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# GHA REPORT 2010



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## GOVERNMENTS

AUTHORS: KERRY SMITH  
AND LISA WALMSLEY

From donor governments to government donors – changing perceptions about donor and recipient countries.



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## FINANCING MECHANISMS

AUTHOR: HANNAH GLANVILLE

Countries might have a combination of humanitarian, recovery and peacebuilding funds – though the activities undertaken with the money that they provide may not always be so easy to distinguish.



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## DELIVERY

AUTHOR: VELINA STOIANOVA

How agencies can be recipients, donors and implementers... sometimes all at the same time.

## GLOBAL TRENDS - INTRO

Humanitarian aid has been increasing – but so have needs.

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## GLOBAL TRENDS - CONCLUSION

When people think of humanitarian assistance they think about rapid response to a crisis, where time is of the essence and exceptional need has arisen from exceptional circumstances. But in practice, for many countries, humanitarian aid is the norm for years.

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## DATA & GUIDES

Why is humanitarian aid so difficult to count? Challenges, methodologies, sources, references and tables.

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# GLOBAL TRENDS

AUTHOR: JAN KELLETT



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## SCALE OF NEEDS

AUTHORS: LYDIA POOLE  
AND VELINA STOIANOVA

If we are spending US\$16.9 billion on humanitarian assistance every year, does that mean there is US\$16.9 billion of need?



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## CONFLICT & THE MILITARY

AUTHOR: LYDIA POOLE

Conflict-affected countries, peacekeeping, stabilisation and militaries delivering aid.



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## DOMESTIC RESPONSE

AUTHOR: JANE KEYLOCK

Is humanitarian response only international? What about national actors?



# GLOBAL TRENDS

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Humanitarian interventions exist to meet humanitarian need – the provision of aid to save life and to maintain human dignity. These needs can be generated by large, sudden and globally visible disasters as well as long-term hard to see events such as drought, a sudden upsurge of violence and forced movement of population; or long-term complex emergencies involving multiple elements of both conflict and natural disaster. Yet it doesn't need a major disaster or a major conflict to create basic humanitarian need; sometimes what might appear to an outsider as a relatively small event – the failure of a single crop, a mud slide – can tip a vulnerable family or community from poverty into a crisis that is literally a matter of life and death. The crisis will almost certainly make them more vulnerable in the future, forcing people to sell their assets and make choices that undermine their future wellbeing and the prospects for their children.

Humanitarian response to this need is complex and varied and not without its confusion. It involves a plethora of actors, international and national, large and small, organisations with complex global mandates and organisations that serve a community or a neighbourhood. There are actions undertaken by militaries and governments and those by families and individuals. There is preparedness for events, immediate response to them, the provision of basic needs and the first elements of recovery. There is also a continual blurring of lines between humanitarian aid, investments in disaster preparedness, recovery programming, and long-term development spending.

This myriad of interconnections is essentially what GHA Report 2010 attempts to track: the response to need, the provision of finance, the actors involved, the funding mechanisms used, and the countries and projects prioritised. A single dollar can actually be spent more than once with every choice made regarding the progress of that dollar through to a final recipient empowers one actor over another, and affects what is finally delivered and to whom.

Effective humanitarian response has a long-term impact, reducing the human consequences of disasters and building resilience. It is one of the components that every society needs to protect the most vulnerable citizens, reduce risk and tackle poverty. At the same time, many people, especially those living in poverty, live their entire lives without the same basic elements that are delivered as part of humanitarian aid, whether that is clean water, adequate nutrition, the basic level of education or a means to earn a simple living. If there is one lesson that emerges from the Global Humanitarian Assistance programme's attempts to understand the way humanitarian financing works, it is this; if we want a coherent and effective response to humanitarian need, we need to stop classifying people's lives into artificial boxes that reflect our own management structures and use all of the tools that we have to reduce current and future vulnerability.

## THE HEADLINES

We estimate that humanitarian aid fell by 11% between 2008 and 2009 from US\$16.9 to US\$15.1 billion. This is still US\$2.5 billion more than in both 2006 and 2007. Government aid, which had risen to US\$12.8 billion in 2008 fell to about US\$11 billion in 2009, the biggest annual decline of the decade. Even so, this is still a substantially higher amount than the humanitarian assistance from governments in both 2006 and 2007. Our data suggests that private contributions to humanitarian delivery agencies have increased by about 50% since 2006 to reach at least US\$4.1 billion in 2008. (See Figure 1.)

The graph on global humanitarian assistance is revealing for what is included as well as for what is not. Not all contributions to humanitarian assistance are easy to locate, to understand, or to disaggregate from other spending. A wide variety of governments outside the OECD Development Assistance Committee


(DAC) provide financing – not all of this is captured. Nor does it include spending on security-related issues that certainly play a part in establishing a secure environment, including elements of peacekeeping, peacebuilding, demining and demobilisation. Domestic response, the response that has its origins in the affected country, and ranges from individuals and families through to national administrations and militaries, is also largely uncounted.

From the recipient perspective it matters less what pocket funding comes from; what matters is what actually arrives on the ground. And while each organisation has responsibility for allocating its own funds effectively, the impact on people's wellbeing is a result of the collective effect of all interventions. This suggests that the primary viewpoint for measuring humanitarian assistance needs to shift from the inputs and outputs of donors and delivery agencies, to the delivery to people affected.

## OUR GLOBAL HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE ESTIMATE

The global humanitarian assistance calculation for this year's GHA report is based on a slightly different methodology to previous years. We have removed post-conflict and security-related ODA from the overall total, since more detailed analysis has revealed some elements of this spending to be less close to security-related humanitarian aid than we had first thought. Our estimate of private contributions to delivery agencies includes contributions to the United Nations and the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement this year, as well as to international NGOs.

FIGURE 1: GLOBAL HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, 2006-2009



Data for 2009 is partly estimated; private contributions to delivery agencies have been assumed to be at the same level as 2008 whilst just under 9% of the government total is presumed to be at 2008 levels. Source: Development Initiatives based on our own research (private contributions) and OECD DAC and UN OCHA FTS data (governments)




## DONORS AND RECIPIENTS: AN INCREASINGLY COMPLEX PICTURE

### OVERALL GOVERNMENT TRENDS

Humanitarian aid from governments is just one element of total official development assistance (ODA). Humanitarian aid has accounted for an average 8.3% of ODA since 2000 – and volumes of ODA have been rising. In 2005, responses to the Indian Ocean earthquake-tsunami and Kashmir earthquake pushed humanitarian aid's share of ODA to 11.3% and higher volumes of humanitarian aid pushed it to 11.8% in 2008. (See Figure 2.)


Governments are giving much more humanitarian aid than they were ten years ago. But this does not reflect a steady annual growth rate. Understandably, humanitarian aid is more volatile than development aid; there are sudden rises and falls as the international community responds to specific crises. However an increase in one year resulting from a major crisis may be followed by a decline, but, humanitarian assistance rarely falls back to its previous level. (See Figure 3.)

FIGURE 2: HUMANITARIAN AID FROM ALL DONORS REPORTING TO THE DAC AS A SHARE OF TOTAL ODA, 2000-2009



Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC data

FIGURE 3: ANNUAL CHANGES IN HUMANITARIAN AND DEVELOPMENT AID, 1992-2009



Source: Development Initiatives analysis based on OECD DAC data

Some spikes in humanitarian aid are easy to explain: 1999 Kosovo, 2003 Iraq and Afghanistan, 2005 Indian Ocean earthquake-tsunami and the Kashmir earthquake. The increase in 2008 is a little different. It is not the result of a single large crisis: the response to cyclone Nargis only accounts for just over US\$300 million of humanitarian aid. The largest increases in humanitarian aid during 2008 are attributable to increased spending in both Afghanistan and Ethiopia – both of which received over US\$500 million more than in 2007. Higher contributions to Ethiopia were mainly driven by a large increase in food aid from the United States in response to successive droughts and high fuel and food prices. Increased contributions to Afghanistan were chiefly driven by EC contributions to reconstruction and relief operations and United States contributions in the form of emergency food relief. Contributions to Sudan, the largest recipient of humanitarian aid, also increased in 2008 – but at a much lower level (US\$50 million).

## DONORS AND RECIPIENTS

In 2009 at least 112 countries gave humanitarian aid.

The OECD DAC group, representing some of the world's largest governmental humanitarian aid donors, continues to fund the bulk of humanitarian financing from governments – between 90.1% and 98.7% of the overall amount from governments over the last 10 years. Yet they do not have a monopoly on humanitarian aid. Humanitarian assistance from non-DAC governments has been significant in particular years, such as 2005 (Indian Ocean earthquake-tsunami and Kashmir earthquake) and is almost certainly under-reported.

The perception that aid is about one consistent group of rich countries giving to a set of poor countries is challenged by the data. Some of the 112 governments that provided contributions in response to humanitarian crises in 2008 were also recipients of humanitarian aid. (See Figure 4.)

## FINANCIAL CRISIS AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

Whilst some donors have recommitted themselves to their pledges to increase or at least maintain current levels of ODA in the face of the financial crisis, others have already made public announcements on cuts. Are these cuts reflected in the data?


DAC donors actually reported a rise of 6.8% in ODA between 2008 and 2009, with particularly large increases from some donors including the United States, France and Japan. Only seven donor governments contributed less ODA in 2009 and we will have to see whether or not the pronouncements on aid will feed through to more uniform cuts in 2010. While some donors have made official declarations on reducing ODA, except in a few cases, most of the declarations were made at the end of 2009 or in 2010 and thus, given budgetary cycles, are unlikely to be seen in aid data until full final information is published on 2010 expenditure.

The question on whether or not humanitarian aid has been affected by the financial crisis is actually more complicated. This is partly a question of the data we have available, since we only have partial information for 2009, although that is about 90% of the usual yearly total. This preliminary data suggests that humanitarian aid certainly declined in 2009 – and in some cases, such as for Australia, Ireland, Japan, Spain, the Netherlands and the European Community, contractions in contributions were significant.

However, even this information has to be read with some caution. For example the EC's humanitarian aid fell in 2009 – but this would need to be set against a substantial increase (US\$300 million) between 2007 and 2008. The same might be said for both Australia and Japan, where the smaller amounts of humanitarian aid in 2009 are still about 50% higher than they were in 2007.

Our initial analysis is inconclusive: we do not yet know whether the falls suggested in the initial data will actually stand true when final data is released at the end of 2010 or whether they will transpire to have been due to budgetary pressure or particular donor circumstances. That said, the potential impact of the financial crisis should not be overlooked. It has already shown signs of throwing millions more people into poverty. In 2009, the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA) suggested that there were between 73 million and 100 million more new people living in poverty (living on or below US\$1.25 per day). The UN Global Impact and Vulnerability Alert System (UN GIVAS) suggests 108 million. The World Bank suggests 89 million. So even though humanitarian aid would appear to be relatively isolated from periods of global recession, far more likely to suddenly rise due to large natural crises, and then fall back somewhat afterwards, there are concerns for the future. The pressure on country finances seems likely to continue; already in 2010 some donors have made or plan to make even more serious cuts in public expenditure to reduce their deficits, just at the time when overall need may drastically increase.

FIGURE 4: GOVERNMENT CONTRIBUTIONS TO HUMANITARIAN AID, 2000-2009. DATA FOR 2009 HAS BEEN ESTIMATED BASED ON PRELIMINARY PARTIAL DATA FOR DAC DONORS



Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS and OECD DAC data

Government humanitarian aid is still dominated by a relatively small group of donors, with the top 10 contributors in 2008 (the most recent year for which we have full figures) accounting for US\$11.6 billion of the US\$12.8 billion (91%) government total. The humanitarian aid of the United States, the United Kingdom and the European Commission (which is financed by contributions from all EU countries) is almost equivalent to the aid of the other donors combined. Not all these major donors are the DAC countries. Saudi Arabia has contributed US\$2 billion in humanitarian aid over the

last ten years, which would place it as the 13<sup>th</sup> largest government contributor to humanitarian aid, just behind Canada (US\$2.3 billion) and just in front of Denmark (US\$1.8 billion). (See Table 1.)

Viewed from the recipient country perspective, non-DAC donors' aid can be disproportionately important. Non-DAC donors have a different funding profile to DAC donors, with those that report their aid funding countries that are geographically closer and with particularly close cultural connections. (See Table 2.)

TABLE 1: TOP 10 DONORS AND RECIPIENTS, 2008

TOP 10 DONORS	US\$m
United States	4,380.8
EC	2,009.8
United Kingdom	1,017.1
Germany	751.1
Saudi Arabia	727.2
Netherlands	632.9
Spain	629.0
Sweden	603.4
Norway	450.6
France	444.9

TOP 10 RECIPIENTS	US\$m
Sudan	1,419.1
Palestine/OPT	884.3
Afghanistan	871.8
Ethiopia	829.6
Somalia	566.7
DRC	547.1
Myanmar	427.7
Iraq	382.1
Zimbabwe	335.1
Kenya	304.1

TABLE 2: TOP RECIPIENTS OF AID FROM DAC AND NON-DAC COUNTRIES, 2008

TOP 10 NON-DAC DONOR RECIPIENTS	NON-DAC US\$m	SHARE OF NON-DAC TOTAL	TOP 10 DAC DONOR RECIPIENTS	DAC US\$m	SHARE OF DAC TOTAL
China	125.1	23.8%	Sudan	1394.6	13.7%
Yemen	105.3	20.0%	Afghanistan	868.4	8.5%
Palestine/OPT	91.6	17.4%	Ethiopia	828.6	8.1%
Myanmar	68.0	12.0%	Palestine/OPT	792.7	7.8%
Sudan	24.4	4.6%	Somalia	562.6	5.5%

Source: OECD DAC and UN OCHA FTS

## GROWTH OF FINANCING MECHANISMS

Over the past five years there has been a major development in new financing mechanisms. These have arisen as the humanitarian actors have struggled to find ways of getting money to flow more equitably between crises and more effectively within crises. Pooled financing, although in one sense an additional layer within the humanitarian system, is designed to provide quick response, flexible funding, reduce overall costs and grant decision-making over funds to those that are best placed on the ground. It has expanded considerably over the last four years. (See Figure 5.)

Funding exists at both global and country levels. At a country level there are two different types of pooled humanitarian funds. There are those for larger complex emergencies that are tied into yearly planning processes (Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and more recently Central African Republic (CAR)). There are also 14 countries that have emergency response funds that can finance immediate needs such as those related to sudden population movements, the effects of a natural disaster or an outbreak of disease.

Meanwhile at a global level the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) administers more than US\$400 million per year, largely made up of donations

from governments (but also with some private corporation money). It provides funding on a different basis, examining whether there are either forgotten emergencies or underfunded crises that require financing. (See Table 3 & 4.)

Some countries receive a substantial amount of funding from the various pooled funding mechanisms. For example, between 2006 and 2009, Sudan received more than US\$700 million through the funds, whilst DRC received just over US\$600 million.


The funds now account for about 7% of total humanitarian funding and both overall participation in them and their scope has increased substantially. In 2006 there were 52 donor countries for all funds with 35 recipient countries; by 2009 this had increased to 82 donors, with funding going to 51 countries. At the same time there is increasing evidence that the variety of pooled mechanisms are providing a channel of humanitarian aid for those donors that perhaps do not have a substantial decision-making infrastructure of their own. This can be seen in the CERF, where the numbers of donors increased from 54 donors in 2006 to 91 in 2009, and also in the Haiti ERF, where contributions from 24 non-DAC donors in response to the earthquake accounted for 82.6% of the total received by the fund.

TABLE 3 & 4: TOP FIVE DONORS AND RECIPIENTS OF HUMANITARIAN POOLED FUNDS, 2009

TOP FIVE DONORS		US\$m
United Kingdom	3rd largest DAC donor	182
Netherlands	9th largest DAC donor	122
Sweden	5th largest DAC donor	111
Spain	6th largest DAC donor	61
Norway	11th largest DAC donor	71
TOP FIVE RECIPIENTS		
Sudan	Largest recipient	148
DRC	3rd largest recipient	141
Somalia	9th largest recipient	74
Ethiopia	7th largest recipient	62
Zimbabwe	16th largest recipient	31

Source: UN OCHA, DREF and OECD DAC

FIGURE 5: HUMANITARIAN POOLED FUND INCOME, 2006-2009



Source: UN OCHA FTS, UN CERF and IFRC for Disaster Emergency Response Fund (DREF)

## PRIORITIES

### COUNTRIES IN CONFLICT

Humanitarian aid to conflict affected states is considerable. We estimate that US\$52.3 billion of US\$72.9 billion in DAC donor contributions allocable by country (71.7%) between 1999 and 2008 was spent in conflict-affected states (which include not only countries in conflict but also those in post-conflict contexts). In some years, such as 2005 and 2006, this peaked at close to 80% of all humanitarian funding. (See Figure 6.)


Yet humanitarian aid is not the only part of the picture. There are other funding streams that pay for activities like peacekeeping, peacebuilding, protection and demobilisation – much of that funding naturally going to states that are emerging from conflict. Personal security is often stated as the most important priority by people living in unstable and conflict affected states. These ‘non-humanitarian’ funding streams have a direct impact on the quality of life of many people who are also the targets for more strictly defined humanitarian assistance.

UN peacekeeping alone was more than US\$7.4 billion in 2010, with close to 100,000 personnel deployed across

55 missions. DAC donors spend close to US\$3.8 billion of additional funds on a range of security-related activities that include landmine clearance, security-system reform and demobilisation. In response to the need to have flexible funding available for supporting nation-states, some donor countries have set up substantially resourced funding pools for working on ‘stabilisation’, peacebuilding and additional peacekeeping activities.


In addition to this conflict and state-building related financing, the military itself has been playing a much larger part of delivering humanitarian aid in the last decade. This has been in natural disasters such as the Haiti earthquake, where at least 34 national militaries deployed both troops and assets to support the humanitarian response. More contentiously perhaps is military involvement in aid delivery where it is also involved in conflict; since 2001 the conflict in both Afghanistan and Iraq has lead to a situation where the US Department of Defense (DoD) has management of a wide variety of funds, the volume of which is significantly higher than both official humanitarian and development aid and yet are not specifically for the direct needs of combat.

FIGURE 6: GROWTH IN HUMANITARIAN FUNDING TO CONFLICT-AFFECTED STATES FROM DAC DONORS, 1999-2008



Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC data

FIGURE 7: THE TOP FOUR TOP-FUNDED SECTORS IN FTS, 2000-2009



Source: UN OCHA FTS

## SECTOR SPENDING

Humanitarian funding is for a wide range of needs, not only the very basic requirements that mean the difference between life and death, but also provision in healthcare, education, protection and livelihoods to enable people to live in dignity.


If we examine the sectors that receive funding we can see that general trends over the last ten years for all sectors are upwards, naturally following the

overall increase in humanitarian aid. The data reveals large spikes in 2003, 2005 and 2008 but with some significant differences depending on the sector, especially for those that traditionally receive less funding. (See Figures 7 & 8.)

The food sector has seen the most significant rise in terms of volume, with the figure reported for 2009 close to US\$4.5 billion – more than four times its 2000 level. Multi-sector, comprising cross-sectoral projects and programmes

We switch from using OECD DAC data to UN OCHA Financial Tracking Service (FTS) data in this section.

FIGURE 8: A BREAKDOWN OF OTHER SECTORS IN THE FTS, 2000-2009



Source: UN OCHA FTS

that are rather difficult to attribute to a particular sector, accounted for over US\$1.5 billion of aid in 2009. This comprises immediate distributions of non-food support and the provision of search of rescue through to much more complex humanitarian programming such as multi-sector support for returning refugees and IDPs. Economic recovery, the sector where the line between humanitarian and recovery spending is more blurred than usual, is quite different with a rather shallow rise in aid over the decade. It peaked in 2003 to reach US\$929 million, 85% of which (US\$796 million) was for Iraq in the first year after the conflict. It also increased following the Indian Ocean earthquake -tsunami in 2004.

Sectors that traditionally receive less funding include mine action, coordination and support services, and protection/human rights/rule of law.

- In 2007, funding for mine-action reached a peak of US\$228 million. US\$67 million of this went to support road and dyke rehabilitation in South Sudan. Sudan itself contributed more than US\$55 million of this total.

- Support for coordination and support services peaked in 2005, 2008 and 2009. Whilst Indonesia and Pakistan accounted for US\$209 million and US\$161 million respectively in 2005, Sudan has accounted for the largest share of spend in this sector over the last five years, US\$467 million of the total US\$3.4 billion spent (13.8%). Unsurprisingly UN OCHA accounts for US\$842.3 million of the organisations receiving funds over the five years, nearly 25% of the total.
- Spending on Protection/Human rights /Rule of law doubled between 2003 and 2009 from US\$193 million to US\$385 million. The recipient profile has changed remarkably however; in 2003 Iraq and Afghanistan alone accounted for US\$127.9 million (66.2%) whilst in 2009 these countries received a combined total of US\$53.6 million (13.9%).

FIGURE 9: FUNDING FOR MINE ACTION, 2007




FIGURE 10: FUNDING FOR PROTECTION/HUMAN RIGHTS/RULE OF LAW, 2003




FIGURE 11: FUNDING FOR COORDINATION AND SUPPORT SERVICES, 2009





FIGURE 12: FUNDING FOR ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND INFRASTRUCTURE, 2003



Source: UN OCHA FTS

# WHO DELIVERS?

## THE SYSTEM

From the recipient perspective, humanitarian aid is what is supplied by the organisations that deliver it on the ground. First among those agencies will be local organisations like churches, local NGOs and governments, and National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, followed later by UN agencies and international NGOs – all of them the visible part of the global humanitarian assistance that has originated with contributions from governments and donations from the public. There is not necessarily a clear path to follow from donor through delivery agency to beneficiary; the architecture of humanitarian aid is such that many agencies may act as recipient, donor and implementer of aid, often at the same time and during the same crisis. (See Figure 13.)


Not surprisingly, the amount of money that passes through delivery agencies accounts for a large proportion of global humanitarian assistance – US\$15 billion of the US\$16.9 billion total (89%) in 2008. Of the \$15 billion, at least US\$4.1 billion came from private contributions (most of which from the general public).

The different delivery agencies have very different profiles, with the UN receiving the bulk of its funding from governments

whilst NGOs in particular raise a substantial amount of funding from private contributions. Two particularly important issues follow from this. Firstly, while the UN receives a substantial amount of money from governments, it passes on a large portion of this to international NGOs that actually do the delivery on the ground, often with local partners. Secondly not all funding comes from governments. We estimate that at least US\$4.1 billion of the money passing through delivery agencies was from private contributions, and most of that from the general public. This gives those organisations that raise these funds substantial power, with some of them having control over far higher humanitarian budgets from private sources alone than many governments. (See Figure 14.)


Delivery agencies of all types mix and match these different sources of money. They combine earmarked contributions for specific places or activities with their own reserves and unearmarked money and public contributions. And as the money flows through the different layers, these sources of finance are usually mixed at the same time that choices are made about where, how and when money will be spent. Each decision affects not only who does what and where but also what is actually achieved on the ground.

FIGURE 14: DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES ANALYSIS OF PRIVATE CONTRIBUTIONS, 2008



Source: Development Initiatives analysis based on annual reports and audited accounts, and data provided by delivery agencies

FIGURE 13: DELIVERY AGENCY FUNDING SOURCES AS A SHARE OF TOTAL INCOME, 2008



Source: Development Initiatives analysis based on annual reports and audited accounts, and data provided by delivery agencies




## DOMESTIC RESPONSE

It is absolutely essential that we do not forget that a substantial and as yet largely unknown element of humanitarian aid is that which has its origins in the community and country affected by the humanitarian crisis. Largely outside of the internationally-focused humanitarian system and largely uncounted because of that, domestic response is made up of many varied actors, governments, individuals, communities, and civil society who are delivering aid that is often goods in-kind and rarely if ever quantified or monetised, a further reason for why it is rarely counted. Yet domestic response is clearly significant – even our partial

figures show significant amounts of money. For example, whilst Indonesia received a substantial US\$243 million of humanitarian aid in 2007, it also spent US\$269 million of its own funds on disaster response.

