# Online Appendix

| Session Type | DG 1 period | BF 10 periods | DG 1 period | # Sessions | Total Indiv Obs | Participants per session | Total Part. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Main Treatment | – | BF + Soc. Id. | £3 | 10 | 30 | 18 | 180 |
| Baseline | – | BF | £3 | 4 | 12 | 18 | 72 |
| Total | | | | 16 | 47 | | 282 |

**Table A.1:** Summary of experimental sessions: In the 'Main Treatment' participants played the BF game and were provided information on the gender, race and ideological position of the other players. In the 'Baseline' sessions participants played the BF game without receiving any information about the other players.

| | Black | Latin American South Asian | White |
|---|---|---|---|
| Female | 27 | 14 | 78 |
| Male | 12 | 3 | 46 |

**Table A.2:** Frequences of Gender and Race in Main treatment sample



**Figure A.6:** Distribution of offers and votes for '2Dictator' sample.

| | M1 Offer FE | M2 Offer FE | M3 Partner C.logit | M4 Vote C.logit | M5 Vote C.logit |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ideo. Dist. P-R | −0.17*** | −0.18*** | −0.26*** | −0.17*** | 0.01 |
| | (0.04) | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.10) |
| Same Gender | 0.20 | 0.22 | 0.31 | −0.04 | −0.37 |
| | (0.13) | (0.13) | (0.17) | (0.18) | (0.32) |
| Same Race | −0.18 | −0.22 | −0.33 | 0.16 | −0.05 |
| | (0.13) | (0.14) | (0.19) | (0.18) | (0.31) |
| Ideo. Dist. P-3rd | | 0.05* | 0.10 | | |
| | | (0.02) | (0.06) | | |
| Same Gender P-3rd | | −0.11 | −0.07 | | |
| | | (0.06) | (0.24) | | |
| Same Race P-3rd | | 0.15* | 0.46* | | |
| | | (0.08) | (0.23) | | |
| Amount Offered | | | | | 1.39*** |
| | | | | | (0.14) |
| AIC | | | 1049.54 | 785.99 | 276.65 |
| $R^2$ | | | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.35 |
| Max. $R^2$ | | | 0.26 | 0.48 | 0.48 |
| Num. events | | | 3291 | 837 | 837 |
| Num. obs. | | | 3600 | 1200 | 1200 |
| Missings | | | 0 | 0 | 0 |

***$p < 0.001$, **$p < 0.01$, *$p < 0.05$

**Table A.3:** Fixed effects regression models on amount offered to other participant (Offer) and conditional logit models on whether a participant was chosen as coalition partner by giving more than zero (Partner), and whether a participant chose to accept the offer they received (Vote). The models include arellano-bond corrected standard errors

# Robustness tests

| | A.M5 Offer p0-5 | A.M6 Offer p6-10 | A.M7 Partner p0-5 | A.M8 Partner p6-10 | A.M9 Vote p0-5 | A.M10 Vote p6-10 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Intercept | 5.33*** | 5.27*** | 3.63*** | 3.11*** | −4.14*** | −2.60*** |
| | (0.20) | (0.19) | (0.66) | (0.53) | (1.01) | (0.72) |
| Ideo. Dist. P-R | −0.11** | −0.20*** | −0.23** | −0.23** | −0.14 | 0.05 |
| | (0.04) | (0.06) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.09) |
| Same Gender | 0.01 | 0.31 | 0.14 | 0.41* | −0.34 | −0.17 |
| | (0.11) | (0.20) | (0.19) | (0.16) | (0.33) | (0.34) |
| Same Race | −0.08 | −0.23 | −0.29 | −0.28 | −0.01 | 0.30 |
| | (0.14) | (0.15) | (0.27) | (0.15) | (0.23) | (0.25) |
| Ideo. Dist. P-3rd | 0.04 | 0.09* | 0.02 | 0.12** | | |
| | (0.02) | (0.04) | (0.07) | (0.04) | | |
| Same Gender P-3rd | 0.00 | −0.25 | 0.35 | −0.19 | | |
| | (0.13) | (0.15) | (0.24) | (0.21) | | |
| Same Race P-3rd | −0.05 | 0.23* | −0.08 | 0.31 | | |
| | (0.10) | (0.11) | (0.30) | (0.23) | | |
| Self-Placement | −0.03 | −0.06* | 0.01 | −0.06 | −0.12 | −0.06 |
| | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.08) | (0.05) | (0.12) | (0.08) |
| Proposer-Male | 0.01 | −0.02 | −0.81* | −0.80** | 0.07 | −0.08 |
| | (0.12) | (0.12) | (0.36) | (0.26) | (0.47) | (0.41) |
| Proposer-White | 0.10 | 0.03 | −0.00 | −0.27 | 0.19 | −0.56 |
| | (0.08) | (0.09) | (0.33) | (0.25) | (0.38) | (0.37) |
| Amount Offered | | | | | 1.29*** | 0.87*** |
| | | | | | (0.17) | (0.10) |
| Num. obs. | 1800 | 1800 | 1800 | 1800 | 600 | 600 |
| $R^2$ | 0.01 | 0.02 | | | | |
| Adj. $R^2$ | 0.00 | 0.02 | | | | |
| L.R. | 17.85 | 39.83 | 44.51 | 72.21 | 318.26 | 328.91 |
| Pseudo $R^2$ | | | 0.07 | 0.08 | 0.60 | 0.59 |

