

Appendix

A Summary Statistics


Table A: Correlation Matrix

	Mass	Distance	Polity
Mass	1	-0.003	0.091
Distance (logged)	-0.003	1	0.008
Polity	0.091	0.008	1
Trade Openness	-0.166	-0.057	-0.078
BITs	0.141	-0.085	0.018
Trade Volume	0.714	-0.215	0.215
GDP per capita (logged)	0.392	-0.084	0.166
Alliance Treaty	0.133	-0.348	0.073
Defense Treaty	0.065	-0.391	0.065

	Trade Openness	BITs	Trade Volume
Mass	-0.166	0.141	0.714
Distance (logged)	-0.057	-0.085	-0.215
Polity	-0.078	0.018	0.215
Trade Openness	1	0.032	-0.055
BITs	0.032	1	0.143
Trade Volume	-0.055	0.143	1
GDP per capita (logged)	0.225	0.093	0.330
Alliance Treaty	-0.044	0.021	0.216
Defense Treaty	-0.046	0.010	0.177

	GDP per capita	Alliance Treaty	Defense Treaty
Mass	0.392	0.133	0.065
Distance	-0.084	-0.348	-0.391
Polity	0.166	0.073	0.065
Trade Openness	0.225	-0.044	-0.046
BITs	0.093	0.021	0.010
Trade Volume	0.330	0.216	0.177
GDP per capita (logged)	1	0.098	0.038
Alliance Treaty	0.098	1	0.850
Defense Treaty	0.038	0.850	1

Table B: Frequency count bar-plots for binary variables and distribution plots for continuous variables.






Figure A: Density Plot of the Difference between Total FDI stocks and Summing Bilateral FDI stocks.

B Time-Pooled Model Results

For robustness checks, we re-estimate the count ERGM by pooling the data, which is common in the literature for regression based models. The exogenous covariates from the pooled model are presented in Table C. The results show that ignoring network structure lead to biased estimates in several covariates. We see significant differences in the coefficients for distance, the product of dyad's GDP, the three treaty variables, as well as origin and destination's GDP per capita, Polity, and trade openness. These findings are consistent with those from the yearly models. It illustrates that failure to include network structure results in biased estimates.




Table C: Estimates of terms in time-pooled ERGMs. Bars span 95% confidence intervals. Black coefficient representations are from models excluding dependence terms (i.e., transitivity and reciprocity).

Figure B shows that after pooling, network terms remain positive and statistically significant, supporting our hypothesis that reciprocity and transitivity characterize FDI flows. The estimates are similar to yearly results in terms of direction and statistical significance.




Figure B: Estimates of Dependence terms in time-pooled ERGMs. Bars span 95% confidence intervals.

C Subset by Missingness Results

In the paper, we imputed missing values with zeros. In this section, we check whether our results are robust if we analyze a subset of the data set based on the level of missingness. To subset the data, we approximate total level of missingness in the adjacency matrices (q) by using the proportion of missing values for each node (p). We conduct two robustness checks: (1) when $p = 0.86$, $q \approx 0.50$ and $n = 70$; and (2) when $p = 0.72$, $q \approx 0.25$ and $n = 28$. In the first case, we only include nodes with missing values that are 86% or less of the possible edges for the entire data set, which leaves us with an adjacency matrix that is only missing 50% of the values (70 countries in total). Similarly, the second set only includes nodes with missing values that are 72% or less of the possible edges for the entire dataset, which leaves us with an adjacency matrix that is only missing 25% of the values (28 countries in total). Following our approach in the paper, we impute missing values in the two subsets of the data with zeros.

Figures C and D present the results for the two robustness checks, respectively. We see

that FDI networks show strong transitivity for all years, but reciprocity effects become weak and insignificant in some years. This may be because most nodes (i.e. states) in the subsets are developed countries that have substantial two-way FDI flows between them and thus there is little variation in the level of reciprocity.

