



Code of Practice on Disinformation – Report of TikTok for the period 1 July 2024 - 31 December 2024



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|--------------------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| II. Scrutiny of Ad Placements | | |
| 1 | Measure 1.1 | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
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| III. Political advertising | | |
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| | Measure 7.3 | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| | Measure 7.4 | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |



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| | | | |
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| IV. Integrity of services | | | |
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| V. Empowering users | | | |
| 17 | <u>Measure 17.1</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | |
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| 25 | | <u>Measure 25.1</u> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
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| VI. Empowering the research community | | | |
| 26 | | <u>Measure 26.1</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
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| | | <u>Measure 26.3</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
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| | | <u>Measure 27.4</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |



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| | <u>Measure 28.1</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| 28 | <u>Measure 28.2</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
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| | <u>Measure 29.3</u> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| VII. Empowering the fact-checking community | | |
| 30 | <u>Measure 30.1</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| | <u>Measure 30.2</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| | <u>Measure 30.3</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
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| | <u>Measure 31.3</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
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| | <u>Measure 32.3</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| 33 | <u>Measure 33.1</u> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| VIII. Transparency centre | | |
| 34 | <u>Measure 34.1</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
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| | <u>Measure 34.5</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
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| | <u>Measure 35.3</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |



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| IX. Permanent Task-Force | | |
| 37 | <u>Measure 37.1</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
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| | <u>Measure 37.5</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| | <u>Measure 37.6</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| X. Monitoring of the Code | | |
| 38 | <u>Measure 38.1</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| 39 | - | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
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| | - | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| 42 | - | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| 43 | - | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| 44 | - | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |



Executive summary

About TikTok

TikTok's mission is to inspire creativity and bring joy. In a global community such as ours with millions of users it is natural for people to have different opinions, so we seek to operate on a shared set of facts and reality when it comes to topics that impact people's safety. Ensuring a safe and authentic environment for our community is critical to achieving our goals - this includes making sure our users have a trustworthy experience on TikTok. As part of creating a trustworthy environment, transparency is essential to enable online communities and wider society to assess TikTok's approach to its regulatory obligations. TikTok is committed to providing insights into the actions we are taking as a signatory to the Code of Practice on Disinformation (the Code).

We take disinformation extremely seriously. We are committed to preventing its spread, promoting authoritative information, and investing in media literacy initiatives that build resilience among our community against misinformation. At TikTok, we prioritise proactive content moderation and are proud that the vast majority of violative content is identified and removed proactively before it receives any views or is reported to us. During H2 2024 of this reporting period, more than 98% of videos violating our Integrity and Authenticity misinformation policies were removed proactively globally.

We are also committed to keeping up with new and evolving behaviours and risks that affect our users. As part of the Digital Services Act (DSA) compliance programme, under which the Code will operate from July 2025 onwards, we have implemented a range of measures designed to keep our users safe across a number of key areas including disinformation. For more information on these measures, including how we use technology and deploy our teams, please refer to our dedicated [European Online Safety Hub](#).

Our work under the Code continues to reflect our strong commitment to combatting disinformation on our platform and being transparent and accountable to our wider community about the measures we take.

Our fifth report under the Code - 1 July to 31 December 2024

TikTok has been heavily involved and committed to the Code process since 2020. We remain actively involved in the Code's Taskforce and its active working groups and subgroups, in particular in H2 regarding the conversion of the COPD into a code of conduct under the DSA and development / activation of the RRS for elections. We continue to co-chair the working group on Elections, and have held the position of co-chair of the Transparency working group since September 2023.

Consistent with our previous reports, this fifth report continues to provide detailed insights into the measures we implement to combat disinformation in compliance with our commitments, along with comprehensive and granular data in support of those measures. Some of the measures we have outlined have been implemented outside of EU member states, including for example in EU candidate countries and nations with significant diaspora communities residing within the EU. While these actions take place beyond the EU's borders, they are expected to have a positive impact on limiting the spread of disinformation within the EU itself.

With more than half of the world's population going to the polls, 2024 represented a significant year for elections and civic processes. Elections result in heightened periods of civic discourse on online platforms. We are therefore aware of elevated risks throughout these electoral periods, including attempts to in-authentically promote polarising narratives or sway public opinion. During these civic processes, TikTok remains focused on keeping people safe and protecting the integrity of the TikTok platform.

We do this by enforcing a set of robust policies aimed at preventing the spread of misinformation, elevating authoritative information from trusted sources, and collaborating with experts who help us



evaluate and improve our approach. This report provides information on the significant resources we devoted to protecting the integrity of our platform during this time. We also include two specific post-election reports for the French Snap Election and the Romanian Presidential Elections.

Examples of the mitigation measures we implemented during this critical period included: running Mission Control Centres to provide consistent and dedicated coverage of potential elections-related issues; participating in the Code's Rapid Response System to streamline the exchange of information among civil society organisations, fact-checkers and platforms; expanding our Fact-Checking Program (we now partner closely with 14 IFCN accredited fact-checking organisations in the EU); and launching localised media literacy campaigns.

There are also two ongoing conflicts taking place (Israel/Hamas and Russia/Ukraine), with significant amounts of dialogue and contrasting political views related to the conflicts being shared online, and with this the potential spread of misinformation. Individual crisis reports are provided detailing information specific to our response to the Israel/Hamas conflict and the war in Ukraine.

We take pride in our ongoing efforts to protect our community from disinformation, equipping them with the tools to navigate emerging misinformation trends and the skills to evaluate the accuracy of the information they encounter.

Our policies

Our Integrity and Authenticity policies are designed to help promote a trustworthy, authentic experience for our users. We have robust policies around specific types of misinformation¹ and deceptive behaviours, as well as misleading AI-generated content, conspiracy theories, Covert Influence Operations (CIO) networks, and public safety events like natural disasters. We do not allow false or misleading content that may cause significant harm to individuals or society, regardless of intent. Our policies are thoughtfully crafted to cover a broad range of content and the constantly changing nature of misinformation trends, often based on what's happening in the world. We also tackle deceptive behaviour by removing accounts that seek to mislead people or engage in platform manipulation.

We continue to review and develop our policies. In the second half of 2024, we introduced a new granular climate misinformation ad policy and refined existing policies, including our Fake Engagement policies, Deceptive Personas policy guidelines and expanded our impersonation policies.

Enforcing our policies

Moderating online misinformation is complex and nuanced. To moderate EU language content effectively at scale, we continue to strengthen our automated review process and invest in training for our Trust and Safety teams. We provide transparency to our community on [how we moderate](#) and [what moderation actions we take](#). This includes detail about what content we make [ineligible for the For You Feed](#). We disclose the underlying metrics in this report.

We rely on automated moderation when our systems have a high degree of confidence that content is violative, however, disinformation presents unique challenges. It is highly complex, evolves quickly, and can require context and so context and fact-checking are critical. While we use machine learning models to help detect potential misinformation, our approach entails having our specialised misinformation moderation team assess, confirm, and remove harmful misinformation violations. Our moderators have access to [independent fact-checking partners](#) and our global database of previously fact-checked claims to help evaluate content accuracy.

¹ At TikTok, we take action to moderate or remove content containing harmful misinformation, irrespective of intent (i.e. whether or not the content in question amounts to disinformation), in accordance with our Community Guidelines. For the purposes of alignment with the Code, throughout this report, we use "misinformation" and "disinformation" interchangeably.



We also address disinformation by removing accounts that repeatedly post misinformation that violate our policies, and have expert teams who continuously monitor for disinformation campaigns, inauthentic behavior, and influence operations.

Transparency and Scrutiny of Advertising

We are pleased to have launched a new climate misinformation ad policy in the EEA at the end of 2024. This is in addition to existing [policies](#) prohibiting misleading, inauthentic and deceptive behaviours and in particular, our [misinformation policy](#) which covers dangerous misinformation, medical misinformation, dangerous conspiracy theories and synthetic and manipulated media. We continuously work on improving the implementation and enforcement of our ad policies, and are constantly considering new focus areas for which we should develop further policies.

Like all users of our platform, participants in content monetisation programs must adhere to our Community Guidelines, including our Integrity and Authenticity policies. Those policies make clear that we do not allow activities that may undermine the integrity of our platform or the authenticity of our users. They also make clear that we remove content or accounts, including those of creators, which contain misleading information that causes significant harm or deceptive behaviours. In certain scenarios, we may remove a creator's access to a creator monetisation feature. Our [Creator Code of Conduct](#) outlines the standards we expect from creators involved in TikTok programs, features, events and campaigns to uphold, both on and off-platform, including in relation to misinformation related activities.

We continue to engage with external stakeholders in order to increase the effectiveness of our scrutiny of ad placements on TikTok. We have continued to expand the functionality (including choice and ability) of the TikTok Inventory Filter our in-house pre-campaign safety tool (which is now available in 29 jurisdictions in the EEA), continue to offer third party brand safety and suitability solutions to our advertisers (such as from DoubleVerify, Integral Ad Science and Zefr) and we have improved our Swedish Gold Standard IAB certification to 2.0.

Prohibiting Political Ads

TikTok is first and foremost an entertainment platform, and we're proud to be a place that brings people together through creative and entertaining content. While sharing political beliefs and engaging in political conversation is allowed as organic content on TikTok, our policies prohibit our community, including politicians and political party accounts, from placing [political ads](#) or posting political [branded content](#). We also prevent [governments, politicians and political party accounts](#) from accessing our monetisation features and campaign fundraising (with a limited exception for government run public service announcements such as health campaigns).

We have been focusing on enforcement of our political advertising prohibition in advance of the majority of the provisions in the EU Regulation on Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising applying from October 2025.

By prohibiting political advertising, campaign fundraising and limiting access to certain monetisation features, we're aiming to strike a balance between enabling people to discuss the issues that are relevant to their lives while also protecting the creative, entertaining platform that our community wants.

Ensuring the Integrity of Services

Our Integrity and Authenticity policies ([I&A policies](#)) strictly prohibit deceptive behaviors, and we are committed to minimizing impermissible manipulative practices. We remain highly vigilant to the evolving disinformation tactics, techniques, and procedures employed by malicious actors, as outlined in detail in Commitment 14. To effectively combat these threats, we continuously assess and refine our policies, ensuring they remain robust and responsive to emerging challenges in the information



ecosystem. Through proactive monitoring and enforcement, we aim to safeguard the integrity of our platform and protect users from harmful influence operations.

In particular we note that while Artificial intelligence (AI) enables incredible creative opportunities, it can potentially confuse or mislead viewers if they're not aware content was generated or edited with AI. Our Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC) policy addresses the use of content created or modified by AI on our platform. To support authentic and transparent experiences for our community, we encourage creators to label content that has been either completely generated or significantly edited by AI and disclose when their content shows realistic scenes.. In addition to the [AI-generated label](#) for creators to disclose AIGC, we implement the Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity (C2PA) [Content Credentials](#) technology, which enables our systems to recognise and automatically label AIGC that originated on other major platforms.

We also continue to fight against covert influence operations (CIO) and we do not allow attempts to sway public opinion while misleading our platform's systems or community about the identity, origin, operating location, popularity, or purpose of the account. To counter emerging threats and stay ahead of evolving challenges, we have expert teams who focus entirely on detecting, investigating, and disrupting covert influence operations. These teams pursue and analyse on-platform signals of deceptive behaviour, as well as leads from external sources. They also collaborate with external intelligence vendors to support specific investigations on a case-by-case basis. In order to provide more regular and detailed updates about the CIOs we disrupt, we have a dedicated transparency report on CIOs, which is [available in TikTok's Transparency Centre](#) and in which we publish information about operations that we have previously removed and that have attempted to return to our platform with new accounts.

TikTok is also proud to actively participate in the Code's Rapid Response System in order to streamline the exchange of information among civil society organisations, fact-checkers, and online platforms.

Empowering Users

In addition to taking action on content generated by users that violates our policies, we continuously work to deter misinformation proactively by empowering our community with resources that help them recognise misinformation, assess content critically, and file reports about violative content. We offer our community in Europe easy-to-use in-app and online reporting tools so they can alert us to content or accounts they believe may violate our Community Guidelines or break the law. Content that is reported for being illegal will be reviewed against our policies and where a violation is detected, the content may be removed globally.

We have dedicated significant resources to increasing the number of in-app intervention tools that provide users with additional context on certain content, prompts them to reconsider sharing certain content, redirects them to authoritative information, and encourages them to report any potential misinformation directly to us. We continue to review what topics we develop interventions for, including on elections, climate change, the War in Ukraine and the Israel / Hamas conflict. We make these tools available in 23 official EU languages and Norwegian and Icelandic for EEA users

We are involved in a variety of on- and off-platform media literacy campaigns in close collaboration with external partners, for example, our fact-checking and media literacy partners in relation to elections. During this reporting period, we ran 14 temporary media literacy campaigns, all with in-app Election Centers, in advance of regional elections. Election Centers were visited more than 4.1 million times during the reporting period.

We believe that collaboration helps strengthen our efforts to mitigate harm and misuse on our platform. To better inform our approach to upcoming elections, we ran 9 Election Speaker Series, 7 in EU member states and 2 in Georgia and Moldova, inviting external experts, including from the fact-checking community, to share their insights and market expertise with our internal teams.



A global media literacy campaign was also launched during COP29 to raise awareness and equip users with critical thinking skills, independent of any specific partnerships. We also introduced media literacy search guides tailored to regions affected by significant events. These guides were launched in Central and Eastern Europe in response to floods, covering countries such as Czechia, Poland, Romania, Austria, Hungary, Slovakia, Germany, and Moldova. Similar efforts were undertaken in Portugal for wildfires, in Spain for floods, and in Mayotte for a cyclone.

We also continue our efforts to [counter influence attempts](#), including by making state-affiliated media accounts that attempt to reach communities outside their home country on current global events and affairs ineligible for recommendation in our users' For You feeds, and by prohibiting state-affiliated media accounts in all markets where our state-controlled media labels are available, including in the EU, from advertising outside of the country with which they are primarily affiliated. We are committed to providing transparency about our systems and our I&A efforts to our users. We continue to expand our Transparency Center with resources like our first-ever US Elections Integrity Hub, European Elections Integrity Hub, dedicated Covert Influence Reports, and a new Transparency Center blog.

Empowering Researchers

We recognise the important role of researchers in helping to identify disinformation trends and practices. We publish quarterly [Community Guidelines Enforcement Reports](#) to provide ongoing insights into the action we take against content and accounts that violate our Community Guidelines, Terms of Service, and Advertising Policies. As part of our continued efforts to make it easy to study the TikTok platform, the report also offers access to aggregated data in a downloadable data file. We maintain, and continue to iterate, our [Research API](#) (providing researchers in Europe with access to public data on content and accounts from our platform) as well as our [Commercial Content API](#) (bringing transparency to paid advertising and other content that is commercial in nature on TikTok) and a Commercial Content Library (a publicly searchable EU ads database with information about paid ads and ad metadata). We also continue to refine the [Virtual Compute Environment](#) (VCE) which offers broader access to user data to qualifying non-academic not-for-profit researchers to query and analyse applicable data while ensuring robust security and privacy protections.

We are committed to transparency about how we operate, moderate and recommend content, empower users, and secure our platform. That's why we opened our global Transparency and Accountability Centers (TACs) for invited guests to see first-hand our work to protect the safety and security of the TikTok platform. The TACs offer an opportunity for researchers and other expert audiences to see first-hand how teams at TikTok go about the critically important work of securing our community's safety, data, and privacy.

Empowering the Fact-Checking Community

TikTok recognises the important contribution of our fact-checking partners in the fight against disinformation. In H2 we onboarded two new fact-checking partners and expanded our fact-checking coverage to a number of wider-European and EU candidate countries with existing fact-checking partners. We now work closely with 14 [IFCN-accredited](#) fact-checking organisations across the EU, EEA and wider Europe who have technical training, resources, and industry-wide insights to impartially assess online misinformation.

Our fact-checking programme incorporates fact-checker input into our broader content moderation efforts. Fact-checkers do not moderate content directly on TikTok, but assess whether a claim is true, false or unsubstantiated. They also share proactive insight reports that help us detect harmful misinformation and anticipate misinformation trends. This feedback from fact-checkers is relayed to TikTok's moderation teams so that they can ensure it is factored into their moderation work and take the relevant action based on our Community Guidelines. This approach effectively produces a force multiplier to the underlying fact-checking output, ensuring that the disinformation content or trend is more comprehensively and broadly addressed. Our expanding fact-checking repository ensures that our teams and systems fully utilise the insights provided by our fact-checking partners on TikTok.



Looking forward

TikTok remains fully committed to the Code which will take effect as a Code of Conduct under the DSA framework from July 2025.

We look forward to ongoing and meaningful collaboration with the industry, civil society and EU authorities as we work together to safeguard the integrity of our platforms. By sharing expertise, strengthening policies, and enhancing enforcement mechanisms, we aim to prevent bad actors from exploiting digital spaces through deceptive behavior and the spread of harmful disinformation.



II. Scrutiny of Ad Placements Commitments 1 - 3



| II. Scrutiny of Ad Placements | |
|---|-----|
| Commitment 1 | |
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No] | Yes |



If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].

Guidance to support the identification of policies. Improving identification. Improvement of the enforcement of the policies themselves (not the policy wording).

- In order to improve the granularity of existing ad policies, developed a specific climate misinformation ad policy.
- Continued to enforce our four granular harmful misinformation ad policies in the EEA. As mentioned in our H2 2023 report, the policies cover:
 - Medical Misinformation
 - Dangerous Misinformation
 - Synthetic and Manipulated Media
 - Dangerous Conspiracy Theories
- Expanded the functionality (including choice and ability) in the EEA of our in-house pre-campaign brand safety tool, the TikTok Inventory Filter.
- Improved our IAB certification for Sweden Gold Standard to 2.0.
- We continue to engage in the Task-force and its working groups and subgroups such as the working subgroup on Elections (Crisis Response).



| | |
|---|--|
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | No |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months? | We are continuously reviewing and improving our tools and processes to fight disinformation and will report on any further development in the next report. |
| Measure 1.1 | |

**QRE 1.1.1**

To help keep our platform welcoming and authentic for everyone, we are focused on ensuring it is free from harmful misinformation.

(I) Our policies and approach

Our Integrity & Authenticity (**I&A**) policies within our CGs are the first line of defence in combating harmful misinformation and deceptive behaviours on our platform. All users are required to comply with our CGs, which set out the circumstances where we will remove, or otherwise limit the availability of, content.

Paid ads are also subject to our [ad policies](#) and are reviewed against these policies before being allowed on our platform. Our ad policies specifically prohibit inaccurate, misleading, or false content that may cause significant harm to individuals or society, regardless of intent. They also prohibit other misleading, inauthentic and deceptive behaviours. Ads deemed in violation of these policies will not be permitted on our platform, and accounts deemed in severe or repeated violation may be suspended or banned.

In 2023, in order to improve our existing ad policies, we launched four granular policies in the EEA. The policies cover:

- Medical Misinformation
- Dangerous Misinformation
- Synthetic and Manipulated Media
- Dangerous Conspiracy Theories

We have been constantly working on improving the implementation of these policies, and reflecting on whether there are further focused areas for which we should develop new policies. We launched a fifth granular ad policy covering climate misinformation at the end of 2024. It prohibits false or misleading claims relating to climate change, such as, denying the existence and impacts of climate change, falsely stating that long-term impacts of climate mitigation strategies are worse than those of climate changes or undermining the validity or credibility of data or research that documents well-established scientific consensus.

Our [ad policies](#) require advertisers to meet a number of requirements regarding the landing page. For example, the landing page must be functioning and must contain complete and accurate information including about the advertiser. Ads risk not being approved if the product or service advertised on the landing page does not match that included in the ad.

In line with our approach of building a platform that brings people together, not divides them, we have long [prohibited political ads](#) and political [branded content](#). Specifically, we do [not allow paid ads](#) (nor landing pages) that promote or oppose a candidate, current leader, political party or group, or content that advocates a stance (for or against) on a local, state, or federal issue of public importance in order to influence a political decision or outcome. Similar rules apply in respect of branded content. We also classify certain accounts as [Government, Politician, and Political Party Accounts \(GPPPA\)](#) and we have introduced restrictions on these at an account level. This means accounts belonging to the government, politicians and political parties will automatically have their access to advertising features turned off. We make exceptions for governments in certain circumstances e.g., to promote public health. We make various brand safety tools available to advertisers to assist in helping to ensure that their ads are not placed



| | |
|---|---|
| | <p>adjacent to content they do not consider to fit with their brand values. While any content that is violative of our CGs, including our I&A policies, is removed, the brand safety tools are designed to help advertisers to further protect their brand. For example, a family-oriented brand may not want to appear next to videos containing news-related content. We have adopted the industry accepted framework in support of these principles.</p> <p>(II) Verification in the context of ads</p> <p>We provide verified badges on some accounts including certain advertisers. Verified badges help users make informed choices about the accounts they choose to follow. It's an easy way for notable figures to let users know they're seeing authentic content, and it helps to build trust among high-profile accounts and their followers. For individuals, non-profits, institutions, businesses, or official brand pages, this badge builds an important layer of clarity with the TikTok community. We consider a number of factors before granting a verified badge, such as whether the notable account is authentic, unique, and active.</p> <p>We strengthen our approach to countering influence attempts by:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Making state-affiliated media accounts that attempt to reach communities outside their home country on current global events and affairs ineligible for recommendation, which means their content won't appear in the For You feed. • Prohibiting state-affiliated media accounts in all markets where our state-controlled media labels are available from advertising outside of the country with which they are primarily affiliated. • Investing in our detection capabilities of state-affiliated media accounts. • Working with third party external experts to shape our state-affiliated media policy and assessment of state-controlled media labels. |
| SLI 1.1.1 – Numbers by actions enforcing policies above (specify if at page and/or domain level) | <p>Methodology of data measurement:</p> <p>We have set out the number of ads that have been removed from our platform for violation of our political content policies, as well as our more granular policies on medical misinformation, dangerous misinformation, synthetic and manipulated media and dangerous conspiracy theories. We launched our granular climate misinformation policy towards the end of the reporting period and we look forward to sharing data on it once we have a full reporting period of data.</p> <p>The majority of ads that violate our previously four, now five, granular misinformation ad policies, would have been removed under our existing policies. In cases where an ad is deemed violative for other policies and also for our more recent granular misinformation policies, the removal is counted under the existing policy. Therefore, the second column below shows only the number of ads removed where the sole reason was one of these four reported additional misinformation policies, and does not include ads already removed under our existing policies or where misinformation policies were not the driving factor for the removal.</p> |



We have been focused on enforcement of our political advertising prohibition as well as our internal detection capability of political content on our platform which included launching specialised political content moderator training and automoderation strategies. The data below suggests that our existing policies (such as political content and other policy areas such as our inaccurate, misleading, or false content policy) already cover the majority of harmful misinformation ads, due to their expansive nature of coverage.

Note that numbers have only been provided for monetised markets and are based on where the ads were displayed. We note that H2 2024 covered a very busy election cycle in Europe, including in Romania, France and Ireland.

| | Number of ad removals under the political content ad policy | Number of ad removals under the <u>four granular</u> misinformation ad policies |
|----------------------|--|--|
| Member States | | |
| Austria | 746 | 3 |
| Belgium | 1,152 | 1 |
| Bulgaria | 328 | 7 |
| Croatia | 3 | 0 |
| Cyprus | 128 | 0 |
| Czech Republic | 111 | 0 |
| Denmark | 409 | 0 |
| Estonia | 90 | 0 |
| Finland | 235 | 0 |
| France | 4,621 | 7 |
| Germany | 6,498 | 63 |



| | | |
|---------------|--------|-----|
| Greece | 911 | 8 |
| Hungary | 512 | 2 |
| Ireland | 565 | 1 |
| Italy | 2,781 | 8 |
| Latvia | 131 | 4 |
| Lithuania | 19 | 0 |
| Luxembourg | 86 | 0 |
| Malta | N/A | N/A |
| Netherlands | 1,179 | 3 |
| Poland | 1,118 | 4 |
| Portugal | 438 | 1 |
| Romania | 10,698 | 2 |
| Slovakia | 145 | 4 |
| Slovenia | 52 | 0 |
| Spain | 2,558 | 17 |
| Sweden | 752 | 0 |
| Iceland | N/A | N/A |
| Liechtenstein | N/A | N/A |
| Norway | 474 | 2 |



| | | |
|-----------|--------|-----|
| Total EU | 36,266 | 135 |
| Total EEA | 36,740 | 137 |

This additional Service Level Indicator provides an estimated financial value of the actions taken by Signatories to demonetise disinformation sources (under SLI 1.1.1). It is based on media metrics available to Signatories (query/bid² or impression³) and applying an agreed-upon conversion factor provided by a third party designated by the Task-force of the Code (Ebiquity plc.).

² Request placed between a seller and buyer of advertising that can detail amongst other things website, specific content, targeting data inclusive of audience or content.

³ Comprehensive calculation of the number of people who have been reached by a piece of media content by passive exposure (viewing a piece of content) or active engagement (visiting a destination).



| | | | | |
|-------------------------------|--|--|----------------------------|--|
| SLI 1.1.2 - | <p>The EU Code of Practice Permanent Task-force appointed Ebiquity Plc to serve in the capacity of 'third-party estimator', responsible for providing periodic Cost Per Mille ('CPM') conversion factors for use by signatories to derive financial estimates solely in relation to this SLI. This SLI applies the conversion factor developed by Ebiquity to the impressions of ads that have been removed from our platform and aims to provide an estimate of the unrealised value of revenue related to the demonetisation of disinformation.</p> <p>The CPM data is provided on a specific EU market basis where available, and currently covers 26 of the 27 EU markets (excluding Luxembourg). Note that we have only provided numbers for monetised markets, based on where the ads were displayed.</p> <p>Ebiquity creates the CPM estimates based on aggregated and anonymized media investment data from their Media Data Vault, its proprietary database infrastructure used to service its clients. Ebiquity has developed three dedicated channel CPMs (Programmatic – Display, Programmatic - Online Video, and Paid Social) as well as a Blended CPM, which can be used for general application and is not identifiable to any specific client, agency, vendor, platform, or ad format.</p> <p>We have calculated the approximate financial value by using the "Blended CPM" value provided by Ebiquity. We note that this SLI provides an approximate financial value only, and does not reflect how TikTok monetises ad content in practice. It is therefore not an accurate representation of TikTok's actual revenue.</p> <p>TikTok was not involved in the development of the conversion factor and so cannot endorse it or the underlying methodology and data. We remain committed to increasing transparency in this chapter, including by participating in the working group to better understand the underlying methodology and ensure the conversion factor provides, as accurately as possible, an approximation of the financial value of actions taken to demonetise disinformation. Note that most of the conversion factors provided by Ebiquity have increased since the last report.</p> | | | |
| Euro value of ads demonetised | | | | |
| | Number of impressions for ads removed under the political content ad policy | Number of impressions for ads removed under the more granular misinformation policies | Ebiquity Conversion | Euro Value of Ads Demonetised/1000 (accounting for Cost per thousand) |



| | | | | |
|----------------|------------|--------|-----|-------------|
| Austria | 2,405,688 | 0 | 4 | 9622.752 |
| Belgium | 414,078 | 16,971 | 5.5 | 2370.7695 |
| Bulgaria | 21,839 | 0 | 1.5 | 32.7585 |
| Croatia | 69 | 0 | 3.5 | 0.2415 |
| Cyprus | 10,838 | 0 | 2.5 | 27.095 |
| Czech Republic | 187,494 | 0 | 4 | 749.976 |
| Denmark | 1,333,325 | 12,268 | 4.5 | 6055.1685 |
| Estonia | 14,889 | 0 | 2.5 | 37.2225 |
| Finland | 7,543,943 | 0 | 4 | 30175.772 |
| France | 14,427,406 | 510 | 4 | 57711.664 |
| Germany | 45,161,261 | 0 | 4.5 | 203225.6745 |
| Greece | 512,170 | 12,873 | 1.5 | 787.5645 |
| Hungary | 3,675,505 | 0 | 2 | 7351.01 |
| Ireland | 1,341,419 | 0 | 3 | 4024.257 |



| | | | | |
|-------------|------------|--------|-----|------------|
| Italy | 6,836,564 | 12,029 | 3.5 | 23970.0755 |
| Latvia | 4,551 | 0 | 3 | 13.653 |
| Lithuania | 59,348 | 0 | 2.5 | 148.37 |
| Luxembourg | 5,472 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Malta | N/A | N/A | 3 | 0 |
| Netherlands | 879,250 | 1,048 | 5 | 4401.49 |
| Poland | 610,009 | 0 | 1.5 | 915.0135 |
| Portugal | 409,358 | 0 | 2.5 | 1023.395 |
| Romania | 27,208,895 | 0 | 1.5 | 40813.3425 |
| Slovakia | 52,215 | 0 | 2.5 | 130.5375 |
| Slovenia | 53,989 | 0 | 2 | 107.978 |
| Spain | 9,622,981 | 8,551 | 3 | 28894.596 |
| Sweden | 4,565,753 | 0 | 4.5 | 20545.8885 |
| Iceland | N/A | N/A | 3 | 0 |



| | | | | |
|------------------|--------------------|---------------|------------|-------------------|
| Liechtenstein | N/A | N/A | 0 | 0 |
| Norway | 120,449 | 1,367 | 5.5 | 669.988 |
| Total EU | 127,358,309 | 64,250 | N/A | 443,136.27 |
| Total EEA | 127,478,758 | 65,517 | N/A | 443,806.25 |

| | |
|------------------|--|
| Measure 1.2 | |
| QRE 1.2.1 | <p>All creators must comply with TikTok's Community Guidelines, including our I&A policies. Where creators fail to comply with our Community Guidelines, this may result in loss of access to monetisation and / or loss of account access. Users in all EU member states are notified by an in-app notification in their relevant local language where there has been a restriction of their ability to monetise, restriction of their access to a feature, removal or otherwise restriction of access to their content, or a ban of their account.</p> <p>Our policies prohibit accounts verified as belonging to a government, politician or political party from accessing monetisation features. They will, for instance, be ineligible for participation in content monetisation programs such as our Creator Rewards Program. Along with our existing ban on political advertising, this means that accounts belonging to politicians, political parties and governments will not be able to give or receive money through TikTok's monetisation features, or spend money promoting their content (although exemptions are made for governments in certain circumstances such as for public health).</p> <p>We launched the Creator Code of Conduct in April 2024. These are the standards we expect creators involved in TikTok programs, features, events and campaigns to follow on and off-platform, in addition to our Community Guidelines and Terms of Service. Being a part of these creator programs is an opportunity that comes with additional responsibilities, and this code will also help provide creators with additional reassurance that other participants are meeting these standards too. We are actively improving our enforcement guidance and processes for this, including building on proactive signalling of off-platform activity.</p> |
| SLI 1.2.1 | Methodology of data measurement: |



| | | | | |
|----------------------|---|-----|-----|-----|
| | <p>Our I&A policies within our CGs are the first line of defence in combating harmful misinformation and deceptive behaviours on our platform. All creators are required to comply with our CGs, which set out the circumstances where we will remove, or otherwise limit the availability of, content. Creators who breach the Community Guidelines or Terms of Service are not eligible to receive rewards. We have set out the number of ads that have been removed from our platform for violation of our political content policies as well as our four more granular policies on medical misinformation, dangerous misinformation, synthetic and manipulated media and dangerous conspiracy theories in SLI 1.1.1. Further, SLI 1.1.2 aims to provide an estimate of the potential impact on revenue of demonetising disinformation. We are working towards being able to provide more data for this SLI.</p> | | | |
| Member States | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| Total EU | | | | |
| Total EEA | | | | |

| | |
|-------------|--|
| Measure 1.3 | |
|-------------|--|

**QRE 1.3.1**

We partner with a number of industry leaders to provide a number of controls and transparency tools to advertising buyers with regard to the placement of ads:

Controls: We offer pre-campaign solutions to advertisers so they can put additional safeguards in place before their campaign goes live to mitigate the risk of their advertising being displayed adjacent to certain types of user-generated content. These measures are in addition to the CGs, which provide overarching rules around the types of content that can appear on TikTok and are eligible for the For You feed:

- **TikTok Inventory Filter:** This is our proprietary system which enables advertisers to choose the profile of content they want their ads to run adjacent to. We expanded our Inventory Filter which is now available in 29 jurisdictions in the EEA and is embedded directly in TikTok Ads Manager, the system through which advertisers purchase ads. We have expanded the functionality of this Inventory Filter in various EEA countries. More details can be found [here](#). The Inventory Filter is informed by Industry Standards and policies include topics which may be susceptible to disinformation.
- **TikTok Pre-bid Brand Safety Solution by Integral Ad Science (“IAS”):** Advertisers can filter content based on industry-standard frameworks with all levels of risk (available in France and Germany). Some misinformation content may be captured and filtered out by these industry standard categories, such as “Sensitive Social Issues”.

Transparency: We have partnered with third parties to offer post-campaign solutions that enable advertisers to assess the suitability of user content that ran immediately adjacent to their ad in the For You feed, against their chosen brand suitability parameters:

- **Zefr:** Through our partnership with Zefr, advertisers can obtain campaign insights into brand suitability and safety on the platform (now available in 29 countries in the EEA). Zefr aligns with the Industry Standards.
- **IAS:** Advertisers can measure brand safety, viewability and invalid traffic on the platform with the IAS Signal platform (post campaign is available in 28 countries in the EEA). As with IAS’s pre-bid solution covered above, this aligns with the GARM Framework.
- **DoubleVerify:** We are partnering with DoubleVerify to provide advertisers with media quality measurement for ads. DoubleVerify is working actively with us to expand their suite of brand suitability and media quality solutions on the platform. DoubleVerify is available in 27 EU countries.

Measure 1.4



| | |
|------------------|--|
| QRE 1.4.1 | <p>When TikTok advertises, we buy advertising space only through ad networks (either directly, through publishers or agencies) which allows for direct measurement of brand safety and suitability, via tagging, using leading brand safety tools across all digital media channels. This allows us to mitigate the risk of TikTok ads appearing next to sources of disinformation and be in control of the environment our content is appearing next to.</p> <p>We use DoubleVerify to ensure our own ads run on or near suitable content, whilst running and monitoring brand safety and suitability metrics across other placements, always updating the context and content of our blocklists as well as to ensure the TikTok brand is protected in any context.</p> <p>For instance, we monitor the placement of our ads very closely, especially in the context of politically sensitive events such as the War in Ukraine or the Israel / Hamas conflict, and in the event of our ads appearing adjacent to or on sources of disinformation, we are able to identify and investigate the content in question to assess risks using DoubleVerify dashboards. Once identified, we will then adjust any filters or add the publication to our blocklist (which is regularly reviewed and updated) to prevent recurrence.</p> |
| Measure 1.5 | |
| QRE 1.5.1 | <p>We have achieved the TAG Brand Safety Certified seal and the TAG Certified Against Fraud seal by the Trustworthy Accountability Group (“TAG”) in the EEA and globally. This required appropriate verification by external auditors. Details of our TAG seal can be found by searching for “TikTok” on their public register which can be found here.</p> <p>We have been certified by the Interactive Advertising Bureau (“IAB”) for the IAB Ireland Gold Standard 2.1 (listed here) and IAB Sweden Gold Standard 2.0.</p> |
| QRE 1.5.2 | We have achieved the TAG Brand Safety Certified and TAG Certified Against Fraud seals and the IAB Ireland Gold Standard and IAB Sweden Gold Standard 2.0. |



| | |
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| Measure 1.6 | |
| QRE 1.6.1 | <p>We offer a variety of brand safety tools for preventing ads from being placed beside specific types of content. We continue to invest in our existing partnerships with leading third party brand safety and suitability providers (including DoubleVerify, Integral Ad Science, and Zefr).</p> <p>We evaluate, on an ongoing basis, whether there are potential new partnerships, including with researchers, that may be appropriate for our platform. Furthermore, our advertising policies help to ensure that the categories of content which are most likely to require such checks and integration of information do not make it onto the platform in the first place.</p> |
| QRE 1.6.2 | We only purchase ads through ad networks which make robust and reputable brand safety tools available to us. All of our media investment is therefore protected by such tools. |
| QRE 1.6.3 | We have partnered with several third parties (IAS, Double Verify and Zefr) to offer post-campaign solutions that enable advertisers to assess the suitability of user content that ran immediately adjacent to their ad in all feeds |
| QRE 1.6.4 | Not applicable as TikTok does not rate sources. |
| SLI 1.6.1 | |

| II. Scrutiny of Ad Placements | |
|--|---|
| Commitment 2 | |
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No] | Yes |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points]. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In order to improve the granularity of existing ad policies, developed a specific climate misinformation ad policy. |



| | |
|---|--|
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Continued to enforce our four granular harmful misinformation ad policies in the EEA. As mentioned in our H2 2023 report, the policies cover: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ Medical Misinformation ◦ Dangerous Misinformation ◦ Synthetic and Manipulated Media ◦ Dangerous Conspiracy Theories • Expanded the functionality (including choice and ability) in the EEA of our in-house pre-campaign brand safety tool, the TikTok Inventory Filter. • Improved our IAB certification for Sweden Gold Standard to 2.0. • We continue to engage in the Task-force and its working groups and subgroups such as the working subgroup on Elections (Crisis Response). |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | No |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months? | We are continuously reviewing and improving our tools and processes to fight disinformation and will report on any further development in the next report. |
| Measure 2.1 | |
| QRE 2.1.1 | Paid ads are subject to our strict ad policies , which specifically prohibit misleading, inauthentic and deceptive behaviours. Ads are reviewed against these policies before being allowed on our platform. In order to improve our existing ad policies, we launched four more granular policies in the EEA in 2023 (covering Medical Misinformation, Dangerous Misinformation, Synthetic and Manipulated Media and Dangerous Conspiracy Theories) which advertisers also need to comply with. Towards the end of 2024, we launched a fifth granular policy covering climate misinformation. |



| SLI 2.1.1 – Numbers by actions enforcing policies above | Methodology of data measurement: | |
|--|--|--|
| | <p>We have set out the number of ads that have been removed from our platform for violation of our political content policies, as well as our four granular policies on medical misinformation, dangerous misinformation, synthetic and manipulated media and dangerous conspiracy theories. We launched our climate misinformation policy towards the end of the reporting period and we look forward to sharing data on it along with our 4 other granular misinformation ad policies once we have a full reporting period of data.</p> <p>The majority of ads that violate our newly launched misinformation policies, would have been removed under our existing policies. In cases where an ad is deemed violative for other policies and also for these additional misinformation policies, the removal is counted under the older policy. Therefore, the second column below shows only the number of ads removed where the sole reason was one of these four additional misinformation policies, and does not include ads already removed under our existing policies or where misinformation policies were not the driving factor for the removal.</p> <p>The data below suggests that our existing policies (such as political content) already cover the majority of harmful misinformation ads, due to their expansive nature of coverage.</p> <p>Note that numbers have only been provided for monetised markets and are based on where the ads were displayed.</p> | |
| | | |
| | | |
| Member States | Number of ad removals under the political content ad policy | Number of ad removals under the four granular misinformation ad policies |
| Austria | 746 | 3 |
| Belgium | 1,152 | 1 |
| Bulgaria | 328 | 7 |
| Croatia | 3 | 0 |
| Cyprus | 128 | 0 |
| Czech Republic | 111 | 0 |



| | | |
|-------------|--------|-----|
| Denmark | 409 | 0 |
| Estonia | 90 | 0 |
| Finland | 235 | 0 |
| France | 4,621 | 7 |
| Germany | 6,498 | 63 |
| Greece | 911 | 8 |
| Hungary | 512 | 2 |
| Ireland | 565 | 1 |
| Italy | 2,781 | 8 |
| Latvia | 131 | 4 |
| Lithuania | 19 | 0 |
| Luxembourg | 86 | 0 |
| Malta | N/A | N/A |
| Netherlands | 1,179 | 3 |
| Poland | 1,118 | 4 |
| Portugal | 438 | 1 |
| Romania | 10,698 | 2 |
| Slovakia | 145 | 4 |
| Slovenia | 52 | 0 |



| | | |
|------------------|---------------|------------|
| Spain | 2,558 | 17 |
| Sweden | 752 | 0 |
| Iceland | N/A | N/A |
| Liechtenstein | N/A | N/A |
| Norway | 474 | 2 |
| Total EU | 36,266 | 135 |
| Total EEA | 36,740 | 137 |

| Measure 2.2 | |
|------------------|---|
| QRE 2.2.1 | <p>In order to identify content and sources that breach our ad policies, ads go through moderation prior to going “live” on the platform.</p> <p>TikTok places considerable emphasis on proactive moderation of advertisements. Advertisements and advertiser accounts are reviewed against our Advertising Policies at the pre-posting and post-posting stage through a combination of automated and human moderation.</p> <p>The majority of ads that violate our misinformation policies would have been removed under our existing policies. Our granular advertising policies currently cover:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dangerous Misinformation • Dangerous Conspiracy Theories • Medical Misinformation • Manipulated Media • Climate Misinformation <p>After the ad goes live on the platform, users can report any concerns using the “report” button, and the ad will be reviewed again and appropriate action taken if necessary.</p> |



| | |
|------------------|---|
| | <p>TikTok also operates a "recall" process whereby ads already on TikTok will go through an additional stage of review if certain conditions are met, including reaching certain impression thresholds. TikTok also conducts additional reviews on random samples of ads to ensure its processes are functioning as expected.</p> <p>We work with 14 fact-checking partners who provide fact-checking coverage in 23 EEA languages, including at least one official language of every EU Member State, plus Georgian, Russian, Turkish, and Ukrainian.</p> |
| Measure 2.3 | |
| QRE 2.3.1 | <p>In order to identify content and sources that breach our ad policies, ads go through moderation prior to going "live" on the platform.</p> <p>TikTok places considerable emphasis on proactive moderation of advertisements. Advertisements and advertiser accounts are reviewed against our Advertising Policies at the pre-posting and post-posting stage through a combination of automated and human moderation.</p> <p>The majority of ads that violate our misinformation policies would have been removed under our existing policies. Our granular advertising policies currently cover:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dangerous Misinformation • Dangerous Conspiracy Theories • Medical Misinformation • Manipulated Media • Climate Misinformation <p>After the ad goes live on the platform, users can report any concerns using the "report" button, and the ad will be reviewed again and appropriate action taken if necessary.</p> <p>TikTok also operates a "recall" process whereby ads already on TikTok will go through an additional stage of review if certain conditions are met, including reaching certain impression thresholds. TikTok also conducts additional reviews on random samples of ads to ensure its processes are functioning as expected.</p> |
| SLI 2.3.1 | <p>We are pleased to be able to report on the ads removed for breach of our political content policies, as well as our more granular misinformation ad policies, including the impressions of those ads in this report. We launched our climate misinformation policy towards the end of the reporting period and we look forward to sharing data on it along with our 4 other granular misinformation ad policies once we have a full reporting period of data.</p> |



| | Number of ad removals under the political content ad policy | Number of ad removals under the four granular misinformation ad policies | Number of impressions for ads removed under the political content ad policy | Number of impressions for ads removed under the four granular misinformation ad policies |
|----------------|---|--|---|--|
| Member States | | | | |
| Austria | 746 | 3 | 2,405,688 | 0 |
| Belgium | 1,152 | 1 | 414,078 | 16,971 |
| Bulgaria | 328 | 7 | 21,839 | 0 |
| Croatia | 3 | 0 | 69 | 0 |
| Cyprus | 128 | 0 | 10,838 | 0 |
| Czech Republic | 111 | 0 | 187,494 | 0 |
| Denmark | 409 | 0 | 1,333,325 | 12,268 |
| Estonia | 90 | 0 | 14,889 | 0 |
| Finland | 235 | 0 | 7,543,943 | 0 |
| France | 4,621 | 7 | 14,427,406 | 510 |
| Germany | 6,498 | 63 | 45,161,261 | 0 |
| Greece | 911 | 8 | 512,170 | 12,873 |
| Hungary | 512 | 2 | 3,675,505 | 0 |
| Ireland | 565 | 1 | 1,341,419 | 0 |
| Italy | 2,781 | 8 | 6,836,564 | 12,029 |



| | | | | |
|------------------|---------------|------------|--------------------|---------------|
| Latvia | 131 | 4 | 4,551 | 0 |
| Lithuania | 19 | 0 | 59,348 | 0 |
| Luxembourg | 86 | 0 | 5,472 | 0 |
| Malta | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| Netherlands | 1,179 | 3 | 879,250 | 1,048 |
| Poland | 1,118 | 4 | 610,009 | 0 |
| Portugal | 438 | 1 | 409,358 | 0 |
| Romania | 10,698 | 2 | 27,208,895 | 0 |
| Slovakia | 145 | 4 | 52,215 | 0 |
| Slovenia | 52 | 0 | 53,989 | 0 |
| Spain | 2,558 | 17 | 9,622,981 | 8,551 |
| Sweden | 752 | 0 | 4,565,753 | 0 |
| Iceland | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| Liechtenstein | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| Norway | 474 | 2 | 120,449 | 1,367 |
| Total EU | 36,266 | 135 | 127,358,309 | 64,250 |
| Total EEA | 36,740 | 137 | 127,478,758 | 65,617 |



| Measure 2.4 | | | | |
|----------------------|--|---|--|---|
| QRE 2.4.1 | <p>We are clear with advertisers that their ads must comply with our strict ad policies (see TikTok Business Help Centre). We explain that all ads are reviewed before being uploaded on our platform - usually within 24 hours. Ads already on TikTok may go through an additional stage of review if they are reported, if certain conditions are met (e.g., reaching certain impression thresholds) or because of random sampling conducted at TikTok's own initiative.</p> <p>Where an advertiser has violated an ad policy they are informed by way of a notification. This is visible in their TikTok Ads Manager account and/or sent by email (if they have provided a valid email address), or where an advertiser has booked their ad through a TikTok representative, then the representative will inform the advertiser of any violations. Advertisers are able to make use of functionality to appeal rejections of their ads in certain circumstances.</p> <p>As part of our overarching DSA compliance programme, we improved how we notify and increase transparency to our advertisers. Notifications of restrictions include the restriction itself, reason for restriction , whether we made that decision by automated means, how we came to detect the violation (e.g. as a result of a user report or proactive TikTok initiatives) and what their rights of redress are .Advertisers can access online functionality to appeal restrictions on their account or ads. These appeals are then also reviewed against our ad policies and additional information could be provided to advertisers to help them understand the violation and what to do about it.</p> | | | |
| SLI 2.4.1 | <p>We are pleased to be able to share the number of appeals for ads removed under our political content ad policies and our four granular misinformation ad policies as well as the number of respective overturns. The data shows a reduced number of appeals for ads removed under the political content policy evidencing our improved moderation and decision making processes. We launched our climate misinformation policy towards the end of the reporting period and we look forward to sharing data on it along with our 4 other granular misinformation ad policies once we have a full reporting period of data.</p> | | | |
| | Number of appeals for ads removed under the the four granular misinformation ad policies | Number of appeals for ads removed under political content policy | Number of overturns of appears under the four more granular misinformation policies | Number of overturns of appeal under political content policy |
| Member States | | | | |
| Austria | 0 | 34 | 0 | 26 |



| | | | | |
|----------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| Belgium | 0 | 18 | 0 | 8 |
| Bulgaria | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| Croatia | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 |
| Cyprus | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Czech Republic | 0 | 6 | 0 | 1 |
| Denmark | 0 | 18 | 0 | 10 |
| Estonia | 0 | 6 | 0 | 4 |
| Finland | 0 | 15 | 0 | 7 |
| France | 0 | 84 | 0 | 50 |
| Germany | 0 | 78 | 0 | 45 |
| Greece | 0 | 16 | 0 | 6 |
| Hungary | 0 | 11 | 0 | 5 |
| Ireland | 0 | 32 | 0 | 18 |
| Italy | 0 | 53 | 0 | 22 |
| Latvia | 0 | 2 | 0 | 1 |
| Lithuania | 0 | 6 | 0 | 2 |
| Luxembourg | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Malta | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| Netherlands | 0 | 24 | 0 | 10 |



| | | | | |
|------------------|----------|------------|----------|------------|
| Poland | 0 | 9 | 0 | 3 |
| Portugal | 0 | 15 | 0 | 7 |
| Romania | 0 | 75 | 0 | 31 |
| Slovakia | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 |
| Slovenia | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Spain | 0 | 90 | 0 | 35 |
| Sweden | 0 | 37 | 0 | 13 |
| Iceland | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| Liechtenstein | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| Norway | 0 | 27 | 0 | 11 |
| Total EU | 0 | 637 | 0 | 307 |
| Total EEA | 0 | 664 | 0 | 318 |



| II. Scrutiny of Ad Placements | |
|---|--|
| Commitment 3 | |
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No] | Yes |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points]. | We continue to engage in the Task-force and all its working groups and subgroups such as the working subgroup on Elections (Crisis Response). |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | No |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months? | We are continuously reviewing and improving our tools and processes to fight disinformation and will report on any further development in the next report. |
| Measure 3.1 | |



| | |
|------------------|--|
| QRE 3.1.1 | <p>As set out later on in this report, we cooperate with a number of third parties to facilitate the flow of information that may be relevant for tackling purveyors of harmful misinformation. This information is shared internally to help ensure consistency of approach across our platform.</p> <p>We also continue to be actively involved in the Task-force working group for Chapter 2, specifically the working subgroup on Elections (Crisis Response) which we co-chaired. We work with other signatories to define and outline metrics regarding the monetary reach and impact of harmful misinformation. We are in close collaboration with industry to ensure alignment and clarity on the reporting of these code requirements.</p> <p>We work with 14 fact-checking partners who provide fact-checking coverage in 23 EEA languages, including at least one official language of every EU Member State, plus Georgian, Russian, Turkish, and Ukrainian.</p> |
| Measure 3.2 | |
| QRE 3.2.1 | <p>We work with industry partners to discuss common standards and definitions to support consistency of categorising content, adjacency & measurement relevant topics, in appropriate fora. We work closely with IAB Sweden, IAB Ireland and other organisations such as TAG in the EEA and globally. We are also on the board of the Brand Safety Institute.</p> <p>We continue to share relevant insights and metrics within our quarterly transparency reports, which aim to inform industry peers and the research community. We continue to engage in the sub groups set up for insights sharing between signatories and the Commission.</p> |
| Measure 3.3 | |
| QRE 3.3.1 | We continue to work closely with IAB Sweden, IAB Ireland and other organisations such as TAG in the EEA and globally. |



