

## COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY INITIATIVE POLICY PAPER

# THE BATTLE FOR PAKISTAN

## Militancy and Conflict in Mohmand

RAZA KHAN, APRIL 2010

The surge of post-9/11 militancy in Mohmand emerged well after the appearance of tribal Taliban groups in South and North Waziristan in 2004. Both of those regions are hundreds of miles south of Mohmand, which limited the spread of militants from Waziristan north into the agency.

Mohmand Agency suffers the same economic and governance problems as other regions in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Only 27 percent of Mohmand residents have access to clean drinking water,<sup>1</sup> primary school enrollment in the district is 21.8 percent, and the net secondary school enrollment for males is an alarming 3.5 percent, while for females it is zero.<sup>2</sup> Further, FATA parliamentarians do not believe that Pakistan has a plan for turning things around in Mohmand or in the FATA as a whole. In 2010, Pakistan allocated only 11 billion rupees (\$140 million) for development in the FATA, which has an estimated population of 4 million people. This lack of assistance is a critical issue because Mohmand residents generally believe that the federal government is the only force that is capable of alleviating their poverty.<sup>3</sup>


Mohmand's residents are highly religious and conservative, but the agency nevertheless is considered to be more integrated into mainstream Pakistani society and culture than most other areas in the FATA and the NWFP.<sup>4</sup> Mohmand is predominantly populated by nonviolent Deobandis, a Sunni belief tradition that advocates a conservative understanding and practice of Islam.

However, since the 1970s when large numbers of Mohmand residents went to work in Gulf and Arab countries, the number of people in the agency who subscribe to the Salafi ideology has increased rapidly. Many Mohmand residents now support the implementation of sharia, although they lack consensus on what sharia specifically would mean in their society.<sup>5</sup> Young people in Mohmand live in a society with a very strict moral code that nonetheless features a variety of behavior considered "deviant." The dichotomy seems to have brought many of Mohmand's young men, "under the sway of new, foreign Islamic ideologies like Salafism, the ideology of al-Qaeda."<sup>6</sup> This is happening even though the people of Mohmand traditionally have preferred Tableeghi Jamaat, a conservative but nonviolent Islamic missionary movement, to militant groups.

### Structure of the Insurgency

Like other tribal areas of Pakistan, Mohmand was affected by the 1980s Soviet-Afghan war, when hundreds of thousands of Afghan refugees burdened its fragile economy and social structure. However, unlike some other tribal

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MAP BY GENE THORP OF CARTOGRAPHIC CONCEPTS, INC.



areas, few militant recruiting and training camps for Afghan *mujahideen* and other international jihadists were established in the agency. After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, indigenous militant groups such as the Tehrik-i-Nifaz-i-Shariat-i-Muhammadi (TNSM) were established in the northern FATA and the neighboring Malakand Division of the North-West Frontier Province. Although these movements certainly affected Mohmand, they had relatively little organized infrastructure within its borders.

Indigenous Taliban emerged as a major social force in Mohmand in 2006 when armed militants began patrolling the district and ordering residents to follow the social codes they imposed.

Mohmand has its own militant tradition, however, much of it linked to the Safi tribe. One early militant leader was Panjpir educated Jamil al-Rahman who left Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s faction of Hizb-e Islami (HIG) in 1985 to lead *Jamaat al-Dawa*, a fundamentalist salafi group that attracted a host of Arab fighters into its ranks.<sup>7</sup> With financial support from Saudi and Kuwaiti citizens, Jamil al-Rahman became a powerful force in the Kunar River Valley of Afghanistan, which borders Mohmand.<sup>8</sup> Jamil was raised in the Pech Valley of Afghanistan and led local elements in a 1978 revolt against the regime of the Communist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan. His movement established local control, but when Jamil was assassinated in 1991 by an Egyptian gunman, his emirate subsequently came under the control of al-Rahman’s former leader, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.<sup>9</sup> Although Hizb-e Islami and the Salafis share the goal of extending Islamic governance in Pakistan, since Jamil’s death, they often have squabbled over tactics and authority.<sup>10</sup> Omar Khalid, the current Taliban commander in Mohmand, is from the Safi tribe,

and many of his activities and tactics mirror those of Jamil al-Rahman’s.

