2016

# ZUY

# MICT1 – Exercise Week 4

**Delano Cörvers** 

**Zuyd University** 

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# MICT1 – Exercise Week 4

Reverse Engineering Data – Exercise week 4

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Module MICT1 – Reverse Engineering Data

Assignment Exercise – Week 4

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### 1 What we found

We received a data dump file that was build up out of 162 clusters of 4096 bytes. The total file size is 663,552 bytes.

We were able to recover three image files from the data file, two files are JPEG and one file is a PNG. The two JPEG files are the exact same image with different dimensions. The smaller image is the thumbnail for the larger image and is in fact embedded in the large image. This means that there is actually one file. The JPEG file uses the JFIF encoding and was created, edited or used by Adobe Photoshop (CC) as it contained a lot of metadata. The JPEG file had a total size of 646,929 bytes (including the thumbnail).

00002000	ff	d8	ff	e0	00	10	4a	46	49	46	00	01	01	01	00	48	ÿ⊘ÿàJFIFH
00002010	00	48	00	00	ff	ed	1b	04	50	68	6f	74	6f	73	68	6f	.HÿíPhotosho
00002020	70	20	33	2e	30	00	38	42	49	4d	04	04	00	00	00	00	p 3.0.8BIM
00002030	00	27	1c	01	5a	00	03	1b	25	47	1c	01	5a	00	03	1b	.'Z%GZ
00002040	25	47	1c	01	5a	00	03	1b	25	47	1c	01	5a	00	03	1b	%GZ%GZ
00002050	25	47	1c	02	00	00	02	7f	fc	00	38	42	49	4d	04	25	%G[ü.8BIM.%
00002060	00	00	00	00	00	10	b1	87	fa	ac	37	cf	bd	5e	74	9e	±‡ú⊣7Ͼ^tž

Figure 1: The header of actual JPEG image file.

```
00002952
                                                                     .. 🗸 🗸 Öÿí. . Adobe CM
           00 01
                         ff ed 00 0c
                                        41 64 6f 62
                                                      65 5f 43 4d
00002960
                                                                     ..ÿî..Adobe.d€..
                         00 0e
                                41 64
                                        6f 62 65 00
                                                      64 80 00 00
                                                                     ..ÿÛ.".....
00002970
                                                      08 Oc 09 09
           00 01 ff db
                         00 84 00 Oc
                                        08 08 08 09
00002980
           0c 11 0b 0a
                         0b 11 15 0f
                                      0c 0c 0f 15
                                                      18 13 13 15
                                                                     . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
00002990
           13 13 18 11
                         0c 0c 0c 0c 0c 0c 11 0c
                                                      0c 0c 0c 0c
                                                                     . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
000029a0 0c 0c 0c 0c
                         0.00 0c 0c 0c 0c 0c 0c 0c 0c 0c
```

Figure 2: The header of the thumbnail, located inside the actual JPEG.

The next two screenshots will show part of the discovered metadata and print –info and style from the JPEG image file.

Delano Cörvers

	000020a0	00	00	00	50	73	74	53	62	6f	6f	6с	01	00	00	00	00	PstSbool
ı	000020b0	49	6e	74	65	65	6e	75	6d	00	00	00	00	49	6e	74	65	InteenumInte
ı	000020c0	00	00	00	00	43	6с	72	6d	00	00	00	0f	70	72	69	6e	Clrmprin
ı	000020d0	74	53	69	78	74	65	65	6e	42	69	74	62	6f	6f	6с	00	tSixteenBitbool.
ı	000020e0	00	00	00	0b	70	72	69	6e	74	65	72	4e	61	6d	65	54	printerNameT
ı	000020f0	45	58	54	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	0f	70	72	69	EXTpri
ı	00002100	6e	74	50	72	6f	6f	66	53	65	74	75	70	4f	62	6a	63	ntProofSetupObjc
ı	00002110	00	00	00	0с	00	50	00	72	00	6f	00	6f	00	66	00	20	P.r.o.o.f.
ı	00002120	00	53	00	65	00	74	00	75	00	70	00	00	00	00	00	0a	.S.e.t.u.p
ı	00002130	70	72	6f	6f	66	53	65	74	75	70	00	00	00	01	00	00	proofSetup
ı	00002140	00	00	42	6с	74	6e	65	6e	75	6d	00	00	00	0с	62	75	Bltnenumbu
ı	00002150	69	6c	74	69	6e	50	72	6f	6f	66	00	00	00	09	70	72	iltinProofpr
ı	00002160	6f	6f	66	43	4d	59	4b	00	38	42	49	4d	04	3b	00	00	oofCMYK.8BIM.;
ı	00002170	00	00	02	2d	00	00	00	10	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	
ı	00002180	00	12	70	72	69	6e	74	4f	75	74	70	75	74	4f	70	74	printOutputOpt
ı	00002190	69	6f	6e	73	00	00	00	17	00	00	00	00	43	70	74	6e	ionsCptr
ı	000021a0	62	6f	6f	6с	00	00	00	00	00	43	6с	62	72	62	6f	6f	ooolClbrboc
ı	000021b0	6с	00	00	00	00	00	52	67	73	4d	62	6f	6f	6с	00	00	lRgsMbool
ı	000021c0	00	00	00	43	72	6e	43	62	6f	6f	6с	00	00	00	00	00	CrnCbool
ı	000021d0	43	6e	74	43	62	6f	6f	6с	00	00	00	00	00	4c	62	6с	CntCboolLbl
ı	000021e0	73	62	6f	6f	6с	00	00	00	00	00	4e	67	74	76	62	6f	₃boolNgtvbc
	000021f0	6f	6с	00	00	00	00	00	45	6d	6с	44	62	6f	6f	6с	00	olEmlDbool.
	00002200	00	00	00	00	49	6e	74	72	62	6f	6f	6с	00	00	00	00	Intrbool
	00002210	00	42	63	6b	67	4f	62	6a	63	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	.BckgObjc