***$p < 0.001$, **$p < 0.01$, *$p < 0.05$

**Table A.4:** Regression models on amount offered to other participant (Offer), whether a participant was chosen as coalition partner by giving more than zero (Partner), and whether a participant chose to accept the offer they received (Vote). The table presents results for periods 0–5 and 6–10, to account for learning effects.

| | A.M11 Offer Int group type | A.M12 Partner Int group type | A.M13 Vote Int group type |
|---|---|---|---|
| Intercept | 5.08*** | 3.15*** | −3.38*** |
| | (0.36) | (0.57) | (0.84) |
| Ideo. Dist. P-R | −0.16** | −0.22** | −0.03 |
| | (0.05) | (0.07) | (0.07) |
| Same Gender | 0.51 | 0.32 | −1.21 |
| | (0.37) | (0.47) | (0.76) |
| N.Female | 0.12 | 0.02 | −0.13 |
| | (0.15) | (0.27) | (0.34) |
| S.Gender x N.Female | −0.20 | −0.02 | 0.49 |
| | (0.17) | (0.26) | (0.40) |
| Same Race | −0.04 | −0.25 | 0.23 |
| | (0.33) | (0.58) | (0.55) |
| N. White | 0.02 | 0.10 | 0.18 |
| | (0.14) | (0.32) | (0.22) |
| S.Race x N. White | −0.06 | −0.03 | −0.02 |
| | (0.16) | (0.34) | (0.30) |
| Ideo. Dist. P-3rd | 0.07* | 0.08* | |
| | (0.03) | (0.04) | |
| Same Gender P-3rd | −0.12 | 0.00 | |
| | (0.12) | (0.19) | |
| Same Race P-3rd | 0.11 | 0.18 | |
| | (0.08) | (0.22) | |
| Self-Placement | −0.05* | −0.04 | −0.07 |
| | (0.02) | (0.06) | (0.08) |
| Proposer-Male | −0.09 | −0.79** | 0.28 |
| | (0.13) | (0.27) | (0.39) |
| Proposer-White | 0.09 | −0.24 | −0.29 |
| | (0.09) | (0.18) | (0.36) |
| Amount Offered | | | 1.01*** |
| | | | (0.12) |
| Num. obs. | 3600 | 3600 | 1200 |
| $R^2$ | 0.02 | | |
| Adj. $R^2$ | 0.01 | | |
| L.R. | 55.93 | 105.96 | 641.28 |
| Pseudo $R^2$ | | 0.07 | 0.59 |

$^{***}p < 0.001, ^{**}p < 0.01, ^{*}p < 0.05$

**Table A.5:** Regression models on amount offered to other participant (Offer), whether a participant was chosen as coalition partner by giving more than zero (Partner), and whether a participant chose to accept the offer they received (Vote). The table presents results of interactions between same gender and the number of women in a group and same race and a number of white participants in the group.

