

# Isogeny graphs in cryptography

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Mathematical foundations of asymmetric cryptography  
Aussois, Savoie

Slides online at <https://defeo.lu/docet/>

# Overview

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  - Isogeny graphs
  - Endomorphism rings
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  - Open Problems


# Elliptic curves

Let  $k$  be a field of characteristic  $\neq 2, 3$ .

An *elliptic curve defined over  $k$*  is the locus in the projective space  $\mathbb{P}^2(\bar{k})$  of an equation

$$Y^2Z = X^3 + aXZ^2 + bZ^3,$$

where  $a, b \in k$  and  $4a^3 + 27b^2 \neq 0$ .



# Elliptic curves


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
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
- $\mathcal{O} = (0 : 1 : 0)$  is the point at infinity;
- $y^2 = x^3 + ax + b$  is the affine Weierstrass equation.

# The group law

Bezout's theorem

Every line cuts  $E$  in exactly three points (counted with multiplicity).

Define a [group law](#) such that any three colinear points add up to zero.




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
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
- The law is **algebraic** (it has *formulas*);
- The law is **commutative**;
- $\mathcal{O}$  is the **group identity**;
- **Opposite points** have the same  $x$ -value.



# Why should I care? (Diffie–Hellman key exchange)

**Goal:** Alice and Bob have never met before. They are chatting over a public channel, and want to agree on a **shared secret** to start a private conversation.

**Setup:** They agree on a (large) cyclic group  $G = \langle g \rangle$  of (prime) order  $q$ .



# Brief history of DH key exchange

- 1976 Diffie & Hellman publish [New directions in cryptography](#), suggest using  $G = \mathbb{F}_p^*$ .
- 1978 Pollard publishes his [discrete logarithm](#) algorithm ( $O(\sqrt{\#G})$  complexity).
- 1980 Miller and Koblitz independently suggest using [elliptic curves](#)  $G = E(\mathbb{F}_p)$ .
- 1994 Shor publishes his quantum polynomial time [discrete logarithm / factoring](#) algorithm.
- 2005 NSA standardizes elliptic curve key agreement (ECDH) and signatures ECDSA.
- 2017 ~ 70% of web traffic is secured by ECDH and/or ECDSA.
- 2017 NIST launches [post-quantum competition](#), says “not to bother moving to elliptic curves, if you haven’t yet”.

## Why should I care? (cont'd)

But, also:

- Elliptic Curve Factoring Method (Lenstra '85);
- Elliptic Curve Primality Proving (Atkin, Morain '86-'93);
- Efficient normal bases for finite fields (Couveignes, Lercier '10);
- ...

# What are elliptic curves?

## For mathematicians

- The smooth projective curves of genus 1;
- The simplest abelian varieties (dimension 1);
- Finitely generated abelian groups of mysterious free rank (aka BSD conjecture);
- What you use to make examples.

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## For cryptographers

- Finite abelian groups (often cyclic);
- Easy to compute the order;
- “2-dimensional” generalizations of  $\mu_k$  (the roots of unity of  $k$ )...
- ...with bilinear maps (aka pairings)!

# Isomorphisms

## Isomorphisms

The only invertible algebraic maps between elliptic curves are of the form

$$(x, y) \mapsto (u^2 x, u^3 y)$$

for some  $u \in \bar{k}$ .

They are group isomorphisms.

## $j$ -Invariant

Let  $E : y^2 = x^3 + ax + b$ , its  $j$ -invariant is

$$j(E) = 1728 \frac{4a^3}{4a^3 + 27b^2}.$$

Two elliptic curves  $E, E'$  are isomorphic if and only if  $j(E) = j(E')$ .

## Group structure

### Torsion structure

Let  $E$  be defined over an algebraically closed field  $\bar{k}$  of characteristic  $p$ .

$$E[m] \simeq \mathbb{Z}/m\mathbb{Z} \times \mathbb{Z}/m\mathbb{Z} \quad \text{if } p \nmid m,$$

$$E[p^e] \simeq \begin{cases} \mathbb{Z}/p^e\mathbb{Z} & \text{ordinary case,} \\ \{\mathcal{O}\} & \text{supersingular case.} \end{cases}$$

### Finite fields (Hasse's theorem)

Let  $E$  be defined over a finite field  $\mathbb{F}_q$ , then

$$|\#E(\mathbb{F}_q) - q - 1| \leq 2\sqrt{q}.$$

In particular, there exist integers  $n_1$  and  $n_2 | \gcd(n_1, q - 1)$  such that

$$E(\mathbb{F}_q) \simeq \mathbb{Z}/n_1\mathbb{Z} \times \mathbb{Z}/n_2\mathbb{Z}.$$

# What is scalar multiplication?

$$[n] : P \mapsto \underbrace{P + P + \cdots + P}_{n \text{ times}}$$

- A map  $E \rightarrow E$ ,
- a group morphism,
- with finite kernel  
(the torsion group  $E[n] \simeq (\mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z})^2$ ),
- surjective (in the algebraic closure),
- given by rational maps of degree  $n^2$ .

# What is scalar multiplication by an isogeny?

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(Separable) isogenies  $\Leftrightarrow$  finite subgroups:


$$0 \longrightarrow H \longrightarrow E \xrightarrow{\phi} E' \rightarrow 0$$

The kernel  $H$  determines the image curve  $E'$  up to isomorphism


$$E/H \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} E'.$$

# Isogenies: an example over $\mathbb{F}_{11}$

$$E : y^2 = x^3 + x$$



$$E' : y^2 = x^3 - 4x$$




$$\phi(x, y) = \left( \frac{x^2 + 1}{x}, \quad y \frac{x^2 - 1}{x^2} \right)$$

# Isogenies: an example over $\mathbb{F}_{11}$

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$$\phi(x, y) = \left( \frac{x^2 + 1}{x}, \quad y \frac{x^2 - 1}{x^2} \right)$$

- Kernel generator in red.
- This is a degree 2 map.
- Analogous to  $x \mapsto x^2$  in  $\mathbb{F}_q^*$ .

# Isogeny properties

Let  $\phi : E \rightarrow E'$  be an isogeny defined over a field  $k$  of characteristic  $p$ .

