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**UNIVERSITY**

## **Cryptanalysis Project Report**

### **SmartCard RSA**

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## 1. Introduction

**RSA** is one of the first practicable public-key cryptosystems and is widely used for secure data transmission. RSA stands for Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir and Leonard Adleman, who first publicly described the algorithm in 1977. In such a cryptosystem, the encryption key is public and differs from the decryption key which is kept secret.

There are three stages of RSA

- Key Generation
- Encryption
- Decryption

### KEY GENERATION

Choose large prime  
no.  $p$  &  $q$

$$N = p * q$$

Choose  $e$  relatively  
prime to  $(p-1)*(q-1)$

$$d = e^{-1} \bmod (p-1)(q-1)$$

### ENCRYPTION

Public key :  $(N, e)$

Private Key :  $(N, d)$

$$\text{Encrypt } C = M^e \bmod N$$

Send the cipher text

### DECRYPTION

#### (Simple Decryption)

$$\text{Decrypt: } M = C^d \bmod N$$

#### (Decryption – CRT)

$$dp = d \bmod (p-1)$$

$$dq = d \bmod (q-1)$$

$$M1 = C^{dp} \bmod p$$

$$M2 = C^{dq} \bmod q$$

$$q_{inv} = q^{-1} \bmod p$$

$$h = (M1 - M2) * q_{inv} \bmod p$$

$$M = M2 + h * q$$

## 2. Problem Statement

The main goal of the project is to find the private key corresponding to the given public parameters in a RSA cryptosystem. Then decrypt the given cipher text to obtain the plaintext message.

To make the decryption process faster and easier, the large value 'd' is broken into two smaller values as given below:

$$dp = d \bmod (p-1)$$

$$dq = d \bmod (q-1)$$

So instead of computing  $C^d$ , we need to compute  $C^{dp}$  and  $C^{dq}$ . Since  $dp$  and  $dq$  are much smaller than  $d$ , the time taken for these two computations will be lesser than the time taken to compute  $C^d$ .

### 3. RSA Smart Card Challenge

#### 3.1 Challenge Input

**n:**

75489763393055314128289985760068186621492280562287920094260074153209517236970341  
57251855979715334494655761454542010268912836014944882627715973284355288509071228  
93849517975920947769168699513594157953875730587323943476340412264776041510220894  
42263032171551224119059291246759481118626066831025730728959763973939

**e:**

46933839936513203806814534785430440399121060041961563534238921289223215886833155  
74892332994276818479312703035733523448875295199895195230075296165479104492171498  
61920712860366622338225861165737738348959555817678858854614025782811877120692451  
54703440996167817002215606658260574029353837097272922247982958120199

**cipher:**

17303115588385783231855542914594436033706210611592142994148195847161380369694148  
89829432131661988916146564674134262295174779202039191939637716660039004269191646  
03320386632028416160054267446603995379157422243007576103500689520821974573699856  
59556824400134147883343181884291377763582387957067404145280221333702

#### 3.2 Challenge Output

**p:**

70182185866827806174089929420490945073985459885737553767118140056721971488143201  
05215550815776617482233629755364714330648127911440775205101042685290382227

**q:**

10756257084425775717093901910403034188709069024950523681940082563306520982262017  
769865566949161857411571031561419602783882736734194719010580555141843481057

**dp:** 593411

**dq:** 597111


**Message:**

88512868077503332992112473866037161020982129488683404447933785527838776323475453  
28977211646318917271548352654722645021529478184878282608076120337616897753623132  
20126531707691992170081760506423102743350462795307416443535572503479062543849178  
1147834836814683959169728790492206

**Message in plaintext:**

Artificial intelligence is the intelligence of machines and the branch of computer science that aims to create it.

### 3.3 Output Snapshot



### 3.4 Link to Hall of Fame (Smartcard RSA)

Our number is 47

## Mystery Twist Hall of Fame

#### 4. Solution and approaches to solution

For a given pair of values for  $(dp, dq)$ , we need to check if it will fit in the RSA cryptosystem with our  $(N, e)$  values.

We used a sample message Test Msg =

[illegible]

$$M_p = \text{Test\_Msg}^{d_p} \bmod N$$
$$M_q = \text{Test\_Msg}^{d_q} \bmod N$$

$$M\_Mp = \text{Test\_Msg} - M_p$$
$$M\_Mq = \text{Test\_Msg} - M_q$$
$$p = \text{GCD}(M\_Mp, N)$$
$$q = \text{GCD}(M\_Mq, N)$$

if  $p \cdot q = N$ , we have obtained the correct values of  $d_p$  and  $d_q$ .

Now we can get the original message  $M$  as follows:

$$M1 = \text{Cipher}^{d_p} \bmod p$$
$$M2 = \text{Cipher}^{d_q} \bmod q$$
$$q_{\text{inv}} = q^{-1} \bmod p$$
$$h = (M1 - M2) \cdot q_{\text{inv}} \bmod p$$

Message,  $M = M2 + hq$

#### 4.1 Factors of $N$

Generate random primes  $p$  and  $q$  and see if  $p \cdot q = N$ . Since  $N$  is 1024 bits long, this approach did not give us any result.

#### 4.2 Random generation of $d_p$ and $d_q$

In this approach, we randomly generated integers of length 512 bits (Since  $N$  is 1024 bits long, we assumed  $p$  and  $q$  would be at most 512 bits long) for the values  $d_p$  and  $d_q$ . This pair was given as input to the Check () method to see if it gives the correct result. This approach also did not give us any result.

