
Autofarm.network V2

Security Code Review

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Overview

Project Summary

Project Name	Autofarm
Description	
Platform	Binance Smart Chain, Solidity
Contracts	https://github.com/autofarm-network/autofarmV2
	commit ad26111fb74b3c63e5af463d766cf2aafa8471c4

Executive Summary

Binance Smart Chain contracts were provided.

We have run extensive static analysis of the codebase as well as standard security assessment utilising industry approved tools.

There were some recommendations being issued regarding some parts of the system. They were fixed by the team and verified.

Disclaimer: The analysis did not include any tokenomics analysis (e.g. APY rates etc).


Architecture & Standards

Please find below the calling architecture of the reviewed contracts.


AutoFarmV2:



StratX (first strategy)



StratVLEV



AUTOToken contract is fully BIP20 compatible.

```
# Check AUTOToken

## Check functions
[✓] totalSupply() is present
    [✓] totalSupply() -> () (correct return value)
    [✓] totalSupply() is view
[✓] balanceOf(address) is present
    [✓] balanceOf(address) -> () (correct return value)
    [✓] balanceOf(address) is view
[✓] transfer(address,uint256) is present
    [✓] transfer(address,uint256) -> () (correct return value)
    [✓] Transfer(address,address,uint256) is emitted
[✓] transferFrom(address,address,uint256) is present
    [✓] transferFrom(address,address,uint256) -> () (correct return value)
    [✓] Transfer(address,address,uint256) is emitted
[✓] approve(address,uint256) is present
    [✓] approve(address,uint256) -> () (correct return value)
    [✓] Approval(address,address,uint256) is emitted
[✓] allowance(address,address) is present
    [✓] allowance(address,address) -> () (correct return value)
    [✓] allowance(address,address) is view
[✓] name() is present
    [✓] name() -> () (correct return value)
    [✓] name() is view
[✓] symbol() is present
    [✓] symbol() -> () (correct return value)
    [✓] symbol() is view
[✓] decimals() is present
    [✓] decimals() -> () (correct return value)
    [✓] decimals() is view

## Check events
[✓] Transfer(address,address,uint256) is present
    [✓] parameter 0 is indexed
    [✓] parameter 1 is indexed
[✓] Approval(address,address,uint256) is present
    [✓] parameter 0 is indexed
    [✓] parameter 1 is indexed

[✓] AUTOToken has increaseAllowance(address,uint256)
```

Findings

Number of contracts: 13+15+11 (including inherited ones)

Use: SafeMath

Name	# functions	ERCS	ERC20 info	Complex code	Features
SafeMath	8			No	
Address	11			No	Send ETH Delegatecall Assembly
SafeERC20	6			No	Send ETH
EnumerableSet	20			No	Tokens interaction
AUTOToken	27	ERC20	✉ Minting Approve Race Cond.	No	
IStrategy	6			No	
AutoFarmV2	22			No	Send ETH Tokens interaction

AUTOToken has minting capabilities, however the owner is moved to AutoFarm contract so it **does not** possesses any risks. See [Deployment section](#) for more details.

Name	# functions	ERCS	ERC20 info	Complex code	Features
SafeMath	8			No	
ERC20	26	ERC20	No Minting Approve Race Cond.	No	
Address	11			No	Send ETH Delegatecall Assembly
SafeERC20	6			No	Send ETH
IPancakeRouter02	3			No	Tokens interaction
IVenusDistribution	5			No	
IWBNB	8	ERC20	No Minting Approve Race Cond.	No	Receive ETH
IVBNB	7			No	Receive ETH
IVToken	14	ERC20	✉ Minting Approve Race Cond.	No	Receive ETH
StratVLEV	43			No	Receive ETH Send ETH Tokens interaction

Name	# functions	ERC20	ERC20 info	Complex code	Features
SafeMath ERC20	8 26	ERC20	No Minting Approve Race Cond.	No No	
Address	11			No	Send ETH Delegatecall
SafeERC20	6			No	Assembly Send ETH
EnumerableSet	20			No	Tokens interaction
IPancakeswapFarm	9			No	
IPancakeRouter02	24			No	Receive ETH
StratX	28			Yes	Send ETH Tokens interaction

Static Analysis Findings

High issues:

