

## Budget-Holder Fraud Risk Guidance

### ## Essential Guide for Financial Decision-Makers

#### ### Document Purpose

This guide provides practical, actionable fraud risk management guidance for budget-holders across all departments. Budget-holders control spending decisions and are on the front line of fraud prevention.

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#### ## Who Is a Budget-Holder?

You are a budget-holder if you:

- Approve purchases or expenditure
- Manage a departmental/project budget
- Authorize supplier payments
- Approve timesheets or expenses
- Make procurement decisions
- Manage contracts with third parties

**\*\*Your role is critical:\*\*** 85% of occupational fraud involves budget-holder functions (procurement, payroll, expenses).

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## ## Your Legal & Ethical Obligations

### ### Legal Duties

Under the **\*\*Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023\*\***  
(effective September 2025):

#### **\*\*Organisational Liability:\*\***

If fraud is committed for the organisation's benefit and you failed to prevent it through reasonable procedures, the organisation can face:

- Unlimited fines
- Director disqualification
- Criminal conviction

#### **\*\*Personal Liability:\*\***

If you knowingly participate in or facilitate fraud:

- Criminal prosecution (Fraud Act 2006)
- Dismissal for gross misconduct
- Civil recovery of losses
- Professional disqualification

### ### Ethical Duties

## **\*\*Stewardship:\*\***

You manage stakeholder resources (taxpayer money, donor funds, shareholder capital). This is a position of trust.

## **\*\*Role Modeling:\*\***

Your team watches your behavior. Shortcuts you take signal "acceptable" conduct.

## **\*\*Fiduciary Duty:\*\***

Act in the organisation's best interests, not personal convenience.

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## **## Understanding Fraud: The Budget-Holder Perspective**

### **### The Fraud Triangle**

Fraud occurs when three elements align:

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PRESSURE

(Financial stress,

unrealistic targets)

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OPPORTUNITY      RATIONALIZATION

(Weak controls, ("Everyone does it,"  
lack of oversight) "I deserve this")

...

**\*\*Your Control Point:\*\*** OPPORTUNITY

You cannot control employee financial pressures or their ability to rationalize.  
But you CAN remove opportunities through robust controls.

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**## Common Fraud Scenarios in Budget-Holder Functions**

**### 1. Procurement Fraud**

**#### Scenario A: Fake Supplier Invoice**

**\*\*How it works:\*\***

- Fraudster creates fake supplier identity
- Submits invoice for goods/services never provided
- Invoice appears legitimate (professional branding, VAT number)
- Payment processed to fraudulent bank account

**\*\*Red Flags:\*\***

- New supplier with no prior relationship
- Sole trader/individual rather than established company
- Generic email (Gmail, Hotmail vs. corporate domain)
- No physical address or vague location
- Payment urgency ("Pay immediately to avoid penalties")
- Round numbers (£5,000.00 vs. £4,847.23)

**\*\*Controls:\*\***

- Verify ALL new suppliers before first payment
- Check Companies House registration (UK)
- Call supplier using independently verified phone number
- Require purchase order before invoice submission
- Three quotes for purchases above threshold

**\*\*Example:\*\***

Finance team received £8,500 invoice from "IT Solutions Ltd" for software

licenses. Checked Companies House—company dissolved 2 years ago. Avoided £8,500 loss.

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#### #### Scenario B: Inflated Pricing / Kickbacks

##### \*\*How it works:\*\*

- Employee colludes with supplier
- Supplier inflates prices above market rate
- Employee approves payment
- Supplier pays kickback to employee (cash, gifts, benefits)

##### \*\*Red Flags:\*\*

- Single supplier used repeatedly without competitive quotes
- Pricing significantly above market rate
- Employee resistant to changing suppliers
- Unusually close relationship between employee and supplier
- Employee lifestyle inconsistent with salary (luxury items, holidays)
- Split purchases just below approval threshold

##### \*\*Controls:\*\*

- Rotate supplier relationships periodically
- Require competitive quotes for purchases >£X
- Benchmark pricing against market rates

- Segregate duties (requisitioner ≠ approver)
- Declare conflicts of interest (family/friend suppliers)
- Random invoice sampling and price verification

**\*\*Example:\*\***

Department spent £45,000 annually with one stationery supplier. Market comparison showed 40% overpricing. Investigation revealed employee received "loyalty rewards" (disguised kickbacks).

