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Proto-Insurgency, Repression-Driven Contagion, and Civil War Onset

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ABSTRACT

The escalation of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) into interstate wars has been studied extensively with opportunity and willingness frameworks. In this article, we conceptualize and operationalize proto-insurgencies as a civil war equivalent to MIDs. Just as most MIDs do not escalate into interstate war, most proto-insurgencies never make the key tactical transitions needed to produce the onset of civil war. We separately examine proto-insurgency formation and proto-insurgency escalation to onset. We find that proto-insurgency formation is associated with political persecution, such as denial of access to justice, regime corruption, and mid-range levels of repression. Our theoretical focus is on how state repressive violence creates diffusion effects that push proto-insurgencies toward the tactical transitions that enable the escalation to civil war. Proto-insurgency escalation to civil war onset is driven by high levels of state repressive violence directed against proto-insurgency and its area of origin. This leads to the dispersal of proto-insurgents and the displacement of surrounding populations, inducing the spread of state repression to a larger number of administrative units. This creates the foundation for guerrilla warfare and establishes the conditions for rebels to offer sanctuary to displaced persons in return for active support, marking the onset of civil war.

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Introduction

The onset of interstate war has been studied extensively using opportunity and willingness frameworks, where opportunity represents the macro-level constraints and possibilities faced by actors in their present environment, and willingness represents the behavioral choices made in response to these situations at the micro-level (Most and Starr 1989). As with wars between nations, civil wars are only possible where a government and one or more rebel organizations have some 'minimum war-fighting capacity' and a corresponding desire or 'willingness to fight' (Most and Starr 1989, 80). The militarized interstate dispute (MIDs) literature finds that only a small percentage of MIDs ever escalate to an actual war between nations and that different processes are involved in the formation of MIDs versus the escalation of MIDs to interstate war (Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1996, 197). We should expect to find a similar pattern for civil wars. Most civil wars begin with attacks by small groups that are able to ignite a chain reaction of events that leads to insurgency and civil war, but only a small percentage of these groups succeed. The groups that failed to escalate their fight are not coded in major civil war datasets as having tried and failed to reach civil war; they are just left out of

the dataset altogether. In civil war datasets, only those groups that succeeded in the escalatory process are recognized and studied.

In the empirical onset literature, civil war is typically modeled as if it emerges spontaneously in a nation that manifests the right mix of structural attributes. Civil war onset studies measure the 'risk' of experiencing onset as a function of a country's mix of social, economic, demographic, and political attributes which have been found to be correlated with civil war onset. The risk of civil war in a given nation in a given year becomes, first, a function of baseline scores on variables identified as key predictors of civil war onset and, second, whether that nation's scores on those variables change from year to year in a direction that increases the risk of onset, compared to the level of risk in previous years (Hegre et al. 2013). Young (2016) refers to these onset models as 'big bang' models, where there is no civil war in the nation in year t_0 and then a full-blown civil war in the following year (t_1). All country-years prior to t_0 are treated, implicitly, as equally peaceful.

This paper contributes to the civil war literature by identifying a population of *proto-insurgencies* (insurgencies in their earliest stages of development) that define a 'risk set' for proto-insurgency escalation (or non-escalation) to civil war. We operationalize the proto-insurgency concept, and our modeling strategy is aimed at trying to distinguish between proto-insurgency formation and proto-insurgency escalation to civil war onset. We expect that both are endogenous outcomes of the same process with some joint causes as well as some distinct causes. As with MID and interstate wars, it is reasonable to suspect that proto-insurgency formation might be determined by causal processes that are in some ways similar to but in other ways different from those determining their escalation to civil war. The task ahead is to (1) identify the proper risk set for escalation or non-escalation (i.e. nations that experience episodes of low-level anti-government violence short of civil war or proto-insurgency), and then with that sample in hand (2) identify the conditions associated with proto-insurgency formation and proto-insurgency escalation to civil war.

Defining the Risk Set for Civil War

The first premise of our framework is that civil war onset marks the point of transition from a proto-insurgency into a viable insurgency. Seen this way, civil war 'onset' represents both the ending point of a prior campaign of violence by a proto-insurgency organization (of mostly non-lethal attacks) and the starting point of a *viable* insurgency, that is, one that went on to produce at least 1,000 cumulative battle-related deaths.¹ If onset represents the ending point of a proto-insurgency, how do we identify the starting point of a proto-insurgency? As noted in one classic work on counter-insurgency, determining 'exactly when an insurgency starts is a difficult legal, political, and historical problem' (Galula 1964, 4). The difficulty only ends, argues Galula (1964, 4), when 'the insurgent has clearly revealed his intentions by engaging in subversion or open violence.' Until then, however, the insurgent 'represents nothing but an imprecise, potential menace to the counterinsurgent and does not offer a concrete target' (Galula 1964, 4). As a coding rule, this implies that an undifferentiated group becomes a differentiated proto-insurgency when it begins to engage in an open, organized campaign of political violence.

What type of political violence would best identify a proto-insurgency? Byman (2008, 170) argues that '[m]ost terrorist groups can also be conceived of as proto-insurgencies' in that they 'already use violence, and they seek to gain the other characteristics of an insurgent.' Based on Byman's (2008) definition, a proto-insurgency is a group engaging in a campaign of terrorist violence that falls short of insurgency and civil war; that is, the tactics being used are not lethal enough to produce civil war onset. The issue of lethality also suggests that the strategic purpose of proto-insurgency terrorism is different from the strategic purpose of terrorism as it may be used later in a conflict. Findley and Young (2012, 287–290) mapped over 50,000 geo-coded acts of terrorism onto civil war locations and found that 'most incidents of terrorism take place in the geographic regions where civil war is occurring,' as documented by the 'prominent use of terrorism before, during, and after civil war in a diverse set of conflicts worldwide.'²

Using Kydd and Walter's (2006, 51) typology of terrorism strategies, Findley and Young (2012) argue that attrition and provocation are the dominant strategies for using terrorist violence before onset of civil war, while intimidation and outbidding strategies are used during civil war to gain compliance from local populations, and spoiler terrorism is used in the aftermath of civil war to influence peace processes. In a proto-insurgency context, attrition terrorism is intended to persuade potential supporters among the population that the rebels have the capacity to challenge the state militarily and that supporting the rebels is not an act of futility. Provocation terrorism involves the use of terrorist attacks to provoke an overreaction by the government towards the group and its known or suspected civilian sympathizers in the hope that state repressive violence will drive more civilians into supporting the rebels (Findley and Young 2012). We argue that attrition and provocation are the main strategies employed by proto-insurgents to build the capacity to escalate their campaign of violence to civil war. How states respond to proto-insurgency terrorist attacks determines the fate of proto-insurgencies.³