III. Political Advertising Commitments 4 - 13



| III. Political Advertising | |
|---|--|
| Commitment 4 | |
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No] | No |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points]. | N/A |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | As we prohibit political advertising we are continuing to focus on enforcement of this policy in light of Regulation EU 2024/900 on the Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising coming into force and the majority of provisions applying from October 2025. |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months? | N/A |
| Measure 4.1 | |
| Measure 4.2 | |
| QRE 4.1.1 (for measures 4.1 and 4.2) | <p>TikTok is first and foremost an entertainment platform, and we're proud to be a place that brings people together through creative and entertaining content. While sharing political beliefs and engaging in political conversation is allowed as organic content on TikTok, our policies prohibit our community, including politicians and political party accounts, from placing political ads or posting political branded content.</p> <p>Specifically, our Politics, Culture and Religion policy prohibits ads and landing pages which:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> reference, promote, or oppose candidates or nominees for public office, political parties, or elected or appointed government officials; |



| | |
|---|--|
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> reference an election, including voter registration, voter turnout, and appeals for votes; include advocacy for or against past, current, or proposed referenda, ballot measures, and legislative, judicial, or regulatory outcomes or processes (including those that promote or attack government policies or track records); and reference, promote, or sell, merchandise that features prohibited individuals, entities, or content, including campaign slogans, symbols, or logos. <p>Where accounts are designated as Government, Politician, and Political Party Accounts ("GPPPA"), those accounts are banned from placing ads on TikTok, accessing monetisation features and from campaign fundraising. We may allow some cause-based advertising and public services advertising from government agencies, non-profits and other entities if they meet certain conditions and are working with a TikTok sales representative.</p> <p>We prohibit political content in branded content i.e. content which is posted in exchange for payment or any other incentive by a third party.</p> <p>We have been reviewing our policies to ensure that our prohibition is at least as broad as that defined by the Regulation EU 2024/900 on the Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising. Our prohibition on political advertising is one part of our election integrity efforts which you can read more about in the elections crisis reports.</p> |
| QRE 4.1.2 (for measures 4.1 and 4.2) | Not applicable at this stage. |

| III. Political Advertising | |
|---|----|
| Commitment 5 | |
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No] | No |



| | |
|---|--|
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points]. | N/A |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | We prohibit political advertising and are continuing to focus on enforcement of this policy in light of Regulation EU 2024/900 on the Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising coming into force and the majority of provisions applying from October 2025. |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months? | N/A |
| Measure 5.1 | |
| QRE 5.1.1 | Not applicable as TikTok does not allow political advertising, as outlined in our Politics, Culture and Religion policy. We do not allow featuring political content in any form of advertising, extending this prohibition to both government, politician, or political party accounts and non-political advertisers expressing political views in advertising. |

| III. Political Advertising | |
|--|-----|
| Commitment 6 | |
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No] | No |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points]. | N/A |



| | | | |
|---|--|-----|-----|
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | We prohibit political advertising and are continuing to focus on enforcement of this policy in light of Regulation EU 2024/900 on the Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising coming into force and the majority of provisions applying from October 2025. | | |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months? | N/A | | |
| Measure 6.1 | | | |
| QRE 6.1.1 | Not applicable as TikTok does not allow political advertising. | | |
| Measure 6.2 | | | |
| QRE 6.2.1 | Not applicable as TikTok does not allow political advertising. | | |
| QRE 6.2.2 | Not applicable as TikTok does not allow political advertising. | | |
| SLI 6.2.1 – numbers for actions enforcing policies above | | | |
| Member States | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| Total EU | | | |
| Total EEA | | | |



| | |
|------------------|---|
| Measure 6.3 | |
| QRE 6.3.1 | Not applicable as TikTok does not allow political advertising. |
| Measure 6.4 | |
| QRE 6.4.1 | Not applicable as TikTok does not allow political advertising. |
| Measure 6.5 | |
| QRE 6.5.1 | This commitment is not applicable as TikTok is not a messaging app. |

| III. Political Advertising | |
|---|--|
| Commitment 7 | |
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No] | No |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points]. | N/A |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | We prohibit political advertising and are continuing to focus on enforcement of this policy in light of Regulation EU 2024/900 on the Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising coming into force and the majority of provisions applying from October 2025. |



| | |
|---|--|
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months? | N/A |
| Measure 7.1 | |
| QRE 7.1.1 | <p>Where accounts are designated as Government, Politician, and Political Party Accounts ("GPPPA"), those accounts are banned from placing ads on TikTok (with the exception of certain government agencies that may have a specific reason to advertise e.g. to promote public health initiatives) and from monetisation features. We publish the details of our GPPPA policy on our website, where we set out who we consider to be a GPPPA and the restrictions on those types of account. We explain how the actor of a government agency should act on our platform and what it can advertise in our TikTok Business Help Centre.</p> <p>In the EU, we apply an internal label to accounts belonging to a government, politician, or political party. Once an account has been labelled in this manner, a number of policies will be applied that help prevent misuse of certain features e.g., access to advertising features and solicitation for campaign fundraising are not allowed.</p> |
| SLI 7.1.1 – numbers for actions enforcing policies above (comparable metrics as for SLI 6.2.1) | |
| Member States | N/A |

| | | | | |
|-----------|--|--|--|--|
| Total EU | | | | |
| Total EEA | | | | |



| | |
|------------------|---|
| Measure 7.2 | |
| QRE 7.2.1 | <p>Not applicable as TikTok does not allow political advertising.</p> <p>Our Actor Policy aims to protect the integrity and authenticity of our community and prevent actors from evading our tools and processes. If an actor consistently demonstrates behaviour that deceives, misleads or is inauthentic to users and/or to TikTok we apply account level enforcement. This is not exclusive to ads containing political content.</p> <p>TikTok is dedicated to investigating and disrupting confirmed cases of CIO on the platform. Covert influence operations (CIOs) are organised attempts to manipulate or corrupt public debate while also misleading TikTok systems or users about identity, origin, operating location, popularity, or overall purpose. Suspension logic is dependent on strikes, where we take into account ad-level violation and advertiser account behaviours. Confirmed critical policy violations lead to permanent suspension. Further information on our policy can be found in our Business Help Centre Article.</p> |
| QRE 7.2.2 | Not applicable as TikTok does not allow political advertising. |
| Measure 7.3 | |
| QRE 7.3.1 | Not applicable as TikTok does not allow political advertising. |
| QRE 7.3.2 | Not applicable as TikTok does not allow political advertising. |
| Measure 7.4 | |
| QRE 7.4.1 | Not applicable as TikTok does not allow political advertising. |



| III. Political Advertising | |
|---|--|
| Commitment 8 | |
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No] | No |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points]. | N/A |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | We prohibit political advertising and are continuing to focus on enforcement of this policy in light of Regulation EU 2024/900 on the Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising coming into force and the majority of provisions applying from October 2025. |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months? | N/A |
| Measure 8.1 | |
| Measure 8.2 | |
| QRE 8.2.1 (for measures 8.1 & 8.2) | Not applicable as TikTok does not allow political advertising. |



III. Political Advertising

Commitment 9

| | |
|---|--|
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No] | No |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points]. | N/A |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | We prohibit political advertising and are continuing to focus on enforcement of this policy in light of Regulation EU 2024/900 on the Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising coming into force and the majority of provisions applying from October 2025. |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months? | N/A |
| Measure 9.1 | N/A |
| Measure 9.2 | N/A |
| QRE 9.2.1 (for measures 9.1 & 9.2) | Not applicable as TikTok does not allow political advertising. |



| III. Political Advertising | |
|---|---|
| Commitment 10 | |
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No] | No |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points]. | N/A |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | We prohibit political advertising and are continuing to focus on enforcement of this policy in light of Regulation EU 2024/900 on the Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising coming into force and the majority of provisions applying from October 2025. |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months? | N/A |
| Measure 10.1 | |
| Measure 10.2 | |
| QRE 10.2.1 (for measures 10.1 & 10.2) | <p>Not applicable as TikTok does not allow political advertising.</p> <p>In compliance with our obligations pursuant to the Digital Services Act, TikTok maintains a publicly searchable Ad Library that features ads that TikTok has been paid to display to users, including those that are not currently active or have been paused by the advertisers. This includes information on the total number of recipients reached, with aggregate numbers broken down by Member State for the group or groups of recipients that the ad specifically targeted,</p> |



| | |
|--|--|
| | <p>including for political ads which have been removed. Each ad entry is available for the duration that it is shown on TikTok and for a year afterwards in compliance with the Digital Services Act.</p> <p>Article 39(3) of the Digital Services Act requires that such libraries should not include the content of the ad, the identity of the person on whose behalf it was presented, or who paid for it where an ad has been <u>removed for incompatibility</u> with a platform's terms and conditions. As political ads are prohibited on TikTok, in order to comply with its legal obligations TikTok must remove these specific details of any political ads that have been removed from its platform (as such ad breaches its terms and conditions). For this reason TikTok's ad library is required to display different information in respect of political ads in comparison to platforms that do allow them.</p> |
|--|--|

| <h3>III. Political Advertising</h3> <h4>Commitment 11</h4> | |
|---|-----|
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No] | No |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points]. | N/A |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | No |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months? | N/A |



| | |
|--|--|
| Measure 11.1 | |
| Measure 11.2 | |
| Measure 11.3 | |
| Measure 11.4 | |
| QRE 11.1.1 (for measures 11.1-11.4) | |
| QRE 11.4.1 | |

| III. Political Advertising | |
|---|--|
| Commitment 12 | |
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No] | No |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points]. | TikTok did not subscribe to this commitment. Commitment 12 and associated measures are applicable to Civil Society only. |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | No |



| | |
|---|--|
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months? | TikTok did not subscribe to this commitment. Commitment 12 and associated measures are applicable to Civil Society only. |
| Measure 12.1 | |
| Measure 12.2 | |
| Measure 12.3 | |
| QRE 12.1.1 (for measures 12.1-12.3) | Commitment 12 and measures 12.1, 12.2 and 12.3 are applicable to Civil Society only. |

| III. Political Advertising | |
|---|--|
| Commitment 13 | |
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No] | No |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points]. | N/A |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | We prohibit political advertising and are continuing to focus on enforcement of this policy in light of Regulation EU 2024/900 on the Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising coming into force and the majority of provisions applying from October 2025. |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months? | N/A |



| | |
|--|---|
| Measure 13.1 | |
| Measure 13.2 | TikTok does not allow political advertising and this continues in blackout periods. |
| Measure 13.3 | |
| QRE 13.1.1 (for measures 13.1-13.3) | Whilst we do not allow political advertising, we remain engaged with discussions being held through the Task-force and other fora to ensure our policies and processes remain current and emerging threats are addressed in our policies and enforcement. |



IV. Integrity of Services Commitments 14 - 16



IV. Integrity of Services

Commitment 14

In order to limit impermissible manipulative behaviours and practices across their services, Relevant Signatories commit to put in place or further bolster policies to address both misinformation and disinformation across their services, and to agree on a cross-service understanding of manipulative behaviours, actors and practices not permitted on their services. Such behaviours and practices, which should periodically be reviewed in light with the latest evidence on the conducts and TTPs employed by malicious actors, such as the AMITT Disinformation Tactics, Techniques and Procedures Framework, include:

The following TTPs pertain to the creation of assets for the purpose of a disinformation campaign, and to ways to make these assets seem credible:

- 1. Creation of inauthentic accounts or botnets (which may include automated, partially automated, or non-automated accounts)
- 2. Use of fake / inauthentic reactions (e.g. likes, up votes, comments)
- 3. Use of fake followers or subscribers
- 4. Creation of inauthentic pages, groups, chat groups, fora, or domains
- 5. Account hijacking or impersonation

The following TTPs pertain to the dissemination of content created in the context of a disinformation campaign, which may or may not include some forms of targeting or attempting to silence opposing views. Relevant TTPs include:

- 6. Deliberately targeting vulnerable recipients (e.g. via personalised advertising, location spoofing or obfuscation)
- 7. Deploy deceptive manipulated media (e.g. “deep fakes”, “cheap fakes”...)
- 8. Use “hack and leak” operation (which may or may not include doctored content)
- 9. Inauthentic coordination of content creation or amplification, including attempts to deceive/manipulate platforms algorithms (e.g. keyword stuffing or inauthentic posting/reposting designed to mislead people about popularity of content, including by influencers)
- 10. Use of deceptive practices to deceive/manipulate platform algorithms, such as to create, amplify or hijack hashtags, data voids, filter bubbles, or echo chambers
- 11. Non-transparent compensated messages or promotions by influencers
- 12. Coordinated mass reporting of non-violative opposing content or accounts

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]

Yes



| | |
|--|--|
| <p>If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Building on our new AI-generated label for creators to disclose content that is completely AI-generated or significantly edited by AI, we have expanded our efforts in the AIGC space by: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ Implementing the Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity (C2PA) Content Credentials, which enables our systems to instantly recognize and automatically label AIGC. ◦ Supporting the coalition's working groups as a C2PA General Member. ◦ Joining the Content Authenticity Initiative (CAI) to drive wider adoption of the technical standard. ◦ Publishing a new Transparency Center article Supporting responsible, transparent AI-generated content. ◦ Building on our new AI-generated content label for creators, and implementation of C2PA Content Credentials, we launched a number of media literacy campaigns with guidance from expert organisations like Mediawise and WITNESS, including in Brazil, Germany, France, Mexico and the UK, that teach our community how to spot and label AI-generated content. This AIGC Transparency Campaign informed by WITNESS has reached 80M users globally, including more than 8.5M and 9.5M in Germany and France respectively. • Continued to join industry partners as a party to the "Tech Accord to Combat Deceptive Use of AI in 2024 Elections" which is a joint commitment to combat the deceptive use of AI in elections. • Continued to participate in the working groups on integrity of services and Generative AI. • We have continued to enhance our ability to detect covert influence operations. To provide more regular and detailed updates about the covert influence operations we disrupt, we have a dedicated Transparency Report on covert influence operations, which is available in TikTok's transparency centre. In this report, we include information about operations that we have previously removed and that have attempted to return to our platform with new accounts. |
| <p>Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]</p> | <p>No</p> |



If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

We are continuously reviewing and improving our tools and processes to fight disinformation and will report on any further development in the next COPD report.

Measure 14.1

**QRE 14.1.1**

As well as our I&A policies in our CGs which safeguard against harmful misinformation (see QRE 18.2.1), our I&A policies also expressly prohibit deceptive behaviours. Our policies on deceptive behaviours relate to the TTPs as follows:

TTPs which pertain to the creation of assets for the purpose of a disinformation campaign, and to ways to make these assets seem credible:

Creation of inauthentic accounts or botnets (which may include automated, partially automated, or non-automated accounts)

Our I&A policies which address **Spam and Deceptive Account Behaviours** expressly prohibit account behaviours that may spam or mislead our community. You can set up multiple accounts on TikTok to create different channels for authentic creative expression, but not for deceptive purposes.

We do not allow spam including:

- Operating large networks of accounts controlled by a single entity, or through automation;
- Bulk distribution of a high-volume of spam; and
- Manipulation of engagement signals to amplify the reach of certain content, or buying and selling followers, particularly for financial purposes

We also do not allow impersonation including:

- Accounts that pose as another real person or entity without disclosing that they are a fan or parody account in the account name, such as using someone's name, biographical details, content, or image without disclosing it
- Presenting as a person or entity that does not exist (a fake persona) with a demonstrated intent to mislead others on the platform

If we determine someone has engaged in any of these deceptive account behaviours, we will ban the account, and may ban any new accounts that are created.

Use of fake / inauthentic reactions (e.g. likes, up votes, comments) and use of fake followers or subscribers



Our I&A policies which address **fake engagement** do not allow the trade or marketing of services that attempt to artificially increase engagement or deceive TikTok's recommendation system. We do not allow our users to:

- facilitate the trade or marketing of services that artificially increase engagement, such as selling followers or likes; or
- provide instructions on how to artificially increase engagement on TikTok.

If we become aware of accounts or content with inauthentically inflated metrics, we will remove the associated fake followers or likes. Content that tricks or manipulates others as a way to increase engagement metrics, such as "like-for-like" promises and false incentives for engaging with content (to increase gifts, followers, likes, views, or other engagement metrics) is ineligible for our For You feed.

Creation of inauthentic pages, groups, chat groups, fora, or domains

TikTok does not have pages, groups, chat groups, fora or domains. This TTP is not relevant to our platform.

Account hijacking or Impersonation

Again, our policies prohibit **impersonation** which refers to accounts that pose as another real person or entity or present as a person or entity that does not exist (a fake persona) with a demonstrated intent to mislead others on the platform. Our users are not allowed to use someone else's name, biographical details, or profile picture in a misleading manner.

In order to protect freedom of expression, we do allow accounts that are clearly parody, commentary, or fan-based, such as where the account name indicates that it is a fan, commentary, or parody account and not affiliated with the subject of the account. We continue to develop our policies to ensure that impersonation of entities (such as businesses or educational institutions, for example) are prohibited and that accounts which impersonate people or entities who are not on the platform are also prohibited. We also issue warnings to users of suspected impersonation accounts and do not recommend those accounts on our For You Feed.



We also have a number of policies that address account hijacking. Our privacy and security policies under our CGs expressly prohibit users from providing access to their account credentials to others or enable others to conduct activities against our CGs. We do not allow access to any part of TikTok through unauthorised methods; attempts to obtain sensitive, confidential, commercial, or personal information; or any abuse of the security, integrity, or reliability of our platform. We also provide practical [guidance](#) to users if they have concerns that their account may have been hacked.

TTPs which pertain to the dissemination of content created in the context of a disinformation campaign, which may or may not include some forms of targeting or attempting to silence opposing views:

Deliberately targeting vulnerable recipients (e.g. via personalised advertising, location spoofing or obfuscation), inauthentic coordination of content creation or amplification, including attempts to deceive/manipulate platforms algorithms (e.g. keyword stuffing or inauthentic posting/reposting designed to mislead people about popularity of content, including by influencers), use of deceptive practices to deceive/manipulate platform algorithms, such as to create, amplify or hijack hashtags, data voids, filter bubbles, or echo chambers and coordinated mass reporting of non-violative opposing content or accounts.

We fight against CIOs as our policies prohibit attempts to sway public opinion while also misleading our systems or users about the identity, origin, approximate location, popularity or overall purpose.



When we investigate and remove these operations, we focus on behaviour and assessing linkages between accounts and techniques to determine if actors are engaging in a coordinated effort to mislead TikTok's systems or our community. In each case, we believe that the people behind these activities coordinate with one another to misrepresent who they are and what they are doing. We know that CIOs will continue to evolve in response to our detection and networks may attempt to reestablish a presence on our platform - that's why we take continuous action against these attempts including banning accounts found to be linked with previously disrupted networks. We continue to iteratively research and evaluate complex deceptive behaviours on our platform and develop appropriate product and policy solutions as appropriate in the long term. We publish all of the CIO networks we identify and remove voluntarily in a dedicated report within our transparency centre [here](#).

Use “hack and leak” operation (which may or may not include doctored content)

We have a number of policies that address hack and leak related threats (some examples are below):

- Our hack and leak policy, which aims to further reduce the harms inflicted by the unauthorised disclosure of hacked materials on the individuals, communities and organisations that may be implicated or exposed by such disclosures
- Our CIO policy addresses use of leaked documents to sway public opinion as part of a wider operation
- Our Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC) policy captures materials that have been digitally altered without an appropriate disclosure
- Our harmful misinformation policies combats conspiracy theories related to unfolding events and dangerous misinformation
- Our Trade of Regulated Goods and Services policy prohibits trading of hacked goods

Deceptive manipulated media (e.g. “deep fakes”, “cheap fakes”...)




Our 'Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC)' policy includes commonly used and easily understood language when referring to AIGC, and outlines our existing prohibitions on AIGC showing fake authoritative sources or crisis events, or falsely showing public figures in certain contexts including being bullied, making an endorsement, or being endorsed. We also do not allow content that contains the likeness of young people, or the likeness of adult private figures used without their permission.

For the purposes of our policy, AIGC refers to content created or modified by artificial intelligence (AI) technology or machine-learning processes, which may include images of real people, and may show highly realistic-appearing scenes, or use a particular artistic style, such as a painting, cartoons, or anime. 'Significantly edited content' is content that shows people doing or saying something they did not do or say, or altering their appearance in a way that makes them difficult to recognise or identify. Misleading AIGC or edited media is audio or visual content that has been edited, including by combining different clips together, to change the composition, sequencing, or timing in a way that alters the meaning of the content and could mislead viewers about the truth of real world events.

In accordance with our policy, we prohibit AIGC that features:

- Realistic-appearing people under the age of 18
- The likeness of adult private figures, if we become aware it was used without their permission
- Misleading AIGC or edited media that falsely shows:
 - Content made to seem as if it comes from an authoritative source, such as a reputable news organisation
 - A crisis event, such as a conflict or natural disaster
 - A public figure who is:
 - being degraded or harassed, or engaging in criminal or antisocial behaviour
 - taking a position on a political issue, commercial product, or a matter of public importance (such as an elections)
 - being politically endorsed or condemned by an individual or group



As AI evolves, we continue to invest in combating harmful AIGC by evolving our proactive detection models, consulting with experts, and partnering with peers on shared solutions.

Non-transparent compensated messages or promotions by influencers

Our [Terms of Service](#) and [Branded Content Policy](#) require users posting about a **brand or product in return for any payment or other incentive** to disclose their content by enabling the branded content toggle which we make available for users. We also provide functionality to enable users to report suspected undisclosed branded content which reminds the user who posted the suspected undisclosed branded content of our requirements and prompts them to turn the branded content toggle on if required. We made this requirement even clearer to users in our **Commercial Disclosures and Paid Promotion** policy in our March 2023 CG refresh, by increasing the information around our policing of this policy and providing specific examples.

In addition to branded content policies, our CIO policy can also apply to non-transparent compensated messages or promotions by influencers where it is found that those messages or promotions formed part of a covert influence campaign.

**QRE 14.1.2**

At TikTok, we place considerable emphasis on proactive content moderation and use a combination of technology and safety professionals to detect and remove harmful misinformation (see QRE 18.1.1) and deceptive behaviours on our Platform, *before* it is reported to us by users or third parties.

For instance, we take proactive measures to prevent inauthentic or spam accounts from being created. Thus, we have created and use detection models and rule engines that:

- prevent inauthentic accounts from being created based on malicious patterns; and
- remove registered accounts based on certain signals (ie, uncommon behaviour on the platform).

We also manually monitor user reports of inauthentic accounts in order to detect larger clusters or similar inauthentic behaviours.

However, given the complex nature of the TTPs, human moderation is critical to success in this area and TikTok's moderation teams therefore play a key role assessing and addressing identified violations. We provide our moderation teams with detailed guidance on how to apply the I&A policies in our CGs, including providing case banks of harmful misinformation claims to support their moderation work, and allow them to route new or evolving content to our fact-checking partners for assessment.

In addition, where content reaches certain levels of popularity in terms of the number of video views, it will be flagged for further review. Such review is undertaken given the extent of the content's dissemination and the increase in potential harm if the content is found to be in breach of our CGs including our I&A policies.

Furthermore, during the reporting period, we improved automated detection and enforcement of our 'Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC)' policy, resulting in an effective increase in the number of videos removed for policy violations. This also resulted in the number of visitors per video decreasing over the reporting period, demonstrating an effective control strategy as the scope of enforcement increased.



We have also set up specifically-trained teams that are focused on investigating and detecting CIO on our Platform. We've built international trust & safety teams with specialized expertise across threat intelligence, security, law enforcement, and data science to work on influence operations full-time. These teams continuously pursue and analyse on-platform signals of deceptive behaviour, as well as leads from external sources. They also collaborate with external intelligence vendors to support specific investigations on a case-by-case basis. When we investigate and remove these operations, we focus on behaviour and assessing linkages between accounts and techniques to determine if actors are engaging in a coordinated effort to mislead TikTok's systems or our community. In each case, we believe that the people behind these activities coordinate with one another to misrepresent who they are and what they are doing.

Accounts that engage in influence operations often avoid posting content that would be violative of platforms' guidelines by itself. That's why we focus on accounts' behaviour and technical linkages when analysing them, specifically looking for evidence that:

- They are coordinating with each other. For example, they are operated by the same entity, share technical similarities like using the same devices, or are working together to spread the same narrative.
- They are misleading our systems or users. For example, they are trying to conceal their actual location, or using fake personas to pose as someone they're not.
- They are attempting to manipulate or corrupt public debate to impact the decision making, beliefs and opinions of a community. For example, they are attempting to shape discourse around an election or conflict.

These criteria are aligned with industry standards and guidance from the experts we regularly consult with. They're particularly important to help us distinguish malicious, inauthentic coordination from authentic interactions that are part of healthy and open communities. For example, it would not violate our policies if a group of people authentically worked together to raise awareness or campaign for a social cause, or express a shared opinion (including political views). However, multiple accounts deceptively working together to spread similar messages in an attempt to influence public discussions would be prohibited and disrupted.



Measure 14.2

QRE 14.2.1

The implementation of our policies is ensured by different means, including specifically-designed tools (such as toggles to disclose branded content - see QRE 14.1.1) or human investigations to detect deceptive behaviours (for CIO activities - see QRE 14.1.2).

The implementation of these policies is also ensured through enforcement measures applied in all Member States.

CIO investigations are resource intensive and require in-depth analysis to ensure high confidence in proposed actions. Where our teams have the necessary high degree of confidence that an account is engaged in CIO or is connected to networks we took down in the past as part of a CIO, it is removed from our Platform.

Similarly, where our teams have a high degree of confidence that specific content violates one of our TTPs-related policies (See QRE 14.1.1), such content is removed from TikTok.

Lastly, we may reduce the discoverability of some content, including by making videos ineligible for recommendation in the For You feed section of our platform. This is, for example, the case for content that tricks or manipulates users in order to inauthentically increase followers, likes, or views.



SLI 14.2.1 – SLI 14.2.4

| TTP OR ACTION1 | <p>TTP No. 1: Creation of inauthentic accounts or botnets (which may include automated, partially automated, or non-automated accounts)</p> <p>Methodology of data measurement</p> <p>We have based the number of: (i) fake accounts removed; and (ii) followers of the fake accounts (identified at the time of removal of the fake account), on the country the fake account was last active in.</p> <p>We have updated our methodology to report the ratio of monthly average of fake accounts over of monthly active users, based on the latest publication of monthly active users, in order to better reflect TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service.</p> | | | | | |
|----------------|---|---------------------------------------|------------|--|------------|--|
| | SLI 14.2.1 | SLI 14.2.2 | SLI 14.2.3 | | SLI 14.2.4 | |
| | Nr of actions taken by type | Interaction/ engagement before action | | | | TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service |



| List actions per member states (see example table above) | Number of fake accounts removed | Number of followers of fake accounts identified at the time of removal | | | | Ratio of monthly average of Fake accounts over monthly active users | | |
|---|--|---|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| Member States | | | | | | | | |
| Austria | 92,511 | 467,635 | | | | | | |
| Belgium | 176,327 | 544,073 | | | | | | |
| Bulgaria | 423,060 | 188,995 | | | | | | |
| Croatia | 74,704 | 175,230 | | | | | | |
| Cyprus | 86,741 | 124,021 | | | | | | |
| Czech Republic | 194,925 | 348,626 | | | | | | |
| Denmark | 155,675 | 298,306 | | | | | | |
| Estonia | 111,506 | 239,039 | | | | | | |
| Finland | 99,745 | 195,684 | | | | | | |
| France | 2,061,174 | 20,207,105 | | | | | | |
| Germany | 1,678,822 | 20,545,728 | | | | | | |



| | | | | | | | | |
|---------------|---------|-----------|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| Greece | 133,443 | 1,702,918 | | | | | | |
| Hungary | 84,057 | 184,291 | | | | | | |
| Ireland | 321,237 | 697,840 | | | | | | |
| Italy | 672,344 | 5,900,534 | | | | | | |
| Latvia | 60,145 | 124,765 | | | | | | |
| Lithuania | 79,417 | 300,241 | | | | | | |
| Luxembourg | 73,258 | 611,602 | | | | | | |
| Malta | 60,192 | 226,073 | | | | | | |
| Netherlands | 886,619 | 1,575,641 | | | | | | |
| Poland | 360,959 | 3,192,516 | | | | | | |
| Portugal | 190,906 | 370,719 | | | | | | |
| Romania | 294,195 | 4,045,608 | | | | | | |
| Slovakia | 131,567 | 1,347,301 | | | | | | |
| Slovenia | 298,807 | 45,359 | | | | | | |
| Spain | 709,560 | 5,351,682 | | | | | | |
| Sweden | 239,020 | 528,326 | | | | | | |
| Iceland | 31,476 | 253,997 | | | | | | |
| Liechtenstein | 1,369 | 11,129 | | | | | | |
| Norway | 92,800 | 151,088 | | | | | | |



| | | | | | | | | |
|-----------|-----------|------------|--|--|--|-------|--|--|
| Total EU | 9,750,916 | 69,539,858 | | | | 0.010 | | |
| Total EEA | 9,876,561 | 69,956,072 | | | | | | |

| TTP OR ACTION 2 | TTP no. 2: Use of fake / inauthentic reactions (e.g. likes, up votes, comments) | | | | |
|--|---|---------------------------------------|------------|------------|--|
| | Methodology of data measurement: | | | | |
| | SLI 14.2.1 | SLI 14.2.2 | SLI 14.2.3 | SLI 14.2.4 | |
| | Nr of actions taken by type | Interaction/ engagement before action | | | |
| List actions per member states (see example table above) | Number of fake likes removed | Number of fake likes prevented | | | |
| Austria | 12,262,551 | 39,213,306 | | | |
| Belgium | 16,913,076 | 56,682,105 | | | |



| | | | | |
|--------------------|-------------|-------------|--|--|
| Bulgaria | 6,468,521 | 40,004,761 | | |
| Croatia | 1,821,268 | 17,901,159 | | |
| Cyprus | 4,176,517 | 6,960,047 | | |
| Czech Rep ublic | 3,052,689 | 31,099,711 | | |
| Denmark | 4,183,605 | 17,585,666 | | |
| Estonia | 687,649 | 7,385,026 | | |
| Finland | 3,086,208 | 19,264,460 | | |
| France | 78,227,394 | 336,499,329 | | |
| Germany | 131,158,324 | 357,582,219 | | |
| Greece | 14,621,872 | 84,211,417 | | |
| Hungary | 1,950,636 | 28,069,699 | | |



| | | | | |
|-------------|------------|-------------|--|--|
| Ireland | 4,520,433 | 31,110,363 | | |
| Italy | 60,514,367 | 606,697,045 | | |
| Latvia | 1,690,473 | 11,600,082 | | |
| Lithuania | 1,682,687 | 11,795,998 | | |
| Luxembourg | 1,920,605 | 7,987,636 | | |
| Malta | 1,395,676 | 3,466,698 | | |
| Netherlands | 23,557,961 | 101,316,771 | | |
| Poland | 8,833,014 | 208,518,568 | | |
| Portugal | 9,239,486 | 56,146,620 | | |
| Romania | 11,254,476 | 83,405,388 | | |
| Slovakia | 1,208,123 | 18,154,505 | | |



| | | | | |
|------------------|--------------------|----------------------|--|--|
| Slovenia | 727,133 | 5,843,233 | | |
| Spain | 38,331,442 | 161,280,031 | | |
| Sweden | 15,782,957 | 48,240,073 | | |
| Iceland | 230,931 | 1,564,206 | | |
| Liechtenstein | 24,827 | 70,045 | | |
| Norway | 5,457,966 | 20,708,187 | | |
| Total EU | 459,269,143 | 2,398,021,916 | | |
| Total EEA | 464,982,867 | 2,420,364,354 | | |

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|------------------------|---|
| TTP OR ACTION 3 | TTP No. 3: Use of fake followers or subscribers Methodology of data measurement: We based the number of fake followers that we removed on the country of registration of the user. We also based the number of fake followers prevented on the country of registration of the user. |
|------------------------|---|



| | SLI 14.2.1 | SLI 14.2.2 | SLI 14.2.3 | SLI 14.2.4 |
|--|---|---|-------------------|-------------------|
| | Nr of actions taken by type | Interaction/ engagement before action | | |
| List actions per member states (see example table above) | Number of fake followers removed | Number of fake follows prevented | | |
| Member States | | | | |
| Austria | 9,980,544 | 25,000,123 | | |
| Belgium | 11,916,866 | 34,550,567 | | |
| Bulgaria | 4,561,129 | 26,400,841 | | |
| Croatia | 1,965,426 | 18,990,456 | | |
| Cyprus | 1,706,405 | 18,497,473 | | |



| | | | | |
|----------------|-------------|-------------|--|--|
| Czech Republic | 4,342,681 | 18,233,387 | | |
| Denmark | 3,154,022 | 23,806,634 | | |
| Estonia | 482,641 | 16,887,949 | | |
| Finland | 3,204,999 | 20,303,735 | | |
| France | 109,481,878 | 127,136,908 | | |
| Germany | 125,941,360 | 138,933,948 | | |
| Greece | 7,880,295 | 38,712,931 | | |
| Hungary | 2,589,692 | 24,773,097 | | |
| Ireland | 3,213,842 | 25,239,860 | | |
| Italy | 35,511,559 | 158,916,638 | | |
| Latvia | 732,030 | 17,952,175 | | |



| | | | | |
|-------------|------------|------------|--|--|
| Lithuania | 2,057,659 | 18,928,046 | | |
| Luxembourg | 1,574,849 | 21,051,498 | | |
| Malta | 401,869 | 15,758,979 | | |
| Netherlands | 17,070,055 | 35,162,609 | | |
| Poland | 10,128,172 | 54,501,610 | | |
| Portugal | 3,714,261 | 26,901,973 | | |
| Romania | 14,021,343 | 44,172,801 | | |
| Slovakia | 4,288,570 | 21,010,637 | | |
| Slovenia | 678,185 | 1,942,793 | | |
| Spain | 31,084,803 | 73,920,335 | | |
| Sweden | 12,342,226 | 36,451,604 | | |



| | | | | |
|------------------|--------------------|----------------------|--|--|
| Iceland | 120,003 | 2,572,695 | | |
| Liechtenstein | 893,407 | 1,045,728 | | |
| Norway | 3,756,414 | 7,242,021 | | |
| Total EU | 424,027,361 | 1,084,139,607 | | |
| Total EEA | 428,797,185 | 1,095,000,051 | | |

| | |
|------------------------|---|
| TTP OR ACTION 4 | TTP No. 4: Creation of inauthentic pages, groups, chat groups, fora, or domains TikTok does not have pages, groups, chat groups, fora or domains. This TTP is not relevant to our platform. |
|------------------------|---|

| | | | | |
|------------------------|---|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| TTP OR ACTION 5 | TTP No. 5: Account hijacking or impersonation Methodology of data measurement: The number of accounts removed under our impersonation policy is based on the approximate location of the users. We have updated our methodology to report the ratio of monthly average impersonation accounts banned over monthly active users, based on the latest publication of monthly active users, in order to better reflect TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service. | | | |
| | SLI 14.2.1 | SLI 14.2.2 | SLI 14.2.3 | SLI 14.2.4 |



| | Nr of actions taken by type | | | TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service |
|--|---|--|--|--|
| Member States | Number of account banned under impersonation policy | | | Impersonation accounts over monthly active users |
| List actions per member states (see example table above) | | | | |
| Austria | 177 | | | |
| Belgium | 300 | | | |
| Bulgaria | 175 | | | |
| Croatia | 77 | | | |
| Cyprus | 54 | | | |
| Czech Rep ublic | 134 | | | |
| Denmark | 115 | | | |
| Estonia | 29 | | | |
| Finland | 92 | | | |
| France | 2,587 | | | |
| Germany | 2,277 | | | |



| | | | | |
|---------------|-------|--|--|--|
| Greece | 215 | | | |
| Hungary | 141 | | | |
| Ireland | 235 | | | |
| Italy | 805 | | | |
| Latvia | 48 | | | |
| Lithuania | 76 | | | |
| Luxembourg | 43 | | | |
| Malta | 0 | | | |
| Netherlands | 567 | | | |
| Poland | 1,251 | | | |
| Portugal | 206 | | | |
| Romania | 1,300 | | | |
| Slovakia | 63 | | | |
| Slovenia | 43 | | | |
| Spain | 709 | | | |
| Sweden | 284 | | | |
| Iceland | 15 | | | |
| Liechtenstein | 0 | | | |



| | | | | |
|-----------|---------------|--|--|-----------------|
| Norway | 178 | | | |
| Total EU | 12,003 | | | 0.000013 |
| Total EEA | 12,196 | | | |

| TTP OR ACTION 6 | TTP No. 6. Deliberately targeting vulnerable recipients (e.g. via personalised advertising, location spoofing or obfuscation) Methodology of data measurement: The number of new CIO network discoveries found to be targeting EU markets relates to our public disclosures for the period July 1st 2024 to December 31st 2024. We have categorised disrupted CIO networks by the country we assess that the network targeted. We have included any network which we assess to have targeted one or more European markets, or have operated from an EU market. We publish all of the CIO networks we identify and remove within our transparency reports here . CIO networks identified and removed are detailed below, including the assessed geographic location of network operation and the assessed target audience of the network, which we assess via technical and behavioural evidence from proprietary and open sources. The number of followers of CIO networks has been based on the number of accounts that followed any account within a network as of the date of that network's removal. | | | | | |
|---|---|-----------------------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------------------------|------------------------------|
| SLI 14.2.1 | SLI 14.2.2 | SLI 14.2.3 | SLI 14.2.4 | | | |
| Member States (Network origin) | Nr of instances of identified TTPs | Nr of actions taken by type | Interaction/engagement before action | Views/impressions after action | Interaction/engagement after action | Trends on targeted audiences |
| July- December2024 | | | | | | |



| | | | | | | | |
|---------|----------------------------|---------------------|---|--------------|--------------|---|--|
| Germany | 29 accounts in the network | 29 removed accounts | 137,671 accounts followed an account within the network as at the date of removal | Not measured | Not measured | We assess that this network operated from Germany and targeted primarily a German audience along with other European markets. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to amplify narratives favourable to Russian foreign policy. The network was found to alternate between multiple languages, indicating an attempt to target audiences from multiple markets. | |
| Italy | 8 | 8 removed accounts | 3,790,110 accounts followed an account within the network as at the date of removal | Not measured | Not measured | We assess that this network operated from Italy and targeted a global audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to promote the Russian administration. The network was found to display anomalous user behaviour which we assess to be an attempt to inauthentically amplify its content. | |



| | | | | | | | |
|---------|----------------------------|---------------------|---|--------------|--------------|--|--|
| Germany | 42 accounts in the network | 42 removed accounts | 127,451 accounts followed an account within the network as at the date of removal | Not measured | Not measured | We assess that this network operated from Germany and targeted a German audience. The individuals behind this network were found to coordinate outside of TikTok, through a messaging platform, where they shared tactics to amplify the reach of pro-AFD (Alternative für Deutschland) political content targeted towards the 2024 German state elections. The network attempted to circumvent action taken by TikTok against accounts or content that violated our policies. | |
|---------|----------------------------|---------------------|---|--------------|--------------|--|--|