Tribe	Sub tribes
Mohmand	Tarakzai
	Halimzai
	Khwaezai
	Baizai
Safi	Qandhari
	Gurbaz
	Masood
	Shinwari
Utman Khel	Ambar Utmankhel
	Laman Utmankhel

The surge of post-9/11 militancy in Mohmand emerged well after the appearance of tribal Taliban groups in South and North Waziristan in 2004. Both of those regions are hundreds of miles south of Mohmand, which limited the spread of militants from Waziristan north into the agency. Instead, Taliban influence drifted into Mohmand from the neighboring Malakand-Swat region of NWFP where militant Islamist groups were entrenched before 9/11 or the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan. The most important of these groups was the TNSM, founded in 1989 by the cleric Sufi Muhammad. It had a strong base in Bajaur and exercised some influence in Mohmand. Shortly after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan Sufi Muhammad led about 10,000 armed volunteers from Malakand, Bajaur, and Mohmand to Afghanistan to fight U.S. and NATO troops.<sup>11</sup> The campaign was a dismal failure. His ill-prepared fighters were killed en masse by superior U.S. forces and that failure weakened support for his cause among tribal leaders in Mohmand, Bajaur, and Malakand.

Despite this failure, indigenous Taliban emerged as a major social force in Mohmand in 2006 when armed militants began patrolling the district and ordering residents to follow the social codes they imposed. Prior to 2006, Mohmand residents saw the militants as a minor threat because, although they operated throughout Mohmand,

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were concentrated in Safi Tehsil, Khwaezai, and Baizai.<sup>12</sup> In June 2006, however, the militants became both more assertive and organized, bombing a tribal *jirga* (council of elders) in Mohmand. A note found at the site of the explosion warned tribesmen not to support the government or hold *jirgas* against militants.<sup>13</sup>

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## The July 2007 Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) incident in Islamabad also spurred increased violence in Mohmand.

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The July 2007 Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) incident in Islamabad also spurred increased violence in Mohmand. In that incident, the Pakistani government raided a mosque used as a militant stronghold in downtown Islamabad. To show solidarity with the embattled militants in Islamabad, about 200 militants in Mohmand seized a shrine commemorating the anti-British freedom fighter Haji Sahib Turangzai and a mosque in village of Ghazi Abad about 25 miles north of Ghalanai, Mohmand's capital. The militants renamed the village mosque Lal Masjid to show their solidarity with the fighters in Islamabad.<sup>14</sup> The group then tried to establish itself as a judicial authority in the region, ultimately beheading six "criminals" on October 12, 2007.<sup>15</sup>

This beheading served as a coming-out party for Omar Khalid, the current Taliban commander in Mohmand. He linked his movement to militant leaders in Mohmand's history and to the broader antipathy to Pakistani governance found in the region, proclaiming, "We want to take forward the missions of Haji Turangzai and the Lal Masjid's slain *khateeb* [preacher], Ghazi Abdul Rashid."<sup>16</sup> In December 2007, when Baitullah Mehsud formed the Tehrik-i-Taliban (TTP), which became an umbrella organization for the anti-Pakistan FATA-based militants, Omar Khalid's group joined.

The formation of the TTP emboldened Omar Khalid's Mohmand Taliban, which began delivering judicial sentences within the agency. One of the most notorious decreed that a man and woman be stoned to death for adultery. The couple fled to Nowshera, a garrison city in the Northwest Frontier Province, but they were abducted from there by Omar Khalid's organization and publicly stoned to death.<sup>17</sup> The TTP's ability to seize the couple from an area outside Mohmand graphically illustrated the group's growing reach. Despite Omar Khalid's entry into the TTP, the Mohmand Taliban continues to operate independently of the core TTP organization, which always has been based in South Waziristan. Omar Khalid has maintained his control over the Mohmand Taliban, and his operational posture is unlikely to be disturbed by the strikes on TTP leadership in South Waziristan.