Possible re-entrancy: [FIXED]

```
Reentrancy in StratVLEV.farm(bool) (StratVLEV.sol#1546-1557):
  External calls:
    - _unwrapBNB() (StratVLEV.sol#1548)
      - IWBNB(wbnbAddress).withdraw(wbnbBal) (StratVLEV.sol#1882)
    - _leverage(address(this).balance,_withLev) (StratVLEV.sol#1549)
      - IVToken(vTokenAddress).borrow(_amount) (StratVLEV.sol#1505)
      - IVBNB(vTokenAddress).mint{value: _amount}() (StratVLEV.sol#1494)
      - IVToken(vTokenAddress).mint(_amount) (StratVLEV.sol#1496)
    - _leverage(wantLockedInHere(),_withLev) (StratVLEV.sol#1551)
      - IVToken(vTokenAddress).borrow(_amount) (StratVLEV.sol#1505)
      - IVBNB(vTokenAddress).mint{value: _amount}() (StratVLEV.sol#1494)
      - IVToken(vTokenAddress).mint(_amount) (StratVLEV.sol#1496)
    - updateBalance() (StratVLEV.sol#1554)
      - supplyBal = IVToken(vTokenAddress).balanceOfUnderlying(address(this)) (StratVLEV.sol#1809)
      - borrowBal = IVToken(vTokenAddress).borrowBalanceCurrent(address(this)) (StratVLEV.sol#1810)
    - deleverageUntilNotOverLevered() (StratVLEV.sol#1556)
      - supplyBal = IVToken(vTokenAddress).balanceOfUnderlying(address(this)) (StratVLEV.sol#1809)
      - IVToken(vTokenAddress).redeemUnderlying(_amount) (StratVLEV.sol#1501)
      - borrowBal = IVToken(vTokenAddress).borrowBalanceCurrent(address(this)) (StratVLEV.sol#1810)
      - IVBNB(vTokenAddress).repayBorrow{value: _amount}() (StratVLEV.sol#1510)
      - IVToken(vTokenAddress).repayBorrow(_amount) (StratVLEV.sol#1512)
      - IWBNB(wbnbAddress).withdraw(wbnbBal) (StratVLEV.sol#1882)
  External calls sending eth:
    - _leverage(address(this).balance,_withLev) (StratVLEV.sol#1549)
      - IVBNB(vTokenAddress).mint{value: _amount}() (StratVLEV.sol#1494)
    - _leverage(wantLockedInHere(),_withLev) (StratVLEV.sol#1551)
      - IVBNB(vTokenAddress).mint{value: _amount}() (StratVLEV.sol#1494)
    - deleverageUntilNotOverLevered() (StratVLEV.sol#1556)
      - IVBNB(vTokenAddress).repayBorrow{value: _amount}() (StratVLEV.sol#1510)
  State variables written after the call(s):
    - deleverageUntilNotOverLevered() (StratVLEV.sol#1556)
      - borrowBal = IVToken(vTokenAddress).borrowBalanceCurrent(address(this)) (StratVLEV.sol#1810)

Reentrancy in StratVLEV.withdraw(address,uint256) (StratVLEV.sol#1743-1773):
  External calls:
    - _deleverage(true,_wantAmt.sub(wantBal)) (StratVLEV.sol#1757)
      - supplyBal = IVToken(vTokenAddress).balanceOfUnderlying(address(this)) (StratVLEV.sol#1809)
      - IVToken(vTokenAddress).redeemUnderlying(_amount) (StratVLEV.sol#1501)
      - IVBNB(vTokenAddress).repayBorrow{value: _amount}() (StratVLEV.sol#1510)
      - borrowBal = IVToken(vTokenAddress).borrowBalanceCurrent(address(this)) (StratVLEV.sol#1810)
      - IVToken(vTokenAddress).repayBorrow(_amount) (StratVLEV.sol#1512)
      - IWBNB(wbnbAddress).withdraw(wbnbBal) (StratVLEV.sol#1882)
      - IWBNB(wbnbAddress).deposit{value: bnbBal}() (StratVLEV.sol#1874)
      - IVToken(vTokenAddress).redeem(wTokenBal) (StratVLEV.sol#1661)
    - _wrapBNB() (StratVLEV.sol#1759)
      - IWBNB(wbnbAddress).deposit{value: bnbBal}() (StratVLEV.sol#1874)
    - IERC20(wantAddress).safeTransfer(autoFarmAddress,_wantAmt) (StratVLEV.sol#1768)
    - farm(true) (StratVLEV.sol#1778)
      - IVToken(vTokenAddress).borrow(_amount) (StratVLEV.sol#1505)
      - supplyBal = IVToken(vTokenAddress).balanceOfUnderlying(address(this)) (StratVLEV.sol#1809)
      - IVToken(vTokenAddress).redeemUnderlying(_amount) (StratVLEV.sol#1501)
      - borrowBal = IVToken(vTokenAddress).borrowBalanceCurrent(address(this)) (StratVLEV.sol#1810)
      - IVBNB(vTokenAddress).mint{value: _amount}() (StratVLEV.sol#1494)
      - IVBNB(vTokenAddress).repayBorrow{value: _amount}() (StratVLEV.sol#1510)
      - IVToken(vTokenAddress).repayBorrow(_amount) (StratVLEV.sol#1512)
      - IWBNB(wbnbAddress).withdraw(wbnbBal) (StratVLEV.sol#1882)
      - IVToken(vTokenAddress).mint(_amount) (StratVLEV.sol#1496)
    External calls sending eth:
      - _deleverage(true,_wantAmt.sub(wantBal)) (StratVLEV.sol#1757)
        - IVBNB(vTokenAddress).repayBorrow{value: _amount}() (StratVLEV.sol#1510)
        - IWBNB(wbnbAddress).deposit{value: bnbBal}() (StratVLEV.sol#1874)
      - _wrapBNB() (StratVLEV.sol#1759)
        - IWBNB(wbnbAddress).deposit{value: bnbBal}() (StratVLEV.sol#1874)
    - farm(true) (StratVLEV.sol#1778)
      - IVBNB(vTokenAddress).mint{value: _amount}() (StratVLEV.sol#1494)
      - IVBNB(vTokenAddress).repayBorrow{value: _amount}() (StratVLEV.sol#1510)
  State variables written after the call(s):
    - farm(true) (StratVLEV.sol#1778)
      - borrowBal = IVToken(vTokenAddress).borrowBalanceCurrent(address(this)) (StratVLEV.sol#1810)
    - farm(true) (StratVLEV.sol#1778)
      - supplyBal = IVToken(vTokenAddress).balanceOfUnderlying(address(this)) (StratVLEV.sol#1809)
    - farm(true) (StratVLEV.sol#1778)
      - supplyBalMin = borrowBal.mul(1000).div(BORROW_RATE_MAX_HARD) (StratVLEV.sol#1812)
    - farm(true) (StratVLEV.sol#1778)
      - supplyBalTargeted = borrowBal.mul(1000).div(borrowRate) (StratVLEV.sol#1811)
```