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#### #### Scenario C: Split Purchases to Avoid Approval

**\*\*How it works:\*\***

- Employee artificially divides one large purchase into multiple smaller transactions
- Each transaction falls below approval threshold
- Avoids scrutiny of higher-level authorization
- May be legitimate need or fraud concealment

**\*\*Red Flags:\*\***

- Multiple invoices from same supplier on same day
- Sequential invoice numbers for similar items
- Purchases just below delegation threshold (e.g., £4,900 when limit is £5,000)
- Vague descriptions ("Miscellaneous supplies")

**\*\*Controls:\*\***

- Monitor transaction patterns (automated alerts)
- Review supplier spending monthly
- Enforce "no splitting" policy
- Require justification for multiple small purchases
- Approval based on total project cost, not per-invoice

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**### 2. Invoice & Payment Fraud**

**#### Scenario D: Email Impersonation (Business Email Compromise)**

**\*\*How it works:\*\***

- Fraudster impersonates supplier via spoofed email
- Email states: "We've changed bank details—please update for future payments"
- Looks identical to legitimate supplier communication
- Payment diverted to fraudulent account
- Often timed when key person on leave/unavailable

**\*\*Red Flags:\*\***

- Unexpected bank detail change request
- Urgency language ("Update immediately")
- Slight misspelling in sender email (supp1ier vs. supplier)



- Generic greeting ("Dear Customer" vs. your name)
- External email warning missing
- Request sent outside normal business hours

**\*\*Controls:\*\***

- **\*\*NEVER** update bank details via email alone
- Call supplier using phone number from contract/invoice (not email)
- Verbal confirmation with two authorized signatories
- Test payment (£1) before full amount
- Flag all bank changes for senior approval
- Email security (SPF, DKIM, DMARC checks)

**\*\*Example:\*\***

NHS trust received email from "construction supplier" requesting bank change. Verified by phone—supplier had not sent email. Avoided £127,000 fraud.

**\*\*Critical Rule:\*\*** All bank detail changes require phone verification using independently sourced contact information.

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**#### Scenario E: Duplicate Payments**

**\*\*How it works:\*\***

- Same invoice submitted twice (intentionally or accidentally)

- Different invoice numbers or formatting to avoid detection
- Second payment processed
- Fraudster pockets duplicate (if intentional) or supplier retains overpayment

**\*\*Red Flags:\*\***

- Same amount, same supplier, similar dates
- Supplier unusually slow to notify overpayment
- Vague invoice descriptions making comparison difficult
- Missing purchase order reference

**\*\*Controls:\*\***

- Three-way match (PO + receipt + invoice)
- Automated duplicate detection (finance system)
- Unique invoice numbering system
- Supplier statement reconciliation monthly
- Payment approval by someone other than requestor

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### ### 3. Payroll & HR Fraud

#### #### Scenario F: Ghost Employees

**\*\*How it works:\*\***

- Fictitious employee added to payroll system
- Salary payments made to fraudulent bank account
- Employee "works" in department with poor headcount oversight
- May be former employee not removed from system

**\*\*Red Flags:\*\***

- Employees with no personnel file
- Same bank account for multiple employees
- Employees never taking leave
- No emergency contact information
- Employee unreachable or never seen in office
- Duplicate National Insurance numbers

**\*\*Controls:\*\***

- Monthly headcount reconciliation (payroll vs. actual staff)
- Starter/leaver verification by HR and department
- Bank account uniqueness checks
- Mandatory annual leave (fraud detection opportunity)
- Random personnel file audits

**\*\*Example:\*\***

Council payroll audit found 3 "employees" paid for 18 months. Total loss: £87,000. Fraudster was payroll clerk with weak oversight.