## Politics

The Taliban in Mohmand are linked to two mainstream and powerful religious parties in Pakistan, Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI-F) and Jamaat-e-Islami (JI). In 2002, a coalition between these and other groups called the Muttahida Majlis-e Amal (MMA) won all of Mohmand's National Assembly seats.<sup>18</sup> The coalition, which opposed the U.S. and NATO war in Afghanistan, subsequently was criticized by NWFP residents for being corrupt and tolerating increased militancy in Mohmand and across the FATA and NWFP.

Some observers have argued that Omar Khalid's rise was promoted by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) as a way of weakening the MMA's political opponents. This scenario suggests that the ISI was opposed to the secular and Pashtun nationalist Awami National Party (ANP), which seemed poised to seize control of the North-West Frontier Province from the MMA in the February 2008 elections. Inter-Services Intelligence views the ANP as pro-Indian for offenses that date back to its founder, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, who supported the All India Congress Party in an undivided India rather than the All India

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Muslim League, which struggled for a separate Pakistan. According to this view, the ISI fostered a grassroots Islamist militant movement to promote the electoral fortunes of the MMA, which it saw as more friendly to its interests.

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In any case, the ANP has been attacked repeatedly by FATA-based Taliban after winning the 2008 elections in the tribal areas. In early 2009, Baitullah Mehsud, the leader of Taliban forces in Afghanistan who was killed later that year, also threatened ANP leaders if they did not resign within five days.<sup>19</sup> Taliban militants have made good on that threat, killing hundreds of ANP members, including some who were serving in the national and NWFP legislatures.<sup>20</sup>

## Goals

Omar Khalid's militants in Mohmand are not separatists in that they realize the infeasibility of running a small emirate under harsh conditions. Like other elements of the TTP, they want to establish sharia across Pakistan, which they consider destined to be ruled by 'religious scholars' – the Taliban's euphemism for mullahs supportive of their movement – who would dictate laws of the state. They support al-Qaeda and Taliban efforts against U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan, and they offer verbal support to insurgencies in Iraq and Palestine, although primarily as a way of inciting local religious sentiments. Their immediate aim is to establish an Islamic emirate in Mohmand to serve as a model for the rest of the country.<sup>21</sup> In principle that goal does not conflict with the notion that Pakistan was founded as a homeland for Muslims with laws that will not conflict with Islamic teachings.<sup>22</sup> But in practice, the Mohmand Taliban have a much more

restrictive understanding of Sharia that does not include any authority for elected representatives of the people.

## Organization

The Taliban militants in Mohmand have this basic organizational structure:

- Amir: Omar Khalid.
- Deputy commander: Qari Shakeel.
- Spokesman: Asad Sayeed.
- Local amirs for each of Mohmand's seven tehsils. (The names of these emirs have never been made public; further, Taliban militants often use many names.)

### *Omar Khalid*

Omar Khalid, whose real name is Abdul Wali, is a resident of the town of Qandharo, and he belongs to the Qandhari section of the Safi tribe that lives in Mohmand. The Safis consider themselves to be part of the Mohmand tribe, but other Mohmands do not believe that the Safis have the same origins and generally consider them to be more religiously conservative than other sub-tribes. The region also has fewer Safis than other Mohmand sub-tribes. Most important, however, the Safis are considered by other Mohmand tribal members to be the last converts to Islam among the area's tribes.<sup>23</sup>

Khalid, who is now in his thirties, received his education in his village. As a youth, he worked with the banned Harakat-ul-Mujahidin, or Movement of Holy Warriors, a militant group dedicated to fighting Indian forces in Kashmir. During the 1990s, he traveled to Kashmir rather than join the Taliban in fighting the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan.<sup>24</sup> His activities in Kashmir are unknown, possibly because militants use code names to operate across the border. Nonetheless, Khalid seems to have had stronger connections with Kashmiri jihadi groups than with the Taliban leadership in Afghanistan. He did, however, lead