| | A.M14 Offer | A.M15 Offer | A.M16 Offer | A. M17 Partner | A.M18 Vote | A.M19 Vote |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Intercept | 5.15*** | 5.11*** | 5.44*** | 3.78*** | 1.69*** | −2.93*** |
| | (0.15) | (0.16) | (0.16) | (0.67) | (0.35) | (0.77) |
| Ideo. Dist. P-R | −0.13** | −0.16** | −0.15** | −0.21** | −0.14** | −0.04 |
| | (0.04) | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.06) | (0.05) | (0.07) |
| Same Gender | 0.09 | 0.16 | 0.15 | 0.28 | −0.02 | −0.29 |
| | (0.13) | (0.14) | (0.13) | (0.16) | (0.19) | (0.28) |
| Same Race All | −0.14 | −0.22 | −0.25 | −0.32* | 0.12 | 0.21 |
| | (0.12) | (0.13) | (0.13) | (0.15) | (0.21) | (0.19) |
| Ideo. Dist. P-3rd | | 0.07* | 0.07* | 0.10 | | |
| | | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.05) | | |
| Same Gender P-3rd | | −0.14 | −0.13 | −0.00 | | |
| | | (0.14) | (0.12) | (0.19) | | |
| Same Race P-3rd All | | 0.17 | 0.12 | 0.17 | | |
| | | (0.12) | (0.11) | (0.25) | | |
| Self-Placement | | | −0.04* | −0.02 | −0.05 | −0.08 |
| | | | (0.02) | (0.06) | (0.04) | (0.08) |
| Proposer-Male | | | −0.03 | −0.86** | 0.03 | −0.09 |
| | | | (0.11) | (0.28) | (0.23) | (0.37) |
| Proposer-Brown | | | −0.54* | −1.33* | −0.62 | −0.23 |
| | | | (0.23) | (0.64) | (0.42) | (0.65) |
| Proposer-White | | | −0.05 | −0.68 | −0.44* | −0.26 |
| | | | (0.10) | (0.39) | (0.22) | (0.33) |
| Amount Offered | | | | | | 1.00*** |
| | | | | | | (0.12) |
| Num. obs. | 3600 | 3600 | 3600 | 3600 | 1200 | 1200 |
| $R^2$ | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.02 | | | |
| Adj. $R^2$ | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.02 | | | |
| L.R. | 39.14 | 50.40 | 70.49 | 135.36 | 26.51 | 635.21 |
| Pseudo $R^2$ | | | | 0.08 | 0.03 | 0.58 |

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$

**Table A.6:** Statistical models on proposal and voting behavior presented in table 2, but including a disaggregated race category.

|  | A.M20 Offer Full | A.M21 Offer Full | A.M22 Offer Full | A.M23 Partner Full | A.M24 Vote Full | A.M25 Vote Full |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Intercept | 4.98*** | 4.93*** | 5.07*** | 3.26*** | 1.42*** | −2.70*** |
|  | (0.15) | (0.16) | (0.19) | (0.54) | (0.32) | (0.63) |
| Ideo. Dist. P-R | −0.14*** | −0.17*** | −0.17*** | −0.22** | −0.16*** | −0.06 |
|  | (0.04) | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.07) | (0.05) | (0.06) |
| Same Gender | 0.13 | 0.20 | 0.20 | 0.28 | 0.04 | −0.28 |
|  | (0.14) | (0.14) | (0.14) | (0.15) | (0.17) | (0.24) |
| Same Race | −0.07 | −0.13 | −0.14 | −0.24 | 0.14 | 0.18 |
|  | (0.12) | (0.12) | (0.12) | (0.14) | (0.17) | (0.17) |
| Ideo. Dist. P-3rd |  | 0.07* | 0.07* | 0.10* |  |  |
|  |  | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.05) |  |  |
| Same Gender P-3rd |  | −0.14 | −0.14 | 0.01 |  |  |
|  |  | (0.13) | (0.11) | (0.18) |  |  |
| Same Race P-3rd |  | 0.17 | 0.16 | 0.18 |  |  |
|  |  | (0.10) | (0.09) | (0.23) |  |  |
| Self-Placement |  |  | −0.03 | −0.03 | −0.05 | −0.07 |
|  |  |  | (0.02) | (0.06) | (0.04) | (0.07) |
| Proposer-Male |  |  | −0.01 | −0.79** | 0.03 | −0.12 |
|  |  |  | (0.11) | (0.25) | (0.22) | (0.34) |
| Proposer-White |  |  | 0.04 | −0.24 | −0.16 | −0.09 |
|  |  |  | (0.08) | (0.26) | (0.18) | (0.29) |
| Amount Offered |  |  |  |  |  | 0.95*** |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | (0.10) |
| Num. obs. | 3900 | 3900 | 3900 | 3900 | 1300 | 1300 |
| R$^2$ | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.02 |  |  |  |
| Adj. R$^2$ | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 |  |  |  |
| L.R. | 43.84 | 57.08 | 60.89 | 113.08 | 23.77 | 676.72 |
| Pseudo R$^2$ |  |  |  | 0.06 | 0.03 | 0.57 |