Our country studies show that affected people place a higher value on some forms of assistance that are provided locally than they do on other types of response, funded by larger sums of money. Aid that has its origin locally is seen as particularly responsive, fast and culturally appropriate and perhaps even more accountable, given that the providers of that aid live and work in the same country as the recipients. (See Figure 15.)

FIGURE15: EXAMPLES OF DOMESTIC RESPONSE SINCE 2004



Source: Development Initiatives analysis based on UN OCHA FTS, Tsunami Evaluation Coalition, Prime Minister's Relief Fund India and Global Fund for Disaster Risk Reduction (GFDRR) data

## DOES FUNDING EQUAL NEEDS?

In 2008 there was at least US\$16.9 billion of humanitarian aid. Does that mean that there was US\$16.9 billion worth of humanitarian need?


The humanitarian community aspires to make its funding proportionate to need. This has focused primarily on equitable funding: the idea that humanitarian funding should be allocated according to need so that the most severe needs are prioritised. But there is also the question of adequacy: is humanitarian assistance adequate to meet global humanitarian needs?

Neither of these questions can be answered with the information that is currently available. Needs are measured in a variety of contrasting and sometimes competing ways. Some measures report the total number affected people – but without a consistent benchmark of what

it means 'to be affected'. Other measures report only those people that delivery agencies can reach. Needs can also be expressed in terms of total volume of funding required to meet identified needs or just the funding requirements of the organisations that are working in a certain place, it can mean all elements of life at the same time or just the needs in an individual sector like health, education or food.

We have no complete figure of how much need there was in 2008 or any other year. The UN consolidated appeals process (CAP), even though it puts a value on project requirements rather than overall needs, provides us with some frame of reference. Whilst requests and funding within the appeals process have increased over the ten-year period, a gap of 30% of unfunded need has been replicated almost every year.

FIGURE 16: HUMANITARIAN AID FOR ALL CRISES AND UN CAP APPEAL FUNDING REQUIREMENTS, 2000-2009



Source: Development Initiatives analysis based on UN OCHA FTS

Yet at the same time, there are billions of dollars being reported as humanitarian assistance to the same crises, which are not allocated to the priorities identified in the appeal. In 2009, despite US\$7 billion being spent inside the UN appeals process, there was still more than US\$4.1 billion of other humanitarian aid, whilst the unmet part of the appeals was only US\$2.7 billion. Over the ten years there has been more than US\$15 billion of unmet need within the UN appeals process despite humanitarian aid in every single year being much more than the requested appeal amount.

Why were these prioritised needs not met? Was the \$4.1 billion of other

humanitarian aid in 2009 for needs which were equally severe?

What we do know is that there are serious inequalities in our spending across different crises, inequalities that cannot be simply explained by the tools at our disposal. Should we really have spent US\$993 dollars per person in Haiti after the earthquake? Why so much more than after the four cyclones in Haiti? And why is the amount of money per person spent on the complex emergency in DRC only US\$58, US\$935 less than the Haiti earthquake?

FIGURE 17: COMPARISON OF SPENDING PER PERSON IN HUMANITARIAN CRISES



Source: Development Initiatives analysis based on UN OCHA FTS and CRED data



# GOVERNMENTS

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
Government donors and the European Commission (EC) play a very large part in shaping the international humanitarian response, accounting for US\$12.8 billion (76%) of the US\$ 16.9 billion international humanitarian aid effort in 2008 and an estimated US\$11 billion (73%) of US\$15.1 billion in 2009.

The overwhelming majority of humanitarian funding from governments comes from members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC): Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the EC, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. These donors alone have accounted for over 95% of the US\$81 billion in humanitarian aid provided by governments since 2000, just under half of which in response to crises in Africa. The sheer scale of some of these contributions influences the headline numbers and informs our overview of the main trends. But decisions about how to allocate even relatively small amounts of aid can affect humanitarian outcomes – and choices about who it is spent through have the potential to affect the behaviour, influence and balance of power of all those involved in the response.

In the last few years, the participation of a number of governments outside the DAC has become increasingly visible. The word 'visible' has been chosen with care here. Some non-DAC governments may have been providing aid for many years – but their contributions are difficult to count because they do not fit the definitions, concepts or systems determined by the DAC group. The response to the flash appeal launched by the UN following the earthquake in Haiti in January 2010 provides a good illustration of these shifting dynamics. Seventy-three governments responded. Saudi Arabia, the third largest donor, contributed more than all but two of the participating DAC donors. Brazil was the ninth largest donor. Thailand, Nigeria, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Equatorial Guinea provided more than Belgium, Ireland and the Netherlands reported bilaterally. The situation was in many senses exceptional, and some of these governments will have spent money through other agencies rather than bilaterally – but overall it highlights that the distinction between donor and recipient governments is much more blurred than it once was.

In terms of the humanitarian aid architecture, which has been attempting to converge and standardise its systems, definitions and concepts over the last 10-20 years, increased diversity in sources of funding, policy and practice poses something of a challenge. Some of its fundamental concepts, definitions and structures are now struggling to include and meet the demands of the various stakeholders.

# GOVERNMENTS: 2008




## TOP 5 RECIPIENTS FROM NON-DAC DONORS

1	China	US\$125m
2	Yemen	US\$105m
3	Palestine/OPT	US\$92m
4	Myanmar	US\$68m
5	Sudan	US\$24m

## TOP 5 RECIPIENTS FROM DAC DONORS

1	Sudan	US\$1.4bn
2	Afganistan	US\$868m
3	Ethiopia	US\$828m
4	Palestine/OPT	US\$793m
5	Somalia	US\$563m

# GOVERNMENTS: 2009



## TOP 5 RECIPIENTS FROM NON-DAC DONORS


1	Palestine/OPT	US\$100m
2	Pakistan	US\$37m
3	Afghanistan	US\$21m
4	Ethiopia	US\$8m
5	Indonesia	US\$7m

## TOP 5 RECIPIENTS FROM DAC DONORS\*

1	Sudan	US\$1.3bn
2	Ethiopia	US\$678m
3	Pakistan	US\$623m
4	Palestine/OPT	US\$540m
5	DRC	US\$507m

\* FTS DATA

FIGURE 1: GOVERNMENT CONTRIBUTIONS TO HUMANITARIAN AID, 2000-2009



Data for 2009 has been estimated based on preliminary partial data for DAC donors.  
Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC and UN OCHA FTS data

## DAC DONORS

### VOLUMES AND TRENDS

Partial, preliminary data for 2009 indicates that humanitarian aid from DAC donors reached US\$10.1 billion in 2009. Based on experience from previous years, we expect to see this rise to at least US\$11 billion when full final data is released in December 2010. Only six DAC donors reported increases in humanitarian aid in 2009. Three of these increases amounted to under US\$7 million each. Just over half of the US\$693 million decline in humanitarian aid on the previous year (US\$390 million) is due to lower volumes from the European Commission.

Turning to the latest full set of available data, we see that humanitarian aid from DAC donors reached US\$11.7 billion in 2008, some US\$2.4 billion (or 26%) higher than in 2007. Several major donors increased their humanitarian expenditure in Afghanistan, Ethiopia and Somalia. There was also increased funding to Myanmar, Zimbabwe and Kenya – subjects of a UN flash appeal, UN consolidated appeal and emergency plan respectively. Over half (US\$1.3 billion) of the US\$2.4 billion increase in 2008 came from the United States – driven by substantial increases in its disbursements to Afghanistan (up

by US\$123 million), Somalia (up by US\$178 million) and, notably, Ethiopia (up by US\$351 million). The next biggest increases in volume came from the European Commission (up by US\$303 million, largely due to increased expenditure in Afghanistan) and Spain, which increased its humanitarian expenditure by US\$226 million.

The main spikes in expenditure over the last 10 years can be attributed to major crises – Afghanistan and Iraq in 2003/4 for example, or the Indian Ocean earthquake-tsunami and the South Asia earthquake in 2004/5. The ‘ratchet’ effect is also in evidence: a peak in spending, driven by a major emergency, followed by spending at higher levels than pre-peak years. So although humanitarian aid fell back in 2006 and 2007 following the global response to the Indian Ocean earthquake-tsunami, it was still above its 2004 levels. Likewise, at US\$10.1 billion, the preliminary and partial humanitarian aid expenditure figure for 2009 is lower than in 2008 but higher than for all years prior to that.

The long-term trend in humanitarian assistance shows a clear upward path, with the increase in humanitarian aid averaging out at 6.9% a year between 2000 and 2008.

### HUMANITARIAN AID IN THE DAC CONTEXT


In DAC reporting, humanitarian aid is a **sector** of ODA that aims specifically to “save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain and protect human dignity during and in the aftermath of emergencies.” It includes: disaster prevention and preparedness, reconstruction relief, relief coordination, protection and support services, emergency food aid and other emergency/distress relief. This strict definition of humanitarian aid, which is governed by the principles of neutrality and impartiality, marks it out from development aid, which can be subject to some conditionality.

While humanitarian aid is traditionally seen as short-term, other ODA sectors (sometimes referred to as ‘development assistance’) such as governance, growth, social services, education, health, and water and sanitation, are seen as sustainable, long-term and poverty-reducing. Since 2000 the humanitarian share of ODA has ranged from a low of 7.5% in 2001 to a high of 10.2% in 2005.

Annual fluctuations in humanitarian aid expenditure can be more extreme than for other types of ODA since they will reflect donor responses to sudden onset emergencies as well as to ongoing ones.

Humanitarian ODA, exempt from the norms that govern other types of ODA, allows donors to provide assistance to people in some countries that they might not otherwise be able to support. But in some senses, the distinction is somewhat artificial. To people living in crisis, it matters little how their assistance is defined – whether to increase food security or to mitigate risk, alleviate immediate basic health needs, or to reduce poverty. We therefore try to contextualise humanitarian ODA by placing it in the context of other flows of assistance.

FIGURE 2: DAC DONOR CONTRIBUTIONS TO HUMANITARIAN AID, 2000-2009



Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC data

### CHANGES IN TYPES OF HUMANITARIAN AID

Around half the humanitarian aid from DAC donors is spent on emergency/distress relief. In 2008 its share declined very slightly in favour of emergency food aid, which went up in response to the food price crisis:

- the largest recipients of food aid in 2008 were Sudan and Ethiopia, each of which received over US\$600 million – the next largest recipient was Somalia with just over US\$300 million
- the largest single donor is the United States (US\$2.2 billion in 2008), followed by the EC (US\$570 million).

Relief coordination, protection and support services more than doubled to reach US\$445 million:


- the top recipients of this type of aid were Afghanistan and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), US\$41 million each; Sudan, Chad, Palestine/OPT, each of which received around US\$40 million
- the largest single donor was Japan (US\$84 million).

Contributions to disaster prevention and preparedness increased threefold in 2008 to reach US\$325 million:

- one-third of this amount (US\$111 million) cannot be attributed to a particular region
- US\$25 million is attributable to the Americas; US\$17 million was for programmes in Bangladesh; and around US\$10 million to each of Indonesia, Dominican Republic and Kenya
- the largest single donor was the EC.


(See Figure 3.)

FIGURE 3: TYPES OF DAC-DEFINED HUMANITARIAN AID, 2006-2008



Source: OECD DAC

FIGURE 4: THE FIVE LARGEST DAC DONORS, 2000-2009.  
DATA FOR 2009 IS INCOMPLETE AND PRELIMINARY



Source: OECD DAC

## MAIN DONORS

The United States, the EC and the United Kingdom are the largest donors of humanitarian aid, together accounting for US\$55 billion (well over half) of the US\$89.3 billion provided by DAC donors over the last decade. Partial preliminary data indicates that they contributed US\$4.3 billion, US\$1.5 billion and US\$1 billion respectively in 2009 – we expect to see the EC and United Kingdom contributions rise when full final data is available in December 2010. The latest full final data indicates that the same three donors provided US\$4.4 billion, US\$2 billion and US\$1.1 billion respectively in 2008. Without the full final data for 2009, it really is too early to jump to any conclusions about what the data shows – but the contribution from the United States is likely to remain roughly unchanged, the EC's contribution looks

lower than the equivalent figure for the previous year and the United Kingdom's expenditure already looks to have increased. (See Figure 4.)

Germany has been the source of the fourth largest volume of humanitarian aid since 2001. The Netherlands has been a top 3 donor in six of the last nine years, though preliminary data suggests a 30% fall in its humanitarian expenditure in 2009. Japan's involvement in the relief efforts following the Indian Ocean earthquake-tsunami made it a top 5 donor in 2005. In the years where Sweden's contributions are higher than those of the Netherlands, it is a top 5 donor.


Collectively, the EC and EU15 member states contributed 48% (US\$5.6 billion) of official humanitarian assistance in 2008. (See Figure 5.)

## HOW GENEROUS IS THAT?

Per donor citizen and as a share of the donor country's gross national income (GNI) provide additional – and different – perspectives on generosity. While the United States is the largest donor by volume, Luxembourg, Norway and Sweden provide by far the most humanitarian assistance on a per citizen basis. Along with Ireland, these same donors are also the most generous, all contributing 0.10% or more of their gross national income (GNI) for humanitarian purposes. See sliding scale at end of chapter.



FIGURE 5: SHARES OF HUMANITARIAN AID FROM DAC DONORS, 2008



Source: OECD DAC

## MAIN CHANNELS

Unlike other government donors, and unlike the pattern that characterises other types of ODA expenditure, DAC donors rarely channel their humanitarian aid directly to recipient governments – in fact this accounted for just about 3% of the total in 2008 (most of which was a contribution made by Japan to the government of Bangladesh for an emergency disaster rehabilitation project following Cyclone Sidr). Instead, the aid flows through many different agencies and organisations – other public sector agencies in both donor and recipient countries, UN agencies, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, the EC, NGOs and civil society organisations. Some of these agencies and organisations will use the funding directly for humanitarian operations, others in turn become donors and each choice about who to spend humanitarian aid through is important as it influences who has power within the system and who does not.

Currently it is not possible to track the aid from the point where it flows out from the donor to the point where it arrives with a recipient, so here we look at disbursements of donors to the first recipient.


Over the last three years, around 60% of humanitarian aid from DAC donors has been channelled through multilateral organisations, chiefly UN agencies. The top three recipients of the US\$6.9 billion channelled through multilateral organisations in 2008, were the World

Food Programme (WFP), which received US\$2.9 billion or 24.4% of the total, the UN Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which received US\$1.3 billion or 10.6% of the total and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), US\$622 million (5.2% of the total). (See Figure 6.)

US\$2.8 billion, just under 25% of total DAC donor humanitarian aid, was channelled directly through NGOs and civil society organisations in 2008:


- just under US\$800 million (6.7% of the total) in contributions to the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement
- US\$611 million or 5.1% of the total to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
- US\$158 million (1.3% of the total) to national societies in donor countries
- US\$1.4 million to national societies in partner countries
- just under US\$30 million (0.2% of the total) directly to the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
- US\$402 million (3.4% of the total) to international NGO bodies and research institutes
- US\$1.6 billion (13% of the total) to national NGOs registered in the donor country
- US\$47 million (0.4%) to NGOs in developing countries.

FIGURE 6: CHANNELS OF HUMANITARIAN AID TO FIRST POINT OF DELIVERY, 2006-2008



Source: OECD DAC

FIGURE 7: CHANNELS OF HUMANITARIAN AID BY DAC DONOR TO FIRST POINT OF DELIVERY, 2008



Source: OECD DAC

In 2008, DAC donors spent US\$1.7 billion (15.1%) through the public sector – a channel that comprises donor government agencies, such as embassies and ministries, universities, and recipient governments.

The above graph (Figure 7) shows just how much the choice of channel can vary widely by donor:

- the amount of humanitarian aid spent directly through NGOs and CSOs varies from 1.9% in the case of Portugal to 46.6% in the case of Switzerland
- Luxembourg does not spend any money through the public sector, whereas Austria spends three-fifths of its humanitarian aid in this way
- 14 donors spend over 60% of their aid through multilateral agencies and the UN.

## RECIPIENT COUNTRIES

Sudan proved to be the largest recipient of DAC donor humanitarian expenditure for the fourth consecutive year in 2008. Its US\$1.4 billion represented 13.7% of the total allocated by DAC donors to specific countries. While its share of the total declined in 2008 (from 17.1% in 2007), the actual volume of aid to the country increased by US\$56 million. The next largest recipient was Afghanistan (US\$868 million), followed by Ethiopia (US\$829 million).

Seven of the top 10 recipients of DAC donor humanitarian assistance in 2007 remained within the top 10 list in 2008 – Sudan, Palestine/OPT, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Somalia and Iraq. Meanwhile,

Lebanon, Pakistan and Indonesia were replaced in the top 10 by Myanmar, Zimbabwe and Kenya – subjects of a UN flash appeal, UN consolidated appeal and emergency plan respectively in 2008. (See Figure 8.)

Sudan has been by far the largest single recipient of DAC donor assistance since 1999, accounting for US\$8.2 billion (11.4%) of the US\$72 billion disbursements to specific countries. Palestine/OPT has received the next largest share (9%) or US\$6.5 billion of the total, followed by Iraq with US\$5.8 billion or 8.1% of the total. Nearly 48% of Iraq's humanitarian aid over the last 10 years came in 2003 and 2004. (See Table 1 & 2.)

FIGURE 8: SHARES OF HUMANITARIAN AID FROM DAC DONORS, 2008




TABLE 1: COUNTRIES FEATURING AS TOP 10 RECIPIENTS OF DAC HUMANITARIAN AID, 1999-2008

	TIMES IN THE TOP 10	TOTAL RECEIVED (US\$m)	SHARE OF TOTAL ALLOCABLE TO ALL COUNTRIES	SHARE OF TOTAL ALLOCABLE TO TOP 10 COUNTRIES	HUMANITARIAN AID AS A SHARE OF ODA IN THE PERIOD
Sudan	10	8.2bn	11.4%	19.5%	69.8%
Palestine/OPT	10	6.5bn	9.0%	15.3%	46.8%
Iraq	10	5.7bn	8.1%	13.8%	9.4%
Afghanistan	9	5.3bn	7.5%	12.7%	23.7%
Ethiopia	9	4.6bn	6.5%	11.0%	23.5%
DRC	8	3.1bn	4.4%	7.5%	16.4%
Bosnia-Herzegovina	2	2.7bn	3.8%	6.5%	33.6%
Serbia	3	2.6bn	3.8%	6.4%	16.3%
States Ex-Yugoslavia	3	2.4bn	3.3%	5.7%	70.2%
Somalia	3	2.3bn	3.3%	5.6%	74.1%
Indonesia	4	2.2bn	3.1%	5.3%	13.5%
Angola	6	2.0bn	2.9%	4.9%	38.4%
Lebanon	2	1.9bn	2.7%	4.6%	44.0%
Uganda	2	1.7bn	2.4%	4.1%	12.3%
Pakistan	3	1.7bn	2.4%	4.1%	9.5%
Kenya	1	1.5bn	2.2%	3.7%	18.3%
Burundi	2	2.4bn	2.0%	3.4%	42.0%
Sri Lanka	1	1.3bn	1.9%	3.3%	21.6%
Liberia	1	1.3bn	1.8%	3.1%	39.8%
Zimbabwe	2	1.1bn	1.6%	2.7%	32.8%
DPRK	2	1.1bn	1.5%	2.6%	60.7%
Eritrea	1	946.7m	1.3%	2.2%	33.3%
Sierra Leone	1	920.1m	1.3%	2.2%	22.5%
India	1	774.7m	1.1%	1.8%	4.5%
Myanmar	1	711.3m	1.0%	1.7%	38.3%
Mozambique	1	697.9m	1.0%	1.7%	3.9%
Albania	1	445.9m	0.6%	1.1%	10.3%
Timor-Leste	1	384.9m	0.5%	0.9%	13.4%

Source: Development Initiatives based on OCED DAC data

TABLE 2: TOP 10 RECIPIENTS OF HUMANITARIAN AID FROM DAC DONORS, 1999–2008

	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
1	Serbia US\$842.4m	Serbia US\$753.7m	Afghanistan US\$593.9m	Afghanistan US\$885.6m	Iraq US\$1.2bn	Iraq US\$1.0bn	Sudan US\$1.4bn	Sudan US\$1.4bn	Sudan US\$1.3bn	Sudan US\$1.3bn
2	St Ex Yugoslavia US\$557.2m	States Ex-Yugoslavia US\$310.3m	Palestine/OPT US\$371.7m	Palestine/OPT US\$478.6m	Ethiopia US\$813.3m	Sudan US\$871.2m	Indonesia US\$720.0m	Palestine/OPT US\$803.4m	Palestine/OPT US\$880.1m	Afghanistan US\$868.4m
3	Bosnia-Herzegovina US\$279.3m	Palestine/OPT US\$275.2m	Serbia US\$318.6m	Angola US\$282.7m	Afghanistan US\$508.0m	Palestine/OPT US\$572.8m	Ethiopia US\$657.5m	Indonesia US\$483.8m	DRC US\$430.1m	Ethiopia US\$828.6m
4	Albania US\$237.9m	Ethiopia US\$234.1m	Ethiopia US\$221.6m	DRC US\$269.0m	Palestine/OPT US\$476.3m	Ethiopia US\$444.7m	Iraq US\$632.6m	DRC US\$454.0m	Iraq US\$347.1m	Palestine/OPT US\$792.7m
5	Sudan US\$235.0m	Afghanistan US\$173.7m	DRC US\$193.9m	Sudan US\$267.5m	Sudan US\$368.2m	Afghanistan US\$432.0m	Palestine/Opt US\$483.9m	Iraq US\$420.9m	Lebanon US\$339.8m	Somalia US\$562.6m
6	Palestine/OPT US\$230.3m	Mozambique US\$168.0m	Iraq US\$186.6m	Ethiopia US\$241.9m	Angola US\$317.3m	DRC US\$298.3m	Pakistan US\$404.2m	Pakistan US\$410.3m	Afghanistan US\$325.6m	DRC US\$545.2m
7	DPRK US\$219.0m	Angola US\$163.4m	Sudan US\$179.7m	Sierra Leone US\$182.3m	DRC US\$263.5m	Angola US\$220.4m	Sri Lanka US\$383.3m	Lebanon US\$405.5m	Ethiopia US\$301.0m	Iraq US\$379.2m
8	Angola US\$189.6m	Iraq US\$149.9m	India US\$162.1m	States Ex-Yugoslavia US\$156.7m	Eritrea US\$179.7m	Liberia US\$177.0m	Afghanistan US\$328.5m	Ethiopia US\$354.6m	Somalia US\$279.1m	Myanmar US\$359.6m
9	Indonesia US\$178.6m	Timor-Leste US\$145.7m	Bosnia-Herzegovina US\$158.8m	Iraq US\$156.7m	Burundi US\$154.5m	Uganda US\$170.5m	DRC US\$321.9m	Afghanistan US\$353.6m	Pakistan US\$245.3m	Zimbabwe US\$332.7m
10	Iraq US\$139.1m	Sudan US\$136.5m	Angola US\$151.3m	DPRK US\$152.0m	Uganda US\$148.0m	Burundi US\$169.5m	Zimbabwe US\$221.2m	Somalia US\$329.8m	Indonesia US\$240.9m	Kenya US\$301.8m


Calculated on the basis of constant 2008 prices. Source: Development Initiatives based on OCED DAC data

Together, the top 10 recipients of humanitarian aid from DAC donors since 1999 – Sudan, Palestine/OPT, Iraq, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, DRC, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, States Ex-Yugoslavia and Somalia (in order) – have accounted for 57.7% (US\$41.5 billion) of the total humanitarian aid disbursed by DAC donors over the 10-year period. As the pattern in Table 2 shows, some countries regularly appear in the top 10 list of recipients. It also highlights that some countries are subject to different types of emergency that require different types of funding: some are the result of conflicts that have a clear end point from a humanitarian funding point of view (for example, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, States Ex-Yugoslavia and Angola);

some situations are more complex and intractable requiring ongoing funding (Sudan, DRC); and some are the result of natural disasters that see a peak in funding for a year or two (India following Gujarat earthquake in 2001, Pakistan in 2005 and 2006 following Kashmir earthquake and Indonesia/Sri Lanka in 2005 and 2006 following the tsunami).

