The results revealed a main effect of condition (see Figure XX). Participants rated compensators to be the most moral and trustworthy of all third-party actors. The *post hoc* tests revealed that all comparisons – except comparison between mixed and punisher conditions – were significant.



The one-way Welch's ANOVA revealed a main effect of condition ($F(3,560.63) = 57.21$, $p < 0.001$, $p\omega^2 = 0.13$, 95% CI [0.10, 0.17], $n = 1015$). Bayes factor test (with Cauchy prior width of 0.71) to quantify evidence for the alternative hypothesis relative to the null hypothesis of no mean differences across groups (BF_{10}) was 4.36×10^{28}. Participants rated compensators ($n = 251$, mean = 4.46) to be the more moral and trustworthy than other third-party actors that chose to do nothing ($n = 251$, mean = 4.46), punish ($n = 256$, mean = 4.85), or engaged in a mixed response ($n = 257$, mean = 5.23). The Bonferroni-corrected *post hoc* Games-Howell test revealed that all comparisons – except comparison between mixed and punisher conditions ($p = 0.072$) – were significant ($p < 0.05$).