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#### #### Scenario G: Timesheet Fraud

##### **\*\*How it works:\*\***

- Employee inflates hours worked
- Unauthorized overtime claimed
- Time claimed for personal activities
- Collusion between employee and timesheet approver

##### **\*\*Red Flags:\*\***

- Overtime patterns inconsistent with workload
- Timesheets always submitted at maximum allowed
- Lack of work output despite claimed hours
- Approver doesn't verify actual work performed
- Retrospective timesheet changes

##### **\*\*Controls:\*\***

- Require evidence of work completed (deliverables)
- Spot checks on claimed hours vs. building access logs
- Approval by direct supervisor who knows workload
- Pre-authorization required for overtime
- System alerts for unusual patterns

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### ### 4. Expense Fraud

#### #### Scenario H: False Expense Claims

##### **\*\*How it works:\*\***

- Personal expenses claimed as business (meals, travel, accommodation)
- Receipts fabricated or altered (Photoshop, online generators)
- Same receipt submitted multiple times to different approvers
- Expenses for events that didn't occur

##### **\*\*Red Flags:\*\***

- Receipts from unusual sources (handwritten, poor quality)
- Mileage claims inconsistent with diary/meetings
- High-value claims with vague descriptions
- Weekend/holiday expenses for "business" activities
- Receipts in employee's name (hotels should show organisation name)
- Sequential receipt numbers across different vendors

##### **\*\*Controls:\*\***

- Require original itemized receipts (not credit card slips)
- Cross-check mileage vs. calendar appointments
- Sample verification (call hotel/restaurant to confirm)

- Expense policy with clear examples (what's allowed/prohibited)
- Random audit of expense claims
- Digital receipt submission (harder to alter)

**\*\*Example:\*\***

Employee claimed £8,000 in "client entertainment" over 6 months. Audit revealed receipts from family birthday parties, personal dining. Dismissed for gross misconduct.

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#### #### Scenario I: Mileage Fraud

**\*\*How it works:\*\***

- Inflated distance claimed
- Personal journeys claimed as business
- Commuting distance included (not reimbursable)
- Phantom journeys (claim travel that didn't occur)

**\*\*Red Flags:\*\***

- Mileage claims exceed vehicle capacity (e.g., 50,000 miles/year)
- Routes inefficient (Google Maps shows shorter distance)
- Claims for dates when employee was on leave
- Same journey different distances each claim

**\*\*Controls:\*\***

- Require destination details (address, postcode)
- Automated mileage calculation (system-generated)
- Comparison to calendar/meeting invites
- Spot checks using mapping tools
- Annual declaration of business vs. personal mileage
- Consider company vehicles to eliminate mileage claims

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**### 5. Contract & Revenue Fraud**

**#### Scenario J: Contract Splitting**

**\*\*How it works:\*\***

- Large contract artificially divided into smaller contracts
- Each below competitive tender threshold
- Avoids procurement scrutiny
- May involve kickbacks from supplier

**\*\*Red Flags:\*\***

- Multiple small contracts with same supplier for similar services
- Contracts start/end on consecutive dates
- Total value would exceed tender threshold

- Services could reasonably be consolidated

**\*\*Controls:\*\***

- Aggregate spending review per supplier annually
- Contracts board review all awards (even below threshold)
- Require business justification for multiple contracts
- Procurement oversight of contract patterns

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**#### Scenario K: Revenue Manipulation**

**\*\*How it works:\*\***

- Cash receipts pocketed before recording
- Sales recorded at inflated values
- Revenue recognized prematurely
- Refunds processed to fraudster's account

**\*\*Red Flags:\*\***

- Unexplained revenue variances
- Cash handling by single individual
- Missing receipt numbers (sequential gaps)
- Refunds processed without supporting evidence
- Customer complaints about missing receipts