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hundreds of his tribal fighters back to Afghanistan after 9/11 to fight beside the Taliban.<sup>25</sup>

Although Khalid's campaign is reminiscent of Sufi Muhammad's nearby movement, which was organized at the same time, Omar Khalid adroitly used the Lal Masjid episode in July 2007 to achieve his long-standing ambition to become a militant commander.<sup>26</sup> At that time, he denied having any link to the Taliban or to al-Qaeda, but declared, "If [the Taliban] come[s] to us, we will welcome them. We will continue Ghazi Abdur Rashid's [the Lal Masjid's imam] mission even if it means sacrificing our lives."<sup>27</sup>

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### Khalid did not seize control of the Mohmand Taliban without a fight. He had to eliminate a rival faction.

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Khalid did not seize control of the Mohmand Taliban without a fight. He had to eliminate a rival faction led by a man named Shah Sahib.<sup>28</sup> Shah Sahib was a Salafi associated with the mainstream political group Markaz-e-Jamiat-e-Ahl-e-Hadith, which complained that Omar Khalid's Taliban faction sanctioned the intentional killing of civilians.<sup>29</sup> Until the rise of Omar Khalid after the Lal Masjid incident, Shah Sahib's militant group was the largest in Mohmand and directed all of its energy into anti-U.S. and anti-NATO violence in Afghanistan. The group reportedly included at least some fighters from the Kashmiri jihadi group Lashkar-e-Taiba.

Despite mediation by Ustad Yasir, a commander loyal to Mullah Omar's Quetta Shura, Omar Khalid attacked the Shah Sahib group repeatedly in 2008.<sup>30</sup> Shah Sahib was killed in that fighting, which largely eliminated his organization as a composed fighting force.<sup>31</sup> Occasional attempts to resurrect it have been unsuccessful.<sup>32</sup> Omar Khalid's elimination of Shah Sahib is notable because TTP Amir Baitullah Mehsud opposed such clashes and was attempting to eliminate fighting between Taliban groups.<sup>33</sup>

### *Qari Shakeel and Asad Sayeed*

Omar Khalid's two most important sub-commanders are Qari Shakeel and Asad Sayeed. Qari Shakeel is from the Michini area of Mohmand, close to Peshawar, and he reportedly is a former criminal. Asad Sayeed, who earned a degree in medicine from Khyber Medical College in Peshawar, is a rigid ideologue who ascribes to al-Qaeda's Takfiri ideology.<sup>34</sup>

### *Taliban Strength in Mohmand*

Omar Khalid claims that he has the backing of about 2,500 militants, but his forces seem to lack popular support in Mohmand.<sup>35</sup> Nonetheless, the lack of organized opposition has enabled Omar Khalid's group to grow more powerful. Omar Khalid has a significant presence throughout Mohmand, and it controls three of its seven tehsils: Khawezai-Baizai, Lakaro, and Ambar. These areas are remote, but Lakaro and Ambar are close to the Afghan border. Lakaro is also a stronghold for the Safi tribe and abuts Bajaur Agency, another Taliban stronghold in the tribal areas.<sup>36</sup>

The Taliban's assault on tribal groups has prompted a backlash from them, some of whom have formed *lashkars* (militias) to fight the insurgents. Although many lashkar leaders have been killed, this local resistance still has been more effective than Pakistani military operations.<sup>37</sup> On August 17, 2009, for example, Mohmand lashkars captured Tehrik-i-Taliban spokesman Mullah Muhammad Umar, who joined Sufi Muhammad's group in 1994 and became the face of the TTP. Before his capture, Umar was in constant contact with the media to ensure that the Taliban got credit for conducting various large-scale attacks inside Pakistan.<sup>38</sup>

### *Quetta Shura Taliban*

Mullah Omar remains an important point of inspiration for the militants in Mohmand, but they do not accept

