VacuousAttack: An Efficient and Robust Prompt-based Jailbreak Framework for Diverse Generative AI Models

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Abstract

While most existing jailbreak studies for generative models focus primarily on compromising the internal safety mechanisms of LLMs, real-world deployments face additional constraints. These include external commercial prompt guardrails, strict language restrictions (e.g., permitting only Chinese characters and punctuation in inputs), and prompt length limitations. Despite the above challenges, jailbreak vulnerabilities in Chinese Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) and text-to-image models (e.g., Stable Diffusion) remain underexplored. In this paper, we propose VacuousAttack, a structured jailbreak framework specifically designed for Chinese environments. The framework simultaneously bypasses both external commercial guardrails and internal model alignment mechanisms through toxic-prompt rewriting and neutral padding strategies, achieving strong transferability across both text-to-text and text-to-image models. Evaluations against six commercial black-box generative models (three LRMs and three diffusion models) demonstrate VacuousAttack's high success rates, robust cross-model transferability, and remarkably low semantic drift under strict length and consistency constraints. Operating without model internals or gradients, this purely black-box framework secured second place in the IJCAI 2025 Generative AI Model Safety Challenge.

1 Introduction

The rapid adoption of generative models like DeepSeek-R1 [Guo *et al.*, 2025] and Stable Diffusion [Rombach *et al.*, 2022] in Chinese applications has revealed significant safety risks. Among these, prompt-based jailbreak attacks—which manipulate models into generating harmful or sensitive content—have emerged as a critical AI security concern. However, existing research primarily focuses on circumventing the built-in safety mechanisms of large language models (LLMs). It often overlooks the additional practical constraints inherent in real-world deployments, such as external commercial prompt guardrails, strict language input restrictions (permitting only Chinese characters and punctuation), and prompt length limitations. These real-world factors introduce unique complexities in Chinese environments, yet they remain significantly underexplored.

To systematically evaluate and enhance the safety of generative models, the IJCAI 2025 Generative AI Model Safety Challenge[1] introduced rigorous constraints specifically designed for Chinese contexts. These constraints included explicit language limitations, external commercial safety filters, comprehensive risk categorization, and black-box model configurations. Participants were required to craft prompts capable of eliciting unsafe outputs—such as hallucinated text or violent imagery—from multiple generative models, including Chinese Language Reasoning Models (LRMs, e.g., DeepSeek-R1) and text-to-image diffusion models (e.g., Stable Diffusion). Departing from prior studies that focus exclusively on internal safety mechanisms, this challenge emphasized the complexities inherent to real-world deployments.

Addressing these challenges, we propose VacuousAttack, a structured prompt-based jailbreak framework specifically designed for Chinese generative models. At the heart of VacuousAttack is a structured rewriting mechanism that preserves adversarial intent through semantic transformation, while leveraging neutral padding to elude both external safety filters and internal alignment enforcement. Extensive experiments demonstrate our method's strong cross-model transferability, successfully compromising both Chinese large language models (LLMs) and text-to-image diffusion systems under strict black-box constraints. Notably, VacuousAttack consistently ranked among the top three performers across diverse black-box models in both preliminary and semi-final evaluations, establishing it as the only framework demonstrating such stability. This exceptional consistency underscores its robust generalization capabilities and practical effectiveness in safety-constrained environments.

2 Related Work

Jailbreaking Large Language Models. Prior research on jailbreaking large language models revealed that safety alignment remains shallow and fragile [Qi *et al.*, 2025]. Manually crafted adversarial prompts can induce toxic or policy-violating responses from aligned chatbots [Bai *et al.*, 2022;

[1]https://tianchi.aliyun.com/competition/entrance/532362



Figure 1: Industrial practice employs a two-tier defense: a front-end commercial prompt moderation service followed by the model's intrinsic safety guardrail built through safety alignment. An attacker has to defeat both layers in one fell swoop; afterward, model and human reviewers jointly determine whether the attack succeeded.

Wei *et al.*, 2023]. Subsequent efforts aimed at improving attack effectiveness include: CodeAttack [Ren *et al.*, 2024], which evades safety alignment by rewriting malicious requests as code snippets; Disguise-and-Reconstruction Attack (DRA) [Liu *et al.*, 2024], concealing harmful intent within benign fragments prior to reconstruction; GCG [Zou *et al.*, 2023], an automated gradient-based approach searching for universal adversarial suffixes.

