


STM32MP1


Boot chain and security



Presentation


40min

- Boot chain
- Security on STM32MP1



Boot chain overview

Standard Linux Boot Chain



Standard Linux Boot Chain



ROM
($<128\text{kB}$)

ROM Code

ROM code :

- **Basic clock tree** initialization
- **FSBL** Int-RAM loading from the **boot device** (mass storage or serial link)
- FSBL launch

Standard Linux Boot Chain



Embedded RAM
($<256\text{kB}$)

First Stage Boot Loader (FSBL)

ROM
($<128\text{kB}$)

ROM Code

FSBL :

- **Complete clock tree (PII) initialization**
- **External RAM (DDR, LpDDR) controller initialization**
- **Boot device init** (mass storage or serial link)
- **SSBL loading** from the **boot device**
- **SSBL launch**

Standard Linux Boot Chain



External RAM
(≥512MBytes)

Linux init
process

Linux User

- User space services and applications launch

Linux kernel

Linux Kernel

- Linux kernel initialisation (platform device drivers, etc.)
- **Root file system** (rootfs) mounting
- User space **init process** launch (/sbin/init)

Second Stage
Boot Loader
(SSBL)

SSBL:

- **Boot file system** (bootfs) **Ext-RAM loading** from boot device (can be also USB mass storage or Ethernet)
- User feedback with boot loader splash screen
- **Linux kernel** (ulmage) **launch** with its device tree blob (*.dtb)

Embedded RAM
(<256kB)


First Stage Boot
Loader (FSBL)

ROM
(<128kB)

ROM Code

STM32MP1 boot chain

8




3rd Party	
ST	Community
Community + ST adds-on	

→ Loads
 → (Loads &) Calls
 : Configured via STM32CubeMX
 : Authentication (optional)


Legend

Engineering Boot chain

10



- Used in M4-only preliminary debug – no Linux boot image needed
- M4 Firmware Load is done via JTAG/SWD
- Need to address clocks and pio alternate function set-up




Boot chain configuration


Variability management via device tree

12

- Former **Linux** kernel used to embed the hardware description of the supported board in the same binary. Current kernels put this information in a separate binary, the **device tree blob** (dtb). As a consequence, a unique kernel binary can support different chips and boards. **U-Boot** also adopted the same solution.



- Device Tree documentation is available on http://elinux.org/Device_Tree, starting from [Device Tree for Dummies](#) from Thomas Petazzoni.
- Linux developers manually edit device tree source files (dts): STMicroelectronics enables this **generation from STM32CubeMX** to ease new comers hands-on!



Device tree example for STM32MP1

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stm32-usart.c

```
static const struct of_device_id stm32_match[] = {  
    { .compatible = "st,stm32h7-usart", .data = &stm32h7_info },  
};
```

stm32mp157c.dtsi

```
uart4: serial@40010000 {  
    compatible = "st,stm32h7-usart";  
    reg = <0x40010000 0x400>;  
    interrupts-extended = <&intc GIC_SPI 52 IRQ_TYPE_NONE>, <&exti 30 1>;  
    clocks = <&rcc_clk UART4_K>;  
    status = "disabled";  
};
```

stm32mp157-pinctrl.dtsi

```
uart4_pins_a: uart4@0 {  
    pins1 {  
        pinmux = <STM32_PINMUX('G', 11, AF6)>; /* UART4_TX */  
        bias-disable;  
        drive-push-pull;  
        slew-rate = <0>;  
    };  
    ...  
};
```

stm32mp157c-ed1.dts


```
&uart4 {  
    pinctrl-names = "default";  
    pinctrl-0 = <&uart4_pins_a>;  
    status = "okay";  
};
```