The recommendation is to use the *check-effects-interactions* pattern or use nonReentrant modifier (<https://docs.openzeppelin.com/contracts/2.x/api/utils#ReentrancyGuard-nonReentrant-->)

Medium issues:

Divide before multiply:

```
AutoFarmV2.pendingAUTO(uint256,address) (AutoFarmV2.sol#1486-1507) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:  
-AUTOReward = multiplier.mul(AUTOPerBlock).mul(pool.allocPoint).div(totalAllocPoint) (AutoFarmV2.sol#1498-1501)  
-accAUTOPerShare = accAUTOPerShare.add(AUTOReward.mul(1e12).div(sharesTotal)) (AutoFarmV2.sol#1502-1504)  
AutoFarmV2.updatePool(uint256) (AutoFarmV2.sol#1536-1562) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:  
-AUTOReward = multiplier.mul(AUTOPerBlock).mul(pool.allocPoint).div(totalAllocPoint) (AutoFarmV2.sol#1547-1550)  
-AUTOToken(AUTOv2).mint(owner(),AUTOReward.mul(ownerAUTOReward).div(1000)) (AutoFarmV2.sol#1552-1555)  
AutoFarmV2.updatePool(uint256) (AutoFarmV2.sol#1536-1562) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:  
-AUTOReward = multiplier.mul(AUTOPerBlock).mul(pool.allocPoint).div(totalAllocPoint) (AutoFarmV2.sol#1547-1550)  
-pool.accAUTOPerShare = pool.accAUTOPerShare.add(AUTOReward.mul(1e12).div(sharesTotal)) (AutoFarmV2.sol#1558-1560)
```

Solidity integer division might truncate. It may happen that performing multiplication before division might reduce precision.