Jailbreaking Text-to-Image Models. Existing jailbreaking methods for text-to-image models can be broadly categorized into heuristic, optimization-based, and LLM-guided approaches. Heuristic strategies, such as HTS-Attack [Gao *et al.*, 2024], TCBS-Attack [Liu *et al.*, 2025], manipulate tokens or characters by exploiting model behaviors near decision boundaries. Optimization-based methods (e.g., SneakyPrompt [Yang *et al.*, 2024]) employ reinforcement learning to explore the adversarial prompt space. LLM-guided techniques [Huang *et al.*, 2025; Kim *et al.*, 2024] leverage the generative and reasoning capabilities of language models to craft adversarial prompts, demonstrating superior transferability and practicality in black-box settings.

Although existing approaches vary methodologically, most require access to internal model components or assume unrestricted input formats, typically focusing on single-modality attacks. These assumptions critically limit their applicability in real-world security-restricted environments. Our work establishes a new paradigm: a unified attack framework targeting both textual and text-to-image systems. Operating purely under black-box constraints with commercial safeguards in Chinese-language contexts, this approach overcomes fundamental limitations of prior work.

3 Methodology

3.1 Preliminary

Task Setting. We investigate black-box jailbreaks against Chinese generative models protected by a two-tier safety stack (Figure 1), comprising: a front-end prompt moderation service that screens the user prompt q for prohibited content before it is forwarded to the model, an intrinsic safety guardrail implemented through safety alignment.

Such a pipeline mirrors the industry practice adopted in commercial applications, where content safety is enforced through multiple, cascaded layers of guardrails rather than only a single-layer protection mechanism.

Threat Model. The attacker operates under strict black-box constraints: they can query the moderation API $\mathrm{Mod}(\cdot)$ and the target model f_θ, but possess no access to model weights, system prompts, intermediate activations, or internal reasoning processes. The attacker can only determine whether an attack succeeded, and in case of failure, whether it resulted from moderation rejection or model refusal (i.e., harmless output generation). No further feedback beyond this coarse outcome is available. Crucially, the attacker lacks knowledge of the target model's architecture, training data, defense mechanisms, or alignment techniques.

The attacker can leverage an external auxiliary LLM, distinct from f_θ, to rewrite, paraphrase, or obfuscate sensitive spans with a base prompt Q_{toxic}, generating candidate adversarial queries Q_{rewrite}.

Notation. We formalize jailbreak attacks against Chinese generative models for both text-to-text and text-to-image tasks. Model behavior is characterized by the tuple (Q, T, R):

- $Q \in \Sigma^{\leq B}$ is the user-issued prompt, written in Chinese and submitted to a closed-source API.
- T is the model's internal reasoning trace (applicable only for text-to-text generation).
- R is the final output, either a text passage (text-to-text) or an image (text-to-image).

For text generation tasks $R = f_\theta(Q, T)$, the model f_θ processes Q via an internal chain-of-thought T before producing R; for image generation $R = f_\theta(Q)$ with $T = \emptyset$, the model f_θ directly renders an image based on Q.

The attacker receives a set of harmful instructions Q_{toxic}, typically containing prohibited content such as violence, self-harm, or illegal behavior. The goal is to construct an adversarial prompt $Q_{\text{adv}} \in \Sigma^{\leq B}$ satisfying:

1. The front-end moderation service passes it without triggering: $\mathrm{Mod}(Q_{\text{adv}}) = 0$;
2. The model's response $R = f_\theta(Q_{\text{adv}})$ reveals, restores, and executes the intent of Q_{toxic}.