$^{***}p < 0.001, ^{**}p < 0.01, ^{*}p < 0.05$

**Table A.7:** Models M1-6 in main text, but including all voting rounds.

## Bootstrapped coefficients proposal behavior, model M3



**Figure A.7:** M3 Bootstrapped coefficients of 'Ideo. Dist. P-R' for 10,000 iterations, red lines at ±1.96 sd from the mean.

**Figure A.8:** M3 Bootstrapped coefficients of 'Ideo. Dist. P-3rd' for 10,000 iterations, red lines at ±1.96 sd from the mean.

**Bootstrapped coefficients partner selection, model M4**



**Figure A.9:** M4 Bootstrapped coefficients of 'Ideo. Dist. P-R' for 10,000 iterations, red lines at ±1.96 sd from the mean.

**Figure A.10:** M4 Bootstrapped coefficients of 'Ideo. Dist. P-3rd' for 10,000 iterations, red lines at $\pm 1.96$ sd from the mean.



**Figure A.11:** M4 Bootstrapped coefficients of 'Same Gender' for 10,000 iterations, red lines at $\pm 1.96$ sd from the mean.

**Interaction with level of variation in the self-placement of group members**

| | A.M26 Offer Int. | A.M27 Offer Int. | A.M28 Offer Int. | A.M29 Partner Int. | A.M30 Vote Int. | A.M31 Vote Int. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Intercept | 4.91*** | 4.94*** | 5.11*** | 3.24*** | 1.52*** | −2.77*** |
| | (0.21) | (0.22) | (0.25) | (0.63) | (0.45) | (0.86) |
| Ideo. Dist. P-R | −0.21** | −0.22*** | −0.22** | −0.26*** | −0.17* | −0.01 |
| | (0.06) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.09) |
| Same Gender | 0.13 | 0.20 | 0.19 | 0.24 | −0.16 | −0.59 |
| | (0.26) | (0.26) | (0.26) | (0.48) | (0.44) | (0.61) |
| SD SP Group | 0.23* | 0.21* | 0.20 | 0.09 | 0.02 | −0.19 |
| | (0.11) | (0.10) | (0.11) | (0.14) | (0.15) | (0.21) |
| Same Race | −0.12 | −0.15 | −0.16 | −0.27 | 0.17 | 0.21 |
| | (0.12) | (0.13) | (0.13) | (0.15) | (0.18) | (0.20) |
| Same Gender * SD SP Group | −0.01 | −0.01 | −0.01 | 0.03 | 0.08 | 0.17 |
| | (0.12) | (0.12) | (0.12) | (0.22) | (0.18) | (0.25) |
| Ideo. Dist. P-3rd | | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.08 | | |
| | | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.04) | | |
| Same Gender P-3rd | | −0.15 | −0.14 | −0.00 | | |
| | | (0.13) | (0.12) | (0.19) | | |
| Same Race P-3rd | | 0.09 | 0.08 | 0.19 | | |
| | | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.22) | | |
| Self-Placement | | | −0.04 | −0.04 | −0.05 | −0.08 |
| | | | (0.02) | (0.06) | (0.04) | (0.08) |
| Proposer-Male | | | −0.02 | −0.80** | 0.04 | −0.08 |
| | | | (0.11) | (0.26) | (0.23) | (0.38) |
| Proposer-White | | | 0.06 | −0.18 | −0.25 | −0.16 |
| | | | (0.08) | (0.27) | (0.17) | (0.33) |
| Amount Offered | | | | | | 1.00*** |
| | | | | | | (0.12) |
| Num. obs. | 3600 | 3600 | 3600 | 3600 | 1200 | 1200 |
| $R^2$ | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.02 | | | |
| Adj. $R^2$ | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | | | |
| L.R. | 52.70 | 58.45 | 63.64 | 106.50 | 21.33 | 635.62 |
| Pseudo $R^2$ | | | | 0.07 | 0.02 | 0.58 |

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$ All models include marching-group clustered s.e.

