

The results revealed a main effect of condition (see Figure XX). Participants rated compensators to be the most moral and trustworthy of all third-party actors. The *post hoc* tests revealed that all comparisons – except comparison between mixed and punisher conditions – were significant.

Study 2b: Character inferences (severe unfairness)





 $\label{eq:Question: After learning how [actor] responded, how moral/trustworthy does [actor] seem to you?" \\ In favor of null: log_e(BF_{01}) = -63.36, r_{Cauchy} = 0.71$ 

 $\label{pairwise comparisons: Games-Howell test;} Adjustment (p-value): \textbf{Bonferroni}$ 

The one-way Welch's ANOVA revealed a main effect of condition (F(3,560.63) = 57.21, p < 0.001,  $p\omega^2 = 0.13$ , 95% CI [0.10, 0.17], n = 1015). Bayes factor test (with Cauchy prior width of 0.71) to quantify evidence for the alternative hypothesis relative to the null hypothesis of no mean differences across groups (BF<sub>10</sub>) was  $4.36 \times 10^{28}$ . Participants rated compensators (n = 251, mean = 4.46) to be the more moral and trustworthy than other third-party actors that chose to do nothing (n = 251, mean = 4.46), punish (n = 256, mean = 4.85), or engaged in a mixed response (n = 257, mean = 5.23). The Bonferroni-corrected *post hoc* Games-Howell test revealed that all comparisons – except comparison between mixed and punisher conditions (p = 0.072) – were significant (p < 0.05).