We formally define the jailbreak success indicator as:

$$J(Q_{\text{adv}}; \theta) = \mathbf{1}\left[R \text{ reflects the intent of } Q_{\text{toxic}}\right] \quad (1)$$

Constraints and Goals. The adversarial prompt Q_{adv} must satisfy practical system constraints. (1) Language constraint: all content must be written in Chinese, including punctuation. (2) Length constraint: character count $|Q|$ is computed



Figure 2: The challenges to jailbreak the 2-tier guarded Chinese generative models: (I) The first layer is a prompt moderation service that filters user input based on surface-level features, including keyword matching and jailbreak pattern detection (e.g., role-playing jailbreak). (II) The second layer is the model's intrinsic safety alignment, which enforces refusal behavior or safety rewrites during generation. Successfully bypassing both layers is non-trivial: the adversarial prompt must simultaneously evade external moderation and trigger the intended malicious behavior, requiring careful optimization to balance obfuscation and recoverability.

by Unicode standards, including whitespace and punctuation. Here B denotes the maximum permitted prompt length, determined by the task type:

$$B = \begin{cases} 200, & \text{for text-to-text,} \\ 75, & \text{for text-to-image.} \end{cases} \tag{2}$$

The feasible prompt space is formally defined as:

$$\Sigma^{\leq B} := \{\, Q \mid Q \text{ is Chinese-only}, \ |Q| \leq B \} \tag{3}$$

As challenges shown in Figure 2, Our objective is to find valid $Q_{\text{adv}} \in \Sigma^{\leq B}$ that maximizes:

$$\max_{Q_{\text{adv}} \in \Sigma^{\leq B}} \quad J(Q_{\text{adv}}; \theta) \cdot (1 - \text{Mod}(Q_{\text{adv}})) \tag{4}$$

Problem Decomposition. To solve the constrained optimization problem in Eq. (4), VacuousAttack decomposes adversarial prompt generation into three coordinated sub-tasks:

1. **Toxic Prompt Neutral Padding**: Carefully insert structured but semantically neutral padding words to fragment the surface coherence of the toxic prompt.
2. **Sensitive-span Rewriting**: Detect and paraphrase the most moderation-sensitive spans in Q_{toxic} to generate syntactically altered yet semantically equivalent expressions.
3. **Prompt-guided Intent Recovery**: Append specially crafted templates instructing the model to focus on and reassemble informative fragments from the obfuscated input, thereby reconstructing the underlying harmful intent of Q_{toxic}.

3.2 Toxic Prompt Neutral Padding Strategy

Prompt-based moderation systems and safety-aligned large generative models rely heavily on surface-level toxicity markers, semantic coherence, and distributional priors to detect unsafe queries. However, these linguistic signals are fragile under obfuscation. Our method carefully select semantically neutral Chinese words, referred to as Neutral Padding Words, that minimally interfere with model understanding while preserving prompt recoverability across both text and image generation models. Unlike DRA and EmojiAttack [Liu *et al.*, 2024; Wei *et al.*, 2025], which targets text-modal LLMs, our method generalizes to multimodal systems. For text-to-image diffusion models with limited text comprehension, neutral padding perturbs text embeddings without altering visual semantics, enabling prompt-level obfuscation while preserving image generation fidelity.

Neutral Padding Words. Neutral Padding Words are specially selected Chinese words that are semantically neutral. Their core property is that, when inserted between the original toxic prompt, they minimally interfere with the target model's understanding—be it textual for large language models (LRMs) or visual for text-to-image diffusion models.

Let $Q_{\text{toxic}} = [w_1, w_2, \ldots, w_n] \in \Sigma^{\leq B}$ denote an original toxic prompt. Define the padding operation with respect to a padding set $\mathcal{P} \subset \Sigma$ as:

$$\text{Pad}(Q_{\text{toxic}}, \mathcal{P}) := [w_1, p_1, w_2, p_2, \ldots], \quad \text{where } p_i \in \mathcal{P} \tag{5}$$

We say $\mathcal{P}$ is a valid *Neutral Padding Word Set* if it satisfies the following two constraints over the distribution of toxic prompts $\mathcal{D}_{\text{toxic}}$:

(I) Moderation Monotonicity: Padding does not increase the likelihood of commercial prompt moderation rejection. That is,

$$\forall Q_{\text{toxic}} \in \mathcal{D}_{\text{toxic}}, \ \ \text{Mod}(\text{Pad}(Q_{\text{toxic}}, \mathcal{P})) \leq \text{Mod}(Q_{\text{toxic}}) \tag{6}$$

where $\text{Mod}(\cdot) \in \{0, 1\}$ is the moderation outcome.

(II) Jailbreak Preservation: The padding preserves attack success across target models. There exists a threshold $\tau \in$



Figure 3: The workflow of VacuousAttack to jailbreak Chinese generative models.