Defining and Measuring Proto-Insurgency

The second premise of our framework is that proto-insurgencies can be identified by the predominant use of terrorist attacks in a pre-civil war setting. Therefore, identifying a population of successful proto-insurgencies is a matter of examining the anterior phase of civil war, before the date of civil war onset. We can then use parameters of pre-onset terrorist violence to operationalize proto-insurgency candidates more broadly so as to include cases that did not escalate to civil war. In other words, we take a population of 'known' proto-insurgencies (i.e. those that did escalate to civil war onset) and deduce the criteria for identifying 'unknown' proto-insurgencies (i.e. those that did not escalate to civil war onset). Our task, then, is to specify the empirical criteria for identifying a population of proto-insurgencies.

To identify a population of proto-insurgencies, both successful and unsuccessful, we examined the average number of terrorist attacks in the time period before civil war onset. These are successful proto-insurgencies. For this, we used annual data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD; LaFree and Dugan 2008) to determine the annual number of terrorist attacks in each country for each of the 10 years preceding the onset of civil war in that country. The GTD definition of terrorism is not limited to attacks on non-combatants but includes the types of attacks that occur in the context of guerrilla warfare or civil war, including attacks on military bases, police stations, or other government facilities. We use dates for civil war onset from the Uppsala Conflict Data Project (UCDP) Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Themnér and Wallensteen 2012). UCDP data are appropriate for this task due to their focus on 'battle-related deaths' and the low annual threshold of 25 deaths used to mark the onset of an armed conflict that eventually produced 1000 cumulative battle-deaths (i.e. civil war).

Figure 1 shows the average number of terrorist attacks per year in a country in the decade preceding onset of civil war for those nations that did experience civil war onset during the time period common to both datasets (GTD and UCDP). The prevalence of terrorism before onset is very high, with close to 80% of all onsets being preceded by terrorist attacks. The frequency of attacks gradually increases for the entire decade prior to onset. Ten years prior to onset, there was an average of 28 attacks per year in countries that eventually experienced civil war onset. Five years before onset, this number increased to an average of 37 attacks. Three years prior to onset, there were over 40 attacks on average, and in the year of onset, there were 45 attacks on average. We also examined the fatality data associated with these attacks and found that these 'pre-onset' terrorist attacks killed very few people. According to GTD data, more than 99% of these attacks were non-lethal.

To operationalize the proto-insurgency concept, we chose 40 attacks per year as our threshold for the presence of a proto-insurgency, based on the analysis above. This yielded a total of 166 country-years in which the amount of terrorist activity met or surpassed this threshold. Comparing proto-insurgency years and non-proto-insurgency years with respect to civil war onset, we find that of the




Figure 1. Average number of GTD attacks before onset.

166 country-years with at least 40 attacks, 24 of them went on to experience civil war onset. This represents 14% of the total number of proto-insurgency-years. By contrast, less than 1% of non-proto-insurgency years (*protoinsurgency*₄₀ = 0) experienced onset of civil war. Thus, we can say that (a) most civil war onsets are preceded by proto-insurgency violence, but (b) most proto-insurgencies fail to escalate to civil war onset.

Escalation from Proto-Insurgency to Civil War

The third premise of our framework is that proto-insurgency development involves sequential tactical transitions, where movement from one stage to another represents increases in the rebel group's organizational complexity and military capacity. These tactical shifts correspond roughly to transitions from (mostly non-lethal) proto-insurgency terrorism to guerrilla warfare (which includes more lethal terrorist attacks), and finally to occasional conventional warfare. This conceptualization is consistent with previous theoretical treatments of insurgency that emphasize stages or phases of group development and combinations of various forms of violence. As Byman's (2008, 166–170) states, most 'terrorist groups . . . seek to gain the other characteristics of an insurgent movement but are too small or are otherwise incapable of conducting large-scale guerrilla operations or extensive political mobilization.' Galula (1964, 4) describes insurgency as 'a protracted struggle conducted . . . step by step, in order to attain specific intermediate objectives leading finally to the overthrow of the existing order.' Hamilton (1998, 21) defines insurgency as a series of stages in which 'political subversion, selective terrorism, and guerrilla operations play an integral, if not primary, role in the outcome.' Kitson (1971, 95) defines insurgency as a 'strength building' exercise, where 'in the earliest stages . . . the war is fought by people who strike at a time and place of their own choosing and then disappear.' While all of these sources emphasize stages of development roughly associated with tactical changes, less attention has been paid, we argue, to explaining why and how these successful tactical shifts take place.

Government Response to Proto-Insurgency Violence

The fourth premise of our framework is that the micro-foundation of the successful transitioning of a proto-insurgency through these stages is rooted in individual-level responses to state interventions

to counter the proto-insurgency. We argue that proto-insurgency success is more likely where the government responds to proto-insurgency violence with repressive, rather than accommodative, strategies (Mason and Krane 1989; Mason 1989, 2004; Kalyvas 2006). Repressive policies are intended to annihilate the proto-insurgents and to intimidate members of the population into withholding support from the proto-insurgency. Accommodative policies are designed to preempt any shift in the distribution of popular support away from the government and toward the armed opposition group by seeking to address grievances among the population that the proto-insurgency seeks to exploit.

Alongside accommodative reforms, governments faced with proto-insurgency conditions can counter the group by using highly selective targeting of counterterrorist violence. A selective strategy, if maintained, affects only individuals identified as directly or indirectly involved in carrying out terrorist attacks. Restrictive state violence of this sort degrades a group's capacity to carry out additional operations, and segments of the public that might be sympathetic to the group's cause will begin to doubt the group's prospects for survival, much less success. As long as targeting remains selective, citizens can assume that they can avoid becoming targets themselves by refraining from providing any tangible support to the movement. Under such an approach, the number of terrorist attacks committed by the group should begin to decline and, although the proto-insurgency may not disappear for some years, it is less likely to escalate to civil war.

When faced with proto-insurgency conditions, some regime types are more likely to resort to repressive responses, which tend to become more indiscriminate over time (Mason 1989, 2004; Kalyvas 2006). In these political systems, accommodative reforms are more difficult to enact and implement, as the governing coalition is narrow, with strong ties to military and economic elites (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). Where political economy makes reforming the system very difficult, the ruling coalition is more likely to respond to terrorist challenges against its continued rule with programs of persecution and repression.