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|---------|----------------------------|---------------------|---|--------------|--------------|--|--|
| Romania | 22 accounts in the network | 22 removed accounts | 299,692 accounts followed an account within the network as at the date of removal | Not measured | Not measured | We assess that this network operated from Romania and targeted a Romanian audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to spread misinformation and promote narratives critical of the current Romanian government. The network was found to direct users away from TikTok to news websites which we assess to be managed by the network for the furtherance of its strategic goal. | |
|---------|----------------------------|---------------------|---|--------------|--------------|--|--|



| | | | | | | | |
|-------|----------------------------|---------------------|---|--------------|--------------|--|--|
| Italy | 22 accounts in the network | 22 removed accounts | 157,913 accounts followed an account within the network as at the date of removal | Not measured | Not measured | We assess that this network operated from Italy and targeted a Moldovan audience. The individuals behind this network created multiple accounts to artificially amplify pro-Russian narratives critical of the current Moldovan government, in an attempt to manipulate elections discourse. The network was found to create inauthentic news accounts in an attempt to appear as a more reputable information source. | |
|-------|----------------------------|---------------------|---|--------------|--------------|--|--|



| | | | | | | | |
|---------|----------------------------|---------------------|---|--------------|--------------|---|--|
| Moldova | 68 accounts in the network | 21 removed accounts | 123 accounts followed an account within the network as at the date of the removal | Not measured | Not measured | We assess that this network operated from Moldova and targeted the Romanian diaspora in Moldova. The individuals behind this network created fictitious personas to promote Lurie Ciocan and the Social Democratic Party, attempting to manipulate Romanian elections discourse. Accounts within the network were found to post an AI-generated video of Stephen the Great (Prince of Moldavia between 1457 and 1504) to promote the network's narrative. | |
|---------|----------------------------|---------------------|---|--------------|--------------|---|--|



| | | | | | | | |
|---------|----------------------------|---------------------|---|--------------|--------------|---|--|
| Romania | 78 accounts in the network | 78 removed accounts | 1,781 accounts followed an account within the network as at the date of removal | Not measured | Not measured | We assess that this network operated from Romania and targeted a Romanian audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to amplify narratives in the Romanian language favorable to political candidate Călin Georgescu, attempting to manipulate Romanian elections discourse. The accounts within the network were found to amplify the same comments repeatedly. | |
| Romania | 12 accounts in the network | 12 removed accounts | 1,704 accounts followed an account within the network as at the date of removal | Not measured | Not measured | We assess that this network operated from Romania and targeted a Romanian audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to amplify narratives in the Romanian language favorable to political candidate Mircea Geoană, attempting to manipulate Romanian elections discourse. The accounts in the network were found to repost the same videos repeatedly. | |



| | | | | | | | |
|---------|----------------------------|-------------------------|--|--------------|--------------|---|--|
| Romania | 21 accounts in the network | 21 removed accounts | 123 accounts followed an account within the network as at the date of removal | Not measured | Not measured | We assess that this network operated from Romania and targeted a Romanian audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to Nicolae Ciucă and the PNL party, attempting to manipulate Romanian elections discourse. The network was found to create fictitious personas. | |
| Romania | 27,217 | 27,217 removed accounts | 70,892 accounts followed an account within the network as at the date of removal | Not measured | Not measured | We assess that this network was operated via a fake engagement vendor and targeted a Romanian audience. The individuals behind this network used inauthentic accounts in order to promote the AUR political party and independent candidate Călin Georgescu, in an attempt to manipulate Romanian elections discourse. This campaign relied on posting comments rather than videos. | |



| TTP OR ACTION 7 | <p>TTP No. 7: Deploy deceptive manipulated media (e.g. "deep fakes", "cheap fakes"...)</p> <p>We have based the following numbers on the country in which the video was posted: videos removed because of violations of the Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC) policy. The number of views of videos removed because of violation of each of these policies is based on the approximate location of the user.</p> | | | |
|-----------------|--|--|---|--|
| Member States | Number of videos removed because of violation of Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC) policy | Number of views of videos removed because of Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC) policy | Number of unique videos labelled with AIGC tag of "Creator labeled as AI-generated" | Number of unique videos labelled with AIGC tag of "AI-generated" |
| Austria | 414 | 216,433 | 110,859 | 38,531 |
| Belgium | 2,092 | 1,119,223 | 166,222 | 75,316 |
| Bulgaria | 227 | 5,977 | 75,036 | 78,668 |
| Croatia | 1,361 | 58,579 | 27,536 | 18,595 |
| Cyprus | 948 | 19,441 | 59,263 | 3,165 |
| Czech Republic | 465 | 8,287,531 | 51,417 | 89,409 |
| Denmark | 315 | 2,742,457 | 49,328 | 30,694 |



| Estonia | 208 | 2,063,380 | 19,687 | 11,220 |
|-----------|--------|-------------|-----------|---------|
| Finland | 716 | 464,824 | 60,083 | 49,106 |
| France | 8,563 | 312,078,908 | 1,399,713 | 432,739 |
| Germany | 11,199 | 23,904,234 | 1,380,835 | 502,916 |
| Greece | 8,742 | 145,950 | 206,528 | 7,936 |
| Hungary | 261 | 86,870 | 63,319 | 74,704 |
| Ireland | 1,063 | 103,199 | 32,936 | 34,736 |
| Italy | 3,574 | 1,892,355 | 746,928 | 393,642 |
| Latvia | 129 | 4,519 | 99,265 | 18,852 |
| Lithuania | 203 | 25,410 | 42,778 | 21,581 |



| Luxembourg | 223 | 8,729 | 40,901 | 3,319 |
|-------------|-------|------------|---------|---------|
| Malta | 183 | 5,811,847 | 12,100 | 3,444 |
| Netherlands | 1,883 | 9,080,526 | 202,203 | 29,448 |
| Poland | 772 | 13,404,186 | 203,835 | 316,048 |
| Portugal | 1,010 | 339,124 | 151,389 | 64,975 |
| Romania | 937 | 623,525 | 287,851 | 37,467 |
| Slovakia | 98 | 2,014 | 21,883 | 28,439 |
| Slovenia | 66 | 605 | 10,131 | 6,969 |
| Spain | 4,392 | 21,882,268 | 676,935 | 493,675 |
| Sweden | 762 | 377,862 | 163,490 | 105,253 |



| | | | | |
|------------------|---------------|--------------------|------------------|------------------|
| Iceland | 85 | 6,113 | 3,353 | 4,720 |
| Liechtenstein | 48 | 525 | 357 | 61 |
| Norway | 679 | 139,984 | 59,556 | 42,172 |
| Total EU | 50,806 | 404,749,976 | 6,362,451 | 2,970,847 |
| Total EEA | 51,618 | 404,896,598 | 6,425,717 | 3,017,800 |

| | |
|-------------------------------|--|
| TTP OR ACTION 8 Member | TTP No. 8: Use “hack and leak” operation (which may or may not include doctored content) We have provided data on the CIO networks that we have disrupted in the reporting period under TTP No. 6. We have also provided data on violations of our Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC) policy under TTP No. 7. Our hack and leak policy was recently launched in H1 2024, but we do not have meaningful metrics under this policy to report for H2. |
|-------------------------------|--|



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| TTP OR ACTION 9 | <p>TTP No. 9: Inauthentic coordination of content creation or amplification, including attempts to deceive/manipulate platforms algorithms (e.g. keyword stuffing or inauthentic posting/reposting designed to mislead people about popularity of content, including by influencers)</p> <p>We have provided data on the CIO networks that we have disrupted in the reporting period under TTP No. 6.</p> |
|-----------------|--|


| | |
|------------------|--|
| TTP OR ACTION 10 | <p>TTP No. 10: Use of deceptive practices to deceive/manipulate platform algorithms, such as to create, amplify or hijack hashtags, data voids, filter bubbles, or echo chambers</p> <p>We have provided data on the CIO networks that we have disrupted in the reporting period under TTP No. 6.</p> |
|------------------|--|

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| TTP OR ACTION 11 | <p>TTP No. 11. Non-transparent compensated messages or promotions by influencers</p> <p>Methodology of data measurement: We are unable to provide this metric due to insufficient data available for the reporting period.</p> |
| | SLI 14.2.1 |
| | Nr of actions taken by type |
| Member States | |
| List actions per member states (see example table above) | |



| | | | | |
|--|--|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| TTP OR ACTION 12 | TTP No. 12: Coordinated mass reporting of non-violative opposing content or accounts We have provided data on the CIO networks that we have disrupted in the reporting period under TTP No. 6. | | | |
| | SLI 14.2.1 | SLI 14.2.2 | SLI 14.2.3 | SLI 14.2.4 |
| | | | | |
| Member States | | | | |
| List actions per member states (see example table above) | | | | |

| | |
|-------------------|--|
| Measure 14.3 | |
| QRE 14.3.1 | We collaborated as part of the Integrity of Services working group to set up the first list of TTPs. |



IV. Integrity of Services

Commitment 15

Relevant Signatories that develop or operate AI systems and that disseminate AI-generated and manipulated content through their services (e.g. deep fakes) commit to take into consideration the transparency obligations and the list of manipulative practices prohibited under the proposal for Artificial Intelligence Act.

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]

Yes



| | |
|---|---|
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points]. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Building on our new AI-generated label for creators to disclose content that is completely AI-generated or significantly edited by AI, we have expanded our efforts in the AIGC space by: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Implementing the Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity (C2PA) Content Credentials, which enables our systems to instantly recognize and automatically label AIGC. ○ Supporting the coalition's working groups as a C2PA General Member. ○ Joining the Content Authenticity Initiative (CAI) to drive wider adoption of the technical standard. ○ Publishing a new Transparency Center article Supporting responsible, transparent AI-generated content. ○ Building on our new AI-generated content label for creators, and implementation of C2PA Content Credentials, we launched a number of media literacy campaigns with guidance from expert organisations like Mediawise and WITNESS, including in Brazil, Germany, France, Mexico and the UK, that teach our community how to spot and label AI-generated content. This AIGC Transparency Campaign informed by WITNESS has reached 80M users globally, including more than 8.5M and 9.5M in Germany and France respectively. • Continued to join industry partners as a party to the 'Tech Accord to Combat Deceptive Use of AI in 2024 Elections' which is a joint commitment to combat the deceptive use of AI in elections. • We continue to participate in relevant working groups, such as the Generative AI working group, which commenced in September 2023. |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | No |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months? | We are continuously reviewing and improving our tools and processes to fight disinformation and will report on any further development in the next COPD report. |
| Measure 15.1 | |

**QRE 15.1.1**

Our Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC) policy includes commonly used and easily understood language when referring to AIGC, and outlines our existing prohibitions on AIGC showing fake authoritative sources or crisis events, or falsely showing public figures in certain contexts including being bullied, making an endorsement, or being endorsed. As AI evolves, we continue to invest in combating harmful AIGC by evolving our proactive detection models, consulting with experts, and partnering with peers on shared solutions.

While we welcome the creativity that new AI may unlock, in line with our updated policy, users must proactively disclose when their content is AI-generated or manipulated but shows realistic scenes (i.e. fake people, places or events that look like they are real). We launched an AI toggle in September 2023, which allows users to self-disclose AI-generated content when posting. When this has been turned on, a tag "Creator labelled as AI-generated" is displayed to users. Alternatively, this can be done through the use of a sticker or caption, such as 'synthetic', 'fake', 'not real', or 'altered'.

We also automatically label content made with TikTok effects if they use AI. TikTok may automatically apply the "AI-generated" label to content we identify as completely generated or significantly edited with AI. This may happen when a creator uses TikTok AI effects or uploads AI-generated content that has Content Credentials attached, a technology from the Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity (C2PA). Content Credentials attach metadata to content that we can use to recognize and label AIGC instantly. Once content is labeled as AI-generated with an auto label, users are unable to remove the label from the post.

We do not allow:

- AIGC that shows realistic-appearing people under the age of 18
- AIGC that shows the likeness of adult private figures, if we become aware it was used without their permission
- Misleading AIGC or edited media that falsely shows:
 - Content made to seem as if it comes from an authoritative source, such as a reputable news organisation
 - A crisis event, such as a conflict or natural disaster
 - A public figure who is:
 - being degraded or harassed, or engaging in criminal or antisocial behaviour
 - taking a position on a political issue, commercial product, or a matter of public importance (such as an elections)



| | |
|-------------------|---|
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ being politically endorsed or condemned by an individual or group |
| Measure 15.2 | |
| QRE 15.2.1 | <p>We have a number of measures to ensure the AI systems we develop uphold the principles of fairness and comply with applicable laws. To that end:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • We have in place internal guidelines and training to help ensure that the training and deployment of our AI systems comply with applicable data protection laws, as well as principles of fairness. • We have instituted a compliance review process for new AI systems that meet certain thresholds, and are working to prioritise review of previously developed algorithms. <p>We are also proud to be a launch partner of the Partnership on AI's Responsible Practices for Synthetic Media.</p> |

| IV. Integrity of Services | |
|---|-----|
| Commitment 16 | |
| Relevant Signatories commit to operate channels of exchange between their relevant teams in order to proactively share information about cross-platform influence operations, foreign interference in information space and relevant incidents that emerge on their respective services, with the aim of preventing dissemination and resurgence on other services, in full compliance with privacy legislation and with due consideration for security and human rights risks. | |
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No] | Yes |



| | |
|---|---|
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points]. | Actively engaged with the Crisis Response working group, sharing insights and learnings about relevant areas including CIOs. |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | No |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months? | We are continuously reviewing and improving our tools and processes to fight disinformation and will report on any further development in the next COPD report. |
| Measure 16.1 | |

**QRE 16.1.1**

Central to our strategy for identifying and removing CIO on our platforms is working with our stakeholders including from civil society to user reports. This approach facilitates us - and others - disrupting the network's operations in their early stages. In addition to continuously enhancing our in-house capabilities, we proactively engage in comprehensive reviews of our peers' publicly disclosed findings and swiftly implement necessary actions in alignment with our policies.

To provide more regular and detailed updates about the CIO we disrupt, we have introduced a new dedicated Transparency Report on covert influence operations, which is available in TikTok's transparency centre. In this report, we have also added new information about operations that we have previously removed and that have attempted to return to our platform with new accounts. The insights and metrics in this report aim to inform industry peers and the research community.

We share relevant insights and metrics within our quarterly transparency reports, which aim to inform industry peers and the research community. We also review relevant insights and metrics from other industry peers to cross-compare for any similar behaviour on TikTok.

We continue to engage in the sub groups set up for insights sharing between signatories and the Commission.

As we have detailed in other chapters to this report, we have robust monetisation integrity policies in place and have established joint operating procedures between specialist CIO investigations teams and monetisation integrity teams to work on joint investigations of CIOs involving monetised products.

SLI 16.1.1

Numbers of actions as a result of information sharing

N/A

Data**Measure 16.2**

**QRE 16.2.1**

We publish all of the CIO networks we identify and remove within our transparency reports [here](#). As new deceptive behaviours emerge, we'll continue to evolve our response, strengthen enforcement capabilities, and publish our findings.



V. Empowering Users Commitments 17 - 25



| V. Empowering Users | |
|---|-----|
| Commitment 17 | |
| In light of the European Commission's initiatives in the area of media literacy, including the new Digital Education Action Plan, Relevant Signatories commit to continue and strengthen their efforts in the area of media literacy and critical thinking, also with the aim to include vulnerable groups. | |
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No] | Yes |



If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].

- Rolled out two new ongoing **general media literacy and critical thinking skills campaigns** in the EU and two in EU candidate countries in collaboration with our fact-checking and media literacy partners:
 - France: Agence France-Presse (AFP)
 - Portugal: Polígrafo
 - Georgia: Fact Check Georgia
 - Moldova: StopFals!

This brings the number of general media literacy and critical thinking skills campaigns in Europe to 11 (Denmark, Finland, France, Georgia, Ireland, Italy, Spain, Sweden, Moldova, Netherlands, and Portugal).

- Onboarded two new fact-checking partners in wider Europe:
 1. Albania & Kosovo: Internews Kosova
 2. Georgia: Fact Check Georgia
- Expanded our fact-checking coverage to a number of wider-European and EU candidate countries:
 - Albania & Kosovo: Internews Kosova
 - Georgia: Fact Check Georgia.
 - Kazakhstan: Reuters
 - Moldova: AFP/Reuters
 - Serbia: Lead Stories
- We ran 14 temporary **media literacy election integrity campaigns** in advance of regional elections, most in collaboration with our fact-checking and media literacy partners:
 - 8 in the EU (Austria, Croatia, France, 2 x Germany, Ireland, Lithuania, and Romania)
 - Austria: Deutsche Presse-Agentur (dpa)
 - Croatia: Faktograf
 - France: Agence France-Presse (AFP)
 - Germany (regional elections): Deutsche Presse-Agentur (dpa)
 - Germany (federal election): Deutsche Presse-Agentur (dpa)
 - Ireland: The Journal
 - Lithuania: N/A
 - Romania: Funky Citizens.
 - 1 in EEA
 - Iceland: N/A
 - 5 in wider Europe/EU candidate countries (Bosnia, Bulgaria, Czechia, Georgia, and Moldova)
 - Bosnia: N/A



| | |
|--|--|
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none">■ Bulgaria: N/A■ Czechia: N/A■ Georgia: Fact Check Georgia■ Moldova: StopFals!● During the reporting period, we ran 9 Election Speaker Series sessions, 7 in EU Member States and 2 in Georgia and Moldova.<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. France: Agence France-Presse (AFP)2. Germany: German Press Agency (dpa)3. Austria: German Press Agency (dpa)4. Lithuania: Logically Facts5. Romania: Funky Citizens6. Ireland: Logically Facts7. Croatia: Faktograf8. Georgia: FactCheck Georgia9. Moldova: Stop Fals!● Launched four new temporary in-app natural disaster media literacy search guides that link to authoritative 3rd party agencies and organisations:<ol style="list-style-type: none">1) Central & Eastern European Floods (Austria, Bosnia, Czechia, Germany, Hungary, Moldova, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia)2) Portugal Wildfires3) Spanish floods4) Mayotte Cyclone● Continued our in-app interventions, including video tags, search interventions and in-app information centres, available in 23 official EU languages and Norwegian and Icelandic for EEA users, around the elections, the Israel-Hamas Conflict, Climate Change, Holocaust Education, Mpox, and the War in Ukraine.● Actively participated in the UN COP29 climate change summit by:<ul style="list-style-type: none">○ Working with the COP29 presidency to promote their content and engage new audiences around the conference as a strategic media partner.○ Re-launching our global #ClimateAction campaign with over 7K posts from around the world. Content across #ClimateAction has now received over 4B video views since being launched in 2021.○ Bringing 5 creators to the summit, who collectively produced 15+ videos that received over 60M video views.○ Launching two global features (a video notice tag and search intervention guide) to point users to authoritative climate related content between 29th October and 25th November, which were viewed 400k times. |
|--|--|



- Our partnership with [Verified for Climate](#), a joint initiative of the UN and social impact agency Purpose, continued to be our flagship climate initiative, which saw a network of 35 Verified Champions across Brazil, the United Arab Emirates, and Spain, work with select TikTok creators to develop educational content tackling climate misinformation and disinformation, and drive climate action within the TikTok community.
- [Partnered with the World Health Organisation \(WHO\)](#), including a US\$ 3 million donation, to support mental well-being awareness and literacy by creating reliable content and combat misinformation through the [Fides](#) network, a diverse community of trusted healthcare professionals and content creators in the United Kingdom, United States, France, Japan, Korea, Indonesia, Mexico, and Brazil.
- Building on these efforts, we also launched the [UK Clinician Creator Network](#), an initiative bringing together 19 leading NHS qualified clinicians who are actively sharing their medical expertise on TikTok, engaging a community of over 2.2 million followers.
- Strengthened our approach to [state-affiliated media](#) by:
 - Working with third party external experts to shape our state-affiliated media policy, assessment of state-controlled media labels, and continuing to expand its use.
 - Continued investment in our detection capabilities for state-affiliated media (SAM) accounts, with a focus on automation and scaled detection.
- Building on our [AI-generated content label](#) for creators, and implementation of C2PA [Content Credentials](#), we launched a number of [media literacy campaigns](#) with guidance from expert organisations like Mediawise and WITNESS, including in Brazil, Germany, France, Mexico and the UK, that teach our community how to spot and label AI-generated content.
 - Our AIGC Transparency Campaign informed by WITNESS has reached 80M users globally, including more than 8.5M and 9.5M in Germany and France respectively.
- Brought greater transparency about our systems and our integrity and authenticity efforts to our community by sharing regular insights and updates. In H2 2024, we continued to expand our [Transparency Center](#) with resources like our first-ever [US Elections Integrity Hub](#), [European Elections Integrity Hub](#), dedicated [Covert Influence Operations Reports](#), and a new [Transparency Center blog](#).
- Continued our partnership with Amadeu Antonio Stiftung in Germany on the Demo:create project, an educational initiative supporting young TikTok users to effectively deal with online hate speech, disinformation and misinformation.
- Continued to invest in training and development for our human moderation teams.
- TikTok continues to co-chair the working group on Elections.



| | |
|---|---|
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | No |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months? | We are continuously reviewing and improving our tools and processes to fight misinformation and disinformation and will report on any further development in the next COPD report |
| Measure 17.1 | |

**QRE 17.1.1**


In addition to systematically removing content that violates our I&A policies, we continue to dedicate significant resources to: expanding our in-app measures that show users additional context on certain content; redirecting them to authoritative information; and making these tools available in 23 EU official languages (plus, for EEA users, Norwegian & Icelandic).

We work with external experts to combat harmful misinformation. For example, we work with the World Health Organisation (WHO) on medical information, and our global fact-checking partners, taking into account their feedback, as well as user feedback, to continually identify new topics and consider which tools may be best suited for raising awareness around that topic.

We deploy a combination of in-app **user intervention tools** on topical issues such as elections , the Israel-Hamas Conflict, [Holocaust Education](#), Mpox and the War in Ukraine..

Video notice tags.

A video notice tag is an information bar at the bottom of a video which is automatically applied to a specific word or hashtag (or set of hashtags). The information bar is clickable and invites users to “*Learn more about [the topic]*”. Users will be directed to an in-app guide, or reliable third party resource, as appropriate.



Holocaust Facts Video Notice Tag

Search intervention. If users search for terms associated with a topic, they will be presented with a banner encouraging them to verify the facts and providing a link to a trusted source of information. Search interventions are not deployed for search terms that violate our Community Guidelines, which are actioned according to our policies.

- For example, the four new ongoing general media literacy and critical thinking skills campaigns rolled out in France, Georgia, Moldova, and Portugal, are all supported with search guides to direct users to authoritative sources.
- Our COP29 global search intervention, which ran from 29th October and 25th November, pointed users to authoritative climate related content, and was viewed 400k times.



#COP29 for Climate Action

We all have a part to play in protecting our planet's future, and together, we can make a difference.[Learn more](#)

Public service announcement (PSA). If users search for a hashtag on the topic, they will be served with a public service announcement reminding them about our Community Guidelines and presenting them with links to a trusted source of information.

Unverified content label. In addition to the above mentioned tools, to encourage users to consider the reliability of content related to an emergency or unfolding event, which has been assessed by our fact-checking partners but cannot be verified as accurate i.e., ‘unverified content’, we apply warning labels and we prompt people to [reconsider sharing](#) such content. Details of these warning labels are included in our [Community Guidelines](#).

Where users continue to post despite the warning:

- To limit the spread of potentially misleading information, the video will become ineligible for recommendation in the For You feed.
- The video's creator is also notified that their video was flagged as unsubstantiated content and is provided additional information about why the warning label has been added to their content. Again, this is to raise the creator's awareness about the credibility of the content that they have shared.



The image consists of three screenshots from the TikTok mobile application, arranged horizontally. The first screenshot shows a video thumbnail of a healthy meal (avocado toast) with a warning overlay: "Caution: Video flagged for unverified content." The second screenshot shows a pop-up dialog asking if the user wants to share the flagged video. The third screenshot shows the "Video details" page with a warning label added to the video, providing information about the flag and how to verify the source.

State-controlled media label. Our state-affiliated media policy is to label accounts run by entities whose editorial output or decision-making process is subject to control or influence by a government. We apply a prominent label to all content and accounts from state-controlled media. The user is also shown a screen pop-up providing information about what the label means, inviting them to “learn more”, and redirecting them to an [in-app page](#). The measure brings transparency to our community, raises users’ awareness, and encourages users to consider the reliability of the source. We continue to work with experts to inform our approach and explore how we can continue to expand its use.



In the EU, Iceland and Liechtenstein, we have also taken steps to restrict access to content from the entities sanctioned by the EU in 2024:


- RT- Russia Today UK
- RT - Russia Today Germany
- RT - Russia Today France
- RT- Russia Today Spanish
- Sputnik
- Rossiya RTR / RTR Planeta
- Rossiya 24 / Russia 24
- TV Centre International
- NTV/NTV Mir
- Rossiya 1
- REN TV



- Pervyi Kanal / Channel 1
- RT Arabic
- Sputnik Arabic
- RT Balkan
- Oriental Review
- Tsargrad
- New Eastern Outlook
- Katehon
- Voice of Europe
- RIA Novosti
- Izvestija
- Rossiiskaja Gazeta



AI-generated content labels. As more creators take advantage of Artificial Intelligence (AI) to enhance their creativity, we want to support transparent and responsible content creation practices. In 2023 TikTok launched a AI-generated label for creators to disclose content that is completely AI-generated or significantly edited by AI. The launch of this new tool to help creators label their AI-generated content was accompanied by a [creator education campaign](#), a [Help Center page](#), and a [Newsroom Post](#). In May 2024, we started using the Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity (C2PA) [Content Credentials](#), which enables our systems to instantly recognize and automatically label AIGC. In the interests of transparency, we also renamed TikTok AI effects to explicitly include "AI" in their name and corresponding effects label, and updated our guidelines for Effect House creators to do the same.



TikTok



| | | | | |
|---------------------------------------|--|---------------------------------------|--|------------------------|
| | <p>Dedicated online and in-app information resources. The above mentioned tools provide links to users to accurate and up-to-date information from trusted sources. Depending on the topic, or the relevant EU country, users may be directed to an external authoritative source (e.g., a national government website or an independent national electoral commission), an in-app information centre (e.g., War in Ukraine), or a dedicated page in the TikTok Safety Center or Transparency Center.</p> <p>We use our Safety Center to inform our community about our approach to safety, privacy, and security on our platform. Relevant to combating harmful misinformation, we have dedicated information on:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Harmful Misinformation, Online challenges, Covid-19, Election integrity, Scams, and how to safely share content about tragic events on TikTok. • Our safety partners page provides details of some of our work with global experts, non-governmental organisations, and industry associations to help build a safe platform for our community. <p>Users can learn more about our transparency efforts in our dedicated Transparency Center, available in a number of EU languages, which houses our transparency reports, including the standalone Covert Influence Operations report and the reports we have published under this Code, as well as information on our commitments to maintaining platform integrity e.g., Protecting the integrity of elections, Combating misinformation, Countering influence operation, Supporting responsible, transparent AI-generated content, and details of Government Removal Requests</p> <p>We also use Newsroom posts to keep our community informed about our most recent updates and efforts across <i>News</i>, <i>Product</i>, <i>Community</i>, <i>Safety</i> and <i>Product</i>. Users can select their country, including EU, for preferred language where available, and regionally relevant posts. For example, upon publication of our fourth Code report in September 2024, we provided users with an overview of our continued commitment to Combating Disinformation under the EU Code of Practice. We also updated users about how we are partnering with our industry to advance AI transparency and literacy, and how we protected the integrity of the platform during the Romanian presidential elections.</p> | | | |
| SLI 17.1.1 | <p>Methodology of data measurement:</p> <p>The number of impressions, clicks and click through rates of video notice tags, search interventions and public service announcements are based on the approximate location of the users that engaged with the tools. The number of impressions of the Safety Center pages is based on the IP location of the users.</p> <table border="1"> <tr> <td>Total count of the tool's impressions</td><td>Interactions/ engagement with the tool</td><td>Other relevant metrics</td></tr> </table> | Total count of the tool's impressions | Interactions/ engagement with the tool | Other relevant metrics |
| Total count of the tool's impressions | Interactions/ engagement with the tool | Other relevant metrics | | |



| | Number of impressions of the State-Controlled Media label | Number of clicks of the State-Controlled Media label | Click through rate of the State-Controlled Media label |
|----------------|--|---|---|
| Member States | | | |
| Austria | 3,705,075 | 5,771 | 0.16% |
| Belgium | 3,789,615 | 6,994 | 0.18% |
| Bulgaria | 7,727,480 | 9,390 | 0.12% |
| Croatia | 1,656,809 | 2,786 | 0.17% |
| Cyprus | 752,546 | 1,166 | 0.15% |
| Czech Republic | 7,602,192 | 7,762 | 0.10% |
| Denmark | 2,074,577 | 4,350 | 0.21% |
| Estonia | 1,391,192 | 2,402 | 0.17% |
| Finland | 3,310,339 | 9,274 | 0.28% |
| France | 32,521,568 | 28,995 | 0.09% |
| Germany | 37,522,365 | 49,125 | 0.13% |
| Greece | 3,107,902 | 6,491 | 0.21% |
| Hungary | 41,012,350 | 27,450 | 0.07% |
| Ireland | 3,250,908 | 6,757 | 0.21% |
| Italy | 12,463,432 | 16,462 | 0.13% |
| Latvia | 3,063,840 | 4,027 | 0.13% |
| Lithuania | 3,025,380 | 5,056 | 0.17% |



| | | | |
|------------------|--------------------|----------------|--------------|
| Luxembourg | 439,714 | 628 | 0.14% |
| Malta | 417,073 | 605 | 0.15% |
| Netherlands | 14,557,284 | 23,801 | 0.16% |
| Poland | 203,836,052 | 63,752 | 0.03% |
| Portugal | 1,518,762 | 4,985 | 0.33% |
| Romania | 36,420,337 | 58,883 | 0.16% |
| Slovakia | 1,971,329 | 3,352 | 0.17% |
| Slovenia | 724,668 | 1,403 | 0.19% |
| Spain | 6,639,002 | 11,904 | 0.18% |
| Sweden | 11,757,565 | 12,977 | 0.11% |
| Iceland | 291,908 | 589 | 0.20% |
| Liechtenstein | 50,186 | 48 | 0.10% |
| Norway | 4,367,100 | 8,605 | 0.20% |
| Total EU | 446,259,356 | 376,548 | 0.08% |
| Total EEA | 450,968,550 | 385,790 | 0.09% |

| | Number of impressions of Video Notice Tag covered by Intervention (Holocaust Misinformation/Denial) | Number of clicks of Video Notice Tag covered by Intervention (Holocaust Misinformation/Denial) | Click Through Rate of Video Notice Tag covered by Intervention (Holocaust Misinformation/Denial) |
|----------------------|--|---|---|
| Member States | | | |



| | | | |
|----------------|------------|---------|-------|
| Austria | 3,987,721 | 11,081 | 0.28% |
| Belgium | 3,501,679 | 10,689 | 0.31% |
| Bulgaria | 697,482 | 2,810 | 0.40% |
| Croatia | 658,928 | 2,223 | 0.34% |
| Cyprus | 311,308 | 1,189 | 0.38% |
| Czech Republic | 2,888,696 | 13,749 | 0.48% |
| Denmark | 1,690,719 | 6,873 | 0.41% |
| Estonia | 406,818 | 1,622 | 0.40% |
| Finland | 3,314,306 | 12,022 | 0.36% |
| France | 2,293,975 | 10,994 | 0.48% |
| Germany | 40,208,515 | 110,850 | 0.28% |
| Greece | 2,559,183 | 10,007 | 0.39% |
| Hungary | 4,785,260 | 17,185 | 0.36% |
| Ireland | 3,352,323 | 10,490 | 0.31% |
| Italy | 1,987,326 | 9,277 | 0.47% |
| Latvia | 491,701 | 2,082 | 0.42% |
| Lithuania | 685,542 | 2,714 | 0.40% |
| Luxembourg | 181,085 | 658 | 0.36% |
| Malta | 206,924 | 592 | 0.29% |



| | | | |
|----------------------|---|--|--|
| Netherlands | 12,745,193 | 33,329 | 0.26% |
| Poland | 27,175,740 | 70,663 | 0.26% |
| Portugal | 1,990,257 | 6,556 | 0.33% |
| Romania | 3,636,828 | 15,035 | 0.41% |
| Slovakia | 640,942 | 2,254 | 0.35% |
| Slovenia | 462,528 | 1,551 | 0.34% |
| Spain | 8,574,010 | 30,920 | 0.36% |
| Sweden | 5,540,266 | 25,954 | 0.47% |
| Iceland | 215,411 | 770 | 0.36% |
| Liechtenstein | 11,568 | 47 | 0.41% |
| Norway | 2,909,307 | 13,198 | 0.45% |
| Total EU | 134,975,255 | 423,369 | 0.31% |
| Total EEA | 138,111,541 | 437,384 | 0.32% |
| | Number of impressions of Video Notice Tag covered by Intervention (Mpox) | Number of clicks of Video Notice Tag covered by Intervention (Mpox) | Click Through Rate of Video Notice Tag covered by Intervention (Mpox) |
| Member States | | | |
| Austria | 6,065,332 | 30,641 | 0.51% |
| Belgium | 15,383,226 | 73,644 | 0.48% |
| Bulgaria | 5,869,376 | 39,855 | 0.68% |



| | | | |
|----------------|-------------|---------|-------|
| Croatia | 5,206,361 | 40,720 | 0.78% |
| Cyprus | 1,309,314 | 7,869 | 0.60% |
| Czech Republic | 6,134,172 | 60,989 | 0.99% |
| Denmark | 4,604,268 | 37,820 | 0.82% |
| Estonia | 2,279,691 | 18,303 | 0.80% |
| Finland | 8,904,456 | 66,423 | 0.75% |
| France | 123,453,307 | 471,892 | 0.38% |
| Germany | 51,643,857 | 244,354 | 0.47% |
| Greece | 9,476,029 | 65,533 | 0.69% |
| Hungary | 5,483,667 | 40,088 | 0.73% |
| Ireland | 9,413,972 | 58,759 | 0.62% |
| Italy | 31,117,509 | 174,013 | 0.56% |
| Latvia | 2,821,714 | 23,843 | 0.84% |
| Lithuania | 5,065,658 | 36,987 | 0.73% |
| Luxembourg | 823,972 | 4,245 | 0.52% |
| Malta | 645,827 | 3,131 | 0.48% |
| Netherlands | 15,404,762 | 115,335 | 0.75% |
| Poland | 25,070,807 | 210,242 | 0.84% |
| Portugal | 6,017,068 | 37,100 | 0.62% |



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|----------------------|--|--|--|
| Romania | 12,931,412 | 100,003 | 0.77% |
| Slovakia | 1,798,295 | 14,348 | 0.80% |
| Slovenia | 2,037,178 | 12,289 | 0.60% |
| Spain | 47,595,074 | 178,276 | 0.37% |
| Sweden | 15,829,378 | 117,375 | 0.74% |
| Iceland | 679,537 | 4,129 | 0.61% |
| Liechtenstein | 21,397 | 132 | 0.62% |
| Norway | 6,765,469 | 64,054 | 0.95% |
| Total EU | 422,385,682 | 2,284,077 | 0.54% |
| Total EEA | 429,852,085 | 2,352,392 | 0.55% |
| | Number of impressions of topic covered by video Intervention (Election) | Number of clicks by video Intervention (Election) | Click Through Rate by video Intervention (Election) |
| Member States | | | |
| Austria | 78,371,511 | 156,117 | 0.20% |
| Belgium | NA | NA | NA |
| Bulgaria | 29,664,185 | 50,018 | 0.17% |
| Croatia | 24,640,666 | 41,715 | 0.17% |
| Cyprus | NA | NA | NA |
| Czech Republic | 329,546 | 332 | 0.10% |



| | | | |
|-------------|---------------|-----------|-------|
| Denmark | NA | NA | NA |
| Estonia | NA | NA | NA |
| Finland | NA | NA | NA |
| France | 1,301,158,781 | 2,080,600 | 0.16% |
| Germany | 209,773,848 | 261,655 | 0.12% |
| Greece | NA | NA | NA |
| Hungary | NA | NA | NA |
| Ireland | 278,245 | 354 | 0.13% |
| Italy | NA | NA | NA |
| Latvia | NA | NA | NA |
| Lithuania | 9,102,070 | 15014 | 0.16% |
| Luxembourg | NA | NA | NA |
| Malta | NA | NA | NA |
| Netherlands | NA | NA | NA |
| Poland | NA | NA | NA |
| Portugal | NA | NA | NA |
| Romania | 1,093,883,826 | 1,531,546 | 0.14% |
| Slovakia | NA | NA | NA |
| Slovenia | NA | NA | NA |



| | | | |
|------------------|----------------------|------------------|--------------|
| Spain | NA | NA | NA |
| Sweden | NA | NA | NAN |
| Iceland | 4,620,010 | 19,661 | 0.43% |
| Liechtenstein | NA | NA | NA |
| Norway | NA | NA | NA |
| Total EU | 2,747,202,678 | 4,137,351 | 0.15% |
| Total EEA | 2,751,822,688 | 4,157,012 | 0.15% |

| | Number of impressions of Search interventions (Holocaust Misinformation/Denial) | Number of clicks of Search interventions (Holocaust Misinformation/Denial) | Click Through Rate of Search interventions (Holocaust Misinformation/Denial) |
|----------------------|---|--|--|
| Member States | | | |
| Austria | 156,298 | 6,187 | 3.96% |
| Belgium | 200,324 | 10,626 | 5.30% |
| Bulgaria | 62,548 | 1,701 | 2.72% |
| Croatia | 100,586 | 2,631 | 2.62% |
| Cyprus | 24,629 | 445 | 1.81% |
| Czech Republic | 88,635 | 2,476 | 2.79% |
| Denmark | 59,881 | 1,572 | 2.63% |
| Estonia | 14,970 | 476 | 3.18% |



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|-------------|-----------|---------|-------|
| Finland | 118,664 | 2,024 | 1.71% |
| France | 1,592,000 | 111,776 | 7.02% |
| Germany | 1,383,744 | 66,652 | 4.82% |
| Greece | 492,728 | 2,946 | 0.60% |
| Hungary | 118,829 | 4,853 | 4.08% |
| Ireland | 112,337 | 1,848 | 1.65% |
| Italy | 877,504 | 11,749 | 1.34% |
| Latvia | 18,212 | 668 | 3.67% |
| Lithuania | 37,622 | 820 | 2.18% |
| Luxembourg | 11,059 | 571 | 5.16% |
| Malta | 7,744 | 178 | 2.30% |
| Netherlands | 490,423 | 6,942 | 1.42% |
| Poland | 1,069,545 | 842 | 0.08% |
| Portugal | 221,507 | 2,507 | 1.13% |
| Romania | 222,020 | 5,125 | 2.31% |
| Slovakia | 42,499 | 1,331 | 3.13% |
| Slovenia | 30,051 | 1,520 | 5.06% |
| Spain | 2,155,115 | 39,383 | 1.83% |
| Sweden | 175,333 | 4,056 | 2.31% |



| Iceland | 5,203 | 147 | 2.83% |
|----------------------|---|--|--|
| Liechtenstein | 478 | 25 | 5.23% |
| Norway | 89,193 | 2,505 | 2.81% |
| Total EU | 9,884,807 | 291,905 | 2.95% |
| Total EEA | 9,979,681 | 294,582 | 2.95% |
| | Number of impressions of Search interventions (Mpox) | Number of clicks of Search interventions (Mpox) | Click Through Rate of Search interventions (Mpox) |
| Member States | | | |
| Austria | 467,253 | 2,111 | 0.45% |
| Belgium | 669,059 | 2,501 | 0.37% |
| Bulgaria | 446,240 | 2,724 | 0.61% |
| Croatia | 561,621 | 3,321 | 0.59% |
| Cyprus | 77,553 | 452 | 0.58% |
| Czech Republic | 587,165 | 4,180 | 0.71% |
| Denmark | 435,391 | 2,571 | 0.59% |
| Estonia | 147,804 | 926 | 0.63% |
| Finland | 648,096 | 4,591 | 0.71% |
| France | 3,031,084 | 5,826 | 0.19% |
| Germany | 3,901,089 | 15,278 | 0.39% |
| Greece | 1,145,046 | 6,796 | 0.59% |



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|-----------------|-------------------|----------------|--------------|
| Hungary | 495,768 | 3,857 | 0.78% |
| Ireland | 714,141 | 2,252 | 0.32% |
| Italy | 2,604,995 | 36,148 | 1.39% |
| Latvia | 206,307 | 1,375 | 0.67% |
| Lithuania | 484,805 | 2,767 | 0.57% |
| Luxembourg | 39,807 | 180 | 0.45% |
| Malta | 33,713 | 148 | 0.44% |
| Netherlands | 1,010,537 | 4,547 | 0.45% |
| Poland | 2,560,968 | 19,079 | 0.74% |
| Portugal | 714,886 | 3,653 | 0.51% |
| Romania | 1,339,325 | 7,857 | 0.59% |
| Slovakia | 329,754 | 2,027 | 0.61% |
| Slovenia | 164,647 | 793 | 0.48% |
| Spain | 1,775,339 | 6,112 | 0.34% |
| Sweden | 1,106,486 | 6,128 | 0.55% |
| Iceland | 22,964 | 245 | 1.07% |
| Liechtenstein | 1,406 | 10 | 0.71% |
| Norway | 539,291 | 3,472 | 0.64% |
| Total EU | 25,698,879 | 148,200 | 0.58% |



| | | | |
|------------------|-------------------|----------------|--------------|
| Total EEA | 26,262,540 | 151,927 | 0.58% |
|------------------|-------------------|----------------|--------------|

| | Number of impressions of Search interventions (Climate change) | Number of clicks of Search interventions (Climate change) | Click Through Rate of Search interventions (Climate change) |
|----------------------|---|--|--|
| Member States | | | |
| Austria | 228,390 | 196 | 0.09% |
| Belgium | 207,808 | 159 | 0.08% |
| Bulgaria | 140,769 | 183 | 0.13% |
| Croatia | 159,478 | 128 | 0.08% |
| Cyprus | 19,126 | 20 | 0.10% |
| Czech Republic | 163,222 | 172 | 0.11% |
| Denmark | 148,528 | 134 | 0.09% |
| Estonia | 29,383 | 44 | 0.15% |
| Finland | 238,286 | 213 | 0.09% |
| France | 652,102 | 446 | 0.07% |
| Germany | 1,761,399 | 1,488 | 0.08% |
| Greece | 250,015 | 361 | 0.14% |
| Hungary | 270,274 | 330 | 0.12% |
| Ireland | 221,386 | 118 | 0.05% |
| Italy | 1,113,346 | 818 | 0.07% |



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|------------------|------------------|--------------|--------------|
| Latvia | 37,048 | 63 | 0.17% |
| Lithuania | 112,397 | 176 | 0.16% |
| Luxembourg | 14,448 | 17 | 0.12% |
| Malta | 9,186 | 5 | 0.05% |
| Netherlands | 406,345 | 308 | 0.08% |
| Poland | 888,768 | 1,136 | 0.13% |
| Portugal | 198,458 | 162 | 0.08% |
| Romania | 375,102 | 513 | 0.14% |
| Slovakia | 93,322 | 104 | 0.11% |
| Slovenia | 34,445 | 26 | 0.08% |
| Spain | 842,382 | 503 | 0.06% |
| Sweden | 486,125 | 405 | 0.08% |
| Iceland | 4,668 | 7 | 0.15% |
| Liechtenstein | 548 | 1 | 0.18% |
| Norway | 223,306 | 179 | 0.08% |
| Total EU | 9,101,538 | 8,228 | 0.09% |
| Total EEA | 9,330,060 | 8,415 | 0.09% |

| | Number of impressions of Search interventions (Election) | Number of clicks of Search interventions (Election) | Click Through Rate of Search interventions (Election) |
|--|---|--|--|
| | | | |



| Member States | | | |
|----------------|------------|--------|-------|
| Austria | 708,656 | 3,263 | 0.46% |
| Belgium | NA | NA | NA |
| Bulgaria | 121,672 | 367 | 0.30% |
| Croatia | 546,661 | 1,767 | 0.32% |
| Cyprus | NA | NA | NA |
| Czech Republic | 17,994 | 56 | 0.31% |
| Denmark | NA | NA | NA |
| Estonia | NA | NA | NA |
| Finland | NA | NA | NA |
| France | 15,712,577 | 7,306 | 0.05% |
| Germany | 7,265,486 | 13,805 | 0.19% |
| Greece | NA | NA | NA |
| Hungary | NA | NA | NA |
| Ireland | 1,651,434 | 16,293 | 0.99% |
| Italy | NA | NA | NA |
| Latvia | NA | NA | NA |
| Lithuania | 41,034 | 127 | 0.31% |
| Luxembourg | NA | NA | NA |



| | | | |
|------------------|-------------------|----------------|--------------|
| Malta | NA | NA | NA |
| Netherlands | NA | NA | NA |
| Poland | NA | NA | NA |
| Portugal | NA | NA | NA |
| Romania | 21,733,061 | 70,746 | 0.33% |
| Slovakia | NA | NA | NA |
| Slovenia | NA | NA | NA |
| Spain | NA | NA | NA |
| Sweden | NA | NA | NA |
| Iceland | 78,449 | 1,095 | 1.40% |
| Liechtenstein | NA | NA | NA |
| Norway | NA | NA | NA |
| Total EU | 47,798,575 | 113,730 | 0.24% |
| Total EEA | 47,877,024 | 114,825 | 0.24% |

| | Number of impressions of Public service announcements (Holocaust Misinformation/Denial) | | |
|----------------------|--|--|--|
| Member States | | | |
| Austria | 16 | | |



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|----------------|-----|--|--|
| Belgium | 41 | | |
| Bulgaria | 17 | | |
| Croatia | 6 | | |
| Cyprus | 4 | | |
| Czech Republic | 99 | | |
| Denmark | 13 | | |
| Estonia | 60 | | |
| Finland | 27 | | |
| France | 562 | | |
| Germany | 344 | | |
| Greece | 14 | | |
| Hungary | 14 | | |
| Ireland | 20 | | |
| Italy | 74 | | |
| Latvia | 89 | | |
| Lithuania | 41 | | |
| Luxembourg | 2 | | |
| Malta | 2 | | |
| Netherlands | 80 | | |



| | | | |
|----------------------|---|--|--|
| Poland | 154 | | |
| Portugal | 11 | | |
| Romania | 21 | | |
| Slovakia | 16 | | |
| Slovenia | 3 | | |
| Spain | 51 | | |
| Sweden | 87 | | |
| Iceland | 4 | | |
| Liechtenstein | 1 | | |
| Norway | 27 | | |
| Total EU | 1,868 | | |
| Total EEA | 1,900 | | |
| | Number of impressions of Public service announcements (Mpox) | | |
| Member States | | | |
| Austria | 26 | | |
| Belgium | 26 | | |
| Bulgaria | 39 | | |
| Croatia | 13 | | |
| Cyprus | 4 | | |



| | | | |
|----------------|-----|--|--|
| Czech Republic | 76 | | |
| Denmark | 17 | | |
| Estonia | 12 | | |
| Finland | 30 | | |
| France | 473 | | |
| Germany | 385 | | |
| Greece | 28 | | |
| Hungary | 33 | | |
| Ireland | 38 | | |
| Italy | 63 | | |
| Latvia | 9 | | |
| Lithuania | 11 | | |
| Luxembourg | 1 | | |
| Malta | 1 | | |
| Netherlands | 147 | | |
| Poland | 172 | | |
| Portugal | 12 | | |
| Romania | 40 | | |
| Slovakia | 24 | | |



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|------------------|--------------|--|--|
| Slovenia | 5 | | |
| Spain | 82 | | |
| Sweden | 55 | | |
| Iceland | 5 | | |
| Liechtenstein | 0 | | |
| Norway | 18 | | |
| Total EU | 1,822 | | |
| Total EEA | 1,845 | | |

Measure 17.2

**QRE 17.2.1**

In order to raise awareness among our users about specific topics and empower them, we run a variety of on and off-platform media literacy campaigns. Our approach may differ depending on the topic. We localise certain campaigns (e.g., for elections) meaning we collaborate with national partners to develop an approach that best resonates with the local audience. For other campaigns such as the War in Ukraine, our emphasis is on scalability and connecting users to accurate and trusted resources.