- $k(E)$  is the **field of all rational functions** from  $E$  to  $k$ ;
- $\phi^* k(E')$  is the subfield of  $k(E)$  defined as

$$\phi^* k(E') = \{f \circ \phi \mid f \in k(E')\}.$$

## Degree, separability

- ① The **degree** of  $\phi$  is  $\deg \phi = [k(E) : \phi^* k(E')]$ . It is always finite.
- ②  $\phi$  is said to be **separable**, **inseparable**, or **purely inseparable** if the extension of function fields is.
- ③ If  $\phi$  is separable, then  $\deg \phi = \#\ker \phi$ .
- ④ If  $\phi$  is purely inseparable, then  $\ker \phi = \{\mathcal{O}\}$  and  $\deg \phi$  is a power of  $p$ .
- ⑤ Any isogeny can be decomposed as a product of a separable and a purely inseparable isogeny.

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# The dual isogeny

Let  $\phi : E \rightarrow E'$  be an isogeny of degree  $m$ . There is a unique isogeny  $\hat{\phi} : E' \rightarrow E$  such that

$$\hat{\phi} \circ \phi = [m]_E, \quad \phi \circ \hat{\phi} = [m]_{E'}.$$

$\hat{\phi}$  is called the **dual isogeny of  $\phi$** ; it has the following properties:


- ①  $\hat{\phi}$  is defined over  $k$  if and only if  $\phi$  is;
- ②  $\widehat{\psi \circ \phi} = \hat{\phi} \circ \hat{\psi}$  for any isogeny  $\psi : E' \rightarrow E''$ ;
- ③  $\widehat{\psi + \phi} = \hat{\psi} + \hat{\phi}$  for any isogeny  $\psi : E \rightarrow E'$ ;
- ④  $\deg \phi = \deg \hat{\phi}$ ;
- ⑤  $\widehat{\hat{\phi}} = \phi$ .

# Isogeny graphs

We look at the graph of elliptic curves with isogenies up to isomorphism. We say two isogenies  $\phi, \phi'$  are isomorphic if:

$$\begin{array}{ccc} E & \xrightarrow{\phi} & E' \\ & \searrow \phi' & \uparrow \wr \\ & & E' \end{array}$$

Example: Finite field, ordinary case, graph of isogenies of degree 3.



# What do isogeny graphs look like?

Torsion subgroups ( $\ell$  prime)

In an algebraically closed field:

$$E[\ell] = \langle P, Q \rangle \simeq (\mathbb{Z}/\ell\mathbb{Z})^2$$




There are exactly  $\ell + 1$  cyclic subgroups  $H \subset E$  of order  $\ell$ :

$$\langle P + Q \rangle, \langle P + 2Q \rangle, \dots, \langle P \rangle, \langle Q \rangle$$



There are exactly  $\ell + 1$  distinct isogenies of degree  $\ell$ .



(non-CM) 2-isogeny graph over  $\mathbb{C}$

# What happens over a finite field $\mathbb{F}_p$ ?

Rational isogenies ( $\ell \neq p$ )

In the algebraic closure  $\bar{\mathbb{F}}_p$

$$E[\ell] = \langle P, Q \rangle \simeq (\mathbb{Z}/\ell\mathbb{Z})^2$$

However, an isogeny is defined over  $\mathbb{F}_p$  only if its kernel is Galois invariant.

Enter the Frobenius map

$$\pi : E \longrightarrow E$$

$$(x, y) \longmapsto (x^p, y^p)$$

$E$  is seen here as a curve over  $\bar{\mathbb{F}}_p$ .

The Frobenius action on  $E[\ell]$

$$\pi(P) = aP + bQ$$

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We identify  $\pi|_{E[\ell]}$  to a conjugacy class in  $\text{GL}(\mathbb{Z}/\ell\mathbb{Z})$ .

# What happens over a finite field $\mathbb{F}_p$ ?

Galois invariant subgroups of  $E[\ell]$

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eigenspaces of  $\pi \in \mathrm{GL}(\mathbb{Z}/\ell\mathbb{Z})$

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## How many Galois invariant subgroups?

- $\pi|E[\ell] \sim \begin{pmatrix} \lambda & 0 \\ 0 & \lambda \end{pmatrix}$   $\rightarrow \ell + 1$  isogenies
- $\pi|E[\ell] \sim \begin{pmatrix} \lambda & 0 \\ 0 & \mu \end{pmatrix}$  with  $\lambda \neq \mu$   $\rightarrow$  two isogenies
- $\pi|E[\ell] \sim \begin{pmatrix} \lambda & * \\ 0 & \lambda \end{pmatrix}$   $\rightarrow$  one isogeny
- $\pi|E[\ell]$  is not diagonalizable  $\rightarrow$  no isogeny

## Weil pairing

Let  $(N, p) = 1$ , fix any basis  $E[N] = \langle R, S \rangle$ . For any points  $P, Q \in E[N]$

$$P = aR + bS$$

$$Q = cR + dS$$

the form  $\det_N(P, Q) = \det \begin{pmatrix} a & b \\ c & d \end{pmatrix} = ad - bc \in \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$   
is bilinear, non-degenerate, and independent from the choice of basis.

### Theorem

Let  $E/\mathbb{F}_q$  be a curve, there exists a Galois invariant bilinear map

$$e_N : E[N] \times E[N] \longrightarrow \mu_N \subset \bar{\mathbb{F}}_q,$$

called the Weil pairing of order  $N$ , and a primitive  $N$ -th root of unity  $\zeta \in \bar{\mathbb{F}}_q$   
such that

$$e_N(P, Q) = \zeta^{\det_N(P, Q)}.$$

The degree  $k$  of the smallest extension such that  $\zeta \in \mathbb{F}_{q^k}$  is called the  
embedding degree of the pairing.

# Weil pairing and isogenies

## Note

The Weil pairing is Galois invariant  $\Leftrightarrow \det(\pi|E[N]) = q$ .

## Theorem

Let  $\phi : E \rightarrow E'$  be an isogeny and  $\hat{\phi} : E' \rightarrow E$  its dual.

Let  $e_N$  be the Weil pairing of  $E$  and  $e'_N$  that of  $E'$ . Then, for

$$e_N(P, \hat{\phi}(Q)) = e'_N(\phi(P), Q),$$

for any  $P \in E[N]$  and  $Q \in E'[N]$ .

## Corollary

$$e'_N(\phi(P), \phi(Q)) = e_N(P, Q)^{\deg \phi}.$$

# From local to global

## Theorem (Hasse)

Let  $E$  be defined over a finite field  $\mathbb{F}_q$ . Its Frobenius map  $\pi$  satisfies a quadratic equation

$$\pi^2 - t\pi + q = 0$$

for some  $|t| \leq 2\sqrt{q}$ , called the **trace** of  $\pi$ . The trace  $t$  is coprime to  $q$  if and only if  $E$  is ordinary.