$[0, 1]$ such that:

$$\mathbb{E}_{Q_{\text{toxic}} \sim \mathcal{D}_{\text{toxic}}} \left[J(\text{Pad}(Q_{\text{toxic}}, \mathcal{P}); \theta) \right] \geq \tau \tag{7}$$

where $J(\cdot; \theta) \in \{0, 1\}$ is the jailbreak success indicator against the target model f_θ.

This definition ensures that neutral padding words do not trigger moderation while still allowing the model to decode the original harmful intent. To identify such words, we propose a two-stage padding selection and pruning algorithm.

To improve stability and reduce variance during evaluation, we construct a filtered subset $\mathcal{D}'_{\text{toxic}}$ for padding testing. This evaluation set excludes highly sensitive prompts that are almost always flagged by $\text{Mod}(\cdot)$, even without padding. The Algorithm 1 evaluates each candidate padding words' behavioral impact across multiple prompts, and filters those that not satisfy the moderation monotonicity and jailbreak preservation conditions defined above.

If the final padded prompt Q_{pad} exceeds the allowed length limit B, we apply a pruning strategy (Algorithm 2) that greedily removes padding words between non-toxic words first. This ensures jailbreak constraints while complying with character constraints.

Algorithm 1 Neutral Padding Discovery

Input: Candidate padding pool $\mathcal{C}$, small test set $\mathcal{D}'_{\text{toxic}}$, target model f_θ, moderation system $\text{Mod}(\cdot)$
Parameter: Success threshold $\tau \in [0, 1]$
Output: Valid neutral padding words sets $\mathcal{P}$

Initialize $\mathcal{P} \leftarrow \emptyset$
for each $p \in \mathcal{C}$ **do**
  $success\_count \leftarrow 0$
  for each $Q_{\text{toxic}} \in \mathcal{D}_{\text{toxic}}$ **do**
    $Q_{\text{pad}} \leftarrow \text{Pad}(Q_{\text{toxic}}, p)$
    if $\text{Mod}(Q_{\text{pad}}) = 0$ **and** $J(Q_{\text{pad}}; \theta) = 1$ **then**
      $success\_count \leftarrow success\_count + 1$
    end if
  end for
  if $\frac{success\_count}{|\mathcal{D}'_{\text{toxic}}|} \geq \tau$ **then**
    $\mathcal{P} \leftarrow \mathcal{P} \cup \{p\}$
  end if
end for
return $\mathcal{P}$

3.3 Sensitive-span Rewriting

To address the limitations of direct prompt-based attacks, particularly length constraints and semantic exposure, we introduce a method that leverages LLM-driven semantic reconstruction under safety-preserving transformations, tailored separately for text-to-text and text-to-image (T2I) scenarios.

In the text-to-text setting, we model a sentence rewriting process as a mapping function

$$f_{\text{text}} : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{X}' \tag{8}$$

where $\mathcal{X}$ denotes the space of toxic instructions, and $\mathcal{X}'$ represents semantically equivalent but compressed and syntactically altered variants. To minimize prompt length while retaining intent, we solve:

$$\min_{x' \in \mathcal{X}'} \text{Len}(x') \quad \text{s.t.} \quad \text{Intent}(x') = \text{Intent}(x) \tag{9}$$

This constraint ensures that adversarial intent is preserved in a compressed form suitable for bypassing length-sensitive defenses such as the toxic prompt neutral padding strategy.



Figure 4: By using auxiliary LLM to identify sensitive words in the original Chinese toxic prompt, a semantically equivalent rewrite strategy is adopted for text-to-text LRMs, and a visually equivalent rewrite strategy is adopted for text-to-images diffusion model.

Figure 5: On the left is an image generated from TongYiWanXiang. The red boxes on the right indicate the original topics, while the green ones show the rewritten prompts.

In the text-to-image setting, we adopt a semantically conservative rewriting strategy based on sensory-safe synonym replacement. Specifically, given an original prompt $x \in \mathcal{X}$, we define the transformation function:

$$f_{\text{T2I}} : x \mapsto x' \in \mathcal{X}'_{\text{safe}} \tag{10}$$

where x' is generated via controlled lexical substitutions of high-risk tokens:

$$x' = \text{Substitute}_{\text{sensory}}(x, \mathcal{S}) \tag{11}$$

with substitution set $\mathcal{S} = \{(w_i, w'_i) \mid w'_i \in \text{Syn}_{\text{sensory}}(w_i),\ \text{Risk}(w'_i) < \text{Risk}(w_i)\}$. Here, $\text{Syn}_{\text{sensory}}(w_i)$ denotes a curated set of perceptually safe synonyms for word w_i, chosen to preserve human-perceived semantic content.