An example of an accommodative (and low repression) response is Spain's interventions against the Basque Homeland and Liberty group (*Euskadi Ta Askatasuna*, ETA). ETA was formed in response to the political persecution and discrimination that residents of the Basque region suffered under the Franco regime as punishment for their opposition to Franco during the Spanish Civil War. According to the GTD, the number of attacks by the ETA peaked in the 1970s at 160 attacks per year. After Franco's death in 1975, the new regime ended the persecution, and the Basque region was granted more autonomy, including control over schools and the promotion of the Basque language (Gil-Alana and Barros 2010). As a result, ETA attacks and popular support for ETA declined. The absence of indiscriminate state repression, combined with accommodative policies, served to weaken popular support for the ETA violence, precluding the escalation of the ETA proto-insurgency to a civil war.

The Basque ETA campaign can be compared to the Kurdish proto-insurgency in Turkey, which did escalate to civil war. Both groups were based in ethno-nationalist autonomy movements, and both used terrorist tactics. In Turkey, the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) launched a campaign of terrorist violence in the aftermath of the 1980 coup d'état. According to the GTD, the number of attacks was under 10 a year in 1980 and progressed to over 100 a year by 1990. That campaign was intended, at least in part, to enable the PKK to compete more effectively for popular support among the Kurdish population. According to Tezcür (2015, 256), the government engaged in indiscriminate repression in PKK areas that 'fueled emotions of insecurity, anger, and revenge that translated into higher levels of recruitment into the PKK,' enabling them to escalate their campaign of terrorist violence to civil war.

From Proto-Insurgency to Civil War

The fifth, and final, premise in our framework is that harsh state repression initiated against the proto-insurgency's area of origin leads to the dispersal of proto-insurgents and their supporters into surrounding regions, which eventually become new targets of the state's repressive forces. Often, the first round of the state's repressive campaign in the proto-insurgency's area of origin appears to be successful, as government troops identify and eliminate the most active members and supporters

of the proto-insurgency movement. Once government troops leave the region, however, the proto-insurgents filter back in, and a new stage of recovery and recruitment begins. When those in power recognize that the proto-insurgency was not eliminated, they are likely to respond by expanding the scope of their repressive violence. This means casting the counterinsurgency net beyond individuals identified as participating in or actively supporting the proto-insurgency to include members of the general identity group or political movement from which the proto-insurgency emerged. Many residents who recognize this escalation in repression will begin to suspect that they too will become targets of the state's armed forces for living in areas where the proto-insurgency is most active. This is especially the case for those sharing other traits of the proto-insurgent stereotype that is being used by the government's counterinsurgency forces to sift through the population (Joshi and Quinn 2017). Many people that match the adopted stereotype will respond to indiscriminate repression by migrating. This dynamic serves to diffuse the base of proto-insurgency operations and expand the civilian recruitment pool of the rebels beyond their place of origin.

We are particularly interested in explaining the mechanisms underlying the drastic and sudden transitions we observe from low-casualty terrorism campaigns to major civil wars. Remarkably, the window of time between onset (battle-related deaths = 25) and civil war (cumulative intensity = 1000 battle-related deaths) is often very small: less than 2 years in most cases and less than 3 years in almost all cases. This suggests that a rapid expansion in the geographical scope of repression and the targeting of new population segments are important elements associated with this escalation to civil war.

We argue that migration and the dispersion of proto-insurgency attacks have several effects. The geographic dispersion of insurgencies and the demands it puts upon the state creates the future structural foundations for guerrilla warfare. Since the state's advantage resides almost completely in the concentrated projection of military force, it is always to the insurgent's advantage to disperse state forces as widely as possible. Dispersion creates a win-win situation for insurgents. If they disperse to new areas and the government chooses not to pursue them, they benefit from having a new safe haven. If they disperse to new areas and the government follows, they spread out the state's forces, reducing the state's concentrated military power. This dispersion of state military forces enables the conduct of surprise hit-and-run attacks on small, isolated bands of government troops, the essence of guerrilla warfare.

The geographic dispersion of the insurgency makes it more dangerous to be a government counterinsurgency soldier since dispersion decreases the ratio of insurgents and active supporters to non-insurgents and neutrals in a population. In other words, insurgency dispersal makes it more difficult to identify insurgents within a population. This creates a principal-agent problem for the counterinsurgency command. Ordinarily, military commanders prefer that their field agents confine their use of violence to those identifiable as participating in and/or providing active support to the proto-insurgency. However, the average soldiers in the field often have different incentives (Overton and Sharif 2023; Sharif 2022). Mason (2004:155) describes this as the 'counterinsurgency dilemma.'

The overriding desire of the soldier in the field is to survive the mission. All too often this leads counterinsurgent units to engage in overkill. The standards of evidence they use to distinguish the guerrilla supporter from the uninvolved civilian are rarely sensitive to the need to avoid punishing neutrals. Instead, their treatment of civilians is dictated by their own desire to survive the mission, which all too often comes to mean eliminating any civilians whom they suspect might pose a threat to the soldiers' own lives.

At this point in the cycle of repression, a civilian's total withdrawal of support for the proto-insurgency does not necessarily ensure immunity from state repression (Mason 2004). The dilemma confronting citizens who have not been actively involved in supporting proto-insurgents is that they may no longer be able to avoid involvement in the conflict. Mason (2004, 156) notes that the government's campaign of repressive violence becoming indiscriminate in its selection of targets (a function of the counterinsurgency dilemma) is a turning point because

The probability of an uninvolved [civilian] becoming a victim of state-sanctioned violence is no longer strictly contingent upon his or her own covert or overt support for the rebels. Refraining from supporting the rebels no longer exempts one from being detained or killed. Under these circumstances, all that the rebels need to do in order to win the support of [civilians] caught in the crossfire between rebels and regime is to offer them sanctuary from counterinsurgent violence.

The proto-insurgents' ability to offer a sanctuary requires the geographic dispersion of proto-insurgency members and the displacement of population segments sympathetic to insurgents. Dispersion establishes the supply and demand conditions for offering sanctuary as a selective incentive for active participation in or support of the movement. Only in the presence of harsh and indiscriminate state repression will individuals who fit the insurgency's recruitment profile (in terms of class, ethnicity, and birthplace) migrate in sizable numbers throughout a region or a nation.