## Endomorphisms

An isogeny  $E \rightarrow E$  is also called an **endomorphism**. Examples:

- scalar multiplication  $[n]$ ,
- Frobenius map  $\pi$ .

With **addition** and **composition**, the endomorphisms form a ring  $\text{End}(E)$ .

# The endomorphism ring

## Theorem (Deuring)

Let  $E$  be an **ordinary** elliptic curve defined over a finite field  $\mathbb{F}_q$ .

Let  $\pi$  be its Frobenius endomorphism, and  $D_\pi = t^2 - 4q < 0$  the **discriminant** of its minimal polynomial.

Then  $\text{End}(E)$  is isomorphic to an **order**  $\mathcal{O}$  of the **quadratic imaginary field**  $\mathbb{Q}(\sqrt{D_\pi})$ .<sup>a</sup>

---

<sup>a</sup>An order is a subring that is a  $\mathbb{Z}$ -module of rank 2 (equiv., a 2-dimensional  $\mathbb{R}$ -lattice).

In this case, we say that  $E$  has **complex multiplication** (CM) by  $\mathcal{O}$ .

## Theorem (Serre-Tate)

CM elliptic curves  $E, E'$  are isogenous iff  $\text{End}(E) \otimes \mathbb{Q} \simeq \text{End}(E') \otimes \mathbb{Q}$ .


**Corollary:**  $E/\mathbb{F}_p$  and  $E'/\mathbb{F}_p$  are isogenous iff  $\#E(\mathbb{F}_p) = \#E'(\mathbb{F}_p)$ .

# Endomorphism rings of ordinary curves

## Classifying quadratic orders

Let  $K$  be a quadratic number field, and let  $\mathcal{O}_K$  be its ring of integers.

- Any order  $\mathcal{O} \subset K$  can be written as  $\mathcal{O} = \mathbb{Z} + f\mathcal{O}_K$  for an integer  $f$ , called the **conductor** of  $\mathcal{O}$ , denoted by  $[\mathcal{O}_K : \mathcal{O}]$ .
- If  $D_K$  is the **discriminant** of  $K$ , the discriminant of  $\mathcal{O}$  is  $f^2 D_K$ .
- If  $\mathcal{O}, \mathcal{O}'$  are two orders with discriminants  $D, D'$ , then  $\mathcal{O} \subset \mathcal{O}'$  iff  $D' | D$ .




# Volcanology (Kohel 1996)

Let  $E, E'$  be curves with respective endomorphism rings  $\mathcal{O}, \mathcal{O}' \subset K$ .

Let  $\phi : E \rightarrow E'$  be an isogeny of prime degree  $\ell$ , then:

if  $\mathcal{O} = \mathcal{O}'$ ,  $\phi$  is horizontal;  
if  $[\mathcal{O}' : \mathcal{O}] = \ell$ ,  $\phi$  is ascending;  
if  $[\mathcal{O} : \mathcal{O}'] = \ell$ ,  $\phi$  is descending.




Ordinary isogeny volcano of degree  $\ell = 3$ .


# Volcanology (Kohel 1996)

Let  $E$  be ordinary,  
 $\text{End}(E) \subset K$ .


$\mathcal{O}_K$ : maximal order of  $K$ ,  
 $D_K$ : discriminant of  $K$ .



$$\left(\frac{D_K}{\ell}\right) = -1$$



$$\left(\frac{D_K}{\ell}\right) = 0$$



$$\left(\frac{D_K}{\ell}\right) = +1$$

		Horizontal	Ascending	Descending
$\ell \nmid [\mathcal{O}_K : \mathcal{O}]$	$\ell \nmid [\mathcal{O} : \mathbb{Z}[\pi]]$	$1 + \left(\frac{D_K}{\ell}\right)$		
$\ell \nmid [\mathcal{O}_K : \mathcal{O}]$	$\ell \mid [\mathcal{O} : \mathbb{Z}[\pi]]$	$1 + \left(\frac{D_K}{\ell}\right)$		$\ell - \left(\frac{D_K}{\ell}\right)$
$\ell \mid [\mathcal{O}_K : \mathcal{O}]$	$\ell \mid [\mathcal{O} : \mathbb{Z}[\pi]]$		1	$\ell$
$\ell \mid [\mathcal{O}_K : \mathcal{O}]$	$\ell \nmid [\mathcal{O} : \mathbb{Z}[\pi]]$		1	

# Volcanology (Kohel 1996)


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
Height =  $v_\ell([\mathcal{O}_K : \mathbb{Z}[\pi]])$ .



$$\left(\frac{D_K}{\ell}\right) = -1$$



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



$$\left(\frac{D_K}{\ell}\right) = +1$$

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


$\mathcal{O}_K$ : maximal order of  $K$ ,  
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$$\left(\frac{D_K}{\ell}\right) = -1$$

$$\left(\frac{D_K}{\ell}\right) = 0$$

Height =  $v_\ell([\mathcal{O}_K : \mathbb{Z}[\pi]])$ .



How large is the crater?

$$\left(\frac{D_K}{\ell}\right) = +1$$

		Horizontal	Ascending	Descending
$\ell \nmid [\mathcal{O}_K : \mathcal{O}]$	$\ell \nmid [\mathcal{O} : \mathbb{Z}[\pi]]$	$1 + \left(\frac{D_K}{\ell}\right)$		
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# How large is the crater of a volcano?

Let  $\text{End}(E) = \mathcal{O} \subset \mathbb{Q}(\sqrt{-D})$ . Define

- $\mathcal{I}(\mathcal{O})$ , the group of invertible fractional ideals,
- $\mathcal{P}(\mathcal{O})$ , the group of principal ideals,

## The class group

The class group of  $\mathcal{O}$  is

$$\text{Cl}(\mathcal{O}) = \mathcal{I}(\mathcal{O})/\mathcal{P}(\mathcal{O}).$$

- It is a finite abelian group.
- Its order  $h(\mathcal{O})$  is called the class number of  $\mathcal{O}$ .
- It arises as the Galois group of an abelian extension of  $\mathbb{Q}(\sqrt{-D})$ .

# Complex multiplication

## The $\mathfrak{a}$ -torsion

- Let  $\mathfrak{a} \subset \mathcal{O}$  be an (integral invertible) ideal of  $\mathcal{O}$ ;
- Let  $E[\mathfrak{a}]$  be the subgroup of  $E$  annihilated by  $\mathfrak{a}$ :

$$E[\mathfrak{a}] = \{P \in E \mid \alpha(P) = 0 \text{ for all } \alpha \in \mathfrak{a}\};$$

- Let  $\phi : E \rightarrow E_{\mathfrak{a}}$ , where  $E_{\mathfrak{a}} = E/E[\mathfrak{a}]$ .