Humanitarian assistance is concentrated on a small number of countries. The ten largest recipients of humanitarian assistance from DAC donors accounted for 62.5% (US\$6.4 billion) of the total in 2008. The remaining 37.5% (US\$3.8 billion) was shared between 138 countries. (See Figure 9.)

**FIGURE 9: CONCENTRATION OF RECIPIENT COUNTRY FUNDING FROM DAC DONORS, 2006-2008**



Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC data

POPULATION

**87 million**

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX VALUE  
171 OUT OF 182 COUNTRIES

**0.414**

LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH  
151 OUT OF 176 COUNTRIES

**54.7 years**

ADULT LITERACY RATE (% AGES 15+)  
145 OUT OF 151 COUNTRIES

**35.9%**

PEOPLE NOT USING  
AN IMPROVED WATER SOURCE  
146 OUT OF 150 COUNTRIES

**58%**

CLASSED AS

**Fragile state**

# Ethiopia

Humanitarian aid to Ethiopia more than doubled in 2008 to reach US\$829 million. This was driven chiefly by an increase from the United States, which provided US\$563 million, mainly in form of emergency in-kind food aid. As a provider of 71% of the country's total humanitarian aid, the United States has a leading role in shaping the response to an agriculture-dependent country which, in spite of showing signs of economic growth over the last few years, has suffered successive droughts, directly affecting the food security of 5-10 million people (6%-11% of the population) – a situation further compounded by high food and fuel prices in 2008.

In 2008, 82% of DAC donor humanitarian aid was provided in the form of emergency ('humanitarian') food aid. When added to the US\$312 million provided in the form of 'development' food aid (food security and crop protection programmes), food aid accounted for 42.6% (US\$957 million) of DAC donors' US\$2.2 billion in bilateral ODA. US\$43 million (1.9% of ODA) was spent on agricultural development. Some of this aid was provided in support of the Ethiopian government's Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP), which aims to help the food security of 7.5 million people in eight regions (Afar, Amhara, Dire Dawa, Harar, Oromiya, Southern Nations, Nationalities and People's Regions, Somali and Tigray). (See Figure 1.)

Although Ethiopia's economy has grown consistently over the last decade and some progress has been made, the country still has high rates of

malnutrition and low primary education enrolment rates. It is ranked 171 out of 182 countries in the UNDP Human Development Index for 2009. After food aid, US\$1.1 billion was left for other development purposes such as basic health, education and water and sanitation in 2008.


Drought means that there is less money in the economy in the year, which undermines the effects of development programmes such as the PSNP and pushes people further into poverty. With six major droughts in just two decades, deforestation, soil erosion, floods and a fall in world prices of cash crops, many families that are already living in poverty never have time to recover between one crisis and the next. (See Figure 2.)

While food prices appear to have stabilised from November 2008 onwards, data from the country's Central Statistical Agency suggests that the prices of bread and cereals are almost twice as high as they were at the end of 2007. The situation was not helped by the virtual failure of the Belg rains in 2009, which not only reduced harvest but also delayed and sometimes prevented the planting of high yield crops such as maize and sorghum. FTS data suggests that food aid remained high on donors' agendas in 2009 – 75.2% of the US\$678 million reported as humanitarian aid to Ethiopia was spent on addressing food needs, US\$421 million of which from the United States.

Ethiopia is the fifth largest recipient of DAC donor humanitarian aid over the last ten years, accounting for US\$19 billion (23.5%) of the total allocated to specific countries.




FIGURE 1: A BREAKDOWN OF DAC DONORS' BILATERAL ODA TO ETHIOPIA, 2008




Source: OECD DAC

FIGURE 2: A MAP OF AID, GNI AND SOME KEY EVENTS, 1995-2008



Source: OECD DAC and British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC)

FIGURE 10: FTS-REPORTED HUMANITARIAN AID FROM NON-DAC DONORS, 2000-2009



Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS data

## NON-DAC DONORS

### VOLUMES AND TRENDS

Humanitarian aid from non-DAC donors amounted to US\$224 million in 2009, a sharp fall from the US\$1.1 billion in 2008 and the fourth lowest amount reported since 2000. The 80% fall in contributions is not entirely surprising as 44% of the humanitarian aid in 2008 was accounted for by a one-off contribution of US\$500 million from Saudi Arabia to WFP's special appeal on the food crisis. (See Figure 10).

Humanitarian aid from non-DAC donors is characterised by similar one-off contributions, which result in big year-on-year fluctuations. In 2001 for example, US\$645 million (or 88%) of the US\$734 million total was from Saudi Arabia to Palestine/OPT. Not all the annual fluctuations are due to large contributions from a single donor. In 2005, at least 75% or US\$476.6 million of humanitarian aid


from non DAC donors was given by 91 countries in response to the Indian Ocean earthquake-tsunami.

### MAIN DONORS

In 2009 Saudi Arabia was the largest donor accounting for US\$51.8 million (23%) of the total. United Emirates (UAE), Kuwait and the Russian Federation also reported contributions of over US\$30 million. The top ten donors contributed 93% of total non-DAC humanitarian aid in 2009. (See Figure 11).

In the last five years only five non-DAC donors have been ever-present in the top ten list of contributors: Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait, Russia and Turkey. In terms of volume the three gulf states have been particularly important and of those Saudi Arabia's aid has been especially significant. It has been the largest non-DAC donor since 2005 and has been in

FIGURE 11: TOP 10 NON-DAC DONORS, 2009



Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS data

TABLE 3: TOP NON-DAC DONORS IN EACH YEAR, 2000-2009, RANKED BY TOTAL HUMANITARIAN AID OVER THE ENTIRE PERIOD.  
ALL FIGURES US\$ MILLION

DONORS (US\$m)	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	TOTAL
Saudi Arabia	11.7	656.7	28.8	59.2	35.1	115.9	131.1	212.5	727.2	51.8	2030.0
Korea	53.9	68.8	94.5	26.6	118.1	3.8	18.1	30.3	30.7	13.2	457.9
UAE	0.5	0.01		2.5	101.4	99.8	43.8	45.1	110.6	35.3	439.0
Kuwait		0.4	3.2	27.7	11.0	13.3	24.2	11.0	95.6	34.2	220.6
Russian Federation	1.8	0.8	17.8	17.2	17.5	20.5	19.9	2.9	44.0	32.5	175.0
Turkey	3.1	0.03	4.1	1.1	10.0	78.7	11.4	11.1	9.7	4.8	134.0
China	6.0	0.8	0.2	0.3	3.2	65.8	1.1	6.9	9.2	0.5	93.9
Qatar	0.6	1.0		15.3		45.7	4.5	0.2	2.5	12.9	82.7
India	0.2		7.4	12.9	0.4	25.0	1.0	1.0	5.2	14.6	67.9
South Africa	1.5	0.5	19.8	8.5	5.1	5.9	15.6	1.2	1.3	1.0	60.6
Thailand	0.2	0.1	0.7	0.4		10.9	0.1	0.04	27.4	0.1	39.9
Czech Republic	0.4	0.3	0.2	1.1	1.1	9.4	4.5	3.5	4.5	4.3	29.1
Kyrgyzstan						27.1			0.1		27.2
Algeria		0.0	4.8	3.2		14.8		0.01	0.01	0.01	22.7
Poland	0.02	0.5	0.2	0.1	0.2	6.9	2.2	2.2	3.3	2.1	17.6
Kazakhstan		0.2			1.0	3.0	0.8	0.1	9.7	0.1	14.8
Slovakia		0.4	0.1		0.04	3.5	1.0	1.4	3.1	0.9	10.4
Romania	2.3		3.2	0.2	0.1	0.8		0.4	2.4	0.1	9.5
Liechtenstein	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.9	1.3	2.2	3.3	0.4	9.0
Hong Kong							2.0	1.6	0.6	4.0	8.2
Libya	1.5				0.01	2.0	4.5				8.0
Iraq									8.0		8.0
Hungary		0.5	0.2	0.1	0.5	2.3	0.2	0.4	2.0	0.3	6.5
Israel	1.2	0.3	0.04	0.01		1.5	0.1	0.1	2.1	0.2	5.6
Bahrain							5.0				5.0
Oman	0.1		2.0		0.03					2.0	4.2
Trinidad and Tobago		0.1			1.3	2.0	0.02	0.1	0.02	0.02	3.5
Taiwan (Province of China)		1.0	0.1	0.1		0.3		0.3		0.01	1.8
Malawi	0.1			1.5							1.6
Namibia	0.8								0.2	0.001	1.0

<span style="color: orange;">■</span> Largest donor	<span style="color: lightblue;">■</span> 4th largest	<span style="color: pink;">■</span> 7th largest	<span style="color: olive;">■</span> 10th largest
<span style="color: yellow;">■</span> 2nd largest	<span style="color: limegreen;">■</span> 5th largest	<span style="color: purple;">■</span> 8th largest	<span style="color: grey;">■</span> Outside the top 10
<span style="color: cyan;">■</span> 3rd largest	<span style="color: blue;">■</span> 6th largest	<span style="color: red;">■</span> 9th largest	

Note that these figures do not include domestic response, i.e. support to humanitarian aid from within the donor country itself. Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS data

first place in seven of the last ten years, and has contributed as much as 89% of total non-DAC humanitarian aid (2001) with significant share of aid in both 2007 (62%) and 2008 (64%). In the ten years since 2000 the total of Saudi Arabia's humanitarian aid is has been just over US\$2 billion dollars. Its humanitarian aid peaked at US\$727.2 million in 2008, largely due to that one-off contribution to WFP's food aid programme.

Although there is a preponderance of aid from the same five or six non-DAC donors the funding over the last ten years reveals a rather diverse picture of donor countries. During that period there have been 30 countries that have at least once been a top 10 non-DAC donor.

MAIN CHANNELS

Traditionally non-DAC donors have channelled a large proportion of humanitarian aid bilaterally to affected governments – more than half (53%) in 2007 for instance. But in the past two years a different spending pattern has emerged. In 2009, more than three-quarters of non-DAC donors’ humanitarian aid was channelled through UN agencies, with all of the top five donors channelling the majority of their funding through these channels (see Figure 12). At the same time, government-to-government humanitarian aid contributions fell from US\$348.7 million in 2008 to US\$16.4 million in 2009. This could be due to the fact that Saudi Arabia had made significant government-to-government contributions to Yemen (US\$103.9 million) and China (US\$76.2 million) in 2008 which have not been repeated in 2009.

Contributions to the CERF are another expression of the increasing shares of non-DAC donor humanitarian aid going

through multilateral mechanisms. Although in terms of absolute volumes non-DAC donor contributions to the CERF are very small (US\$6.8 million in 2009 compared to US\$384 million from DAC donors), the number of non-DAC governments channelling money through this mechanism increased from 54 in 2008 to 62 in 2009.

In 2009 the Republic of Korea was the 15<sup>th</sup> largest donor to channel funds through the CERF making contributions worth US\$3 million, which is more than individual contributions from six DAC donors – Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Greece, Austria and Portugal.


In 2009, non-DAC donor contributions via the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement declined significantly, with only US\$6 million recorded in the FTS data. These had been at US\$86.8 million in 2008 (US\$81.9 million of which from UAE) and US\$105.1 million in 2009.

**HUMANITARIAN AID IN THE NON-DAC CONTEXT**

Non-DAC donor analysis of humanitarian aid relies on data from the Financial Tracking Service (FTS) – currently the most comprehensive and comparable data available on this group of donors. Donors and implementing agencies report their humanitarian aid expenditure to the FTS based on a broad definition of humanitarian aid as “an intervention to help people who are victims of a natural disaster or conflict meet their basic needs and rights”. The aid is: to save lives, to alleviate suffering and to prevent the occurrence of another emergency; guided by principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence; and to protect civilians.


The voluntary nature of reporting to the FTS means that not all humanitarian aid from all donors is captured.

FIGURE 12: NON-DAC HUMANITARIAN AID CHANNEL OF DELIVERY BREAKDOWN, 2007-2009



Source: Development Initiatives analysis based on UN OCHA FTS data

FIGURE 13: TOP 10 RECIPIENTS OF NON-DAC DONOR HUMANITARIAN AID, 2009



Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS data

## RECIPIENT COUNTRIES

The single largest recipient country of non-DAC donor humanitarian aid contributions in 2009 was Palestine/OPT which received US\$99.7 million, or 45% of all humanitarian aid from non-DAC donors. Since 2001 Palestine/OPT has featured every year in the top 10 recipient countries and was the top recipient in both 2001 and 2009. Over the decade it has received 30% (US\$967.5 million) of all humanitarian aid to recipient countries from non-DAC governments. In 2008 the top recipient was China (US\$125.1 million) followed by Arab countries, Yemen (US\$105.3 million) and Palestine/OPT (US\$91.6 million) – see Figure 13.

In 2009, 76% of all non-DAC donor reported contributions were spent in three countries – Palestine/OPT, Pakistan and Afghanistan whilst over 90% of humanitarian aid from each of

the top five donors – Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, the Russian Federation and India – was channelled to just seven recipient countries (see Table 4). In comparison the figure for the top three recipients of DAC donor humanitarian aid, as reported through the FTS, was significantly lower at just 29%.

This level of concentration is a standard feature of non-DAC donor humanitarian aid. Every year since 2000 more than 61% of humanitarian aid from non-DAC donors has been spent in the top three countries. Since 2006 at least one Arab country has appeared in the top three recipient countries – Palestine/OPT in 2009; Yemen and Palestine/OPT in 2008; Sudan and Lebanon in 2007 and Lebanon in 2006. By way of contrast, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) consistently appears in the top three recipients of non-DAC donor humanitarian aid between 2000 and 2004.

TABLE 4: TOP FIVE NON DAC DONORS TOP THREE RECIPIENT COUNTRIES, 2009

	SAUDI ARABIA	UAE	KUWAIT	RUSSIA	INDIA
Top recipient	Palestine/OPT	Pakistan	Palestine/OPT	Afghanistan	Afghanistan
2nd recipient	Pakistan	Palestine/OPT		Palestine/OPT	Sri Lanka
3rd recipient	Ethiopia	Yemen		DRC/Ethiopia	Palestine/OPT
TOP 3 RECIPIENTS	79%	98%	100%	86%	99%

Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS data

# Palestine/OPT

The ongoing conflict in Palestine/OPT has resulted in many Palestinians being denied access to basic provisions and services, and has created an environment of chronic food insecurity with continued dependence on international aid. The humanitarian crisis has heightened since Israel's blockade on Gaza in 2007 and the military offensive in December 2008 in which the movement of people and goods has been heavily restricted.


From 2008 to 2009 there has been an increase in humanitarian aid from a number of donors and through a variety of financial mechanisms. Humanitarian aid from DAC donors increased from US\$332.9 million to US\$539.6 million and non-DAC donor contributions increased from US\$91.6 million to US\$99.7 million in this period. Funding through pooled mechanisms also rose; the Emergency Response Fund (ERF) increased from US\$2.5 million to US\$7.5 million, and the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) increased its financing of humanitarian

interventions from US\$5 million to US\$9.4 million. [See Figure 1.]

Palestine/OPT has been in the top ten recipients of humanitarian aid from non-DAC donors since 2001. Since 2007 humanitarian aid from non-DAC donors has steadily increased and its share of the total has also risen. (See Table 1.)

In 2009, 13% of total contributions were from non-DAC donors compared to 71% of shares from DAC donors. Kuwait was the most significant donor channelling all its reported humanitarian aid for that year, US\$34 million, to Palestine/OPT. This amounted to 34% of total non-DAC donor aid to Palestine/OPT. Kuwait was followed by Saudi Arabia, US\$32.2 million (32%) and then Qatar, US\$10.1 million (10%). In comparison, DAC donors reported US\$539.6 million to Palestine/OPT of which the United States gave 34% (US\$183.4 million). Whilst the US gave much more aid to Palestine/OPT in total volume Kuwait gave more per person, US\$11.4 compared to the US figure of US\$0.6.

FIGURE 1: FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO PALESTINE/OPT, 2008-2009



Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS, CERF and World Bank data

TABLE 2: GOVERNMENT DONOR FUNDING TO PRDP, 2008-2010

US\$m	2008	2009	2010
Australia	23.8	8.0	
Canada	14.2		14.9
Finland	3.9		
France	1.5	5.2	
Kuwait	80.0		
Norway	59.8	47.9	40.2
Poland	0.5		
United Kingdom	67.6	46.0	25.8
TOTAL	251.3	107.1	80.9

Source: World Bank

In 2007 an ERF was established in Palestine/OPT. The aim of an ERF is to facilitate the rapid release of funding to enable humanitarian actors to respond more efficiently and effectively to emergencies. Since its establishment in 2007, the ERF for Palestine/OPT has

been funded by DAC donors. In contrast, some non-DAC donors have provided aid through the Palestinian Reform and Development Plan (PRDP) Trust Fund – a Multi Donor Trust Fund (MDTF). The PRDP was established in response to a number of donors requesting an “independent supervised mechanism for channelling budget support funds to Palestine” that would reduce transaction costs. Since it was set up in 2008 total donor contributions to the PRDP have declined from US\$251.3 million to US\$107.1 million in 2009. Kuwait was the largest donor to the fund in 2008 providing US\$80 million or 32% of total assistance, more than the United Kingdom and Norway who were the highest contributors in 2009 and 2010. (See Table 2.)

In 2009 the UN launched an US\$804.5 million appeal for humanitarian aid for Palestine/OPT of which 78% was funded. Non-DAC donors gave US\$86.1 million to this which was 17% of total government donations to the appeal. This funding was also equivalent to 42% of all non-DAC donor funding inside the appeals process in 2009. In 2010 the UN launched another appeal for humanitarian aid to the value of US\$664.5 million.

POPULATION

**4.3 million**

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX VALUE  
110 OUT OF 182 COUNTRIES

**0.737**

LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH  
66 OUT OF 176 COUNTRIES

**73.3 years**

ADULT LITERACY RATE  
53 OUT OF 151 COUNTRIES

**93.8%**

PEOPLE NOT USING  
AN IMPROVED WATER SOURCE  
72 OUT OF 150 COUNTRIES

**11%**

WEST BANK AND GAZA CLASSED AS


**Fragile state**

TABLE 1: NON-DAC DONOR HUMANITARIAN AID TO PALESTINE/OPT, 2001-2009

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Humanitarian aid (US\$m)	645.4	2.5	2.7	92.6	23.7	6.6	2.6	91.6	99.7
Humanitarian aid to Palestine/OPT as a share of their aid to all countries	88%	1%	1%	30%	5%	3%	1%	17%	48%

Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS data

FIGURE 14: NON-DAC DONOR REGIONAL PRIORITIES, 2009



Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS data

## REGIONAL TRENDS

Regionally in 2009, the Middle East received the biggest share of humanitarian aid from non-DAC donors, US\$107.7 million or 51% followed by South-Central Asia, US\$65.7 million (31%) and sub-Saharan Africa US\$24.4 million (11%). It is often assumed that humanitarian assistance from these donors is regionally prioritised, and that they are more inclined to support neighbouring recipient countries during humanitarian crises.

The data supports this assumption and shows that, with the exception of South America, Africa, north of Sahara and Europe (whose humanitarian contributions are often small) that the top recipient region is the same as


the donor region. Donors from South-Central Asia gave 92% of aid to the same region; the Middle East gave 66% to the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa gave 87% of humanitarian aid to sub-Saharan Africa. (See Figure 14.)

In times of humanitarian crisis the role of national governments and neighbouring countries is vital in providing aid, in assisting the emergency and in housing refugees. For example, in 2008 15 of the top 20 countries housing refugees were non-DAC countries and the top three – Syria, Iran and Pakistan – housed 32% of all refugees. (See Figure 15.)

Non-DAC donors often support and prioritise emergencies that are regionally located. There are a number of explanations for non-DAC donor

prioritisation which include historical links from colonialism, regional proximity, the influence of the diaspora, housing and foreign policy. However, regional priorities and interests are not just limited to non-DAC donors, although the concentration of their aid is much higher. Both DAC and non-DAC donors channel humanitarian aid to certain recipients for specific reasons such as location, language or history. For example, Australia supports emergencies that are in the same geographical area such as Asia-Pacific and Spain's humanitarian strategy outlines priority countries, many of which are Spanish speaking, such as the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia and Paraguay.

FIGURE 15: NUMBER OF REFUGES IN TOP RECIPIENT COUNTRIES, 2008



Source: UNHCR



## GOVERNMENT DONOR PRIORITIES, PATTERNS AND PROCESSES COMPARED

### REGION AND COUNTRY

Decisions about where to spend humanitarian aid can be influenced by a number of (often interrelated) factors including: access and logistics; strategy, politics and diplomacy (policies on aid, national security, climate change and the environment); public and media opinion; historic/geographic/cultural ties; and experience in the area requiring intervention. While humanitarian financing is supposed to be governed by the principles of humanity, neutrality, independence and impartiality, and based on need, policy and practice nonetheless varies widely by donor – whether DAC or non-DAC, government or non-government donors – and sometimes for very practical reasons.


Our analysis shows that DAC donors have spent the vast majority of their aid in Africa and that non-DAC donors prioritise Arab countries, though as mentioned before this may be influenced by lack of full data. In 2008, only three countries appeared on the top 10 list of recipients of both DAC and non-DAC humanitarian aid – Sudan, Palestine/OPT and Myanmar – all of which were also subject of UN CAP appeals that year. Volumes of aid from DAC donors to these countries were higher. But prioritisation as a share of overall aid expenditure also varied. 17% of non-DAC humanitarian aid went to Palestine compared to 8% of DAC donor aid and 13% of humanitarian aid from non-DAC donors went to Myanmar compared to only 4% from DAC donors. (See Figure 16 and Table 5.)

TABLE 5: TOP 10 RECIPIENTS OF DAC AND NON-DAC DONOR CONTRIBUTIONS COMPARED, 2008

TOP 10 NON-DAC DONOR RECIPIENTS	NON-DAC US\$m	SHARE OF NON-DAC TOTAL
China	125.1	23.8%
Yemen	105.3	20.0%
Palestine/OPT	91.6	17.4%
Myanmar	68	12.9%
Sudan	24.4	4.6%
Tajikistan	22.8	4.3%
DPRK	15.5	3.0%
Georgia	8.2	1.5%
Jordan	8.1	1.5%
Syria	5.1	1.0%
TOP 10 DAC DONOR RECIPIENTS	DAC US\$m	SHARE OF DAC TOTAL
Sudan	1394.6	13.7%
Afghanistan	868.4	8.5%
Ethiopia	828.6	8.1%
Palestine/OPT	792.7	7.8%
Somalia	562.6	5.5%
DRC	545.2	5.4%
Iraq	379.2	3.7%
Myanmar	359.6	3.5%
Zimbabwe	332.7	3.3%
Kenya	301.8	3.0%


Source: UNOCHA FTS and OECD DAC

FIGURE 16: COMPARISON OF SHARES OF HUMANITARIAN AID PROVIDED TO TOP RECIPIENT COUNTRIES BY DAC AND NON DAC DONORS, 2008



Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC and UN OCHA FTS data

FIGURE 17: SHARE OF FUNDING FROM DAC AND NON-DAC DONORS OF HUMANITARIAN AID TO THE TOP TWO RECIPIENTS OF NON DAC HUMANITARIAN AID IN 2007 AND 2008



Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS data

Analysis also shows that non-DAC donor humanitarian aid is much more heavily concentrated than humanitarian aid of DAC donors. Over 90% of humanitarian aid from the top five non-DAC donors in 2009 was channelled to just seven recipient countries. As a result, at individual country level, the influence of non-DAC donors is much stronger than their share of global governmental humanitarian assistance might suggest. In some countries they will be providing very significant shares of the overall resources. (See Figure 17.)