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operational direction from the Taliban leader and use some controversial tactics frowned upon by Mullah Omar's Quetta Shura. Mohmand's militants often say that Mullah Omar is their supreme leader, and they clearly see themselves as part of a political and religious movement that he leads. Nonetheless, Mullah Omar does not have operational control over militants in Mohmand.<sup>39</sup> Indeed, the murderous attacks on civilians and beheadings employed by militants in Mohmand depart from the model set by the Quetta Shura.<sup>40</sup> One reason is that Quetta is more than 850 miles from Mohmand. Without modern command and control infrastructure, it is difficult for the Quetta Shura to direct militants in Mohmand. The Mohmand Taliban do get some support from Qari Zia ur-Rahman, a Taliban leader in Afghanistan.<sup>41</sup>

### Hizb-e Islami Gulbuddin

Neither do the Mohmand Taliban have direct operational links with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hizb-e Islami Group (HIG), which is active Kunar, Nangarhar, and Kapisa, Afghan provinces neighboring Mohmand.<sup>42</sup> Hekmatyar abhors the gruesome tactics and exclusivity of the more extreme Taliban groups like those in Mohmand, recently writing a pamphlet rhetorically asking whether he should become a Wahhabi or remain a religious person.<sup>43</sup> In the pamphlet, which was released just weeks before HIG representatives began a round of negotiations with the Afghan government in early 2010, Hekmatyar claimed militancy in the region was being carried out by Salafis supported by elements of the Saudi government, various Arab charity organizations, and some sections of Pakistan's intelligence services. Hekmatyar may be posturing to demonstrate that he is a reliable Afghan politician, and not beholden to al-Qaeda and other hardline movements.

### Foreign Militants

People in remote parts of Mohmand have reported seeing scores of non-Pakistani militants accompanying the local Taliban militants, but the number and exact locations of

these foreign militants has not been ascertained because they usually were seen while on the move and in small bands.<sup>44</sup> On Jan. 11, 2009, however, about 600 heavily armed foreign and local militants attacked the Frontier Corps check posts in the Mamad Gat, Sagi, and Lakaro areas. In all-night fighting, at least 10 Frontier Corps personnel were killed along with a reported 40 militants.<sup>45</sup> Most of the militants came from the Afghan side of the border and were joined by local Taliban fighters. The combined force of insurgents later attacked a Frontier Corps base near the border.<sup>46</sup>

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Al-Qaeda leaders have also used Mohmand as a safe haven, though it does not appear to be a major stronghold for foreign militants. In September 2008 Rehman Malik, the interior security adviser to the Pakistani prime minister (and now interior minister) revealed that al-Qaeda Deputy Ayman Al-Zawahiri had barely escaped a military action in the Mohmand Agency.<sup>47</sup>

### Pakistani Military Operations

The Pakistani military did not pursue aggressive military operations in Mohmand prior to 2007 in part because the dominant militant group in the region, led by Shah Sahib was focused on attacks in Afghanistan. That changed after Omar Khalid burst on to the scene in July 2007, and changed even more in December 2007 when Omar Khalid's group joined the TTP. Although the Pakistani Army did not launch a major military offensive in Mohmand, Omar Khalid's group did target government personnel in the agency until representatives of the local government and Taliban fighters signed a peace agreement in May 2008.<sup>48</sup>

The peace deal and subsequent assassination of Shah Sahib strengthened Omar Khalid's Taliban's authority in the region, which established an administrative capability to parallel the Pakistani state.<sup>49</sup> The deal required the Taliban to renounce attacks on the Pakistani government and security forces, but also authorized Omar Khalid to regulate the activities of nongovernment organizations funded by international donors, but not religious organizations or madrassas.

Political pressure compelled Pakistani security forces to launch operations against the Taliban in Mohmand in October 2008. Previous operations there had been half-hearted and poorly designed; in many cases militant leaders survived while many civilians were killed.<sup>50</sup> But the 2008 operation was more aggressive. In early 2009, the Pakistani Army reported killing numerous Taliban members, including several senior leaders.<sup>51</sup> By May 2009 important Taliban sub-commanders in the region were surrendering to the government, including Yar Said, the first commander from Safi Tehsil to turn on Omar Khalid.<sup>52</sup> Said claimed he was surrendering because of humanitarian concerns for Internally Displaced Persons (IDP), but was under a lot of pressure from the Pakistani military at the time.