#### 4.3 Iterative approach

In this approach, we fixed an upper limit for both  $d_p$  and  $d_q$  and iteratively tried every combination, starting from  $d_p = 1$ . Our method was successful for  $d_p = 593411$  and  $d_q = 597111$ . To confirm these values, we tried encrypting several sample messages. The decryption of each of the cipher text generated the corresponding sample message and hence it was verified that we got the correct values of  $d_p$  and  $d_q$ .

### 5. Some Other Attacks that did not fit in our case

#### 5.1 Low Public Exponent

Public exponent  $e$  is huge, therefore we can't apply this attack.

#### 5.2 Franklin-Reiter Related Message Attack

Franklin and Reiter found a clever attack when Bob sends Alice related messages using the same modulus.  $M1, M2 \in \mathbb{Z}_N^*$  are two distinct messages satisfying  $M1 = f(M2) \bmod N$  for some publicly known polynomial  $f \in \mathbb{Z}_N[x]$ . Since  $C1 = M1^e \bmod N$  and  $M2$  is root of polynomial

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$g_1(x) = f(x)^e - C_1 \in \mathbb{Z}_N[x]$ . Similarly,  $M_2$  is root of polynomial  $g_2(x) = f(x)^e - C_2 \in \mathbb{Z}_N[x]$ . The linear factor  $x - M_2$  divides both polynomial. We can use the Euclidean algorithm to compute gcd of  $g_1$  and  $g_2$ . If the gcd is linear,  $M_2$  is found. For  $e > 3$  the attack takes time quadratic in  $e$ . As our value of  $e$  is huge, we can't apply this attack.

### 5.3 Partial Key Attack

If  $e < \sqrt{N}$  and a quarter of bits of  $d$  is known then it is possible to reconstruct whole  $d$ . This approach is also not applicable in our problem as  $e$  is very large and no bit of  $d$  is known to us.

### 5.4 Timing Attack

By measuring the time taken by RSA smart card to decrypt the cipher text, the decryption exponent  $d$  can be discovered. This attack is based on repeated squaring algorithm which works as shown below:-

Let  $d_0, d_1, d_2, d_3, \dots, d_{n-1}$  be binary representation of  $d$

$z = M$  (message)

for  $j = 1$  to  $n$

if ( $d_j = 1$ ) then

$z = \text{mod}(zM, N)$

end if

$x = \text{mod}(z^2, N)$

next  $j$ ;

return  $z$

If  $d_j = 1$  then two operations are performed namely  $z = \text{mod}(z^2, N)$  and  $z = \text{mod}(zM, N)$  whereas

if  $d_j = 0$  then only one operation is performed namely  $z = \text{mod}(z^2, N)$

By measuring the time difference, bits of  $d$  can be exposed. This method was not feasible in our case as we need the physical device for it.

### 5.5 Random Faults

A random glitch is introduced in the system by power spike or some other method to generate  $c'$  instead of  $c$  where  $c'$  consists of a glitch. Then by finding gcd ( $M, c' - M$ ) the factors of  $N$  can be obtained. But for this attack full knowledge of  $M$  is required.

### 5.6 Chosen Cipher Text Attack

In this method to decrypt a cipher text  $c_1$ , we can choose a random integer  $C_2 \text{ mod } n$ , and compute  $C_3 = c_1 / C_2 \text{ (mod } n)$ ; Then we need to obtain  $m_2$  and  $m_3$ , corresponding to  $C_2$  and  $C_3$ .

$C_1 = m_1^e \text{ (mod } n) \rightarrow m_1^e = C_1 \text{ (mod } n)$

$C_2 = m_2^e \text{ (mod } n) \rightarrow m_2^e = C_2 \text{ (mod } n)$

$C_3 = c_1 / C_2 \text{ (mod } n) \rightarrow c_1 = C_2 C_3 \text{ (mod } n)$

$m_1 = m_2 m_3 \text{ (mod } n)$

Theoretically we understand how it is working but we could not implement it.

All the attacks explained above either requires hardware or work on the weakness of public and private exponent length. However none of the attack was possible in our case as n and e value are very large.

## 6. Implementation Details

As our values of n and e were very large, it was not possible to perform mathematical operations by the general C Math library functions so we used a free library for manipulating big integers in C. This library has implementations for big integer operations like add, subtract, multiply, mod, exponent etc. We have included the following files from this library in our project:

1. bigd.c
2. bigd.h
3. bigdRand.c
4. bigdRand.h
5. bigdigits.c
6. bigdigits.h
7. bigdigitsRand.c
8. bigdigitsRand.h

The methods implemented by us are in the file CryptAnalysis.c.

These are some of the important methods in our implementation:

Check()

Test the current dp and dq values and see if they generate the correct p and q values. If they do, print the values of dp, dq, p and q. Call Decrypt() and PrintMessage() methods.

BruteForce():

Iteratively call Check()

Decrypt():

Apply the dp and dq values to the input cipher and get the original message.

PrintMessage()

Extract the message byte by byte and then convert each byte into a character. Store it in a character array and print all the characters when done.

## 7. References

1. [Key recovery for CRT implementation of RSA](#)
2. [Twenty years of attack on RSA cryptosystem](#)
3. <http://www.cs.utsa.edu/~wagner/laws/ARSAFast.html>
4. [BigDigits in C](#)
5. Chapter 6 Information Security Principles and Practices Second Edition, Mark Stamp, November 12,2013
6. <http://crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/1408/cracking-plain-rsa-without-private-key>