## SECTOR

Food has traditionally accounted for the largest proportion of humanitarian aid, amounting to US\$7.5 billion (or 36.6%) of the US\$20.5 billion in governmental humanitarian aid reported through the FTS between the beginning of 2007 and the end of 2009. Food aid peaked at US\$3.2 billion in 2008, driven by the food price crisis. US\$1.5 billion of this was from the United States – the world's biggest food aid donor. The main recipients of food aid over the last few years have been Ethiopia and Sudan. Somalia was a fairly significant recipient in 2009 as was Zimbabwe in 2007.


After food, 'multisector' expenditure (meaning projects with no one dominant

sector, such as nutrition projects or ones that focus on IDP or refugee humanitarian needs) is the next most significant area, accounting for 24.7% (US\$5 billion) of expenditure since 2006. This was a particularly significant area for non-DAC donors in 2008, driven by Saudi Arabia's contributions to the governments of China and Yemen following the earthquake and floods in each of those countries. (See Figure 18.)

Just under 40% of FTS-reported humanitarian aid has been spent on agriculture, coordination and support services, economic recovery and infrastructure, education, health (the next most significant sector, with an 8.9% share of funding since 2007), mine action, protection/human rights/rule of law, safety and security of staff and operations, shelter and non-food items and water and sanitation.


Food and 'multisector' are the two main priority areas for both DAC and non-DAC donors. Only food aid shares similar proportions with priorities diverging quite extensively thereafter. Data shows that non-DAC donors support sectors that reflect commodities e.g. food and shelter/non food items, rather than services e.g. education and coordination/support services. (See Figure 19.)

FIGURE 18: SECTORAL EXPENDITURE AS REPORTED THROUGH THE FTS, 2006-2009



Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS data

FIGURE 19: SHARES OF HUMANITARIAN AID BY SECTOR FROM DAC AND NON-DAC DONORS, 2007-2009



Source: Development Initiatives analysis based on UN OCHA FTS data

## SUPPORT FOR UN PROCESSES AND FINANCING MECHANISMS

### SUPPORT FOR MULTILATERAL CHANNELS

Traditionally, non-DAC donors have channelled a larger proportion of humanitarian aid bilaterally to the affected recipient governments whereas in contrast, DAC donors have favoured multilateral channels. In 2008 just 3% of DAC humanitarian aid was channelled bilaterally compared 30.8% of non-DAC donor humanitarian aid. Whilst the proportion of non-DAC donor humanitarian contributions directed to recipient governments is higher than DAC contributions, recent trends show that traditional non-DAC donor patterns of channelling humanitarian aid seem to be changing. For example, in 2009 non-DAC donor bilateral contributions dropped from 30.8% to 7.3% and contributions through UN multilateral organisations rose from 51.6% to 83.6%. The evidence suggests this may not be a complete change in delivery priorities. UN appeals for Pakistan, Palestine/OPT and Afghanistan – all priorities for non-DAC donors – may have promoted more funding through UN channels.

### SUPPORT FOR FINANCING MECHANISMS

Government donors make significant contributions to pooled funding mechanisms. In 2008:

- of total government donor humanitarian contributions (US\$12.8 billion), 6.8% (US\$851 million) was channelled to humanitarian pooled funds (CERF, ERF, and CHF)


- the majority of this funding was from DAC donors (US\$845 million, 97.4%)
- government donors gave US\$452.3 million to the CERF (99.8% of the total) of which US\$446.5 million (98.5%) was from DAC donors and US\$5.8 million (1.3%) from non-DAC donors
- the largest DAC donor to pooled funds (CERF, ERFs and CHFs) was the UK with US\$255 million; the highest non-DAC contributor was Korea with US\$2 million.

### SUPPORT FOR THE CONSOLIDATED APPEALS PROCESS (CAP)

Since 2000, governments and the EC have provided over US\$26 billion in response to 235 appeals launched by the UN Office of Coordination for Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) as part of the consolidated appeals process (CAP). The overwhelming majority of this (97.1%) has come from DAC donors.

In the past non-DAC donors have tended to channel much smaller proportions of their humanitarian aid through the UN CAP process. There was a major change in 2009 however, where 78.2% of non-DAC donor funding was spent inside the appeal. Data shows that this was driven largely by a by a few non-DAC donors giving to appeals in countries that non-DAC donors usually favour, (UAE US\$30 million and Pakistan US\$25.5 million to Pakistan, Saudi Arabia US\$25 million and Kuwait US\$34 million to Palestine/OPT and US\$10.4 million from India and US\$10 million from the Russian Federation to Afghanistan.)

FIGURE 20: SHARE OF FTS-REPORTED HUMANITARIAN EXPENDITURE SPENT ON UN CAP APPEALS, 2000-2009



Source: UN OCHA FTS





TABLE 6: DAC AND NON-DAC DONOR SUPPORT FOR UN CAP APPEALS, 2009

TOP 10 UN CAP APPEALS 2009	NON-DAC DONORS		DAC DONORS		
	US\$m	% total		US\$m	% total
Palestine/OPT	86.1	42.0%	Sudan	1,134.00	24.1%
Pakistan	59.8	29.1%	DRC	448.24	9.5%
Afghanistan	20.5	10.0%	Pakistan	440.50	9.3%
Kenya	13.8	6.7%	Palestine/OPT	427.25	9.1%
Iraq	5.0	2.4%	Kenya	332.68	7.1%
DRC	4.9	2.4%	Iraq	327.25	6.9%
Zimbabwe	3.9	1.9%	Zimbabwe	291.54	6.2%
Sri Lanka	3.8	1.9%	Chad	288.81	6.1%
Sudan	1.8	0.9%	Afghanistan	263.76	5.6%
West Africa	1.5	0.7%	Somalia	239.68	5.1%
10 others	4.2	2.0%	12 others	521.0	11.0%

Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS data

Non-DAC donor funding inside the CAP was heavily concentrated on three appeals in countries that are known priorities for non-DAC humanitarian aid – Palestine/OPT, Pakistan and Afghanistan. 81% of non-DAC CAP appeal expenditure focused on these three countries. DAC donor concentration on the top 3 appeals – Sudan, DRC and Pakistan – was just over half of this at 42.9%.

The evidence suggests that it is not changes in non-DAC priorities that have lead to this shift in funding inside appeals (as well as increased funding for the UN) but rather that the presence of appeals (and the humanitarian infrastructure that goes with them) has allowed non-DAC donors the opportunity to fund in this way in the countries that are their priority recipients.



## SHIFTING STRUCTURES, CHANGING TRENDS

There is increasing recognition that the humanitarian system is, and has been, much more diverse than previously represented. The perception that humanitarian relations between nation states is one where a set group of donor countries gives to a set group of recipient countries is shown to be flawed by the data, which highlights that many countries (some of which are still recipients of aid) have contributed to humanitarian assistance.

The signs are that the trend towards a more complicated humanitarian world is likely to continue. Whilst non-DAC donor volumes of aid remain small (though almost certainly undercounted as well) they are increasingly influential actors in the countries in which they prioritise their aid. Nations in crisis are increasingly taking control of humanitarian situations, leading and directing how aid should be allocated and implemented, rather than just playing a part. And both non-DAC donors and countries receiving humanitarian aid have their own blocs of power (the Arab League, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Union of South American Nations etc).


There have been signs of progress. The UN Development Cooperation

Forum (DCF) has been working on standardisation of development standards of DAC and non-DAC donors. The Dubai International Humanitarian Aid and Development (DIHAD) Conference, now in its seventh year, is growing in influence. There has been a growing involvement of non-DAC donors in high level events such as the Bogotá High Level Event on South-South Cooperation and Capacity.

The humanitarian system, however, is perhaps isolated from some of this progress. Whilst itself not designed to exclude certain elements of humanitarian support, it has evolved into something that has done so, largely because it has been dominated by the DAC donor countries and humanitarian organisations largely based in those same donor countries. Other nations, whether donors or recipients, have been in one way or another isolated from the system and its processes of humanitarian standardisation and integration. Some of these donors have quite different views on how aid should be managed and make quite different choices about where it should be spent.

Is it a choice between integration and diversity or can the system adapt to new ways of doing humanitarian business?

# FINANCING MECHANISMS







# FINANCING MECHANISMS

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Until 2005 there were only five main groups of organisations spending humanitarian assistance funds: international NGOs, domestic governments and organisations, UN funds agencies and programmes, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and government donors. Each element within these groups has a different mandate, capacity and priority. UN humanitarian coordinators, senior representatives of the humanitarian system charged with ensuring efficient and effective delivery of a common humanitarian action plan, had few if any funds that they were able to deploy directly. While in long-running complex emergencies and large natural disasters the appeals process brought together a collective statement of needs, there was no collective pot of finance to ensure that gaps could be filled or strategic priorities met. Similarly, donors who wanted to offer holistic and coherent support to post-conflict and transition countries found themselves facing choices about individual agency programmes – choices many of them felt ill equipped to make.

The pattern at country level was mirrored internationally. The sum of all the individual humanitarian organisations' priorities resulted in an inequitable allocation of humanitarian resources between countries affected by crisis. Some were generously funded; others profoundly under-resourced and there was no global mechanism to right the balance.

Country level pooled funds and the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) were thus established to improve both humanitarian effectiveness at country level and equity at a global level.

Pooled mechanisms are now a significant part of the humanitarian system, used by many donors as a way of ensuring their own aid spending is coordinated and able to respond to shifting priorities in a flexible and coherent way, relying on good quality on-the-ground information based on operational presence. To date the four main humanitarian pooled mechanisms have received more than US\$2.9 billion since 2006, with the figures for 2008 and 2009 (both US\$878 million and US\$733 million respectively) accounting for about 7% of total humanitarian government aid for those years.

As always, financing is about more than money and the pooled funds have changed the way humanitarian assistance is undertaken: some organisations are able to access more funds under different terms; humanitarian coordinators have more room for manoeuvre; new and more diverse donors are enabled to respond to complex situations; donors that do not finance the pooled funds can still contribute by providing information on how they are allocating their own money. And the development of pooled financing has not happened in a vacuum. Over the same period the cluster system has been implemented with similar goals to improve coordination and coherence.

POOLED FUNDING: AN INCREASING TREND


Between 2006 and 2008 donor contributions to humanitarian pooled funds steadily and consistently rose with the majority of funding channelled through the CERF. In 2008 the funds received total contributions amounting to US\$878 million. However after this steady increase the total donor contributions to the funds decreased by 16% in 2009 to US\$733 million; only the IFRC's Disaster Relief Emergency Fund (DREF) witnessed an increase of 37% or just over US\$3 million in the amount it received from donors. (See Figure 1.)

The decline in total CERF contributions could be attributed to the fluctuation in exchange rates and not a decrease in actual contributions. Many of the funds operate in US dollars, which at the start

of 2009 were very strong against other currencies; therefore contributions by donors at that time in their national currency were worth much less than in 2008. Spain contributed a total of EUR30 million in 2008 and 2009. However its 2009 contribution, once converted to US dollars, dropped from US\$45.5 million to US\$44.2 million – over US\$1 million less than the previous year.

Nevertheless, despite the fluctuation in exchange rates, the amount of humanitarian aid spent through financing mechanisms as a share of the total was maintained at 7% in 2009 suggesting that there has not been a decline in global commitment to these mechanisms. The funding profile for individual donors is quite different.

FIGURE 1: CONTRIBUTIONS TO HUMANITARIAN POOLED FUNDS, 2006-2009




Source: UN OCHA FTS, IFRC, and UN CERF

WHAT ARE HUMANITARIAN POOLED FUNDS?

The UN humanitarian reform process started in 2005 and built on existing thinking on the use of pooled funding as a mechanism for channeling humanitarian assistance. This resulted in the evolution of the existing loan-based global revolving fund into the present day grant-funded CERF and the creation of several more country-level pooled funding mechanisms. There are now various humanitarian pooled funds. Here we focus on the IFRC's Disaster Relief Emergency Fund (DREF) and those managed by the United Nations: CERF, emergency response funds (ERFs) and common humanitarian funds (CHF).

- The CERF allows donor governments and the private sector to pool their financing on a global level to enable more timely and reliable humanitarian assistance to those affected by natural disasters and armed conflicts.
- CHFs are in-country pooled mechanisms. Funding received is unearmarked. This allows money to be allocated on the basis of needs (as defined in the emergency's humanitarian action plan).
- ERFs are also country-level mechanisms. They vary from CHFs in that they have the facility to provide finance to small-scale projects, allowing more national NGOs to access resources.
- The DREF is a fund set up by the IFRC to provide immediate funding to Red Cross and Red Crescent societies responding to a humanitarian emergency. Donors to this fund include DAC governments but also a range of smaller governments, Red Cross and Red Crescent national societies and private donors.

FIGURE 2: TOP 10 DONORS TO HUMANITARIAN POOLED FINANCING MECHANISMS (CERF, CHF AND ERF), 2006-2009



DAC donors are ordered left to right according to their overall humanitarian aid expenditure, based on partial preliminary DAC data for 2009. (The United Kingdom is the 3rd largest DAC donor and Ireland is the 17th.) Source: UN OCHA FTS, UN CERF and OECD DAC data

## CONTRIBUTORS TO POOLED FUNDING

Pooled funds are emerging as significant tools for a wide range of humanitarian actors - yet the majority of funding is provided by a relatively small group of donors.

### OECD DAC GOVERNMENTS

The top ten contributors to pooled funds, all members of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC), contributed 94% (US\$674 million) of the US\$720 million total in 2009. (See Figure 2.)

The UN's pooled funds rely on the support of three main donors - the United Kingdom, Sweden and the Netherlands. In both 2008 and 2009, these three donors represented just over 60% of the funding from the top ten donors.

The United Kingdom is the top donor to humanitarian funding mechanisms. Its contributions increased by 10% to reach US\$255 million in 2008, as part of the country's near 20% increase in overall humanitarian funding that year. However, although the United Kingdom's overall humanitarian aid expenditure increased by 4.2% in 2009 (a figure that might rise further still when the full final data is released in December 2010), its contributions to pooled funds fell sharply (by 28.5%) to US\$182 million. The decline could in part be due to exchange rates. In 2009 sterling rose from 0.55 to 0.64 against the dollar. If the 2008 exchange rate is applied to the contributions made in 2009 then the decline in actual contributions is reduced to 17%.

Pooled funds also saw contributions from their second largest contributor, the Netherlands, contract by 18.2% in 2009. This cannot be explained solely by a fluctuation in currency rates (as the euro only witnessed a slight increase from 0.69 to 0.71 against the US dollar) but could in part reflect the overall decline in humanitarian expenditure by the Netherlands in 2009, which could prove to be up to 46% lower than in 2008.

Partial preliminary data for 2009 indicates a similar story for Sweden. Its humanitarian aid expenditure declined by 17.6% in 2009 and its contributions to pooled funds fell by 2.6%. In fact, of the top ten donors to the pooled funds, only Spain, Germany and Denmark increased their contributions in spite of overall reductions in total humanitarian aid expenditure. Therefore the overall decline in money channelled through the funds in 2009 does not necessarily signify a loss of trust in the mechanisms but perhaps reflects the status of global humanitarian financing.

Pooled funding accounts for a considerable share of some donors' overall humanitarian aid expenditure. The rationales for donors choosing to channel such large shares of their humanitarian aid expenditure in this way are varied. Others cite their ability to influence the humanitarian system, with increased efficiency and coordination without compromising core humanitarian principles. Some donors

TABLE 1: CHANGES IN DONOR CONTRIBUTIONS TO POOLED FUNDS, 2008-2009

2008-2009	CHANGE IN HUMANITARIAN AID (US\$m)	CHANGE IN HUMANITARIAN AID (%)	CHANGE IN POOLED FUNDING CONTRIBUTIONS (US\$m)	CHANGE IN POOLED FUNDING CONTRIBUTIONS (%)
United Kingdom	US\$43m	4.2%	-US\$73m	-28.5%
The Netherlands	-US\$291m	-46.0%	-US\$27m	-18.2%
Denmark	-US\$131m	-44.3%	US\$9m	72.5%
Sweden	-US\$106m	-17.6%	-US\$3m	-2.6%
Norway	-US\$142m	-31.5%	-US\$18m	-19.9%

say that the funds allow them to reach target groups that they may not be able to reach through bilateral channels. In addition, pooled funding mechanisms allow for a transfer of the bulk of the decision-making process, thus reducing the need for donor infrastructure and costs whilst also transferring decisions to the field where there should be much more substantial expertise and local knowledge.

The United Kingdom, Ireland and the Netherlands channelled the highest shares of humanitarian aid through pooled funding mechanisms in 2008 (25.1%, 24.6% and 23.5% respectively). All three donors contributed to the CERF, CHF and ERFs. Germany, the second largest overall provider of humanitarian aid within the top 10 contributors to pooled funds, channelled just 2% through pooled funding mechanisms, in this case just the CERF. This is below the average of 7.2% for all DAC donors. (See Figure 3.)


The largest donor of humanitarian aid, the United States, is notably absent from the list of top 10 contributors to pooled funds. It has only contributed twice to the CERF – US\$10 million in 2006 (0.3% of its humanitarian aid expenditure) and US\$5 million in 2008 (0.1% of its

humanitarian aid expenditure). Its rationale for this is that it has a very large field presence and in-country knowledge and consequently prefers to fund through bilateral channels.

### NON-DAC GOVERNMENTS

Over the last few years, the humanitarian aid of governments such as India, China, Korea and Saudi Arabia has become increasingly visible alongside that of the DAC governments. Financing mechanisms have played a key role in providing small and new donors with ways of channelling funding in response to humanitarian crises and post-conflict situations. These donors often do not have the necessary humanitarian infrastructure, field presence or in-country experience to participate and contribute in the same way as some DAC donors. The response to the ERF following the Haiti earthquake demonstrates this phenomenon – of the 27 contributing governments only three of them were DAC donors and of the remaining 24 countries all but four received humanitarian aid in 2008. These 24 donors contributed US\$15 million to the ERF – in 2008 they received combined humanitarian aid of US\$1.2 billion.

FIGURE 3: SHARES OF HUMANITARIAN AID PROVIDED BY TOP 10 DONORS THROUGH POOLED FUNDING MECHANISMS, 2008



Source: Development Initiatives analysis based on OECD DAC, UN OCHA FTS and UN CERF data

On the one hand it could be said that these contributions demonstrate solidarity towards humanitarian assistance by contributing what may be a considerable amount of available funds. On the other it could be argued that these countries are recycling aid which has been given to them for developmental purposes by other donors. For example, in giving US\$1.5 million to the ERF, Nigeria could be seen as transferring part of the US\$378 million that it received in official development assistance (ODA) from the United Kingdom in 2008. The Haiti ERF is rather unique: never before have so many non-DAC donors pooled their emergency assistance through this type of in-country mechanism and certainly the appearance of so many countries that are actually recipients of aid is almost more unusual. (See Figure 4.)

But it is the CERF that has received the largest share of non-DAC donor contributions to pooled funds. In 2009 Korea, China and India contributed more money than several DAC donors, ranking 15th, 19th and 21st out of 91 donors respectively. The largest non-DAC contributor to the CERF, Korea, has given money to the fund every year. In 2009 it further increased its contributions to US\$3 million.

Between 2008 and 2009, the number of non-DAC donor governments contributing to the CERF increased from 54 to 61, with 14 brand new contributors, whilst in 2010, four new non-DAC donors have pledged money: the Russian Federation, Singapore, Madagascar and Mauritania.

In 2009 15 non-DAC donors to the fund were also recipients of humanitarian assistance and all of them except one, China, were recipients of CERF funding.

China along with Afghanistan, which also contributed to the CERF in 2009, receive a large amount of ODA. For China this amounted to US\$1.5 billion in 2008, US\$105 million of which was for humanitarian purposes, whilst Afghanistan received US\$4.3 billion, of which US\$871 million was humanitarian. (See Figure 5.)


#### PRIVATE DONORS

The CERF also provides a diverse group of private donors with a way of channelling funds to humanitarian crises on a global level without having to necessarily develop their own detailed policies for aid. PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC), the Western Union Foundation (WUF), the Abu Dhabi National Energy Company PJSC (TAQA), Alexander Bodini Foundation and Baha'i International Community have all been consistent corporate donors. PWC has been the most significant by volume, though Jefferies, a major global securities and investment banking firm, became the largest corporate donor to date following the Haiti earthquake with a contribution of US\$1 million.

Notable new private donors for 2010 are Skanska USA Building Inc., Latin American Development Foundation, Bilken Holding AS and Daystar Christian Centre. Contributions have also been received from a Korean fan club of Kim Hyun Joong, customers of HSBC bank and employees of Endesa Group.


In addition, the CERF received numerous donations from individuals, totalling more than US\$39,000 in the aftermath of the earthquake in Haiti. Similarly, private donors have contributed to ERFs (Indonesia in 2006 and 2008, and to Haiti in 2010).

FIGURE 4: DONOR CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE ERF IN HAITI, 2010



Source: UN OCHA FTS

FIGURE 5: TOP NON-DAC DONORS TO THE CERF, 2006-2009



Source: UN CERF

## RECIPIENTS OF POOLED FUNDING

Globally 16 countries have two or more humanitarian funds in operation and this number is set to increase with the introduction of further country-level pooled funds. Eight such countries are located in sub-Saharan Africa with the concentration of funding occurring in Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). This is hardly surprising given that these countries are subject to ongoing conflict, have weak infrastructure, poor public services and are extremely fragile with in some cases non-existing governance. All these factors contribute to making them more susceptible and less prepared to respond effectively to climate-change induced natural disasters or increased humanitarian need caused by prolonged conflict. In-country pooled funds are also being considered by donors as a means of channelling humanitarian assistance to other countries where flexible and prioritised financing is needed including Palestine/OPT and Colombia.


Many of the countries that have in-country pooled funds (notably DRC and Sudan) are in the process of transitioning out of conflict and the funding mechanisms are proving to be a tool for channelling funds for recovery activities, which, arguably, is not what they were designed to do. According to the report on Resource Flows to Fragile and Conflict-affected States (OECD, 2010), nine of the top ten

recipients of humanitarian assistance through country-level pooled funds are classed as fragile states. The key characteristics of such states are that they tend to experience lower rates of aid predictability and higher volatility than other developing countries. It could be argued that financing mechanisms are therefore an important instrument for channelling both humanitarian and reconstruction assistance in these contexts as they promote coordination of funding as well as making aid more predictable, flexible and timely.

The top recipient country of humanitarian assistance channelled through the CERF, ERFs and CHF between 2006 and 2009 was Sudan, closely followed by DRC. These countries received US\$148 million and US\$141 million respectively in 2009. This is due in large part to the fact that both countries have CHFs that support their common humanitarian action plans (CHAPs). In 2008 Sudan received a total of US\$1.4 billion in humanitarian assistance and, of this total, 12.2% was channelled through the pooled funds. Yet in the DRC, 38.9% of the country's US\$473 million in humanitarian aid was channelled through pooled funds. (See Figure 6.)

In 2009 only three countries in sub-Saharan Africa had a common humanitarian fund – Sudan, DRC and Central African Republic (CAR). The

FIGURE 6: TOP TEN RECIPIENTS OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE THROUGH POOLED MECHANISMS, 2006-2009



Source: UN OCHA FTS and UN CERF

two former funds were established in 2006 with CAR joining in 2008 when the country's ERF evolved into a common humanitarian fund. These mechanisms are able to fund large projects in support of CHAPs in countries that are experiencing long and complex humanitarian emergencies. In 2008 the fund in Sudan disbursed US\$149 million to a combination of UN agencies and NGO projects. This compared to only US\$3 million in CAR due to the relatively small size of the appeal – US\$119 million compared with that of Sudan (US\$2. billion) and DRC (US\$737 million). In 2010 a new fund is proposed for Somalia with the aim of allocating funds twice-yearly.