Below are examples of the campaigns we have most recently run in-app which have leveraged a number of the intervention tools we have outlined in our response to QRE 17.1.1 (e.g. search interventions and video notice tags).

(I) Promoting election integrity. As well as the election integrity pages on TikTok's [Safety Center](#) and [Transparency Center](#), and the new dedicated [European Elections Integrity Hub](#), which bring awareness and visibility to how we tackle election misinformation and covert influence operations on our platform, we launched media literacy campaigns in advance of several elections in the EU and wider Europe.

France Legislative Elections 2024: From 17 June 2024, we launched an in-app [Election Centre](#) to provide users with up-to-date information about the 2024 French legislative elections. The centre contained a section about spotting misinformation, which included videos created in partnership with fact-checking organisation [Agence France-Presse \(AFP\)](#).



Germany Regional Elections 2024 (Saxony, Thuringia, Brandenburg): From 8 Aug 2024, we launched an in-app [Election Centre](#) to provide users with up-to-date information about the German regional elections. The centre contained a section about spotting misinformation, which included videos created in partnership with the fact-checking organisation [Deutsche Presse-Agentur \(dpa\)](#).



Austria Federal Election 2024: From 13 Aug 2024, we launched an in-app [Election Centre](#) to provide users with up-to-date information about the election. The centre contained a section about spotting misinformation, which included videos created in partnership with the fact-checking organisation [Deutsche Presse-Agentur \(dpa\)](#).



Moldova Presidential Election and EU Referendum 2024: From 6 Sept 2024, we launched an in-app [Election Centre](#) to provide users with up-to-date information about the 2024 Moldova presidential election and EU referendum. The centre contained a section about spotting misinformation, which included videos created in partnership with the fact-checking organisation [StopFals!](#)



Georgia Parliamentary Election 2024: From 16 Sept 2024, we launched an in-app [Election Centre](#) to provide users with up-to-date information about the 2024 Georgia parliamentary election. The centre contained a section about spotting misinformation, which included videos created in partnership with the fact-checking organisation [Fact Check Georgia](#).



Bosnia Parliamentary Election 2024: From 17 Sept 2024, we launched an in-app [Election Centre](#) to provide users with up-to-date information about the 2024 Bosnian regional elections, which contained a section about spotting misinformation.



The image shows a smartphone displaying a TikTok activity for local elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The screen has a white background with a blue and yellow decorative border at the top. At the top center, it says "TikTok" and "Lokalni izbori u Bosni i Hercegovini". Below this is a small graphic of a ballot box with the flag of Bosnia and Herzegovina. A dropdown menu says "Izaberite jezik". Underneath, it says "Odbrojavanje do lokalnih izbora u Bosni i Hercegovini" and "6. oktobar 2024.", with a "0 dana" button. A section titled "Lokalni izbori u Bosni i Hercegovini" describes the election on Sunday, October 6, 2024, in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republika Srpska, and Brčko district. It encourages users to visit the Central Election Commission website. The phone's status bar shows the time as 13:38 and 5G connectivity.

Lithuania Parliamentary Election 2024: From 17 Sept 2024, we launched an in-app [Election Centre](#) to provide users with up-to-date information about the 2024 Lithuanian parliamentary elections, which contained a section about spotting misinformation.




Czechia Regional Elections 2024: From 13 Sept 2024, we launched an in-app [Election Centre](#) to provide users with up-to-date information about the 2024 Czechia regional elections, which contained a section about spotting misinformation.



Bulgaria Parliamentary Election 2024: From 1 Oct 2024, we launched an in-app [Election Centre](#) to provide users with up-to-date information about the 2024 Bulgaria parliamentary election, which contained a section about spotting misinformation.



Romania Presidential and Parliamentary Election 2024: From 11 Nov 2024, we launched an in-app [Election Centre](#) to provide users with up-to-date information about the 2024 Romanian elections. The centre contained a section about spotting misinformation, which included videos created in partnership with the fact-checking organisation [Funky Citizens](#). [On 6 Dec 2024, following the Constitutional Court's decision to annul the first round of the presidential election, we updated our in-app Election Centre to guide users on rapidly changing events].



Ireland General Election: From 7 Nov 2024, we launched an in-app [Election Centre](#) to provide users with up-to-date information about the 2024 Irish general election. The centre contained a section about spotting misinformation, which included videos created in partnership with the fact-checking organisation [The Journal](#).



Iceland Parliamentary Election 2024: From 7 Nov 2024, we launched an in-app [Election Centre](#) to provide users with up-to-date information about the 2024 Iceland parliamentary election, which contained a section about spotting misinformation.




The image shows a smartphone displaying the TikTok app's election information center for the 2024 Icelandic Presidential Election. The screen features a festive header with fireworks and the text "Þingkosningarnar á Íslandi 2024". Below this, a section titled "Niðurtalning í þingkosningarnar á Íslandi" shows "0 dagar" until November 30, 2024. A detailed description of the election follows, mentioning it will take place on November 30, 2024, and includes a link to "activity-i18n.tiktok.com". The bottom of the screen shows standard iOS navigation controls.

Croatia Presidential Election 2024: From 6 Dec 2024, we launched an in-app [Election Centre](#) to provide users with up-to-date information about the 2024 Croatia presidential election. The centre contained a section about spotting misinformation, which included videos created in partnership with the fact-checking organisation [Faktograf](#).



The image shows a smartphone displaying a special election center on the TikTok app. The screen features a festive design with fireworks and the Croatian flag. The main text reads "Izbori za predsjednika Republike Hrvatske 12. siječnja 2025.". Below this, it says "Odbrojavanje do drugog kruga izbora" and "12. siječnja 2025.", with a circular icon showing "0 dana". A section titled "Izbori za predsjednika Republike Hrvatske" provides information about the second-round election on January 12, 2025, stating that the president will be elected by a general and equal secret ballot for a five-year term. At the bottom, there's a browser-style interface with zoom controls (AA), a lock icon, and a URL: activity-va.tiktok.com.

Germany Federal Election 2024: From 16 Dec 2024, we launched an in-app [Election Centre](#) to provide users with up-to-date information about the 2025 German federal election. The centre contained a section about spotting misinformation, which included videos created in partnership with the fact-checking organisation [Deutsche Presse-Agentur \(dpa\)](#).





(II) Election Speaker Series. To further promote election integrity, and inform our approach to elections, we invited suitably qualified local and regional external experts to share their insights and market expertise with our internal teams. During this reporting period, we ran 9 Election Speaker Series sessions, 7 in EU Member States and 2 in Georgia and Moldova.

1. France: Agence France-Presse (AFP)
2. Germany: German Press Agency (dpa)
3. Austria: German Press Agency (dpa)
4. Lithuania: Logically Facts
5. Romania: Funky Citizens
6. Ireland: Logically Facts
7. Croatia: Faktograf
8. Georgia: FactCheck Georgia
9. Moldova: Stop Fals!

(III) Media literacy (General). We rolled out two new ongoing general media literacy and critical thinking skills campaigns in the EU and two in EU candidate countries in collaboration with our fact-checking and media literacy partners:

- France: Agence France-Presse (AFP)
- Portugal: Polígrafo
- Georgia: Fact Check Georgia
- Moldova: StopFals!

This brings the number of general media literacy and critical thinking skills campaigns in Europe to 11 (Denmark, Finland, France, Georgia, Ireland, Italy, Spain, Sweden, Moldova, Netherlands, and Portugal).




(IV) Media literacy (War in Ukraine). We continue to serve 17 localised media literacy campaigns specific to the war in Ukraine in: Ukraine, Romania, Slovakia, Hungary, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Czechia, Poland, Croatia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Germany, Austria, Bosnia, Montenegro, and Serbia.

- Partnered with Lead Stories: Ukraine, Romania, Slovakia, Hungary, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania.
- Partnered with fakenews.pl: Poland.
- Partnered with Correctiv: Germany, Austria.

Through these media literacy campaigns, users searching for keywords relating to the war in Ukraine on TikTok are directed to tips prepared in partnership with local media literacy bodies and our trusted fact-checking partners, to help them identify misinformation and prevent its spread on the platform.

(V) Israel-Hamas conflict. To help raise awareness and to protect our users, we have search interventions which are triggered when users search for neutral terms related to this topic (e.g., Israel, Palestine). These search interventions remind users to pause and check their sources and also directs them to well-being resources.



(VI) Climate literacy.

- Our [climate change search intervention tool](#) is available in 23 official EU languages (plus Norwegian and Icelandic for EEA users). It redirects users looking for climate change-related content to authoritative information and encourages them to report any potential misinformation they see.
- In April 2024, in partnership with [The Mary Robinson Centre](#), TikTok launched the [TikTok Youth Climate Leaders Alliance](#), a programme aimed at 18-30-year-olds looking to make significant changes in the face of the climate crisis.
- Actively participated in the **UN COP29 climate change summit** by:
 - Working with the COP29 presidency to promote their content and engage new audiences around the conference as a strategic media partner.



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| | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Re-launching our global #ClimateAction campaign with over 7K posts from around the world. Content across #ClimateAction has now received over 4B video views since being launched in 2021. ○ Bringing 5 creators to the summit, who collectively produced 15+ videos that received over 60M video views. ○ Launching two global features (a video notice tag and search intervention guide) to point users to authoritative climate related content between 29th October and 25th November, which were viewed 400k times. ● As of August 2024, popular hashtags #ClimateChange, #SustainableLiving, and #ClimateAction have more than 800,000 associated posts on TikTok, combined. | | |
| SLI 17.2.1 - actions enforcing policies above | <p>We are pleased to report metrics on the four new general media literacy and critical thinking skills campaigns in France, Georgia, Moldova, and Portugal as well as the existing permanent campaigns that ran through the reporting period in: Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Spain, Sweden, and Netherlands.</p> | | | |
| Member States | Total number of impressions of the H5 Page (Views generated between July 1 and December 31 , 2024) | Number of impressions of the search intervention | Number of clicks on the search intervention | Click through rate of the search intervention |
| France (in partnership with AFP) | 72,861 | 229,676 | 1,370 | 0.60% |
| Portugal (in partnership with Poligrafo) | 3,400 | 107,964 | 426 | 0.39% |
| Denmark (in partnership with Logically Facts) | 1,540 | 10,854 | 30 | 0.28% |
| The Netherlands (in partnership with Nieuwscheckers) | 2,492 | 64,241 | 226 | 0.35% |



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| Ireland (in partnership with The journal.ie) | 1,320 | 14,282 | 46 | 0.32% |
| Finland (in partnership with Logically Facts) | 595 | 3,725 | 25 | 0.67% |
| Sweden (in partnership with Logically Facts) | 1,197 | 13,444 | 64 | 0.48% |
| Spain (in partnership with Maldita) | 26,213 | 1,253,955 | 3,220 | 0.26% |
| Italy (in partnership with Facta) | 1,948 | 41,297 | 181 | 0.44% |
| Austria and Germany (in partnership with Correctiv) | 33,220 | 15,072,256 | 45,865 | 0.3% |
| Bulgaria | 741 | 309,132 | 1,095 | 0.35% |
| Croatia | 811 | 449,332 | 1,452 | 0.32% |
| Czech Republic | 1,025 | 954,741 | 1,722 | 0.18% |
| Slovenia | 286 | 118,972 | 407 | 0.34% |

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| Measure 17.3 | |
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**QRE 17.3.1**

As documented in the TikTok Safety Center [Safety Partners](#) page and [TikTok's Advisory Councils](#), we work with an array of industry experts, non-governmental organisations, and industry associations around the world in our commitment to building a safe platform for our community. They include media literacy bodies, to develop campaigns that educate users and redirect them to authoritative resources, and fact-checking partners. Specific examples of partnerships within the campaigns and projects set out in QRE 17.2.1 are:

(I) Promoting election integrity. We partner with various media organisations and fact-checkers to promote election integrity on TikTok. For more detail about the input our fact-checking partners provide please refer to QRE 30.1.3.

- We ran 14 temporary **media literacy election integrity campaigns** in advance of regional elections, most in collaboration with our fact-checking and media literacy partners:
 - 7 in the EU (Austria, Croatia, France, 2 x Germany, Ireland and Lithuania)
 - Austria: Deutsche Presse-Agentur (dpa)
 - Croatia: Faktograf
 - France: Agence France-Presse (AFP)
 - Germany (regional elections): Deutsche Presse-Agentur (dpa)
 - Germany (federal election): Deutsche Presse-Agentur (dpa)
 - Ireland: The Journal
 - 1 in EEA (Iceland)
 - 6 in wider Europe/EU candidate countries (Bosnia, Bulgaria, Czechia, Georgia, Moldova and Romania)
 - Georgia: Fact Check Georgia
 - Moldova: StopFals!
 - Romania: Funky Citizens.
- **Election speaker series.** To further promote election integrity, and inform our approach to elections, we invited suitably qualified local and regional external experts to share their insights and market expertise with our internal teams. During this reporting period, we ran 9 Election Speaker Series sessions, 7 in EU Member States and 2 in Georgia and Moldova.
 1. France: Agence France-Presse (AFP)
 2. Germany: German Press Agency (dpa)
 3. Austria: German Press Agency (dpa)
 4. Lithuania: Logically Facts



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| | <p>5. Romania: Funky Citizens 6. Ireland: Logically Facts 7. Croatia: Faktograf 8. Georgia: FactCheck Georgia 9. Moldova: Stop Fals!</p> <p>(II) War in Ukraine. We continue to run our media literacy campaigns about the war in Ukraine, developed in partnership with our media literacy partners Correctiv in Austria and Germany, Fakenews.pl in Poland and Lead Stories in Ukraine, Romania, Slovakia, Hungary, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania. We also expanded this campaign to Serbia, Bosnia, Montenegro, Czechia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bulgaria.</p> |
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V. Empowering Users

Commitment 18

Relevant Signatories commit to minimise the risks of viral propagation of Disinformation by adopting safe design practices as they develop their systems, policies, and features.

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| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No] | Yes |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points]. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Onboarded two new fact-checking partners in wider Europe: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Albania & Kosovo: Internews Kosova 2. Georgia: Fact Check Georgia ● Continued to improve the accuracy of, and overall coverage provided by, our machine learning detection models. |



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| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Members of the EDMO working group for the creation of the Independent Intermediary Body (IIB) to support research on digital platforms. ● Refined our standard operating procedure (SOP) for vetted researcher access to ensure compliance with the provisions of the Delegated Act on Data Access for Research. ● Participated in the EC Technical Roundtable on data access in December, 2024. ● Invested in training and development for our Trust and Safety team, including regular internal sessions dedicated to knowledge sharing and discussion about relevant issues and trends and attending external events to share their expertise and support continued professional learning. For example: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ In the lead-up to certain elections, we invite suitably qualified external local/regional experts, as part of our Election Speaker Series. Sharing their market expertise with our internal teams provides us with insights to better understand areas that could potentially amount to election manipulation, and informs our approach to the upcoming election. ○ In June 2024, 12 members of our Trust & Safety team (including leaders of our fact-checking program) attended the GlobalFact11 and participated in an on-the-record mainstage presentation answering questions about our misinformation strategy and partnerships with professional fact-checkers. ● Continued to participate in, and co-chair, the working group on Elections. ● In October, we sponsored, attended, and presented at Disinfo24 the annual EU DisinfoLab Conference in Riga. |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | No |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months? | We are continuously reviewing and improving our tools and processes to fight misinformation and disinformation and will report on any further development in the next COPD report. |
| Measure 18.1 | |

**QRE 18.1.1**

TikTok takes a multi-faceted approach to tackling the spread of harmful misinformation, regardless of intent. This includes our policies, products, practices and external partnerships with fact-checkers, media literacy bodies, and researchers.

(I) Removal of violating content or accounts. To reduce potential harm, we aim to remove content or accounts that violate our CGs including our I&A policies before they are viewed or shared by other people. We detect and take action on this content by using a combination of automation and human moderation.

- a) **Automated Review** We place considerable emphasis on proactive detection to remove violative content. Content that is uploaded to the platform is typically first reviewed by our automated moderation technology, which looks at a variety of signals across content, including keywords, images, captions, and audio, to identify violating content. We work with various external experts, like our [fact-checking partners](#), to inform our keyword lists. If our automated moderation technology identifies content that is a potential violation, it will either be automatically removed from the platform or flagged for further review by our human moderation teams. In line with our safeguards to help ensure accurate decisions are made, automated removal is applied when violations are the most clear-cut. We also carry out targeted sweeps of certain types of violative content including harmful misinformation, where we have identified specific risks or where our fact-checking partners or other experts have alerted us to specific risks.
- b) **Human Moderation** While some misinformation can be enforced through technology alone—for example, repetitions of previously debunked content—misinformation evolves quickly and is highly nuanced. That's why we have misinformation moderators with enhanced training and access to tools like our global repository of previously fact-checked claims from the IFCN-accredited fact-checking partners, who help assess the accuracy of content. We also have teams on the ground who partner with experts to prioritise local context and nuance. We may also issue guidance to our moderation teams to help them more easily spot and take swift action on violating content. Human moderation will also occur if a video gains popularity or has been reported. Community members can report violations in-app and on our website. Our fact-checking



partners and other stakeholders can also report potential violating content to us directly.

(II) Safety in our recommendations. In addition to removing content that clearly violates our CGs, we have a number of safeguards in place to ensure the For You feed (as the primary access point for discovering original and entertaining content on the platform) has safety built-in.

- a. For content that does not violate our CGs but may negatively impact the authenticity of the platform, we reduce its prominence on the For You feed and / or label it. The types of misinformation we may make ineligible for the For You feed are made clear to users [here](#); general conspiracy theories, unverified information related to an emergency or unfolding event and potential high-harm misinformation that is undergoing a fact-check. We also label accounts and content of state-affiliated media entities to empower users to consider the sources of information. Our moderators take additional precautions to review videos as they rise in popularity to reduce the likelihood of content that may not be appropriate entering our recommended system.
- b. Providing access to authoritative information is an important part of our overall strategy to counter misinformation. There are a number of ways in which we do this, including launching information centres with informative resources from authoritative third-parties in response to global or local events, adding public service announcements on hashtag or search pages, or labelling content related to a certain topic to prompt our community to seek out authoritative information.

(III) Safety by Design. Within our Trust and Safety Product and Policy teams, we have subject matter experts dedicated to integrity and authenticity. When we develop a new feature or policy, these teams work closely with external partners to ensure we are building safety into TikTok by design and reflecting industry best practice. For example:

- We collaborate with [Irrational Labs](#) to develop and implement [specialised prompts](#) to help users consider before sharing unverified content (as outlined in [QRE 21.3.1](#)),
- [Yad Vashem](#) created an enrichment program on the Holocaust for our Trust and Safety team. The five week program aimed to give our team a deeper



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| | <p>understanding about the Holocaust, its lessons and misinformation related to antisemitism and hatred.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• We worked with local/regional experts through our Election Speaker Series to ensure their insights and expertise informs our internal teams ahead of particular elections throughout 2024 including [include examples from 17.3.1]. |
| QRE 18.1.2 | <p>The For You feed is the interface users first see when they open TikTok. It is central to the TikTok experience and where most of our users spend their time exploring the platform. User interactions act as signals that help the recommender systems predict content they are more likely to be interested in as well as the content they might be less interested in and may prefer to skip. User interactions across TikTok can impact how the system ranks and serves content. These are some examples of information that may influence TikTok content in your For You feed:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• User interactions: Content you like, share, comment on, and watch in full or skip, as well as accounts of followers that you follow back.• Content information: Sounds, hashtags, number of views, and the country in which the content was published.• User information: Device settings, language preference, location, time zone and day, and device type. <p>For most users, user interactions, which may include the time spent watching a video, are generally weighted more heavily than others.</p> <p>Aside from the signals users provide by how they interact with content on TikTok, there are additional tools we have built to help them better control what kind of content is recommended to them.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Not interested: Users can long-press on the video in their For You feed and select 'Not interested' from the pop-up menu. This will let us know they are not interested in this type of content and we will limit how much of that content we recommend in their feed.• Video keyword filters: They can add keywords – both words or hashtags – they'd like to filter from their For You feed. |



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| | <ul style="list-style-type: none">● For You refresh: To help you discover new content, users can refresh their For You feed, enabling them to explore entirely new sides of TikTok. <p>We share more information about our recommender systems in our Help Center and Transparency Center and below in our response to QRE 19.1.1.</p> |
| QRE 18.1.3 | <p>We take action to prevent and mitigate the spread of inaccurate, misleading, or false misinformation that may cause significant harm to individuals or the public at large. We do this by removing content and accounts that violate our rules, investing in media literacy and connecting our community to authoritative information, and partnering with external experts. Our I&A policies make clear that we do not allow activities that may undermine the integrity of our platform or the authenticity of our users. We remove content or accounts that involve misleading information that causes significant harm or, in certain circumstances, reduce the prominence of content. The types of misinformation we may make ineligible For You feed are set out in our Community Guidelines.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">● Misinformation<ul style="list-style-type: none">○ Conspiracy theories that are unfounded and claim that certain events or situations are carried out by covert or powerful groups, such as "the government" or a "secret society".○ Moderate harm health misinformation, such as an unproven recommendation for how to treat a minor illness.○ Repurposed media, such as showing a crowd at a music concert and suggesting it is a political protest.○ Misrepresenting authoritative sources, such as selectively referencing certain scientific data to support a conclusion that is counter to the findings of the study.○ Unverified claims related to an emergency or unfolding event.○ Potential high-harm misinformation while it is undergoing a fact-checking review.● Civic and Election Integrity |



- Unverified claims about an election, such as a premature claim that all ballots have been counted or tallied.
- Statements that significantly misrepresent authoritative civic information, such as a false claim about the text of a parliamentary bill.

- **Fake Engagement**

- Content that tricks or manipulates others as a way to increase gifts, or engagement metrics, such as "like-for-like" promises or other false incentives for engaging with content.

To enforce our CGs at scale, we use a combination of automated review and human moderation. While some misinformation can be enforced through technology alone—for example, repetitions of previously debunked content—misinformation evolves quickly and is highly nuanced. Assessing harmful misinformation requires additional context and assessment by our misinformation moderators who have enhanced training, expertise and tools to identify such content, including our global repository of previously fact-checked claims from the IFCN-accredited fact-checking partners and direct access to our fact-checking partners where appropriate.

Our network of independent fact-checking partners do not moderate content directly on TikTok, but assess whether a claim is true, false, or unsubstantiated so that our moderators can take action based on our Community Guidelines. We incorporate fact-checker input into our broader content moderation efforts through:

- Proactive insight reports that flag new and evolving claims they're seeing across the internet. This helps us detect harmful misinformation and anticipate misinformation trends on our platform.
- A repository of previously fact-checked claims to help misinformation moderators make swift and accurate decisions.

Working with our network of independent fact-checking organisations enables TikTok to identify and take action on misinformation and connect our community to authoritative information around important events. This is an important part of our overall strategy to counter misinformation. There are a number of ways in which we do this, including launching information centers with resources from authoritative third-parties in response to global or local events,



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| | <p>adding public service announcements (PSAs) on hashtags or search pages, or labelling content related to a certain topic to prompt our community to seek out authoritative information.</p> <p>We are also committed to civic and election integrity and mitigating the spread of false or misleading content about an electoral or civic process. We work with national electoral commissions, media literacy bodies and civil society organisations to ensure we are providing our community with accurate up-to-date information about an election through our in-app election information centers, election guides, search interventions and content labels.</p> | | | |
| SLI 18.1.1 - actions proving effectiveness of measures and policies | <p>Methodology of data measurement:</p> <p>The share cancel rate (%) following the unverified content label share warning pop-up indicates the percentage of users who do not share a video after seeing the label pop up. This metric is based on the approximate location of the users that engaged with these tools.</p> | | | |
| List actions per member states and languages (see example table above) | Share cancel rate (%) following the unverified content label share warning pop-up (users who do not share the video after seeing the pop up) | | | |
| Member States | | | | |
| Austria | 31.81% | | | |



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| Belgium | 33.81% | | | | |
| Bulgaria | 33.97% | | | | |
| Croatia | 33.66% | | | | |
| Cyprus | 32.91% | | | | |
| Czech Republic | 29.52% | | | | |
| Denmark | 30.20% | | | | |
| Estonia | 28.53% | | | | |
| Finland | 27.21% | | | | |
| France | 37.13% | | | | |
| Germany | 30.09% | | | | |
| Greece | 32.05% | | | | |
| Hungary | 31.38% | | | | |
| Ireland | 29.59% | | | | |
| Italy | 37.65% | | | | |
| Latvia | 30.90% | | | | |
| Lithuania | 30.80% | | | | |



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| Luxembourg | 33.64% | | | | |
| Malta | 35.43% | | | | |
| Netherlands | 27.79% | | | | |
| Poland | 28.88% | | | | |
| Portugal | 33.08% | | | | |
| Romania | 30.08% | | | | |
| Slovakia | 28.89% | | | | |
| Slovenia | 33.33% | | | | |
| Spain | 34.09% | | | | |
| Sweden | 29.44% | | | | |
| Iceland | 27.86% | | | | |
| Liechtenstein | 19.61% | | | | |
| Norway | 25.37% | | | | |
| Total EU | 32.24% | | | | |
| Total EEA | 32.13% | | | | |
| Measure 18.2 | | | | | |

**QRE 18.2.1**

We take action against misinformation that causes significant harm to individuals, our community, or the larger public regardless of intent. We do this by removing content and accounts that violate our rules, by investing in media literacy and connecting our community to authoritative information, and by partnering with experts.

Our Terms of Service and I&A policies under our CGs are the first line of defence in combating harmful misinformation and (as outlined in more detail in QRE 14.1.1) deceptive behaviours on our platform. These rules make clear to our users what content we remove or make ineligible for the For You feed when they pose a risk of harm to our users and our community.

Specifically, our policies do not allow:

- **Misinformation**

- Misinformation that poses a risk to public safety or may induce panic about a crisis event or emergency, including using historical footage of a previous attack as if it were current, or incorrectly claiming a basic necessity (such as food or water) is no longer available in a particular location. Health misinformation, such as misleading statements about vaccines, inaccurate medical advice that discourages people from getting appropriate medical care for a life-threatening disease, or other misinformation which may cause negative health effects on an individual's life
- Climate change misinformation that undermines well-established scientific consensus, such as denying the existence of climate change or the factors that contribute to it.
- Conspiracy theories that name and attack individual people.
- Conspiracy theories that are violent or hateful, such as making a violent call to action, having links to previous violence, denying well-documented violent events, or causing prejudice towards a group with a protected attribute.

- **Civic and Election Integrity**

- Election misinformation, including:
 - How, when, and where to vote or register to vote;
 - Eligibility requirements of voters to participate in an election, and the qualifications for candidates to run for office;
 - Laws, processes, and procedures that govern the organisation and implementation of elections and other civic processes, such as referendums, ballot propositions, or censuses;



- Final results or outcome of an election.

- **Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC)**

- Realistic-appearing people under the age of 18.
- The likeness of adult private figures, if we become aware it was used without their permission.
- Misleading AIGC or edited media that falsely shows:
 - Content made to seem as if it comes from an authoritative source, such as a reputable news organisation;
 - A crisis event, such as a conflict or natural disaster.
- A public figure who is:
 - being degraded or harassed, or engaging in criminal or antisocial behaviour;
 - taking a position on a political issue, commercial product, or a matter of public importance (such as an election);
 - being politically endorsed or condemned by an individual or group.

- **Fake Engagement**

- Facilitating the trade or marketing of services that artificially increase engagement, such as selling followers or likes.
- Providing instructions on how to artificially increase engagement on TikTok.

We have made even clearer to our users [here](#) that the following content is ineligible for the For You feed:

- **Misinformation**

- Conspiracy theories that are unfounded and claim that certain events or situations are carried out by covert or powerful groups, such as "the government" or a "secret society"
- Moderate harm health misinformation, such as an unproven recommendation for how to treat a minor illness
- Repurposed media, such as showing a crowd at a music concert and suggesting it is a political protest
- Misrepresenting authoritative sources, such as selectively referencing certain scientific data to support a conclusion that is counter to the findings of the study
- Unverified claims related to an emergency or unfolding event
- Potential high-harm misinformation while it is undergoing a fact-checking review



- **Civic and Election Integrity**

- Unverified claims about an election, such as a premature claim that all ballots have been counted or tallied
- Statements that significantly misrepresent authoritative civic information, such as a false claim about the text of a parliamentary bill

- **Fake Engagement**

- Content that tricks or manipulates others as a way to increase gifts, or engagement metrics, such as "like-for-like" promises or other false incentives for engaging with content

As outlined in the QRE 14, we also remove accounts that seek to mislead people or use TikTok to deceptively sway public opinion. These activities range from inauthentic or fake account creation, to more sophisticated efforts to undermine public trust.

We have policy experts within our Trust and Safety team dedicated to the topic of integrity and authenticity. They continually keep these policies under review and collaborate with external partners and experts to understand whether updates or new policies are required and ensure they are informed by a diversity of perspectives, expertise, and lived experiences. In particular, our Safety Advisory Council for Europe, which brings together independent leaders from academia and civil society, represent a diverse array of backgrounds and perspectives, and are made up of experts in free expression, misinformation and other safety topics. They work collaboratively with us to inform and strengthen our policies, product features, and safety processes.

Enforcing our policies. We remove content – including video, audio, livestream, images, comments, links, or other text – that violates our I&A policies. Individuals are notified of our decisions and can appeal them if they believe no violation has occurred. We also make clear in our CGs that we will temporarily or permanently ban accounts and/or users that are involved in serious or repeated violations, including violations of our I&A policies.

We enforce our CGs policies, including our I&A policies, through a mix of technology and human moderation. To do this effectively at scale, we continue to invest in our automated review process as well as in people and training. At TikTok we place a considerable emphasis on proactive content moderation. This means our teams work to detect and remove harmful material before it is reported to us.



| | |
|-------------------|---|
| | <p>However, misinformation is different from other content issues. Context and fact-checking are critical to consistently and accurately enforcing our misinformation policies. So while we use machine learning models to help detect potential misinformation, ultimately our approach today is having our moderation team assess, confirm, and remove misinformation violations. We have misinformation moderators who have enhanced training, expertise, and tools to take action on harmful misinformation. This includes a repository of previously fact-checked claims to help misinformation moderators make swift and accurate decisions and direct access to our fact-checking partners who help assess the accuracy of new content.</p> <p>We strive to maintain a balance between freedom of expression and protecting our users and the wider public from harmful content. Our approach to combating harmful misinformation, as stated in our CGs, is to remove content that is both false and can cause harm to individuals or the wider public. This does not include simply inaccurate information which does not pose a risk of harm. Additionally, in cases where fact-checks are inconclusive, especially during emergency or unfolding events, content may not be removed and may instead become ineligible for recommendation in the For You feed and labelled with the “unverified content” label to limit the spread of potentially misleading information.</p> <p>We are pleased to include in this report the number of videos made ineligible for the For You feed under the relevant I&A policies as explained to users here.</p> <p>Note that in relation to the metrics we have shared at SLI 18.2.1 below, of all the views that occurred in H2 2024, approximately less than 1 per 10,000 views occurred on content identified and removed for violating our policies around harmful misinformation.</p> |
| SLI 18.2.1 | <p>Methodology of data measurement:</p> <p>We have based the following numbers on the country in which the video was posted: videos removed because of violations of our Misinformation, Civic and Election Integrity and Edited media and AIGC policies.</p> <p>The number of views of videos removed because of violation of each of these policies is based on the approximate location of the user.</p> <p>We also updated the methodology on the number of videos made ineligible for the For You feed under our Misinformation policy.</p> |



| | Total no of violations | Metric 1: indicating the impact of the action taken | Total no of violations | Metric 1: indicating the impact of the action taken |
|--|---|--|---|---|
| List actions per member states and languages (see example table above) | Number of videos removed because of violation of misinformation policy | Number of views of videos removed because of violation of misinformation policy | Number of videos made ineligible for the For You feed under the Misinformation policy. | |
| Member States | | | | |
| Austria | 2,888 | 1,313,102 | 1,696 | |
| Belgium | 3,902 | 2,844,929 | 2,688 | |
| Bulgaria | 1,568 | 5,435,715 | 1,600 | |
| Croatia | 789 | 973,202 | 616 | |
| Cyprus | 511 | 1,241,327 | 326 | |
| Czech Republic | 2,720 | 4,705,302 | 6470 | |
| Denmark | 1,455 | 2,979,180 | 1157 | |
| Estonia | 319 | 77,555 | 453 | |
| Finland | 984 | 1,784,968 | 811 | |
| France | 44,354 | 61,693,484 | 24,035 | |



| | | | | |
|-------------|--------|-------------|--------|--|
| Germany | 50,335 | 162,220,869 | 30,934 | |
| Greece | 4,198 | 4,431,258 | 1,735 | |
| Hungary | 2,002 | 9,947,587 | 957 | |
| Ireland | 4,676 | 4,802,257 | 2,154 | |
| Italy | 21,035 | 39,078,480 | 19,481 | |
| Latvia | 694 | 3,745,925 | 459 | |
| Lithuania | 520 | 1,122,197 | 647 | |
| Luxembourg | 279 | 162,787 | 121 | |
| Malta | 168 | 5,599 | 173 | |
| Netherlands | 5,422 | 28,11,880 | 6,189 | |
| Poland | 13,028 | 59,545,691 | 9,872 | |
| Portugal | 2,629 | 31,071,224 | 1,400 | |
| Romania | 14,103 | 64,183,832 | 11,739 | |
| Slovakia | 1,365 | 4,714,713 | 1,472 | |
| Slovenia | 574 | 22,494 | 346 | |
| Spain | 22,581 | 37,024,505 | 54,592 | |



| | | | | |
|--|---|--|---|--|
| Sweden | 3,489 | 9,893,681 | 2,423 | |
| Iceland | 122 | 153,566 | 77 | |
| Liechtenstein | 35 | 0 | 33 | |
| Norway | 1,798 | 5,158,745 | 1,200 | |
| Total EU | 206,588 | 517,833,743 | 184,546 | |
| Total EEA | 208,543 | 523,146,054 | 185,856 | |
| List actions per member states and languages (see example table above) | Number of videos removed because of violation of Civic and Election Integrity policy | Number of views of videos removed because of violation of Civic and Election Integrity policy | Number of videos removed because of violation of Synthetic and Manipulated Media | Number of views of videos removed because of violation of Synthetic and Manipulated Media |
| Member States | | | | |
| Austria | 472 | 843,182 | 414 | 216,433 |
| Belgium | 1,002 | 107,828 | 2,092 | 1,119,223 |
| Bulgaria | 182 | 110,186 | 227 | 5,977 |
| Croatia | 64 | 3,753 | 1,361 | 58,579 |
| Cyprus | 86 | 1,333 | 948 | 19,441 |
| Czech Republic | 275 | 25,952 | 465 | 8,287,531 |
| Denmark | 335 | 14,082 | 315 | 2,742,457 |



| | | | | | |
|-------------|--------|------------|--------|-------------|--|
| Estonia | 41 | 866 | 208 | 2,063,380 | |
| Finland | 199 | 1,944 | 716 | 464,824 | |
| France | 4,390 | 8,369,126 | 8,563 | 312,078,908 | |
| Germany | 12,231 | 3,510,858 | 11,199 | 23,904,234 | |
| Greece | 649 | 1,726,365 | 8,742 | 145,950 | |
| Hungary | 308 | 273,247 | 261 | 86,870 | |
| Ireland | 2,051 | 568,596 | 1063 | 103,199 | |
| Italy | 3,910 | 1,578,217 | 3,574 | 1,892,355 | |
| Latvia | 48 | 9 | 129 | 4,519 | |
| Lithuania | 57 | 26 | 203 | 25,410 | |
| Luxembourg | 66 | 2,180 | 223 | 8,729 | |
| Malta | 70 | 97 | 183 | 5,811,847 | |
| Netherlands | 1,046 | 55,695 | 1,883 | 9,080,526 | |
| Poland | 768 | 3,942,081 | 772 | 13,404,186 | |
| Portugal | 535 | 28,529 | 1,010 | 339,124 | |
| Romania | 4,276 | 33,123,122 | 937 | 623,525 | |
| Slovakia | 41 | 677 | 98 | 2,014 | |
| Slovenia | 28 | 111 | 66 | 605 | |
| Spain | 2,126 | 3,554,918 | 4,392 | 21,882,268 | |



| | | | | | |
|-------------------|---------------|---|---------------|--------------------|--|
| Sweden | 633 | 6,424 | 762 | 377,862 | |
| Iceland | 26 | 19 | 85 | 6,113 | |
| Liechtenstein | 20 | 0 | 48 | 525 | |
| Norway | 313 | 1,152,478 | 679 | 139,984 | |
| Total EU | 35,889 | 57,849,404 | 50,806 | 404,749,976 | |
| Total EEA | 36,248 | 59,001,901 | 51,618 | 404,896,598 | |
| Measure 18.3 | | | | | |
| QRE 18.3.1 | | <p>We regularly consult with third party experts and researchers in relation to the development of policies and features which are designed to reduce the spread of disinformation. For example, we engaged with experts globally on our Election Misinformation policies, which help inform updates of our I&A policies.</p> <p>We are proud of our close work with behavioural psychologists, Irrational Labs, which led to the development of the following warning and labelling features (more detail at QRE 21.3.1):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • specialised prompts for unverified content, which alerts viewers to unverified content identified during an emergency or unfolding event and • our state-controlled media label, which brings transparency to our community in relation to state affiliated media entities and raises awareness among users to encourage users to consider the reliability of the source. <p>We are proud to be a signatory to the Partnership on AI's (PAI) Responsible Practices for Synthetic Media. We contributed to developing this code of industry best practices for AI transparency and responsible innovation, balancing creative expression with the risks of emerging AI technology. And, in accordance with our commitments as a launch partner, we worked on a case study outlining how the Practices informed our policy making on synthetic media.</p> | | | |



V. Empowering Users

Commitment 19

Relevant Signatories using recommender systems commit to make them transparent to the recipients regarding the main criteria and parameters used for prioritising or deprioritising information, and provide options to users about recommender systems, and make available information on those options.

| | |
|---|---|
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No] | Yes |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points]. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● At TikTok, we strive to bring more transparency to how we protect our platform. We continue to increase the reports we voluntarily publish, the depth of data we disclose, and the frequency with which we publish. ● In December 2024, we published our newest collection of transparency reports, including our: Community Guidelines Enforcement Report (July-September 2024); Government Removal Requests Report; Law Enforcement Information Requests Report, IP Removal Requests Report; and most recent Covert Influence Operations Reports, where we shared information about the influence networks we disrupted in October and November 2024. ● We also worked to make it easier for people to independently study our data and platform. For example through: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ our Research Tools which empower over 500 research teams to independently study our platform. ○ the downloadable data file in the Community Guidelines Enforcement Report offering access to aggregated data, including removal data by policy category, for the 50 markets with the highest volumes of removed content. |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | No |



| | |
|---|--|
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months? | |
| Measure 19.1 | |
| QRE 19.1.1 | <p>The For You feed is the interface users first see when they open TikTok. It's central to the TikTok experience and where most of our users spend their time exploring the platform.</p> <p>We make clear to users in our Terms of Service and CGs (and also provide more context in our Help Center article and Transparency Center page) that each account holder's For You feed is based on a personalised recommendation system. The For You feed is curated to each user. Safety is built into our recommendations. As well as removing harmful misinformation content that violates our CGs, we take steps to avoid recommending certain categories of content that may not be appropriate for a broad audience including general conspiracy theories and unverified information related to an emergency or unfolding event. We may also make some of this content harder to find in search.</p> <p>Main parameters. The system recommends content by ranking content based on a combination of factors including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • user interactions (e.g. content users like, share, comment on, and watch in full or skip, as well as accounts of followers that users follow back); • Content information (e.g. sounds, hashtags, number of views, and the country the content was published); and • User information (e.g. device settings, language preferences, location, time zone and day, and device types). <p>The main parameters help us make predictions on the content users are likely to be interested in. Different factors can play a larger or smaller role in what's recommended, and the importance – or weighting – of a factor can change over time. For many users, the time spent watching a specific video is generally weighted more heavily than other factors. These predictions are also influenced by the interactions of other people on TikTok who appear to have similar interests. For example, if a user likes videos 1, 2, and 3 and a second user likes</p> |



| | |
|--------------|--|
| | <p>videos 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, the recommendation system may predict that the first user will also like videos 4 and 5.</p> <p>Users can also access the “Why this video” feature, which allows them to see with any particular video that appears in their For You feed factors that influenced why it appeared in their feed. This feature provides added transparency in relation to how our ranking system works and empowers our users to better understand why a particular video has been recommended to them. The feature essentially explains to users how past interactions on the platform have impacted the video they have been recommended. For further information, see our newsroom post.</p> <p>User preferences. Together with the safeguards we build into our platform by design, we also empower our users to customise their experience to their preferences and comfort. These include a number of features to help shape the content they see. For example, in the For You feed:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Users can click on any video and select “not interested” to indicate that they do not want to see similar content.• Users are able to automatically filter out specific words or hashtags from the content recommended to them(see here). <p>Users are able to refresh their For You feed if they no longer feel like recommendations are relevant to them or are too similar. When the For You feed is refreshed, users view a number of new videos which include popular videos (e.g., they have a high view count or a high like rate). Their interaction with these new videos will inform future recommendations.</p> <p>As part of our obligations under the DSA (Article 38), we introduced non-personalized feeds on our platform, which provide our European users with an alternative to recommender systems. They are able to turn off personalisation so that feeds show non-personalised content. For example, the For You feed, will instead show popular videos in their regions and internationally. See here.</p> |
| Measure 19.2 | |



| | | | | |
|--|---|---|--|--|
| SLI 19.2.1 – user settings | Methodology of data measurement: The number of users who have filtered hashtags or a keyword to set preferences for For You feed, the number of times users clicked “not interested” in relation to the For You feed, and the number of times users clicked on the For You Feed Refresh are all based on the approximate location of the users that engaged with these tools. The number for videos tagged with AIGC label includes both automatic and creator-generated labeling. | | | |
| | No of times users actively engaged with these settings | No of times users actively engaged with these settings | | |
| List actions per member states and languages (see example table above) | Number of users that filtered hashtags or words | Number of users that clicked on "not interested" | Number of times users clicked on the For You Feed Refresh | Number of Videos tagged with AIGC label |
| Member States | | | | |
| Austria | 53,057 | 886,639 | 52,559 | 149,390 |
| Belgium | 67,734 | 1,322,561 | 83,721 | 241,538 |
| Bulgaria | 34,081 | 744,333 | 38,568 | 153,704 |
| Croatia | 20,196 | 486,259 | 23,134 | 46,131 |
| Cyprus | 7,895 | 176,600 | 13,456 | 62,428 |
| Czech Republic | 45,392 | 753,417 | 35,791 | 140,826 |
| Denmark | 35,294 | 573,821 | 27,747 | 80,022 |
| Estonia | 11,648 | 151,267 | 11,558 | 30907 |



| | | | | |
|-------------|---------|-----------|---------|-----------|
| Finland | 45,185 | 586,897 | 43,657 | 109,189 |
| France | 332,521 | 7,939,397 | 486,316 | 1,832,452 |
| Germany | 503,549 | 7,977,800 | 648,033 | 1,883,751 |
| Greece | 52,519 | 1,344,879 | 68,577 | 214,464 |
| Hungary | 46,966 | 1,020,692 | 28,543 | 138,023 |
| Ireland | 54,952 | 801,523 | 52,714 | 67,672 |
| Italy | 261,272 | 6,455,485 | 295,958 | 1,140,570 |
| Latvia | 15,527 | 279,241 | 24,888 | 118,117 |
| Lithuania | 21,247 | 325,564 | 23,209 | 64,359 |
| Luxembourg | 4,519 | 76,244 | 5,508 | 44,220 |
| Malta | 3,137 | 77,760 | 4,923 | 15,544 |
| Netherlands | 135,944 | 2,081,920 | 150,651 | 231,651 |
| Poland | 196,496 | 3,383,567 | 175,988 | 519,883 |
| Portugal | 57,677 | 1,152,515 | 61,327 | 216,364 |
| Romania | 85,551 | 2,629,162 | 165,990 | 325,318 |
| Slovakia | 18,482 | 347,681 | 13,822 | 50,322 |
| Slovenia | 9,983 | 177,990 | 19,591 | 17,100 |
| Spain | 275,604 | 6,889,325 | 381,588 | 1,170,610 |
| Sweden | 82,868 | 1,371,265 | 111,934 | 268,743 |



| | | | | |
|------------------|------------------|-------------------|------------------|------------------|
| Iceland | 4,720 | 57,250 | 3,175 | 8,073 |
| Liechtenstein | 129 | 3,563 | 291 | 418 |
| Norway | 48,188 | 685,406 | 63,483 | 101,728 |
| Total EU | 2,479,296 | 5,001,3804 | 3,049,751 | 9,333,298 |
| Total EEA | 2,532,333 | 50,760,023 | 3,116,700 | 9,443,517 |

V. Empowering Users

Commitment 20

Relevant Signatories commit to empower users with tools to assess the provenance and edit history or authenticity or accuracy of digital content.

| | |
|---|---|
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No] | No |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points]. | TikTok did not subscribe to this commitment. TikTok considers that it would be imprudent to commit to this measure at a time when the underlying technology remains unproven and the standards to be complied with are not yet finalised. |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | No |



| | |
|---|---|
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months? | We are continuously reviewing and improving our tools and processes to fight disinformation and will report on any further development in the next COPD report. |
| Measure 20.1 | |
| QRE 20.1.1 | Not committed. TikTok considers that it would be imprudent to commit to this measure at a time when the underlying technology remains unproven and the standards to be complied with are not yet finalised. Once the relevant technology is proven and the standards are agreed and identifiable, TikTok will assess whether such an approach would be beneficial, taking into account existing measures in place. |
| Measure 20.2 | |
| QRE 20.2.1 | Not committed. Similarly to Measure 20.1, TikTok considers that it would be imprudent to commit to this measure at this time. TikTok is, however, open to reassessing in the future whether such an approach would be beneficial. |

V. Empowering Users

Commitment 21

Relevant Signatories commit to strengthen their efforts to better equip users to identify Disinformation. In particular, in order to enable users to navigate services in an informed way, Relevant Signatories commit to facilitate, across all Member States languages in which their services are provided, user access to tools for assessing the factual accuracy of sources through fact-checks from fact-checking organisations that have flagged potential Disinformation, as well as warning labels from other authoritative sources.

