


Improvements on Distributed Key Generation

Bachelor Project

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
Improvements on Distributed Key Generation


• Objective: Bringing improvements in order to enhance the security of the protocol

Outline

- Background:
 - What is DKG
 - Shamir's secret
 - Feldman's VSS
- How DKG works
- My work: Proactive secret sharing
- Implementation
- Conclusion

- Set of n participants who collectively generate a shared private/public key
- Each node have a share of the secret (private key)
- No single point failure: attacker needs to break into multiple location to have access to the secret.
- DKG is mostly used in group digital signature, or decrypt shared ciphertexts.







- $f(x) = s + a_1x + a_2x^2 + ... + a_{t-1}x^{t-1}$, t < n
- \cdot f(0) = secret
- construct n points out of it (shares) and distributes to the nodes



• t points are sufficient to reconstruct a t-1 degree polynomial function








Feldman's verifiable secret sharing


- Based on Shamir's secret sharing
- nodes can verify if their shares are consistent
- dealer broadcasts F(•) = f(•) * g
- $F(i) == s_i * g$


- Based on Feldman's VSS
- System without any trusted party
- Executes *n* VSS instances in parallel: every node is a dealer
- Each node generates $f_i(x) = z_i + a_1x + a_2x^2 + ... + a_{t-1}x^{t-1}$, where z_i is random






















$$s = \sum_{j} f_{j}(0)$$

$$S = \sum_{j} F_{j}(0) = s * g$$






- Given enough time, an attacker can gradually break into more than t servers
- Not practical to change the secret
- Solution: Proactive secret sharing.
- We only focus on refreshing the shares

- Why refreshing?
- Refreshing the shares makes the underlying polynomial change!
- Old stolen information become useless

The idea

- Let's assume that the initial DKG round has been done
- Each node generates new intermediate random polynomials gi(x)
- $g_i(x) = 0 + b_{1,i}x + b_{2,i}x^2 + ... + b_{t-1,i}x^{t-1}$

- They execute again the DKG protocol:
- distributions of the intermediate shares



$$s_i = \sum_j f_j(i)$$
 for node i
 $s_i' = \sum_j g_j(i)$

$$s_{i} = \sum_{j} f_{j}(i)$$

$$+ s_{i}' = \sum_{j} g_{j}(i) < --- 2^{nd} \text{ round DKG}$$

$$r_{i} = \sum_{j} h_{j}(i)$$

$$s_{i} = \sum_{j} f_{j}(i)$$

$$+ s_{i}' = \sum_{j} g_{j}(i)$$

$$r_{i} = \sum_{j} h_{j}(i)$$

$$s_{i} = \sum_{j} f_{j}(i)$$

$$+ s_{i}' = \sum_{j} g_{j}(i)$$

$$+ s_{i}' = \sum_{j} h_{j}(0)$$

$$+ s_{i}' = \sum_{j} h_{j}(0)$$

$$s = \sum_{j} h_{j}(0)$$

$$s = \sum_{j} h_{j}(0)$$

$$g_i(x) = 0 + b_{1,i}x + b_{2,i}x^2 + ... + b_{t-1,i}x^{t-1}$$


$$+ \sum_{j} g_{j}(1)$$

$$= r_{1}$$
1

$$+ \sum_{j} g_{j}(2)$$

$$= r_{2}$$

+
$$\sum_{j} g_{j}(3)$$
= \mathbf{r}_{3}



$$+ \sum_{j} g_{j}(1)$$

$$= r_{1}$$


$$\uparrow$$

renewed share

$$+ \sum_{j} g_{j}(2)$$

$$= r_{2}$$

+
$$\sum_{j} g_{j}(3)$$
= \mathbf{r}_{3}



- The attacker's time is now restricted between the updating process
- He need to break into servers at the same period

Implementation

- 2nd round of DKG for updating the shares:
- Renew function adds 2 shares according to their indices:
 - check if G(0) = 0 (= 0 * g)
 - check share1.index == share2.index

Conclusion

- enhances security of the protocol
- much more interesting if periodicity is implemented

Future work

- Implement the periodicity
- Implement the share recovering process

Current work

- Drand (distributed randomness beacon daemon) where
- nodes collectively produces random values