Then  $\text{End}(E_{\mathfrak{a}}) = \mathcal{O}$  (i.e.,  $\phi$  is horizontal).


## Theorem (Complex multiplication)

The action on the set of elliptic curves with complex multiplication by  $\mathcal{O}$  defined by  $\mathfrak{a} * j(E) = j(E_{\mathfrak{a}})$  factors through  $\text{Cl}(\mathcal{O})$ , is faithful and transitive.

## Corollary


Let  $\text{End}(E)$  have discriminant  $D$ . Assume that  $\left(\frac{D}{\ell}\right) = 1$ , then  $E$  is on a crater of size  $N$  of an  $\ell$ -volcano, and  $N|h(\text{End}(E))$

# Complex multiplication graphs



Vertices are elliptic curves with complex multiplication by  $\mathcal{O}_K$  (i.e.,  $\text{End}(E) \simeq \mathcal{O}_K \subset \mathbb{Q}(\sqrt{-D})$ ).

# Complex multiplication graphs




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Edges are horizontal isogenies of bounded prime degree.

— degree 2

# Complex multiplication graphs




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Edges are horizontal isogenies of bounded prime degree.

— degree 2

— degree 3

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
Edges are horizontal isogenies of bounded prime degree.

degree 2

degree 3

degree 5

# Complex multiplication graphs



Vertices are elliptic curves with complex multiplication by  $\mathcal{O}_K$  (i.e.,  $\text{End}(E) \simeq \mathcal{O}_K \subset \mathbb{Q}(\sqrt{-D})$ ).

Edges are horizontal isogenies of bounded prime degree.

degree 2

degree 3

degree 5

Isomorphic to a Cayley graph of  $\text{Cl}(\mathcal{O}_K)$ .

# Supersingular endomorphisms

Recall, a curve  $E$  over a field  $\mathbb{F}_q$  of characteristic  $p$  is **supersingular** iff

$$\pi^2 - t\pi + q = 0$$

with  $t \equiv 0 \pmod{p}$ .

Case:  $t = 0 \Rightarrow D_\pi = -4q$

- Only possibility for  $E/\mathbb{F}_p$ ,
- $E/\mathbb{F}_p$  has CM by an order of  $\mathbb{Q}(\sqrt{-p})$ , similar to the ordinary case.

Case:  $t = \pm 2\sqrt{q} \Rightarrow D_\pi = 0$

- General case for  $E/\mathbb{F}_q$ , when  $q$  is an even power.
- $\pi = \pm\sqrt{q}$ , hence no complex multiplication.

We will ignore marginal cases:  $t = \pm\sqrt{q}, \pm\sqrt{2q}, \pm\sqrt{3q}$ .

# Supersingular complex multiplication

Let  $E/\mathbb{F}_p$  be a supersingular curve, then  $\pi^2 = -p$ , and

$$\pi = \begin{pmatrix} \sqrt{-p} & 0 \\ 0 & -\sqrt{-p} \end{pmatrix} \mod \ell$$

for any  $\ell$  s.t.  $\left(\frac{-p}{\ell}\right) = 1$ .

Theorem (Delfs and Galbraith 2016)

Let  $\text{End}_{\mathbb{F}_p}(E)$  denote the ring of  $\mathbb{F}_p$ -rational endomorphisms of  $E$ . Then



$$\mathbb{Z}[\pi] \subset \text{End}_{\mathbb{F}_p}(E) \subset \mathbb{Q}(\sqrt{-p}).$$

Orders of  $\mathbb{Q}(\sqrt{-p})$

- If  $p \equiv 1 \pmod{4}$ , then  $\mathbb{Z}[\pi]$  is the maximal order.
- If  $p \equiv -1 \pmod{4}$ , then  $\mathbb{Z}[\frac{\pi+1}{2}]$  is the maximal order, and  $[\mathbb{Z}[\frac{\pi+1}{2}] : \mathbb{Z}[\pi]] = 2$ .


# Supersingular CM graphs

2-volcanoes,  $p = -1 \bmod 4$



$$\begin{array}{c} \bullet \\ \text{---} \\ \bullet \end{array} \quad \mathbb{Z}\left[\frac{\pi+1}{2}\right]$$
$$\bullet \\ \text{---} \\ \bullet \end{array} \quad \mathbb{Z}[\pi]$$

2-graphs,  $p = 1 \bmod 4$



$$\bullet \\ \text{---} \\ \bullet \end{array} \quad \mathbb{Z}[\pi]$$

All other  $\ell$ -graphs are cycles of horizontal isogenies iff  $\left(\frac{-p}{\ell}\right) = 1$ .

# The full endomorphism ring

## Theorem (Deuring)

Let  $E$  be a supersingular elliptic curve, then

- $E$  is isomorphic to a curve defined over  $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$ ;
- Every isogeny of  $E$  is defined over  $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$ ;
- Every endomorphism of  $E$  is defined over  $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$ ;
- $\text{End}(E)$  is isomorphic to a maximal order in a quaternion algebra ramified at  $p$  and  $\infty$ .

In particular:

- If  $E$  is defined over  $\mathbb{F}_p$ , then  $\text{End}_{\mathbb{F}_p}(E)$  is strictly contained in  $\text{End}(E)$ .
- Some endomorphisms do not commute!

# An example

The curve of  $j$ -invariant 1728

$$E : y^2 = x^3 + x$$

is supersingular over  $\mathbb{F}_p$  iff  $p \equiv -1 \pmod{4}$ .

## Endomorphisms

$\text{End}(E) = \mathbb{Z}\langle \iota, \pi \rangle$ , with:

- $\pi$  the Frobenius endomorphism, s.t.  $\pi^2 = -p$ ;
- $\iota$  the map

$$\iota(x, y) = (-x, iy),$$


where  $i \in \mathbb{F}_{p^2}$  is a 4-th root of unity. Clearly,  $\iota^2 = -1$ .

And  $\iota\pi = -\pi\iota$ .


# Class group action party

- $j = 1728$


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
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
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# Quaternion algebra?! WTF?<sup>2</sup>

The quaternion algebra  $B_{p,\infty}$  is:

- A 4-dimensional  $\mathbb{Q}$ -vector space with basis  $(1, i, j, k)$ ;
- A non-commutative division algebra<sup>1</sup>  $B_{p,\infty} = \mathbb{Q}\langle i, j \rangle$  with the relations:

$$i^2 = a, \quad j^2 = -p, \quad ij = -ji = k,$$

for some  $a < 0$  (depending on  $p$ ).