By September 2009, Pakistani security forces claimed to have cleared 80 percent of Mohmand of insurgents, the exceptions being militant strongholds near the Afghan border.<sup>53</sup> The Taliban have not been defeated however, and many in Mohmand Agency now believe that TTP-aligned groups are now resurgent. Thousands of displaced persons continue to live in makeshift camps in Peshawar because they fear that if they return to their homes they will become the victims of violence and targeted killings.<sup>54</sup>



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<sup>1</sup> Multiple Indicators Cluster Survey (FATA 2007) conducted by the Planning and Development Department, FATA Secretariat, Government of Pakistan, with technical assistance from the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and World Food Programme (WFP).

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<sup>2</sup> Multiple Indicators Cluster Survey (FATA 2007) conducted by the Planning and Development Department, FATA Secretariat, Government of Pakistan, with technical assistance from the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and World Food Programme (WFP).

<sup>3</sup> Interviews with a cross section of residents of the Mohmand Agency, including Pakistan's ex-ambassador to Afghanistan, Rusta Shah Mohmthe. Mohmthe remains the chief secretary of the NWFP (November-December 2009 in Shabqadar and Peshawar).

<sup>4</sup> The NWFP has recently been renamed Khyber-Pukhtunkhwa.

<sup>5</sup> Interviews and discussions with inhabitants of the Mohmand Agency and members of Tableeghi Jamaat who are involved in transporting goods throughout Pakistan. Those interviewed include Sher Zaman Khan Mohmand, Gohar Zaman, Amir Nawab Mohmand, and Rozi Gul Muhmand. Also, an interview with Nasir Mohmand, reporter for Geo TV (November-December 2009, Shabqadar and Peshawar).

<sup>6</sup> Interview with Imran Khan Wazir, a regional analyst who hails from South Waziristan; Wazir holds a master's degree in international relations and has worked as a journalist/TV producer for several years (November 2009, Peshawar).

<sup>7</sup> Rubin, B. R. *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan*. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, Pakistan) 2003, p. 242.; Panjpir is home to a large, Saudi-funded Wahabi madrasa run by the brother of ex-ISI official Major Amir, who in the 1990s was charged with conspiring to destabilize the government of Benazir Bhutto and subsequently was dismissed from service.

<sup>8</sup> Rubin, B. R. *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan*

<sup>9</sup> Rubin, B. R. *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan*

<sup>10</sup> Information provided by Shamim Shahid, a Peshawar-based journalist and expert on Afghanistan and the Pashtuns (November 2009).

<sup>11</sup> Rana, M. A. *A to Z of Jihadi Organization in Pakistan* (Lahore: Mashal Books Publishers) 2007, pp. 189-190.

<sup>12</sup> Interview with Mohmand-based journalist Fauzee Khan Mohmand (November 2009, Peshawar).

<sup>13</sup> Correspondent report, "Militant Groups Warn Pro-Gov't Tribal Elders," Dawn, June 14, 2007.

<sup>14</sup> "Militants Occupy Pakistan Shrine," BBC Online, July 30, 2007.

<sup>15</sup> Saleem Athar, "Mohmand Taliban Behead 6 'Criminals,'" Daily Times, Oct. 13, 2007.

<sup>16</sup> Staff report, "Another Lal Masjid Surfaces," Daily Times, July 30, 2007.

<sup>17</sup> Delawar Jan, "Must They Die," The News, Islamabad, April 13, 2008.

<sup>18</sup> The religious parties ruled NWFP as an alliance called the MMA, which evolved from the Council for Defense of Afghanistan. The latter was formed in 2001 to generate political resistance to the U.S.-NATO attack on Afghanistan.

<sup>19</sup> Discussions with Dr. Ijaz Khan, chairman of the Department of International Relations, University of Peshawar (August 2009, Peshawar).

<sup>20</sup> "Peshawar: The New Militant Frontline," Associated Press, Dec. 14, 2009.