Another effect of the geographic dispersion of a proto-insurgency is that it decentralizes repressive violence to a larger number of small administrative units or locales. As the internally displaced flee to new areas, they are picked up by police or military units as suspected insurgents, since they are from the insurgency's area of origin. Hence, as displacement continues, so does the geographical scope of repressive violence in the country expands. Putting these contagion effects together yields a large, multi-faceted feedback system, where forced migration (resulting from repression in one part of the country) leads to the dispersal of rebels and the spatial expansion of state repression in continuous loops. State repression focused on the insurgency's area of origin serves to transplant a successful dynamic of recruitment to other (adjacent) geographical areas. This is the principal way, we believe, that rebel groups are able to expand geographically into areas of a country or regions where they had no prior presence.

The case of the Shining Path (*Sendero Luminoso*) rebel group in Peru illustrates some of the repression-driven dynamics discussed earlier. Shining Path was a small Maoist-inspired student group formed in the late 1960s in Ayacucho, Peru, by Professor Abimael Guzmán. Shining Path engaged in sporadic acts of terrorism in the 1970s with little reaction by the state, until the election of Fernando Belaunde Terry (1980–1985) as its first elected president since the 1968 coup. Shining Path's terrorist attacks began in Ayacucho, where its members were well integrated with certain segments of the local population. In 1982, the Ayacucho region was declared an emergency zone, and a large, specialized contingent of armed forces (*Sinchis*) entered Ayacucho (Smith 1992, 133). Reliable records show that, in the first 4 years, 7,126 people were killed in the provinces of rebel origin (1992, 92).

Berg (1992) observed first-hand the group's evolving relationship with the peasantry of the Andahuaylas province both before and after the arrival of the state's counterinsurgency forces. In 1982, before the military arrived, Berg (1992, 96) wrote that, 'the peasants have a great deal of sympathy for the actions of the Shining Path ... but not a great deal of active support.' Returning to the area four years later, Berg found high levels of active support for rebels. Even the terminology used by peasants when referring to the Shining Path changed within 4 years: 'in 1982, they were known as "terrorist" (*terroristas*, *terros*, *terukuna*) or sometimes, sarcastically, as *los universitarios*,' but 'in 1985, in contrast, they were often called "comrades" or "buddies" (*compañeros*)' (Berg 1992, 96). Strong (1992, 93) notes that 'Despite all the armed forces' torture and massacres and burning down of villages, the number of Shining Paths attacks in the Ayacucho department in 1984 ... were double those in 1982.' Although the Shining Path engaged in its own share of repression, Berg (1992) notes that rebel violence was much more selective than that of the police or the military. As one villager put it, 'When the guerrillas struck, it was against people whose "crimes" were well known. ... On the other hand, the police arrested and interrogated blindly' (1992, 98).

The Peace Commission after the war estimated that by 1985 fifty thousand forced migrants had left the region and settled in Ica, Huancayo, Lima, and other areas. Once relocated to a new locale, Smith (1992, 133) noted that 'carrying a voting identification card with Ayacucho marked as birthplace was a guarantee of two weeks in the security police's prisons and even torture.' In response, the Shining Path had a policy of making 'house calls' to those individuals picked up by security forces

to offer help and support, starting a relationship of reciprocity between rebels and internally displaced peasants (Smith 1992). By 1985, Ayacucho was no longer the region with the most insurgent activity (Smith 1992). Manrique (1998, 198) notes that “During the same period that Shining Path was forced into a general retreat in Ayacucho by the Armed Forces’ genocidal tactics . . . there was a marked increase in terrorist actions in the central *sierra*.” Similarly, Long (2001, 165) notes that the city of Huancaayo ‘had become a centre of violence, . . . filling up with refugees from the surrounding southern highland regions, where Sendero had its garrisons.’ With respect to the ability to provide sanctuary, Palmer (1992) noted in a study of the peasant communities who supported the rebels that the alliances only lasted as long as the state’s military forces were kept at bay by the rebel group. When the Shining Path was unable to protect a community, ‘the insurgents lost their momentum in the area’ (Palmer 1992, 5). Isbell (1992, 72) tells a similar story about the village of Cancha that gave the rebels wide support in its first 2 years, but then withdrew it when the military presence became too large in the area for Sendero to be able to provide effective protection.

The Peruvian case illustrates some of the contagion dynamics and how they work in the expected direction of the argument we presented. Importantly, the meta-data on the case supports the construct validity of the main concepts in our argument and the feasibility of using GTD and UCDP onset data to capture proto-insurgency formation and escalation dynamics. For instance, the UCDP data has Peru reaching civil war onset (at least 25 annual battle-related deaths) in 1982 and reaching 1,000 cumulative deaths in 1983. From 1977 to 1981, GTD records 224 terrorist attacks. The overwhelming majority of these attacks were bombings in which no one was killed or injured (there were only 17 deaths spread over the 5-year span). The GTD reports that only 2% of the 224 pre-onset attacks were aimed at the military and 6% at the police. Therefore, the case provides strong evidence of a large tactical shift taking place over the course of a two-year period (1982–1983). In other words, it seems clear that, if the tactical forms of violence used by the Shining Path before onset had continued, it would have been impossible to reach 1,000 deaths by 1983. The case also shows that harsh state repression was not the cause of proto-insurgency formation in the Peruvian case since the military only arrived in Ayacucho in response to the rebel’s campaign of terrorism. We now turn to a discussion of what these dynamics mean for estimation choice.

Implications of the Argument for Estimation Choice

The determining factor in estimation choice is whether proto-insurgency formation and escalation to civil war onset are separate outcomes or endogenous variables in the same process, where the effect of exogenous on endogenous variables changes across stages of proto-insurgency transition. With the exception of Öberg, Möller, and Wallensteen (2009) and Melander, Möller, and Öberg (2009), the small number of process-oriented empirical studies of civil war onset have all used separate equations, rather than simultaneous equations models.⁴ While multiple single-equation models representing phases or dimensions of violence by one actor can be estimated separately, the single-equation approach is inefficient from a statistical point of view, if (as is the case with the present study) the dimensions of violence (and hence the equations) are endogenous outcomes in the same system (Judge et al. 1988). In such a system, the two equations share a common error structure with non-zero covariance. Unlike separate equations, modeling equations simultaneously does not assume a diagonal matrix of the two equations’ disturbances and uses information from the off-diagonal elements of the disturbances matrix.