**\*\*Controls:\*\***

- Dual control over cash handling
- Pre-numbered receipt books (gap analysis)
- Daily cash reconciliation
- Refund approval by manager
- Surprise cash counts
- Segregation of duties (cash handler  $\neq$  reconciler)

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**## Your Fraud Prevention Checklist**

Use this checklist daily/weekly to ensure robust controls:

**### Daily Responsibilities**

**\*\*Before Approving ANY Payment:\*\***

- ☐ Verify goods/services actually received (three-way match)
- ☐ Confirm supplier is legitimate (if new/unusual)
- ☐ Check invoice amount matches agreement/quote
- ☐ Ensure proper authorization obtained
- ☐ Verify bank details if payment to new account

- [ ] Question anything unusual or urgent

**\*\*Before Approving Timesheets/Expenses:\*\***

- [ ] Verify hours/expenses are reasonable and consistent with work
- [ ] Check receipts are original, itemized, and dated
- [ ] Confirm business purpose is legitimate
- [ ] Cross-check dates (employee was at work/traveling)
- [ ] Apply policy consistently (no favoritism)

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**### Weekly Responsibilities**

- [ ] Review budget variances (investigate significant deviations)
- [ ] Check for unusual transaction patterns (duplicates, round numbers)
- [ ] Reconcile supplier statements to payments
- [ ] Review aged payables (are we paying on time? delays may indicate issues)
- [ ] Spot-check a sample of transactions approved by subordinates

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**### Monthly Responsibilities**

- [ ] Review total spending by supplier (concentration risk)
- [ ] Benchmark key costs against market/budget
- [ ] Reconcile headcount to payroll
- [ ] Review exception reports (split purchases, high-value transactions)
- [ ] Assess control effectiveness (are processes working?)
- [ ] Update fraud risk register for your area

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### ### Quarterly Responsibilities

- [ ] Conduct surprise audits/spot checks
- [ ] Review and update delegated authorities
- [ ] Refresh fraud awareness with team
- [ ] Report fraud risk metrics to senior management
- [ ] Test controls (e.g., attempt to process fake invoice—does it get caught?)

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### ### Annual Responsibilities

- [ ] Complete fraud risk assessment for your budget area
- [ ] Review and update financial policies/procedures

- [ ] Mandatory fraud awareness training
- [ ] Declare conflicts of interest
- [ ] Rotate duties/responsibilities (prevent over-familiarity)

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## ## Delegation of Authority: Know Your Limits

### ### Why Authority Limits Matter

Delegation limits exist to:

- Prevent single-person fraud
- Ensure appropriate oversight
- Protect you from unwitting involvement in fraud
- Spread accountability

### ### Common Authority Structures

**\*\*Example Authority Matrix:\*\***

Transaction Type	Up to £1,000	£1,000-£5,000	£5,000-£25,000	£25,000+

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| **Procurement** | Team Leader | Budget Holder | Senior Manager | Director + CFO |

| **Expenses** | Line Manager | Budget Holder | Director | CEO |

| **Payroll Changes** | HR Officer | HR Manager | HR Director | CEO |

| **Contract Awards** | N/A | Budget Holder | Director + Procurement | Board |

| **New Suppliers** | N/A | Budget Holder (verified) | Senior Manager | CFO |

#### **Golden Rules:**

1. Never exceed your authority (even "just this once")
2. Never approve your own transactions
3. Never approve for family/friends without disclosure
4. If in doubt, escalate upward

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#### **Spotting Red Flags: Your Fraud Radar**

##### **Behavioral Red Flags (People)**

Watch for changes in behavior:

##### **Financial Stress Indicators:**

- Employee discussing money problems
- Debt collector calls to workplace

- Gambling references
- Sudden lifestyle changes (new car, luxury items inconsistent with salary)