In 2009, following the success of similar mechanisms in other countries, ERFs were established in Afghanistan, Colombia, Uganda and Kenya. This type of mechanism has become increasingly popular due to the fact that it allows the humanitarian coordinator in-country to allocate funding to small-scale projects that aim to address unexpected needs; this includes projects put forward by local NGOs. In 2008 the fund in Ethiopia received 8.6% of total humanitarian assistance to the country and, having received more than US\$120 million between 2006 and 2009, far above the

next highest, Somalia, with just less than US\$40 million. (See Figure 7.)

The CERF on the other hand has been established in order to fill the gaps not met by other mechanisms for humanitarian funding. The allocation of CERF funds is split between rapid response grants to sudden onset emergencies and grants to emergencies classed as underfunded by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). These grants are designed to go some way to ensuring that donor funding is more equitable and that sudden humanitarian emergencies are not prioritised to the detriment of other ongoing humanitarian needs. For example in 2008 and 2009, DRC was classed as an underfunded emergency; of the total it received from the CERF for these years 92.8% and 34.4% respectively were from this underfunded window. Kenya on the other hand received 75.4% and 69.5% of its CERF funding through the rapid response window in those same years.

Between 2007 and 2009 the CERF provided an average of 10% of total funding to countries that were not the subject of a UN consolidated or flash (CAP) appeal, compared to an average of just 3.9% to those with a CAP appeal.

FIGURE 7: ERF INCOME BY COUNTRY, 2007-2009



Source: UN OCHA FTS

Given that smaller crises are in general less likely to be underfunded, the CERF can help address financing gaps, where even small amounts make a big difference. CERF funding to Honduras after the flooding in 2008 was US\$1.5 million but that was 25% of the funding received. Similarly after the heavy flooding in Namibia in 2009, US\$1.3 million of the US\$4 million received was from the CERF, making it the highest donor. (See Table 3.)


In 2008, 55 countries received funding from the CERF, amounting to a total of US\$429 million. In 2009 the number of recipient countries decreased to 51. The total amount allocable by country also fell the same year to US\$397 million. DRC was the top recipient of the CERF from 2006-2008 inclusive. Somalia became the top recipient country in 2009, receiving a total of US\$60 million. Its 15.2% share of CERF funding in 2009 almost doubled that of the DRC, the next largest recipient. (See Figure 8.)

TABLE 3: CERF GRANTS, 2008 AND 2009

	2008	2009
Rapid response grants	70.1%	67.5%
Grants to underfunded emergencies	29.9%	32.5%

Source: UN CERF

FIGURE 8: RECIPIENTS OF CERF FUNDING, 2008-2009



Source: UN CERF




# Sudan

Sudan witnessed ongoing conflict for 21 years between the northern-dominated government of Sudan and the largely southern-based Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) until the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed in 2005. The country has also been subject to natural disasters including droughts and floods with 4 million people affected in 2009. Meanwhile, the complex humanitarian emergency in Darfur continues; the peace agreement remains threatened by inter-ethnic and inter-militia fighting; and in many places basic service provision remains seriously poor.

A CHF was set up in 2006 to support the country's CHAP. Since that date the fund has received US\$609 million in donor contributions. The largest amount, US\$171 million, was received in 2006 from a total of five donors and equated to 13.6% of the country's humanitarian aid. Although the number of donors supporting the fund has increased over the last four years, the total amount contributed has declined, as has the percentage channelled through the fund. (See Table 4.)

UN agencies are the main implementers of CHF funds in Sudan. In 2009 the UN received 70.3% of total expenditure which was 5% higher than in 2008. A portion of this increase can be explained by the fact that in March 2009, 13 international NGOs were expelled from northern Sudan and UN agencies were forced to step in to fill the programme delivery gap, thereby increasing UN funding requirements. Sudan also receives money from the CERF. All funds received in 2008 and 2009 were allocated from the rapid response window, largely in response to sudden IDP movement. Sudan was not classed as underfunded as its humanitarian appeals for the two

ALLOCATION OF CHF FUNDING THROUGH NGOS AND UN AGENCIES



Source: OCHA

previous years 2007 and 2008 received 81% and 70% respectively of the required funding.

Following the peace agreement in 2005, two MDTFs were established by the World Bank, one for South Sudan and the other national, both designed to address the reconstruction and recovery needs following years of conflict. Between 2006 and 2009 these MDTFs received almost the same amount of funding (US\$630 million) as the CHF. However, more money (US\$425 million from a total of 14 donors) has been channelled through the Southern Sudan fund - not surprising since the bulk of construction and reconstruction is required in the south. Sudan also received US\$4 million through the World Bank's SPF in 2008 and US\$9 million at the start of 2010 from the UN PBF. (See Figure 10.)

ODA, 2008

**US\$2.9 billion**

POPULATION

**41 million**

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX  
150 OUT OF 182 COUNTRIES

**0.531**

LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH  
142 OUT OF 176 COUNTRIES

**57.9 years**

ADULT LITERACY RATE (% AGES 15+)  
126 OUT OF 159 COUNTRIES

**60.9%**

PEOPLE NOT USING AN  
IMPROVED WATER SOURCE

**30%**

CLASSED AS


**Fragile state**

TABLE 4: MONEY CHANNELLED THROUGH POOLED FUNDS IN SUDAN

POOLED FUNDS IN SUDAN	2006	2007	2008
CHF (US\$m)	171	167	150
CHF as a share of humanitarian aid	13.6%	13.4%	11.0%
MDTF (US\$m)	200	209	110
MDTF as a share of ODA	9.8%	9.9%	4.6%

Source: Development Initiatives analysis based on OECD DAC, UN OCHA FTS and UN World bank data

FIGURE 10: MONEY CHANNELLED THROUGH POOLED FUNDS IN SUDAN COMPARED TO OTHER HUMANITARIAN AID



Source: Development Initiatives analysis based on OECD DAC, UN OCHA FTS and UN CERF data

# Iraq


The invasion of Iraq in 2003 was followed by years of insurgency and inter-ethnic strife that reached a peak in late 2006/early 2007. This was largely a national political and security-related crisis – in general, humanitarian need, although intense at times, was more sporadic in nature and location. At present the country is in a transition between crisis and recovery.

An ERF was set up in 2007 in order to ensure that rapid response funding was available to address the ongoing needs. Since then, the fund has received US\$24 million in donor contributions. The largest amount, US\$21 million, was received in 2008 from a total of seven donors including Iraq’s MDTF, the International Reconstruction Fund For Iraq (IRFFI), and the CERF. However this equated to only 5.6% of total humanitarian aid to the country.

Iraq’s MDTF was jointly established in 2004 by the World Bank and the UN Development Group (UNDG) to address the reconstruction and recovery needs following the outbreak of war. The volume of funding channeled through Iraq’s MDTF is similar to that channeled through the MDTF in Sudan - but because ODA to Iraq is so much higher than to Sudan, it represents a much smaller share (0.9% in 2008 compared to 4.6% in Sudan. Iraq also received US\$5 million through the World Bank’s SPF in 2009, the majority of which financed a service delivery programme. (See Table 5.)

In Iraq, national NGOs are the main implementers of ERF money. In 2009 they received 73% of total expenditure.

ALLOCATION OF ERF FUNDING THROUGH NGOS AND UN AGENCIES



Source: UN OCHA FTS

Direct funding to national NGOs is one of the benefits of an ERF. However the reason why the proportion is so high in Iraq is due to the unstable and insecure environment, which made it incredibly difficult for international organisations to operate. No ERF money was implemented by UN agencies.

The CERF funds to Iraq in 2009 were allocated from the rapid response window. However in 2008 both rapid response and underfunded emergency grants were allocated to Iraq. This was due to the fact that there was no UN consolidated appeal process (CAP) in 2007 and appeals outside the CAP were severely underfunded. (See Figure 11.)

ODA, 2008  
**US\$9.9 billion**

POPULATION  
**31 million**

LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH  
**67.8 years**

ADULT LITERACY RATE (% AGE 15+)  
**74.1%**

PEOPLE NOT USING AN IMPROVED WATER SOURCE  
**23%**


CLASSED AS  
**Fragile state**

TABLE 5: MONEY CHANNELLED THROUGH POOLED FUNDS IN IRAQ

POOLED FUNDS IN IRAQ	2006	2007	2008
ERF (US\$m)	0	2	21
ERF as a share of humanitarian aid	0.0%	0.6%	5.6%
MDTF (US\$m)	214	170	85
MDTF as a share of ODA	2.4%	1.9%	0.9%
Total humanitarian aid to Iraq (US\$m)	365	335	379

Source: Development Initiatives analysis based on OECD DAC and UN OCHA FTS and UN CERF

FIGURE 11: MONEY CHANNELLED THROUGH POOLED FUNDS IN IRAQ COMPARED TO OTHER HUMANITARIAN AID



Source: Development Initiatives analysis based on OECD DAC, UN OCHA FTS and UN CERF data

TABLE 6: MATRIX OF IN-COUNTRY FINANCING MECHANISMS, 2008-2009

Country	Humanitarian				Recovery and peacebuilding					TOTAL US\$m	Hum share of ODA	Rec share of ODA	TOTAL % OF DAC DONOR ODA	
	CERF	CHF	ERF	DREF	MDTF	PBF	SPF							
Afghanistan	2008	2009	2008	2009	2008	2009	2008	2009	2008	2009	2008			
	US\$18m	US\$4m			US\$629m	US\$791m			US\$0.1m		647	0.5%	15.9%	16.4%
	US\$12m	US\$1m	US\$21m	US\$1m	US\$85m	US\$28m			US\$5m		118	1.1%	2.7%	3.8%
Ethiopia	US\$32m	US\$16m	US\$68m	US\$46m		US\$0.2m	US\$0.3m	US\$0.2m			100	5.4%		5.4%
Somalia	US\$12m	US\$61m	US\$12m	US\$13m					US\$1m	US\$6m	30	4.2%	1.1%	5.3%
Sudan	US\$16m	US\$26m	US\$150m	US\$122m	US\$110m	US\$112m	US\$0.2m	US\$0.3m	US\$110m	US\$4m	280	9.1%	6.3%	15.4%
DRC	US\$41m	US\$30m	US\$143m	US\$111m			US\$0.3m	US\$0.2m		US\$7m	184	18.8%		18.8%
CAR	US\$3m	US\$3m	US\$2m	US\$11m			US\$0.1m	US\$0.2m		US\$4m	9	4.6%	3.7%	8.3%
Haiti	US\$16m	US\$5m			US\$5m		US\$0.3m	US\$0m		US\$6m	28	3.8%	1.3%	5.1%
Kenya	US\$26m	US\$26m					US\$0.5m	US\$0.1m		US\$1m	27	2.8%	0.1%	2.8%
Uganda	US\$6m	US\$1m					US\$0.9m	US\$0.4m			7	0.7%		0.7%
Indonesia		US\$7m			US\$1m	US\$3m	US\$3m		US\$90m	US\$23m	91	0.2%	15.2%	15.4%
Palestine/OPT	US\$5m	US\$9m			US\$3m	US\$8m	US\$0.1m		US\$251m	US\$107m	259	0.6%	18.1%	18.7%
Sierra Leone									US\$0m	US\$17m	17		9.7%	9.7%
Myanmar	US\$28m	US\$3m					US\$0.2m				28	6.6%		6.6%
Zimbabwe	US\$11m	US\$27m	US\$3m	US\$4m			US\$0.4m			US\$0.2m	14	2.6%	0.0%	2.6%
Nepal	US\$13m	US\$6m	US\$0.1m				US\$0.3m			US\$3m	13	2.9%		2.9%
Colombia	US\$2m	US\$9m		US\$1m			US\$0.3m	US\$0.2m		US\$5m	2	0.2%		0.2%

Source: UN OCHA FTS, UN CERF, World Bank, UNDP, IFRC

## CONTEXTUALISING FINANCING MECHANISMS

Funding mechanisms are about choice – whether to use them or not, and which ones to use. Depending on the type of situation a country faces, it could have a combination of humanitarian, recovery and peacebuilding funds, though the activities undertaken with the money provided by these mechanisms may not always be so easy to distinguish.


- All three types of funds – humanitarian, recovery and peacebuilding – are in operation in Sudan, Haiti and Iraq.
- Unsurprisingly the majority of the countries receiving through these funds are conflict-affected although a few such as Myanmar and Indonesia are not.
- All but one country has received CERF funds whilst only five have an MDTF.
- Of the five recipient countries that have over 15% of their ODA from pooled mechanisms only one of them has the bulk of its pooled money from humanitarian funds (DRC) whilst three of them receive much more from the recovery and peace-building funds (Afghanistan, Indonesia, Palestine/OPT).
- Only one of these five (Sudan) has more of a balance in its pooled funding receiving 9.1% of total ODA from the CERF and Common Humanitarian Fund and 6.3% from its MDTF.

In all sorts of crisis situations there are different resources coming through different channels. If resources are to be spent effectively and actions are to be coordinated, information about all finance and other resources needs to be available. Humanitarian funding and humanitarian pooled funds are only a part of the overall aid that comes into a country. Clearly the people and organisations responsible for coordination of humanitarian affairs do not control all of those resources, but if they know about them they will be able to make better decisions and allocate funding more effectively. As other chapters of GHA 2010 have noted, the lines between humanitarian, recovery and development funding are becoming increasingly blurred. This is a response to real life since the conditions of people and countries in, and recovering from, crisis do not fall into neat categories. Pooled funding is used for a range of activities both humanitarian and in situations where the government is fragile and flexibility is needed. These funds support a wide range of reconstruction, recovery and peacebuilding activities following a conflict or natural disaster. They offer a way for donors to engage in complex situations, support on the ground funding allocations and share the risk of working in difficult environments.


Increasingly, multi-donor trust funds (MDTFs) are being established for reconstruction and recovery activities. These funds are managed by either the World Bank or UNDP or a combination of the two. This type of fund is the most common in post-conflict countries such as Sudan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Indonesia, West bank and Gaza. These funds are designed to enhance donor coordination for financing and policy dialogue. MDTFs can work with government, NGOs, UN agencies and private organisations to implement projects.

The UN global Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) was established in response to a growing demand for a mechanism that would assist the process of peacebuilding. Its objective is to provide assistance to those countries that are recently emerging from conflict and support interventions relevant to the peacebuilding process. The World Bank State and Peacebuilding Fund (SPF) commenced in 2008 and aims to address the needs of state and local governance, and peacebuilding in fragile and conflict-affected situations.

2008



2009



## WHAT IS THE FUTURE OF HUMANITARIAN POOLED FUNDS?


The aim of pooled funding is not to replace bilateral money, but to increase the flexibility of funding for humanitarian emergencies through the provision of flexible funds where they are most required, and to speed up disbursements to recipients without the reporting burden that is often associated with bilateral transactions.

Donor governments chose to channel a significant 7% of their total humanitarian aid through these channels in both 2008 and 2009, this despite some criticism of aspects of pooled funding. The process of project prioritisation has been seen to be lacking in transparency in some cases. The role of the UN has come under scrutiny; there have been suggestions that the process of fund allocation is too slow and in some cases a lack of impartiality in complex emergencies. There are also questions of increased transaction costs that may not be outweighed by the greater effectiveness of the overall funding. Several key donors remain sceptical of greater involvement of such funding mechanisms, preferring to control more directly the vast majority of their funding. Meanwhile there remains the great challenge of understanding whether pooled funding actually leads to more impact.

These issues aside, pooled funds are clearly emerging as a vehicle that enables many more countries as well as private individuals, foundations and companies to make contributions in response to humanitarian crises. For non-DAC donor governments without a field presence or humanitarian aid infrastructure, these mechanisms can also play a vital role in supporting their participation in the humanitarian aid architecture. As Haiti has shown, in-country emergency funds encourage more donors to contribute to the global response.

Meanwhile the number of pooled financial mechanisms appears set to continue. A number of countries such as Iraq and Sudan have a complex combination of humanitarian and reconstruction funds. Yet in many cases there is a surprising isolation between funding mechanisms in the same country. This is perhaps a reflection of how humanitarian and development aid are isolated one from the other, with decisions made over many years often without a clear understanding of the other volumes of aid arriving to the same place – a function of the artificial divide that has developed between humanitarian funding on the one hand and development on the other, a divide reinforced in many cases by institutional make-up, policies and priorities.

# DELIVERY: DELIVERING HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE: 2008





# DELIVERY

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At the sharp end of humanitarian response is the final delivery of aid to individuals, families and communities. For people in need, delivery agencies – United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, non-government organisations – are the key element of the humanitarian assistance chain, and quite naturally the recognisable face of international support. They vary from huge organisations with complex global mandates and responsibilities that combine implementation of large amounts of money, large numbers of staff and multi-context humanitarian interventions, to relatively small entities that may implement in a single sector within a single country.

DELIVERING HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

The amount of funding through NGOs, the UN and the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement naturally accounts for a huge proportion of humanitarian financing, since they are doing exactly what we think they might do: delivering the bulk of aid to people in need. The amount they receive, some of which they pass on to other organisations to implement and some of which they implement themselves, reached US\$15 billion in 2008. Unsurprisingly given the general upward trend of humanitarian aid, the delivery agencies have seen


increasing funding over each of the these three years with a more than 50% increase in their total funding in 2007 and 2008. (See Figures 2 & 3.)

There are however some marked differences in their funding profiles. Whilst the NGO sector usually receives close to 60% of its funding from private contributions and the remainder from government sources, the UN organisations we have examined have received the vast majority solely from governments.

PRIVATE AND GOVERNMENT

For the purpose of this chapter, private sources of funding are contributions from individuals; private foundations, trusts, and organisations; and private companies and corporations. Government sources includes funding raised from DAC and non-DAC governments, the European Commission, as well as funding received from multilateral organisations and UN agencies.

FIGURE 1: HUMANITARIAN FINANCING TO NGOS, ICRC AND IFRC AND THE UN



Source: Development Initiatives analysis of private contributions and OECD DAC

THE CHALLENGE OF COUNTING


Until relatively recently our understanding of humanitarian financing to and through the spectrum of delivery agencies has been limited to the funding received from DAC donors.

Financial tracking mechanisms, such as UN OCHA's Financial Tracking Service (FTS), the ECHO Holis 14-point system used by European Union government donors and the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) statistics only capture part of the funding received by alternative channels.

The volume of funding raised from private sources accounts for substantial volumes of total global humanitarian aid as well as a substantial amount of the funds that the delivery agencies.

For this exercise we have analysed the financial data of a study set of 48 NGOs that are part of 11 representative and well known NGO alliances and federations. We have also examined and analysed the information from the five larger humanitarian funds and programmes of the United Nations as well as both the International Federation and Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent. The funds that the delivery agencies implement can only be assessed by approaching agencies directly and to asking them for this financial information.

FIGURE 2 & FIGURE 3: FUNDING SOURCE AS A SHARE OF TOTAL INCOME



Source: Development Initiatives analysis based on annual reports and audited accounts, and data provided by delivery agencies



## NGOS

NGOs work in the front line of humanitarian programming and aid delivery and it is natural to see them implementing large amounts of funding from governments. Our figures suggest that for the years 2006 through to 2008, the NGO community received US\$1.8 billion, US\$2.6 billion and US\$3.1 billion of humanitarian financing respectively from government donors. (See Figure 4.)

A conservative estimate of what NGOs receive indirectly from donor governments (funds that have passed through multilateral organisations, especially the UN) based on our analysis of the share of funding NGOs receive from the UN, would increase these year on year figures to US\$2.3 billion, US\$3.4 billion and US\$4 billion.

Whilst government donations are clearly of importance to NGOs many of them actually raise significant humanitarian financing through their own fundraising and their own direct

private contributions. The sums are quite substantial. We estimate NGOs to have raised US\$2.2 billion, US\$3.2 billion and US\$3.7 billion in each of the years between 2006 and 2008 – a total of US\$9.1 billion. This is funding that they largely control themselves, either targeted towards an appeal that they themselves have raised funds for or money that is not tied to any particular crisis or activity. Humanitarian funding from donors is much more likely to be tied to particular interventions in particular countries and contexts.

The proportion of humanitarian activities financed by private funding and that funded from the government varies greatly between NGOs. Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) receives the largest share of its humanitarian income from private sources with figures ranging from 87% in 2006 to over 90% in 2008. On the other hand, Norwegian Refugee Council receives a very small share of private contributions for humanitarian activities with an average of 2.4% for the period


## FUNDS PASSED ON TO NGOS?

Not all funding to the UN is implemented by the UN itself as it often acts as first recipient; NGOs very often take on the role of implementing agency and are responsible for the delivery of aid. The set of NGOs we have studied in detail report an average of 19.1% of their total funding as coming from the UN. NGOs receive very different proportions of their total income from government donors. For example in 2008 Concern received 50% of its funding from the UN whilst MSF received only 3.3%.

Given that the bulk of UN funding came from government sources (98% in 2007 and 97.5% in 2008) we can be fairly safe to assume that the vast majority of the 19.1% of income the NGOs receive from the UN is also government sources.

We estimate this to have been US\$0.5 billion, US\$0.8 billion and US\$0.9 billion for years 2006, 2007 and 2008.

FIGURE 4: FUNDING FOR NGOS, 2006-2008



Source: Development Initiatives analysis of private voluntary contributions, UN OCHA FTS and OECD DAC

2006–2008, the remainder funded largely by government, most of it, 65%, from the Norwegian government. Some NGOs, like MSF, have an organisational policy on how much funding they are prepared to accept from government sources, in an attempt to ensure the organisation's independence from any possible political, economic or strategic interests behind the funding from governments. For most NGOs however, the shares of private and governments sources vary on an ad hoc basis. (See Figure 5.)



The volume of humanitarian assistance financed by private sources also varies dramatically between organisations. Some of the big NGOs exercise decision-making over more money

than government donors. MSF for example consistently contributes more humanitarian assistance than 20 of the 23 OECD DAC members. In 2007 the private contributions it raised reached US\$700 million and were in the region of US\$800 million in 2008. This huge humanitarian funding coming from the organisations' private supporters means that MSF exercises decision-making over a larger budget than that of most traditional bilateral humanitarian donors. In terms of expenditure it spent more than US\$496 million on humanitarian assistance in 2006 – if it were a country that would have made it the third most generous after the United States and the United Kingdom.

## COORDINATION AND DELIVERY

Delivery of humanitarian assistance is not just about the complexity of decision-making as funding travels from donor to implementer to recipient. Coordination also plays a part and, over the last decade, with the development of humanitarian reform and the advent of the cluster system, it has seen a renewed focus. In the ten years from 2000 to 2009 more than US\$4.3 billion has been recorded as spent on 'coordination and support services' within the FTS with the peak years being 2005, 2008 and 2009. Unsurprisingly UN OCHA, which is mandated to manage coordination at both global and country levels, is a very significant actor. Funded largely by DAC donors, it spent the bulk of its US\$238 million budget for 2009 on headquarters coordination and support for field coordination (43%) and then on Africa (36%).

FIGURE 5: HUMANITARIAN AID FROM THE TEN LARGEST DAC DONORS AND THE TEN LARGEST NGO RECIPIENTS OF PRIVATE FUNDING, 2008



Please note that figures for Caritas, Oxfam, World Vision, Save the Children and Tearfund are for 2006. Source: Development Initiatives analysis based on data from OECD DAC, NGO reports and financial information provided directly by NGOs

## THE UNITED NATIONS


UN agencies, funds and organisations are collectively a big player in humanitarian assistance. With the World Food Programme (WFP) alone having approximately US\$4.6 billion for humanitarian activities in 2008, the total of our five UN agencies – the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) – have collectively reported a total budget of US\$7.6 billion. Given that we estimate global humanitarian assistance for 2008 to be at least US\$16.9 billion, the UN is therefore handling nearly half of total funding. (See Figure 6.)

Government donors are the source of the vast majority of UN humanitarian financing, accounting for 98% of total funding in both 2007 and 2008.

WFP, the largest UN humanitarian organisation in terms of income, receives US\$3.6 of its US\$4.6 billion of funding from governments, the majority of which came from countries within the DAC. (See Figures 7 & 8.)