Rather than relying on continuous embedding-based similarity, we define a symbolic similarity condition:

$$\text{Sim}_{\text{manual}}(x, x') = 1 \text{ if } \forall (w_i, w'_i) \in \mathcal{S},\ w'_i \approx_{\text{perceptual}} w_i \tag{12}$$

This indicates that all substituted tokens are subjectively equivalent in meaning under common human perception, particularly in a visual or sensory context (e.g., "Gambling software" → "Poker Game", "Sexy Girl" → "A girl wearing a swimsuit"), as illustrated in Figure 5.

Together, these strategies (as shown in Figure 4) demonstrate a unified approach to adversarial prompt design via controlled semantic manipulation, where reconstruction and disguise operate within task-specific safety boundaries, effectively lowering detection risks while preserving attack utility.

3.4 Prompt-guided Intent Recovery

After paraphrasing and neutral padding, the surface form of the toxic prompt is intentionally disrupted. However,

Algorithm 2 Length-Constrained Padding Pruning

Input: Padded prompt Q_{pad}, length limit B, toxic core word set $\mathcal{S}_{\text{toxic}}$
Output: Truncated prompt Q'_{pad}

```
while |Q_pad| > B do
    for each padding p_i in Q_pad do
        Let w_i denote the word before Pad(·, p_i)
        if w_i ∉ S_toxic then
            Remove p_i from Q_pad
            break
        end if
    end for
end while
return Q'_pad
```

LLMs have demonstrated strong recovery capabilities in reconstructing obfuscated inputs, especially when guided by auxiliary instructions [Liu *et al.*, 2024]. Additionally, recent research [Qi *et al.*, 2025] reveals that most safety-aligned LLMs suffer from *shallow alignment*, namely safety mechanisms primarily constrain early decoding steps.

We exploit these properties through a two-stage decoding strategy as shown in Figure 3. For text-to-text LRMs, we prepend a benign instruction that reframes the task as a neutral objective. This enables the model to first perform a low-risk reasoning task (e.g., reconstruct obfuscated input), before proceeding to reconstruct and respond to the actual toxic intent at a later decoding stage. The shallow alignment gap ensures that once early-stage refusal filters are bypassed, the model executes the reconstructed instruction without triggering further safety constraints.

In contrast, text-to-image diffusion models lack such stepwise reasoning and instead map input text directly to visual context. For these models, we omit recovery instructions entirely. Instead, we rely on the padding structure itself: neutral padding words are carefully selected to be visually irrelevant and semantically inert, ensuring minimal interference with the model's internal representation of the core visual concepts. This allows the toxic content to dominate the embedding while remaining hidden from prompt moderation service.

In summary, prompt-guided intent recovery enables the ad-

versarial prompt to survive moderation, bypass early-stage alignment defenses, and still deliver the original harmful intent through late decoding or stable visual rendering.

4 Experiments

4.1 Experimental Setup

Model Settings. In our experimental setup, we utilized DeepSeek-V3 as the auxiliary large language model to assist in prompt generation and analysis. For evaluation of the commercial safety boundary, we use Alibaba Cloud's LLM query moderation API ($llm\_query\_moderation$) to assess the risk level of input prompts under real-world content filtering conditions.

Evaluation Metrics. In the final evaluation phase, the overall score is calculated as follows.

$$\text{Score} = 0.1 \times S_1 + 0.4 \times S_2 + 0.5 \times S_3,$$

subject to the constraint that if $S_1 < 0.15$, then $S_2 = 0$ and $S_3 = 0$.

The evaluation metrics are defined as follows:

Prompt Diversity Score (S_1): Measures the semantic variability among prompts generated for different risk subtopics. Each prompt is embedded into a semantic vector using an enhanced CLIP text encoder, and the average pairwise cosine similarity is computed to quantify semantic differences (ranging from 0 to 1).