**Table A.8:** Statistical models on proposal and voting behaviour with interaction of Gender and Standard Deviation of Self-Placement in Groups.

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**Table A.9:** Statistical models on proposal and voting behaviour with interaction of Race and Standard Deviation of Self-Placement in Groups.

| | A.M32 Offer Int. | A.M33 Offer Int. | A.M34 Offer Int. | A.M35 Partner Int. | A.M36 Vote Int. | A.M37 Vote Int. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Intercept | 4.89*** | 4.92*** | 5.09*** | 3.09*** | 1.44*** | −2.80*** |
| | (0.18) | (0.21) | (0.24) | (0.59) | (0.36) | (0.77) |
| Ideo. Dist. P-R | −0.21** | −0.22*** | −0.22** | −0.26*** | −0.17* | −0.00 |
| | (0.06) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.09) |
| Same Gender | 0.12 | 0.18 | 0.17 | 0.30* | −0.02 | −0.32 |
| | (0.13) | (0.14) | (0.13) | (0.15) | (0.19) | (0.29) |
| Same Race | −0.08 | −0.11 | −0.11 | −0.07 | 0.14 | −0.17 |
| | (0.23) | (0.23) | (0.22) | (0.37) | (0.33) | (0.36) |
| SD SP Group | 0.24 | 0.22 | 0.21 | 0.17 | 0.05 | −0.22 |
| | (0.12) | (0.11) | (0.11) | (0.14) | (0.17) | (0.19) |
| Same Race * SD SP Group | −0.02 | −0.02 | −0.03 | −0.11 | 0.02 | 0.23 |
| | (0.12) | (0.12) | (0.12) | (0.18) | (0.20) | (0.21) |
| Ideo. Dist. P-3rd | | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.08 | | |
| | | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.04) | | |
| Same Gender P-3rd | | −0.15 | −0.14 | −0.00 | | |
| | | (0.14) | (0.12) | (0.19) | | |
| Same Race P-3rd | | 0.09 | 0.08 | 0.19 | | |
| | | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.22) | | |
| Self-Placement | | | −0.04 | −0.04 | −0.05 | −0.07 |
| | | | (0.02) | (0.06) | (0.04) | (0.08) |
| Proposer-Male | | | −0.02 | −0.79** | 0.05 | −0.08 |
| | | | (0.11) | (0.26) | (0.23) | (0.38) |
| Proposer-White | | | 0.06 | −0.18 | −0.25 | −0.16 |
| | | | (0.08) | (0.26) | (0.17) | (0.33) |
| Amount Offered | | | | | | 1.00*** |
| | | | | | | (0.12) |
| Num. obs. | 3600 | 3600 | 3600 | 3600 | 1200 | 1200 |
| $R^2$ | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.02 | | | |
| Adj. $R^2$ | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | | | |
| L.R. | 52.76 | 58.52 | 63.75 | 107.11 | 21.04 | 636.25 |
| Pseudo $R^2$ | | | | 0.07 | 0.02 | 0.58 |

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$ All models include marching-group clustered s.e.

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# Experiment materials



**Figure A.12:** Screen shot of treatment sessions.

# Experimenter Instructions

## On the day of the experiment

1. Open two screens of putty, one for the expt and another to watch the cpu (access it typing *top*)

2. Open each computer on the right kiosk mode

3. Adjust code to match the right number of people. **MAKE SURE YOU ARE USING THE RIGHT CODE,** $N = 18, T = 10$

4. Upload the code to putty and run it.

5. Make sure all the computers have

   * paper

   * pencil

   * calculator

   * instructions

   * consent form

   * information sheet

   * Receipt

## Experimenter instructions

**Bring to the lab:**

1. Instructions, consent forms, info sheets, receipts, calculators.

2. Signed up subjects sheet

   Come to the lab. Distribute consent forms/information sheets receipts and calculators to all seats. Open putty and winscp. `source(R script)` and `ready(expt)`. Then open Chrome Kiosk windows on computers 1-N. When everyone is seated `start(expt)`.

**At experiment time**

At the door ask *"Has everyone got university ID or another form of ID?"* Those who haven't will only be used if we have insufficient of those who have; warn them, in future bring ID.

Randomize over subjects using the lab tokens (Sara knows where these are). Surplus subjects given £2.50 and sent off.