The United States is the largest DAC donor to WFP, contributing US\$2 billion in 2008, followed by the EC with US\$336 million, Canada with US\$222 million and the United Kingdom with US\$163 million. Iraq was the most important non-DAC donor in 2008 with a donation of US\$40 million, all of it implemented within Iraq itself. In the previous year, the Government of South Sudan had contributed US\$55 million to WFP humanitarian activities (similarly allocated to response inside Sudan) – double the contributions of Norway and France.

FIGURE 6: UN STUDY SET VOLUME OF HUMANITARIAN INCOME PER FUNDING SOURCE




Source: Development Initiatives analysis based on financial information provided by UN Study Set

FIGURE 7 AND FIGURE 8: WFP INCOME FROM DAC AND NON-DAC DONORS, 2008



Source: Development Initiatives analysis based on financial information provided by WFP

FIGURE 9: INCREASE IN UN INCOME FROM PRIVATE SOURCES FOR HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE



Please note that WFP figures for 2007 and 2008 are not comparable since a change of reporting system occurred in that period. Source: Development Initiatives analysis based on financial information provided by UN Study Set; FTS data has been used to complete UNRWA figures for operations outside Palestine

Although the proportion of humanitarian funding coming from private sources for the UN accounted for an average of only 2% of the total humanitarian income for 2007 and 2008, it has doubled in volume over the same period. The increase in the share of private funding has however risen by only 0.5% since the volume of government funding has kept a similar pace of growth. (See Figure 9.)

Considerable variations can be observed between the different UN agencies. UNICEF accounted for the largest share of private funding with over 12% in 2008, while FAO showed the lowest proportion with 0.1% in the same year. UNICEF humanitarian income from private sources is raised through 36 national committees, which support its work through fundraising, advocacy and education in their home countries. This structure gives UNICEF a physical presence in the richest countries of the world. In 2005, the year of Indian Ocean earthquake-tsunami, national committees and offices around the world raised US\$324 million from the general public to support humanitarian programmes.

#### THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT MOVEMENT

The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) is perhaps the largest world disaster response organisation with an unmatched global presence, with a unique network of 186 national societies and therefore a presence in almost every country in world.


The IFRC's funding patterns place it closer to the NGO group than to the

United Nations we have examined. In 2008 it raised 65.5% of its humanitarian income from private sources, US\$181 million. But while other delivery agencies receive private funding mainly from individuals, charities, and private companies and corporations, it is, in fact, the national societies that provide the larger share of IFRC funding both from private and government sources. The IFRC's federal body, the Secretariat, raises very limited funding directly.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has quite a different pattern of funding. Over 90% of ICRC financing comes from government donors and the European Commission, and a mere 2%-3% comes from private sources. This places the ICRC closer to the group of UN agencies than to NGOs. National Red Cross and Red Crescent societies are big players with an average share of 5% of the total income. In monetary terms private funding amounted to US\$24.7 million in 2009, US\$32.7 million in 2008 and US\$18.6 million in 2007. These amounts are a very small percentage of the total \$3.7 billion that ICRC has raised over the last four years. (See Figure 10, 11 & 12.)

The fundraising mechanism within the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, made up of the IFRC, ICRC and national societies is a very complex one. While the ICRC raises the bulk of its income directly from their government donors, the IFRC and national societies follow a different and intricate funding path. When it comes to the income from government sources, both raise money directly from government donors – or one may raise it on behalf of the other. Some government

FIGURE 10: ICRC SHARE OF HUMANITARIAN INCOME PER FUNDING SOURCE WITH TOTAL FUNDING




Source: Development Initiatives analysis based on ICRC annual reports

donors' financing mechanisms for humanitarian assistance may favour international over national organisations, or vice versa. This may mean that in certain cases the IFRC may be better placed to receive humanitarian funding than the national society of the donor country. If that is the case, the IFRC can

raise the money and then pass it on to the national society. The opposite also occurs and government financing for humanitarian assistance can be received by a national society and then donated to the IFRC. Some donors may make generous donations to both their national society and the IFRC.

FIGURE 11 AND FIGURE 12: IFRC DISTRIBUTION OF PRIVATE FUNDING SOURCES AND OF GOVERNMENT FUNDING SOURCES, RESPECTIVELY, 2008



Source: Development Initiatives analysis based on financial information provided by IFRC

## DELIVERY AGENCY RECIPIENTS

If we examine the top ten priorities of each of the delivery agencies we have looked at in detail we see that, in 2007, 38 countries received a total of US\$4 billion (out of a total US\$7.4 billion for all the countries they operated in during that year). With over US\$1 billion, Sudan was the top recipient country of humanitarian assistance for most delivery agencies, and received 25.7% of the total (13.9% of all destination countries, including the top ten for each organisation). In fact Sudan was the single top recipient for more than half of the organisations with worldwide operational coverage (which excludes UNRWA whose mandate is geographically limited to the Near East) and was within the top 5 for all but one of our delivery agencies. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) was the second most frequent destination of humanitarian expenditure being present in the top ten recipients list for 11 out of 15 organisations. Uganda also appeared 11 times amongst the top ten recipients but received US\$40 million less than DRC. Palestine/OPT which appeared four times amongst the top recipients of humanitarian assistance (seven times less frequently than DRC) was actually the second largest recipient accounting for 8.2% of the total, driven largely by the US\$203 million contribution from UNRWA.

In 2008, these same delivery agencies, with the exception of one for which we do not have consolidated financial figures, spent US\$4.7 billion (a rise of US\$700 million) across their combined top ten priorities which, in this year was 40 countries, out of a total of US\$8 billion in total humanitarian aid. Georgia and Tanzania were the two emerging contexts amongst the top ten recipients (respectively driven by the response to the Georgia/Russian conflict and UNHCR support for Burundi refugees). Sudan remained the single largest recipient of humanitarian assistance with just over US\$1 billion or 22.2% of all the funding spent in the top 40 contexts. However, a quick look at the distribution of top recipient countries for that year reveals a decreasing pattern in the pre-eminence of Sudan as a top recipient of humanitarian assistance, even when the volume of funding remains unchanged. Sudan was the first largest recipient for six delivery agencies (as opposed to eight in 2007) and was amongst the top five recipients of nine (as opposed to 11) of them. DRC remained the second most frequent recipient of humanitarian assistance, but contexts such as Ethiopia, Somalia and Uganda were almost as commonly represented. (See Tables 1 & 2.)

Humanitarian income and expenditure figures do not necessarily match in a single year and vary greatly depending on what reporting and accounting mechanism the organisation is using. Typically, not all activities are funded through a single income source since many organisations do not organise their fundraising around thematic issues (i.e. humanitarian or development activities) and the actual expenditure may be covered by different funding sources. In the same way, not all programming is covered by external funding in a single year as some delivery agencies use reserves or carry-overs from the previous year (in itself external funding) to finance the initial stages of their programmes allowing time for external fundraising. On top of that, part of the income is used to cover core needs, such as HQ, staff and office costs, without which the organisation would not be able to operate and fulfil its mandate. Additionally, some delivery agencies do not implement the totality of their income and 'subcontract' other organisations to do the programming; in that case, any analysis of expenditure should account for the difference between transferring financial resources to another stakeholder and the actual humanitarian delivery. And finally, in the growing complexity of humanitarian crisis, the frontier between humanitarian assistance and longer-term development aid is increasingly blurred with the consequent challenge for allocation of income and expenditure.

TABLE 1: TOP TEN RECIPIENTS OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE IN 2007. ALL FIGURES ARE IN US\$ MILLION

WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME	Sudan	Kenya	Ethiopia	Afghanistan	Uganda	Zimbabwe	DRC	Palestine/OPT	Somalia	Chad
	561.9	161.8	149.0	133.7	109.5	97.9	76.2	70.0	67.7	67.6
UNHCR	Chad	Sudan	Afghanistan	Syria	Kenya	DRC	Liberia	Jordan	Uganda	Iraq
	82.4	75.6	70.3	55.4	53.5	47.9	40.6	40.6	32.4	30.8
FAO	Sudan	DRC	Indonesia	Uganda	Iraq	Pakistan	Burundi	Nicaragua	Somalia	Palestine/OPT
	83.4	24.9	17.4	16.1	12.1	11.9	11.9	11.8	11.5	7.1
ACTION CONTRE LA FAIM INTERNATIONAL	Sudan	DRC	Uganda	Kenya	Liberia	Afghanistan	Somalia	Myanmar	Burundi	Ethiopia
	16.3	10.3	5.3	4.2	4.0	3.3	3.2	2.9	2.8	1.9
CONCERN WORLDWIDE	Bangladesh	Sudan	Somalia	India	Zambia	Zimbabwe	Uganda	DRC	Liberia	DPRK
	1.0	0.6	0.5	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1
SAVE THE CHILDREN	Asian Tsunami	Sudan	India	Zimbabwe	Liberia	Niger	DRC	Sri Lanka	Ethiopia	
	23.2	10.0	8.1	6.1	5.4	4.8	4.7	3.5	2.9	
OXFAM INTERNATIONAL	Indonesia	Sudan	Kenya	Sri Lanka	Bangladesh	DRC	Somalia	Pakistan	Zimbabwe	Chad
	22.7	20.8	19.0	17.1	12.3	12.0	9.0	8.9	8.7	8.7
MÉDECINS SANS FRONTIÈRES	Sudan	DRC	Chad	Somalia	Niger	Kenya	Haiti	Liberia	Iraq	Uganda
	56.0	54.6	34.7	30.0	21.6	17.9	17.3	13.8	13.6	13.4
INTERNATIONAL MEDICAL CORPS	Sudan	Iraq	DRC	Lebanon	Liberia	Chad	Ethiopia	Uganda	Somalia	Kenya
	24.2	12.1	11.5	8.2	7.1	6.8	6.1	3.0	2.2	1.4
NORWEGIAN REFUGEE COUNCIL	Sri Lanka	Uganda	DRC	Lebanon	Afghanistan	Sudan	Pakistan	Somalia/Kenya	Liberia	Burundi
	10.7	9.8	9.6	9.0	8.7	8.7	7.6	7.5	6.6	5.6
MERCY CORPS	Sudan	Iraq	Lebanon	Indonesia	Uganda	Pakistan	China	Kosovo	Afghanistan	
	21.8	17.0	17.0	4.3	2.4	2.3	2.3	2.2	1.8	
WORLD VISION	Sudan	Zambia	Zimbabwe	Uganda	Kenya	Ghana	Swaziland	Lesotho	Bolivia	Haiti
	79.0	40.0	36.0	25.0	20.0	16.0	13.0	11.0	5.0	4.0
IFRC	Maldives	Indonesia	Sri Lanka	Pakistan	Kenya	Philippines	Mozambique	Bangladesh	Myanmar	China
	27.8	23.9	22.8	10.0	8.6	8.6	8.1	5.0	2.6	1.9
ICRC	Sudan	Iraq	Palestine/OPT	Afghanistan	Somalia	DRC	Colombia	Sri Lanka	Chad	Uganda
	78.1	63.6	51.0	41.3	40.9	27.1	25.4	25.1	20.4	18.8
UNRWA	Palestine/OPT	Lebanon	Syria							
	202.9	59.2	2.8							

	X <sup>1st</sup>	X <sup>TOP 5</sup>	X <sup>TOP 10</sup>	X <sup>1st</sup>	X <sup>TOP 5</sup>	X <sup>TOP 10</sup>	X <sup>1st</sup>	X <sup>TOP 5</sup>	X <sup>TOP 10</sup>
Afghanistan	0	4	6						
Asian Tsunami	1	1	1						
Bangladesh	1	2	3						
Bolivia	0	0	1						
Burundi	0	0	3						
Chad	1	2	5						
China	0	0	2						
Colombia	0	0	1						
DRC	0	5	11						
Ethiopia	0	1	4						

	X <sup>1st</sup>	X <sup>TOP 5</sup>	X <sup>TOP 10</sup>	X <sup>1st</sup>	X <sup>TOP 5</sup>	X <sup>TOP 10</sup>	X <sup>1st</sup>	X <sup>TOP 5</sup>	X <sup>TOP 10</sup>
Ghana	0	0	1						
Haiti	0	0	2						
India	0	2	2						
Indonesia	1	4	4						
Iraq	0	4	6						
DPRK	0	0	1						
Kosovo	0	0	1						
Jordan	0	0	1						
Kenya	0	6	8						
Lebanon	0	4	4						

	X <sup>1st</sup>	X <sup>TOP 5</sup>	X <sup>TOP 10</sup>	X <sup>1st</sup>	X <sup>TOP 5</sup>	X <sup>TOP 10</sup>	X <sup>1st</sup>	X <sup>TOP 5</sup>	X <sup>TOP 10</sup>
Lesotho	0	0	1						
Liberia	0	3	7						
Maldives	1	1	1						
Mozambique	0	0	1						
Myanmar	0	0	2						
Nicaragua	0	0	1						
Niger	0	1	2						
Pakistan	0	1	5						
Palestine/OPT	1	2	4						

	X <sup>1st</sup>	X <sup>TOP 5</sup>	X <sup>TOP 10</sup>	X <sup>1st</sup>	X <sup>TOP 5</sup>	X <sup>TOP 10</sup>	X <sup>1st</sup>	X <sup>TOP 5</sup>	X <sup>TOP 10</sup>
Philippines	0	0	1						
Somalia	0	3	9						
Sri Lanka	1	3	5						
Sudan	8	12	13						
Swaziland	0	0	1						
Syria	0	2	2						
Uganda	0	6	11						
Zambia	0	2	2						
Zimbabwe	0	2	5						

Please note that World Vision figures here refer to World Vision International with 15 NGO members Source: Development Initiatives analysis based on annual reports and audited accounts, and data provided by the Study Set



TABLE 2: TOP TEN RECIPIENTS OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE IN 2008. ALL FIGURES ARE IN US\$ MILLION

X<sup>1ST</sup> Times in 1st place X<sup>TOP 5</sup> Times in the Top 5 X<sup>TOP 10</sup> Times in the Top 10

	Sudan 622.8	Ethiopia 264.4	Aghanistan 204.5	Somalia 178.8	Zimbabwe 155.6	Kenya 137.2	Uganda 113.6	DRC 101.3	Chad 90.9	Myanmar 81.2
WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME										
UNHCR	Syria 108.1	Chad 93.2	Sudan 90.0	Aghanistan 75.5	Kenya 66.2	DRC 62.4	Iraq 50.7	Jordan 45.6	Tanzania 41.9	Ethiopia 37.3
FAO	Sudan 28.2	Somalia 24.7	DRC 19.3	Iraq 8.0	Burundi 8.0	Palestine/OPT 7.4	Uganda 5.6	Pakistan 3.9	Nicaragua 1.6	Indonesia 0.7
ACTION CONTRE LA FAIM INTERNATIONAL	Sudan 18.5	DRC 13.0	Somalia 7.6	Myanmar 7.2	Kenya 7.1	Uganda 5.1	Aghanistan 4.3	Ethiopia 3.8	Liberia 3.6	Haiti 3.1
CONCERN WORLDWIDE	Kenya 1.0	Ethiopia 0.7	Zimbabwe 0.6	Somalia 0.5	India 0.2	Bangladesh 0.2	Myanmar 0.1	Chad 0.1	Pakistan 0.1	Mozambique 0.1
SAVE THE CHILDREN	Myanmar 47.7	Asian Tsunami 15.3	Ethiopia 12.4	Zimbabwe 11.4	DRC 7.7	Niger 6.9	Sri Lanka 5.9	India 5.6	Liberia 5.5	Sudan 5.4
MÉDECINS SANS FRONTIÈRES	Sudan 68.1	DRC 63.1	Somalia 32.7	Niger 30.4	Chad 29.5	Kenya 24.6	Haiti 20.7	Iraq 17.6	Uganda 12.6	Liberia 11.0
INTERNATIONAL MEDICAL CORPS	Sudan 19.2	Iraq 15.7	Liberia 8.2	Chad 8.2	DRC 7.4	Kenya 5.7	Ethiopia 5.6	Lebanon 5.2	Somalia 4.5	Uganda 2.8
NORWEGIAN REFUGEE COUNCIL	Somalia/Kenya 13.3	Aghanistan 11.5	Uganda 10.5	DRC 10.1	Burundi 7.7	Sudan 7.4	Liberia 7.00	Sri Lanka 7.0	Colombia 6.0	Georgia 5.7
MERCY CORPS	Iraq 31.4	DPRK 26.2	Sudan 6.0	Uganda 4.9	Lebanon 4.9	Indonesia 4.2	Pakistan 2.4	Kosovo 2.2	China 0.9	Afghanistan 0.1
WORLD VISION	Zimbabwe 99.0	Sudan 73.0	Zambia 65.0	Ghana 28.0	Uganda 25.0	Bolivia 19.0	Lesotho 17.0	Kenya 16.0	Haiti 16.0	Swaziland 16.0
IFRC	China 50.5	Sri Lanka 50.4	Myanmar 30.4	Pakistan 22.7	Maldives 14.9	Indonesia 13.8	Bangladesh 10.2	Mozambique 2.6	Philippines 2.1	Kenya 1.1
ICRC	Sudan 101.9	Somalia 94.8	Iraq 88.5	Aghanistan 64.7	Palestine/OPT 57.6	DRC 46.2	Colombia 34.8	Sri Lanka 27.9	Chad 24.7	Pakistan 23.0
UNRWA	Palestine/OPT 152.7	Lebanon 25.3	Syria 7.0	Jordan 1.0						

	X <sup>1ST</sup>	X <sup>TOP 5</sup>	X <sup>TOP 10</sup>
Afghanistan	0	4	6
Asian Tsunami	0	1	1
Bangladesh	0	0	2
Bolivia	0	0	1
Burundi	0	2	2
Chad	0	3	6
China	1	1	2
Colombia	0	0	2
DRC	0	6	9
Ethiopia	0	3	6

	X <sup>1ST</sup>	X <sup>TOP 5</sup>	X <sup>TOP 10</sup>
Georgia	0	0	1
Ghana	0	1	1
Haiti	0	0	3
India	0	1	2
Indonesia	0	0	3
Iraq	1	4	6
DPRK	0	1	1
Kosovo	0	0	1
Jordan	0	1	2
Kenya	1	3	8

	X <sup>1ST</sup>	X <sup>TOP 5</sup>	X <sup>TOP 10</sup>
Lebanon	0	2	3
Lesotho	0	0	1
Liberia	0	1	5
Maldives	0	1	1
Mozambique	0	0	2
Myanmar	1	3	5
Nicaragua	0	0	1
Niger	0	1	2
Pakistan	0	1	5
Palestine/OPT	1	2	3

	X <sup>1ST</sup>	X <sup>TOP 5</sup>	X <sup>TOP 10</sup>
Philippines	0	0	1
Somalia	1	7	8
Sri Lanka	0	1	4
Sudan	6	9	11
Swaziland	0	0	1
Syria	1	2	2
Uganda	0	3	8
Tanzania	0	0	1
Zambia	0	1	1
Zimbabwe	1	4	4

Please note that World Vision figures here refer to World Vision International with 15 NGO members. Source: Development Initiatives analysis based on annual reports and audited accounts, and data provided by the Study Set



While delivery agencies concentrate approximately a quarter of their humanitarian expenditure in only five country contexts in the period 2007-2008, they also spend money in countries that have traditionally not been priority countries for donor humanitarian aid, often ones that have substantial levels of underlying chronic poverty such as Haiti, Niger, Chad, Bangladesh and the Philippines. All of these featured at least once in the top list of recipient countries for delivery agencies whilst none of them is represented in the top 10 list of recipients for DAC donors. The volume of humanitarian assistance that goes to these countries is considerably inferior to that destined to the top recipients such as Sudan, DRC or Kenya, common to both delivery agencies and DAC donors. However their presence amongst the top recipient countries for some of the key delivery agencies is very significant.

What countries get to be amongst the top ten recipients of humanitarian assistance from delivery agencies will depend not only on the severity of the humanitarian situation in the country but also on the delivery agency mandate and expertise. The humanitarian emergency in Chad and Northern Sudan, for instance, generated a severe internally displaced (IDP) and refugee crisis in 2007. Thus it is not surprising that these countries were respectively the first and second largest recipients of UNHCR humanitarian expenditure. Palestine/OPT is the obvious key priority for UNRWA. The agency's work in neighbouring countries is also closely linked to the precarious situation

of the 2.9 million registered Palestinian refugees the organisation provides for. The Maldives as a choice of main recipient of humanitarian assistance from the IFRC may seem odd but is explained in part by the fact that the organisation specialises in disaster preparedness and risk reduction and it has recently completed a five-year post-tsunami risk-reduction programme to promote the resilience of communities against potential future disasters.

Our data also reveals some other significant trends. While high levels of humanitarian funding have continued to some high-profile protracted emergencies like Sudan and DRC, most countries experience sharp shifts in the volume of humanitarian assistance they receive. Several humanitarian emergencies have seen their funding dramatically increase from delivery agencies – by over 700% in some cases between 2007 and 2008 – while others have suffered a decrease of up to four times the original figures. On occasion, increases in funding are attributable to sudden onset emergencies, such as in the case of Myanmar, where funding shot up from barely US\$5.5 million in 2007 to US\$167 million following Cyclone Nargis in 2008. In 2008 Haiti also experienced an increase of 87% over the previous year, due to the multiple tropical storms that hit the country. However, some protracted emergencies also show a sharp increase over short periods of time. Humanitarian assistance for Zimbabwe rose by 87% between 2007 and 2008, and funding for Somalia and Ethiopia more than doubled during the same period.

## THE MANY PATHS OF DELIVERING AID

Delivery agencies have managed more than US\$36.3 billion of humanitarian aid between 2006 and 2008. This is important but in fact but there is much more to delivery agencies than just the volume of money. It is the incredible diversity of delivery agencies that makes a difference.

They range from huge organisations working in multiple settings with multi-sector mandates to single-country organisations with highly focused working areas. They receive, donate and of course deliver, often all at the same time. And they are involved in so much more beyond the direct use of money. They work in advocacy, campaigning, coordination, policy formulation, and more. Their choices of where and when to undertake activities, though in part related to donor funding, are also rooted in their own mandates and priorities, whilst those organisations that raise substantial private contributions have control over


substantial flexible funds. Their definition of humanitarian assistance is highly variable as is their classification of what constitutes humanitarian activities. While some organisations have a more long-term approach, others link their humanitarian assistance directly to emergency response that by definition has a shorter lifespan than the effects of the crisis and its impact on the levels of vulnerability.

This range of activities, these individual facets of structure or mandate, the variety of roles they play, the different contexts within which they choose to work and what they choose to do, all of this matters just as much as US\$36.3 billion of aid. For each of these elements determines the path the funding flows down, empowering some to the loss of others, and each choice about who does what determines what a beneficiary might receive.

# DOMESTIC RESPONSE: TIMELINE FOLLOWING THE HAITI EARTHQUAKE, 2010

## DOMESTIC RESPONSE

Governments have a responsibility to take care of people affected by disaster on their territory. Statutory services (police, fire, etc), local governments and affected communities are often the first responders. If domestic governments are unable to respond, they may appeal for international assistance.



## INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE

UN agencies, International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and international NGOs.



# DOMESTIC RESPONSE

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If you are affected by crisis, the first, most visible, lifesaving and sometimes only response you will see will be from people and organisations close at hand. No analysis of resources for humanitarian assistance can be complete without taking account of this domestic humanitarian response, yet it is rarely, if ever, considered.

A largely unrecognised component of humanitarian intervention, responders range from governments, at both local and central level, through to a whole host of groups, organisations and institutions. Some of these are shaped by internationally recognised policies but many are spontaneous efforts by groups and individuals, particularly those on the front line. Unlike the international humanitarian community, which is standardised, to an extent, by guidelines, sector divisions of work and codes of conduct, the domestic humanitarian response is less uniform and less organised. And it is because it is complex, varied, unstandardised and without a structured relationship with the international community, that this domestic response remains largely unknown and largely uncounted. This creates all sorts of issues for effective humanitarian response. If we don't know the scale of domestic capacity and response, how can international efforts respect national ownership and deliver effective, coordinated assistance?