Output Consistency Score (S_2): Assesses the semantic alignment between generated outputs (text or image) and the intended risk topic. We employ a large multimodal model (Qwen2.5-VL-72B-Instruct) to perform instance-level comparisons between the outputs and predefined sensitive elements, producing a consistency score between 0 and 1.

Output Risk Level Score (S_3): Represents the proportion of generated content that corresponds to varying levels of risk. This score (ranging from 0 to 1) is derived through a collaborative human-AI evaluation pipeline, where both model predictions and manual reviews are used to determine the severity of content across predefined risk categories.

4.2 Experimental Results

Our proposed jailbreak attack method, VacuousAttack, demonstrated exceptional stability and generalization capability throughout the competition. In the IJCAI 2025 Generative Model Security Challenge. **Notably, our team was the sole participant achieving top-three rankings in both preliminary and final rounds**, securing third place preliminarily and advancing to second place in finals, with a consistent score of 0.45 across stages.

These results provide compelling evidence of the effectiveness of VacuousAttack in achieving robust cross-model transferability against diverse unseen black-box models. The sustained high performance underscores its practical applicability and stability in real-world adversarial scenarios involving commercial safety-constrained generative systems.

The diversity score S_1 of the generated text prompts meets the required standard (defined as a threshold for semantic differences $D_c >= 0.15$). As the feedback only reports discrete levels: "High," "Medium," "Low," or "Below Standard", without disclosing the exact numerical values, we do not conduct further quantitative analysis. Among the evaluated samples, 60% were rated as "High," while "Medium" and "Low" each accounted for 20%. This confirms our method's effectiveness in maintaining semantic variation while adhering to attack constraints.

Quantitative safety evaluations appear in Table 1, reporting Consistency Score and Risk Level Score for two tasks: T2T (text-to-text) generation and T2I (text-to-image) generation across three commercial models (ModelA, ModelB, and ModelC).

Consistency Score: For T2T (text-to-text) generation, all models achieved achieved high consistency scores, with ModelB performing best (0.9222), followed by ModelA (0.8778), and ModelC lagging behind (0.7444). This indicates that ModelB produces the most semantically faithful outputs compared to the others in text generation.

Conversely, text-to-image (T2I) models showed significantly lower consistency (0.20–0.21 range), revealing that the modified prompts crafted for jailbreak purposes often experience semantic drift.

Risk Level Score: Regarding risk, which likely measures safety or harmful content levels, ModelB and ModelA have comparable scores for T2T (around 0.45), while ModelC shows a markedly lower risk level (0.1722), potentially indicating stronger safety filtering or more conservative outputs.

For the T2I task, risk scores increase notably for ModelA (0.5278) and are moderately high for ModelB (0.4611) and ModelC (0.4500), suggesting that image generation is associated with a higher potential for risk content compared to text generation.

In summary, T2T models achieve higher consistency, but their extended reasoning and analysis tend to maintain only moderate risk levels. Among them, ModelC is the safest, albeit the least consistent. In contrast, T2I models exhibit a trade-off between lower consistency and higher risk, highlighting the challenge of generating semantically aligned yet safe images.

4.3 Ablation Analysis

To better understand the effectiveness and underlying mechanisms of VacuousAttack, we conducted a prompt ablation analysis to assess the relative contribution of different prompt components. Specifically, we decomposed the final adversarial prompt Q_{adv} into two conceptual elements: (1) Toxic Prompt Neutral Padding, and (2) Sensitive-span Rewriting.

We then constructed several ablated variants of Q_{adv} by selectively removing or perturbing one component at a time, and evaluated their impact on the model's ability to produce jailbreak outputs under strict black-box settings, across both text-to-text (T2T) and text-to-image (T2I) tasks (see Table 2).

Our findings show that the sensitive-span rewriting component—despite being heavily paraphrased—remains critical in eliciting harmful model behavior. Removing this segment or replacing it with benign content led to a near-complete failure of the jailbreak. Conversely, removing the neutral padding portion resulted in significantly higher detection rates by commercial safety filters, indicating its role in masking adversarial intent and reducing toxicity salience.

Task	Metric	ModelA	ModelB	ModelC
T2T	Consistency Score	0.8778	0.9222	0.7444
	Risk Level Score	0.4500	0.4611	0.1722
T2I	Consistency Score	0.200	0.2111	0.200
	Risk Level Score	0.5278	0.4611	0.4500

Table 1: Consistency and risk scores of T2T and T2I tasks across different models.