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]

Yes



If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].

- Onboarded two new fact-checking partners in wider Europe:
 1. Albania & Kosovo: Internews Kosova
 2. Georgia: Fact Check Georgia
- Expanded our fact-checking coverage to a number of wider-European and EU candidate countries:
 - Albania & Kosovo: Internews Kosova
 - Georgia: Fact Check Georgia.
 - Kazakhstan: Reuters
 - Moldova: AFP/Reuters
 - Serbia: Lead Stories
- We ran 14 temporary **media literacy election integrity campaigns** in advance of regional elections, most in collaboration with our fact-checking and media literacy partners:
 - 8 in the EU (Austria, Croatia, France, 2 x Germany, Ireland, Lithuania, and Romania)
 - Austria: Deutsche Presse-Agentur (dpa)
 - Croatia: Faktograf
 - France: Agence France-Presse (AFP)
 - Germany (regional elections): Deutsche Presse-Agentur (dpa)
 - Germany (federal election): Deutsche Presse-Agentur (dpa)
 - Ireland: The Journal
 - Lithuania: N/A
 - Romania: Funky Citizens
 - 1 in EEA
 - Iceland: N/A
 - 5 in wider Europe/EU candidate countries (Bosnia, Bulgaria, Czechia, Georgia, and Moldova)
 - Bosnia: N/A
 - Bulgaria: N/A
 - Czechia: N/A
 - Georgia: Fact Check Georgia
 - Moldova: StopFals!
- Launched four new temporary in-app natural disaster media literacy search guides that link to authoritative 3rd party agencies and organisations:



| | |
|---|---|
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Central & Eastern European Floods (Austria, Bosnia, Czechia, Germany, Hungary, Moldova, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia) ○ Portugal Wildfires ○ Spanish floods ○ Mayotte Cyclone ● Continued our in-app interventions, including video tags, search interventions and in-app information centres, available in 23 official EU languages and Norwegian and Icelandic for EEA users, around the elections, the Israel-Hamas Conflict, Climate Change, Holocaust Education, Mpox, and the War in Ukraine. ● We partner with fact checkers to assess the accuracy of content. Sometimes, our fact-checking partners determine that content cannot be confirmed or checks are inconclusive (especially during unfolding events). Where our fact-checking partners provide us with a rating that demonstrates the claim cannot yet be verified, we may use our unverified content label to inform viewers via a banner that a video contains unverified content, in an effort to raise user awareness about content credibility. ● Building on our new AI-generated content label for creators, and implementation of C2PA Content Credentials, we launched a number of media literacy campaigns with guidance from expert organisations like Mediawise and WITNESS, including in Brazil, Germany, France, Mexico and the UK, that teach our community how to spot and label AI-generated content. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Our AIGC Transparency Campaign informed by WITNESS has reached 80M users globally, including more than 8.5M and 9.5M in Germany and France respectively. |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | No |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months? | We are continuously reviewing and improving our tools and processes to fight misinformation and disinformation and will report on any further development in the next COPD report. |



| | |
|-------------------|--|
| Measure 21.1 | |
| QRE 21.1.1 | <p>We currently have 14 IFCN accredited fact-checking partners across the EU, EEA, and wider Europe:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Agence France-Presse (AFP)2. dpa Deutsche Presse-Agentur3. Demagog4. Facta5. Fact Check Georgia6. Faktograf7. Internews Kosova8. Lead Stories9. Logically Facts10. Newtral11. Poligrafo12. Reuters13. Science Feedback14. Teyit <p>These partners provide fact-checking coverage in 23 official EEA languages, including at least one official language of each EU Member States, plus Georgian, Russian, Turkish, and Ukrainian.</p> <p>We ensure that our users benefit from the context and insights provided by the fact checking organisations we partner with in the following ways:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">● Enforcement of misinformation policies. Our fact-checking partners play a critical role in helping us enforce our misinformation policies, which aim to promote a trustworthy and authentic experience for our users. We consider context and fact-checking to be key to consistently and accurately enforcing these policies, so, while we use machine learning models to help detect potential misinformation, we have our misinformation moderators assess, confirm, and take action on harmful misinformation. As part of this process, our moderators can access a repository of previously fact-checked claims and they are able to provide content to our expert fact checking partners for further evaluation. Where fact-checking partners advise that content is false, our moderators take measures to assess and remove it from our |



platform. Our response to QRE 31.1.1 provides further insight into the way in which fact-checking partners are involved in this process.

- **Unverified content labelling.** As mentioned above, we partner with fact checkers to assess the accuracy of content. Sometimes, our fact-checking partners determine that content cannot be confirmed or checks are inconclusive (especially during unfolding events). Where our fact-checking partners provide us with a rating that demonstrates the claim cannot yet be verified, we may use our unverified content label to inform viewers [via a banner](#) that a video contains unverified content, in an effort to raise user awareness about content credibility. In these circumstances, the content creator is also notified that their video was flagged as unsubstantiated content and the video will become ineligible for recommendation in the For You feed.
- **In-app tools related to specific topics:**
 - **Election integrity.** We have launched campaigns in advance of several major elections aimed at educating the public about the voting process which encourage users to fact-check information with our fact-checking partners. For example, the election integrity campaign we rolled out in advance of France legislative elections in June 2024 included a search intervention and in-app [Election Centre](#). The centre contained a section about spotting misinformation, which included videos created in partnership with fact-checking organisation [Agence France-Presse \(AFP\)](#). In total, during the reporting period, we ran 14 temporary **media literacy election integrity campaigns** in advance of regional elections.
 - **Climate Change.** We launched a search intervention which redirects users seeking out climate change-related content to authoritative information. We worked with the UN to provide the authoritative information (see our newsroom post [here](#)).
 - **COP29:** We launched two global features (a video notice tag and search intervention guide) to point users to authoritative climate related content between 29th October and 25th November, which were viewed 400k times.
 - **Natural disasters:** Launched four new temporary in-app natural disaster media literacy search guides that link to authoritative 3rd party agencies and organisations:
 - 1) Central & Eastern European Floods (Austria, Bosnia, Czechia, Germany, Hungary, Moldova, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia)



| | <p>2) Portugal Wildfires 3) Spanish floods 4) Mayotte Cyclone</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> User awareness of our fact-checking partnerships and labels. We have created pages on our Safety Center & Transparency Center to raise users' awareness about our fact-checking program and labels and to support the work of our fact-checking partners. | | | | | |
|---|--|---|---|--|---|------------------------------|
| SLI 21.1.1 - actions taken under measure 21.1 | <p>Methodology of data measurement:</p> <p>The share of removals under our harmful misinformation policy, share of proactive removals, share of removals before any views and share of the removals within 24h are relative to the total removals of each policy.</p> <p>The share cancel rate (%) following the unverified content label share warning pop-up indicates the percentage of users who do not share a video after seeing the label pop up. This metric is based on the approximate location of the users that engaged with these tools.</p> | | | | | |
| | <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>Reach of labels/ fact-checkers and other authoritative sources</th><th>Other pertinent metric</th><th>Other pertinent metric</th><th>Other pertinent metric</th><th>Other pertinent metric</th></tr> </thead> </table> | Reach of labels/ fact-checkers and other authoritative sources | Other pertinent metric | Other pertinent metric | Other pertinent metric | Other pertinent metric |
| Reach of labels/ fact-checkers and other authoritative sources | Other pertinent metric | Other pertinent metric | Other pertinent metric | Other pertinent metric | | |
| List actions per member states and languages (see example table above) | Share cancel rate (%) following the unverified content label share warning pop-up (users who do not share the video after seeing the pop up) | Share of removals under misinformation policy | Share of proactive removals under misinformatio n policy | Share of video removals before any views under misinformatio n policy | Share of video removals within 24h by misinformati on policy | |
| Member States | | | | | | |



| | | | | | |
|----------------|--------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Austria | 31.81% | 20.2% | 97.9% | 80.9% | 82.2% |
| Belgium | 33.81% | 14.4% | 98.9% | 82.5% | 89.6% |
| Bulgaria | 33.97% | 30.6% | 94.4% | 59.4% | 82.9% |
| Croatia | 33.66% | 20.9% | 99.0% | 70.5% | 89.5% |
| Cyprus | 32.91% | 18.4% | 95.7% | 71.6% | 83.0% |
| Czech Republic | 29.52% | 25.2% | 91.8% | 53.2% | 90.9% |
| Denmark | 30.20% | 8.3% | 96.9% | 73.5% | 83.1% |
| Estonia | 28.53% | 18.7% | 99.4% | 75.9% | 93.1% |
| Finland | 27.21% | 15.5% | 94.1% | 69.8% | 89.4% |
| France | 37.13% | 22.4% | 99.2% | 86.9% | 95.6% |
| Germany | 30.09% | 21.8% | 97.7% | 76.1% | 90.9% |
| Greece | 32.05% | 17.3% | 96.9% | 74.9% | 92.3% |
| Hungary | 31.38% | 28.9% | 90.5% | 63.5% | 86.3% |
| Ireland | 29.59% | 22.2% | 93.8% | 61.2% | 88.4% |
| Italy | 37.65% | 27.7% | 98.3% | 72.7% | 92.1% |
| Latvia | 30.90% | 27.0% | 98.8% | 82.4% | 94.2% |
| Lithuania | 30.80% | 23.2% | 99.2% | 87.5% | 94.4% |
| Luxembourg | 33.64% | 9.4% | 98.9% | 88.5% | 86.4% |
| Malta | 35.43% | 9.8% | 98.2% | 89.3% | 88.1% |



| Member States | | Share of video removals under Civic and Election Integrity policy | Share of proactive video removals under Civic and Election Integrity policy | Share of video removals before any views under Civic and Election Integrity policy | Share of video removals within 24h under Civic and Election Integrity policy |
|------------------|---------------|---|---|--|--|
| Netherlands | 27.79% | 16.6% | 99.2% | 86.3% | 89.5% |
| Poland | 28.88% | 30.4% | 94.3% | 63.9% | 89.6% |
| Portugal | 33.08% | 26.7% | 97.6% | 84.9% | 90.6% |
| Romania | 30.08% | 41.0% | 91.7% | 62.5% | 82.1% |
| Slovakia | 28.89% | 45.7% | 89.2% | 56.0% | 87.5% |
| Slovenia | 33.33% | 22.9% | 99.3% | 79.1% | 95.8% |
| Spain | 34.09% | 28.3% | 99.1% | 82.6% | 90.4% |
| Sweden | 29.44% | 10.9% | 97.7% | 77.8% | 90.4% |
| Iceland | 27.86% | 4.4% | 97.5% | 90.2% | 92.6% |
| Liechtenstein | 19.61% | 3.1% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 91.4% |
| Norway | 25.37% | 18.8% | 96.1% | 74.0% | 89.9% |
| Total EU | 32.24% | 23.1% | 97.4% | 76.6% | 90.9% |
| Total EEA | 32.13% | 23.0% | 97.3% | 76.6% | 90.9% |
| Austria | | 3.3% | 96.6% | 77.1% | 82.8% |



| | | | | | |
|----------------|--|------|--------|-------|-------|
| Belgium | | 3.7% | 98.6% | 89.9% | 93.1% |
| Bulgaria | | 3.5% | 95.1% | 90.1% | 94.5% |
| Croatia | | 1.7% | 95.3% | 85.9% | 87.5% |
| Cyprus | | 3.1% | 98.8% | 83.7% | 82.6% |
| Czech Republic | | 2.5% | 98.2% | 94.2% | 94.9% |
| Denmark | | 1.9% | 97.6% | 94.6% | 96.7% |
| Estonia | | 2.4% | 97.6% | 82.9% | 87.8% |
| Finland | | 3.1% | 98.0% | 92.5% | 97.0% |
| France | | 2.2% | 97.9% | 90.0% | 96.5% |
| Germany | | 5.3% | 98.1% | 85.1% | 96.2% |
| Greece | | 2.7% | 98.8% | 96.5% | 98.2% |
| Hungary | | 4.4% | 91.9% | 82.5% | 95.1% |
| Ireland | | 9.7% | 86.0% | 24.4% | 96.3% |
| Italy | | 5.1% | 98.6% | 81.4% | 88.8% |
| Latvia | | 1.9% | 97.9% | 93.8% | 87.5% |
| Lithuania | | 2.5% | 100.0% | 93.0% | 91.2% |
| Luxembourg | | 2.2% | 97.0% | 92.4% | 98.5% |
| Malta | | 4.1% | 100.0% | 94.3% | 95.7% |
| Netherlands | | 3.2% | 99.4% | 91.0% | 94.5% |



| Member States | % video removals under Synthetic Media policy | % proactive video removals under Synthetic Media policy | % video removals before any views under Synthetic Media policy | % video removals within 24h under Synthetic Media policy |
|------------------|---|---|--|--|
| Poland | 1.8% | 95.6% | 90.9% | 93.6% |
| Portugal | 5.4% | 99.4% | 97.2% | 97.8% |
| Romania | 12.4% | 78.0% | 27.8% | 49.8% |
| Slovakia | 1.4% | 97.6% | 92.7% | 97.6% |
| Slovenia | 1.1% | 100.0% | 89.3% | 92.9% |
| Spain | 2.7% | 98.5% | 69.7% | 81.9% |
| Sweden | 2.0% | 98.9% | 95.1% | 98.1% |
| Iceland | 0.9% | 100.0% | 96.2% | 100.0% |
| Liechtenstein | 1.8% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |
| Norway | 3.3% | 96.5% | 89.5% | 92.7% |
| Total EU | 4.0% | 95.0% | 75.3% | 88.7% |
| Total EEA | 4.0% | 95.1% | 75.4% | 88.7% |
| Austria | 2.9% | 99.0% | 57.2% | 47.3% |
| Belgium | 7.7% | 97.6% | 62.8% | 72.7% |
| Bulgaria | 4.4% | 99.1% | 46.7% | 23.8% |



| | | | | | |
|----------------|--|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Croatia | | 36.1% | 93.2% | 15.4% | 11.1% |
| Cyprus | | 34.2% | 93.8% | 30.7% | 6.9% |
| Czech Republic | | 4.3% | 97.2% | 48.8% | 70.8% |
| Denmark | | 1.8% | 98.1% | 48.6% | 59.0% |
| Estonia | | 12.2% | 96.6% | 59.1% | 74.5% |
| Finland | | 11.3% | 97.1% | 39.9% | 55.3% |
| France | | 4.3% | 96.1% | 46.5% | 47.4% |
| Germany | | 4.8% | 97.8% | 62.1% | 56.7% |
| Greece | | 35.9% | 89.9% | 27.9% | 10.2% |
| Hungary | | 3.8% | 98.5% | 55.6% | 57.5% |
| Ireland | | 5.0% | 92.8% | 52.3% | 60.1% |
| Italy | | 4.7% | 98.8% | 47.3% | 44.7% |
| Latvia | | 5.0% | 99.2% | 45.7% | 47.3% |
| Lithuania | | 9.0% | 98.0% | 47.8% | 48.3% |
| Luxembourg | | 7.5% | 96.9% | 50.7% | 41.7% |
| Malta | | 10.7% | 98.4% | 67.2% | 79.2% |
| Netherlands | | 5.8% | 98.7% | 60.6% | 67.7% |
| Poland | | 1.8% | 95.9% | 56.3% | 51.3% |
| Portugal | | 10.3% | 96.0% | 37.8% | 31.8% |



| | | | | | |
|------------------|--|-------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| Romania | | 2.7% | 96.8% | 37.9% | 25.0% |
| Slovakia | | 3.3% | 98.0% | 38.8% | 18.4% |
| Slovenia | | 2.6% | 100.0% | 57.6% | 60.6% |
| Spain | | 5.5% | 97.7% | 33.2% | 30.8% |
| Sweden | | 2.4% | 95.3% | 48.7% | 53.7% |
| Iceland | | 3.1% | 98.8% | 72.9% | 75.3% |
| Liechtenstein | | 4.3% | 97.9% | 68.8% | 60.4% |
| Norway | | 7.1% | 94.0% | 46.5% | 55.7% |
| Total EU | | 5.7% | 95.8% | 45.9% | 41.7% |
| Total EEA | | 5.7% | 95.8% | 46.0% | 42.0% |

SLI 21.1.2 - actions taken under measure 21.1**Methodology of data measurement:**

The number of videos tagged with the unverified content label is based on the country in which the video was posted.

The share cancel rate (%) following the unverified content label share warning pop-up indicates the percentage of users who do not share a video after seeing the label pop up. This metric is based on the approximate location of the users that engaged with these tools.

Number of labels applied to content, such as on the basis of such articles

Meaningful metrics such as the impact of 21.1. measures on user interactions with, or user re-shares of, content



| | | | | |
|--|--|--|--|---|
| | | | | fact-checked as false or misleading |
| List actions per member states and languages (see example table above) | | Number of videos tagged with the unverified content label | | Share cancel rate (%) following the unverified content label share warning pop-up (users who do not share the video after seeing the pop up) |
| Member States | | | | |
| Austria | | 1,875 | | 31.8% |
| Belgium | | 2,387 | | 33.8% |
| Bulgaria | | 2,428 | | 34.0% |
| Croatia | | 532 | | 33.7% |
| Cyprus | | 330 | | 32.9% |
| Czech Republic | | 2,431 | | 29.5% |
| Denmark | | 2,438 | | 30.2% |
| Estonia | | 190 | | 28.5% |
| Finland | | 1,768 | | 27.2% |
| France | | 24,023 | | 37.1% |
| Germany | | 28,389 | | 30.1% |
| Greece | | 3,363 | | 32.0% |
| Hungary | | 2,683 | | 31.4% |



| | | | | |
|------------------|--|----------------|--|--------------|
| Ireland | | 1,591 | | 29.6% |
| Italy | | 23,139 | | 37.6% |
| Latvia | | 415 | | 30.9% |
| Lithuania | | 389 | | 30.8% |
| Luxembourg | | 135 | | 33.6% |
| Malta | | 64 | | 35.4% |
| Netherlands | | 4,787 | | 27.8% |
| Poland | | 12,974 | | 28.9% |
| Portugal | | 1,921 | | 33.1% |
| Romania | | 6,708 | | 30.1% |
| Slovakia | | 1,229 | | 28.9% |
| Slovenia | | 169 | | 33.3% |
| Spain | | 25,829 | | 34.1% |
| Sweden | | 3,207 | | 29.4% |
| Iceland | | 49 | | 27.9% |
| Liechtenstein | | 0 | | 19.6% |
| Norway | | 1,516 | | 25.4% |
| Total EU | | 155,394 | | 32.2% |
| Total EEA | | 156,959 | | 32.1% |



| | |
|-------------------|--|
| Measure 21.2 | |
| QRE 21.2.1 | |
| Measure 21.3 | |
| QRE 21.3.1 | <p>As set out within our response to QRE 17.1.1, we apply our unverified content, state-controlled media labels, and AI-generated labels to certain content in order to empower our community by providing them with an additional layer of context. We ensure these labels are developed and deployed in line with scientific evidence by partnering with fact-checkers and working with external experts, including scientists, in the following ways:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unverified content label. In 2021, we partnered with behavioural scientists, Irrational Labs, on the design and testing of the specialised prompts which encourage users to consider content which has been labelled as unverified, before sharing it, as detailed in QRE 17.1.1. On testing the prompts, Irrational Labs found that viewers decreased the rate at which they shared videos by 24%, while likes on such unsubstantiated content also decreased by 7%. Their full report can be found here. <p>As mentioned above, we partner with a number of IFCN accredited fact-checkers in Europe, who assist with assessing the accuracy of certain content on our platform. Where our fact-checking partners determine that a video is not able to be confirmed or their fact-checks are inconclusive (which is sometimes the case, particularly during unfolding events or emergencies), we may apply our unverified content label to the video.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • State-controlled media label. Since January 2023, we have been applying state-controlled media labels to accounts or content where there is evidence of clear editorial control and decision-making by members of the state. To inform our state-affiliated media policy, including the updates set out in this report, and our approach to making such designations, we consult with media experts, political scientists, academics, and representatives from international organisations and civil society across North and South America, Africa, Europe, the Middle East, Asia, and Australia. We continue to work with these experts to inform our global approach and expansion of the policy. <p>We worked closely with Irrational Labs on the development of the state-affiliated media policy and the ways in which we could present the label to our users. We tested various copy options across</p> |



| | |
|--|--|
| | <p>English, Spanish, and Arabic via quantitative surveys and qualitative panels, and found that "[country] state-controlled media" was the option most preferred by users while being the most accurate representation of the relevant media entities' relationship to their respective governments.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• AI-generated content label. In advance of launching our new AI-generated labels for creators to disclose content that is completely AI-generated or significantly edited by AI, we consulted with our Safety Advisory Councils as well as industry experts including MIT's Dr. David G. Rand, who is studying how viewers perceive different types of AI labels. Dr. Rand's research helped guide the design of our AI-generated labels. |
| | |

V. Empowering Users

Commitment 22

Relevant Signatories commit to provide users with tools to help them make more informed decisions when they encounter online information that may be false or misleading, and to facilitate user access to tools and information to assess the trustworthiness of information sources, such as indicators of trustworthiness for informed online navigation, particularly relating to societal issues or debates of general interest.

| | |
|--|--|
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No] | No |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points]. | TikTok did not subscribe to this commitment. |



| | |
|---|---|
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | No |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months? | We are continuously reviewing and improving our tools and processes to fight misinformation and disinformation and will report on any further development in the next COPD report. |
| Measure 22.1 | |
| QRE 22.1.1 | <p>Not committed. TikTok considers that the implementation of the other commitments under the Code (including, but not limited to, the other commitments relating to empowering users and fact-checking) provide a comprehensive approach to tackling disinformation, including facilitating users in making more informed decisions when they encounter online information that may be false or misleading. This position is also reflected in the Commission's guidance. As such, TikTok does not consider that committing to this measure will materially add to the other measures being adopted under the Code.</p> <p>TikTok does, however, keep an open mind. As such, it is prepared to explore such solutions with the relevant providers in due course and to reassess whether such an approach would be beneficial, taking into account existing measures in place.</p> |
| SLI 22.1.1 - actions enforcing policies above | N/A |
| | N/A |

| | |
|--------------|--|
| Measure 22.2 | |
|--------------|--|



| | |
|--|--|
| QRE 22.2.1 | Not committed. TikTok does not consider this to be a practical or implementable proposal. In any event, this measure is unnecessary as the combination of other commitments underpinning the Code (including, but not limited to, those relating to fact-checking) represent a comprehensive approach to achieving the goal of providing users with tools to make more informed decisions when they encounter online information that may be false or misleading. |
| Measure 22.3 | |
| QRE 22.3.1 | Not committed. Not relevant, linked to the above Measures. |
| Measure 22.4 | |
| QRE 22.4.1 | Not committed. Measures 22.4, 22.5 and 22.6 are not applicable as TikTok is not a provider of trustworthiness indicators. |
| SLI 22.4.1 - actions enforcing policies above | N/A |
| | N/A |
| Data | Not committed. TikTok does not consider this to be a practical or implementable proposal. In any event, this measure is unnecessary as the combination of other commitments underpinning the Code (including, but not limited to, those relating to fact-checking) represent a comprehensive approach to achieving the goal of providing users with tools to make more informed decisions when they encounter online information that may be false or misleading. |
| Measure 22.5 | |
| QRE 22.5.1 | Not committed. Not relevant, linked to the above Measures. |



| | |
|--|--|
| SLI 22.5.1 - actions enforcing policies above | |
| | Not committed. Measures 22.4, 22.5 and 22.6 are not applicable as TikTok is not a provider of trustworthiness indicators. |

| | |
|--|---|
| SLI 22.5.2 - actions enforcing policies above | N/A |
| | N/A |
| Data | |
| Measure 22.6 | |
| QRE 22.6.1 | Not committed. Measures 22.4, 22.5 and 22.6 are not applicable as TikTok is not a provider of trustworthiness indicators. |
| SLI 22.6.1 - actions enforcing policies above | N/A |
| | N/A |
| Data | |
| Measure 22.7 | |
| QRE 22.7.1 | As per our response to QRE 17.1.1, we have numerous tools (video notice tags, search interventions, public service announcements, in-app information centres and Safety Center pages) that lead users to authoritative sources available in all EU member states and in 23 official EU languages (plus, for EEA users, Norwegian and Icelandic). We also run localised campaigns on specific topics which deploy different engagement techniques depending on the |



| | |
|--|--|
| | subject matter and / or member state involved, e.g., in-person workshops, radio and newspaper campaigns. |
| SLI 22.7.1 - actions enforcing policies above | N/A |
| | |

V. Empowering Users


Commitment 23


Relevant Signatories commit to provide users with the functionality to flag harmful false and/or misleading information that violates Signatories policies or terms of service.

| | |
|---|--|
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No] | Yes |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points]. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In line with our DSA requirements, we continued to provide a dedicated reporting channel, and appeals process for users who disagree with the outcome, for our community in the European Union to 'Report Illegal Content,' enabling users to alert us to content they believe breaches the law. |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | No |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months? | We are continuously reviewing and improving our tools and processes to fight misinformation and disinformation and will report on any further development in the next COPD report. |



| | |
|-------------------|---|
| | |
| Measure 23.1 | |
| QRE 23.1.1 | <p>We provide users with simple, intuitive ways to report/flag content in-app for any breach of our Terms of Service or CGs including for harmful misinformation in each EU Member State and in an official language of the European Union.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• By ‘long-pressing’ (e.g., clicking for 3 seconds) on the video content and selecting the “Report” option.• By selecting the “Share” button available on the right-hand side of the video content and then selecting the “Report” option. <p>The user is then shown categories of reporting reasons from which to select (which align with the harms our CGs seek to address). In 2024, we updated this feature to make the “Misinformation” categories more intuitive and allow users to report with increased granularity. We have also made changes to implement an additional option to enable users to report illegal content in line with our requirements under DSA.</p> |





Users do not need to be logged into an account on the platform to report content, and can also report video content via the TikTok website (by clicking on the “Report” button which is prominently displayed in the upper right hand corner of each video when hovering over a video) or by means of our “Report Inappropriate content” webform which is available in our [Support Centre](#).

We are aware that harmful misinformation is not limited to video content and so users can also report a comment, a suggested search, a hashtag, a sound or an account, again specifically for harmful misinformation.



| | |
|--|---|
| Measure 23.2 | |
| QRE 23.2.1 Relevant Signatories will report on the general measures they take to ensure the integrity of their reporting and appeals systems, while steering clear of disclosing information that would help would-be abusers find and exploit vulnerabilities in their defences. | <p>Reporting system</p> <p>To ensure the integrity of our reporting system, we deploy a combination of automated review and human moderation.</p> <p>Videos uploaded to TikTok are initially reviewed by our automated moderation technology, which aims to identify content that violates our Community Guidelines. If a potential violation of our CGs is found, the automated review system will either pass it on to our moderation teams for further review or, if there is a high degree of confidence that the content violates our CGs, remove it automatically. Automated removal is only applied when violations are clear-cut, such as where the content contains nudity or pertains to youth safety. We are constantly working to improve the precision of our automated moderation technology so we can more effectively remove violative content at scale, while also reducing the number of incorrect removals.</p> <p>To support the fair and consistent review of potentially violative content, where violations are less clear-cut, content will be passed to our human moderation teams for further review. Human moderators can take additional context and nuance into account, which cannot always be picked up by technology, and in the context of harmful misinformation, for example, our moderators have access to a repository of previously fact-checked claims to help make swift and accurate decisions and direct access to our fact-checking partners who help assess the accuracy of new content.</p> <p>We have sought to make our CGs as clear and comprehensive as possible and have put in place robust Quality Assurance processes (including steps such as review of moderation cases, flows, appeals and undertaking Root Cause Analyses).</p> <p>As part of our requirements under the DSA, we have introduced an additional reporting channel for our community in the European Union to 'Report Illegal Content,' which enables users to alert us to content they believe breaches the law. TikTok will review the content against our Community Guidelines and where a violation is detected, the content may be removed globally. If it is not removed, our illegal content moderation team will further review the content to assess whether it is unlawful in the relevant jurisdiction - this assessment is undertaken by human review. If it is, access to that content will be restricted in that country.</p> |



Those who report suspected illegal content will be notified of our decision, including if we consider that the content is not illegal. Users who disagree can [appeal](#) those decisions using the appeals process.

We also note that whilst user reports are important, at TikTok we place considerable emphasis on proactive detection to remove violative content. We are proud that the vast majority of removed content is identified proactively before it is reported to us.

Appeals system.

We are transparent with users in relation to appeals. We set out [the options](#) that may be available both to the user who reported the content and the creator of the affected content, where they disagree with the decision we have taken.

The integrity of our appeals systems is reinforced by the involvement of our trained human moderators, who can take context and nuance into consideration when deciding whether content is illegal or violates our CGs.

Our moderators review all appeals raised in relation to removed videos, removed comments, and banned accounts and assess them against our policies. To ensure consistency within this process and its overall integrity, we have sought to make our policies as clear and comprehensive as possible and have put in place robust Quality Assurance processes (including steps such as auditing appeals and undertaking Root Cause Analyses).

If users who have submitted an appeal are still not satisfied with our decision, they can share feedback with us via the [webform](#) on TikTok.com. We continuously take user feedback into consideration to identify areas of improvement, including within the appeals process. Users may also have other legal rights in relation to decisions we make, as set out further [here](#).



V. Empowering Users

Commitment 24

Relevant Signatories commit to inform users whose content or accounts has been subject to enforcement actions (content/accounts labelled, demoted or otherwise enforced on) taken on the basis of violation of policies relevant to this section (as outlined in Measure 18.2), and provide them with the possibility to appeal against the enforcement action at issue and to handle complaints in a timely, diligent, transparent, and objective manner and to reverse the action without undue delay where the complaint is deemed to be founded.

| | |
|---|--|
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No] | No |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points]. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Continued to serve user notifications following action on a user's account or content, which includes a clear explanation about the action taken and a simple way to appeal the decision taken. Continued to provide additional user transparency around our appeals processes (here) |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | No |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months? | We are continuously reviewing and improving our tools and processes to fight misinformation and disinformation and will report on any further development in the next COPD report. |
| Measure 24.1 | |
| QRE 24.1.1 | Users in all EU member states are notified by an in-app notification in their relevant local language where the following action is taken: |



| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● removal or otherwise restriction of access to their content; ● a ban of the account; ● restriction of their access to a feature (such as LIVE); or ● restriction of their ability to monetise. <p>Such notifications are provided in near real time after action has been taken (i.e. generally within several seconds or up to a few minutes at most).</p> <p>Where we have taken any of these decisions, an in-app inbox notification sets out the violation deemed to have taken place, along with an option for users to "disagree" and submit an appeal. Users can submit appeals within 180 days of being notified of the decision they want to appeal. Further information, including about how to appeal a report is set out here.</p> <p>All such appeals raised will be queued for review by our specialised human moderators so as to ensure that context is adequately taken into account in reaching a determination. Users can monitor the status and view the results of their appeal within their in-app inbox.</p> <p>As mentioned above, our users have the ability to share feedback with us to the extent that they don't agree with the result of their appeal. They can do so by using the in-app function which allows them to "report a problem". We are continuously taking user feedback into consideration in order to identify areas of improvement within the appeals process.</p> | | | | |
|--|--|--|---|--|--|
| SLI 24.1.1 - enforcement actions | <p>Methodology of data measurement:</p> <p>The number of appeals/overturbs is based on the country in which the video being appealed/overturbed was posted. These numbers are only related to our Misinformation, Civic and Election Integrity and Edited media and AIGC policies.</p> <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>Number of actions appealed</th> <th>Metrics on results of appeals</th> <th>Number of actions appealed</th> <th></th> </tr> </thead> </table> | Number of actions appealed | Metrics on results of appeals | Number of actions appealed | |
| Number of actions appealed | Metrics on results of appeals | Number of actions appealed | | | |
| List actions per member states and languages (see example table above) | <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>Number of Appeals of videos removed for violation of misinformation policy</th> <th>Number of overturns of appeals for violation of misinformation policy</th> <th>Appeal success rate of videos removed for violation of misinformation policy</th> <th></th> </tr> </thead> </table> | Number of Appeals of videos removed for violation of misinformation policy | Number of overturns of appeals for violation of misinformation policy | Appeal success rate of videos removed for violation of misinformation policy | |
| Number of Appeals of videos removed for violation of misinformation policy | Number of overturns of appeals for violation of misinformation policy | Appeal success rate of videos removed for violation of misinformation policy | | | |



| Member States | | | | |
|----------------|--------|-------|-------|--|
| Austria | 619 | 352 | 56.9% | |
| Belgium | 863 | 673 | 78.0% | |
| Bulgaria | 267 | 107 | 40.1% | |
| Croatia | 140 | 84 | 60.0% | |
| Cyprus | 108 | 56 | 51.9% | |
| Czech Republic | 902 | 433 | 48.0% | |
| Denmark | 289 | 215 | 74.4% | |
| Estonia | 140 | 113 | 80.7% | |
| Finland | 202 | 156 | 77.2% | |
| France | 7,461 | 6,189 | 83.0% | |
| Germany | 13,540 | 72,68 | 53.7% | |
| Greece | 734 | 425 | 57.9% | |
| Hungary | 481 | 314 | 65.3% | |
| Ireland | 1,091 | 845 | 77.5% | |
| Italy | 6,074 | 4,174 | 68.7% | |



| | | | | |
|-----------------|---------------|---------------|--------------|--|
| Latvia | 110 | 83 | 75.5% | |
| Lithuania | 105 | 87 | 82.9% | |
| Luxembourg | 17 | 16 | 94.1% | |
| Malta | 38 | 37 | 97.4% | |
| Netherlands | 1,207 | 959 | 79.5% | |
| Poland | 4263 | 1,833 | 43.0% | |
| Portugal | 402 | 274 | 68.2% | |
| Romania | 2,573 | 1,598 | 62.1% | |
| Slovakia | 401 | 175 | 43.6% | |
| Slovenia | 267 | 153 | 57.3% | |
| Spain | 4,920 | 3,961 | 80.5% | |
| Sweden | 943 | 544 | 57.7% | |
| Iceland | 20 | 17 | 85.0% | |
| Liechtenstein | 0 | 0 | 0.0% | |
| Norway | 437 | 322 | 73.7% | |
| Total EU | 48,157 | 31,124 | 64.6% | |



| Total EEA | 48,614 | 31,463 | 64.7% | |
|--|--|---|--|--|
| List actions per member states and languages (see example table above) | Number of appeals of videos removed for violation of Civic and Election Integrity policy | Number of overturns of appeals for violation of Civic and Election Integrity policy | Appeal success rate of videos removed for violation of Civic and Election Integrity policy | |
| Member States | | | | |
| Austria | 79 | 65 | 82.3% | |
| Belgium | 149 | 123 | 82.6% | |
| Bulgaria | 34 | 23 | 67.6% | |
| Croatia | 7 | 7 | 100.0% | |
| Cyprus | 4 | 2 | 50.0% | |
| Czech Republic | 45 | 33 | 73.3% | |
| Denmark | 57 | 50 | 87.7% | |
| Estonia | 3 | 3 | 100.0% | |
| Finland | 12 | 9 | 75.0% | |
| France | 331 | 301 | 90.9% | |
| Germany | 1,302 | 1,053 | 80.9% | |
| Greece | 68 | 56 | 82.4% | |



| | | | | |
|-------------|-----|-----|--------|--|
| Hungary | 45 | 32 | 71.1% | |
| Ireland | 53 | 48 | 90.6% | |
| Italy | 553 | 491 | 88.8% | |
| Latvia | 5 | 5 | 100.0% | |
| Lithuania | 13 | 11 | 84.6% | |
| Luxembourg | 7 | 4 | 57.1% | |
| Malta | 3 | 3 | 100.0% | |
| Netherlands | 123 | 103 | 83.7% | |
| Poland | 177 | 125 | 70.6% | |
| Portugal | 79 | 56 | 70.9% | |
| Romania | 524 | 403 | 76.9% | |
| Slovakia | 11 | 7 | 63.6% | |
| Slovenia | 5 | 4 | 80.0% | |
| Spain | 239 | 202 | 84.5% | |
| Sweden | 124 | 100 | 80.6% | |
| Iceland | 2 | 0 | 0.0% | |



| | | | | |
|--|---|--|---|--|
| Liechtenstein | 0 | 0 | 0.0% | |
| Norway | 44 | 35 | 79.5% | |
| Total EU | 4,052 | 3,319 | 81.9% | |
| Total EEA | 4,098 | 3,354 | 81.8% | |
| List actions per member states and languages (see example table above) | Number of appeals of videos removed for violation of Synthetic and Manipulated Media | Number of overturns of appeals for violation of Synthetic and Manipulated Media | Appeal success rate of videos removed for violation of Synthetic and Manipulated Media | |
| Member States | | | | |
| Austria | 9 | 8 | 88.9% | |
| Belgium | 14 | 12 | 85.7% | |
| Bulgaria | 5 | 2 | 40.0% | |
| Croatia | 12 | 8 | 66.7% | |
| Cyprus | 4 | 3 | 75.0% | |
| Czech Republic | 31 | 12 | 38.7% | |
| Denmark | 18 | 16 | 88.9% | |
| Estonia | 18 | 14 | 77.8% | |
| Finland | 6 | 5 | 83.3% | |



| | | | | |
|-------------|-----|-----|-------|--|
| France | 110 | 87 | 79.1% | |
| Germany | 177 | 121 | 68.4% | |
| Greece | 12 | 9 | 75.0% | |
| Hungary | 22 | 15 | 68.2% | |
| Ireland | 17 | 15 | 88.2% | |
| Italy | 57 | 48 | 84.2% | |
| Latvia | 7 | 3 | 42.9% | |
| Lithuania | 0 | 0 | 0.0% | |
| Luxembourg | 0 | 0 | 0.0% | |
| Malta | 0 | 0 | 0.0% | |
| Netherlands | 19 | 14 | 73.7% | |
| Poland | 35 | 25 | 71.4% | |
| Portugal | 22 | 16 | 72.7% | |
| Romania | 30 | 24 | 80.0% | |
| Slovakia | 5 | 4 | 80.0% | |
| Slovenia | 7 | 2 | 28.6% | |



| | | | | |
|------------------|------------|------------|--------------|--|
| Spain | 52 | 40 | 76.9% | |
| Sweden | 15 | 7 | 46.7% | |
| Iceland | 0 | 0 | 0.0% | |
| Liechtenstein | 0 | 0 | 0.0% | |
| Norway | 14 | 9 | 64.3% | |
| Total EU | 704 | 510 | 72.4% | |
| Total EEA | 718 | 519 | 72.3% | |

V. Empowering Users

Commitment 25

In order to help users of private messaging services to identify possible disinformation disseminated through such services, Relevant Signatories that provide messaging applications commit to continue to build and implement features or initiatives that empower users to think critically about information they receive and help them to determine whether it is accurate, without any weakening of encryption and with due regard to the protection of privacy.

| | |
|--|---|
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No] | No |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points]. | This commitment is not applicable as TikTok is not a messaging app. |



| | |
|---|---|
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | No |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months? | This commitment is not applicable as TikTok is not a messaging app. |
| Measure 25.1 | |
| QRE 25.1.1 | Not committed. This commitment is not applicable as TikTok is not a messaging app. |
| SLI 25.1.1 | N/A |
| | N/A |
| Data | |
| Measure 25.2 | |
| QRE 25.2.1 | Not committed. This commitment is not applicable as TikTok is not a messaging app. |
| SLI 25.2.1 - use of select tools | N/A |
| | N/A |
| Data | |



VI. Empowering the research community Commitments 26 - 29



VI. Empowering the research community

Commitment 26

Relevant Signatories commit to provide access, wherever safe and practicable, to continuous, real-time or near real-time, searchable stable access to non-personal data and anonymised, aggregated, or manifestly-made public data for research purposes on Disinformation through automated means such as APIs or other open and accessible technical solutions allowing the analysis of said data.

| | |
|---|---|
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No] | Yes |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points]. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Continued to refine the new Virtual Compute Environment (VCE), launched May 2024, by: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ Providing access to public U18 data. ◦ Adding new data points (e.g., Hashtag Info) and endpoints (e.g., Playlist Info). See Changelog. ◦ Establishing a new due diligence process with an external partner to confirm the eligibility of NGO applicants. • Continued to support independent research through the Research API and improve accessibility by: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ Adding three new endpoints for TikTok Shop, which launched in Spain and Ireland in December 2024. ◦ Making Python and R (programming languages) wrappers available via GitHub. • Continued to make the Commercial Content API available in Europe to bring transparency to paid advertising, advertisers and other commercial content on TikTok. • Continued to offer our Commercial Content Library, a publicly searchable EU ads database with information about paid ads and ad metadata, such as the advertising creative, dates the ad was active for, the main parameters used for targeting (e.g. age, gender), the number of people who were served the ad. |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | No |



| | |
|---|---|
| | |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months? | We are continuously reviewing and improving our tools and processes to fight misinformation and disinformation and will report on any further development in the next COPD report. |
| Measure 26.1 | |
| QRE 26.1.1 | <p>We have a dedicated TikTok Transparency Centre available in a number of EU languages which hosts our:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • COPD Transparency Reports, as part of our commitments to the Code, we publish a transparency report every six months to provide granular data for EU/EEA countries about our efforts to combat online misinformation. • Our TikTok Community Guidelines Enforcement Reports, providing proactive quarterly insights into the volume and nature of content and accounts removed from our platform for violating our Community Guidelines, Terms of Service or Advertising Policies since 2019. • DSA Transparency Reports, building on our proactive approach to transparency in our quarterly TikTok Community Guidelines Enforcement Reports and our obligations under the Digital Services Act (“DSA”), we publish a transparency report every six months to provide granular data for EU countries about our content moderation activities. • In January 2024, we began publishing quarterly Covert Influence Operations Reports, providing more frequent and granular detail about the covert influence operations we have disrupted. <p>As part of our commitment to regulatory transparency and accountability, we launched the European Online Safety Hub, which serves as a 'one-stop-shop' for our community to learn more about how we're complying with the DSA. The Hub is currently available in 22 EU languages and at least one official language of each of the EU Member States. Our dedicated TikTok for Developers website hosts our Research Tools and Commercial Content APIs.(detailed below).</p> |
| QRE 26.1.2 | In this H2 2024 report, TikTok has shared more than 3000 data points across 30 EU/EEA countries - this is a slight decrease as compared to the 3,300 data points from our previous report. The reduction is due to the fact that we are no longer reporting COVID-19-specific |



| | |
|---------------------|---|
| | <p>metrics in this report. As the pandemic has transitioned from an acute global crisis to a more managed public health issue, the relevance and utility of these metrics have diminished.</p> <p>We provide access to researchers to data that is publicly available on our platform through our Research Tools and through our Commercial Content API for commercial content (detailed below).</p> <p>We also provide ongoing insights into the action we take against content and accounts that violate our CGs, Terms of Service, or Advertising Policies, in our quarterly TikTok Community Guideline Enforcement Reports. The report includes a variety of data visualisations, which are designed with transparency and accessibility in mind, including for people with colour vision deficiency.</p> <p>We work hard to supplement the comprehensive data in the report and provide new insights. For example, we recently shared data on comment enforcement, including the number of comments we removed and the percentage of published comments we removed.</p> <p>As part of our continued efforts to make it easy to study the TikTok platform, the report also offers access to aggregated data, including removal data by policy category, for the 50 markets with the highest volumes of removed content.</p> |
| SLI 26.1.1 | |
| Data | |
| Measure 26.2 | |
| QRE 26.2.1 | <p>(I) Research API</p> <p>To make it easier to independently research our platform and bring transparency to TikTok content, we built a Research API that provides researchers in the US, EEA, UK and Switzerland, with access to public data on accounts and content, including comments, captions, subtitles, number of comments, shares, likes, followers and following lists, and favourites that a video receives on our platform. More information is available here. We carefully consider</p> |



feedback from researchers who have used the API and continue to make improvements such as additional data fields, streamlining the application process, and enabling collaboration through Lab Access, which allows up to 10 researchers to work together on a shared research project.