- All elements of  $B_{p,\infty}$  are quadratic algebraic numbers;
- $B_{p,\infty} \otimes \mathbb{Q}_\ell \simeq M_{2 \times 2}(\mathbb{Q}_\ell)$  for all  $\ell \neq p$ .  
I.e., endomorphisms restricted to  $E[\ell^e]$  are just  $2 \times 2$  matrices mod  $\ell^e$ .
- $B_{p,\infty} \otimes \mathbb{R} \simeq M_{2 \times 2}(\mathbb{R})$ .

---

<sup>1</sup>All elements have inverses.

<sup>2</sup>What The Field?

# Supersingular graphs

- Quaternion algebras have many maximal orders.
- For every maximal order type of  $B_{p,\infty}$  there are 1 or 2 curves over  $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$  having endomorphism ring isomorphic to it.
- There is a unique isogeny class of supersingular curves over  $\bar{\mathbb{F}}_p$  of size  $\approx p/12$ .
- Left ideals act on the set of maximal orders like isogenies.
- The graph of  $\ell$ -isogenies is  $(\ell + 1)$ -regular.




Figure: 3-isogeny graph on  $\mathbb{F}_{97^2}$ .

# Graphs lexicon

**Degree:** Number of (outgoing/ingoing) edges.

**$k$ -regular:** All vertices have degree  $k$ .

**Connected:** There is a path between any two vertices.

**Distance:** The length of the shortest path between two vertices.

**Diameter:** The longest distance between two vertices.

$\lambda_1 \geq \dots \geq \lambda_n$ : The (ordered) eigenvalues of the adjacency matrix.

# Expander graphs

## Proposition

If  $G$  is a  $k$ -regular graph, its largest and smallest eigenvalues satisfy

$$k = \lambda_1 \geq \lambda_n \geq -k.$$

## Expander families

An infinite family of connected  $k$ -regular graphs on  $n$  vertices is an **expander family** if there exists an  $\epsilon > 0$  such that all **non-trivial** eigenvalues satisfy  $|\lambda| \leq (1 - \epsilon)k$  for  $n$  large enough.

- Expander graphs have **short diameter** ( $O(\log n)$ );
- Random walks **mix rapidly** (after  $O(\log n)$  steps, the induced distribution on the vertices is close to uniform).

# Expander graphs from isogenies

## Theorem (Pizer 1990, 1998)

Let  $\ell$  be fixed. The family of graphs of supersingular curves over  $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$  with  $\ell$ -isogenies, as  $p \rightarrow \infty$ , is an expander family<sup>a</sup>.

---

<sup>a</sup>Even better, it has the Ramanujan property.

## Theorem (Jao, Miller, and Venkatesan 2009)

Let  $\mathcal{O} \subset \mathbb{Q}(\sqrt{-D})$  be an order in a quadratic imaginary field. The graphs of all curves over  $\mathbb{F}_q$  with complex multiplication by  $\mathcal{O}$ , with isogenies of prime degree bounded<sup>a</sup> by  $(\log q)^{2+\delta}$ , are expanders.

---

<sup>a</sup>May contain traces of GRH.

# Overview

- 1 Isogeny graphs
  - Elliptic Curves
  - Isogenies
  - Isogeny graphs
  - Endomorphism rings
  - Ordinary graphs
  - Supersingular graphs

- 2 Cryptography
  - Isogeny walks and Hash functions
  - Pairing verification and Verifiable Delay Functions
  - Key exchange
  - Open Problems

# History of isogeny-based cryptography

- 1996 Couveignes introduces the Hard Homogeneous Spaces (HHS). His work stays unpublished for 10 years.
- 2006 Rostovtsev & Stolbunov independently rediscover Couveignes ideas, suggest isogeny-based Diffie–Hellman as a quantum-resistant primitive.
- 2007 Charles, Goren & Lauter propose supersingular 2-isogeny graphs as a foundation for a “provably secure” hash function.
- 2011-2012 D., Jao & Plût introduce SIDH, an efficient post-quantum key exchange inspired by Couveignes, Rostovtsev, Stolbunov, Charles, Goren, Lauter.
- 2017 SIDH is submitted to the NIST competition (with the name SIKE, only isogeny-based candidate).
- 2018 Castryck, Lange, Martindale, Panny & Renes publish an efficient variant of HHS named CSIDH.
- 2019 New isogeny protocols: Signatures, Verifiable Delay Functions, ...

# Computing Isogenies

## Vélu's formulas

**Input:** A subgroup  $H \subset E$ ,

**Output:** The isogeny  $\phi : E \rightarrow E/H$ .

**Complexity:**  $O(\ell)$  — Vélu 1971, ...

- Why?**
- Evaluate isogeny on points  $P \in E$ ;
  - Walk in isogeny graphs.

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  - Walk in isogeny graphs.

## Explicit Isogeny Problem

Input: Curve  $E$ , (prime) integer  $\ell$

Output: All subgroups  $H \subset E$  of order  $\ell$ .

Complexity:  $\tilde{O}(\ell^2)$  — Elkies 1992

- Why?
- List all isogenies of given degree;
  - Count points of elliptic curves;
  - Compute endomorphism rings of elliptic curves;
  - Walk in isogeny graphs.

# Computing Isogenies

## Explicit Isogeny Problem (2)

**Input:** Curves  $E, E'$ , isogenous of degree  $\ell$ .

**Output:** The isogeny  $\phi : E \rightarrow E'$  of degree  $\ell$ .

**Complexity:**  $O(\ell^2)$  — Elkies 1992; Couveignes 1996; Lercier and Sirvent 2008; De Feo 2011; De Feo, Hugounenq, Plût, and Schost 2016; Lairez and Vaccon 2016, ...

**Why?** • Count points of elliptic curves.

# Computing Isogenies

## Explicit Isogeny Problem (2)

**Input:** Curves  $E, E'$ , isogenous of degree  $\ell$ .

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**Why?** • Count points of elliptic curves.

## Isogeny Walk Problem

**Input:** Isogenous curves  $E, E'$ .

**Output:** An isogeny  $\phi : E \rightarrow E'$  of **smooth** degree.

**Complexity:** Generically hard — Galbraith, Hess, and Nigel P. Smart 2002,


...

**Why?** • Cryptanalysis (ECC);

• Foundational problem for **isogeny-based cryptography**.

# Random walks and hash functions (circa 2006)

Any expander graph gives rise to a hash function.