[Recommendation] All those operation have to be carefully analysed for any precision reduction based on the code business logic. **Not a significant risk.**

Possible re-entrancy:

```
Reentrancy in AutoFarmV2.deposit(uint256,uint256) (AutoFarmV2.sol#1565-1593):  
    External calls:  
        - updatePool(_pid) (AutoFarmV2.sol#1566)  
            - AUTOToken(AUTOv2).mint(owner(),AUTOReward.mul(ownerAUTOReward).div(1000)) (AutoFarmV2.sol#1552-1555)  
            - AUTOToken(AUTOv2).mint(address(this),AUTOReward) (AutoFarmV2.sol#1556)  
        - safeAUTOTransfer(msg.sender,pending) (AutoFarmV2.sol#1576)  
            - IERC20(AUTOv2).transfer(_to,AUTOBal) (AutoFarmV2.sol#1669)  
            - IERC20(AUTOv2).transfer(_to,_AUTOAmt) (AutoFarmV2.sol#1671)  
    - pool.want.safeTransferFrom(address(msg.sender),address(this),_wantAmt) (AutoFarmV2.sol#1580-1584)  
    - pool.want.safeIncreaseAllowance(pool.strat,_wantAmt) (AutoFarmV2.sol#1586)  
    - sharesAdded = IStrategy(poolInfo[_pid].strat).deposit(msg.sender,_wantAmt) (AutoFarmV2.sol#1587-1588)  
    State variables written after the call(s):  
        - user.shares = user.shares.add(sharesAdded) (AutoFarmV2.sol#1589)  
        - user.rewardDebt = user.shares.mul(pool.accAUTOPerShare).div(1e12) (AutoFarmV2.sol#1591)  
Reentrancy in AutoFarmV2.emergencyWithdraw(uint256) (AutoFarmV2.sol#1648-1663):  
    External calls:  
        - IStrategy(poolInfo[_pid].strat).withdraw(msg.sender,amount) (AutoFarmV2.sol#1657)  
        - pool.want.safeTransfer(address(msg.sender),amount) (AutoFarmV2.sol#1659)  
    State variables written after the call(s):  
        - user.shares = 0 (AutoFarmV2.sol#1661)  
        - user.rewardDebt = 0 (AutoFarmV2.sol#1662)
```

```
Reentrancy in AutoFarmV2.withdraw(uint256,uint256) (AutoFarmV2.sol#1596-1641):  
    External calls:  
        - updatePool(_pid) (AutoFarmV2.sol#1597)  
            - AUTOToken(AUTOv2).mint(owner(),AUTOReward.mul(ownerAUTOReward).div(1000)) (AutoFarmV2.sol#1552-1555)  
            - AUTOToken(AUTOv2).mint(address(this),AUTOReward) (AutoFarmV2.sol#1556)  
        - safeAUTOTransfer(msg.sender,pending) (AutoFarmV2.sol#1615)  
            - IERC20(AUTOv2).transfer(_to,AUTOBal) (AutoFarmV2.sol#1669)  
            - IERC20(AUTOv2).transfer(_to,_AUTOAmt) (AutoFarmV2.sol#1671)  
    - sharesRemoved = IStrategy(poolInfo[_pid].strat).withdraw(msg.sender,_wantAmt) (AutoFarmV2.sol#1624-1625)  
    State variables written after the call(s):  
        - user.shares = 0 (AutoFarmV2.sol#1628)  
        - user.shares = user.shares.sub(sharesRemoved) (AutoFarmV2.sol#1630)
```

The recommendation is to use the *check-effects-interactions* pattern or use nonReentrant modifier (<https://docs.openzeppelin.com/contracts/2.x/api/utils#ReentrancyGuard-nonReentrant-->)

Low/Informational issues:

Different versions of solidity used:

```
Different versions of Solidity is used in :  
- Version used: ['0.6.12', '^0.6.0', '^0.6.12']  
- 0.6.12 (StratVLEV.sol#7)  
- ^0.6.0 (StratVLEV.sol#1309)  
- ^0.6.0 (StratVLEV.sol#1333)  
- ^0.6.12 (StratVLEV.sol#1385)
```

[Recommendation] Stick to one version of Solidity.

Dynamic Tests

We have run fuzzing / property-based testing of Solidity smart contracts. It was using sophisticated grammar-based fuzzing campaigns based on a contract ABI to falsify user-defined predicates or Solidity assertions.

