

# ToolApe

## smart contract audit report

Prepared for:  
ToolApe

Authors: HashEx audit team  
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# Disclaimer

This is a limited report on our findings, based on our analysis, in accordance with good industry practice as at the date of this report, in relation to cybersecurity vulnerabilities and issues in the framework and algorithms based on smart contracts, the details of which are set out in this report. In order to get a full view of our analysis, it is crucial for you to read the full report. While we have done our best in conducting our analysis and producing this report, it is important to note that you should not rely on this report and cannot claim against us on the basis of what it says or doesn't say, or how we produced it, and it is important for you to conduct your own independent investigations before making any decisions. We go into more detail on this in the disclaimer below – please make sure to read it in full.

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The analysis of security is purely based on smart contracts alone. No applications or operations were reviewed for security. No product code has been reviewed.

# Introduction

HashEx was commissioned by the ToolApe team to perform an audit of SuperBid token smart contracts. The audit was conducted between May 09 and May 11, 2021.

The audited smart contract is deployed to Binance Smart Chain (BSC) at the address of [0x993660CD4b6529ac122571cE434219bDB506E0fb](https://bscscan.com/address/0x993660CD4b6529ac122571cE434219bDB506E0fb).

The audited contract is an ERC20 token with minor extensions.

The purpose of this audit was to achieve the following:

- Identify potential security issues with smart contracts.
- Ensure that smart contract functions perform as intended.

Information in this report should be used to understand the risk exposure of smart contracts, and as a guide to improving the security posture of smart contracts by remediating the issues that were identified.

## Contracts overview

### ToolApe

Implementation of ERC20 token standard [1]. Supports burns: a user can burn it's tokens.

### Ownable

Standard OpenZeppelin contract without the `renounceOwnership()` function.

### Pausable

Custom implementation based on OpenZeppelin contract. Owner of the contract can call the function `pause()` up to May 20 2021 15:00:00 GMT+00.

### IBEP20

Custom interface of BEP20 standard [2]. Lacks getter functions `decimals()`, `symbol()`, `name()`, `getOwner()`.

### HasForeignAsset

Transfers any ERC20 token from the balance of the contract. Intended to be used if any ERC20 token was accidentally sent to the token address.

## Found issues

ID	Title	Severity	Response
<a href="#">01</a>	BEP20 standard violation	Medium	
<a href="#">02</a>	Transfer to contract is restricted	Low	
<a href="#">03</a>	No error messages in pause	Low	
<a href="#">04</a>	Redundant receive() function	Low	
<a href="#">05</a>	General recommendations	Low	

### #01 BEP20 standard violation

Medium

Interface IBEP20 lacks some getters. Token contract has no `getOwner()` function required by BEP20 standard [2].

### #02 Transfer to contract is restricted

Low

`_transfer()` function contains a restriction for transfers to this contract. This seems excessive as the function to retrieve ERC20 tokens was implemented.

### #03 No error messages in pause

Low

`whenPaused` and `whenNotPaused` modifiers should revert with error messages to provide a better user experience.

### #04 Redundant receive() function

Low

Payable `receive()` function with `revert` is not needed for this pragma version.

### #05 General recommendations

Low

Address library is not in use and may be removed.

Pragma version should be fixed.

No need to use SafeMath library as the contract is compiled with v0.8.4+commit.c7e474f2 Solidity compile version which includes overflow/underflow checks.

Generally, for retrieving any ERC20 token SafeERC20 library should be used.

## Conclusion

Reviewed contract is deployed at [0x993660CD4b6529ac122571cE434219bDB506E0fb](#) in BSC. The audited contract is an ERC20 token made with standard OpenZeppelin templates with minor modifications.

No critical nor high severity issues were found.

Audit includes recommendations on code improvement.

## References

1. [EIP-20: ERC-20 Token Standard](#)
2. [BEP20 Standard by Binance](#)

## Appendix. Issues' severity classification

We consider an issue critical if it may cause unlimited losses or breaks the workflow of the contract and could be easily triggered.

High severity issues may lead to limited losses or break interaction with users or other contracts under very specific conditions.

Medium severity issues do not cause full loss of functionality but break the contract logic.

Low severity issues are typically nonoptimal code, unused variables, errors in messages. Usually, these issues do not need immediate reactions.

## Appendix B. List of examined issue types

Business logic overview

Functionality checks

Following best practices

Access control and authorization

Reentrancy attacks

Front-run attacks

DoS with (unexpected) revert

DoS with block gas limit

Transaction-ordering dependence

ERC/BEP and other standards violation

Unchecked math

Implicit visibility levels

Excessive gas usage

Timestamp dependence

Forcibly sending ether to a contract

Weak sources of randomness

Shadowing state variables

Usage of deprecated code