Figure 3: JPEG Image print info.

00005ac0	22	3e	20	3с	72	64	66	3a	52	44	46	20	78	6d	6с	6e	"> <rdf:rdf td="" xmln<=""></rdf:rdf>
\$0005ad0	73	3a	72	64	66	3d	22	68	74	74	70	3a	2f	2f	77	77	s:rdf="http://ww
00005ae0	77	2e	77	33	2e	6f	72	67	2f	31	39	39	39	2f	30	32	w.w3.org/1999/02
00005af0	2f	32	32	2d	72	64	66	2d	73	79	6e	74	61	78	2d	6e	/22-rdf-syntax-n
00005b00	73	23	22	3e	20	3с	72	64	66	3a	44	65	73	63	72	69	s#"> <rdf:descri< td=""></rdf:descri<>
00005b10	70	74	69	6f	6e	20	72	64	66	3a	61	62	6f	75	74	3d	ption rdf:about=
00005b20	22	22	20	78	6d	6с	6e	73	3a	78	6d	70	3d	22	68	74	"" xmlns:xmp="ht
00005b30	74	70	3a	2f	2f	6e	73	2e	61	64	6f	62	65	2e	63	6f	tp://ns.adobe.co
00005b40	6d	2f	78	61	70	2f	31	2e	30	2f	22	20	78	6d	6с	6e	m/xap/1.0/" xmln
00005b50	73	3a	64	63	3d	22	68	74	74	70	3a	2f	2f	70	75	72	s:dc="http://pur
00005b60	6с	2e	6f	72	67	2f	64	63	2f	65	6c	65	6d	65	6e	74	l.org/dc/element
00005b70	73	2f	31	2e	31	2f	22	20	78	6d	6с	6е	73	3a	70	68	s/1.1/" xmlns:ph
00005b80	6f	74	6f	73	68	6f	70	3d	22	68	74	74	70	3a	2f	2f	otoshop="http://
00005b90	6е	73	2e	61	64	6f	62	65	2e	63	6f	6d	2f	70	68	6f	ns.adobe.com/phc
00005ba0	74	6f	73	68	6f	70	2f	31	2e	30	2f	22	20	78	6d	6с	toshop/1.0/" xml
00005bb0	6e	73	3a	78	6d	70	4d	4d	3d	22	68	74	74	70	3a	2f	ns:xmpMM="http:/
00005bc0	2f	6e	73	2e	61	64	6f	62	65	2e	63	6f	6d	2f	78	61	/ns.adobe.com/xa
00005bd0	70	2f	31	2e	30	2f	6d	6d	2f	22	20	78	6d	6с	6e	73	p/1.0/mm/" xmlns
00005be0	3а	73	74	45	76	74	3d	22	68	74	74	70	3a	2f	2f	6е	:stEvt="http://n
00005bf0	73	2e	61	64	6f	62	65	2e	63	6f	6d	2f	78	61	70	2f	s.adobe.com/xap/
00005c00	31	2e	30	2f	73	54	79	70	65	2f	52	65	73	6f	75	72	1.0/sType/Resour

Figure 4: JPEG Image metadata

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The discovered PNG file is one by one pixels large, so the image is not usable (as there is nothing to see).