We have argued that proto-insurgencies have become a target for state repression as a result of their use of provocation terrorism (which we found to be mostly non-lethal). Escalation to civil war is possible, we argue, only after the proto-insurgency’s area of origin is directly targeted with state repressive violence. As the case of Peru showed, the Shining Path emerged in a setting absent harsh state repression and remained small and marginal until it was able to provoke military intervention into Ayacucho. It follows that proto-insurgency formation and proto-insurgency escalation to civil war are two *related* processes with *different* causes. Proto-insurgency formation is, we argue,

determined by political grievances regarding such things as access to the justice system, regime corruption, and witnessing moderate forms of repression against people that are viewed as ‘one of us.’ Proto-insurgency escalation, however, is determined by harsh state repressive violence directed against the proto-insurgency. Their seeming interrelatedness calls for a model in which the impact of exogenous variables on endogenous variables is estimated simultaneously. We, therefore, jointly estimate the equations to determine peace disrupting factors working through two related but distinct pathways: proto-insurgency formation and proto-insurgency escalation to civil war.

We perform a seemingly unrelated bivariate probit to estimate proto-insurgency and civil war onset within a system of equations (Marra and Radice 2017; Mullahy 2016). Seemingly unrelated bivariate probit models are an extension of seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) for binary endogenous variables, where the disturbance terms of two equations are correlated and the two equations should be estimated jointly for efficiency. Figure 2 presents the two equations for proto-insurgency and civil war onset, with the disturbance terms for each equation indicated by ζ_1 and ζ_2 . Each equation contains exogenous variables that either explain both proto-insurgency and civil war onset (the two endogenous variables) or are unique to each outcome.⁵ The curved line between the two disturbance terms indicates the correlation between them. In the SUR model, higher correlation among the error terms of the different equations (and higher multi-collinearity between the regressors) has been shown to result in even greater efficiency of the parameter estimates, as more information can be used to describe the overall system (Yahya et al. 2008; Judge et al. 1988). Unlike separate equations, SUR models do not assume a diagonal matrix for disturbances of the two equations and use information from the off-diagonal elements of the disturbances matrix.

The first endogenous variable – proto-insurgency (Y_1) – is determined by regime corruption (X_1), access to justice (X_2), repression (X_3), gross domestic product per capita (GDP; X_4), ethnic fractionalization (X_5), mountainous terrain (X_6), population (X_7), democracy (X_8), oil dependence (X_9), and peace years (X_{10}). The other endogenous variable – civil war onset (Y_2) – is determined by repression (X_3), GDP per capita (X_4), ethnic fractionalization (X_5), mountainous terrain (X_6), population (X_7), democracy (X_8), oil dependence (X_9), peace years (X_{10}), attack growth (X_{11}), and civil liberties (X_{12}).

Data and Model

We estimate the two equations for proto-insurgency and civil war onset with a seemingly unrelated bivariate probit model (Marra and Radice 2017) on a cross-sectional time-series dataset of 110 developing nations with country-year as the unit of analysis.⁶ For the dates of major civil war onset, we use the UCDP Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Themnér and Wallensteen 2012). UCDP codes the start of a major civil war as the first year that deaths from political violence surpassed the 25 battle-related deaths’ threshold (*Startdate2*) in a conflict that eventually reached a cumulative intensity of 1,000 or more battle deaths (we do not include minor conflicts that never reached 1,000 deaths). Following most other onset studies, we dropped all country-years with active armed conflict ongoing following the year of onset. Once a conflict ends in a country, it reenters the dataset as being eligible for new civil war onset. We include the variable *peace years*, which counts the number of years since the last episode of war in a country that reentered the dataset after a given episode of civil war ended. This produces a sample consisting only of country-years outside of armed conflict, except for years experiencing onset. Countries that never experienced civil war onset are right-censored.

We measure proto-insurgency violence using the Global Terrorism Database (GTD; LaFree and Dugan 2008), a global database of domestic and international terrorist attacks. The record for each attack contains information on the date, location, weapons, target, casualties, and the perpetrator. The GTD codes attacks by non-state actors as ‘terrorism.’ These include attacks that occur in the context of civil war. Over 82,000 attacks took place globally over our study period, allowing us to create a count variable of the number of attacks per year in each country. As we explained in the previous sections, we found that roughly 80% of UCDP onsets (*Startdate2*)




Figure 2. Path diagram of the seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) model.

were preceded by terrorist attacks, and the frequency of attacks gradually increased in the decade prior to civil war onset. Before onset, there were 44 attacks on average per year. From the count variable, we created a range of binary variables marking whether or not a particular annual threshold was exceeded. For this analysis, we use *protoinsurgency*₄₀ as the endogenous variable in the first equation, indicating that at least 40 attacks took place within a given year. We chose this threshold on the grounds that the annual number of attacks in the five-year period before civil war onset was roughly between 35 and 45 attacks. Our data include 166 country-years with proto-insurgency conditions (*proto-insurgency* = 1).

State repressive violence is measured using the CIRI Human Rights Data Project's physical integrity index, which is a 9-point additive scale of the frequency of four different indicators of

violations of physical integrity rights: (1) torture, (2) extrajudicial killings, (3) disappearances, and (4) political imprisonment. We reversed the scale so that higher scores represent higher levels of state repression. We log-transformed the variable in the proto-insurgency equation to fit a linear model to predict proto-insurgency formation. We also created the variable *increase in attacks* which is the percentage change in the number of terrorist attacks from 1 year to the next.

As indicators of political persecution, we use measures of access to justice and regime corruption, derived from the Global State of Democracy Indices, IDEA 2020 (Coppedge et al. 2020). Access to justice is an ordinal variable with (–4) indicating that secure and effective access to justice is non-existent and (4) indicating that secure and effective access to justice is almost always observed. The indicator is converted to an interval measure by a Bayesian item response theory measurement model (Pemstein et al. 2021). We add the indicators for access to justice for men and women to obtain a global measure and convert the values to positive numbers (0–16). Regime corruption fromn IDEA 2020 captures the extent to which political actors use political office for private or political gain (Coppedge et al. 2020). It is on the interval scale (0–1). The willingness of the state to engage in accommodative actions to help avoid conflict escalation is captured by group inequalities in civil liberties in IDEA 2020. Social groups are groups distinguished by language, ethnicity, religion, race, region, or caste. Higher scores suggest that group-level accommodations were made with respect to demands made in the past and are more likely to be made if new demands are raised. A score of (–3) indicates that some members of some social groups enjoy much fewer civil liberties than the general population and (3) indicates that members of all salient social groups enjoy the same level of civil liberties as the rest of the population. We changed these to positive values (0–6). We include control variables with a relatively high degree of consensus as antecedents of onset in 46 studies of civil war (Dixon 2009). The control variables mostly come from the Quality of Government Dataset (QOG; Teorell et al. 2013) and Hegre and Sambanis (2006).⁷ Table A1 in the Appendix presents summary statistics of the variables and Table A2 in the Appendix shows correlations among variables.