## WHAT DO WE MEAN BY 'DOMESTIC RESPONSE'?

What is domestic response? Who is responding and how, and to what? What kinds of activities do they undertake?

### THE COMMUNITY

When disaster strikes the affected community is naturally the first to respond and this initial response can have a far-reaching impact, not only by saving lives through search and rescue, or reducing risk through evacuation but also by housing and feeding those made homeless.

- "Many in the capital Port-au-Prince picked away at shattered buildings with bare hands, sticks and hammers hoping to find loved-ones alive. Thousands of homeless people began to set up their own camps anywhere they could, the biggest right opposite the collapsed presidential palace." Reuters, January 2010
- "Our neighbours' help was immediate – they put a ladder at the window of our room to get us out. In no time, we were out of the house and stayed with a neighbour friend for safety." A personal account after Typhoon Ketsana in the Philippines, 2008
- "We borrowed a pickup, chipped in and bought several hundred litres of drinks, biscuits, tins of food, fruit, candles and matches and set off to the worse affected areas to help out as best we could on our own mission. "A personal account after the flooding in Cusco, Peru, January 2010.

In their large-scale quantitative study carried out 60 days after the Indian Ocean earthquake-tsunami in India, Indonesia and Sri Lanka, the Fritz Institute found that the aid provided during the first 48 hours was mostly from private individuals or the local community, which emphasises the vital role that local people play. Similarly it was already poor communities of Raja County of South Sudan that housed, clothed and fed the one thousand and more internally displaced that fled from South Darfur before the international community had even heard of the need.

Yet it should not be thought that domestic response ends when the international community arrives, that the burden of support is somehow handed over en masse. In fact evidence shows that local families and communities continue to provide support, often because they host those made homeless by whatever event, a natural disaster or a conflict that has occurred. In 2001, when the Macedonian conflict broke out, more than 20,000 ethnic Albanian families fled into Kosovo, many to stay with host families. These host homes continued to house and support the refugees long after the initial arrival, in fact in almost all cases only stopping to do so when their guests could finally return to their homes.

## GOVERNMENTS

The response by governments can be rapid and continuous as well, and often extends beyond simple distribution of relief to the maintenance of law and order. Within 24 hours of the Chilean earthquake in February 2010, the government had sent helicopters to deliver relief supplies, declared a state of emergency, sent in army forces to quell outbreaks of looting and established curfews. Following Cyclone Sidr in Bangladesh, the authorities not only despatched six ships, numerous helicopters and thousands of troops to the affected area, distributing large quantities of aid, they also continued to distribute food for months after the disaster, feeding more than 3.5 million people. This compares to World Food Programme's (WFP) 750,000.

Not only can this government aid be rapid and continuous, it can also be of significant volume. The Fritz Institute and its partner TNS Indonesia assessed the perceptions and opinions of more than 100 people affected by the Java


earthquake-tsunami in 2006, and the local government was cited by the respondents as the primary assistance provider across all sectors by providing 36% of aid in the first 48 hours. The study also asked who the primary providers of 12 forms of assistance such as the provision of medical care and drinking water were. In 50% of cases, the respondents said the local government assistance was more important; it was the main provider of medical care, drinking water and food as well as helping with the deceased, assisting with the injured and relocating people.

Expenditure on disaster response by the Indonesian government continued to increase between 2001 and 2007 probably fuelled by the Indian Ocean earthquake-tsunami in 2004 and the Java earthquake-tsunami in 2006. (See Figure 2.) These events have created momentum and energy in Indonesia which have led the government adopting a pro-active management approach including passing a disaster management law.

**The UN humanitarian resolution, Resolution 46/182 of 1991 states:**

"Each State has the responsibility first and foremost to take care of the victims of natural disasters and other emergencies occurring on its territory. Hence, the affected State has the primary role in the initiation, organization, coordination, and implementation of humanitarian assistance within its territory".

FIGURE 1: PRIMARY ASSISTANCE PROVIDERS ACROSS ALL SECTORS ACCORDING TO THE RESPONDENTS' OPINION



Source: Fritz Institute and TNS Indonesia

Government leadership in natural disasters can be marginalised by large-scale international responses with the sudden imposition of the humanitarian cluster system and arrival of hundreds of expatriate staff with a multitude of interventions. However even in the larger natural disasters there are examples of government leadership and that leadership is often centred on national militaries, which have logistical and manpower resources unavailable to civilian authorities. For example after the Kashmir earthquake in Pakistan in 2005 the military played a central role in coordinating the response and although international actors were initially uncomfortable with this situation, citing concerns over a lack of neutrality and impartiality, retrospective analysis suggests the military offered effective coordination and communicated well with the international system, developing a strong working relationship with international actors.

#### DOMESTIC CIVIL SOCIETY

Domestic civil society plays an important role in the overall response to humanitarian crises. Local organisations have staff that are already in place, they are likely to have a better understanding of the culture and context, they can usually move with much more freedom, and invariably they are not hampered by language barriers. Furthermore, they have existing relationships with community leaders and government staff. This existing knowledge can also help strengthen and expedite needs assessments by providing a foundation

on cause, dynamics within the community and changes over time. Running costs and salary costs are cheaper for local NGOs than for international NGOs, which means they may be able to offer better value for money.


Because of these strengths local NGOs are often the primary means of delivering assistance – this can be independently, with direct funding from donors or through partnerships with international organisations such as UN agencies, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and international NGOs. Save the Children UK (SC-UK) is one of the international organisations that makes a point of highlighting its work with national partners. Nearly half of its projects in the West Bank and Gaza are run by local partners, which often provide services during the worst of the fighting. Similarly, from the onset of the 1998 floods in Bangladesh, SC-UK decided to respond through its already-existing network of local grassroots organisations. It believes that this will contribute to longer term capacity-building of its partners and help build up skills in a country that frequently suffers severe flooding. In the case of Cyclone Nargis, where the government of Myanmar was reluctant to allow significant direct foreign assistance or prohibited travel to certain areas of the affected region, local NGOs were the only organisations that could actually respond directly to beneficiary need. Over 500 local NGOs and community-based organisations (CBOs) were used by the international community in this way.

TABLE 1: FOOD DISTRIBUTION SUMMARY AFTER CYCLONE SIDR

	NO. OF BENEFICIARIES (MILLION)
Government of Bangladesh	18.6
UN agencies	4.2
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies/ Bangladesh Red Crescent (BDRCS)	0.1
International NGOs	2
Bangladesh NGOs	0.8

Source: LCG Bangladesh, 20 January 2008.  
www.lcgbangladesh.org

FIGURE 2: INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE ON DISASTER RESPONSE, 2001-2007



Source: Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR)

Some donors actively encourage international NGOs to partner with local organisations. In response to the increased profile of sexual violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in part due to better reporting, donors tied international NGO funding to a requirement that they form local partnerships and work with local NGOs or community-based organisations (CBOs).

Domestic organisations will also still be there when the disaster is deemed to be over. They can therefore support transition from disaster to recovery – and there will be something for international agencies leaving the area to hand over to. During our own research into the influence of domestic response in Uganda, a donor stated that it was a shame that international NGOs had not considered building the capacity of local NGOs during the emergency because if they had done so international NGOs would be able to handover to a stronger system.


One of the roles of National Red Cross/Red Crescent Societies is to provide first-line disaster response services as an auxiliary to the authorities. All national societies have a legally defined position of humanitarian auxiliary to their nation state, although in practice the role they play may vary from country to country. It may involve search and rescue operations, evacuating the injured or people endangered by the disaster, managing shelters, restoring family links, running ambulance services or retrieving and evacuating dead bodies. In about 80% of cases, National societies

respond to a disaster at the local or national level, without the need for regional or international support

National societies use a variety of means to raise funds themselves. The Afghanistan Red Crescent raises funds through a lottery while the Ethiopian Red Cross Society is constructing a building on land donated by the government free of lease charge, which can be used to generate income. Gala dinners, fundraising walks, a lottery and trade fairs have all been organised to finance the project. Following the earthquake in China in May 2008, 36% of private and corporate donation went to the Red Cross Society of China and China Charity Federation.

However, despite these efforts, in some cases the amount raised domestically compared to externally sourced funds is a “drop in the ocean” (as described by the Head of Resource Mobilisation for the Uganda Red Cross Society (URCS)). Despite this, donations received by the Red Cross in Uganda in response to the 2010 landslides highlight that a wide variety of funders choose to support Red Cross/Red Crescent national societies. While over half the financial contributions received by the URCS were from donors (57.5%) over half of in-kind contributions were donated by the private sector with Ugandan citizens being the second largest source (URCS received 51 different in-kind contributions; 30 were from the private sector and 14 were individual contributions).

FIGURE 3: SOURCE OF FINANCIAL DONATIONS RECEIVED BY UGANDA RED CROSS AFTER THE LANDSLIDES, 2010



Source: The New Vision Newspaper, Uganda Red Cross Society advertorial, Thursday 18 March 2010

## THE GENERAL PUBLIC

The act of giving is widespread and not just isolated to relatively rich Western nations.


There is not enough data to estimate global giving at this point but examples of the scale are available for a few individual events. Following the mudslides in Uganda in March 2010, the international community planned to mount an international appeal – but this was deemed unnecessary after just a week as the donations and support from various national sources, including individuals and the private sector, were actually deemed sufficient.

Other ways for the public to channel funding in response to domestic crises include direct donations to civil society organisations, and faith-based organisations, or in certain countries, to a fund such as the Prime Minister's Relief Fund in India. The graph below shows the income and expenditure of the relief fund over a five-year period; in this time its programming included responses to the Indian Ocean earthquake-tsunami, Kashmir

earthquake, Cyclone Aila and Bihar Koshi floods.

Remittances are also known to be an important source of income for many and evidence suggests they can play a significant part of post-crisis support. A WFP assessment a month into the 2006 Lebanon conflict found that remittances played a major role in building the coping capacity of the population. Families with an emigrant member were likely to have received financial support from them and were sent cash, either with the family member themselves returning to the country, or when a friend or extended family relative returned. Remittances filtering through at that time were believed to be in small amounts and to cover subsistence needs rather than to invest in physical damage to assets and livelihood investments. Remittances are a major source of income for the country. According to WFP (in its Rapid Food Security Assessment, August 2006), remittances to Lebanon reached US\$5.2 billion in 2006 (25.8% of gross domestic product (GDP)) compared with US\$4.9 billion in 2005 and US\$5.6 billion in 2004.

FIGURE 4: INCOME AND EXPENDITURE OF PRIME MINISTER'S RELIEF FUND IN INDIA, 2004-2009



Source: Prime Minister's Relief Fund in India



Data is not disaggregated sufficiently below national level to show which remittances go to areas affected by humanitarian crises. However, previous analysis of World Development Indicators (WDI) indicators and World Bank remittance data by Development Initiatives shows that remittances make up a higher proportion of gross domestic product (GDP) in fragile states than in non-fragile state. While absolute volumes of global remittances for fragile states are small compared to larger economies (such as China, Mexico, India), they are significant in terms of GDP, and have been increasing.

## THE PRIVATE SECTOR

While the private sector's involvement in humanitarian response through corporate giving is usually well acknowledged (for example Walmart, Walt Disney, AXA and Bechtel in response to Haiti's earthquake), the activities of national private sectors in affected countries go largely unrecognised beyond the confines of the national and sometimes local context. Companies often donate to the government or civil society organisations but in some cases they may implement directly; in Bangladesh after Cyclone Aila, private companies distributed both

food and non-food items directly to the population. Digicel Group, a top mobile phone operator in Haiti, said it would donate US\$5 million in cash toward relief efforts and appealed to others to help victims of the quake. After the Koshi flooding in East Nepal, thousands of dollars worth of goods was distributed to affected families within the first few days of the response by local shops and businesses. Many private actors donated their goods and services to the Peru earthquake appeal in 2001, helping the country respond to the disaster without substantial international support.

The Indonesian media played a role in mobilising and distributing funds in the aftermath of the Indian Ocean earthquake-tsunami. As they covered the unfolding of events, they also encouraged the public to contribute to the relief and rehabilitation fund, mobilised volunteers and helped to reunite families. In addition to collecting funds, they also distributed these funds to civil society organisations involved in relief and rehabilitation work. Even in the most complex of situations such as Somalia, business people supply investment and goods for the running of local social services such as hospitals, and provide essential public services such as electricity.


Understanding the full nature and scale of domestic humanitarian response is fraught with many problems. Details of the challenges of counting its many layers and actors can be found in the methodology chapter.

TABLE 2: PRIVATE COMPANY CONTRIBUTIONS FOLLOWING THE 2001 EARTHQUAKE IN PERU

PRIVATE COMPANY	COMMITTED
Alicorp	In kind 30 tons of food
Backus y Cervezur	US\$ 20,000
Chinese community in Peru	US\$7,000
Gamarra's Merchant Commission	In kind 20 tons clothing and food
Lima Airport Partners	In kind
Nextel Peru	US\$ 50,000
PeruRail	In kind transport of aid materials
Colchones Paraiso Peru	US\$200,000 Mattresses
Banco Ripley	US\$ 100,000
Saga Falabella	In kind 18,000 blankets
Santa Isabel supermarket	In kind 12 tons of food

Source: UN OCHA FTS

FIGURE 5: REMITTANCES AS A PERCENTAGE OF GDP, 2000-2008



Source: Ensuring fragile states are not left behind, OECD, February 2010

When Bangladesh's early warning system detected the threat from Cyclone Aila, some immediate responses were triggered. Volunteer teams from local NGOs began disseminating early warning messages and one of them opened a cyclone information centre that continuously relayed information and advice to those at risk so that they could evacuate to safe places. Local government administration used mobile telephones to call local transport owners who evacuated large numbers of the population to shelter and safety. Since the area had few cyclone shelters, a number of houses and office buildings were offered and converted into emergency shelters. Using their own resources, local NGOs, traders

The mobile phone company, Grameen Phone, provided 4,000 food packages and medical services to 967 people through a local NGO. Mosques and **mandirs** (hindu temples) provided special funeral services as well as psychosocial support, and mobilised in-kind goods for affected communities. A number of local NGOs responded too.

US\$ BILLION CONSTANT 2008 PRICES

Year	Humanitarian aid	Non-humanitarian aid	Total ODA (excluding debt relief)
1995	0.07	1.56	1.56
1996	0.02	1.61	1.61
1997	0.06	1.41	1.41
1998	0.07	1.63	1.63
1999	0.06	1.68	1.68
2000	0.03	1.68	1.68
2001	0.06	1.57	1.57
2002	0.06	1.29	1.29
2003	0.03	1.78	1.78
2004	0.10	1.58	1.58
2005	0.03	1.50	1.50
2006	0.01	1.37	1.37
2007	0.12	1.45	1.45
2008	0.14	1.92	1.92

Legend:  
 — Total ODA (excluding debt relief)  
 ■ Non-humanitarian aid  
 ■ Humanitarian aid





TABLE 3: HUMANITARIAN DISTRIBUTIONS FOLLOWING CYCLONE AILA, 2009


ORGANISATION	WATER	FOOD	MEDICINE	SHELTER	SANITATION	NON-FOOD ITEMS	CASH/CASH FOR WORK
Government of Bangladesh (GoB)	X	X	X	X		X	X
Department of Public Health and Engineering (DPHE)	X				X		
Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC)	X	X	X	X			
World Vision	X	X	X		X	X	
Health, Education and Economic Development (HEED)	X	X	X				
Dhaka Ahsania Mission	X	X	X			X	
Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA)		X	X				
CARE/ United States Agency for International Development (USAID)	X	X				X	
Save the Children	X	X	X			X	
Rupantar	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Concern		X	X			X	
Oxfam	X		X	X	X	X	
ActionAid	X	X	X			X	
United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)	X				X		
Protik Trust	X		X				
Solidaritiés	X				X		
Islamic Relief	X	X	X				
Christian Commission for Development in Bangladesh (CCDB)		X					
Catholic Relief Services (CRS) / CARITAS	X			X	X		X
Muslim Aid	X	X	X				
Plan Bangladesh	X	X	X				
Integrated Development Organisation			X				
IFRC/BDRCS	X	X	X	X		X	
Uttaran	X	X	X			X	
World Health Organization (WHO)			X				
ITEMS ALLOCATED TO DISTRICTS FROM GOVERNMENT AT CENTRAL LEVEL			ITEMS LOCALLY PURCHASED AND DISTRIBUTED				
Saree (clothing)	22,200 packets		Biscuit		1,859 packets		
Lungi (clothing)	6,500 packets		Puffed rice		4,000 kg		
Flattened rice	5,800 kg		Flattened rice		67,000 kg		
Molasses	1,900 kg		Molasses		8,350 kg		
Medicine	1 carton		Sugar		2,079 kg		
Water purifying tablet	6 cartons		Oral saline		40,000 sachets		
Drinking water	24,650 litres		Drinking water		2,790 litres		
Tarpaulin	4,000 packets		Bread		476 kg		
Tent	350 units		Funeral fabric		360 metres		
Jerry can	1,000 packets		Water tank (500 l)		5 units		
Family kit	50 cartons						

Source: Ministry of Food and Disaster Management, Bangladesh

## How the affected community values assistance in the hours following a natural disaster



## How the affected community values assistance in a complex emergency



# Uganda

Plagued by conflict between the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and the Ugandan government, which itself was interconnected with the conflict in South Sudan, people living in northern Uganda also face drought, floods, landslides and cattle rustling. Pader is one of the districts most affected. During the LRA conflict up to 95% of the population was displaced. Periodic cattle raids, together with droughts and floods, have resulted in pervasive food insecurity. Katakwi has been similarly heavily affected by conflict: it hosted a large population of internally displaced people (IDPs) as a result of the LRA insurgency and suffers from ongoing cattle rustling (a problem that peaked in 2006). It has also been hit by devastating natural disasters, the most recent of which was the 2007 floods.

During the course of the conflicts, the government strengthened its security forces (assisted by international donors) and volunteer youth were armed to supplement them. This was cited as most important as it paved the way for other responses such as enabling free movement of communities, allowing them to engage in livelihood activities. Local government authorities were able to carry out operations such as monitoring, assessment and supervision. Communities kept their cattle in communal secure areas 'secured' by the army (though the army was accused of looting). Other responses in relation to the insecurity included moving people to live in camps and disarming the Karamajong cattle raiders. Religious and cultural leaders initiated peace dialogues with both Karamajong cattle raiders and LRA under the auspices of both international and local NGOs.

Casual labouring has always been the major livelihood coping strategy for local communities in emergency situations. This includes activities such as fetching water, collection and sale of thatch (grass used in roofing mud housing structures in camps), collection and sale of firewood, alcohol brewing and working in other peoples' fields. It helps supplement the usually insufficient relief supplies and helps communities survive.

In Pader, the Catholic church housed night commuters during the worst days of the LRA insurgency in the district. Most people moved from the camps to spend nights in the walled missions. The church also offered land on which camp settlements were set up still during the LRA insecurity. After the 2007 floods,

churches and mosques distributed clothes and food and members of the affected community living in other parts of the country gave used clothes and money. During the floods, men assisted in evacuation and movement of the vulnerable, such as elderly or the ill, to safer areas.

In response to the drought in 2009, food items were distributed from the central government. Households in different sub-counties and parishes received varied amounts depending on the total population of an administrative unit. In Pader, government distribution of food targeted only extremely vulnerable people. Delays were a major issue, however. Even after delivery of food from central level, to various districts, it took another two months before food was delivered to the sub-counties because districts did not have the fuel to distribute it and were not facilitated by central government.

The Ugandan government also mobilised the media to report on the crises and to disperse information to affected populations, as well as to help mobilise funds. This was done primarily through the Information and National Guidance Directorate which is called on by the Ministry of Disaster Management, Response and Refugees in the case of a disaster.

1988 – 2008

## Conflict

CONFLICT IN NORTH BETWEEN LORD'S RESISTANCE ARMY (LRA) AND GOVERNMENT FORCES

1999

## Drought

2003

## Crises

JAN EGELAND, HUMANITARIAN RELIEF COORDINATOR, REFERS TO THE SITUATION IN NORTHERN UGANDA AS "ONE OF THE WORST HUMANITARIAN CRISES IN THE WORLD"

2007

## Flood


2008

## Drought

ONGOING

## Karamajong cattle-raids

FIGURE 7: HUMANITARIAN AND NON-HUMANITARIAN ODA TO UGANDA, 1995-2008



## COMPLEX WORLD: DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE ENTWINED

External assistance will never be immediate. It takes time to plan activities and organise resources. As shown in Bangladesh after Cyclone Aila, community response is significant because it is immediate. It acts as first aid, helps to save lives, reduces risk, minimises the effects of a disaster and lessens vulnerability. Often the community response is brushed aside because many actors do not realise that it is even there, yet external assistance can help complement what the community has already started without undermining it. Many people help because they want to, rather than out of need to because no-one else is there. The community can be involved in quality assurance of the overall response. One respondent in the Listening Project's Sri Lanka case study (October 2007) said "Community participation is important – the community is in the best position to do quality checks on certain aspects of work, and if they know every step of the project from start to finish, will be able to give good input and will be able to carry the work on in the future." In Uganda, our own case study found that people are now more individualistic and the culture of sharing or supporting the vulnerable has reduced. This is because these people are existing in camps and their assets have been depleted or destroyed; they have become reliant on international assistance.

It is common for international NGOs to work with local partners and it is important that the strengths of local civil society are harnessed. But the dynamics of this relationship should be fully understood. When international organisations try and work through local organisations, pressure can be put on the often weak internal systems of domestic civil society organisations. Furthermore, power usually still lies with international actors – it is often international funders that have decision-making power, rather than domestic organisations. These implementing partnerships should not be mistaken for domestic response, which is autonomous, self-financed and self-determined.

The dynamic between the international community and the state should be understood too. After flooding and a cyclone in 2007, the Mozambique government did not issue an appeal for international assistance, deciding to rely primarily on national resources. The response was considered largely

successful because the government was well prepared, there was mutual respect between national and international humanitarian agencies – and many senior international agency staff spoke Portuguese.

One major constraint of the domestic humanitarian system is capacity – whether human, technical, financial or administrative. One Sri Lankan NGO worker says "local NGOs help to address local needs but their impact is not far reaching. They struggle with capacity". As in the case of the Indian Ocean earthquake-tsunami, the sudden availability of international funding can result in a plethora of new local NGOs. Although international NGOs may have criteria for partnering with credible local organisations, once the 'good ones' have been taken, many international NGOs use weaker partners. The tied funding for those addressing sexual violence in DRC for example, led international NGOs to partner with local NGOs that were perhaps ill-placed to respond. The issue of capacity stretches to governments too. As seen recently in Haiti and similarly large and sudden disasters, the government can be seriously weakened through death of staff and destruction of key response assets and infrastructure.

Weak systems are more open to corruption. In the Listening Project's Sri Lankan case study, one respondent said "Once aid reaches NGOs, only half of that reaches us. As far as we know it is the same with every camp. We accept donors, but Sri Lankans are involved in bribery and corruption. We want the donor to come directly to the field without coming through other organisations. This will be of fullest use and also more effective." Another one said "It is the local NGOs who are responsible for shortcomings. The corruption happened through the local NGOs and it was not the international NGOs or the donors because the donors fund the project and they only want to see that the people are benefited out of it. And our people should be responsible to see that they follow through with their commitments."

These caveats to one side, domestic actors can and do work in ways that international actors cannot. There are other instances where external assistance is delayed, absent or insufficient, leaving domestic actors to bridge the gap. After the floods in Uganda, it took about three months

before external support started reaching people because the floods had completely cut off the affected districts from other parts of the country. Most relief agencies only started intervening after the routes had been cleared and rehabilitated by the government. Furthermore international actors often concentrate on easy to reach areas. Communities in Uganda noted that people in the furthest camps often did not receive assistance because almost all agencies concentrate in the nearby and central camps. It was primarily the government that reached people in remote rural areas. In insecure environments, domestic organisations may be the only option in areas that are otherwise no-go for international actors.