- Fix a starting vertex  $v$ ;
- The value to be hashed determines a random path to  $v'$ ;
- $v'$  is the hash.

(Denis X. Charles, Kristin E. Lauter, and Goren 2009) hash function (CGL)

- Use the expander graph of **supersingular 2-isogenies**;
- **Collision resistance**
- **2nd preimage resistance**
- **Preimage resistance** = hardness of finding a path from  $v$  to  $v'$ .

# Hardness of CGL

## Finding cycles

- Analogous to finding endomorphisms...
- ...very bad idea to start from a curve with known endomorphism ring!
- Translation algortihm: elements of  $B_{p,\infty}$   $\leftrightarrow$  isogeny loops  
Doable in  $\text{polylog}(p)$ .<sup>a</sup>

---

<sup>a</sup>Kohel, K. Lauter, Petit, and Tignol 2014; Eisenträger, Hallgren, K. Lauter, Morrison, and Petit 2018.

## Finding paths $E \rightarrow E'$

- Analogous to finding connecting ideals between two maximal orders  $\mathcal{O}, \mathcal{O}'$  (i.e. a left ideal  $I \subset \mathcal{O}$  that is a right ideal of  $\mathcal{O}'$ ).
- Poly-time equivalent to computing  $\text{End}(E)$  and  $\text{End}(E')$ .<sup>a</sup>
- Best known algorithm to compute  $\text{End}(E)$  takes  $\text{poly}(p)$ .<sup>b</sup>

---

<sup>a</sup>Eisenträger, Hallgren, K. Lauter, Morrison, and Petit 2018.

<sup>b</sup>Kohel 1996; Cerviño 2004.

- Input:**
- Maximal order  $\mathcal{O} \subset B_{p,\infty}$  and associated curve  $E$ ,
  - Left ideal  $I \subset \mathcal{O}$ .

- Output:**
- Maximal order  $\mathcal{O}' \subset B_{p,\infty}$  s.t.  $I$  connects  $\mathcal{O}$  to  $\mathcal{O}'$ ,
  - **Equivalent** ideal  $J$  (i.e., also connecting  $\mathcal{O}$  to  $\mathcal{O}'$ )  
of [smooth/power-smooth] norm.
  - Isogeny walk associated to  $J$ .

- Complexity:  $\text{polylog}(p)$ ,
- Output size:  $\text{polylog}(p)$ ,
- Useful for:
  - ▶ “Shortening” isogeny walks (see VDFs),
  - ▶ “Reducing” isogeny walks (see Signatures),

when these start from a **curve with known endomorphism ring!**  
(think  $j = 0, 1728$  and other curves with small CM discriminant)

# Sampling supersingular curves

How to sample:

- A supersingular curve  $E/\mathbb{F}_p$ ?
- A supersingular curve  $E/\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$ ?

## Random walks

- Start from a supersingular curve  $E_0$  with small CM discriminant (e.g.:  $j = 1728$ ),
- Do a random walk  $E_0 \rightarrow E$  until reaching the mixing bound ( $O(\log(p))$  steps).

Problem: the random walk reveals  $\text{End}(E)$  via the KLPT algorithm.

## Open problem

Give an algorithm to sample (uniformly) random supersingular curves in a way that does not reveal the endomorphism ring.

# Boneh, Lynn, and Shacham 2004 signatures (BLS)

- Setup:**
- Elliptic curve  $E/\mathbb{F}_p$ , s.t  $N \mid \#E(\mathbb{F}_p)$  for a large prime  $N$ ,
  - (Weil) pairing  $e_N : E[N] \times E[N] \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_{p^k}$  for some small embedding degree  $k$ ,
  - A decomposition  $E[N] = X_1 \times X_2$ , with  $X_1 = \langle P \rangle$ .
  - A hash function  $H : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow X_2$ .

**Private key:**  $s \in \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$ .

**Public key:**  $sP$ .

**Sign:**  $m \mapsto sH(m)$ .

**Verify:**  $e_N(P, sH(m)) = e_N(sP, H(m))$ .

$$\begin{array}{ccc} X_1 \times X_2 & \xrightarrow{[s] \times 1} & X_1 \times X_2 \\ 1 \times [s] \downarrow & & \downarrow e_N \\ X_1 \times X_2 & \xrightarrow{e_N} & \mathbb{F}_{p^k} \end{array}$$

## Signatures from isogenies + pairings

- Replace the secret  $[s] : E \rightarrow E$  with an isogeny  $\phi : E \rightarrow E'$ ;
- Define decompositions

$$E[N] = X_1 \times X_2, \quad E'[N] = Y_1 \times Y_2,$$

s.t.  $\phi(X_1) = Y_1$  and  $\phi(X_2) = Y_2$ ;

- Define a hash function  $H : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow Y_2$ .

$$\begin{array}{ccc} X_1 \times Y_2 & \xrightarrow{\phi \times 1} & Y_1 \times Y_2 \\ 1 \times \hat{\phi} \downarrow & & \downarrow e'_N \\ X_1 \times X_2 & \xrightarrow{e_N} & \mathbb{F}_{p^k} \end{array}$$

---

<sup>3</sup>Broker, Denis X Charles, and Kristin E Lauter 2012.

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 X_1 \times X_2 & \xrightarrow{e_N} & \mathbb{F}_{p^k}
 \end{array}
 \qquad \text{Useless, but nice!}$$

<sup>3</sup>Broker, Denis X Charles, and Kristin E Lauter 2012.

# Verifiable Delay Functions

A Verifiable Delay Function (VDF) is a function  $f : X \rightarrow Y$  s.t.:

- Evaluating  $f$  at random  $x \in X$  is provably “slow” (e.g.,  $\text{poly}(\#X)$ ),
- Given  $x \in X$  and  $y \in Y$ , verifying that  $f(x) = y$  can be done “fast” (e.g.,  $\text{polylog}(\#X)$ ).

## (non)-Example (time-lock puzzles)

- Take a trapdoor group  $G$  of (e.g.,  $G = \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$  with  $N = pq$ );
- Define  $f : G \rightarrow G$  as  $f(g) = g^{2^T}$ :
  - ▶ Best algorithm if  $p, q$  known: compute  $g^{2^T \bmod \varphi(pq)}$   $\text{polylog}(N)$
  - ▶ Best algorithm if  $p, q$  unknown:  $T$  squarings  $O(T)$

However, in VDFs we want to let anyone verify efficiently.