(II) Virtual Compute Environment (VCE)

The VCE allows qualifying non-academic not-for-profit researchers in the EU to access and analyse TikTok's public data, while ensuring robust security and privacy protections. Public data can be accessed and analysed in 2 stages:

1. Test Stage: Query the data using TikTok's query software development kit (SDK). The VCE will return random sample data based on your query, limited to 5,000 records per day.
2. Execution Stage: Submit a script to execute against all public data. TikTok provides a powerful search capability that allows data to be paginated in increments of up to 100,000 records. TikTok will review the results file to make sure the output is aggregated.

(III) Commercial Content API

As required under the DSA, and to enhance transparency on advertisements presented on our platform, we have built a [commercial content API](#) that includes ads, ad and advertiser metadata, and targeting information. Researchers and professionals are required to create a TikTok for Developers account and submit an application to access the Commercial Content API which we review to help prevent malicious actors from misusing this data.

(IV) Commercial Content Library

The Commercial Content Library is a publicly searchable database with information about paid ads and ad metadata, such as the advertising creative, dates the ad ran, main parameters used for targeting (e.g. age, gender), number of people who were served the ad, and more. It also includes information about content that's commercial in nature and tagged with either a paid partnership label or promotional label, such as content that promotes a brand, product or service, but is not a paid ad.

**QRE 26.2.2****(I) Research API**

Through our Research API, academic researchers from non-profit academic institutions in the US and Europe, or not-for-profit research institutions, organisations, associations, or bodies in the EU, can apply to study public data about TikTok content and accounts. This public data includes comments, captions, subtitles, number of comments, shares, likes, followers and following lists, and favourites that a video receives on our platform. More information is available [here](#).

(II) Virtual Compute Environment (VCE)

Through our VCE, qualifying non-academic not-for-profit researchers and academic researchers from non-profit academic institutions in the EU can query and analyse TikTok's public data. To protect the security and privacy of our users the VCE is designed to ensure that TikTok data is processed within confined parameters. TikTok only reviews the results to ensure that there is no identifiable individual information extracted out of the platform. All aggregated results will be shared as a downloadable link to the approved primary researcher's email.

(III) Commercial Content API

Through our Commercial Content API, qualifying researchers and professionals, who can be located in any country, can request public data about commercial content including ads, ad and advertiser metadata, and targeting information. To date, the Commercial Content API only includes data from EU countries.

(IV) Commercial Content Library

TikTok's [Commercial Content Library](#) is a repository of ads and other types of commercial content posted to users in the European Economic Area (EEA), Switzerland, and the UK only, but can be accessed by members of the public located in any country. Each ad and ad details will be available in the library for one year after the advertisement was last viewed by any user. Through the Commercial Content Library, the public can access information about paid ads and ad metadata, such as the advertising creative, dates the ad ran, main parameters used for targeting (e.g. age, gender), number of people who were served the ad, and more. It also includes information about content that is commercial in nature and tagged with either a paid partnership label or promotional label, such as content that promotes a brand, product or service, but is not a paid ad.

**QRE 26.2.3**

We make detailed information available to applicants about our Research Tools ([Research API](#) and [VCE](#)) and [Commercial Content API](#), through our dedicated [TikTok for Developers](#) website, including on what data is made available and how to apply for access. In August 2024, we established a new due diligence process with an external vendor to confirm the eligibility of NGO applicants.

Once an application has been approved for access to our Research Tools, we provide step-by-step instructions for researchers on how to access research data, how to comply with the security steps, and how to run queries on the data.

Similarly with the Commercial Content API, we provide participants with detailed information on [how to query ad data and fetch public advertiser data](#).

SLI 26.2.1**Research Tools, Commercial Content API, and the Commercial Content Library**

During this reporting period we received:

- 148 applications to access TikTok's Research Tools (Research API and VCE) from researchers in the EU and EEA.
- 61 applications to access the TikTok Commercial Content API.

| | Number of applications received for Research Tools | Number of applications accepted for Research Tools | Number of applications rejected for Research Tools | Number of applications received for TikTok Commercial Content API | Number of applications accepted for TikTok Commercial Content API | Number of applications rejected for TikTok Commercial Content API |
|----------|---|---|---|--|--|--|
| Austria | 5 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Belgium | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 0 |
| Bulgaria | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Croatia | 2 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Cyprus | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |



| | | | | | | |
|----------------|----|----|----|----|----|---|
| Czech Republic | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Denmark | 4 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Estonia | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Finland | 1 | 2 | 0 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
| France | 16 | 4 | 6 | 11 | 8 | 3 |
| Germany | 50 | 12 | 16 | 14 | 11 | 3 |
| Greece | 5 | 1 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Hungary | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 0 |
| Ireland | 3 | 2 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Italy | 13 | 5 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 0 |
| Latvia | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Lithuania | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 0 |
| Luxembourg | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Malta | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Netherlands | 17 | 7 | 7 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
| Poland | 3 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
| Portugal | 2 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 0 |
| Romania | 6 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Slovakia | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 |



| | | | | | | |
|---------------------|--|----|----|----|----|----|
| Slovenia | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Spain | 11 | 2 | 4 | 6 | 4 | 2 |
| Sweden | 4 | 3 | 1 | 4 | 3 | 1 |
| Iceland | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Lichtenstein | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Norway | 2 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| EU Level | 146 | 49 | 50 | 60 | 48 | 12 |
| EEA Level | 148 | 51 | 50 | 61 | 49 | 12 |
| Measure 26.3 | | | | | | |
| QRE 26.3.1 | We welcome feedback from researchers on our APIs and have a dedicated support form where researchers can provide feedback about their experience. On foot of recent feedback, we added the new data point Video_label, which returns any labels applied to a video such as "election labels". Prior to expanding the Research API to Europe, we acted on feedback from US based researchers by streamlining the application process and enabling greater collaboration through Lab Access. | | | | | |

VI. Empowering the research community

Commitment 27

Relevant Signatories commit to provide vetted researchers with access to data necessary to undertake research on Disinformation by developing, funding, and cooperating with an independent, third-party body that can vet researchers and research proposals.



| | |
|---|---|
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No] | |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points]. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> We are members of the EDMO working group for the creation of the Independent Intermediary Body (IIB) to support research on digital platforms. Refined our standard operating procedure (SOP) for vetted researcher access to ensure compliance with the provisions of the Delegated Act on Data Access for Research. Participated in the EC Technical Roundtable on data access in December, 2024. The roundtable focused on the technical measures and best practices that could be implemented to facilitate the roll-out of the data access mechanism for vetted researchers. |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | No |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months? | We are continuously reviewing and improving our tools and processes to fight misinformation and disinformation and will report on any further development in the next COPD report. |
| Measure 27.1 | |
| QRE 27.1.1 | We have engaged with EDMO and actively participated in the working group that was set up in order to implement the Independent Intermediary Body (IIB). TikTok was also one of two platforms to complete EDMO's data access pilot, trialling the process for sharing data with vetted researchers designated under the DSA. |
| Measure 27.2 | |
| QRE 27.2.1 | We continue to participate in the working group which has been set up to implement the Independent Intermediary Body (IIB). |



| | |
|--|---|
| Measure 27.3 | |
| QRE 27.3.1 | We have participated in the working group which was set up to implement the Independent Intermediary Body (IIB), and remain ready to engage with vetted researcher access. TikTok also completed the data access pilot with EDMO trialling the process for sharing data with vetted researchers designated under the DSA. |
| SLI 27.3.1 - research projects vetted by the independent third-party body | N/A |
| | N/A |
| Data | |
| Measure 27.4 | |
| QRE 27.4.1 | We completed the data access pilot with EDMO trialling the process for sharing data with vetted researchers designated under the DSA. |

VI. Empowering the research community

Commitment 28

Relevant Signatories commit to support good faith research into Disinformation that involves their services.

| | |
|--|---|
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No] | Yes |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points]. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Continued to refine the new Virtual Compute Environment (VCE), launched May 2024, by: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ Providing access to public U18 data. |



| | |
|---|---|
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Adding new data points (e.g., Hashtag Info) and endpoints (e.g., Playlist Info). See Changelog. ○ Establishing a new due diligence process with an external partner to confirm the eligibility of NGO applicants. ● Continued to support independent research through the Research API and improve accessibility by: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Adding three new endpoints for TikTok Shop, which launched in Spain and Ireland in December 2024. ○ Making Python and R (programming languages) wrappers available via GitHub. ● Continued to make the Commercial Content API available in Europe to bring transparency to paid advertising, advertisers and other commercial content on TikTok. ● Continued to offer our Commercial Content Library, a publicly searchable EU ads database with information about paid ads and ad metadata, such as the advertising creative, dates the ad ran, main parameters used for targeting (e.g. age, gender), number of people who were served the ad, and more. |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | No |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months? | We are continuously reviewing and improving our tools and processes to fight misinformation and disinformation and will report on any further development in the next COPD report. |
| Measure 28.1 | |
| QRE 28.1.1 | <p>TikTok is committed to facilitating research and engaging with the research community.</p> <p>As set out above, TikTok is committed to facilitating research through our Research Tools, Commercial Content APIs and Commercial Content Library, full details of which are available on our TikTok for Developers and Commercial Content Library websites.</p> |



We have many teams and individuals across product, policy, data science, outreach and legal working to facilitate research. We believe transparency and accountability are essential to fostering trust with our community. We are committed to transparency in how we operate, moderate and recommend content, empower users, and secure our platform. That's why we opened our global Transparency and Accountability Centers (TACs) for invited guests to see first-hand our work to protect the safety and security of the TikTok platform..

Our TACs are located in Dublin, Los Angeles, Singapore, and Washington, DC. In October 2024, we opened our rehoused Dublin based [TAC](#) in TikTok's new premises. DUBTAC offers an opportunity for academics, businesses, policymakers, politicians, regulators, researchers and many other expert audiences from Europe and around the world to see first-hand how teams at TikTok go about the critically important work of securing our community's safety, data, and privacy. During the reporting period, DUBTAC hosted the following visits:

- 22 external tours including 3 NGO/industry bodies, 6 media representatives, and 2 creators.
- On 22 & 23 October 2024 respectively, we welcomed the Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) Safety Advisory Council and the Middle East, North Africa and Turkey (MENAT) Safety Advisory Council members. These visits were attended by TikTok T&S personnel where there were discussions on a range of topics and exchanges of views.
- In November 2024, we welcomed the Latin America (LATAM) Safety Advisory Council.

We work closely with our nine regional [Advisory Councils](#), including our European Safety Advisory Council and US Content Advisory Council, and our global Youth Advisory Council, which bring together a diverse array of independent experts from academia and civil society as well as youth perspectives. Advisory Council members provide subject matter expertise and advice on issues relating to user safety, content policy, and emerging issues that affect TikTok and our community, including in the development of our [AI-generated content label](#) and a recent campaign to raise awareness around AI labeling and potentially misleading AIGC. These councils are an important way to bring outside perspectives into our company and onto our platform.

In addition to these efforts, there are a plethora of ways through which we engage with the research community in the course of our work.



Our **Outreach & Partnerships Management (OPM) Team** is dedicated to establishing partnerships and regularly engaging with civil society stakeholders and external experts, including the academic and research community, to ensure their perspectives inform our policy creation, feature development, risk mitigation, and safety strategies. For example, we engaged with global experts, including numerous academics in Europe, in the development of our state-affiliated media policy, Election Misinformation policies, and AI-generated content labels. OPM also plays an important role in our efforts to counter misinformation by identifying, onboarding and managing new partners to our fact-checking programme. In H2 2024, we expanded fact-checking coverage to a number of wider-European and EU candidate countries:

- Moldova: AFP/Reuters
- Georgia: Fact Check Georgia
- Albania & Kosovo: Internews Kosova
- Serbia: Lead Stories
- Kazakhstan: Reuters

In the lead-up to certain elections, we invite suitably qualified external local/regional experts, as part of our Election Speaker Series. Sharing their market expertise with our internal teams provides us with insights to better understand areas that could potentially amount to election manipulation, and informs our approach to the upcoming election.

During this reporting period, we ran 9 Election Speaker Series sessions, 7 in EU Member States and 2 in Georgia and Moldova.

1. France: Agence France-Presse (AFP)
2. Germany: German Press Agency (dpa)
3. Austria: German Press Agency (dpa)
4. Lithuania: Logically Facts
5. Romania: Funky Citizens
6. Ireland: Logically Facts
7. Croatia: Faktograf
8. Georgia: FactCheck Georgia
9. Moldova: Stop Fals!

TikTok teams and personnel also regularly participate in **research-focused events**. At the end of June 2024, we sent a 12 strong delegation to [GlobalFact11](#) in Sarajevo, Bosnia and



| | |
|-------------------|---|
| | <p>Herzegovina. TikTok was one of three top-tier sponsors of GlobalFact11, the International Fact-Checking Network's largest gathering for professional fact-checkers. In addition to sponsorship, we participated in an on-the-record mainstage presentation answering questions about our misinformation strategy and partnerships with professional fact-checkers. We also had meetings with many existing and potentially new partners as well as the EFCSN. In September 2024, we sent a delegation of 16 to the Trust & Safety Research Conference at Stanford University. In October, we sponsored, attended, and presented at Disinfo24 the annual EU DisinfoLab Conference in Riga. And, in December 2024, we hosted a webinar for approximately 20 French NGOs on the Virtual Compute Environment.</p> <p>As well as opportunities to share context about our approach, research interests, and opportunities to collaborate, these events enable us to learn from the important work being done by the research community on various topics, which include aspects related to harmful misinformation.</p> |
| Measure 28.2 | |
| QRE 28.2.1 | <p>We have a dedicated TikTok for Developers website which hosts our Research Tools and Commercial Content APIs.</p> <p>With the Research API, researchers can access:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Public account data, such as user profiles, followers and following lists, liked videos, pinned videos and reposted videos.• Public content data, such as comments, captions, subtitles, and number of comments, shares and likes that a video receives. <p>Through the VCE, qualifying non-academic not-for-profit researchers in the EU can access and analyse TikTok's public data, including public U18 data, in a secure environment that is subject to strict security controls.</p> <p>Our commercial content related APIs includes ads, ad and advertiser metadata, and targeting information. These APIs will allow the public and researchers to perform customised - advertiser name or keyword based - searches on ads and other commercial content data that is stored in the Commercial Content Library repository. The Library is a searchable database with</p> |



| | |
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| | information about paid ads and ad metadata, such as the advertising creative, dates the ad ran, main parameters used for targeting (e.g. age, gender), number of people who were served the ad, and more. |
| Measure 28.3 | |
| QRE 28.3.1 | The data we make available and the application criteria for our Research Tools (Research API and VCE) and Commercial Content API is research topic agnostic and clearly set out in our dedicated TikTok for Developers website. In August 2024, we established a new due diligence process with an external vendor to confirm the eligibility of NGO applicants. |
| Measure 28.4 | |
| QRE 28.4.1 | We are committed to continued engagement with EDMO and the broader research community. |

| VI. Empowering the research community | |
|--|----|
| Commitment 29 | |
| Relevant Signatories commit to conduct research based on transparent methodology and ethical standards, as well as to share datasets, research findings and methodologies with relevant audiences. | |
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No] | No |



| | |
|---|--|
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points]. | This Commitment relates to Research Organisations. |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | No |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months? | This Commitment relates to Research Organisations. |
| Measure 29.1 | |
| QRE 29.1.1 | Not committed. |
| QRE 29.1.2 | Not committed. |
| QRE 29.1.3 | Not committed. |
| SLI 29.1.1 - reach of stakeholders or citizens informed about the outcome of research projects | N/A |
| | N/A |
| Data | |
| Measure 29.2 | |
| QRE 29.2.1 | Not committed. |
| QRE 29.2.2 | Not committed. |



| | |
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| QRE 29.2.3 | N/A |
| SLI 29.2.1 | N/A |
| | Not committed. |
| Data | |
| Measure 29.3 | |
| QRE 29.3.1 | Not committed. |
| SLI 29.3.1 - reach of stakeholders or citizens informed about the outcome of research projects | N/A |
| | N/A |
| Data | |



VII. Empowering the fact-checking community Commitments 30 - 33



VII. Empowering the fact-checking community

Commitment 30

Relevant Signatories commit to establish a framework for transparent, structured, open, financially sustainable, and non-discriminatory cooperation between them and the EU fact-checking community regarding resources and support made available to fact-checkers

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| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No] | Yes |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points]. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Onboarded two new fact-checking partners in wider Europe: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Albania & Kosovo: Internews Kosova 2. Georgia: Fact Check Georgia. • In H2 we also expanded our fact-checking coverage to other wider-European and EU candidate countries with existing fact-checking partners: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ Moldova: AFP/Reuters ◦ Serbia: Lead Stories • Continued to expand our fact-checking repository to ensure our teams and systems leverage the full scope of insights our fact-checking partners submitted to TikTok (regardless of the original language of the relevant content). • Continued to conduct feedback sessions with our partners to further enhance the efficiency of the fact-checking program. • Continued to participate in the working group within the Code framework on the creation of an external fact-checking repository. |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | No |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months? | |



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| | |
| Measure 30.1 | |
| QRE 30.1.1 | <p>Within Europe, we work with 14 fact-checking partners who provide fact-checking coverage in 23 EEA languages, including at least one official language of every EU Member State, plus Georgian, Russian, Turkish, and Ukrainian. Our partners have teams of fact-checkers who review and verify reported content. Our moderators then use that independent feedback to take action and where appropriate, remove or make ineligible for recommendation false or misleading content or label unverified content.</p> <p>Our agreements with our partners are standardised, meaning the agreements are based on our template master services agreements and consistent of common standards and conditions. We reviewed and updated our template standard agreements as part of our annual contract renewal process.</p> <p>The terms of the agreements describe:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The service the fact-checking partner will provide, namely that their team of fact checkers review, assess and rate video content uploaded to their fact-checking queue. • The expected results e.g., the fact-checkers advise on whether the content may be or contain misinformation and rate it using our classification categories. • An option to agree that our fact-checker partners provide regular written reports about disinformation trends identified. • An option to receive pro-actively flagging of potential harmful misinformation from our partners. • The languages in which they will provide fact-checking services. • The ability to request temporary coverage regarding additional languages or support on ad hoc additional projects. • All other key terms including the applicable term and fees and payment arrangements. |
| QRE 30.1.2 | <p>We currently have 14 IFCN accredited fact-checking partners across the EU, EEA, and wider Europe:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Agence France-Presse (AFP) 2. dpa Deutsche Presse-Agentur |



3. Demagog
4. Facta
5. Fact Check Georgia
6. Faktograf
7. Internews Kosova
8. Lead Stories
9. Logically Facts
10. Newtral
11. Poligrafo
12. Reuters
13. Science Feedback
14. Teyit

These partners provide fact-checking coverage in 23 official EEA languages, including at least one official language of each EU Member States, plus Georgian, Russian, Turkish, and Ukrainian.

We can, and have, put in place temporary agreements with these fact-checking partners to provide additional EU language coverage during high risk events like elections or an unfolding crisis. For example, we temporarily expanded our fact-checking coverage to Maltese for the EU Parliamentary Election of June 2024.

Outside of our fact-checking program, we also collaborate with fact-checking organisations to develop a variety of media literacy campaigns. For example, during this reporting period, we partnered with a number of fact-checking organisations on **election specific media literacy campaigns**:

- Austria: Deutsche Presse-Agentur (dpa)
- Croatia: Faktograf
- France: Agence France-Presse (AFP)
- Georgia: Fact Check Georgia
- Germany (regional elections): Deutsche Presse-Agentur (dpa)
- Germany (federal election): Deutsche Presse-Agentur (dpa)
- Ireland: The Journal
- Moldova: StopFals!
- Romania: Funky Citizens



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| | <p>We also rolled out two new ongoing general media literacy and critical thinking skills campaigns in the EU and two in EU candidate countries in collaboration with our fact-checking and media literacy partners:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">○ France: Agence France-Presse (AFP)○ Portugal: Polígrafo○ Georgia: Fact Check Georgia○ Moldova: StopFals! <p>Globally, we have 22 IFCN-accredited fact-checking partners. We are continuously working to expand our fact-checking network and we keep users updated here.</p> |
| QRE 30.1.3 | <p>We have fact-checking coverage in 23 official EEA languages: Bulgarian, Croatian, Czech, Danish, Dutch, English, Estonian, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Hungarian, Italian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Norwegian, Polish, Portuguese, Romanian, Slovak, Slovenian, Spanish and Swedish.</p> <p>We have fact-checking coverage in a number of other European languages or languages which affect European users, including Georgian, Russian, Turkish, and Ukrainian and we can request additional support in Azeri, Armenian, and Belarusian.</p> <p>In terms of global fact-checking initiatives, we currently cover more than 50 languages and assess content in more than 100 countries, thereby improving the overall integrity of the service and benefiting European users.</p> <p>In order to effectively scale the feedback provided by our fact-checkers globally, we have implemented the measures listed below.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">● Fact-checking repository. We have built a repository of previously fact-checked claims to help misinformation moderators make swift and accurate decisions.● Trends reports. Our fact-checking partners can provide us with regular reports identifying general misinformation trends observed on our platform and across the industry generally, including new/changing industry or market trends, events or topics that generated particular misinformation or disinformation.● Proactive detection by our fact-checking partners. Our fact-checking partners are authorised to proactively identify content that may constitute harmful misinformation on |



our platform and suggest prominent misinformation that is circulating online that may benefit from verification.

- **Fact-checking guidelines.** We create guidelines and trending topic reminders for our moderators on the basis of previous fact-checking assessments. This ensures our moderation teams leverage the insights from our fact-checking partners and helps our moderators make swift and accurate decisions on flagged content regardless of the language in which the original claim was made.
- **Election Speaker Series.** To further promote election integrity, and inform our approach to country-level EU elections, we invited suitably qualified local and regional external experts to share their insights and market expertise with our internal teams. Our recent Election Speaker Series heard presentations from the following organisations:
 - France: Agence France-Presse (AFP)
 - Germany: German Press Agency (dpa)
 - Austria: German Press Agency (dpa)
 - Lithuania: Logically Facts
 - Romania: Funky Citizens
 - Ireland: Logically Facts
 - Croatia: Faktograf
 - Georgia: FactCheck Georgia
 - Moldova: Stop Fals!

Members of moderation teams receive specialised training on misinformation and have direct access to these tools and measures, which enables them to more accurately take action on violating content across Europe and globally.

We are continuing to invest in building, and improving, models which may allow for the output of these measures to be used to update the machine learning models we use in proactive detection, learning, over time, to search for similar content which can be proactively recalled into our moderation system for review. We use a variety of automated tools, including:

- Computer Vision models, which help to detect objects so it can be determined whether the content likely contains material which violates our policies.
- Keyword lists and models are used to review text and audio content to detect material in violation of our policies. We work with various external experts, including our fact-checking partners, to inform our keyword lists.
- Where we have previously detected content that violates our policies, we use de-duplication and hashing technologies that enable us to recognise copies or near



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| | <p>copies of such content to prevent further re-distribution of violative content on our platform.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• We launched the ability to read Content Credentials that attach metadata to content, which we can use to automatically label AI-generated content that originated on other major platforms. <p>Continuing to leverage the fact-checking output in this way enables us to further increase the positive impact of our fact checking programme.</p> |
| SLI 30.1.1 - Member States and languages covered by agreements with the fact-checking organisations | |
| Austria | Fact-checking coverage implemented |
| Belgium | Fact-checking coverage implemented |
| Bulgaria | Fact-checking coverage implemented |
| Croatia | Fact-checking coverage implemented |
| Cyprus | Fact-checking coverage implemented |
| Czech Republic | Fact-checking coverage implemented |
| Denmark | Fact-checking coverage implemented |
| Estonia | Fact-checking coverage implemented |
| Finland | Fact-checking coverage implemented |
| France | Fact-checking coverage implemented |



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| Germany | Fact-checking coverage implemented |
| Greece | Fact-checking coverage implemented |
| Hungary | Fact-checking coverage implemented |
| Ireland | Fact-checking coverage implemented |
| Italy | Fact-checking coverage implemented |
| Latvia | Fact-checking coverage implemented |
| Lithuania | |
| Luxembourg | Fact-checking coverage implemented |
| Malta | No permanent fact-checking coverage. We can, and have, put in place temporary agreements with fact-checking partners to provide additional EU language coverage during high risk events like elections or an unfolding crisis. For example, we temporarily expanded our fact-checking coverage to Maltese for the EU Parliamentary Election of June 2024. Meanwhile, our fact-checking repository and other initiatives benefit all European users and ensure the overall integrity of our platform. |
| Netherlands | Fact-checking coverage implemented |
| Poland | Fact-checking coverage implemented |
| Portugal | Fact-checking coverage implemented |
| Romania | Fact-checking coverage implemented |
| Slovakia | Fact-checking coverage implemented |



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| Slovenia | Fact-checking coverage implemented |
| Spain | Fact-checking coverage implemented |
| Sweden | Fact-checking coverage implemented |
| Iceland | No permanent fact-checking coverage. We can, and have, put in place temporary agreements with fact-checking partners to provide additional EU language coverage during high risk events like elections or an unfolding crisis. Meanwhile, our fact-checking repository and other initiatives benefit all European users and ensure the overall integrity of our platform. |
| Liechtenstein | Fact-checking coverage implemented |
| Norway | Fact-checking coverage implemented |
| Total EU | 22 languages |
| Total EEA | 23 languages |

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| Measure 30.2 | |
| QRE 30.2.1 | <p>Our agreements with our fact-checking partners are standardised, meaning the agreements are based on our template master services agreements and consistent of common standards and conditions. These agreements, as with all of our agreements, must meet the ethical and professional standards we set internally including containing anti-bribery and corruption provisions.</p> <p>Our partners are compensated in a fair, transparent way based on the work done by them using standardised rates. Our fact-checking partners then invoice us on a monthly basis based on work done.</p> <p>All of our fact-checking partners are independent organisations, which are certified through the non-partisan IFCN. Our agreements with them explicitly state that the fact-checkers are non-exclusive, independent contractors of TikTok who retain editorial independence in relation to</p> |



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| | <p>the fact-checking, and that the services shall be performed in a professional manner and in line with the highest standards in the industry. Our processes are also set up to ensure our fact-checking partners independence. Our partners access flagged content through an exclusive dashboard for their use and provide their assessment of the accuracy of the content by providing a rating. Fact-checkers will do so independently from us, and their review may include calling sources, consulting public data or authenticating videos and images.</p> <p>To facilitate transparency and openness with our fact-checking partners, we regularly meet them and provide data regarding their feedback and also conduct surveys with them.</p> |
| QRE 30.2.2 | We meet regularly with our fact-checking partners and have an ongoing dialogue with them about how our partnership is working and evolving. We survey our fact-checking partners to encourage feedback about what we are doing well and how we could improve. |
| QRE 30.2.3 | This provision is not relevant to TikTok, only to fact-checking organisations. |
| Measure 30.3 | |
| QRE 30.3.1 | <p>Given our fact-checking partners are all IFCN-accredited, our fact-checking partners already engage in some informal cross-border collaboration through that network.</p> <p>In addition, we continue to collaborate with our partners to understand how we may be able to facilitate further collaboration through individual feedback sessions with partners.</p> |
| Measure 30.4 | |
| QRE 30.4.1 | We are in regular dialogue with EDMO and the EFCSN on these and other issues. We continue to be open to discussing and exploring what further progress can be made on these points. |



VII. Empowering the fact-checking community

Commitment 31

Relevant Signatories commit to integrate, showcase, or otherwise consistently use fact-checkers' work in their platforms' services, processes, and contents; with full coverage of all Member States and languages.

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| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No] | Yes |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points]. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Onboarded two new fact-checking partners in wider Europe: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Albania & Kosovo: Internews Kosova 2) Georgia: Fact Check Georgia. And, in addition, expanded our fact-checking coverage to other wider-European and EU candidate countries with existing fact-checking partners: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Moldova: AFP/Reuters o Serbia: Lead Stories • Continued to expand our fact-checking repository to ensure our teams and systems leverage the full scope of insights our fact-checking partners submitted to TikTok (regardless of the original language of the relevant content). • Continued to conduct feedback sessions with our partners to further enhance the efficiency of the fact-checking program. • Continued to participate in the working group within the Code framework on the creation of an external fact-checking repository. |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | No |



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| | |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months? | We are continuously reviewing and improving our tools and processes to fight misinformation and disinformation and will report on any further development in the next COPD report. |
| Measure 31.1 | |
| Measure 31.2 | |
| QRE 31.1.1 | <p>We see harmful misinformation as different from other content issues. Context and fact-checking are critical to consistently and accurately enforcing our harmful misinformation policies, which is why we work with 14 fact-checking partners in Europe, covering 23 EEA languages. While we use machine learning models to help detect potential misinformation, our approach is to have members of our content moderation team, who receive specialised training on misinformation, assess, confirm, and take action on harmful misinformation. This includes direct access to our fact-checking partners who help assess the accuracy of content. Our fact-checking partners are involved in our moderation process in three ways:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (i) a moderator sends a video to fact-checkers for review and their assessment of the accuracy of the content by providing a rating. Fact-checkers will do so independently from us, and their review may include calling sources, consulting public data, authenticating videos and images, and more. While content is being fact-checked or when content can't be substantiated through fact-checking, we may reduce the content's distribution so that fewer people see it. Fact-checkers ultimately do not take action on the content directly. The moderator will instead take into account the fact-checkers' feedback on the accuracy of the content when deciding whether the content violates our CGs and what action to take. (ii) contributing to our global database of previously fact-checked claims to help our misinformation moderators make decisions. (iii) a proactive detection programme with our fact-checkers who flag new and evolving claims they're seeing on our platform. This enables our moderators to quickly assess these claims and remove violations. |



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| | In addition, we use fact-checking feedback to provide additional context to users about certain content. As mentioned, when our fact checking partners conclude that the fact-check is inconclusive or content is not able to be confirmed, (which is especially common during unfolding events or crises), we inform viewers via a banner when we identify a video with unverified content in an effort to raise users' awareness about the credibility of the content and to reduce sharing. The video may also become ineligible for recommendation into anyone's For You feed to limit the spread of potentially misleading information. |
| SLI 31.1.1 - use of fact-checks | <p>Methodology of data measurement:</p> <p>The number of fact checked videos is based on the number of videos that have been reviewed by one of our fact-checking partners in the relevant territory.</p> |
| | Nr of fact-checked articles published |
| List actions per member states and languages (see example table above) | Number of fact checked videos (tasks) |
| Member States | |
| Austria | 64 |
| Belgium | 141 |
| Bulgaria | 398 |
| Croatia | 137 |
| Cyprus | 8 |
| Czech Republic | 200 |
| Denmark | 175 |



| | | | | |
|-------------|-------|--|--|--|
| Estonia | 84 | | | |
| Finland | 61 | | | |
| France | 1,045 | | | |
| Germany | 837 | | | |
| Greece | 64 | | | |
| Hungary | 144 | | | |
| Ireland | 91 | | | |
| Italy | 202 | | | |
| Latvia | 40 | | | |
| Lithuania | 41 | | | |
| Luxembourg | 2 | | | |
| Malta | 0 | | | |
| Netherlands | 52 | | | |
| Poland | 622 | | | |
| Portugal | 59 | | | |
| Romania | 669 | | | |
| Slovakia | 138 | | | |
| Slovenia | 22 | | | |
| Spain | 407 | | | |



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|------------------|--------------|--|--|--|
| Sweden | 158 | | | |
| Iceland | 1 | | | |
| Liechtenstein | 0 | | | |
| Norway | 227 | | | |
| Total EU | 5,861 | | | |
| Total EEA | 6,089 | | | |

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| SLI 31.1.2 - impact of actions taken | Methodology of data measurement: | | |
| | The number of videos removed as a result of a fact-checking assessment and the number of videos removed because of policy guidelines, known misinformation trends and our knowledge based repository is based on the country in which the video was posted. | These metrics correspond to the numbers of removals under the misinformation policy since all of its enforcement are based on the policy guidelines, known misinformation trends and knowledge based repository. | |
| | N/A | | |
| List actions per member states and languages (see example table above) | Number of videos removed as a result of a fact checking assessment | Number of videos removed because of policy guidelines, known misinformation trends and knowledge based repository | |
| Member States | | | |
| Austria | 8 | 2,888 | |
| Belgium | 26 | 3,902 | |



| | | | |
|----------------|-----|--------|--|
| Bulgaria | 62 | 1,568 | |
| Croatia | 31 | 789 | |
| Cyprus | 0 | 511 | |
| Czech Republic | 42 | 2,720 | |
| Denmark | 12 | 1,455 | |
| Estonia | 2 | 319 | |
| Finland | 4 | 984 | |
| France | 166 | 44,354 | |
| Germany | 177 | 50,335 | |
| Greece | 8 | 4,198 | |
| Hungary | 21 | 2,002 | |
| Ireland | 13 | 4,676 | |
| Italy | 40 | 21,035 | |
| Latvia | 1 | 694 | |
| Lithuania | 0 | 520 | |
| Luxembourg | 0 | 279 | |
| Malta | 0 | 168 | |
| Netherlands | 13 | 5,422 | |
| Poland | 152 | 13,028 | |



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|------------------|--------------|----------------|--|
| Portugal | 10 | 2,629 | |
| Romania | 168 | 14,103 | |
| Slovakia | 42 | 1,365 | |
| Slovenia | 3 | 574 | |
| Spain | 55 | 22,581 | |
| Sweden | 15 | 3,489 | |
| Iceland | 1 | 122 | |
| Liechtenstein | 0 | 35 | |
| Norway | 14 | 1,798 | |
| Total EU | 1,071 | 206,588 | |
| Total EEA | 1,086 | 208,543 | |

| | |
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| SLI 31.1.3 – Quantitative information used for contextualisation for the SLIs 31.1.1 / 31.1.2 | Methodology of data measurement: The metric we have provided demonstrates the % of videos which have been removed as a result of the fact checking assessment, in comparison to the total number of videos removed because of violation of our harmful misinformation policy. |
| | |



| List actions per member states and languages (see example table above) | Videos removed as a result of a fact checking assessment as a percentage of total number of videos removed due to violation of harmful misinformation policy |
|--|---|
| Austria | 0.2% |
| Belgium | 0.5% |
| Bulgaria | 3.6% |
| Croatia | 1.0% |
| Cyprus | 0.0% |
| Czech Republic | 1.3% |
| Denmark | 0.8% |
| Estonia | 0.6% |
| Finland | 0.4% |
| France | 0.4% |
| Germany | 0.3% |
| Greece | 0.2% |
| Hungary | 0.3% |
| Ireland | 0.0% |
| Italy | 0.2% |
| Latvia | 0.0% |
| Lithuania | 0.0% |



| | |
|------------------|-------------|
| Luxembourg | 0.0% |
| Malta | 0.0% |
| Netherlands | 0.1% |
| Poland | 1.0% |
| Portugal | 0.3% |
| Romania | 0.9% |
| Slovakia | 2.8% |
| Slovenia | 0.0% |
| Spain | 0.2% |
| Sweden | 0.4% |
| Iceland | 0.0% |
| Liechtenstein | 0.0% |
| Norway | 0.6% |
| Total EU | 0.4% |
| Total EEA | 0.4% |

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| Measure 31.3 | |
| QRE 31.3.1 | We are participating in the sub-group created for this purpose. We actively worked with all signatories to define clear deliverables and timelines for the creation of an external fact-checking repository, as contemplated in this measure. |



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| Measure 31.4 | |
| QRE 31.4.1 | We commit to being an active participant in the discussion about technological solutions to facilitate the efficient use of the common repository across platforms and languages. |

| VII. Empowering the fact-checking community | |
|---|---|
| Commitment 32 | |
| Relevant Signatories commit to provide fact-checkers with prompt, and whenever possible automated, access to information that is pertinent to help them to maximise the quality and impact of fact-checking, as defined in a framework to be designed in coordination with EDMO and an elected body representative of the independent European fact-checking organisations. | |
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No] | Yes |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points]. | Continued to explore ways to improve data sharing in connection with our pilot scheme to share enforcement data with our fact-checking partners on the claims they have provided feedback on. |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | No |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months? | We are continuously reviewing and improving our tools and processes to fight disinformation and will report on any further development in the next COPD report. |



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| Measure 32.1 | | | |
| Measure 32.2 | | | |
| QRE 32.1.1 <input type="checkbox"/> | <p>Our fact-checking partners access content which has been flagged for review through a dashboard made available for their exclusive use. The dashboard shows our fact-checkers certain quantitative information about the services they provide, including the number of videos queued for assessment at any one time, as well as the time the review has taken. Fact-checkers can also use the dashboard to see the rating they applied to videos they have previously assessed.</p> <p>Going forward, we plan to continue to explore ways to further increase the quality of our methods of data sharing with fact-checking partners.</p> | | |
| SLI 32.1.1 - use of the interfaces and other tools | <p>Methodology of data measurement:</p> <p>N/A. As mentioned in our response to QRE 32.1.1, the dashboard we currently share with our partners only contains high level quantitative information about the services they provide, including the number of videos queued for assessment at any one time, as well as the time the review has taken. We are continuing to work with our fact checking partners to understand what further data it would be helpful for us to share with them.</p> | | |
| Data | | | |
| Measure 32.3 | | | |
| QRE 32.3.1 | <p>We continue to participate in the taskforce made up of the relevant signatories' representatives that is being set up for this purpose. Meanwhile we are also engaging with EDMO pro-actively on this commitment.</p> | | |



VII. Empowering the fact-checking community

Commitment 33

Relevant Signatories (i.e. fact-checking organisations) commit to operate on the basis of strict ethical and transparency rules, and to protect their independence.

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| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No] | No |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points]. | This Commitment and Measure relates to fact checking organisations. |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | No |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months? | This Commitment and Measure relates to fact checking organisations. |
| Measure 33.1 | |
| QRE 33.1.1 | Not committed. This Commitment and Measure relates to Fact-Checking organisations. |
| SLI 33.1.1 - number of European fact-checkers that are IFCN-certified | N/A |



VIII. Transparency Centre Commitments 34 - 36



VIII. Transparency Centre

Commitment 34

To ensure transparency and accountability around the implementation of this Code, Relevant Signatories commit to set up and maintain a publicly available common Transparency Centre website

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| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No] | Yes |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points]. | We have been an active participant in the working group that has successfully launched the common Transparency Centre this year. We have held the position of co-chair of the Transparency working group since September 2023. From January 2024, we supported the transition of the maintenance and development of the website from the former third-party vendor, to the signatory of the Code, Vost.eu. |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | No |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months? | No |
| Measure 34.1 | |
| Measure 34.2 | |
| Measure 34.3 | |



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| Measure 34.4 | |
| Measure 34.5 | |

| VIII. Transparency Centre | |
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| Commitment 35 | |
| Signatories commit to ensure that the Transparency Centre contains all the relevant information related to the implementation of the Code's Commitments and Measures and that this information is presented in an easy-to-understand manner, per service, and is easily searchable. | |
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No] | Yes |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points]. | Through our participation in the Transparency Centre working group, we have ensured that the Transparency Centre will allow the general public to access general information about the Code as well as the underlying reports (and for the Centre to be navigated both by commitment and by signatory). |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | No |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months? | no |
| Measure 35.1 | |



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| Measure 35.2 | |
| Measure 35.3 | |
| Measure 35.4 | |
| Measure 35.5 | |
| Measure 35.6 | |

| VIII. Transparency Centre | |
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| Commitment 36 | |
| Signatories commit to updating the relevant information contained in the Transparency Centre in a timely and complete manner. | |
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No] | No |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | No |



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| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months? | |
| Measure 36.1 | |
| Measure 36.2 | |
| Measure 36.3 | |
| QRE 36.1.1 (for the Commitments 34-36) | The Transparency Centre was successfully launched in February 2023. We continue to upload our report according to the approved deadlines. |
| QRE 36.1.2 (for the Commitments 34-36) | The administration of the Transparency Centre website has been transferred fully to the community of the Code's signatories, with VOST Europe taking the role of developer. |
| SLI 36.1.1 | We worked with the vendor to develop relevant metrics for this SLI. |
| Data | Between 1 July 2024 and 31 December 2024, the common Transparency Centre has been visited by 20,255 unique visitors. The Signatories' reports were downloaded 5,626 times by 1,275 unique visitors. More specifically, TikTok's previous COPD report was downloaded 302 times by 135 visitors. |



IX. Permanent Task-Force Commitment 37



IX. Permanent Task-Force

Commitment 37

Signatories commit to participate in the permanent Task-force. The Task-force includes the Signatories of the Code and representatives from EDMO and ERGA. It is chaired by the European Commission, and includes representatives of the European External Action Service (EEAS). The Task-force can also invite relevant experts as observers to support its work. Decisions of the Task-force are made by consensus.

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| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No] | No |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points]. | We have meaningfully engaged in the Task-force / Plenaries and all working groups. |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | No |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months? | N/A |
| Measure 37.1 | |
| Measure 37.2 | |
| Measure 37.3 | |



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| Measure 37.4 | |
| Measure 37.5 | |
| Measure 37.6 | |
| QRE 37.6.1 | <p>We have meaningfully engaged in the Task-force and all of its working groups by attending and participating at meetings and engaging in any relevant discussions, in particular regarding the Code conversion process and development / activation of the RRS for elections.</p> <p>We will continue to engage in the Task-force and all of its working groups and subgroups.</p> |



X. Monitoring of Code Commitment 38 - 44



X. Monitoring of Code

Commitment 38

The Signatories commit to dedicate adequate financial and human resources and put in place appropriate internal processes to ensure the implementation of their commitments under the Code.

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| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No] | No |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points]. | |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | No |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months? | We are continuously reviewing and improving our tools and processes to fight misinformation and disinformation and will report on any further development in the next COPD report. |
| Measure 38.1 | |

**QRE 38.1.1**

TikTok has assigned the highest priority level to the Code, which means that we have, and will continue to have, appropriate resources in place to meet our commitments and compliance.

Given the breadth of the Code and the commitments therein, our work spans multiple teams, including Trust and Safety, Legal, Monetisation Integrity, Product and Public Policy. Teams across the globe are deployed to ensure that we meet our commitments and compliance with the notable involvement of our Trust and Safety Leadership.

Across the European Union, we have thousands of trust and safety professionals dedicated to keeping our platform safe. We also recognise the importance of local knowledge and expertise as we work to ensure online safety for our users. We take a similar approach to our third party partnerships.

X. Monitoring of Code

Commitment 39

Signatories commit to provide to the European Commission, within 1 month after the end of the implementation period (6 months after this Code's signature) the baseline reports as set out in the Preamble.