**\*\*Work Behavior Indicators:\*\***

- Reluctance to take leave (fear of discovery)
- Working unusual hours alone
- Defensive when questioned
- Overly close relationships with suppliers/contractors
- Control issues (won't delegate, won't share passwords)
- Unusually helpful in "covering" for colleagues

**\*\*Attitudinal Indicators:\*\***

- Disgruntlement with employer
- Entitlement mentality ("I'm underpaid, so I deserve this")
- Pressure to meet unrealistic targets
- "Everyone else does it" justifications

**\*\*Important:\*\*** These are indicators, not proof. Do not accuse—report concerns through proper channels.

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**### Transactional Red Flags (Documents)**

**\*\*Invoice Red Flags:\*\***

- Photocopied invoices (original should be available)
- Handwritten invoices from "established" companies
- Invoice numbers out of sequence
- Dates inconsistent (invoice dated before PO)
- Vague descriptions ("Miscellaneous services")
- Unprofessional formatting/typos
- Missing VAT registration (if VAT charged)
- Post office box address only

**\*\*Payment Red Flags:\*\***

- Payee name doesn't match supplier
- Payment to individual for corporate service
- Offshore bank accounts (when not expected)
- Round numbers (£10,000.00 vs. £9,847.50)
- Urgency demands ("Pay today or face penalties")

**\*\*Supplier Red Flags:\*\***

- No online presence (website, Companies House, reviews)
- Contact details generic (mobile phone, Gmail)
- Address is residential or non-existent
- Company name very similar to established firm
- Recently incorporated (check formation date)

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## ## What to Do If You Suspect Fraud

### ### Step 1: Do Not Confront the Individual

#### **\*\*Why?\*\***

- Fraudster may destroy evidence
- May pose personal safety risk
- May intimidate witnesses
- Could constitute defamation if wrong

#### **\*\*Instead:\*\***

- Document your concerns objectively
- Secure evidence (take copies, don't remove originals)
- Report through proper channels

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### ### Step 2: Report Through Proper Channels

#### **\*\*Internal Reporting Options:\*\***



1. **\*\*Line Manager/Senior Manager\*\***

Best for: Concerns about subordinates or peers

2. **\*\*Fraud Risk Owner\*\*** (typically CFO, Head of Finance, Head of Governance)

Best for: Concerns about your manager or complex fraud

3. **\*\*Whistleblowing Hotline/Email\*\***

Best for: Sensitive concerns, desire for anonymity

[Insert your organisation's whistleblowing contact details]

4. **\*\*Internal Audit\*\***

Best for: Systemic control weaknesses

5. **\*\*HR Department\*\***

Best for: Concerns about employment fraud (timesheets, expenses)

**\*\*External Reporting Options (if internal channels ineffective):\*\***

- **\*\*Serious Fraud Office (SFO):\*\*** Major/complex fraud

- **\*\*Action Fraud (National Fraud & Cyber Crime Reporting Centre):\*\*** 0300 123 2040

- **\*\*HMRC:\*\*** Tax fraud

- **\*\*Charity Commission:\*\*** Charity sector fraud

- **NHS Counter Fraud Authority:** NHS fraud

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### Step 3: Preserve Evidence

#### **Do:**

- Make copies of suspicious documents
- Save emails (don't delete or forward to personal accounts)
- Note dates, times, people involved
- Write down your observations contemporaneously
- Secure physical evidence (lock in drawer/safe)

#### **Don't:**

- Remove original documents (could be construed as theft)
- Discuss with colleagues (rumors, tipping off fraudster)
- Conduct your own investigation (contaminate evidence)
- Use company IT systems to store evidence (may be accessed by fraudster)

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### Step 4: Cooperate with Investigation

If an investigation is launched:

- **Be available** for interviews
- **Answer honestly** - don't speculate or embellish
- **Maintain confidentiality** - don't discuss with anyone except investigators/legal counsel
- **Don't retaliate** against whistleblower (even if you disagree with allegation)
- **Follow instructions** from investigators (e.g., don't alert the subject)