# VDFs from groups of unknown order

## Interactive verification protocol (Wesolowski 2019)

- ① Verifier chooses a prime  $\ell$  in a set of small primes  $\mathcal{P}$ ;
- ② Prover computes  $2^T = a\ell + b$ , sends  $g^{2^T}, g^a, b$  to verifier;
- ③ Verifier checks that

$$g^{2^T} = (g^a)^\ell g^b$$

Can be made non-interactive via Fiat-Shamir.

Candidate groups of unknown order:

- RSA groups  $\mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$ , needs trusted third party to generate  $N = pq$ ;
- Quadratic imaginary class groups  $\text{Cl}(-D)$  for large random discriminants  $-D < 0$ .

# VDFs from isogenies and pairings

$$\begin{array}{ccc} X_1 \times Y_2 & \xrightarrow{\phi \times 1} & Y_1 \times Y_2 \\ 1 \times \hat{\phi} \downarrow & & \downarrow e'_N \\ X_1 \times X_2 & \xrightarrow{e_N} & \mathbb{F}_{p^k} \end{array}$$

- Setup:
- Supersingular curve  $E/\mathbb{F}_p$  with (Weil) pairing  $e_N$ ;
  - Public isogeny  $\phi : E \rightarrow E'$  of degree  $2^T$ ;
  - The dual isogeny  $\hat{\phi} : E' \rightarrow E$ ;
  - A generator  $\langle P \rangle = X_1 \subset E[N]$ , compute  $\phi(P)$ .

Evaluate: On input a random  $Q \in Y_2 \subset E'[N]$ , compute  $\hat{\phi}(Q)$ .

Verify: Check that  $e_N(P, \hat{\phi}(Q)) = e'_N(\phi(P), Q)$ .

# Security


Obvious attack: Pairing inversion must be hard (non post-quantum).

Wanted: No better way to evaluate  $\hat{\phi} : E' \rightarrow E$  than composing  $T$  degree 2 isogenies.


## Shortcuts

- If we can find a shorter way from  $E$  to  $E'$ , we can evaluate  $\hat{\phi}$  faster.
- Shortcuts are easy to compute:
  - ▶ If the isogeny graph is small (excludes ordinary pairing friendly curves);
  - ▶ If  $\text{End}(E)$  or  $\text{End}(E')$  is known (via KLPT).
- Needed: choose  $E/\mathbb{F}_p$  in a way that does not reveal  $\text{End}(E)$ ;
- Only known solution: let a trusted third party generate  $E$ .


# Let's get back to Diffie-Hellman




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
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
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


# Elliptic curves




**I power 70% of WWW traffic!**


# The Q Menace




# Post-quantum cryptographer?




# Elliptic curves of the world, UNITE!




And so, they found a way around the Q...




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
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# Expander graphs from groups




# Expander graphs from groups



Let  $G = \langle g \rangle$  be a cyclic group of order  $p$ .

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


Let  $G = \langle g \rangle$  be a cyclic group of order  $p$ .

$$\text{--- } x \mapsto x^2$$

$$\text{--- } x \mapsto x^3$$

# Expander graphs from groups




Let  $G = \langle g \rangle$  be a cyclic group of order  $p$ .

$\textcolor{blue}{\rule[0.5ex]{0.8em}{0.8pt}} x \mapsto x^2$

$\textcolor{red}{\rule[0.5ex]{0.8em}{0.8pt}} x \mapsto x^3$

$\textcolor{green}{\rule[0.5ex]{0.8em}{0.8pt}} x \mapsto x^5$

# Expander graphs from groups



Let  $G = \langle g \rangle$  be a cyclic group of order  $p$ . Let  $S \subset (\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z})^\times$  s.t.  $S^{-1} \subset S$ .

The Schreier graph of  $(S, G \setminus \{1\})$  is (usually) an expander.

—  $x \mapsto x^2$


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
# Key exchange from Schreier graphs

## Public parameters:

- A group  $G = \langle g \rangle$  of order  $p$ ;
- A subset  $S \subset (\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z})^\times$ .



# Key exchange from Schreier graphs




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- ➊ **Alice** takes a **secret** random walk  $s_A : g \rightarrow g_A$  of length  $O(\log p)$ ;


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
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  - ➌ They publish  $g_A$  and  $g_B$ ;


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  - ➍ **Alice** repeats her secret walk  $s_A$  starting from  $g_B$ .


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  - ➎ **Bob** repeats his secret walk  $s_B$  starting from  $g_A$ .

# Key exchange from Schreier graphs



**Why does this work?**


$$g_A = g^{2 \cdot 3 \cdot 2 \cdot 5},$$

$$g_B = g^{3^2 \cdot 5 \cdot 2},$$

$$g_{BA} = g_{AB} = g^{2^3 \cdot 3^3 \cdot 5^2};$$

and  $g_A, g_B, g_{AB}$  are uniformly distributed in  $G$ ...

# Key exchange from Schreier graphs



Why does this work?

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
...Indeed, this is just a twisted presentation of the **classical Diffie-Hellman protocol!**

# Key exchange in graphs of ordinary isogenies<sup>4</sup> (CRS)

Parameters:

- $E/\mathbb{F}_p$  ordinary elliptic curve, with Frobenius endomorphism  $\pi \in \mathcal{O}$ .
- (small) primes  $\ell_1, \ell_2, \dots$  such that  $\left(\frac{D_\pi}{\ell_i}\right) = 1$ .
- elements  $f_1 = (\ell_1, \pi - \lambda_1), f_2 = (\ell_2, \pi - \lambda_2), \dots$  in  $\text{Cl}(\mathcal{O})$ .

Secret data: Random walks  $a, b \in \text{Cl}(\mathcal{O})$  in the isogeny graph.



<sup>4</sup>Couveignes 2006; Rostovtsev and Stolbunov 2006.

# Computing the action of $\text{Cl}(\mathcal{O})$

**Input:** An ideal class  $\mathfrak{a} = \mathfrak{f}_1^{a_1} \mathfrak{f}_2^{a_2} \cdots$ .

**Output:** The elliptic curve  $\mathfrak{a} * E$ .

**Algorithm:** Let  $\mathfrak{f}^n = (\ell, \pi - \lambda)^n$ , repeat  $n$  times:

- Use **Elkies' algorithm** to find all (two) curves isogenous to  $E$  of degree  $\ell$ ,
- Choose the one such that  $\ker \phi \subset \ker(\pi - \lambda)$ .

