

- HW1 grades are not finalized yet. When the grades are finalized, the TAs will make a Piazza post. You can expect this post by the end of Saturday.
- HW2 : Selecting pages
  - deadline has passed, but we will give you until 12:30 pm IST on Friday (2.5 hours after our session ends) to do the needful.
- Starting HW3 no such exceptions will be made.

Exam 1 : Feb, 20


- re-create lectures, hws, recitations.
- memorization will not help much.
- 8 questions, 90 minutes

- You may use any result proven in lecture, hw, recitations without justification  
for e.g. you may assume  $\sqrt{2}$  is irrational,  
but you may not assume  $\pi$  is irrational.

### Stable Matching.

Input :  $n$  people ,  $n$  pets.



- each person ranks the pets in descending order of their preferences
- each pet ranks the people in descending order of their preferences
- no ties

Objective :  perfect matching.  
(To pair each person with

exactly one pet and each pet with

exactly one person, such that no instability  
occurs.



no person & no pet must prefer  
 each other over their existing partners.



Q1: Does every input have a stable  
 $\otimes$  matching?

Q2: Can an input have more than one  
 stable matching?

Examples




$(t_1, t_2)_{p_1}$    $t_1$   $(p_2, p_1)$

$(t_1, t_2)$    $t_2$   $(p_2, p_1)$   
 $p_2$

### Algorithm.


1. Line all the people in a row.
2. for each permutation/ordering of the pets :
  - pair person  $i$  with pet in the  $i$ th pos<sup>n</sup> in the ordering.
  - if there is no instability then  
o/p the matching

(\*) 3. return false (no stable matching)



The above algorithm will always output a correct answer, but it is very inefficient.

The above algorithm takes at least  $n!$  steps.



## Gale-Shapley algorithm. (GS alg)

1. Initially all people & all pets are free.
2. while there is a free person  $p$  who has not yet proposed to all pets do
3.      $t \leftarrow$  highest ranked pet whom  $p$  has not yet proposed to.
4.     if  $t$  is free then
5.          $(p, t)$  becomes a pair
6.     else if  $(p', t)$  is a pair then
7.         if  $t$  prefers  $p$  over  $p'$  then
8.              $(p, t)$  becomes a pair



9. <sup>1</sup>  $p'$  becomes free

10. return all matched pairs.

Q. Does this algorithm always terminate?

Yes.

Q. # iterations of the while loop  $\leq \frac{n^n}{n^2}$ .

- each person proposes to a

person at most once. There are

$n$  people. Thus  $n^2$  proposals

in the maximum.

Lemma: Once a pet receives their first proposal, they always remain engaged and as the algorithm progresses, their partners can only get better.

\* Question: Does the GS alg favor the people or the pets?

Lemma: The GS alg. outputs a perfect matching.

↳ matching in which each person is paired with exactly one pet & each pet is paired with exactly one person.

Proof : Assume for contradiction that the o/p of the GS alg is not a perfect matching.

Clearly, each person is paired with at most one pet & each pet is paired with at most one person.


Can I : at the end of the GS alg, person  $p$  is free.

- Since the alg. has ended, it must be that  $p$  has proposed to every single pet.

- By the previous lemma, every

pet must be enjoyed.

- This means that two pets are paired with the same person, a contradiction.



Case II : a pet is free.