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## ## Protection for Whistleblowers

### ### Legal Protections (UK)

**Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998** protects you if:

- You report in good faith
- You reasonably believe the information is true
- You report to appropriate person/body
- The disclosure is in the public interest

**You are protected from:**

- Dismissal

- Disciplinary action
- Demotion or denial of promotion
- Harassment or victimization

**\*\*Your responsibilities:\*\***

- Report through proper channels first (internal before external)
- Do not make malicious/false allegations
- Do not disclose for personal gain

**\*\*If you face retaliation:\*\***

Contact [Insert HR/Legal contact] immediately. Retaliation is grounds for employment tribunal claim.

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## ## Common Myths About Fraud

### Myth 1: "Fraud only happens in large organisations"

**\*\*Reality:\*\*** Small organisations suffer higher fraud losses (as % of revenue) due to:

- Fewer resources for controls
- Greater trust/familiarity (less skepticism)
- Lack of segregation of duties

### Myth 2: "Trusted, long-serving employees won't commit fraud"

**\*\*Reality:\*\***

- Average fraudster tenure: 8+ years (ACFE)
- Trust creates opportunity
- Pressure/rationalization can affect anyone

### Myth 3: "We have an audit—fraud would be detected"

**\*\*Reality:\*\***

- Audits sample transactions (don't check 100%)
- Auditors aren't forensic investigators
- Sophisticated fraud designed to pass audit scrutiny
- 15% of fraud detected by external audit vs. 40% by whistleblowing

### Myth 4: "Fraud prevention is Finance's job"

**\*\*Reality:\*\***

- Budget-holders approve 85% of fraud transactions
- YOU are the front line
- Finance provides oversight, but you approve day-to-day spending

### ### Myth 5: "Small amounts don't matter"

#### **\*\*Reality:\*\***

- Small frauds escalate (fraudster becomes emboldened)
- Signal weak controls (attracts more fraud)
- £100/week = £5,200/year per fraudster
- Cultural impact ("if they get away with it, why can't I?")

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## ## Training & Awareness

### ### Mandatory Training Requirements

All budget-holders must complete:

#### 1. **\*\*Initial fraud awareness training\*\*** (upon appointment)

- This guidance document
- Organisation-specific policies
- Case studies
- Assessment quiz

#### 2. **\*\*Annual refresher training\*\***

- Update on new fraud trends
- Policy changes
- Control effectiveness review

### 3. **\*\*Specific training for role\*\***

- Procurement fraud (if managing contracts)
- Payroll fraud (if approving timesheets)
- Expense fraud (if approving claims)

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### ### Team Awareness

**\*\*Your responsibility:\*\*** Ensure your team understands:

- Fraud risks relevant to their roles
- How to report concerns
- Why controls exist (not "red tape")
- Consequences of fraud (organisational and personal)

**\*\*Suggested methods:\*\***

- Team meetings (quarterly fraud risk discussion)
- Case study reviews (anonymized)

- Control walkthroughs (explain why we do things)
- "Fraud of the month" email (brief awareness)

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## ## Case Studies: Learn from Real Incidents

### ### Case Study 1: The Trusted Administrator

#### **\*\*Background:\*\***

Finance administrator, 12 years' service, highly trusted, never took leave.

#### **\*\*Fraud:\*\***

Created fake supplier ("Office Solutions Pro")

Submitted 47 invoices over 3 years for office supplies never delivered

Invoices just below approval threshold (£4,950)

Payments diverted to personal bank account

**\*\*Total Loss:\*\*** £232,650

#### **\*\*How Detected:\*\***

Administrator went on sick leave (unexpected)

Temporary cover queried invoice from unfamiliar supplier



Investigation revealed supplier was fake

**\*\*Controls That Failed:\*\***

- No mandatory annual leave policy
- No supplier verification for amounts below £5,000
- Same person requested and processed payments
- No periodic supplier review

**\*\*Lessons:\*\***

- Mandatory leave is a control (fraud can't be concealed when absent)
- Verify ALL suppliers, not just large ones
- Segregation of duties prevents single-person fraud

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**### Case Study 2: The Email Impersonation**

**\*\*Background:\*\***

Finance team received email from "building contractor" working on premises.

