

## Large-scale Execution for Industry & Society





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### **HPC & CLOUD SECURITY**

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**FREDERIC DONNAT** OUTPOST24







## Large-scale Execution for Industry & Society





Scope:

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Topic: HPC and Big Data enabled Large-scale Test-beds and Applications

Topic identifier: ICT-11-2018-2019

Type of action: IA Innovation action

> 11a) targeting the development of large-scale HPC-enabled industrial pilot test-beds supporting big data applications and services by combining and/or adapting existing relevant technologies (HPC/BD/cloud) in order to handle and optimize the specific features of processing very large data

sets. The industrial pilot test-beds should handle massive amounts of diverse types of big data coming from a multitude of players and sources and clearly demonstrate how they will generate

innovation and large value creation. The proposal shall describe the data assets available to the testbeds and, as appropriate, the standards it intends to use to enable interoperability. Pilot test-beds

should also aim to provide, via the cloud, simple secure access and secure service provisioning of highly demanding data use cases for companies and especially SMEs.

Project Coordinator: Jan Martinovič, IT4Innovations, VSB-TU Ostrava

Budget: 13 997 428,71 euro

EC Contribution: 12 218 545,50 euro

17 Partners:

Project duration: January 2019 - December 2021

## **Large-scale Execution for Industry & Society**





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
Topic: HPC and Big Data enabled Large-scale Test-beds and Applications Topic **LEXIS** project builds an advanced engineering platform at the confluence Type c of HPC, Cloud and Big Data which leverages large-scale geographicallydistributed resources from existing HPC infrastructure, employ Big Data analytics solutions and augments them with Cloud services. Scope: Driven by the requirements of the pilots, the LEXIS platform builds on best of breed data management solutions (EUDAT) and advanced distributed **orchestration solutions** (TOSCA), augmenting them with new efficient hardware capabilities in the form of **Data Nodes and federation**, usage Project monitoring and accounting/billing supports to realize an innovative Budge solution. EC Cor Partne

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Project duration: January 2019 - December 2021

## **LEXIS TEAM**



IT4INNOVATIONS

**VSB** TECHNICAL



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under grant agreement No. 825532

## ZERO TRUST DEFINITION FROM NIST

Zero trust (ZT) provides a collection of concepts and ideas designed to minimize uncertainty in enforcing accurate, least privilege per-request access decisions in information systems and services in the face of a network viewed as compromised. Zero trust architecture (ZTA) is an enterprise's cybersecurity plan that utilizes zero trust concepts and encompasses component relationships, workflow planning, and access policies. Therefore, a zero trust enterprise is the network infrastructure (physical and virtual) and operational policies that are in place for an enterprise as a product of a zero trust architecture plan.


#### Zero Trust concepts

- > Threats exists both outside and inside the perimeter
- Follow least privileges principles
- No implicit trust granted, continuously authenticate and authorize



## **ZERO TRUST CONCEPT**

Do NOT rely on network perimeter, Assume breach





## **ZERO TRUST CONCEPT**

Never Trust, Continuously Verify



## **ZERO TRUST CONCEPT**

Use least privileges principles, verify Explicitly

## SHARED ACCOUNTS

ACCESS MANAGEMENT WORST NIGHTMARE SOLVED!





## **ZERO TRUST PRINCIPLES**

#### **NIST Tenets:**

- ✓ All data sources and computing services are considered resources
- ✓ All communication is secured regardless of network location
- ✓ Access to individual enterprise resources is granted on a per-session basis
- ✓ Access to resources is determined by dynamic policy—including the observable state of client identity, application/service, and the requesting asset—and may include other behavioral and environmental attributes
- ✓ The enterprise monitors and measures the integrity and security posture of all owned and associated assets
- ✓ All resource authentication and authorization are dynamic and strictly enforced before access is allowed
- ✓ The enterprise collects as much information as possible about the current state of assets, network infrastructure and communications and uses it to improve its security posture




## ZERO TRUST ARCHITECTURE PRINCIPLES

#### **NIST Tenets:**

- ✓ The entire enterprise private network is not considered an implicit trust zone
- ✓ Devices on the network may not be owned or configurable by the enterprise
- ✓ No resource is inherently trusted
- ✓ Not all enterprise resources are on enterprise-owned infrastructure
- ✓ Remote enterprise subjects and assets cannot fully trust their local network connection
- ✓ Assets and workflows moving between enterprise and non-enterprise infrastructure should have a consistent security policy and posture