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| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No] | No |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points]. | We have shared our baseline report with the Commission in accordance with the agreed timeframes. |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | No |



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| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months? | N/A |

| X. Monitoring of Code | |
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| Commitment 40 | |
| <p>Signatories commit to provide regular reporting on Service Level Indicators (SLIs) and Qualitative Reporting Elements (QREs). The reports and data provided should allow for a thorough assessment of the extent of the implementation of the Code's Commitments and Measures by each Signatory, service and at Member State level.</p> | |
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No] | Yes |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points]. | We have reported on the SLIs and QREs relevant to the Commitments we signed-up to within this report. |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | No |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months? | We are continuously reviewing and improving our tools and processes to fight misinformation and disinformation and will report on any further development in the next COPD report. |



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|--------------|--|
| Measure 40.1 | |
| Measure 40.2 | |
| Measure 40.3 | |
| Measure 40.4 | |
| Measure 40.5 | |
| Measure 40.6 | |

| X. Monitoring of Code | |
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| Commitment 41 | |
| <p>Signatories commit to work within the Task-force towards developing Structural Indicators, and publish a first set of them within 9 months from the signature of this Code; and to publish an initial measurement alongside their first full report. To achieve this goal, Signatories commit to support their implementation, including the testing and adapting of the initial set of Structural Indicators agreed in this Code. This, in order to assess the effectiveness of the Code in reducing the spread of online disinformation for each of the relevant Signatories, and for the entire online ecosystem in the EU and at Member State level. Signatories will collaborate with relevant actors in that regard, including ERGA and EDMO.</p> | |
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No] | Yes |



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| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points]. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • We have been an active participant in the working group dedicated to developing Structural Indicators. • We supported the publication of the second analysis of Structural Indicators, expanding it to covering 4 markets and increasing the sample size in September 2024. |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | No |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months? | N/A |
| Measure 41.1 | |
| Measure 41.2 | |
| Measure 41.3 | |

X. Monitoring of Code

Commitment 42

Relevant Signatories commit to provide, in special situations like elections or crisis, upon request of the European Commission, proportionate and appropriate information and data, including ad-hoc specific reports and specific chapters within the regular monitoring, in accordance with the rapid response system established by the Taskforce.



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| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No] | Yes |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points]. | We have been an active participant in the Crisis Response working group, which resulted in the implementation of the Rapid Response System being developed/ activated for elections. We have also published Crisis Reports specific to the War in Ukraine, the Israel/Hamas conflict and also elections reports on the French snap election and the Romanian Presidential Election along with this report. |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | No |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months? | We are continuously reviewing and improving our tools and processes to fight misinformation and disinformation and will report on any further development in the next COPD report. |

| X. Monitoring of Code | |
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| Commitment 43 | |
| Signatories commit to produce reports and provide data following the harmonised reporting templates and refined methodology for reporting and data disclosure, as agreed in the Task-force. | |
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No] | Yes |



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| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points]. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Participated in the monitoring and reporting working group. Published transparency report in September 2024. |
| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | No |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months? | We are continuously reviewing and improving our tools and processes to fight misinformation and disinformation and will report on any further development in the next COPD report. |

| X. Monitoring of Code | |
|---|---|
| Commitment 44 | |
| <p>Relevant Signatories that are providers of Very Large Online Platforms commit, seeking alignment with the DSA, to be audited at their own expense, for their compliance with the commitments undertaken pursuant to this Code. Audits should be performed by organisations, independent from, and without conflict of interest with, the provider of the Very Large Online Platform concerned. Such organisations shall have proven expertise in the area of disinformation, appropriate technical competence and capabilities and have proven objectivity and professional ethics, based in particular on adherence to auditing standards and guidelines.</p> | |
| In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No] | Yes |
| If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points]. | Implemented the annual DSA audit programme. |



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| Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No] | No |
| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months? | We are continuously reviewing and improving our tools and processes to fight misinformation and disinformation and will report on any further development in the next COPD report. |



Reporting on the service's response during a crisis

War of aggression by Russia on Ukraine

Threats observed or anticipated at time of reporting: [suggested character limit 2000 characters].

The war of aggression by Russia on Ukraine (hereinafter, “**War in Ukraine**”) continues to challenge us to confront an incredibly complex and continually evolving environment. At TikTok, the safety of our people and community is of paramount importance and we work continuously to safeguard our platform.

We have set out below some of the main threats we have observed on our platform in relation to the spread of harmful misinformation and covert influence operations (**CIO**) related to the War in Ukraine in the reporting period. We remain committed to preventing such content from being shared in this context.

(I) Spread of harmful misinformation

We observe and take action where appropriate under our policies. Since the War in Ukraine began we have seen false or unconfirmed claims about specific attacks and events, the development or use of weapons, the involvement of specific countries in the conflict and statements about specific military activities, such as the direction of troop movement. We also have seen instances of footage repurposed in a misleading way, including from video games or unrelated footage from past events presented as current.

TikTok adopts a dynamic approach to understanding and removing misleading stories. When addressing harmful misinformation, we apply our [Integrity & Authenticity policies \(I&A policies\)](#) in our [Community Guidelines](#) and we will take action against offending content on our platform. Our moderation teams are provided with detailed policy guidance and direction when moderating on crisis related misinformation using our misinformation policies, this includes the provision of case banks of harmful misinformation claims to support their moderation work.

(II) CIOs

We continuously work to detect and disrupt covert influence operations that attempt to establish themselves on TikTok and undermine the integrity of our platform. Our I&A policies prohibit attempts to sway public opinion while also misleading our systems or users about the identity, origin, approximate location, popularity or overall purpose. We have specifically-trained teams which are on high alert to investigate and detect CIOs on our platform. We ban accounts that try to engage in such behavior, take action on others that we assess as part of the network, and report them regularly in our transparency center. When we ban these accounts, any content they posted is also removed.

In the period from July to December 2024, we took action to remove a total of 9 networks (consisting of 20,002 accounts in total) that were found to be involved in coordinated attempts to influence public opinion about the War in Ukraine while also misleading individuals, our community, or our systems. We publish all of the CIO networks we identify and remove within our new dedicated CIO transparency report [here](#).

CIO will continue to evolve in response to our detection and networks may attempt to reestablish a presence on our platform.



To counter these emerging threats and stay ahead of evolving challenges, we have expert teams who focus entirely on detecting, investigating, and disrupting covert influence operations.

Mitigations in place at time of reporting: [suggested character limit: 2000 characters].

We aim to ensure that TikTok is a source of reliable and safe information and recognise the heightened risk and impact of misleading information during a time of crisis such as the War in Ukraine..

(I) Investment in our fact-checking programme

We employ a layered approach to detecting harmful misinformation which is in violation of our CGs.

Working closely with our fact-checking partners is a crucial part of our approach to enforcing harmful misinformation on our platform. Our fact-checking programme includes coverage of Russian, Ukrainian and Belarusian. We also partner with Reuters, who are dedicated to fact-checking content in Russian and Ukrainian.

We also collaborate with certain of our fact-checking partners to receive advance warning of emerging misinformation narratives, which has facilitated proactive responses against high-harm trends and has ensured that our moderation teams have up-to-date guidance.

(II) Disruption of CIOs

As set out above, disrupting CIO networks has been high priority work for us in the context of the crisis and we published a list of the networks we disrupted in the relevant period within our most recently published transparency report [here](#).

Between July and December 2024, we took action to remove a total of 9 networks (consisting of 20,002 accounts in total) that were found to be involved in coordinated attempts to influence public opinion about the War in Ukraine while also misleading individuals, our community, or our systems. We publish all of the CIO networks we identify and remove within our dedicated CIO transparency report [here](#).

Countering influence operations is an industry-wide effort, in part because these operations often spread their activity across multiple platforms. We regularly consult with third-party experts, including our global [Content and Safety Advisory Councils](#), whose guidance helps us improve our policies and understand regional context.

(III) Restricting access to content for state affiliated media

Since the early stages of the war, we have restricted access to content from a number of Russian state affiliated media entities in the EU, Iceland and Liechtenstein. Our state affiliated media policy is used to help users understand the context of certain content and to help them to evaluate the content they consume on our platform. Labels have since applied to content posted by the state affiliated accounts of such entities in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus.

We continue the detection and labeling of state-controlled media accounts in accordance with our state-controlled media label policy globally.



(IV) Mitigating the risk of monetisation of harmful misinformation

Political advertising has been prohibited on our platform for many years, but as an additional risk mitigation measure against the risk of monetisation off the back of the War in Ukraine we prohibit Russian-based advertisers from outbound targeting of EU markets. We also suspended TikTok in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, removing Livestream videos originating in Ukraine from the For You feed of users located in the EU. In addition, the ability to add new video content or Livestream videos to the platform in Russia remains suspended.

(V) Launching localised media literacy campaigns

Proactive measures which are aimed at improving our users' digital literacy are vital and we recognise the importance of increasing the prominence of authoritative information. We have thirteen localised media literacy campaigns addressing disinformation related to the War in Ukraine in Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Croatia, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia in close collaboration with our fact-checking partners. Users searching for keywords relating to the War in Ukraine are directed to tips, prepared in partnership with our fact checking partners, to help users identify misinformation and prevent the spread of it on the platform. We have also partnered with a local Ukrainian fact-checking organisation, VoxCheck, with the aim of launching a permanent media literacy campaign in Ukraine.

[Note: Signatories are requested to provide information relevant to their particular response to the threats and challenges they observed on their service(s). They ensure that the information below provides an accurate and complete report of their relevant actions. As operational responses to crisis/election situations can vary from service to service, an absence of information should not be considered a priori a shortfall in the way a particular service has responded. Impact metrics are accurate to the best of signatories' abilities to measure them].

Policies and Terms and Conditions

Outline any changes to your policies

| Policy | Changes (such as newly introduced policies, edits, adaptation in scope or implementation) | Rationale |
|---|--|--|
| No relevant updates in the reporting period. | N/A In a crisis, we keep under review our policies and to ensure moderation teams | Our I&A policies are our first line of defense in combating harmful misinformation and deceptive behaviours on our platform. Our Community Guidelines make clear to our users what content we remove or make ineligible for the For You feed when they pose a risk of harm to our users or the wider public. Our moderation teams are provided with detailed policy guidance and direction when moderating on war-related harmful |



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| | <p>have supplementary guidance.</p> <p>misinformation using existing policies.</p> <p>We have specialist teams within our Trust and Safety department dedicated to the policy issue of I&A, including within the areas of product and policy. Our experienced subject matter experts on I&A continually keep these policies under review and collaborate with external partners and experts when understanding whether updates are required.</p> <p>When situations such as the War in Ukraine arise, our teams work to ensure that appropriate guidance is developed so that the I&A policies are applied in an effective manner in respect of content relating to the relevant crisis (in this case, the war). This includes issuing detailed policy guidance and direction, including providing case banks on harmful misinformation claims to support moderation teams.</p> |
| Scrutiny of Ads Placements | |
| Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement. | |
| Preventing misuse of our monetisation features <i>(Commitment 1, Measure 1.1)</i> | <p>Description of intervention</p> <p>Since the beginning of the War in Ukraine, we have suspended livestreaming and new content in Russia, and also taken a strict position not to enable monetisation in Russia. Since March 2022 Russia-based advertisers have been prohibited from outbound targeting ads to EU markets. TikTok remains suspended in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. We also take steps to comply with other applicable sanctions, such as geoblocking content of identified sanctioned persons from the EU and UK.</p> <p>Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available</p> <p>N/A</p> |
| Content moderation <i>(Commitment 2, Measure 2.2)</i> | <p>Description of intervention</p> <p>We use a combination of automated and human moderation to identify content that breaches our ad policies.</p> <p>We enforce our strict ad policies and have expert teams focused on investigating and responding to any attempts to circumvent them.</p> |



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| | <p><i>Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available</i></p> <p>Our efforts on ad moderation practices help to ensure that ads that breach our policies are rejected or removed, both in the context of the War in Ukraine and more broadly on our platform.</p> |
| Political Advertising | |
| Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement. | |
| Prohibition on Political Advertising (Commitment 4) | <p><i>Description of intervention</i></p> <p>In an effort to maintain both the integrity of the platform and safety of the people who use it, accounts belonging to politicians or political parties are not able to advertise or make money on TikTok.</p> <p>We do not allow paid political promotion, political advertising, or fundraising by politicians and political parties (for themselves or others). Our political ads policy includes both traditional paid ads and creators receiving compensation to support or oppose a candidate for office. This has been a long-standing policy at TikTok since 2019. We don't allow paid or branded content that promotes or opposes a candidate, current leader, political party or group, or issue at the federal, state, or local level – including election-related ads.</p> <p>We are pleased that Regulation EU 2024/900 on the Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising set out a common definition of "political advertising". We are reviewing our policies to ensure that our prohibition of political advertising is at least as broad as the regulation.</p> <p><i>Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available</i></p> <p>Our monetisation integrity content teams observed a sharp rise in attempts to post ads related to political/war content during the initial period of the conflict commencement. Our risk control methods ensured there was no corresponding increase in violating activity going live on the platform. Since the early stages of the conflict, these numbers have declined significantly, and no further spikes have occurred.</p> |
| Integrity of Services | |



Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

| | |
|--|---|
| Identifying and removing CIO networks <i>(Commitment 14, Measure 14.1)</i> | <p>Description of intervention</p> <p>We fight against CIO as our I&A policies prohibit attempts to sway public opinion while also misleading our systems or users about the identity, origin, approximate location, popularity or overall purpose. We prohibit and constantly work to disrupt attempts to engage in covert influence operations by manipulating our platform and/or harmfully misleading our community, our expert teams who focus entirely on detecting, investigating and disrupting CIO networks who have removed numerous networks targeting discourse about the War in Ukraine.</p> <p>Countering covert influence operations is a particular challenge because the adversarial actors behind them continuously evolve the ways they hide the linkage between their accounts. Our experts work to counter covert influence operations by studying the many layers of techniques, tactics and procedures that deceptive actors use to try to manipulate platforms, drawing from a variety of disciplines including threat intelligence and data science.</p> |
| | <p>Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available</p> <p>Between July and December 2024, we took action to remove the following [] networks (consisting of [] accounts in total) that were found to be involved in coordinated attempts to influence public opinion about the Russia-Ukraine war while also misleading individuals, our community, or our systems:</p> <p>Network Origin: Russia Description: We assess that this network operated from Russia and targeted a Ukrainian audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to undermine the Ukrainian Territorial Recruitment and Social Support Center. The network was found to display anomalous user behaviour which we assess to be an attempt to inauthentically amplify its content and redirect users away from TikTok through sharing of external links.</p> <p>Accounts removed: 19,727 Followers: 41,921</p> <p>Network Origin: Ukraine Description: We assess that this network operated from Ukraine and targeted both Ukrainian and Russian audiences. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to artificially amplify narratives in Ukrainian and Russian, critical of the Russian government. The network was found to create inauthentic news outlets in an attempt to appear as a more reputable information source.</p> |



Accounts removed: 76

Followers: 214,715

Network Origin: Italy

Description: We assess that this network operated from Italy and targeted a global audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to promote the Russian administration. The network was found to display anomalous user behaviour which we assess to be an attempt to inauthentically amplify its content.

Accounts removed: 8

Followers: 3,790,110

Network Origin: Russia

Description: We assess that this network operated from Russia and targeted a Ukrainian audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to undermine the Ukrainian Territorial Recruitment and Social Support Center. The network was found to display anomalous user behavior which we assess to be an attempt to inauthentically amplify its content and redirect users away from TikTok through sharing of external links.

Accounts removed: 19,727

Followers: 41,921

Network Origin: Russia

Description: We assess that this network operated from Russia and targeted a Ukrainian audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts and posted content to artificially amplify pro-Russia narratives, within the context of the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine. The network was found to repurpose content by reposting duplicate content throughout its accounts.

Accounts removed: 45

Followers: 8,389

Network Origin: Russia (state-affiliated media accounts engaging in covert influence (Rossiya Segodnya))

Description: We removed a network of accounts which we assess to be affiliated with Russian State-Affiliated Media organization Rossiya Segodnya (Including Sputnik news accounts) for violation of our policy against covert influence operations.

Accounts removed: 99

Followers: 9,905,964

Network Origin: Russia (state-affiliated media accounts engaging in covert influence (TV-Novosti))

Description: We removed a network of accounts which we assess to be affiliated with Russian State-Affiliated Media organization TV-Novosti (Including RT news accounts) for violation of our policy against covert influence operations.

Accounts removed: 65



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| | <p>Followers: 9,830,799</p> <p>Network Origin: Russia</p> <p>Description: We assess that this network operated from Russia and targeted a Moldovan audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to artificially amplify narratives critical of the current Moldovan Government, in an attempt to manipulate elections discourse. The network was found to be using location obfuscation services in order to hide their true location.</p> <p>Accounts removed: 107</p> <p>Followers: 5,026</p> <p>Network Origin: Russia</p> <p>Description: We assess that this network operated from Russia and targeted a Ukrainian audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to amplify narratives highlighting challenges faced by Ukrainian soldiers, questioning the credibility of the Ukrainian government, and suggesting declining support from NATO and Western allies. The network used technical means to obfuscate its true location..</p> <p>Accounts removed: 51</p> <p>Followers: 1,177,876</p> <p>We published this information within our most recently published transparency report here.</p> |
| <p>Tackling synthetic and manipulated media</p> <p><i>(Commitments 14 and 15, Measures 14.1, 15.1 and 15.2).</i></p> | <p>Description of intervention</p> <p>Artificial intelligence (AI) enables incredible creative opportunities, but can potentially confuse or mislead users if they're not aware content was generated or edited with AI.</p> <p>Our 'Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC)' policy became effective in May 2024. In this policy we prohibit AIGC showing fake authoritative sources or crisis events, or falsely showing public figures in certain contexts including being bullied, making an endorsement, or being endorsed. TikTok has also started to automatically label AIGC when it's uploaded from certain other platforms.</p> <p>For the purposes of our policy, AIGC refers to content created or modified by artificial intelligence (AI) technology or machine-learning processes, which may include images of real people, and may show highly realistic-appearing scenes, or use a particular artistic style, such as a painting, cartoons, or anime. 'Significantly edited content' is content that shows people doing or saying something they did not do or say, or altering their appearance in a way that makes them difficult to recognise or identify.</p> <p>In accordance with our policy, we prohibit AIGC that features:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Realistic-appearing people under the age of 18 |



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| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The likeness of adult private figures, if we become aware it was used without their permission • Misleading AIGC or edited media that falsely shows: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ Content made to seem as if it comes from an authoritative source, such as a reputable news organisation ◦ A crisis event, such as a conflict or natural disaster ◦ A public figure who is: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ being degraded or harassed, or engaging in criminal or antisocial behaviour ▪ taking a position on a political issue, commercial product, or a matter of public importance (such as an election) ▪ being politically endorsed or condemned by an individual or group <p>As AI evolves, we continue to invest in combating harmful AIGC by evolving our proactive detection models, consulting with experts, and partnering with peers on shared solutions.</p> <p>Prohibited practices are set out in our I&A policies here.</p> |
| | <p><i>Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available</i></p> <p>Our efforts support transparent and responsible content creation practices, both in the context of the War in Ukraine and more broadly on our platform.</p> |
| <p>Removing harmful misinformation from our platform <i>(Commitment 14, Measure 14.1)</i></p> | <p><i>Description of intervention</i></p> <p>We take action to remove accounts or content which contain inaccurate, misleading, or false content that may cause significant harm to individuals or society, regardless of intent. In conflict environments, such information may include content that is repurposed from past conflicts, content which makes false and harmful claims about specific events, or incites panic. In certain circumstances, we may also reduce the prominence of such content where it does not warrant removal.</p> <p>We employ a layered approach to misinformation detection, leveraging multiple overlapping strategies to ensure comprehensive and responsive coverage. We place considerable emphasis on proactive content moderation strategies in order to remove harmful misinformation which is in violation of our policies before it is reported to us by users or third parties.</p> <p>We place significant emphasis on proactive content moderation at TikTok, and are proud that we remove the vast majority of violative videos before they are reported to us by users or other third parties.</p> <p><i>Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available</i></p> <p>In the context of the crisis, we are proud to have proactively removed thousands of videos containing harmful misinformation related to the War in Ukraine. We have been able to do this through a combination of automated review, - human level content</p> |



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| | <p>moderation, carrying out targeted sweeps of certain types of content (e.g. hashtags/sensitive keyword lists) as well as working closely with our fact-checking partners and responding to emerging trends they identify.</p> <p><i>Relevant metrics:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number of videos removed because of violation of misinformation policy with a proxy related to the War in Ukraine - 4,429 • Number of videos not recommended because of violation of misinformation policy with a proxy (only focusing on RU/UA) - 5,903 • Number of proactive removals of videos removed because of violation of misinformation policy with a proxy related to the War in Ukraine - 3,889 |
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Empowering Users

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

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| Not proactively promoting news-type content to our users <i>(Commitment 18, Measure 18.1)</i> | <p>Description of intervention</p> <p>TikTok is primarily an entertainment platform. It may be the case that a user's For You feed shows more news-type content (such as news content relating to the War in Ukraine) over time if that is content that a user is actively looking for and engaging with, but we do not actively promote news content to users on TikTok.</p> <p>Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available</p> <p>Our approach to news-type content supports our efforts to reduce the spread of harmful disinformation to users.</p> |
| Applying our state affiliated media label <i>(Commitment 17, Measure 17.1)</i> | <p>Description of intervention</p> <p>We have restricted access to certain state-affiliated media entities and strengthened our state-affiliated media policy in order to provide context to users to evaluate content shared by such Russian, Ukrainian and Belarusian entities.</p> <p>In the EU, Iceland and Liechtenstein, we have taken steps to restrict access to content from media outlets and accounts subject to sanctions.</p> <p>We have also updated our state-affiliated media policy in order to strengthen our approach to countering influence attempts. These updates included:</p> |



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| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Making state-affiliated media accounts that attempt to reach communities outside their home country on current global events and affairs ineligible for recommendation, which means their content won't appear in the For You feed; - Prohibiting state-affiliated media accounts in all markets where our state-controlled media labels are available, including in the EU, from advertising outside of the country with which they are primarily affiliated; - Investing in our detection capabilities of state-affiliated media accounts; AND <p>We have also worked with third party external experts to shape our state-affiliated media policy and assessment of state-controlled media labels.</p> <p>Where our state-affiliated media label is applied to content posted by the accounts of such entities in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, users across the EEA are automatically shown a full screen pop-up containing information about what the label means and inviting the user to click on “learn more” and be redirected to an in-app page, which explains why the content has been labelled as state-controlled media.</p> <p>In addition to the above, we continue to invest in automation and scaled detection of state-affiliated media accounts. We also continue to work with third party experts who help shape our state-affiliated media policies and who help inform our assessments of accounts which have been labelled as state-controlled. We continue to improve our existing processes for applying our state-affiliated media label, such as looking to automate where possible, and aiming to streamline all communications to ensure maximum efficiency. We also continue our efforts in developing an additional layer of intervention to state-affiliated accounts that engage in harmful behaviours.</p> |
| | <p><i>Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available</i></p> <p>We continue the detection and labelling of state-controlled media accounts in accordance with our state-controlled media label policy globally.</p> <p><i>Relevant metrics:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number of videos tagged with the state affiliated media label for Russia, Belarus and Ukraine - 29,665 • Number of impressions of the state affiliated media label for Russia, Belarus and Ukraine - 158,700,542 |
| <p>Creating localised media literacy campaigns <i>(Commitment 17, Measures 17.2 and 17.3)</i></p> | <p><i>Description of intervention</i></p> <p>We recognise the importance of proactive measures which are aimed at improving our users' digital literacy and increasing the prominence of authoritative information.</p> <p>We have localised media literacy campaigns relating to the crisis in order to raise awareness amongst our users. We promoted the campaign through a combination of our in-app intervention tools in order to ensure that authoritative information is</p> |



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| | <p>promoted to our users. We have also partnered with a local Ukrainian fact-checking organisation, VoxCheck, with the aim of launching a permanent media literacy campaign in Ukraine.</p> <p>Users searching for keywords relating to the War in Ukraine are directed to tips, prepared in partnership with our fact checking partners, to help users identify misinformation and prevent the spread of it on the platform.</p> | | | | |
| <p><i>Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available</i></p> <p>Working with our fact-checking partners, we have thirteen localised media literacy campaigns addressing disinformation related to the War in Ukraine in Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Croatia, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.</p> <p><i>Relevant metrics for the media literacy campaigns (EEA total numbers):</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Total Number of impressions of the search intervention - 30,278,338 • Total Number of clicks on the search intervention - 130,282 • Click through rate of the search intervention - 0.43% | | | | | |
| <h3>Empowering the Research Community</h3> | | | | | |
| | <p>Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.</p> <table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td data-bbox="197 939 541 1141" style="vertical-align: top; padding: 10px;"> Measures taken to support research into crisis related misinformation and disinformation (Commitment 27, Measure 26.1 and 26.2) </td><td data-bbox="541 939 2059 1141" style="padding: 10px;"> <p><i>Description of intervention</i></p> <p>Through our Research API, academic researchers from non-profit universities in the US and Europe can apply to study public data about TikTok content and accounts. This public data includes comments, captions, subtitles, and number of comments, shares, likes, and favourites that a video receives, comments from our platform. More information is available here.</p> </td></tr> <tr> <td data-bbox="197 1141 541 1327" style="vertical-align: top; padding: 10px;"> </td><td data-bbox="541 1141 2059 1327" style="padding: 10px;"> <p><i>Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available</i></p> <p>During the period of this COPD report, we approved 1 application through the Research API, with an express focus on the War in Ukraine.</p> </td></tr> </table> | Measures taken to support research into crisis related misinformation and disinformation (Commitment 27, Measure 26.1 and 26.2) | <p><i>Description of intervention</i></p> <p>Through our Research API, academic researchers from non-profit universities in the US and Europe can apply to study public data about TikTok content and accounts. This public data includes comments, captions, subtitles, and number of comments, shares, likes, and favourites that a video receives, comments from our platform. More information is available here.</p> | | <p><i>Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available</i></p> <p>During the period of this COPD report, we approved 1 application through the Research API, with an express focus on the War in Ukraine.</p> |
| Measures taken to support research into crisis related misinformation and disinformation (Commitment 27, Measure 26.1 and 26.2) | <p><i>Description of intervention</i></p> <p>Through our Research API, academic researchers from non-profit universities in the US and Europe can apply to study public data about TikTok content and accounts. This public data includes comments, captions, subtitles, and number of comments, shares, likes, and favourites that a video receives, comments from our platform. More information is available here.</p> | | | | |
| | <p><i>Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available</i></p> <p>During the period of this COPD report, we approved 1 application through the Research API, with an express focus on the War in Ukraine.</p> | | | | |



Empowering the Fact-Checking Community

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

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| Applying our unverified content label and making content ineligible for recommendation <i>(Commitment 31, Measure 31.2)</i> | <p>Description of intervention</p> <p>Where our misinformation moderators or fact-checking partners determine that content is not able to be verified at the given time (which is common during an unfolding event), we apply our unverified content label to the content to encourage users to consider the reliability or source of the content. The application of the label will also result in the content becoming ineligible for recommendation in order to limit the spread of potentially misleading information.</p> |
| | <p>Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available</p> <p>Verifying certain information during dynamic and fast moving events such as a war can be challenging and our moderators and fact-checkers cannot always conclusively determine whether content is indeed harmful misinformation, in violation of our CGs. Therefore, in order to minimise risk, where our fact-checkers or our trained moderators do not have enough information to verify content which may potentially be misleading, we apply our unverified content label to inform users the content has been reviewed but cannot be conclusively validated. The goal is to raise users' awareness about the credibility of the content and to reduce sharing (see screenshots here). Our unverified content label is available to users in 23 EU official languages (plus, for EEA users, Norwegian and Icelandic).</p> <p>Where the banner is applied, the content will also become ineligible for recommendation into anyone's For You feed to limit the spread of information relating to unfolding events where details are still developing and which may potentially be misleading.</p> |
| Ensuring fact-checking coverage <i>(Commitment 30, Measure 30.1)</i> | <p>Description of intervention</p> <p>Our fact checking efforts cover Russian, Ukrainian, Belarusian and all major European languages (including 18 official European languages as well as a number of other languages which affect European users).</p> |
| | <p>Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available</p> <p>Context and fact-checking are critical to consistently and accurately enforcing our harmful misinformation policies, which is why we have ensured that, in the context of the crisis, our fact-checking programme covers Russian, Ukrainian and Belarusian.</p> <p>More generally, we work with 14-fact-checking partners in Europe, covering the spoken language of 23 EEA countries (as well</p> |



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| | <p>as a number of other languages which affect European users). One of our fact-checking partners, Reuters, is dedicated to fact-checking content in Russian and Ukrainian. To further support our fact-checking efforts in Ukraine specifically, we have also been leveraging additional Ukrainian-speaking reporters who are connected with some of our existing fact checking partners.</p> <p><i>Relevant metrics:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Number of fact checked videos with a proxy related to the War in Ukraine - 577• Number of videos removed as a result of a fact checking assessment with words related to the War in Ukraine - 104• Number of videos not recommended in the For Your Feed as a result of a fact checking assessment with words related to the War in Ukraine - 133 |
| <p>Collaborating with our fact-checking partners in relation to emerging trends</p> <p>(Commitment 31, Measure 31.1)</p> | <p>Description of intervention</p> <p>We meet with our fact checking partners on a monthly basis where we discuss misinformation trends and ongoing narratives in the market. Our fact checking partners also provide us with proactive leads of videos they have found on TikTok which are deemed to be misinformation.</p> <p>Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available</p> <p><i>Relevant metrics:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Number of videos removed because of violation of misinformation policy with a proxy related to the War in Ukraine - 4,429 |



Reporting on the service's response during a crisis

Israel - Hamas Conflict

Threats observed or anticipated at time of reporting: [suggested character limit 2000 characters].

TikTok acknowledges both the significance and sensitivity of the Israel-Hamas conflict (referred to as the “Conflict” throughout this section). We understand this remains a difficult, fearful, and polarizing time for many people around the world and on TikTok. TikTok continues to recognise the need to engage in content moderation of violative content at scale while ensuring that the fundamental rights and freedoms of European citizens are respected and protected. We remain dedicated to supporting free expression, upholding our commitment to human rights, and maintaining the safety of our community and integrity of our platform during the Conflict.

In advance of the anniversary of the Conflict, we were aware that there would be an increase in content posted at this time relevant to the content and we wanted to ensure the safety of our community and integrity of the platform at this sensitive time. In preparation for the Anniversary of the Conflict, a comprehensive plan was developed to address potential risks and ensure platform safety. This involved strategic coordination across multiple regions, including IL, MENA, APAC, EU, US/CA, and AMS, with a focus on mitigating high-risk content and ensuring uninterrupted service.

We remain committed to transparency throughout this time and have kept our community informed of our immediate and ongoing response through the following Newsroom post which was last updated approaching the anniversary of the Conflict: in October 2024 [Our continued actions to protect the TikTok community during the Israel-Hamas war.](#)

We have set out below some of the main threats both observed and considered in relation to the Conflict and the actions we have taken to address these during the reporting period.

(I) Spread of harmful misinformation

Trust forms the foundation of our community, and we strive to keep TikTok a safe and authentic space where genuine interactions and content can thrive. TikTok takes a multi-faceted approach to tackling the spread of harmful misinformation, regardless of intent. This includes our: [Integrity & Authenticity policies](#) (I&A policies) in our [Community Guidelines](#); products; practices; and external partnerships with fact-checkers, media literacy bodies, and researchers. We support our moderation teams with detailed misinformation policy guidance, enhanced training, and access to tools like our global database of previously fact-checked claims from our IFCN-accredited fact-checking partners, who help assess the accuracy of content.

We continue to take swift action against misinformation, conspiracy theories, fake engagement, and fake accounts relating to the Conflict.



(II) Covert Influence Operations (CIO)

TikTok's integrity and authenticity policies do not allow deceptive behaviour that may cause harm to our community or society at large. This includes coordinated attempts to influence or sway public opinion while also misleading individuals, our community, or our systems about an account's identity, approximate location, relationships, popularity, or purpose.

We have specifically-trained teams on high alert to investigate CIO, and disrupting CIO networks has been high priority work for us in the context of the Conflict. We now provide regular updates on the CIO networks we detect and remove from our platform, including those we identify relating to the Conflict, in our dedicated [CIO transparency report](#). Between June 2024- December 2024, we reported 3 new CIO network disruptions that were found to post content relating to the Conflict as a dominant theme.

We know that CIO will continue to evolve in response to our detection and networks may attempt to reestablish a presence on our platform, which is why we continually seek to strengthen our policies and enforcement actions in order to protect our community against new types of harmful misinformation and inauthentic behaviours.

Mitigations in place at time of reporting: [suggested character limit: 2000 characters].

We are continually working hard to ensure that TikTok is a source of reliable and safe information and recognise the heightened risk and impact of misleading information during a time of crisis. As part of our crisis management process, we launched a command centre that brings together key members of our global team of thousands of safety professionals, representing a range of expertise and regional perspectives, so that we remain agile in how we take action to respond to this fast-evolving crisis. Since the beginning of the Conflict, we are:

(I) Upholding TikTok's Community Guidelines

We rolled out refreshed [Community Guidelines](#) and began to enforce expanded hate speech and hateful behavior policies. These policies aim to better address implicit or indirect hate speech and create a safer and more civil environment for everyone. These add to our long-standing policies against antisemitism and other hateful ideologies. We also updated our hate speech policy to recognize content that uses "Zionist" as a proxy for a protected attribute when it is not used to refer to a political ideology and instead used as a proxy with Jewish or Israeli identity. This policy was implemented early in 2024 after observing a rise in how the word was increasingly used in a hateful way.

Continuing to enforce our [policies](#) against [violence](#), [hate](#), and [harmful misinformation](#) by taking action to remove violative content and accounts. For example, we remove content that promotes Hamas, or otherwise supports the attacks or mocks victims affected by the violence. If content is posted depicting a person who has been taken hostage, we will do everything we can to protect their dignity and remove content that breaks our rules. We do not tolerate attempts to incite violence or spread hateful ideologies. We have a zero-tolerance policy for content praising violent and hateful organisations and individuals, and those organisations and individuals aren't allowed on our platform. We also block hashtags that promote violence or otherwise break our rules. We have removed 8,765 videos in relation to the conflict which violated our misinformation policies.



Evolving our proactive automated detection systems in real-time as we identify new threats; this enables us to automatically detect and remove graphic and violent content so that neither our moderators nor our community members are exposed to it.

(II) Leveraging our Fact-Checking Program

We employ a layered approach to detecting harmful misinformation which is in violation of our Community Guidelines and our global fact-checking program is a critical part of this. The core objective of the fact-checking program is to leverage the expertise of external fact-checking organisations to help assess the accuracy of harmful and difficult to verify claims.

To limit the spread of potentially misleading information, we apply [warning labels](#) and prompt users to reconsider sharing content related to unfolding or emergency events, which have been assessed by our fact-checkers but cannot be verified as accurate i.e., 'unverified content'. Mindful about how evolving events may impact the assessment of sensitive Conflict related claims day-to-day, we have implemented a process that allows our fact-checking partners to update us quickly if claims previously assessed as 'unverified' become verified with additional context and/or at a later stage.

(III) Scaling up our content moderation capabilities

TikTok has Arabic and Hebrew speaking moderators in the content moderation teams who review content and assist with Conflict-related translations. As we continue to focus on moderator care, we have also deployed additional well-being resources for our human moderation teams during this time.

(IV) Disruption of CIOs

Disrupting CIO networks has also been high priority work for us in tackling deceptive behaviour that may cause harm to our community or society at large. As noted above, between July and December 2024, we took action to remove 3 networks (consisting of 132 accounts in total) that were found to be related to the Conflict. We now publish all of the CIO networks we identify and remove, including those relating to the conflict, within our dedicated CIO transparency report, [here](#).

(V) Mitigating the risk of monetisation of harmful misinformation

Making temporary adjustments to policies that govern TikTok features in an effort to proactively prevent them from being used for hateful or violent behaviour in the region. For example, we've added additional restrictions on LIVE eligibility as a temporary measure given the heightened safety risk in the context of the current hostage situation. Our existing [political ads policy](#), GPPPA labelling and [safety and civility policies](#) help to mitigate the risk of monetisation of harmful misinformation.

(VI) Deploying search interventions to raise awareness of potential misinformation

To help raise awareness and to protect our users, we have launched search interventions which are triggered when users search for non-violating terms



related to the Conflict (e.g., Israel, Palestine). These search interventions remind users to pause and check their sources and also direct them to well-being resources. In H2 we continued to refine this process, in particular we focused on improving keywords to ensure they are relevant and effective.

(VII) Adding opt-in screens over content that could be shocking or graphic

We recognise that some content that may otherwise break our rules can be in the public interest, and we allow this content to remain on the platform for documentary, educational, and counterspeech purposes. Opt-in screens help prevent people from unexpectedly viewing shocking or graphic content as we continue to make [public interest exceptions](#) for some content.

In addition, we are committed to engagement with experts across the industry and civil society, such as [Tech Against Terrorism](#) and our [Advisory Councils](#), and cooperation with law enforcement agencies globally in line with our [Law Enforcement Guidelines](#), to further safeguard and secure our platform during these difficult times.

[Note: Signatories are requested to provide information relevant to their particular response to the threats and challenges they observed on their service(s). They ensure that the information below provides an accurate and complete report of their relevant actions. As operational responses to crisis/election situations can vary from service to service, an absence of information should not be considered a priori a shortfall in the way a particular service has responded. Impact metrics are accurate to the best of signatories' abilities to measure them].

Policies and Terms and Conditions

Outline any changes to your policies

| Policy | Changes (such as newly introduced policies, edits, adaptation in scope or implementation) | Rationale |
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| | | <p>We refined and expanded our newsworthy exceptions to allow the dissemination of content documenting from a conflict zone and legitimate political speech/criticism, while remaining sensitive to the potential harm users may experience from exposure to graphic visuals, hateful behaviours or incitement to violence. As part of this effort, we introduced dedicated policies addressing content related to the Conflict, specifically in areas depicting hostages, human suffering, and protests.</p> <p>Additionally, we strengthened our policies on content that glorifies Hamas or Hezbollah and on the promotion or celebration of violent acts committed by either side of the Conflict. To further enhance platform integrity, we implemented specific Integrity & Authenticity policies for Israel-Hamas-related content, with a focus on conspiracy theories of varying severity and unsubstantiated claims.</p> |



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| | <p>We continue to rely on our existing, robust I&A policies, which are an effective basis for tackling content related to the Conflict. As such, we have not needed to introduce any new misinformation policies, for the purposes of addressing the crisis.</p> <p>In a crisis, we keep under review our policies and to ensure moderation teams have supplementary guidance.</p> | <p>In the context of the Conflict, we rely on our robust I&A policies as our first line of defence in combating harmful misinformation and deceptive behaviours on our platform.</p> <p>Our Community Guidelines clearly identify to our users what content we remove or make ineligible for the For You feed when they pose a risk of harm to our users or the wider public. We have also supported our moderation teams with detailed policy guidance and direction when moderating on Conflict-related harmful misinformation using existing policies.</p> <p>We have specialist teams within our Trust and Safety department dedicated to the policy issue of I&A, including within the areas of product and policy. Our experienced subject matter experts on I&A continually keep these policies under review and collaborate with external partners and experts when understanding whether updates are required.</p> <p>When situations such as the Conflict arise, these teams work to ensure that appropriate guidance is developed so that the I&A policies are applied in an effective manner in respect of content relating to the relevant crisis (in this case, the Conflict). This includes issuing detailed policy guidance and direction, including providing case banks on harmful misinformation claims to support moderation teams.</p> |
| TikTok Feature Policies | <p>In addition to being able to rely on our I&A policies, we have made temporary adjustments to existing policies which govern certain TikTok features. For example, we have added additional restrictions on LIVE eligibility as a temporary measure given the heightened safety risk in the context of the current hostage situation.</p> | <p>Temporary adjustments have been introduced in an effort to proactively prevent certain features from being used for hateful or violent behaviour in the region.</p> |
| Scrutiny of Ads Placements | | |



Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

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| <p>Preventing misuse of our monetisation features <i>(Commitment 1, Measure 1.1 and 1.4)</i></p> | <p>Description of intervention</p> <p>Our existing political ads policy and safety and civility policies help to mitigate the monetisation of harmful misinformation. NGOs that are vetted by our Monetisation Integrity team and working with our sales team, are permitted to run ad campaigns for fundraising during the Conflict. This process however, operates with strict oversight to mitigate the risk of false fundraising campaigns and does not permit advocating for any of the parties involved.</p> <p>In response to the Conflict, we have updated our LIVE feature guidelines and our monetisation guidelines to better prevent people from using monetisation features to exploit the ongoing tragedy for personal gain.</p> <p>We closely monitor the placement of our ads (especially in the context of events such as the Israel-Hamas conflict) and in the event our ads are found to run adjacent to or on sources of disinformation, we will investigate to determine whether the content in question has been correctly identified and verify this with Integral Ad Science, Double Verify or Zefr as appropriate. We will then adjust any filters or add the publication in question to a blocklist to prevent a recurrence.</p> |
| | <p>Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available</p> <p>Monitoring the placement of our ads and updating our LIVE policy helps to prevent people from monetising the ongoing tragedy for financial gain.</p> |
| <p>Content moderation <i>(Commitment 2, Measure 2.2)</i></p> | <p>Description of intervention</p> <p>We use a combination of automated and human moderation in order to identify content that breaches our ad policies. These policies prohibit, among other things, ad content and landing pages to display negative content regarding the military or police symbols, sensitive military events, militarism, the advocating or whitewashing of war, terrorism, illegal organizations, or unlawful elements.</p> <p>We've continued to invest in both automated moderation technology - which now takes down 80% of the content removed from TikTok - as well as moderators. We've continued to update and expand our hate speech policy refreshers, trainings, and course materials, including implicit bias training addressing antisemitism and Islamophobia. We also had additional training from the</p> |



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| | <p>Anti-Defamation League and the American Jewish Committee to further our understanding of new threats facing the Jewish community.</p> <p>Our Monetisation Integrity department has moderation teams in multiple locations that speak Arabic and Hebrew.</p> |
| | <p><i>Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available</i></p> <p>Given the range of potential policy violations that could be engaged, we are currently unable to provide metrics specific to this issue.</p> |
| Political Advertising | |
| <p>Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.</p> | |
| <p>Prohibition on Political Advertising <i>(Commitment 5, Measure 5.1)</i></p> | <p><i>Description of intervention</i></p> <p>In an effort to maintain both the integrity of the platform and safety of the people who use it, accounts belonging to politicians or political parties are not able to advertise or make money on TikTok.</p> <p>We do not allow paid political promotion, political advertising, or fundraising by politicians and political parties (for themselves or others). Our political ads policy includes both traditional paid ads and creators receiving compensation to support or oppose a candidate for office. This has been a long-standing policy at TikTok since 2019. We also do not allow ads and landing pages which:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> reference, promote, or oppose candidates or nominees for public office, political parties, or elected or appointed government officials; reference an election, including voter registration, voter turnout, and appeals for votes; include advocacy for or against past, current, or proposed referenda, ballot measures, and legislative, judicial, or regulatory outcomes or processes (including those that promote or attack government policies or track records); and reference, promote, or sell, merchandise that features prohibited individuals, entities, or content, including campaign slogans, symbols, or logos. |



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| | <p>We require users to use the content disclosure toggle when posting branded content, and we prohibit political branded content. During the reporting period, we introduced restrictions on content from the For You Feed that was suspected undisclosed political branded content.</p> <p>We are pleased that Regulation EU 2024/900 on the Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising which came into force in the reporting period has now set out a common definition of “political advertising”. We have been reviewing our policies to ensure that our prohibition of political advertising is at least as broad as the regulation.</p> |
| | <p><i>Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available</i></p> <p>By prohibiting political advertising, we help ensure our community can have a creative and authentic TikTok experience, and we reduce the risk of our platform being used to advertise and amplify narratives that may be divisive or false.</p> |
| Integrity of Services | |
| Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement. | |
| <p>Identifying and removing CIO networks <i>(Commitment 14, Measure 14.1)</i></p> | <p>Description of intervention</p> <p>We have assigned dedicated resourcing within our specialist teams to proactively monitor for CIO in connection with the Conflict. We fight against CIO as our I&A policies prohibit attempts to sway public opinion while also misleading our systems or users about the identity, origin, approximate location, popularity or overall purpose. We have specifically-trained and dedicated teams which are on high alert to investigate and detect CIO networks on our platform and have removed networks targeting discourse about the Conflict, in accordance with our I&A policies which prohibit deceptive behaviours.</p> <p>We know that CIO will continue to evolve in response to our detection and networks may attempt to reestablish a presence on our platform, which is why we continually seek to strengthen our policies and enforcement actions in order to protect our community against new types of harmful misinformation and inauthentic behaviours.</p> <p><i>Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available</i></p> |



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| | <p>Between June - December 2024, we took action to remove the following 3 networks (consisting of 132 accounts in total) that were found to be related to the Conflict:</p> <p>Network Origin: Iran</p> <p>Description: We assess that this network operated from Iran and targeted a global audience, setting up accounts to target Arabic speakers. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts to artificially amplify narratives sympathetic to Iraqi and Iranian foreign policy on the Israel-Hamas war. The network was found to repurpose content by reposting duplicate content throughout its accounts.</p> <p>Accounts in network: 26</p> <p>Followers of network: 66,507</p> <p>Network Origin: Egypt</p> <p>Description: We assess that this network operated from Egypt and targeted an Israeli audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to artificially amplify narratives critical of Israel's actions in Gaza. We assess that the network coordinated online, outside of TikTok, and used artificial intelligence to aid in generation of fictitious Israeli personas, targeting different audiences by alternating between Arabic and Hebrew languages.</p> <p>Accounts in network: 94</p> <p>Followers of network: 44,896</p> <p>Description: We assess that this network targeted a US audience. The individuals behind this network created a series of inauthentic accounts mimicking US nationals in order to amplify narratives critical of Israel's actions in Gaza and US support of Israel. The network was found to display advanced operational security.</p> <p>Accounts in network: 12</p> <p>Followers of network: 3,442</p> <p>We now publish all of the CIO networks we identify and remove, including those relating to the Conflict, within our dedicated CIO transparency report, here.</p> |
| <p>Tackling synthetic and manipulated media</p> <p><i>(Commitment 15, Measures 15.1 and 15.2)</i></p> | <p>Description of intervention</p> <p>Our Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC) policy makes it clear that we do not want our users to be misled about crisis events. For the purposes of our policy, AIGC refers to content created or modified by AI technology or machine-learning processes. It includes images of real people, and may show highly realistic-appearing scenes.</p> <p>We do not allow misleading AIGC or edited media that falsely shows:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Content made to seem as if it comes from an authoritative source, such as a reputable news organisation, A crisis event, such as a conflict or natural disaster, |