**\*\*Fraud Attempt:\*\***

Email stated: "Our bank has changed. Please update payment details for final invoice (£87,000) due this week."

Email looked identical to contractor's format

Sender address: contractor-ltd.com (real company: contractorltd.com - subtle difference)

**\*\*Outcome:\*\***

Finance officer called contractor using phone number from original contract

Contractor confirmed they had NOT changed banks and had not sent email

Payment blocked

Police notified (international fraud gang)

**\*\*Total Loss:\*\*** £0 (prevented)

**\*\*Controls That Worked:\*\***

- Policy: All bank changes verified by phone
- Used independently sourced contact info (not from email)
- Staff trained to spot impersonation

**\*\*Lessons:\*\***

- Email is not a secure method for bank changes
- Visual inspection of sender email address critical
- Phone verification using known contact details is gold standard

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**### Case Study 3: The Split Purchases**

**\*\*Background:\*\***

Department manager had £10,000 single-transaction authority.

**\*\*Fraud:\*\***

Over 18 months, made 60+ purchases from same IT supplier

Each purchase £9,500-£9,900 (just below threshold)

Total spending: £580,000

Market comparison showed 35% overpricing

**\*\*Investigation Findings:\*\***

Manager receiving "commission" from supplier (disguised as "consulting fees" to shell company)

Supplier inflated prices and paid kickback

Many items never delivered or inferior quality

**\*\*Total Loss:\*\*** £203,000 (overpayments + fictitious goods)

**\*\*How Detected:\*\***

Finance team ran supplier spend analysis

Flagged concentration risk (single supplier, 60+ transactions)

Internal audit investigation launched

**\*\*Controls That Failed:\*\***

- No competitive quotes required below £10,000
- No periodic supplier spend review
- Manager not required to declare conflict (consulting relationship)

**\*\*Lessons:\*\***

- Analyse transaction patterns, not just individual transactions
- Require competitive quotes periodically (even for established suppliers)
- Mandatory conflict of interest declarations annually

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## **## Policy & Procedure Quick Reference**

### **### Key Policies You Must Follow**

#### **1. \*\*Financial Regulations/Standing Orders\*\***

- Delegation of authority limits
- Procurement thresholds
- Payment approval process

#### **2. \*\*Procurement Policy\*\***

- Competitive quotes/tender requirements
- Supplier verification process

- Contract award procedures

### 3. **Expenses Policy**

- What can be claimed (mileage, meals, accommodation)
- Receipt requirements
- Approval limits
- Timescales for submission

### 4. **Gifts & Hospitality Policy**

- What can be accepted (typically <£50)
- Declaration requirements
- Register of interests

### 5. **Whistleblowing Policy**

- How to report concerns
- Protections available
- Investigation process

### 6. **Fraud Response Plan**

- What constitutes fraud
- Immediate actions if fraud suspected
- Investigation procedures
- Disciplinary process

**\*\*Action:\*\*** Confirm you have read and understood these policies. Keep copies accessible.

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## ## FAQs for Budget-Holders

**\*\*Q1:** I've approved a payment but now suspect it might be fraudulent. What do I do?**\*\***

A: Report immediately to your manager or fraud risk owner. Do not delay. The sooner fraud is detected, the more likely recovery. Do not feel embarrassed—detecting fraud is a success, not a failure.

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**\*\*Q2:** A supplier is pressuring me to bypass procurement procedures due to "urgency." Can I do this?**\*\***

A: No. Urgency is a common fraud indicator. Legitimate suppliers understand proper procedures. Escalate to procurement or senior management if genuinely urgent. Document the request and your response.