C.1 $q \approx 0.50$




Figure C: Estimates of Dependence terms. Bars span 95% confidence intervals.

C.2 $q \approx 0.25$




Figure D: Estimates of Dependence terms. Bars span 95% confidence intervals.

D Multiple Imputations with Amelia Results

In this section, we utilize the R package Amelia to impute the missing values in the full data set, when $q \approx 0.50$, and when $q \approx 0.25$ (Honaker, King, Blackwell et al., 2011; King, Honaker, Joseph and Scheve, 2002). Figures E and F show the results. We see that transitivity effects are significant in all years and reciprocity effects are also significant in most years. The results in Sections C and D give us confidence that our findings regarding the reciprocity and transitivity of FDI are not driven by the pattern of missingness in the data set.

D.1 Full




Figure E: Estimates of Dependence terms. Bars span 95% confidence intervals.

D.2 $q \approx 0.50$




Figure F: Estimates of Dependence terms. Bars span 95% confidence intervals.

D.3 $q \approx 0.25$




Figure G: Estimates of Dependence terms. Bars span 95% confidence intervals.

E Tax Incentives and FDI

One potential concern with bilateral FDI data is that they include round-tripping FDI, in which domestic firms transfer funds to a foreign country (typically a tax haven) and invest back as “foreign capital” to take advantage of preferential policies that their home countries offer to foreign investors (Borga, 2016). Round-tripping FDI could inflate reciprocity. Further, firms may use tax havens to channel funds to other countries (Sauvant, 2017). If firms in one country use a tax haven to invest in another country whose firms also invest in the former country, it creates an artificial triangle closure of investment flows (i.e., transitivity). To address these issues in bilateral FDI data and check the robustness of our findings, we re-estimated the model by including the corporate tax rate for both the sending and receiving country¹ and estimating models that exclude tax havens. The countries dropped as tax havens are Namibia, Trinidad and Tobago, Bahrain, Luxembourg, the United Kingdom, Ireland, and the Netherlands. We used the EU list of 17 countries as a base list, although most of them were not in our sample due to data availability.² We also added Luxembourg, the United Kingdom, Ireland, and the Netherlands since they are often considered cooperative

¹Corporate tax rate data comes from the World Bank’s *World Development Indicators*.

²https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/tax-common-eu-list_en

tax havens.³ Figure H plots the results for reciprocity and transitivity for the models with corporate tax rates. We see that the results on reciprocity become a little weaker when tax rates are included, but they remain significant in most years. Including tax rates does not affect transitivity. Figure I plots the results for reciprocity and transitivity for the models that exclude tax havens and the results are nearly identical to those with corporate tax rates.




Figure H: Estimates of Dependence terms for models with corporate tax rates. Bars span 95% confidence intervals.




Figure I: Estimates of Dependence terms for models without tax havens. Bars span 95% confidence intervals.

³Matthew C. Klein. “What the Foreign Direct Investment Data Tell Us About Corporate Tax Avoidance.” *Financial Times*, November 23, 2017. <https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2017/11/23/2196028/what-the-foreign-direct-investment-data-tell-us-about-corporate-tax-avoidance/>

F Excluding the European Union

A significant portion of the FDI in the global economy involves the European Union and the majority of the top partners for the EU are other EU countries. This is because of proximity, similar business environments and endowments, and few barriers for EU firms to send FDI to other EU countries. Because of this, there is a high degree of clustering within the EU, and so we run models that drop all EU countries to test if reciprocity and transitivity is still significant for the rest of the global economy. We find that the transitivity statistic remains largely unchanged after dropping EU countries, but that reciprocity is either insignificant or negative for all years except the last two. This supports our point that reciprocity is stronger for Western democracies. However, the positive trend beginning in 2005 indicates that this is changing as FDI between developing countries increases.




Figure J: Estimates of Dependence terms. Bars span 95% confidence intervals.

References

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