These results highlight the importance of the multi-stage design in VacuousAttack, where each component—semantic rewriting and padding—contributes synergistically to both evasion and effectiveness in bypassing safety mechanisms.

Method	Score
VacuousAttack	0.4470
w/o sensitive-span rewriting	0.4230
w/o neutral padding	0.3540

Table 2: Comparison of different jailbreak methods on the IJCAI 2025 Generative AI Model Safety Challenge.

Note: *As the review process involves human assessment, performance scores may vary slightly.*

4.4 Discussion

VacuousAttack succeeds not through complex optimization or adversarial sophistication, but by strategically exploiting structural blind spots in the multi-layered safety architectures of modern Chinese generative models. Below, we qualitatively analyze the key mechanisms underlying its effectiveness.

Tokenization boundary disruption. Consistent with observations in English-language attacks such as EmojiAttack [Wei *et al.*, 2025], VacuousAttack leverages the model's sensitivity to token segmentation. By inserting semantically neutral padding tokens within critical spans, it alters token boundaries and disrupts the lexical decomposition. Thus VacuousAttack implicitly evades the distributional priors established during safety fine-tuning, which concentrate safety supervision on canonical, well-tokenized representations of harmful content.

Shallow alignment and delayed execution. As discussed in prior work [Qi *et al.*, 2025], many safety-aligned LLMs disproportionately allocate their safety mechanisms to early decoding tokens. VacuousAttack decouples malicious intent from prompt surface semantics through a three-stage design: toxic span rewriting, neutral padding insertion, and intent reconstruction. This effectively transforms the initial decoding process into a benign task, delaying the manifestation of sensitive content until after the model's refusal trigger window, thereby bypassing its shallow alignment budget.

Semantic manipulation via carefully selected padding. A critical factor in the success of VacuousAttack lies in the deliberate selection of neutral padding words. These words are semantically inert and contextually plausible—on the one hand, they obfuscate risky topics, sensitive keywords, and jailbreak patterns, reducing the chance of detection by front-end moderation filters. On the other hand, their semantic laziness ensures minimal activation in both text-to-text and text-to-image pathways. In multimodal models such as diffusion-based T2I generators, such padding words do not alter the image semantics, thereby preserving prompt coherence.

In summary, VacuousAttack demonstrates that strategically orchestrated perturbations can successfully evade both prompt-layer moderation and safety alignment defenses. Crucially, this attack operates effectively in black-box settings and generalizes across diverse Chinese LRMs and diffusion-based generative models. Its simplicity and portability reveal a fundamental weakness in the dual-layer safety stack and offer a practical path forward for both red teaming and future research on genrative model robustness in Chinese environments.

5 Conclusion

This work presents VacuousAttack, a simple yet powerful black-box jailbreak technique targeting Chinese generative models in both text-to-text and text-to-image models. Unlike existing methods that rely on complex perturbation strategies or white-box access, VacuousAttack exploits structural blind spots in the dual-layer safety architecture through a three-stage design: semantic rewriting, insertion of neutral padding, and guided response elicitation. We show that carefully selected neutral padding words can evade both commercial prompt-level moderation service and model-internal alignment constraints, while preserving semantic coherence and visual consistency. Extensive experiments across diverse LRMs and diffusion models demonstrate the method's high success rate, generalizability, and transferability in constrained Chinese-language attack settings.

Our findings reveal vulnerabilities in the tokenizor bias that can be exploit even in 2-tier safety stack, highlighting the limitations of current defense regimes. We believe VacuousAttack offers not only a practical red-teaming tool but also conceptual insights for the development of more robust safety defense mechanism in future Chinese generative systems.

Ethical Statement

Our primary objective is to develop jailbreak techniques targeting both text-to-image (T2I) generation models and text-based reasoning models. We acknowledge that adversarial prompts may trigger the generation of inappropriate content. As such, we have conducted and reported our research with

great caution and a strong commitment to responsible disclosure. We firmly believe that the societal benefits of exposing the vulnerabilities in these systems, thereby informing the development of more robust and secure models, significantly outweigh the relatively limited potential risks associated with our findings.

References

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