Findings

Table 1 presents the results of bivariate probit models, estimating the relationship between proto-insurgency violence, state repression, and civil war onset. In both models, the endogenous variable is proto-insurgency in the first equation and onset of major civil war in the second equation. A Lagrangian multiplier test shows that there is a significant correlation (p -value = 0.031) among the two equations (Silvey 1959), justifying our choice for estimating them jointly.⁸ In other words, the unobserved variables influencing proto-insurgency formation and escalation to onset are correlated. Model 2 includes country and time-fixed effects. The coefficients on all variables of interest are significant and in the expected direction when including country and time-fixed effects. Values of log-likelihood and Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) suggest that the two models are of similar fit to the data. Below, we interpret the results of Model 1.

The results from Model 1 show that, when estimated simultaneously, the variables that are significant in both equations disrupt peace through the two theoretical mechanisms associated with proto-insurgency formation and civil war onset. We find that the emergence of proto-insurgency conditions is determined by the presence of state repression, especially with the lower to mid-range values. Figure 3 shows the increase in the probability of proto-insurgency for each unit increase in the level of state repression. Increasing repression from the lowest values up to the value of (6) increases the probability of proto-insurgency violence, while higher values are not associated with any further change in the probability of proto-insurgency emergence.

Proto-insurgency formation is also more likely in countries with higher degrees of regime corruption (Figure 4) and in countries where there is more difficulty accessing the justice system (Figure 5). To capture the non-linear relationship between these variables and proto-insurgency, the squared, cubed, and biquadratic terms are also entered in the model. Regime corruption is

Table 1. Seemingly unrelated bivariate probit models of proto-insurgency and civil war onset.

	Model 1		Model 2	
	Proto-insurgency	Conflict onset	Proto-insurgency	Conflict onset
State repression (log)	1.302*** (0.000)	0.237*** (0.000)	1.769*** (0.000)	0.315 *** (0.000)
Increase in attacks (%)	-	0.0519† (0.065)	-	0.132 (0.127)
Access to justice	-61.375*** (0.001)	-	-18.53 (0.155)	-
Access to justice, 4	-47.620* (0.017)	-	-44.03** (0.009)	-
Civil liberties (log)	-	-0.663*** (0.000)	-	-0.481** (0.002)
Regime corruption	-30.839*** (0.000)	-	-20.16*** (0.000)	-
Regime corruption, 4	-13.326* (0.004)	-	-7.731* (0.035)	-
GDP per capita (log)	0.489*** (0.000)	-0.144 (0.128)	-	-
Ethnic fractionalization	-0.423 (0.286)	0.276 (0.362)	-	-
Mountainous (%)	0.006 (0.190)	0.006* (0.039)	-	-
Population size (log)	0.419*** (0.000)	0.100 (0.032)	-	-
Democracy (1-21)	29.310 (0.000)	0.035** (0.005)	-	-
Democracy squared	-11.655 (0.023)	-	-	-
Peace years	-0.031*** (0.000)	-0.024*** (0.000)	-	-
Oil dependency	-0.085 (0.741)	0.150 (0.380)	-	-
Country fixed effects	-	-	0.000 (0.726)	0.001*** (0.000)
Year fixed effects	-	-	-0.074*** (0.000)	-0.008 (0.045)
Constant	-12.188*** (0.000)	-2.052* (0.025)	-5.248*** (0.000)	-3.560 (0.000)
N		1889		1845
Log likelihood		-328.6		-326.2
AIC		717		702

Significance codes: '***' 0.001; '**' 0.01; '*' 0.05; '†' 0.1; robust standard errors in parentheses; not showing regime corruption squared and cubed terms, which are not significant at the 0.1 level; also not showing access to justice squared and cubed terms, with only the squared term significant at the 0.05 level; theta = 0.359 (0.048,0.627); tau = 0.234 (0.030, 0.431); total edf = 32.

negatively and non-linearly related to proto-insurgency, with lower values of corruption associated with about one-third lower levels of proto-insurgency risk, compared to higher values of corruption.

Among the control variables in equation 1, we find that proto-insurgency conditions are more likely in nations with larger populations, which is consistent with Blanton and Apodaca (2007) and Hendrix and Salehyan (2012). We find that GDP per capita is a significant but positive predictor of proto-insurgency emergence, which matches Regan and Norton (2005). GDP per capita is not significant in the low-level conflict models in Blanton and Apodaca (2007), or in Hendrix and Salehyan (2012, 43–44). Young (2012) does not include GDP per capita in his dissident activity model. In Model 1, peace years are significant and negatively associated with proto-insurgency conditions. Proto-insurgencies are less likely to emerge with each passing year of peace since the last civil war episode. Hendrix and Salehyan (2012), Blanton and Apodaca (2007), and Young (2012) do not include a peace year count in their analyses. Except for population, none of the conventional indicators from Dixon's consensus model are significant predictors of proto-insurgencies. In sum, we find that proto-insurgencies are likely to




Figure 3. The effect of state repression on proto-insurgency. The figure shows smooth function estimates and associated 95% pointwise confidence intervals. The jittered rug plot, at the bottom of each graph, shows the covariate values.




Figure 4. Predicted effect of regime corruption on proto-insurgency, with higher values indicating lower corruption. The figure shows smooth function estimates and associated 95% pointwise confidence intervals. The jittered rug plot, at the bottom of each graph, shows the covariate values.

emerge in a much wider number and variety of nations than conventional ‘big bang’ theories of civil war onset identify as the risk set for civil war.