There were also dynamic tests run on EVM byte code to detect common vulnerabilities including integer underflows, owner-overwrite-to-Ether-withdrawal, and others.

```
==== Multiple Calls in a Single Transaction ====
SWC ID: 113
Severity: Low
Contract: AutoFarmV2
Function name: emergencyWithdraw(uint256)
PC address: 5055
Estimated Gas Usage: 27812 - 211453
Multiple calls are executed in the same transaction.
This call is executed following another call within the same transaction. It is possible that the call never gets executed if a prior call fails permanently. This might be caused intentionally by a malicious callee. If possible, refactor the code such that each transaction only executes one external call or make sure that all callees can be trusted (i.e. they're part of your own codebase).
-----
In file: /tmp/AutoFarmV2.sol:1654
IStrategy(poolInfo[_pid].strat).sharesTotal()
```

```
==== External Call To User-Supplied Address ====
SWC ID: 107
Severity: Low
Contract: AutoFarmV2
Function name: emergencyWithdraw(uint256)
PC address: 5336
Estimated Gas Usage: 27812 - 211453
A call to a user-supplied address is executed.
An external message call to an address specified by the caller is executed. Note that the callee account might contain arbitrary code and could re-enter any function within this contract. Reentering the contract in an intermediate state may lead to unexpected behaviour. Make sure that no state modifications are executed after this call and/or reentrancy guards are in place.
-----
In file: /tmp/AutoFarmV2.sol:1657
IStrategy(poolInfo[_pid].strat).withdraw(msg.sender, amount)
```

[Manual Check] IStrategy contract is fully controlled by the codebase, providing proper tests are done it is **NOT an issue**.

```
==== State access after external call ====
SWC ID: 107
Severity: Medium
Contract: AutoFarmV2
Function name: emergencyWithdraw(uint256)
PC address: 5560
Estimated Gas Usage: 27812 - 211453
Write to persistent state following external call
The contract account state is accessed after an external call to a user defined address. To prevent reentrancy issues, consider accessing the state only before the call, especially if the callee is untrusted. Alternatively, a reentrancy lock can be used to prevent untrusted callees from re-entering the contract in an intermediate state.
-----
In file: /tmp/AutoFarmV2.sol:1661
user.shares = 0
```

```
==== State access after external call ====
SWC ID: 107
Severity: Medium
Contract: AutoFarmV2
Function name: emergencyWithdraw(uint256)
PC address: 5578
Estimated Gas Usage: 27812 - 211453
Write to persistent state following external call
The contract account state is accessed after an external call to a user defined address. To prevent reentrancy issues, consider accessing the state only before the call, especially if the callee is untrusted. Alternatively, a reentrancy lock can be used to prevent untrusted callees from re-entering the contract in an intermediate state.
-----
In file: /tmp/AutoFarmV2.sol:1662
user.rewardDebt = 0
```

[Recommendation] It may cause possible re-entrancy attack, use nonReentrant modifier (<https://docs.openzeppelin.com/contracts/2.x/api/utils#ReentrancyGuard-nonReentrant-->) **[FIXED]**

Manual Checks

StratX params:

4. buyBackRate

150 *uint256*

5. buyBackRateMax

10000 *uint256*

6. buyBackRateUL

800 *uint256*

7. controllerFee

20 *uint256*

8. controllerFeeMax

10000 *uint256*

9. controllerFeeUL

300 *uint256*

StratVLEV params:

10. buyBackRate

150 *uint256*

11. buyBackRateMax

10000 *uint256*

12. buyBackRateUL

800 *uint256*

13. controllerFee

60 *uint256*

14. controllerFeeMax

10000 *uint256*

15. controllerFeeUL

300 *uint256*

Automatic Tests

The project lacks any automatic testing and tests scripts. We did not run any functional tests provided by the team, due to lack of such scripts provided. Hence the full business logic functionality was not tested.

[Recommendation]: Create comprehensive test cases and implement them as scripts or mocha tests using the hardhat infrastructure.

[Disclaimer] There were no tests conducted testing full system functionality due to lack of proper test cases and/or test scripts.

Deployment & Contract Ownership

The contracts are currently deployed on BSC Mainnet:

- AUTOv2 - <https://bscscan.com/address/0x12300ea3d3444e9106c65913de24c58462abfe24>
- AutofarmV2 - <https://bscscan.com/address/0xf6c361f82c744881fb58563e6c0563601007cde2>
- TimelockController - <https://bscscan.com/address/0x28579eca0a326e53340edd93e18698d379876a04>
- StratX - <https://bscscan.com/address/0x5f93026bcf9120ccf719882fcde147a52da8ca5c>
- StratVLEV - <https://bscscan.com/address/0x89e1509810378f73b4bc0c1dec87fccaa6fbe9a1>

TimelockController controls multiple functions with significant importance to the overall system. Currently the delay in the time lock is set to 60/30 seconds.

17. minDelay
60 <i>uint256</i>
18. minDelayReduced
30 <i>uint256</i>

Recommendations:

- Deploy a governance on top of the ownership of all contracts.
 - It could be a proper multi-sig controlled setup or full Compound like governance system - <https://medium.com/compound-finance/compound-governance-5531f524cf68>
 - Increase the TimelockController delay to significant value accepted by the project community.

Disclaimer

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