In the provided file we also found a GIF file and another PNG file. These files were not recoverable. The GIF file had valid magic numbers and trailer, but had no information in between. The PNG also had a header and trailer, but had no data blocks.

If we take a look at the remaining file size of the provided file when we exclude the useable JPEG image, we can conclude that 16,623 bytes of the file is not useable.



Figure 5: The recovered JPEG (JFIF) image file



Figure 6: The recovered thumbnail (located inside the JPEG Image).

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## 2 Where we found it

In this chapter the locations and spans of each file we discovered are noted.

Block	Start	End	Start cluster (4096 KiB)	Ending cluster (4096 KiB)
JFIF	0x00002000 (8,192)	0x0009ff10 (655,120)	3	159
Thumbnail	0x00002952 (10,578)	0x00003a9b (15,003)	3	4
Incomplete GIF	0x0009ff11 (655,121)	0x0009ff35 (655,157)	159	159
PNG (0 frames)	0x000a0000 (655,360)	0x000a0043 (655,427)	160	160
Left-over-data 1	0x00000000 (0)	0x00001fff (8,191)	1	2
Left over-data 2	0x000a0044 (655,428)	0x000a1fff (663,551)	160	162

Figure 7: The locations and spans of each file we discovered.

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### 3 How we found it

We opened the file with Hex Editor Neo to figure out if we could find a structure in the file. While scrolling through, we noticed a few image file headers (JFIF/JPEG, PNG and GIF). At first, we thought it would be easier to work with the file if we split the provided data into smaller files that were the size of each cluster. To split the file in clusters we wrote a small Python script that would do this for us.

```
from os <mark>import</mark> getcwd
def cluster_splitter(cluster_size=4096):
    file_path = getcwd() + r"\files\data"
   with open(file_path, "rb") as f:
def create_cluster_file(array, counter):
   file_path = getcwd() + r"\files\clusters\cluster_"
   with open(file_path + str(counter), "wb") as f:
def main():
   print "The tool has started...\n"
```

Figure 8: Screenshot of the Python script

After having created and used the tool, we started to think about extracting usable files or parts of file from the data. We realized that we didn't actually had to split the files, although it made manually checking the files easier.

With the use of a File Carver, QPhotoRec, we pulled out the image files that we had previously detected manually. QPhotoRec is able to scan drives or image files. Since we had neither, we made a copy of the original data file and added the .img (image) extension to it. This way we were able to open the data using the File Carver.

The File Carver recovered three images, two JPEG files and one PNG file. As said previously in chapter 1 "What we found", the PNG file was not usable and the two JPEG files are in fact one with the smaller file being the thumbnail for the actual image.




Figure 9: QPhotoRec - Select the data (image file) and the final results.

It is possible to do this task without the use of a File Carver. The File Carver checks for the headers or magic numbers of certain files and then proceeds to find a trailer for that file. It also checks for mandatory blocks to make sure it is a valid file type. Manually you would use a hex value search to find the start of a block using the magic numbers for various image files. As we already found some files ourselves when we opened the file (JFIF, PNG and GIF) it would make sense to look for these magic numbers and then proceed to find the ending signature. When you would find these you can extract the image and test it.

After we recovered the image files, it seemed like there was a lot of random data inside the images. We figured this was left over data from other files. To confirm our thoughts we used Jeffrey's Exif Viewer (<a href="http://regex.info/exif.cgi">http://regex.info/exif.cgi</a>). This is how we actually found out about the metadata in the JPEG image which was most likely added to the file by Adobe Photoshop. This gives us reason to believe the image file was created or, more likely, modified using Adobe Photoshop CC.

### Jeffrey's Exif Viewer



Here's the full data:

### XMP

XMP Toolkit	Adobe XMP Core 5.5-c021 79.155772, 2014/01/13-19:44:00
Creator Tool	Adobe Photoshop CS6 (Windows)
Create Date	2015:07:22 15:10:29+02:00 7 months, 16 days, 21 hours, 2 minutes, 54 seconds ago
Modify Date	2016;01:13 12:07:13-08:00 1 month, 25 days, 15 hours, 6 minutes, 10 seconds ago
Metadata Date	2016:01:13 12:07:13-08:00 1 month, 25 days, 15 hours, 6 minutes, 10 seconds ago
Format	image/jpeg
Color Mode	RGB
ICC Profile Name	sRGB IEC61966-2.1
Instance ID	xmp.iid:45c7f710-9e41-40bb-8d80-6783e4e4cd4d

Figure 10: Screenshot of Jeffrey's Exif Viewer