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**\*\*Q3: I'm worried about reporting a colleague—we've worked together for years.\*\***

A: Your duty is to the organisation, not personal relationships. Report concerns; let investigators determine facts. Most suspicions are resolved innocently. Failing to report is a breach of your responsibilities.

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**\*\*Q4: How do I balance fraud prevention with trust in my team?\*\***

A: Controls are not about distrust—they protect everyone. Fraud controls prevent false accusations (evidence trail) and protect honest employees from suspicion. Frame controls as protecting the team, not policing them.

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**\*\*Q5: What if I make a mistake and accidentally approve something I shouldn't?  
\*\***

A: Honest mistakes happen. Report immediately. Fraud requires intent. If you approved in good faith but were deceived, that's fraud by the other party, not you. Cooperate with any investigation.

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**\*\*Q6: Can I approve my own expenses or purchases?\*\***

A: No. Self-approval is a fundamental control weakness. All transactions require independent approval by someone with appropriate authority.

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**\*\*Q7: Our budget is tight. Can we skip controls to save time/money?\*\***

A: No. Weak controls cost more in fraud losses than they save in efficiency. Budget constraints are fraud pressure—controls become MORE important, not less.

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**\*\*Q8: What's the difference between fraud, error, and poor judgment?\*\***

A:

- **\*\*Fraud:\*\*** Intentional deception for personal gain (criminal)
- **\*\*Error:\*\*** Unintentional mistake (training/process issue)
- **\*\*Poor judgment:\*\*** Bad decision made honestly (performance issue)

Intent is the key. If unsure, report and let investigators determine.

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**## Your Fraud Prevention Pledge**



As a budget-holder, I commit to:

- ☐ Understand and comply with all financial policies
- ☐ Exercise delegated authority responsibly and within limits
- ☐ Apply controls consistently (no shortcuts, no exceptions)
- ☐ Question unusual, urgent, or suspicious requests
- ☐ Verify suppliers, invoices, and bank details before approval
- ☐ Never approve my own transactions
- ☐ Declare all conflicts of interest
- ☐ Report fraud concerns immediately through proper channels
- ☐ Set the tone for my team (ethical behavior, speak-up culture)
- ☐ Complete mandatory fraud awareness training annually
- ☐ Support fraud investigations with full cooperation
- ☐ Protect whistleblowers from retaliation

**\*\*Signature:\*\*** \_\_\_\_\_

**\*\*Date:\*\*** \_\_\_\_\_

**\*\*Budget Area/Department:\*\*** \_\_\_\_\_

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**## Additional Resources**

### ### Internal Resources

- \*\*Fraud Risk Owner:\*\* [Name, Email, Phone]
- \*\*Whistleblowing Hotline:\*\* [Number/Email]
- \*\*Internal Audit:\*\* [Contact]
- \*\*Procurement Team:\*\* [Contact]
- \*\*HR Department:\*\* [Contact]

### ### External Resources

- \*\*Action Fraud:\*\* 0300 123 2040 | [[www.actionfraud.police.uk](http://www.actionfraud.police.uk)](<https://www.actionfraud.police.uk>)
- \*\*Serious Fraud Office:\*\* [[www.sfo.gov.uk](http://www.sfo.gov.uk)](<https://www.sfo.gov.uk>)
- \*\*Government Counter-Fraud Standards:\*\* [GovS-013](<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/government-functional-standard-govs-013-counter-fraud>)
- \*\*Chartered Institute of Public Finance & Accountancy (CIPFA):\*\* Fraud guidance
- \*\*Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE):\*\* Global fraud statistics

### ### Stop FRA Platform

- \*\*Platform:\*\* Automated fraud risk assessment
- \*\*Contact:\*\* [Insert Stop FRA contact details]

- **Resources:** Training modules, case studies, templates

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**Owner:** [Fraud Risk Owner Name/Title]

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**Distribution:** All budget-holders, procurement staff, senior management

**Status:** Mandatory reading for all financial decision-makers