## Parameters size / performance

**Adversary goal:** Given  $E, \mathfrak{a} * E$ , find  $\mathfrak{a}$ ;

**Graph size:**  $\# \text{Cl}(\mathcal{O}) \approx \sqrt{p}$ ;

**Best (classical) attack:** Meet-in-the-middle / Random-walk in  $\sqrt{\# \text{Cl}(\mathcal{O})}$ ;

For  $2^{128}$  security: choose  $\log p \sim 512$ ;

**Time to evaluate the isogeny action<sup>a</sup>:** Dozens of minutes!

---

<sup>a</sup>De Feo, Kieffer, and Smith 2018.

# Vélu to the rescue?

**Input:** An ideal class  $\alpha = f_1^{a_1} f_2^{a_2} \cdots$ .

**Output:** The elliptic curve  $\alpha * E$ .

**Algorithm:** Let  $f^n = (\ell, \pi - \lambda)^n$ . Why not:

- Presciently find  $H = E[\ell] \cap \ker(\pi - \lambda)$ ,
- Apply Vélu's formulas to  $H$ .

## Speeding up the class group action

**Problem:**  $H$  must be in  $E(\mathbb{F}_p)$  for Vélu's formulas to be efficient.

**Idea<sup>a</sup>:** Force  $\begin{cases} p = -1 \pmod{\ell}, \\ \lambda = 1 \pmod{\ell}, \end{cases}$

so that  $E[\ell] = H \subset E(\mathbb{F}_p)$ .

---

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**How to waste an internship:** Forcing  $\lambda = 1$  = Forcing  $\#E = \text{Very hard!}$

---

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## Speeding up the class group action

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**Idea<sup>a</sup>:** Force  $\begin{cases} p \equiv -1 \pmod{\ell}, \\ \lambda \equiv 1 \pmod{\ell}, \end{cases}$   
so that  $E[\ell] = H \subset E(\mathbb{F}_p)$ .

**How to waste an internship:** Forcing  $\lambda = 1$  = Forcing  $\#E = \text{Very hard!}$

**Time to evaluate the isogeny action:** Still 5 minutes!

---

<sup>a</sup>De Feo, Kieffer, and Smith 2018.

# Supersingular to the rescue!

For all supersingular curves defined over  $\mathbb{F}_p$ ,

$$\pi = \begin{pmatrix} \sqrt{-p} & 0 \\ 0 & -\sqrt{-p} \end{pmatrix} \pmod{\ell}$$

CSIDH (*pron.*: Seaside)

Choose  $p = -1 \pmod{\ell}$  for many primes  $\ell$ ;

Hence,  $\lambda = 1 \pmod{\ell}$ . Win!

Performance: Same security as CRS in less than 50ms!<sup>a</sup>

---

<sup>a</sup>Castryck, Lange, Martindale, Panny, and Renes 2018.

# Quantum security

**Fact:** Shor's algorithm [does not apply](#) to Diffie-Hellman protocols from group actions.

## Subexponential attack

$$\exp(\sqrt{\log p \log \log p})$$

- Reduction to the [hidden shift problem](#) by evaluating the class group action in [quantum supersposition](#)<sup>a</sup> (subexponential cost);
- Well known reduction from the hidden shift to the [dihedral \(non-abelian\) hidden subgroup problem](#);
- Kuperberg's algorithm<sup>b</sup> solves the dHSP with a subexponential number of class group evaluations.
- Recent work<sup>c</sup> suggests that  $2^{64}$ -qbit security is achieved somewhere in  $512 < \log p < 1024$ .

---

<sup>a</sup>Childs, Jao, and Soukharev 2014.

<sup>b</sup>Kuperberg 2005; Regev 2004; Kuperberg 2013.

<sup>c</sup>Bonnetain and Naya-Plasencia 2018; Bonnetain and Schrottenloher 2018; Biasse, Jacobson Jr, and Iezzi 2018.

# Key exchange with supersingular curves (2011)

Good news: there is no action of a commutative class group.

Bad news: there is no action of a commutative class group.

Idea: Let Alice and Bob walk in two different isogeny graphs on the same vertex set.




Figure: 2- and 3-isogeny graphs on  $\mathbb{F}_{97^2}$ .

# Key exchange with supersingular curves (2011)

Good news: there is no action of a commutative class group.

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


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


Figure: 2- and 3-isogeny graphs on  $\mathbb{F}_{97^2}$ .

# Key exchange with supersingular curves (2011)

- Fix small primes  $\ell_A$ ,  $\ell_B$ ;
- No canonical labeling of the  $\ell_A$ - and  $\ell_B$ -isogeny graphs; however...

**Walk of length  $e_A$**

=

**Isogeny of degree  $\ell_A^{e_A}$**

=


**Kernel  $\langle P \rangle \subset E[\ell_A^{e_A}]$**

$$\ker \phi = \langle P \rangle \subset E[\ell_A^{e_A}]$$

$$\ker \psi = \langle Q \rangle \subset E[\ell_B^{e_B}]$$

$$\ker \phi' = \langle \psi(P) \rangle$$

$$\ker \psi' = \langle \phi(Q) \rangle$$




# Supersingular Isogeny Diffie-Hellman<sup>5</sup>

Parameters:

- Prime  $p$  such that  $p + 1 = \ell_A^a \ell_B^b$ ;
- Supersingular curve  $E \simeq (\mathbb{Z}/(p+1)\mathbb{Z})^2$ ;
- $E[\ell_A^a] = \langle P_A, Q_A \rangle$ ;
- $E[\ell_B^b] = \langle P_B, Q_B \rangle$ .

Secret data:

- $R_A = m_A P_A + n_A Q_A$ ,
- $R_B = m_B P_B + n_B Q_B$ ,



<sup>5</sup>Jao and De Feo 2011; De Feo, Jao, and Plût 2014.


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
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# From 10 minutes to 10ms in 20 years


Couveignes' key exchange



# From 10 minutes to 10ms in 20 years



# From 10 minutes to 10ms in 20 years



# From 10 minutes to 10ms in 20 years

D., Jao and Plût's SIDH (50ms)


Jao and D.'s SIDH (500ms)

Rostovstev & Stolbunov (> 5 min)

Couveignes' key exchange




# From 10 minutes to 10ms in 20 years



# From 10 minutes to 10ms in 20 years



# From 10 minutes to 10ms in 20 years



# Open problems

- Precisely assess the quantum security of CRS/CSIDH.
- Give a convincing constant-time implementation of CSIDH.
- Find an efficient post-quantum isogeny-based signature scheme.
- Sample supersingular curves without revealing endomorphism rings.
- Compute endomorphism rings of supersingular curves.



# Thank you

<https://defeo.lu/>

 @luca\_defeo

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