<sup>21</sup> Interview with Shakoor Safi (February 2010, Peshawar).

<sup>22</sup> Its 1973 constitution states that no legislation should be passed that conflict with the spirit of the teachings of the Koran and the Sunnah, which chronicle the practices and habits of the Prophet Muhammad. Further, the directive principles of Pakistan's constitution establish the legitimacy of sharia.

<sup>23</sup> Caroe, Olaf. *The Pathans* (Oxford University Press: Karachi) 1958, p. 362.

<sup>24</sup> Imtiaz Ali, "Taliban Find Fertile New Ground in Pakistan," Asia Times, Jan. 30, 2008.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.



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26 Discussion with Shakoor Safi and Fauzee Khan (February 2010; November 2009, Peshawar).

27 Shams Mohmand, "Mohmand 'Lal Masjid' Offers Talks," Dawn, July 31, 2007.

28 Shah Sahib is identified in some sources as Shah Khalid.

29 Rahimullah Yusufzai, "A Who's Who of the Insurgency in Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province: Part Two—FATA Excluding the Waziristans," Terrorism Monitor, March 3, 2009.

30 Mushtaq Yousafzai "50 Killed as Two Militant Groups Clash in Mohmand," The News, July 19, 2008.

31 Rahimullah Yusufzai "A Who's Who of the Insurgency in Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province" Jamestown Foundation September 22, 2008

32 Noor Mohmand "19 Dead as Guns Blaze" The Nation August 10, 2009

33 Rahimullah Yusufzai "A Who's Who of the Insurgency in Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province"

34 Interview with Shakoor Safi, a doctoral candidate at the University of Peshawar who is researching alien, particularly Arab, influences on Pashtun culture since the Afghan jihad began. Safi belongs to Safi tribe and comes from the Mohmand area (February 2010, Peshawar).

35 Information provided by Mohmand-based journalist Fauzee Khan citing statements made by Taliban commanders in local gatherings and the estimates of local experts about the strength of the Taliban.

36 Discussion with Shakoor Safi and Fauzee Khan.

37 Fauzee Khan Muhammad, "Mohmand Lashkar Kills 23 Taliban Militants," Dawn, July 14, 2009.

38 Fauzee Khan Muhammad, "TTP's Chief Spokesman Captured," Dawn, Aug. 18, 2009.

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39 Author interview with Shakoor Safi on April 09, 2010, Peshawar

40 Author interview with Shakoor Safi on April 09, 2010, Peshawar

41 Author interview with Shakoor Safi on April 09, 2010, Peshawar

42 Author interview with Dr Nasreen Ghufra, who teaches at University of Peshawar, on April 09, 2010

43 Gulbuddin Hekmatyar "Wahabi Sham Ko Mazhabi Patay Sham (Should I Become a Wahabbi or Remain a Religious Person)"

44 Interview with Fauzee Khan Mohmand (April 2010, Peshawar).

45 Correspondent report, "40 Militants, Six Soldiers Killed in Mohmand," The News, Jan. 12, 2009.

46 Agence France Presse, Jan. 12, 2009.

47 "We Lost the Chance to Nab Ayman Al-Zawahiri," Daily Nawa-i-Waqt, Pakistan, Sept. 10, 2008.

48 "Pakistan Strikes Deal With the Taliban in Mohmand," Daily Times, May 28, 2008.

49 Report, Geo News, June 25, 2009.

50 Interview with Shamim Shahid, Peshawar bureau chief, The Nation (Lahore), and correspondent, Voice of America, Urdu Service (December 2009, Peshawar).

51 "TTP Mohmand Chief Among 15 Killed" The News January 22, 2009

52 Rahimullah Yusufzai "IDP's Plight Moves Taliban Commander to Surrender," The News, May 23, 2009

53 Report, "80pc of Mohmand Agency Cleared," Geo News, Sept. 16, 2009.

54 Mushtaq Yousafzai, "Return of Mohmand IDPs to Start Towards End of Month" The News, March 15, 2010.



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