      apply (rule xs_list)
23      apply (rule xs_list)
24      apply (rule n_nat)
25      apply (rule true_bool)
26      done
27    show "True" by (rule true)
28  qed
```

After:

```
1  lemma cons_is_list [gd_auto]:                            Isabelle
2    shows "n N ⇒ xs N ⇒ is_list xs ⇒ is_list (Cons n xs)"
3  by (unfold_def is_list_def, simp)
```

A References

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