Moving to the civil war onset equation in Model 1, we find that the onset of civil war is associated with a very parsimonious set of factors when simultaneously estimated with proto-insurgency formation. The significant predictors of civil war onset are high levels of repression and low levels of (past) accommodation (measured by group – level inequalities in civil liberties). Among the controls, only peace years, mountainous terrain, and democracy reach statistical significance. [Figure 6](#) shows changes in the risk of civil war onset for each unit increase in the nation’s repression score (CIRI), using a smooth term. Higher values of repression are linearly associated with higher predicted probability of civil war onset. The findings on state repression and onset conform with the




Figure 5. Predicted effect of access to justice on proto-insurgency, with higher values indicating higher access to justice. The figure shows smooth function estimates and associated 95% pointwise confidence intervals. The jittered rug plot, at the bottom of each graph, shows the covariate values.




Figure 6. The effects of repression on civil war onset, with higher values indicating greater repression. The figure shows smooth function estimates and associated 95% pointwise confidence intervals. The jittered rug plot, at the bottom of each graph, shows the covariate values.

findings of Young (2012), Rost (2011), and Regan and Norton (2005). Figure 7 presents the effect of group-level inequalities in civil liberties on conflict onset, which shows a negative but non-linear association with onset. With the joint estimation of the two equations, we find that, when accounting for the presence or absence of state repressive violence and the willingness of the state to accommodate grievances over group-level inequalities in treatment by the regime, onset is no longer strongly predicted by poverty, population size, ethnic fragmentation, or oil dependency. We believe that these measures for state weakness in most ‘big bang’ models of civil war onset are predicting how the state will respond to proto-insurgency attacks. We argue that the state’s response – repression in particular – determines the risk of civil war.




Figure 7. Predicted effect of group civil liberties on conflict onset, with higher values indicating higher equality among groups. The figure shows smooth function estimates and associated 95% pointwise confidence intervals. The jittered rug plot, at the bottom of each graph, shows the covariate values.

Conclusion

In this paper, we examined proto-insurgency formation and its escalation to civil war as jointly produced but distinguishable phases of insurgency development. We found proto-insurgency formation to be associated with political persecution and mid-ranges of repression, and escalation to civil war to be associated with the harshest levels of state repressive violence. In terms of the typical predictors of onset, the results reveal differences with previous single-equation models of civil war onset. We think the structural antecedents of civil war cataloged by Dixon (2009) are predicting state repressive violence, rather than civil war onset. Dixon's (2009) catalog of civil war predictors is largely the same set of variables that the human rights literature has identified as predictors of widespread state repression and abuse of physical integrity rights (Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999; Richards, Gelleny, and Sacko 2001). Human rights studies find that weak states with lower levels of economic development, large populations, and lower levels of democratization engage in significantly greater human rights abuses. Ongoing civil war is also a strong predictor of higher levels of human rights abuse; our analysis does not include civil war years in the dataset. While those variables are associated with higher levels of state repression, our findings suggest that they are associated with civil war onset through their effect on repression.

Our analysis finds that the risk set of countries experiencing the kind of proto-insurgency violence that usually precedes civil war is much more diverse than the domain of poor, weak, and authoritarian regimes that conventional civil war onset models describe. But civil war onset occurs in a much narrower range of those nations experiencing proto-insurgencies: those that engage in high levels of indiscriminate repression. Our findings echo the rich, qualitative literature on civil war that addresses how opportunity structures for mobilization, the mobilization capabilities of dissident groups, and the state's response to such mobilization affect the risk of civil war onset (Tilly 1978; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 1997). As Goodwin (2001, 245) notes in his qualitative study of successful and unsuccessful revolutionary movements,

[T]he "root cause" of armed rebellions that seeks the overthrow of the state – as distinct from other forms of political conflict – is not poverty, exploitation, or inequality per se. Rather, armed revolutionary movements result from the violent suppression of the peaceful political activities of aggrieved people who have the capacity to rebel.

Future research could explore this escalatory process with a dyadic framework. Does the same dynamic described here determine whether some government-rebel dyads within a country escalate

to civil war while others do not? This will require documenting that a specific proto-insurgency group was targeted directly by state repression, which is a complicated, laborious, but worthwhile task. Another path to onset could involve the escalation of non-violent opposition movements, although it is unclear to us how a non-violent movement could adapt quickly to wartime tactics. Exploring the feedback loops of protest, terrorism, repression, and civil war is needed, if we are to build empirical models of the civil war process that better fit the rich qualitative literature on the subject that preceded the last two decades of empirical studies.

Notes

1. As commonly operationalized, a conflict reaches 'civil war' when the warring government-rebel dyad surpasses a high threshold of accumulated battle-related deaths. In the Uppsala Conflict Data Project (UCDP), onset of armed conflict requires 25 annual deaths, and a cumulative death toll of 1000 deaths is the point at which an armed conflict is considered a 'civil war' as opposed to a 'minor conflict.'
2. See also Polo and González (2020) as well as Stanton (2013).
3. Blankenship (2016) finds that the propensity to resort to repression is related to the frequency of terrorist incidents. Furthermore, low capacity states are more likely to respond to terrorist attacks with repression.
4. Bartusevicius and Gleditsch (2019) use two-stage models to distinguish between conflicts with and without contested incompatibilities. The dependent variable in their second stage is a 5-point scale of whether the incompatibility became 'militarized.' Regan and Norton (2005) examine protest, rebellion, and civil war in three separate single-equation models. Hendrix and Salehyan (2012) examine protests, riots, strikes, coups, and organized violence using eleven single-equation models. Young (2012, 522) estimates three separate equations of repression, dissident activity, and onset in the third. Rost (2011) uses a Heckman selection model of onset (using Sambanis 2004 civil war list) with repression as the dependent variable in the first stage. Also using a Heckman model are Blanton and Apodaca (2007) who assess the impact of globalization on intrastate conflict within developing countries (1990-1996). Cunningham et al. (2017) use a two-stage model to examine dissident claims and the escalation to violent and nonviolent collective action. Hultquist (2017) jointly estimates state repression (E1) and battle-deaths (E2) inside of ongoing civil wars, as opposed to escalation to onset.
5. We do not lag the independent variables as we are trying to model as close to real time as possible the effect of exogenous on endogenous variables. We believe that state violence and proto-insurgency violence in 1983 would explain 25 battle deaths in 1983.
6. The sample is middle income countries and below. The period under examination is 1981 to 2010. The beginning date is the first year for which data are available from the CIRI Human Rights Data Project (Cingranelli and Richards 1999), and the end date is the last year for which data are available for one or more independent variables.
7. *GDP per Capita* (QOG); *Ethnic fractionalization* (QOG); *Mountainous terrain* as percentage of overall territory (Hegre and Sambanis 2006); *Population* in Thousands (QOG); *Democracy* is a 21 point positive scale taken from the PolityIV project (Marshall and Jaggers 2007); *Peace Duration* is years since last major civil war coded by the authors; *Oil exports* greater than 1/3 of all exports (Hegre and Sambanis 2006).
8. Table A3 in the Appendix presents estimation results for separate bivariate probit models.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

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Appendix

Protoinsurgencies, Repression-Driven Contagion, and Escalation to Civil War Onset

Proto-Insurgency, Repression-Driven Contagion, and Civil War Onset

Table A1. Descriptive statistics.