You need 18 participants. (The can only run using 18 participants, on the Factor Analysis won't work and matching groups are of size 6). Only use the chrome kiosk pages for the 18 people

*If you get number 1-18, come in and sit quietly at that desk. Please do not talk or communicate with other participants while you are in the room. Keep mobile phones and other communication devices silent, and do not use them while in the room. If you get a 13 or higher, wait outside.*

Subjects 1-18 come in with ID checked at the door.

**When everyone is seated, say**

*"Welcome to this experimental session.*

*Your behaviour in this experiment will be confidential. Data is collected based on your computer number, which was assigned randomly. Personally identifying information about you will never be linked to this computer number. At the end of the experiment, you will be paid privately, so that no other participants will know how much you have earned.*

*You may have heard about experiments in which participants were deceived. Experiments in [omitted for anonymity] never involve deception by the experimenters. That is, everything the experimenter tells you, and all on-screen instructions, are true and accurate. If you have any questions about this, please email [omitted for anonymity]*

*Fire exits are here and here [point them out]. Is there anyone who will have difficulty exiting the lab in an emergency? If so, please put your hand up."* [If so, ask if they have a Personal Emergency Plan; if they do not, use your judgement as to whether it is safe for them.]

*"On your desk there is a consent form for this experiment, as well as an information sheet. There is also a receipt. At the end of the experiment you will be asked to fill it out with the*

*amount you have won, and return it with the signed consent form to the experimenter. You may keep the information sheet if you wish. Lastly there are experiment instructions and a number of blank papers for you to take notes on during the experiment.*

*I will now read out experiment instructions. At the end you will have an opportunity to ask questions. If at any time you have a question or a problem with your computer, please put your hand up, and an experimenter will help you privately."*

Start the corresponding treatment on putty using `start(expt).` The participants will see the instructions screen.

**Read the instructions**

When you finish reading the instructions, *"Once you finish reading the instructions please press the 'Continue' button to start the experiment"*

**When the experiment is over:**

*"Please sign and date your receipts with the amount shown on your screen, and then click "Payment" on screen to show that you have done so."*

While this is happening prepare payment envelopes.

*"The experiment is now over. I will come round to each of you in turn with your payment in an envelope. Check that you have received the correct payment. Note that amounts have been rounded to the nearest 10 pence. Please hand over your receipt and consent form when I do so. After you have received payment, please quietly leave the laboratory."*

*"Please check the amount and if it's wrong, raise your hand."*

Go round swapping envelopes for receipts. To each individual:

Email the results to me and store them safely somewhere, then delete them from the server.

# Instructions

Welcome to the experiment.

During this experiment, please follow the instructions of the experimenters at all times. Please do not communicate with any other participants or anyone outside the lab, either directly or via mobile devices. If you do not follow these rules, you may be removed from the experiment without payment and you may not be allowed to participate in future experiments.

Please switch off your mobile phones and other electronic devices.

Once you have finished reading the instructions, please sign the **consent form** on your desk.

## Experiment

The experiment starts with a short survey on general demographics and your views about some political topics. All the data that you enter are completely anonymous and no personal information will be recorded.

Later on, you will take part in a series of group decision-making periods in which each of you will propose how to divide £17.00 amongst the members of your group. Participants will be randomly allocated to groups of 3 by the computer. You will complete 10 periods and in each period you will be rematched into a different group. All of the interaction with your group will be conducted via your computer.

Each period will happen as follows:

1. In the **Proposal Stage** you will make an offer to each participant in your group. You can offer any quantity, by increments of 10 pence, to each player. The offers must add up to a 'pie' of £17.00.

2. Once all offers have been made, the computer will choose **one** of the proposals randomly and present it to all of the group members. If you **accept** the offer, then press the 'Accept' button. If you do not want to accept the offer, then **reject** it by pressing the 'Reject' button.

3. If more than half of the group members 'Accept' the offer it will be approved and each group member will be allocated that amount for the current period. If more than half of the group members 'Reject' the offer, it will be rejected by the group and all group members will be asked to propose a new division of the 'pie', but this time you will only have £11.90 to divide. Again, one proposal will be chosen randomly and presented to all group members. If the new proposal is rejected you will repeat the process, but the 'pie' will again be reduced, this time to £8.30. Each of these steps is called a 'round' and you can play up to 5 rounds per period, but in each round the 'pie' will get smaller. If the proposal is rejected in the fifth round, all group members will be allocated £0.00 for that period and you will all pass on to a new negotiation with a new group.