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| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● A public figure who is: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ being degraded or harassed, or engaging in criminal or anti-social behavior ○ taking a position on a political issue, commercial product, or a matter of public importance (such as an elections) ○ spreading misinformation about matters of public importance <p>In addition, all AIGC or edited media, including that which depicts public figures, such as politicians, must be clearly labelled as AI generated, and can not be used for endorsements.</p> <p>We have an AI-generated content label for users to easily inform their community when they post AIGC. The label can be applied to any content that has been completely generated or significantly edited by AI which makes it easier to comply with the obligation to disclose AIGC that shows realistic scenes. Creators can do this through this label or through other types of disclosures, like a sticker, watermark or caption.</p> <p>TikTok is also proud to be a part of, the Content Authenticity Initiative (CAI) and the Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity (C2PA), and were the first video sharing platform to put Content Credentials into practice. TikTok has the ability to read Content Credentials that attach metadata to content, which we can use to instantly recognize and label AIGC. This helps our auto-labelling functionality for AIGC created on some other platforms.</p> |
| Removing harmful misinformation from our platform <i>(Commitment 14, Measure 14.1)</i> | <p><i>Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available</i></p> <p>Our efforts support transparent and responsible content creation practices, which is relevant both in the context of the Conflict and more broadly on our platform.</p> <p><i>Description of intervention</i></p> <p>We employ a dynamic approach to misinformation detection, leveraging multiple overlapping strategies to ensure comprehensive and responsive coverage. We place considerable emphasis on proactive content moderation strategies in order to remove harmful misinformation which is in violation of our policies before it is reported to us by users or third parties.</p> <p>We take action to remove accounts or content which contain inaccurate, misleading, or false information that may cause significant harm to individuals or society, regardless of intent. In conflict environments, such information may include content that is repurposed from past conflicts, content which makes false and harmful claims about specific events, or incites panic. In certain circumstances, we may reduce the prominence of such content.</p> |



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| | <p><i>Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available</i></p> <p>In the context of the crisis, we have proactively removed over 8,700 videos in H2 containing harmful misinformation related to the Conflict. We have been able to do this through a combination of automation and human moderation. We carry out targeted sweeps of certain types of content (e.g. hashtags/sensitive keyword lists) as well as working closely with our fact-checking partners and responding to emerging trends they identify.</p> <p>We have Arabic and Hebrew speaking content moderation as we recognise the importance of language and cultural context in the misinformation moderation process.</p> <p><i>Relevant metrics:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number of videos removed because of violation of misinformation policy with a proxy (IL/Hamas) - 9,633 • Number of videos not recommended because of violation of misinformation policy with a proxy (IL/Hamas) - 201 • Number of proactive removals of videos removed because of violation of misinformation policy with a proxy (IL/Hamas) 8,765 |
| Empowering Users | |
| Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement. | |
| Deploying search interventions to raise awareness of potential misinformation <i>(Commitment 21, Measure 21.1)</i> | <p><i>Description of intervention</i></p> <p>To minimise the discoverability of misinformation and help to protect our users, we have launched search interventions which are triggered when users search for neutral terms related to the Conflict (e.g., Israel, Palestine). We continuously evaluate the effectiveness of our keywords, adding or removing terms based on their relevance.</p> <p><i>Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available</i></p> <p>These search interventions remind users to pause and check their sources and also direct them to well-being resources.</p> |
| Not proactively promoting news-type content to our users | <p><i>Description of intervention</i></p> |



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| <p>(Commitment 18, Measure 18.1)</p> | <p>TikTok is primarily an entertainment platform, we do not actively promote news content to users on TikTok. However, if a user is actively looking for and engaging with news-type content, it may be the case that a user's For You feed will show more news-type content (such as news content relating to the Conflict) over time. In addition, TikTok's recommender system delivers a personalised feed of content based on a user's engagement behaviour with video content types, as a result every user's feed will look different, according to their own preferences. These preferences are demonstrated through 'likes', watch duration and other related metrics. For more information on how our recommendation system works, see here.</p> |
| | <p><i>Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available</i></p> <p>Our approach to news-type content supports our efforts to reduce the spread of harmful disinformation related to the Conflict to users.</p> |
| Empowering the Research Community | |
| Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement. | |
| <p>Measures taken to support research into Conflict- related misinformation and disinformation</p> | <p><i>Description of intervention</i></p> <p>Through our Research API, academic researchers from non-profit universities in the US and Europe can apply to study public data about TikTok content and accounts. This public data includes comments, captions, subtitles, and number of comments, shares, likes, and favourites that a video receives, comments from our platform. More information is available here.</p> |
| <p>(Commitment 26, Measure 26.1 and 26.2)</p> | <p><i>Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available</i></p> <p>Between January and June 2024 2 Research API applications related to the Conflict have been approved.</p> |
| Empowering the Fact-Checking Community | |
| Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement. | |



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| <p>Applying our unverified content label to make content ineligible for recommendation <i>(Commitment 31, Measure 31.2)</i></p> | <p>Description of intervention</p> <p>Where our misinformation moderators or fact-checking partners determine that content is not able to be verified at the given time (which is common during an emergency or unfolding event), we apply our unverified content label to the content to encourage users to consider the reliability or source of the content. The application of the label will also result in the content becoming ineligible for recommendation in order to limit the spread of potentially misleading information</p> <p>Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available</p> <p>Verifying certain information during dynamic and fast moving events such as the Conflict can be challenging and our moderators and fact-checkers cannot always conclusively determine whether content is indeed harmful misinformation. Therefore, in order to minimise risk, where our fact-checkers or our moderators do not have enough information to verify content which may potentially be misleading, we apply our unverified content label to inform users the content has been reviewed but cannot be conclusively validated. The goal is to raise users' awareness about the credibility of the content and to reduce sharing (see screenshots here). Our unverified content label is available to users in 23 EU official languages (plus, for EEA users, Norwegian and Icelandic).</p> <p>Where the label is applied, the content will also become ineligible for recommendation into anyone's For You feed to limit the spread of information relating to unfolding events where details are still developing and which may potentially be misleading.</p> |
| <p>Ensuring fact-checking coverage <i>(Commitment 30, Measure 30.1)</i></p> | <p>Description of intervention</p> <p>As part of our fact-checking program, TikTok works with more than 20 IFCN-accredited fact-checking organisations that support more than 50 languages, including Hebrew and Arabic, to help assess the accuracy of content in this rapidly-changing environment. In the context of the Conflict, our independent fact-checking partners are following our standard practice, whereby they do not moderate content directly on TikTok, but assess whether a claim is true, false, or unsubstantiated so that our moderators can take action based on our Community Guidelines. Fact-checker input is then incorporated into our broader content moderation efforts in a number of different ways, as further outlined in the 'indication of impact' section below.</p> <p>In the context of the Conflict, we have also adjusted our information consolidation process to allow us to track and store Conflict related claims separately from our global repository of previously fact-checked claims. This facilitates quick and effective access to relevant assessments, which, in turn, increases the effectiveness of our moderation efforts. We also continue to improve our hate speech detection with an improved audio hash bank to help detect hateful sounds as well as updated machine learning models to recognize emerging hateful content. In addition, we increased fact checking resources and expanded our fact-checking program by partnering with Fatabyyano to fact-check content in the Middle East.</p> |



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| | <p><i>Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available</i></p> <p>We see harmful misinformation as different from other content issues. Context and fact-checking are critical to consistently and accurately enforcing our harmful misinformation policies, which is why we have ensured that, in the context of the crisis, our fact-checking programme covers Arabic and Hebrew.</p> <p>As noted above, we also incorporate fact-checker input into our broader content moderation efforts in different ways:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Proactive insight reports that flag new and evolving claims they're seeing across the internet. This helps us detect harmful misinformation and anticipate misinformation trends on our platform. • Collaborating with our fact-checking partners to receive advance warning of emerging misinformation narratives has facilitated proactive responses against high-harm trends and has helped to ensure that our moderation teams have up-to-date guidance. • A repository of previously fact-checked claims to help misinformation moderators make swift and accurate decisions. <p><i>Relevant metrics:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number of fact checked tasks related to IL/Hamas - 1,061 • Number of videos removed as a result of a fact checking assessment with words related to IL/Hamas - 165 • Number of videos demoted (NR) as a result of a fact checking assessment with words related to IL/Hamas - 201 |
| Collaborating with our fact-checking partners in relation to emerging trends <i>(Commitment 31, Measure 31.1)</i> | <p><i>Description of intervention</i></p> <p>Throughout the Conflict representatives from TikTok's misinformation policy and product teams have connected regularly with our external fact-checking partners, to receive advance insights into emerging misinformation narratives, facilitating proactive responses against high-harm trends.</p> <p><i>Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available</i></p> <p><i>Relevant metrics:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number of videos removed because of violation of misinformation policy with a proxy (IL/Hamas) - 9,633 |



Reporting on the signatory's response during an election

French Election 2024

Threats observed during the electoral period: [suggested character limit 2000 characters].

We have comprehensive measures in place to anticipate and address the risks associated with electoral processes, including the risks associated with election misinformation in the context of the French snap elections held on June 30 and July 7 2024. In response to the snap elections announcement, a core election team was formed and consultations between cross function teams helped to identify and design response strategies.

TikTok did not observe major threats during the French Elections, some examples of the violative content we successfully disrupted include:

- 636 attempts at impersonation were detected and enforced against
- A total of 259 short video / photo posts were enforced against
- A total 19 Audio ID's were enforced against
- There were 46 Profile Resets

Mitigations in place during the electoral period: [suggested character limit: 2000 characters].

Enforcing our policies

(I) Moderation capabilities

We have thousands of trust and safety professionals dedicated to keeping our platform safe. As they usually do, our teams worked alongside technology to ensure that we were consistently [enforcing our rules](#) to detect and remove misinformation, covert influence operations, and other content and behaviour that can increase during an election period. In advance of the election we had proactive data monitoring, trend detection and regular monitoring of enriched keywords and accounts.

(II) Mission Control Centre: internal cross-functional collaboration

On 17 June, ahead of the French Elections, we established a dedicated Mission Control Centre (MCC) bringing together employees from multiple specialist teams within our safety department. Through the MCC, our teams were able to provide consistent and dedicated coverage of potential election-related issues in the run-up to, and during, the French Election.



(III) Countering misinformation

Our misinformation moderators receive enhanced training and tools to detect and remove misinformation and other violative content. We also have teams on the ground who partner with experts to ensure local context and nuance is reflected in our approach.

In the weeks leading up to and including the snap election, we removed over **1,200** videos for violating our civic and election integrity policies, and over **9,000** videos for violating our misinformation policies. We removed over **99%** of violative misinformation content before it was reported to us.

(IV) Fact-checking

Our global fact-checking programme is a critical part of our layered approach to detecting harmful misinformation in the context of elections. The core objective of the fact-checking program is to leverage the expertise of external fact-checking organisations to help assess the accuracy of potentially harmful claims that are difficult to verify.

TikTok collaborates with [14 fact-checking organizations](#) across Europe to evaluate the accuracy of content in most European languages, including French. [Agence France-Presse](#) (AFP), serves as the fact-checking partner for France, which provided coverage for the platform.

(V) Deterring covert influence operations

We prohibit covert influence operations and remain constantly vigilant against attempts to use deceptive behaviours and manipulate our platform. We proactively seek and continuously investigate leads for potential influence operations. We're also working with government authorities and encourage them to share any intelligence so that we can work together to ensure election integrity. More detail on our policy against covert influence operations is published on our [website](#).

(VI) Tackling misleading AI-generated content

Creators are required to label any realistic AI-generated content (AIGC) and we have an [AI-generated content label](#) to help people do this. TikTok has a 'Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC)' policy, which prohibits AIGC showing fake authoritative sources or crisis events, or falsely showing public figures in certain contexts including being bullied, making an endorsement, or being endorsed.

(VII) Government, Politician, and Political Party Accounts (GPPPAs)

Many political leaders, ministers, and political parties have a presence on TikTok. These politicians and parties play an important role on our platform - we believe that verified accounts belonging to politicians and institutions provide the electorate with another route to access their representatives, and additional trusted voices in the shared fight against misinformation.



We strongly recommend GPPAs have their accounts [verified by TikTok](#). Verified badges help users make informed choices about the accounts they choose to follow. It is also an easy way for notable figures to let users know they're seeing authentic content, and it helps to build trust among high-profile accounts and their followers.

Before the French Election we met with French political parties Heads of Communication to (i) provide an overview of TikTok's policies for political accounts, (ii) outline TikTok's approach to election integrity and to data security, (iii) encourage account verification and (iv) enable direct contact to respond to their specific requests.

Directing people to trusted sources

(I) Investing in media literacy

We invest in media literacy campaigns as a counter-misinformation strategy. TikTok has partnered with AFP in France to help the community safely navigate the platform and protect themselves against potential misinformation during the elections. AFP developed a series of educational videos explaining how users could identify and avoid misinformation, use TikTok's safety features, and critically evaluate content related to the electoral process. The French community could find the video series with practical advice and useful information about the electoral process in the relevant Election Center.

External engagement at the national and EU levels

(I) Rapid Response System: external collaboration with COPD Signatories

The COPD Rapid Response System (RRS) was utilised to exchange information among civil society organisations, fact-checkers, and online platforms. TikTok received 2 RRS reports through the RRS before the French Election, which were rapidly addressed. Actions included banning of accounts and content removals for violation of Community Guidelines.

(II) Engagement with local experts

To further promote election integrity, and inform our approach to the French Election, we organised an Election Speaker Series with AFP who shared their insights and market expertise with our internal teams

(III) Engagement with national authorities and stakeholders

In order to prepare for the French Election, our Government Relations represented TikTok at an official meeting organised by the EU Commission with ARCOM ahead of the elections alongside representatives from other online platforms.

We also liaised with the French Government's Information Service (SIG) to include relevant official resources in TikTok's in-app election guide.



As previously referenced, we also met with French political parties' Heads of Communication to (i) provide an overview of TikTok's policies for political accounts, (ii) outline TikTok's approach to election integrity and to data security, (iii) encourage account verification and (iv) enable direct contact to respond to their specific requests.

[Note: Signatories are requested to provide information relevant to their particular response to the threats and challenges they observed on their service(s). They ensure that the information below provides an accurate and complete report of their relevant actions. As operational responses to crisis/election situations can vary from service to service, an absence of information should not be considered a priori a shortfall in the way a particular service has responded. Impact metrics are accurate to the best of signatories' abilities to measure them].

Policies and Terms and Conditions

Outline any changes to your policies

| Policy | Changes (such as newly introduced policies, edits, adaptation in scope or implementation) | Rationale |
|--------|---|-----------|
| N/A | N/A | |

Scrutiny of Ads Placements

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

| Scrutiny of Ad Placements, including prohibition on monetisation and fundraising campaigns for GPPPAs <i>(Commitment 1 and Measure 1.1)</i> | Description of intervention |
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| | We prohibit political advertising, which is outlined in more detail in the Political Advertising section below. In order to do this, we classify certain TikTok accounts as Government, Politician, and Political Party Accounts (GPPPA). GPPPAs can include government-run entities, elected officials or candidates, political parties, current/former heads of state or government. Where accounts are designated as GPPPAs, they are banned from placing ads on TikTok and from monetisation features. We have a limited exception where governments may be allowed to advertise (e.g. for a public health campaign), provided they are working with a TikTok sales representative. |



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| | <p>Solicitations for campaign fundraising by GPPPAs are not permitted either on the platform. That includes content like a video from a politician asking for donations, or a political party directing people to a donation page on their website. We provide GPPPAs account holders with information on our policies and moderation systems as well as actively encourage them to verify their profiles. Read more here.</p> <p>In order to enforce these policies and the correct labelling of GPPPAs, TikTok met with French political parties Heads of Communication to (i) provide an overview of TikTok's policies for political accounts, (ii) outline TikTok's approach to election integrity and to data security, (iii) encourage account verification and (iv) enable direct contact to respond to their specific requests.</p> |
| | <p>Indication of impact including relevant metrics when available</p> <p>Our GPPPA-specific policies helped us recognise the public interest associated with these accounts, while also putting guardrails in place (for example by restricting advertising and monetisation features).</p> |
| Political Advertising | |
| Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement. | |
| Prohibition on Political Advertising <i>(Commitment 5, Measure 5.1)</i> | <p>TikTok prohibits political advertising on its platform.</p> <p>We recognise that some members of our community may want to create or engage with political content on TikTok and so sharing political beliefs and engaging in political conversation is allowed as organic content provided it does not violate our Community Guidelines or Branded Content policy. However, users cannot pay to advertise or promote this content. Furthermore, in an effort to maintain both the integrity of the platform and safety of the people who use it, accounts belonging to politicians or political parties cannot advertise or make money on TikTok.</p> <p>We do not allow paid political promotion, political advertising, or fundraising by politicians and political parties (for themselves or others). Our political ads policy prohibits both traditional paid ads and creators being paid to make branded political content. This has been a long-standing policy at TikTok since 2019. We do not allow paid or branded content that promotes or opposes a candidate, current leader, political party or group, or issue at the federal, state, or local level – including election-related ads, advocacy ads, or issue ads. This means that accounts we identify as belonging to politicians and political parties (i.e. GPPPAs) have their access to advertising features turned off.</p> |



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| | <p>Ads are reviewed before being displayed on our platform. Upon review, if an ad is deemed to violate our strict ads policies including our prohibition of political ads, it will not be permitted on our platform. We also review ads reported to us and upon review, violating ads will be removed. Our community can also report ads, through our reporting tools, that they believe break our rules, which our teams will review and remove if they are found to be violative.</p> <p>We take extremely seriously our responsibility to ensure electoral integrity. We strive to combat election misinformation and promote fair elections. We have instituted practices to mitigate the risk of harmful misinformation impacting election integrity, such as investing in media literacy campaigns as a counter-misinformation strategy. We continue to regularly review and improve our policies and processes in order to combat increasingly sophisticated attempts to spread disinformation and to further strengthen our systems.</p> <p>In the reporting period we also launched an update to our policy on undisclosed political advertisements. This did not alter our longstanding prohibition on political advertising but introduced a solution to restrict content from the For you Feed that is suspected and unconfirmed political advertising.</p> <p>Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available</p> <p>By prohibiting political advertising, we help ensure our community can have a creative and authentic TikTok experience, and we reduce the risk of our platform being used to advertise and amplify narratives that may be divisive or false.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Number of ads removed for our political advertisement policies during the 4 weeks leading up to and including the days of the French Election (June 30 and July 7, 2024) - 3,360 |
| Integrity of Services | |
| <p>Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.</p> | |
| Identifying and removing CIO networks <i>(Commitment 14, Measure 14.1)</i> | <p>Description of intervention</p> <p>During the French Election we continued our work to detect and disrupt covert influence operations (CIOs) that attempt to establish themselves on TikTok and undermine the integrity of our platform. To further increase transparency, accountability, and cross-industry sharing we introduced dedicated covert influence operations reports.</p> |



| | Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available |
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| | <p>During the reporting period we did not detect any CIOs focussed on the French Elections. We do however continue to remove accounts from previously disclosed CIO networks when they try to reestablish a presence on the platform and our efforts there are disclosed monthly on our CIO transparency page.</p> |
| Tackling misleading AIGC and edited media <i>(Commitment 15, Measures 15.1 and 15.2)</i> | <p>Description of intervention</p> <p>Our Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC) policy makes it clear that we do not want our users to be misled about political issues. For the purposes of our policy, AIGC refers to content created or modified by artificial intelligence (AI) technology or machine-learning processes, which may include images of real people, and may show highly realistic-appearing scenes, or use a particular artistic style, such as a painting, cartoons, or anime.</p> <p>We do not allow misleading AIGC or edited media that falsely shows:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Content made to seem as if it comes from an authoritative source, such as a reputable news organisation, A crisis event, such as a conflict or natural disaster, A public figure who is: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> being degraded or harassed, or engaging in criminal or anti-social behaviour taking a position on a political issue, commercial product, or a matter of public importance (such as an elections) being politically endorsed or condemned by an individual or group. <p>In addition, all AIGC or edited media, including that which depicts public figures, such as politicians, must be clearly labelled as AI generated, and can not be used for endorsements.</p> <p>As AI evolves, we continue to invest in combating harmful AIGC by evolving our proactive detection models, consulting with experts, and partnering with peers on shared solutions.</p> <p>TikTok has invested in labeling technologies and tools, including the implementation of Content Credentials technology from the Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity (C2PA), which enables the automatic recognition and labeling of AI-generated content. This is complemented by a TikTok-developed tool that allows creators to easily label AI-generated content, already used by 37 million creators. TikTok's commitment to AIGC transparency ensures a safe environment for users, who can easily identify synthetic content and understand its context.</p> <p>TikTok is a member of the Content Authenticity Initiative and the Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity, and was the first video sharing platform to put Content Credentials into practice. We have the ability to read Content Credentials that attach metadata to content, which we can use to instantly recognise and label AIGC. This helped us to expand auto-labelling to AIGC created on some other platforms.</p> |



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| | <p>Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available</p> <p>Number of videos removed because of violation of our Edited media and AIGC policy during the weeks leading up to the French Election (noting the snap election was only called on 9 June 2024) and including the days of the French EU Elections (June 30 and July 7, 2024) - 469</p> |
| Empowering Users | |
| Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement. | |
| Rolling out Media literacy campaigns <i>(Commitment 17, Measure 17.2)</i> | <p>Description of intervention</p> <p>Tiktok had an in app Election Centre dedicated to the French Election. Working with electoral commissions and civil society organisations, the Election Centres connected people with reliable voting information, including when, where, and how to vote; eligibility requirements for candidates; and, ultimately, the election results.</p> <p>The Election Centre contained a media literacy section that provided tips and resources on how to identify misinformation and improve media literacy skills. This section included videos from our trusted fact-checking partners and local media literacy bodyAgence France-Presse (AFP).</p> <p>We directed people to the Election Centres through prompts on videos, LIVEs and searches related to elections,</p> |
| | <p>Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available</p> <p>The Election Centre launched before the French Election was visited 1,578,583 times, and search banners were viewed 15,712,577 times.</p> |
| Engagement with local and regional experts <i>(Commitment 17, Measure 17.2)</i> | <p>Description of intervention</p> <p>To further promote election integrity, and inform our approach to the French Election, we organised an Election Speaker Series on 26 June 2024 with AFP who shared their insights and market expertise with our internal teams.</p> |



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| | <p>Our fact-checking partners and local media literacy bodies have also supported TikTok in our launch of the Election Centres, which featured videos from them. This localised approach helped to ensure that messaging in relation to the French election was relevant to our community and encouraged more engagement.</p> <p>Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available</p> <p>This engagement with external regional and local experts allowed us to inform our country-level approach to the French Election.</p> |
| Empowering the Research Community | |
| Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement. | |
| Providing access to our Research API <i>(Commitment 26 and Measures 26.1 and 26.2)</i> | <p>Description of intervention</p> <p>Through our Research API, academic researchers from non-profit universities in the US and Europe can apply to study public data about TikTok content and accounts. This public data includes comments, captions, subtitles, and number of comments, shares, likes, and favourites that a video receives, and comments from our platform. More information is available here.</p> <p>Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available</p> <p>Number of Research API applications related to the French Election that have been approved from July to December 2024: 1</p> |
| Empowering the Fact-Checking Community | |
| Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement. | |
| Ensuring fact-checking coverage (<i>Commitment 30, Measure 30.1</i>) | <p>Description of intervention</p> <p>Agence France-Presse (AFP), serves as the fact-checking partner for France, which provided coverage for the platform.</p> |



| | Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available |
|--|---|
| | Number of videos reviewed by fact-checking partners during the weeks leading up to the French Election: 161 |



Reporting on the signatory's response during an election

2024 Romanian Presidential Election

Threats observed during the electoral period: [suggested character limit 2000 characters].

As co-chair of the Code of Practice on Disinformation's Working Group on elections, TikTok takes our role of [protecting the integrity of elections](#) on our platform very seriously. We have comprehensive measures in place to anticipate and address the risks associated with electoral processes, including the risks associated with election misinformation in the context of the Romanian Election which took place on 24 November 2024.

The following are examples of some of the threats TikTok observed in relation to the Romanian Presidential Election:

- TikTok reported removing six CIO networks in 2024 that were identified as specifically targeting a Romanian audience. More information relating to the network disruptions is published on our dedicated [Covert Influence Operations transparency page](#).
- In addition to these networks, it's worth highlighting our broader defences against covert influence campaigns across Europe. In September 2024, we took global action against a covert network linked to Sputnik Media. When we remove such networks, we continue monitoring for any attempts to re-emerge. As part of our anti-recidivism strategy, we removed 11 accounts in November 2024 believed to be associated with Sputnik Media and targeting Romanian and Moldovan audiences.
- We proactively removed more than 5,500 pieces of election-related content in Romania for violating our policies on misinformation, harassment, and hate speech since the end of October.
- We received 11 notifications through the COPD Rapid Response System in relation to the Romanian Presidential Election, which were rapidly addressed. Actions included banning or geo-blocking of accounts and content removals for violation of Community Guidelines.



Mitigations in place during the electoral period: [suggested character limit: 2000 characters].

A. Enforcing our policies

(I) Moderation capabilities

Our teams worked alongside technology to ensure that we were consistently [enforcing our rules](#) to detect and remove misinformation, covert influence operations, and other content and behaviour that can increase during an election period. We continue to prioritize and enhance TikTok's automated moderation technology as such technology enables faster and consistent removal of content that violates our rules. We invest in technologies that improve content understanding and predict potential risks so that we can take action on violative content before it's viewed.

We have thousands of trust and safety professionals dedicated to keeping our platform safe. We have 99 Romanian-speaking moderators, which is the largest such team among digital platforms in the country, both in absolute terms and relative to the number of users. We increased resources on our Romanian elections task force by adding more than 120 subject matter experts across multiple teams including Deceptive Behaviour (which includes Covert Influence Operations analysts), Security and Ads Integrity.

(II) Mission Control Centre: internal cross-functional collaboration

On 23 October 2024, in advance of the official campaign period for the Romanian Presidential Election, we established a dedicated Mission Control Centre (MCC), including employees from multiple specialist teams within our safety department. Through the MCC, our teams were able to provide consistent and dedicated coverage of potential election-related issues in the run-up to, and during, the Romanian Presidential Election.

(III) Countering misinformation

Our misinformation moderators receive enhanced training and tools to detect and remove misinformation and other violative content. We also have teams on the ground who partner with experts to ensure local context and nuance is reflected in our approach. We also integrated the most recent insights from our expert partners into our policies and guidelines on misinformation and impersonation. We removed more than 5,500 pieces of election-related content in Romania for violating our policies on misinformation, harassment, and hate speech between the end of October and 17 December 2024.

(IV) Fact-checking

Our global fact-checking programme is a critical part of our layered approach to detecting harmful misinformation in the context of elections. The core objective of the fact-checking program is to leverage the expertise of external fact-checking organisations to help assess the accuracy of potentially harmful claims that are difficult to verify. TikTok collaborates with [14 fact-checking organizations](#) across Europe to evaluate the accuracy of content in most European languages, including Romanian. **LeadStories**, which is a verified member of International Fact-Checking Network and the European Fact-Checking Standards Network, serves as the fact-checking partner for Romania, which provided coverage for the platform, including across weekends.



(V) Deterring covert influence operations

We prohibit covert influence operations and remain constantly vigilant against attempts to use deceptive behaviours and manipulate our platform. We proactively seek and continuously investigate leads for potential influence operations. We're also working with government authorities and encourage them to share any intelligence so that we can work together to ensure election integrity. More detail on our policy against covert influence operations is published on our [website](#).

(VI) Tackling misleading AI-generated content

Creators are required to label any realistic AI-generated content (AIGC) and we have an [AI-generated content label](#) to help people do this. TikTok has a 'Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC)' policy, which prohibits AIGC showing fake authoritative sources or crisis events, or falsely showing public figures in certain contexts including being bullied, making an endorsement, or being endorsed.

(VII) Government, Politician, and Political Party Accounts (GPPPAs)

We classify presidential candidate accounts as a Government, Politician, and Political Party Account ([GPPPA](#)). We then apply designated policies to GPPPAs to ensure the right experience, given their important role in civic processes. This includes disabling monetization features.

We strongly recommend that GPPPAs be [verified](#). Verified badges help users make informed choices about the accounts they choose to follow. It is also an easy way for notable figures to let users know they're seeing authentic content, and it helps to build trust among high-profile accounts and their followers.

In advance of the elections TikTok's GR team organized dedicated sessions with every political group in Romania to inform about our policies and to educate political actors about safety measures. TikTok also requested a list of candidates be provided by the Romanian authorities to ensure the GPPPA label could be correctly applied where relevant.

B. Directing people to trusted sources

(I) Investing in media literacy

We invest in media literacy campaigns as a counter-misinformation strategy. TikTok has partnered with the local NGO Funky Citizens in Romania to help the community safely navigate the platform and protect themselves against potential misinformation during the election. Funky Citizens developed a series of educational videos explaining how users could identify and avoid misinformation, use TikTok's safety features, and critically evaluate content related to the electoral process. The Romanian community could find the video series with practical advice and useful information about the electoral process on Funky Citizens' official TikTok account and the in-app Election Center dedicated to Romania's elections. These videos were viewed 47,855,301 times between November 2024 and December 2024.



C. External engagement at the national and EU levels

(I) Rapid Response System: external collaboration with COPD Signatories

The COPD Rapid Response System (RRS) was utilised to exchange information among civil society organisations, fact-checkers, and online platforms. TikTok received 11 notifications through the RRS in relation to the Romanian Election which were addressed and actioned, enforcement included banning or geo-blocking of accounts and content removals for violation of Community Guidelines.

(II) Engagement with local experts

To further promote election integrity, and inform our approach to the Romanian Presidential Election, we organised an Election Speaker Series with Funky Citizens who shared their insights and market expertise with our internal teams.

(III) Engagement with national authorities pre-election

GR proactively organized an election-dedicated meeting on 22 October 2024 with ANCOM, the Permanent Electoral Authority and Ministry of Research, Innovation and Digitalization to establish points of contact before the elections and to offer access to our reporting tools and propose joint cooperation in creating an election center. At this meeting TikTok requested a candidate list to ensure we could apply our GPPPA label where relevant.

On 14 November 2024, TikTok in cooperation with the Ministry of Research, Innovation and Digitalization, organized an onsite session on disrupting covert influence operations. The meeting was attended by Romanian experts from the Ministry, ANCOM, DNSC and the Police. TikTok representatives from explained TikTok's approach to those risk posed by CIO and shared their professional knowledge

(III) Engagement with national authorities and stakeholders and EU authorities post election

The first round of the Presidential election was held on 24 November 2024. In the immediate aftermath, there were concerns about the election results and suspicions of an inauthentic online campaign aimed at mobilising voters in favour of one candidate.

On 29 November 2024 TikTok participated in a European Commission Roundtable with the Romanian Digital Services Coordinator ANCOM, relevant state authorities and civil society organisations and other platforms to discuss the situation in respect of the Romanian elections and the measures platforms were taking to help protect election integrity.

On 3 December 2024, we publicly answered questions from lawmakers at the European Parliament Committee on Internal Market and Consumer Protection.



On 5 December 2024 the European Commission issued a 'retention order' to TikTok requiring TikTok to preserve data related to risks its service could potentially pose to electoral processes and civic discourse in the EU. The order followed information received by the Commission in the context of the Romanian elections.

On 6 December 2024 the Constitutional Court of Romania exercised its power under the Romanian Constitution and decided that the entire electoral process with regard to the election of the President of Romania was annulled.

On 17 December 2024, the European Commission opened formal proceedings against TikTok on election risks under the DSA in the context of the Romanian presidential elections. The decision to open an investigation took into account information received from declassified intelligence reports by the Romanian authorities, as well as third-party reports. TikTok are co-operating fully with the EC in relation to the investigation.

More generally, we have engaged with relevant authorities in Romania in relation to the situation with the Presidential Election and encouraged them to share any intelligence so that we could work together to ensure the integrity of the election. TikTok has also responded to content related requests from the authorities, including the EC, by answering their specific questions about accounts and sharing details of our investigations.

Romania has now set a date to rerun its presidential election. The new vote will take place on May 4, with a runoff planned two weeks later, on May 18.

[Note: Signatories are requested to provide information relevant to their particular response to the threats and challenges they observed on their service(s). They ensure that the information below provides an accurate and complete report of their relevant actions. As operational responses to crisis/election situations can vary from service to service, an absence of information should not be considered a priori a shortfall in the way a particular service has responded. Impact metrics are accurate to the best of signatories' abilities to measure them].

Policies and Terms and Conditions

Outline any changes to your policies

| Policy | Changes (such as newly introduced policies, edits, adaptation in scope or implementation) | | Rationale |
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| Integrity and Authenticity (I&A) Policies | N/a | | |
| Scrutiny of Ads Placements | | | |
| <p>Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.</p> | | | |
| Scrutiny of Ad Placements, including prohibition on monetisation and fundraising campaigns for GPPPAs <i>(Commitment 1 and Measure 1.1)</i> | <p>Description of intervention</p> <p>We prohibit political advertising, which is outlined in more detail in the Political Advertising section below. We classify relevant political TikTok accounts as GPPPAs, examples include government-run entities, elected officials or candidates, political parties, current/former heads of state or government. Where accounts are designated as GPPPAs, they are banned from placing ads on TikTok and from monetisation features. We have a limited exception where governments may be allowed to advertise (e.g. for a public health campaign), provided they are working with a TikTok sales representative.</p> <p>Solicitations for campaign fundraising by GPPPAs are also not permitted on the platform. That includes content like a video from a politician asking for donations, or a political party directing people to a donation page on their website. We provide GPPPAs account holders with information on our policies and moderation systems as well as actively encourage them to verify their profiles. Read more here.</p> <p>In order to enforce these policies, our local Government Relations teams identified and labelled GPPPAs in Romania ahead of the election, including ensuring that each and every presidential candidate account was labelled as a GPPPA.</p> | | |
| | <p>Indication of impact including relevant metrics when available</p> <p>Our GPPPA-specific policies helped us recognise the public interest associated with these accounts, while also putting guardrails in place (for example by restricting advertising and monetisation features).</p> | | |
| Political Advertising | | | |

**Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.**

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| Prohibition on Political Advertising (Commitment 5, Measure 5.1) | <p>TikTok <u>prohibits political advertising</u> on its platform.</p> <p>We recognise that some members of our community may want to create or engage with political content on TikTok and so sharing political beliefs and engaging in political conversation is allowed as organic content provided it does not violate our Community Guidelines or Branded Content policy. However, users cannot pay to advertise or promote this content. Furthermore, in an effort to maintain both the integrity of the platform and safety of the people who use it, accounts belonging to politicians or political parties cannot advertise or make money on TikTok.</p> <p>We do not allow paid political promotion, political advertising, or fundraising by politicians and political parties (for themselves or others). Our political ads policy prohibits both traditional paid ads and creators being paid to make branded political content. This has been a long-standing policy at TikTok since 2019. We do not allow paid or branded content that promotes or opposes a candidate, current leader, political party or group, or issue at the federal, state, or local level – including election-related ads, advocacy ads, or issue ads. This means that accounts we identify as belonging to politicians and political parties (i.e. GPPPAs) have their access to advertising features turned off. As mentioned above, we classified each and every presidential candidate account as a GPPPA, which enabled us to subject them to the policies designed to help prevent misuse of certain features, including monetisation features.</p> <p>In order to enforce our political advertising prohibition effectively, we have robust, round the clock, pre and post publication processes in place. In Romania, these comprise automated detection and human moderation, by moderators who receive additional, specific training on our political advertising policies. We prohibit political content in both paid advertising (i.e. where TikTok would receive remuneration) and in branded content (e.g. where an individual promotes a candidate or party in exchange for payment or any other incentive). We also remove content that constitutes undisclosed branded content based on evidence-based requests or credible information obtained by the appropriate regulatory authorities.</p> <p>Ads are reviewed before being displayed on our platform. Upon review, if an ad is deemed to violate our strict ads policies including our prohibition of political ads, it will not be permitted on our platform. We also review ads reported to us and upon review, violating ads will be removed. Our community can also report ads, through our reporting tools, that they believe break our rules, which our teams will review and remove if they are found to be violative.</p> <p>We take extremely seriously our responsibility to ensure electoral integrity. We strive to combat election misinformation and promote fair elections. We have instituted practices to mitigate the risk of harmful misinformation impacting election integrity, such as investing in media literacy campaigns as a counter-misinformation strategy. We continue to regularly review and improve our</p> |
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| | <p>policies and processes in order to combat increasingly sophisticated attempts to spread disinformation and to further strengthen our systems.</p> <p>Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available</p> <p>By prohibiting political advertising, we help ensure our community can have a creative and authentic TikTok experience, and we reduce the risk of our platform being used to advertise and amplify narratives that may be divisive or false.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Number of ads removed for violating our political advertisement policies in Romania during the 4 weeks leading up to and including the day of the Romanian Presidential Election: 2,743 |
| Integrity of Services | |
| <p>Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.</p> | |
| Identifying and removing CIO networks <i>(Commitment 14, Measure 14.1)</i> | <p>Description of intervention</p> <p>During the Romanian Presidential Election we continued our work to detect and disrupt covert influence operations (CIOs) that attempt to establish themselves on TikTok and undermine the integrity of our platform.</p> <p>Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available</p> <p>TikTok has scaled mitigations against deceptive behaviours including spam, impersonation and activities in relation to fake engagement. As an example of our efforts in this area:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> from December 5 to December 14, we prevented 4,415,720 fake likes and 1,559,406 fake follow requests, and we blocked 33,594 spam accounts from being created in Romania. We also removed: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 900 accounts impersonating Romanian election candidates and already elected officials 92,958 fake accounts 616,548 fake likes 1,023,652 fake followers From 15-30 December we prevented more than 5.3 million fake likes and more than 2.6 million fake follow requests, and we blocked more than 116,000 spam accounts from being created in Romania. We also removed: 59 accounts |



| | |
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| | <p>impersonating Romanian Government, Politician, or Political Party Accounts, +59,000 fake accounts, +1.5 million fake likes and +1.3 million fake followers.</p> <p>As set out above we reported removing six CIO networks in 2024 that were identified as specifically targeting a Romanian audience, including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● In September 2024, <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ A network of 22 accounts operating from Romania that attempted to target Romanian audiences in order to spread misinformation and promote narratives critical of the Romanian government. ● In November 2024, <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ A network of 78 accounts operating from Romania that attempted to promote candidate Călin Georgescu on TikTok. ○ A network of 12 accounts operating from Romania that attempted to amplify narratives in Romanian favourable to independent political candidate Mircea Geoană. ● In December 2024, <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ A network of 27,217 accounts operated via a fake engagement vendor, which attempted to promote the AUR political party and independent candidate Călin Georgescu through posting comments at scale. ○ A network of 68 accounts operated from Moldova and targeted the Romanian diaspora in Romania, which attempted to promote Iurie Ciocan and the Social Democratic Party. <p>In addition to these networks, it's worth highlighting our broader defences against covert influence campaigns across Europe. In September 2024, we took global action against a covert network linked to Sputnik Media. When we remove such networks, we continue monitoring for any attempts to re-emerge. As part of our anti-recidivism strategy, we removed 11 accounts in November 2024 believed to be associated with Sputnik Media and targeting Romanian and Moldovan audiences.</p> <p>More information relating to the above detailed network disruptions is published on our dedicated Covert Influence Operations transparency page.</p> |
| Tackling misleading AIGC and edited media <i>(Commitment 15, Measures 15.1 and 15.2)</i> | <p>Description of intervention</p> <p>Our Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC) policy makes it clear that we do not want our users to be misled about political issues. For the purposes of our policy, AIGC refers to content created or modified by artificial intelligence (AI) technology or machine-learning processes, which may include images of real people, and may show highly realistic-looking scenes, or use a particular artistic style, such as a painting, cartoons, or anime.</p> <p>We do not allow misleading AIGC or edited media that falsely shows:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Content made to seem as if it comes from an authoritative source, such as a reputable news organisation, |



- A crisis event, such as a conflict or natural disaster,
- A public figure who is:
 - being degraded or harassed, or engaging in criminal or anti-social behaviour
 - taking a position on a political issue, commercial product, or a matter of public importance (such as an election)
 - being politically endorsed or condemned by an individual or group.

In addition, all AIGC or edited media, including that which depicts public figures, such as politicians, must be clearly labelled as AI generated, and can not be used for endorsements.

As AI evolves, we continue to invest in combating harmful AIGC by evolving our proactive detection models, consulting with experts, and partnering with peers on shared solutions.

TikTok has invested in labeling technologies and tools, including the implementation of [Content Credentials technology from the Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity](#) (C2PA), which enables the automatic recognition and labeling of AI-generated content. This is complemented by a TikTok-developed tool that allows creators to easily label AI-generated content, already used by **37 million creators**. TikTok's commitment to AIGC transparency ensures a safe environment for users, who can easily identify synthetic content and understand its context.

TikTok is a member of the Content Authenticity Initiative and the Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity, and was the first video sharing platform to put Content Credentials into practice. We have the ability to read Content Credentials that attach metadata to content, which we can use to instantly recognise and label AIGC. This helped us to expand auto-labelling to AIGC created on some other platforms.

These measures [are supported](#) by strategic collaborations with other leading tech companies to combat AI-generated misinformation, including signing the [Tech Accord at the industry level to combat the deceptive use of AI in 2024 Elections](#) at the Munich Security Conference this year. Furthermore, TikTok supports the new guidelines of the [International Foundation for Electoral Systems](#).

Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available

Number of videos removed because of violation of synthetic and manipulated media policy during the 4 weeks leading up to the Romanian Presidential Election and including the days of the Election: 34

Empowering Users



Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

| | |
|---|---|
| Rolling out Media literacy campaigns <i>(Commitment 17, Measure 17.2)</i> | <p>Description of intervention</p> <p>TikTok had an in-app Election Center dedicated to Romania's Presidential election. We updated our in-app Election Center to directly link to the Electoral Commission's website so it's even easier for people to access authoritative election information. In line with media literacy best practices, we also added a reminder to verify the accuracy of election information people see online and off.</p> <p>TikTok also partnered with local NGO Funky Citizens to help the community safely navigate the platform and protect themselves against potential misinformation during the election.</p> <p>Funky Citizens developed a series of educational videos explaining how users could identify and avoid misinformation, use TikTok's safety features, and critically evaluate content related to the electoral process. The Romanian community could find the video series with practical advice and useful information about the electoral process on Funky Citizens' official TikTok account and in the Election Center.</p> |
| | <p>Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available</p> <p>The Election Center launched before the Presidential Election was visited more than 1,008,537 times, and search banners were viewed more than 21,733,061 times.</p> <p>Funky Citizens videos were viewed 47,855,301 times between November 2024 and December 2024.</p> |
| Engagement with local and regional experts <i>(Commitment 17, Measure 17.2)</i> | <p>Description of intervention</p> <p>To further promote election integrity, and inform our approach to the Romanian Presidential Election, we organised an Election Speaker Series with Funky Citizens who shared their insights and market expertise with our internal teams.</p> <p>Our fact-checking partners and local media literacy bodies also supported our launch of the Election Center that included videos from them. This localised approach helped to ensure that messages were relevant to our community and encouraged more engagement.</p> <p>Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available</p> |



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| | This engagement with external regional and local experts allowed TikTok to inform its approach to the Romanian Presidential Election. |
| Empowering the Research Community | |
| Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement. | |
| Providing access to our Research API <i>(Commitment 26 and Measures 26.1 and 26.2)</i> | <p>Description of intervention</p> <p>Through our Research API, academic researchers from non-profit universities in the US and Europe can apply to study public data about TikTok content and accounts. This public data includes comments, captions, subtitles, and number of comments, shares, likes, and favourites that a video receives, and comments from our platform. More information is available here.</p> <p>Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available</p> <p>Number of Research API applications related to the Romanian Presidential Election that have been approved from June to December 2024: 4</p> |
| Empowering the Fact-Checking Community | |
| Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement. | |
| Ensuring fact-checking coverage <i>(Commitment 30, Measure 30.1)</i> | <p>Description of intervention</p> <p>LeadStories serves as the fact-checking partner for Romania, which provided coverage for the platform, including across weekends in advance of the Romanian Presidential Election.</p> <p>Indication of impact (at beginning of action: expected impact) including relevant metrics when available</p> <p>Number of fact-checked tasks related to keywords assigned for the Romanian Presidential Election: approx. 6</p> |