	Overall (N = 1840)
Attack % increase (annual)	
Mean (SD)	0.0841 (1.60)
Median [Min, Max]	0 [−1.00, 38.0]
Physical integrity (reversed)	
Mean (SD)	4.33 (1.95)
Median [Min, Max]	4.00 [1.00, 9.00]
Mountainous terrain	
Mean (SD)	16.9 (20.2)
Median [Min, Max]	8.90 [0.00100, 82.2]
Population (log)	
Mean (SD)	9.15 (1.38)
Median [Min, Max]	9.01 [6.45, 14.1]
Polity IV score	
Mean (SD)	−0.118 (6.88)
Median [Min, Max]	−2.00 [−10.0, 10.0]
Peacetime	
Mean (SD)	26.9 (16.4)
Median [Min, Max]	26.0 [0, 78.0]
Oil	
Mean (SD)	0.162 (0.369)
Median [Min, Max]	0 [0, 1.00]
Protoinsurg40	
Mean (SD)	0.0326 (0.178)
Median [Min, Max]	0 [0, 1.00]
GDP (log)	
Mean (SD)	7.83 (0.963)
Median [Min, Max]	7.92 [5.17, 10.0]
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization	
Mean (SD)	0.517 (0.247)
Median [Min, Max]	0.542 [0.00200, 0.930]
Onset	
Mean (SD)	0.0364 (0.187)
Median [Min, Max]	0 [0, 1.00]
Civil liberties (0-4)	
Mean (SD)	3.64 (1.07)
Median [Min, Max]	3.75 [0.783, 5.73]
Corruption (0-1)	
Mean (SD)	0.633 (0.228)
Median [Min, Max]	0.669 [0.0422, 0.971]
Access to justice (0-8)	
Mean (SD)	8.48 (2.13)
Median [Min, Max]	8.45 [2.44, 13.8]

Table A2. Correlations matrix.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
1. onset	1.00													
2. proto-insurgency	0.19***	1.00												
3. attack growth	0.13***	0.11***	1.00											
4. repression	0.27***	0.19***	0.11***	1.00										
5. civil liberties	-0.16***	-0.11***	-0.05*	-0.35***	1.00									
6. corruption	0.05*	-0.08**	-0.00	0.30***	-0.28***	1.00								
7. justice	-0.09***	-0.03	-0.01	-0.44***	0.55***	-0.49***	1.00							
8. mountainous	0.07**	0.09***	0.02	0.10***	-0.11***	0.01	-0.04	1.00						
9. population	0.16***	0.25***	0.10***	0.46***	-0.17***	0.14***	-0.07**	0.15***	1.00					
10. polity	-0.03	0.11***	0.02	-0.24***	0.24***	-0.24***	0.54***	0.07**	0.05*	1.00				
11. peace years	-0.18***	-0.08***	-0.02	-0.10***	0.11***	-0.09***	0.15***	0.05*	0.02	0.24***	1.00			
12. oil	0.07**	-0.02	0.03	0.17***	-0.20***	0.26***	-0.18***	-0.05*	0.04	-0.22***	-0.08***	1.00		
13. GDP	-0.07**	0.06**	0.00	-0.14***	0.06**	-0.31***	0.39***	0.01	0.02	0.34***	0.17***	0.14***	1.00	
14. ethnic frac	0.03	-0.06**	0.02	0.06*	0.02	0.25***	-0.25***	-0.24***	-0.05*	-0.16***	-0.07**	0.11***	-0.47***	1.00

Table A3. Separate bivariate probit models of proto-insurgency and onset, with and without country and year-fixed effects.

	Dependent variable:			
	Proto-insurgency (1)	Conflict onset (2)	Proto-insurgency (3)	Conflict onset (4)
State repression (log for proto-insurgency)	1.341*** (0.313)	0.236*** (0.043)	1.609*** (0.327)	0.258*** (0.044)
Access to justice, 1	-59.351*** (20.614)		-50.529** (20.873)	
Access to justice, 2	-73.925** (31.367)		-68.504** (33.038)	
Access to justice, 3	-30.695** (15.432)		-24.952 (15.612)	
Access to justice, 4	-43.134** (19.769)		-40.650* (21.482)	
Civil liberties (log)		-0.647*** (0.189)		-0.561*** (0.195)
Regime corruption, 1	-30.371*** (5.393)		-24.557*** (5.715)	
Regime corruption, 2	6.439 (4.787)		11.583** (4.809)	
Regime corruption, 3	3.704 (4.329)		1.771 (4.338)	
Regime corruption, 4	-14.156*** (4.827)		-13.590*** (4.807)	
Ethnic fractionalization	-0.478 (0.394)	0.285 (0.301)		
Mountainous (%)	0.007 (0.005)	0.007** (0.003)		
Population size (log)	0.411*** (0.072)	0.091* (0.047)	0.466*** (0.080)	0.039 (0.051)
Democracy (1-21), 1	28.791*** (5.355)	0.035*** (0.012)	30.672*** (5.677)	0.041*** (0.013)
Democracy (1-21), 2	-10.867** (4.982)		-9.343* (4.974)	
Oil dependency	-0.016 (0.260)	0.126 (0.174)	-0.231 (0.265)	0.125 (0.177)
Peace years	-0.032*** (0.006)	-0.024*** (0.005)	-0.034*** (0.007)	-0.021*** (0.005)
Country fixed effects			-0.001 (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)
Year fixed effects			-0.071*** (0.017)	-0.007 (0.011)
Constant	-12.232*** (1.610)	-2.015** (0.912)	125.626*** (33.633)	10.921 (21.941)
Observations	1,840	1,840	1,840	1,840
Log Likelihood	-135.740	-194.389	-128.025	-193.573
Akaike Inf. Crit.	307.479	410.779	292.050	409.146

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$