4. When you finish the 10 periods, you will be asked to complete a final decision making process. This time you will have to divide £3.00 amongst three group members and, in this section, whatever you allocate to each person is what they will get. In this section there will be **no voting**.

5. At the end of the experiment we will ask you to fill in a few questions regarding your experience in the lab. Once again, all the data that you enter are completely anonymous and no personal information will be recorded. After you finish the survey, a screen will appear indicating which period was chosen for payment and how much you will be paid.

**Payment**

In this experiment you will be paid according to the decisions that you have made. One of the ten negotiation periods will be chosen at random, and each will have a 1/10 chance of being chosen. You will also be paid for the decisions you make in the 'decision' section and a £2.50 show-up fee. At the end of the experiment you will be informed of how much you have earned in each section and your total payment.

## Treatment Information - Provided after the survey

The information you have provided has been used to allocate each participant one of the following avatars.



There are only 6 avatars, so more than one participant will be allocated the same image, based on the race and gender each person stated in the survey.

The survey data has also been used to calculate a score that places each participant and their political views on the left right political spectrum.

**Bargaining Experiment Survey**

# Survey Questions

Please answer the following questions. As indicated in the instructions, personal data will not be disclosed and all information you provide is anonymous.

- What year were you born? | Year |

- What gender do you identify with?

    Male

    Female

- What is your nationality? | Country | *(Drop-down menu with all countries accepted in the sample plus and 'other' option)*

- What race to you identify with? If you are mixed race, please state the one you feel closest to.

    White Caucasian

    Black

    Latin American

    South Asian

- Are you a student at the University of Essex?

    Yes

    No

- If Yes, are you an undergraduate or graduate student?

    Undergraduate

Graduate

Does not apply

- If you are a student, in what academic year did you start your course/degree? | Academic Years |

  *(Drop-down menu with a list of academic years)*

- If you are a student, what is the name of your course/degree?

  | *Empty for participants to fill in* |

————- Next Screen ————-

# Survey Questions Continued

**Could you please state how strongly you agree or disagree with the following statements**

- There is one law for the rich and one law for the poor.

  Strongly Disagree                                        Strongly Agree

- There is no need for strong trade unions to protect employees' working conditions and wages.

  Strongly Disagree                                        Strongly Agree

- Major public services and industries ought to be in state ownership.

  Strongly Disagree                                        Strongly Agree

- Ordinary people get their fair share of the nation's wealth.

  Strongly Disagree                                        Strongly Agree

- Government should reduce the taxes paid by higher-income citizens.

  Strongly Disagree                                        Strongly Agree

- Same sex couples should enjoy the same rights as heterosexual couples to marry.

  Strongly Disagree                                        Strongly Agree

- Women should be free to decide on matters of abortion.

  Strongly Disagree                                    Strongly Agree

- The government should try to reduce the income differences between rich and poor citizens.

  Strongly Disagree                                    Strongly Agree

- The UK should be allowed to set quotas on the number of EU immigrants entering the country.

  Strongly Disagree                                    Strongly Agree

- Free market competition makes the health care system function better.

  Strongly Disagree                                    Strongly Agree

- An Orange is orange.

  Strongly Disagree                                    Strongly Agree

- Have you ever participated in any economics, government or psychology experimental studies before?

      Yes

      No

- Please specify the number of times. If you have not participated in any experiment please indicate it with a zero. number

————- Next Screen ————-

# Survey Questions Continued

In politics people sometimes talk of 'left' and 'right'. Where would you place yourself on a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 means extreme left and 10 means extreme right?

Extreme Left 0 | ———————◯——— | 10 Extreme Right

You have selected: number selected

————- At the End of the Experiment ————-

Please take a few minutes and to answer the following questions

- From your experience, what did you think the experiment was about?

*Empty for participants to fill in*

- What was your overall impression of the experiment?

*Empty for participants to fill in*

## Countries of origin

The sample was restricted to participants who were in the [omitted for anonymity] subject pool and stated their country of origin as one of the following 42: Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Botswana, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Mauritius, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay. Checks were included in the experiment and only two participants in treatment sessions indicate they came from a country that was not in this original list.