## **ZERO TRUST COMPONENTS**





## ZERO TRUST MATURITY MODEL


Zero trust takes time and effort: Build a plan and continously improve



## LEXIS ARCHITECTURE

#### "Security by Design"

- Minimizing Attack Surface Area
- Keeping "Security Simple"
- Separation of duties
- LEXIS DMZ
  - Direct access to internet
  - Reverse Proxy + VPN Gateway
- LEXIS "Trusted Zone"
  - Functional Services
- HPC/Cloud Infrastructure
  - HPC Services
  - HEAppE "security middleware" from IT4I






## LEXIS APPROACH TO ZERO TRUST

#### "Zero Trust Architecture"

- Do NOT rely on perimeter-based network security
- Minimize access to resources
- Enforce Authentication and Authorization

- Do "NOT TRUST" anything inside the perimeter
- Use secure communication channel
- Always check Identity and Access





User Authentication

+ Login / Password

### RBAC MATRIX WITH KEYCLOAK


- Basic concept with 3 permissions
  - List: Users, processes or devices are able to list a resource and get its details; e.g., name, creation date, etc. We can refer to such details as the meta-data of the resource;
  - Read: Users, processes or devices can access the resource in read-only mode;
  - Execute: Users, processes or devices can execute actions on the resource such as creation, update, deletion.

	LEXIS PERMISSIONS	Tist Osers	Read details of a User	Create/Delete/Update a User	List Organizations	Read details of an Organization	Create/Delete/Update an	드 IList Billing&Payment informations	Read details of a Billing & Payment information	Create/Delete/Update a	지하는 List Licensing informations	Read details of a Licensing information	Create/Delete/Update a Licensing information	List Projects	Read details of a Project	Create/Delete/Update a Project	List Workflows	Read details of a Workflow	Create/Delete/Update/Start/Stop	List Computations	Read details of a Computation	Create/Delete/Update/Start/Stop	List Datasets	Read details of a Dataset	Create/Delete/Update/Import/Ex
		iam_list   iam_read   iam_write Identity & Access Management			org_list org_read org_write Organization Management			bil_list   bil_read   bil_write Billing Management			lic_list   lic_read   lic_write Licensing Management			prj_list   prj_read   prj_write Project Management			wfl_list   wfl_read   wfl_write Workflow Management						dat_list   dat_read   dat_write Data Management (iRODS DDI		
LEXIS ROLES																					(jobs, tasks of differents			and WCDA)	
LEXIS Administrator	lex_adm	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F		F	F		F
LEXIS Support	lex_sup	P (PO)	P (PO)		P (PO)	P (PO)		P (PO)			P (PO)			P (PO)	P (PO)		P (PO)	P (PO)		P (PP)			P (PP)		
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LEXIS Financial Manager	fin_mgr				P (PO)			P (PO)	P (PO)	P (PO)				P (PO)											
LEXIS License Manager	lic_mgr				P (PO)						P (PO)	P (PO)	P (PO)	P (PO)											
LEXIS Project Manager	prj_mgr	P (PO, PP)			P (PO, PP)									P (PO, PP)	P (PO, PP)	P (PO, PP)	P (PO, PP)			P (PP)			P (PP)		
LEXIS Workflow Manager	wfl_mgr	P (PO, PW)			P (PO, PW)									P (PO, PW)			P (PO, PW)	P (PO, PW)	P (PO, PW)	P (PP)			P (PP)		
LEXIS IAM Manager	iam_mgr	P (PO)	P (PO)	P (PO)	P (PO)									P (PO)			PVV)	PVV)	PVV)						
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### KEYCLOAK CONFIGURATION PER COMPONENT

Create REALM + Client for Monitoring





### **DOCUMENTATION & LINKS**

- Zero Trust and Zero Trust Architecture
  - NIST: <a href="https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-207/final">https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-207/final</a>
  - NSA: https://media.defense.gov/2021/Feb/25/2002588479/-1/-1/0/CSI\_EMBRACING\_ZT\_SECURITY\_MODEL\_UOO115131-21.PDF
- Keycloak
  - https://www.keycloak.org/
  - https://www.keycloak.org/extensions.html



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#### **CONSORTIUM**

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NATIONAL SUPERCOMPUTING
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