Different ROMCode boot devices

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BOOT pins	TAMP_REG[20] (Force Serial)	OTP WORD 3 Primary boot source	OTP WORD 3 Secondary boot source	Boot source #1	Boot source #2 if #1 fails	Boot source if #2 fails
b000	x (don't care)	x (don't care)	x (don't care)	Serial	-	-
b001	!= 0xFF	0 (virgin)	0 (virgin)	QSPI NOR	Serial	-
b010	!= 0xFF	0 (virgin)	0 (virgin)	eMMC	Serial	-
b011	!= 0xFF	0 (virgin)	0 (virgin)	FMC NAND	Serial	-
b100	x (don't care)	x (don't care)	x (don't care)	NoBoot	-	-
b101	!= 0xFF	0 (virgin)	0 (virgin)	SD-Card	Serial	-
b110	!= 0xFF	0 (virgin)	0 (virgin)	Serial	-	-
b111	!= 0xFF	0 (virgin)	0 (virgin)	QSPI NAND	Serial	-
!= b100	!= 0xFF	Primary ¹	0 (virgin)	Primary ¹	Serial	-
!= b100	!= 0xFF	0 (virgin)	Secondary ¹	Secondary ¹	Serial	-
!= b100	!= 0xFF	Primary ¹	Secondary ¹	Primary ¹	Secondary ¹	Serial
!= b100	0xFF	x (don't care)	x (don't care)	Serial	-	-

¹Primary and Secondary are fields of [OTP WORD3](#).



OpenSTLinux flash memory mapping


Flash partitions


17

Size	Component	Comment
Remaining area	userfs	The user file system contains <u>user data</u> and examples
768MB	rootfs	Linux root file system contains all user space binaries (executable, libraries, ...) and kernel modules
64MB	bootfs	The boot file system contains: <ul style="list-style-type: none">- (option) the init ram file system, that can be copied to the external RAM and used by Linux before mounting a fatter rootfs- Linux kernel device tree (can be in a Flattened Image Tree - FIT)- Linux kernel U-Boot image (can be in a Flattened Image Tree - FIT)- The boot loader splash screen image, displayed by U-Boot- U-Boot distro config file extlinux.conf (can be in a Flattened Image Tree – FIT)
1MB	ssbl	The Second Stage Boot Loader (SSBL) is U-Boot , with its device tree blob (dtb) appended at the end
256kB	fsbl	The First Stage Boot Loader is ARM Trusted Firmware (TF-A) with its device tree blob (dtb) appended at the end. At least two copies are embedded. Note: due to ROM code RAM needs, FSBL payload is limited to 247kB.

SD card memory mapping

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Security on STM32MP1


Based on 2 mechanisms

- MCU hardware isolation avoids A7 corruption of M4 peripherals configuration or M4 memory

and

- A7 hardware isolation called Arm Trust-zone.
Arm Trust-zone enables isolated hw execution context.
A7 access to these peripherals & memories depends on this execution context.

- Hardware execution context
 - « a core and a security mode »
 - Each Cortex-A core can run secure and non-secure contexts
- Peripheral assignment to one hw execution context



Hw execution contexts

3rd Party

STCommunity

Community + ST adds-on

→ Loads


→ (Loads &) Calls



→ (Loads &) Calls options

⚙ : Configured via STM32CubeMX

🔒 : Authentication (optional)


Legend





A Trusted boot chain


27



Note : a Basic boot chain is also available, fully relying on U-Boot (instead of TF-A + U-Boot)

Peripheral (IP) assignment

30





All IP are associated to an *hardware execution context*

- IP can be “**assigned**” **exclusively** to an hw execution context
- IP can be “**shared**” between the 2 or 3 hw execution contexts
- When an IP is **assigned** to hw execution context
 - **Cortex-A secure:** IP register or mem accessible to A7 in secure mode (not by M4,A7-non-secure)
 - **Cortex-A non-secure:** IP register or mem accessible to A7S, A7NS, M4
 - **Cortex-M:** IP register or mem accessible by M4, A7 cannot access
- IP assigned ensured by **ETZPC IP** (Extended Trust Zone Protection Controller)
 - static configuration (TF-A device tree - manual or by CubeMx)


Peripherals sharing - M4 isolation

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
Source: ST Wiki article [STM32MP15 peripherals overview]



Peripherals assignment via STM32CubeMX



Options		Boot time contexts		Run time contexts	
Categories		Boot ROM	Boot loader	Cortex-A7 secure	Cortex-M4
✓ USART1			<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
✓ USART2		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
✓ USART3		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
✓ USART6		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>



Thanks