It has been argued that climate change will lead to an appreciable increase in the cost of responding to disasters. A 2008 study carried out by Feinstein International Center on the humanitarian costs of climate change estimated the minimum projected increase in spending on climate-related disasters at US\$57 million by 2030. The worst-case maximum projection yields a rise of over US\$1.3 billion in international climate-related disaster response (at 2006 US\$

values). The scale of this increase, combined with the fact that climate change is resulting in the increased number and frequency of small-scale disasters, means that domestic humanitarian actors will have to play a more substantial role – all the more so since the current international system is strongly geared towards responding to disasters affecting very large numbers of people.

Humanitarian crises can easily cause vulnerable people to fall into chronic poverty. If livelihoods are destroyed, families have no source of income, without which they fall into poverty. In Uganda, it was noted that prolonged and varied disasters, such as insecurity, drought and floods, depleted local assets and resources (both human and physical) and increased vulnerability. This reduced both household and community reliance and ability to cope with crises. The domestic community is well placed to reduce vulnerability to disasters both through disaster risk-reduction activities and through initial responses post-onset. However, it is important that domestic structures are nurtured during the response to allow them to play their part during the recovery.

## THE IMPORTANCE OF COUNTING

If countries and people affected by crises are to benefit from a response that is efficient and effective, one that reduces vulnerability and risk and offers pathways from crisis to security, then understanding domestic response is indispensable. By recognising its strengths and weakness, a stronger and more effective humanitarian system can emerge where international and domestic actors respond cohesively and the comparative strengths of each are fully employed. Where states are weaker, international actors can step up. Where the domestic system is stronger, international actors can take a less prominent role focusing their activities on specific areas of response.


Making domestic response much more visible is crucial to this process, both in terms of its scale and its inter-relation with international aid.

When the Global Humanitarian Assistance programme set out to make domestic

response visible, we had hoped to have overall estimates of its scale to compare with international response and thus provide a more accurate picture of overall humanitarian aid. We wanted to understand just how much families, communities and domestic civil society, national governments are all involved in providing assistance. The scale and impact of the majority of their interventions remains largely outside of the humanitarian system and the closer delivery actors are to the recipients they serve, the less likely we are to have reliable and comparable information on their activities. Yet a full understanding of domestic response is essential, not only because it helps make links to both preparation for response and recovery but also only with this knowledge can humanitarian interventions be both coherent and effective.

# CONFLICT AND THE MILITARY

## TOP 10 CONFLICT-AFFECTED RECIPIENTS OF HUMANITARIAN AID FROM GOVERNMENTS



Key: Conflict-affected states Non conflict-affected states





# CONFLICT AND THE MILITARY

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Armed conflict and humanitarian assistance are close companions. People trying to live their lives in conflict-affected states have seen the volumes of humanitarian aid to their countries grow progressively over the last ten years. At the same time funding dedicated to addressing the root causes of conflict and promoting peace and stability has grown and new organisations and mechanisms have emerged to try to drive resources and support into these very difficult environments.

# CONFLICT AND AID

States affected by active conflict or emerging from conflict are major recipients of humanitarian assistance receiving 73.8% (US\$7.9 billion) of humanitarian aid from governments and the European Commission in 2008. Of this total, more than US\$7.7 billion came from the 23 DAC donors. And despite a reduction in the overall number of active conflicts since the late 1990s, there has been significant growth in the total volume and overall share of humanitarian aid flowing to conflict-affected states.

While the number of conflict-affected states has remained relatively constant between 1999 and 2008 at around 31 each year, the number in currently active conflict has declined and the number in post conflict has increased. Typically volumes of aid increase following the signing of a peace agreement and deployment of a multilateral peacekeeping force, which in part accounts for the growth in funding to conflict-affected states. (See Figure 1.)

Humanitarian aid to the top five conflict-affected recipients by volume dominates the share of total humanitarian aid received by conflict-affected states, accounting for 51% over the ten-year period between 1999 and 2008. Moreover, growth has

been concentrated amongst these leading dominant recipients; while humanitarian aid received by conflict-affected states grew roughly three times between 1999 and 2008, humanitarian aid to the top five recipients grew six times. Humanitarian funding to the leading recipients, Sudan and Afghanistan, increased six and eight times respectively. Other notable areas of growth include a ten-fold increase in humanitarian aid to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), from US\$52 million in 1999 to US\$549 in 2008.


Volumes of funding to conflict-affected states vary widely, with some only receiving small overall volumes compared with the leading recipients. Sudan alone has received more than US\$8.2 billion in the ten years between 1999 and 2008, equivalent to the combined total of all the bottom ten conflict-affected states.

Conflict-affected states are likely to receive a greater proportion of their total aid as humanitarian rather than development aid and are likely to be long-term recipients of humanitarian aid. Of 23 countries identified as long-term recipients of humanitarian aid, 16 were conflict-affected or in post-conflict transition between 1999 and 2008. (See Table 1.)

A set of conflict-affected states was derived for each of the years between 1999 and 2009 using the Uppsala Conflict Data Programme's database to determine the incidence of active conflict in a given year (both involving state actors and where no state actor is involved but where more than 25 battle deaths resulted) and where the presence of a multilateral peacekeeping mission (excluding purely civilian missions) and no recurrence of violence in that year indicates a country in post conflict.






























































































































































































































































































































The analysis in this chapter focuses on mainly DAC donor government contributions to conflict affected states, peacekeeping and stabilisation.

FIGURE 1: GROWTH IN HUMANITARIAN FUNDING TO CONFLICT-AFFECTED STATES, 1999-2008



Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC data

TABLE 1: PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL ODA (EXCLUDING DEBT RELIEF) THAT IS HUMANITARIAN AID IN CONFLICT-AFFECTED AND NON-CONFLICT-AFFECTED COUNTRIES THAT ARE ALSO LONG-TERM HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE COUNTRIES (LTHACS)

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	
<b>Sudan</b>	43.0% 	47.3% 	65.9% 	69.7% 	80.2% 	79.8% 	76.6% 	72.5% 	49.9% 	77.6% 	71.4% 	64.2% 	62.0% 	59.8% 	64.7% 
Somalia	55.2% 	44.5% 	38.8% 	36.3% 	38.9% 	50.9% 	51.9% 	63.9% 	59.9% 	66.8% 	72.8% 	73.8% 	63.0% 	72.3% 	63.4% 
<b>DPRK</b>	17.4% 	50.5% 	42.8% 	35.0% 	84.9% 	40.4% 	40.4% 	43.1% 	59.5% 	73.1% 	64.9% 	55.3% 	45.4% 	48.3% 	53.7% 
<b>Palestine/OPT</b>	49.8% 	33.7% 	45.7% 	53.5% 	43.4% 	47.4% 	54.7% 	49.5% 	45.7% 	48.0% 	41.0% 	51.7% 	44.7% 	29.5% 	43.6% 
Lebanon	47.7% 	38.1% 	49.9% 	38.4% 	43.2% 	38.9% 	49.1% 	46.4% 	33.1% 	32.6% 	43.3% 	53.2% 	51.1% 	24.3% 	40.5% 
Liberia	72.2% 	45.7% 	59.9% 	44.0% 	71.7% 	54.3% 	52.0% 	81.5% 	81.6% 	71.4% 	59.8% 	51.3% 	14.5% 	13.1% 	38.8% 
Syria	21.2% 	28.2% 	35.4% 	33.2% 	18.4% 	31.0% 	143.1% 	62.4% 	35.1% 	33.3% 	60.4% 	78.1% 	44.2% 	58.2% 	38.5% 
<b>Burundi</b>	53.2% 	29.2% 	28.3% 	34.3% 	49.1% 	44.5% 	39.0% 	48.9% 	56.8% 	46.5% 	43.5% 	34.3% 	20.2% 	15.5% 	36.1% 
<b>Myanmar</b>	15.0% 	13.8% 	-45.9% 	73.6% 	7.2% 	19.2% 	21.3% 	34.9% 	21.4% 	24.1% 	23.1% 	25.2% 	22.9% 	63.7% 	34.9% 
Angola	32.3% 	21.7% 	29.6% 	20.8% 	36.7% 	42.0% 	37.6% 	51.6% 	53.1% 	42.8% 	26.4% 	86.0% 	7.9% 	3.0% 	33.6% 
Iran	15.8% 	27.1% 	31.1% 	19.0% 	23.3% 	28.6% 	32.8% 	45.8% 	43.4% 	54.1% 	25.7% 	37.2% 	21.5% 	6.9% 	29.9% 
<b>DRC</b>	27.0% 	32.5% 	33.4% 	27.7% 	27.7% 	40.9% 	64.5% 	20.5% 	37.8% 	25.4% 	22.6% 	32.3% 	31.8% 	29.7% 	29.4% 
<b>Eritrea</b>	25.4% 	8.0% 	9.5% 	4.9% 	13.7% 	27.7% 	15.4% 	31.1% 	46.8% 	39.4% 	48.3% 	28.5% 	14.1% 	16.8% 	27.7% 
Cuba	38.6% 	20.5% 	53.3% 	39.9% 	41.6% 	30.3% 	32.7% 	15.7% 	9.6% 	9.1% 	13.6% 	8.0% 	3.9% 	18.0% 	21.7% 
<b>Ethiopia</b>	14.8% 	8.8% 	14.5% 	11.7% 	13.7% 	26.6% 	16.1% 	15.3% 	44.6% 	23.4% 	32.4% 	17.9% 	11.0% 	24.1% 	21.2% 
<b>Afghanistan</b>	70.8% 	70.5% 	85.9% 	81.4% 	54.5% 	86.2% 	91.5% 	51.6% 	25.4% 	17.2% 	10.6% 	10.0% 	8.0% 	17.9% 	21.0% 
Jordan	21.7% 	18.0% 	25.5% 	28.6% 	27.7% 	21.4% 	28.2% 	23.5% 	10.5% 	18.8% 	19.7% 	22.0% 	24.6% 	20.7% 	20.8% 
Sierra Leone	10.0% 	16.5% 	18.7% 	21.4% 	61.0% 	17.1% 	30.1% 	40.1% 	37.4% 	20.6% 	12.5% 	12.6% 	9.5% 	4.9% 	20.5% 
Tajikistan	45.6% 	38.2% 	40.4% 	20.5% 	35.6% 	28.5% 	25.5% 	33.1% 	24.5% 	11.4% 	8.1% 	8.6% 	5.2% 	8.4% 	19.2% 
<b>Iraq</b>	80.6% 	94.0% 	96.4% 	82.4% 	116.7% 	91.6% 	94.7% 	95.9% 	43.2% 	21.3% 	7.4% 	7.2% 	7.1% 	11.5% 	16.7% 
Guinea	6.3% 	12.1% 	10.5% 	11.5% 	19.7% 	23.6% 	28.5% 	26.8% 	24.4% 	16.4% 	16.3% 	13.2% 	8.8% 	8.2% 	15.5% 
<b>Kenya</b>	6.0% 	5.5%													

Unsurprisingly the countries with high shares of humanitarian aid compared to ODA are ones where conflict has been and in many cases remains a serious issue such as Sudan, Somalia and Palestine/OPT. There is a positive trend in some post conflict countries with progressively diminishing percentages of humanitarian aid, such as in Sierra Leone and Angola. The appearance of both DPRK and Syria near the top of the list, neither of which are conflict-affected, might suggest that humanitarian aid is being used to channel aid to countries where development funding, which entails a much closer relationship with governments, is more problematic.

Growth in the total volumes of humanitarian aid to conflict-affected states also reflects in part a recognition of the protracted nature of assistance, which has prompted an expansion in the remit of humanitarian action to include an ever-widening range of activities such as protection, community-based peacebuilding and a range of livelihood activities to address underlying causes of vulnerability.

In keeping with the 2005 Paris Declaration principles of aid harmonisation and changes in funding mechanisms associated with the UN reform agenda however, conflict and post-conflict states are more likely to receive a good proportion of their aid via UN- or World Bank-managed pooled funding mechanisms, some strictly humanitarian and others with more specifically developmental agenda. In 2008, DRC received 19% of its total ODA via humanitarian pooled funds whilst Palestine/OPT received 19%, Afghanistan 16% and Sudan 15% respectively of their total ODA from both humanitarian and developmental pooled funds.

Humanitarian assistance is only one element of response to global conflict and several other modes of government engagement, which operate in parallel and in some cases in tension with humanitarian assistance, have also seen significant growth and evolution over the last decade.

# Conflict and aid in DRC

DRC has a long history of extreme violence, predatory economic practice and dysfunctional governance. The fragile post-independence state continued this trend under a two-decade period of brutal and incompetent rule under Mobutu in which DRC suffered protracted economic collapse and exhaustive corruption of government. Mobutu's rule was brought to a tumultuous conclusion in 1997 when Rwandan backed rebels swept through the country from the east installing Laurent Kabila as president. This outbreak of violence quickly descended into a bloody struggle over power, regional ethnic politics and mineral resources.

In 1999 Kabila's government, the six other African nations involved in the war and two rebel groups signed the Lusaka peace accord. Despite the existence of a peace process, successful elections in 2006 and the deployment of the largest UN peacekeeping mission ever seen, levels of violence, including

sexual violence against women, and humanitarian needs remain chronic.

DRC is a major recipient of humanitarian assistance and has been subject to a plethora of humanitarian reform initiatives including changes in the way humanitarian funding is channelled. DRC has been a major beneficiary of the UN's Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and overall funding levels have increased dramatically following changes in the way the UN appeal was compiled in 2005 and the creation of a country level pooled humanitarian fund. A further recovery pooled fund, the Stabilisation and Recovery Fund, was created in November 2009.

As well as an overall increase in humanitarian funding to DRC, there has been a significant growth in the thematic areas of disaster prevention and preparedness and relief coordination, protection and support services as well as relief coordination, protection and support services since 2006. (See Figure 2.)

POPULATION

**69 million**

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

176 OUT OF 182 COUNTRIES

**0.389**

LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH

168 OUT OF 176 COUNTRIES

**47.6 years**

ADULT LITERACY RATE (% AGES 15+)

118 OUT OF 159 COUNTRIES

**67.2%**

GDP PER CAPITA (PPP US\$)

181 OUT OF 181 COUNTRIES

**298**

PEOPLE NOT USING

AN IMPROVED WATER SOURCE


144 OUT OF 150 COUNTRIES

**54%**

CLASSED AS

**Fragile state**

FIGURE 2: HUMANITARIAN AID TO DRC FROM OECD DAC DONORS (EXCLUDING TOTALLY UNEARMARKED CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNHCR AND WFP, 2001-2008)



2000

2000 UN Peacekeeping mission MONUC mandated to monitor 1999 Lusaka peace accord

2001

2001 President Laurent Kabila shot dead by a bodyguard and is succeeded by his son, Joseph

2002

2002 Mount Nyiragongo erupts in Goma, destroying much of the city

2003

2003 Peace deal signed between Kinshasa government and main rebel group

2004

2004 Violent clashes in the east between Congolese army and former pro-Rwanda rebel group

2005

2005 New constitution approved

2006

2006 First free elections in 40 years. Incumbent Joseph Kabila wins in presidential run-off  
Rebel group led by Tutsi Laurent Nkunda clashes with Congolese army in North Kivu displacing 50,000 people

2007

2007 Troops loyal to presidential loser Jean Pierre Bemba and Congolese army clash in Kinshasa


2008

2008 Nkunda's militia continues to carry out attacks in the east, despite signing peace agreement  
Uganda and DRC launch a joint assault on LRA bases in eastern DRC

2009

2009 DRC and Rwanda undertake joint military operations against Nkunda's militia. Kabila signs into law an amnesty for armed groups in an attempt to end conflict in the east  
MONUC mandate extended with emphasis on prioritising civilian protection

FIGURE 3: INTERNATIONAL FUNDING FLOWS TO DRC, 2000-2009



Source: UN OCHA FTS and SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations database

## GROWTH IN INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING

The deployment of a UN peacekeeping mission has become the standard international response to support peace processes and peace agreements and, in some cases, to protracted crises where there is little peace to keep, such as in Darfur, parts of DRC and the African Union (AU) mission in Somalia. Multilateral peacekeeping operations continue to expand in complexity and size in conflict-affected states. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) there were just over 210,000 uniformed peacekeepers under UN and non-UN command deployed across 55 missions in 2009, a record high in troop numbers following several years of growth (see Table 2). The Annual Review of Peace Operations by the Centre on International Cooperation cites growth in troop numbers at a rate of 15-20% for several years to 2008 then a rate of 8.7% in 2008 with most of

that growth in the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan.


While the global demand for peacekeepers has risen, the range of tasks UN peacekeeping missions regularly undertake has also grown dramatically. In Sudan for example, in addition to traditional activities monitoring the peace agreement and process, the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) is tasked with a swathe of responsibilities that aim to support peace, stability and the rule of law including restructuring the Sudan police service, promoting the rule of law, promoting and monitoring human rights, assisting in the establishment of a disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programme, providing guidance and technical support to elections, facilitating and coordinating the voluntary return of refugees and

TABLE 2: NUMBER OF INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING PERSONNEL DEPLOYED IN 2009

	TROOPS	MILITARY OBSERVERS	CIVILIAN POLICE	TOTAL
UN missions	83,089	2,446	2,808	98,343
Non-UN missions	108,745	1,750	1,853	112,348
All peacekeeping missions	191,834	4,196	14,661	210,691

Source: SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations database

FIGURE 4: GLOBAL EXPENDITURE ON UN DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS (DPKO) MISSIONS, 2000-2009



Source: SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations database

internally displaced people (IDPs), establishing security conditions necessary for provision of humanitarian assistance, coordinating humanitarian demining and coordinating international efforts towards the protection of civilians.

The responsibility to protect civilians is perhaps the most challenging growing area of responsibility for UN peacekeeping missions and continues to gain international support in principle, evident in the increasing number of UN peacekeeping missions granted Chapter VII mandates stipulating the responsibility and authorisation to use force to "protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence". Prior to the creation of the UN Peacekeeping Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) in October 1999, no UN-mandated peacekeeping operation included permission to use force to protect civilians. Including UNAMSIL, a total of 10 UN peacekeeping missions have been granted civilian protection mandates and, of these, eight are currently operational.

A handful of large peacekeeping operations dominates the total UN peacekeeping expenditure with the six largest missions in 2009 (the UNMIS and UNAMID missions in Sudan, MONUC in DRC, UNMIL in Liberia, UNIFIL in Lebanon and MINUSTAH in Haiti) accounting for 75.7% (US\$5.6 billion) of the total spending on UN peacekeeping.

The 2010 budget figure continues this overall rising trend at US\$7.8 billion. (See Figure 4.)

Most UN peacekeeping missions are funded through assessed contributions from UN member states, of which 6% is eligible as ODA. As contributions to UN peacekeeping through assessed contributions have risen, so too have contributions to the growing field of non-traditional peacekeeping activities, including promoting the rule of law, monitoring human rights, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes, technical support to elections and humanitarian demining, funded and through regular UN budgets.

Growth in global peacekeeping is by no means restricted to UN peacekeeping operations however. 2009 saw rapid growth in the number of peacekeepers deployed under North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) led command with the total deployed to ISAF increasing by nearly 33,000 to a high of 84,146 and overtaking the total global deployment of peacekeeping troops under UN command, at 82,868. The cost of the NATO ISAF operation is extremely difficult to determine. The cost to NATO in 2009 is reported as US\$416 million, but this is only a fraction of the total cost, the remainder of which is borne by the military budgets of the 40 troop-contributing nations.

Regional organisations are also significant contributors to multilateral

Of 12 newly mandated UN peacekeeping missions since the creation of UNAMSIL, eight have included the provision for the use of force to protect civilians in: DRC; Liberia; Burundi; Haiti; Cote d'Ivoire; Lebanon; the combined mission for the Central African Republic (CAR) and Chad; and the two missions in Sudan, one of which is expressly for the purpose of peacekeeping in Darfur.

## WHAT IS ODA AND WHAT IS NOT ODA?

ODA cannot be used to fund military equipment, services or debt relief. It cannot fund security expenditure related to paramilitary functions or anti terrorism. It cannot fund mine clearance if the objective is not developmental.

If the military are used to deliver humanitarian aid, limited additional costs can be counted as ODA. To be additional, costs must be incurred over and above the costs of keeping personnel on base in the donor country and take account of any compensation received from the UN for the use of military services.

Within UN approved peace operations some activities in the post conflict phase can count as ODA. These include human rights, election monitoring, rehabilitation of demobilised soldiers, advice on economic stabilisation, demobilisation of soldiers and weapons disposal. Within these activities funding must not go to the armed forces or for military capacity building. It has to be used to increase democratic control or for civil society engagement.



peacekeeping operations with the AU weighing in as the third largest by troop number in 2009 with 5,221 troops and a budget of US\$200 million for the AMISOM mission in Somalia. AU operational budgets are principally funded from voluntary donor contributions. A variety of funding mechanisms supporting the AU's operational costs and capacity development have emerged including the European Union (EU) African Peace Facility, the United States Global Peace Operations Initiative and recently a UN Security Council proposed trust

fund to receive contributions to the AU in Somalia.

This recent and considerable growth in global peacekeeping forces is not necessarily likely to continue. It has already faced challenges in meeting the demand for personnel, with a shortfall of 10,903 UN troops and 1,514 UN civilian staff against the authorised numbers in 2009. In January 2009 the UN Security Council noted in its Peacekeeping report that "combined with the global economic downturn, members are likely to be keen to discuss ways of streamlining peacekeeping costs

Donor contributions to AU peacekeeping operations are currently considered to be ineligible as ODA by the OECD DAC. However, UN Security Council resolution 1863 issued in January 2009 authorised the use of UN assessed peacekeeping contributions to fund a UN support package and requested the formation of a trust fund to receive voluntary donor contributions to the AMISOM mission.


## THE RETURN OF THE STATE

Emerging from a decade of donor reflection on how best to engage with fragile and conflict-affected states beyond the provision of life saving humanitarian assistance and the external stabilising influence of a multilateral peacekeeping presence, many donors have converged on the idea of building functional, accountable service delivering states that are fundamentally able to ensure the security of their citizens. This requires not only investing in building the infrastructure and systems of accountable governance, but also on altering the incentives and opportunities for violence. This policy shift has driven distinct trends in funding volumes and generated new mechanisms and relationships through which donors engage in conflict-affected states.

Donor spending on a range of conflict prevention, stabilisation and peacebuilding activities, including support to an expanding range of tasks undertaken by UN peacekeeping missions continues to grow. Spending on capacity building and technical support to governance and civil society has also grown rapidly. (See Figure 5.)


Between 1998 and 2008, while total development assistance grew by just over one and a half times, humanitarian assistance roughly doubled, while spending on government and civil society increased five-fold, and spending on conflict, peace and security-related activities increased twenty-fold.

FIGURE 5: ODA FOR HUMANITARIAN AID, GOVERNMENT AND CIVIL SOCIETY AND CONFLICT, PEACE AND SECURITY-RELATED ACTIVITIES, 1998-2008



Sources: Development assistance calculated as ODA excluding debt relief, minus total humanitarian assistance (OECD DAC; Development Initiatives analysis); Conflict, peace and security and government and civil society (OECD DAC CRS); all in 2008 constant prices

FIGURE 6: ODA FROM OECD DAC DONORS TO CONFLICT, PEACE AND SECURITY-RELATED ACTIVITIES, 1995–2008



Note that civilian peacebuilding and security system codes were not in use prior to 2004.

Source: OECD DAC


Of these activities the growth has been particularly evident for peace-building and security system management and reform. (See Figure 6.)

Funds have been spent in remarkably diverse contexts with 127 countries having received funds for peace and security-related activities with Afghanistan as the top recipient (US\$590 million, 16% of total). It was

perhaps surprising to see Serbia as second highest recipient (US\$361 million, 9.5% of total) and significantly higher than Iraq which was third highest (US\$201 million, 5.3%).

In contrast to humanitarian aid, which in principle is provided on an impartial basis to save lives and alleviate suffering, and development aid, which has the ultimate goal of poverty reduction,

FIGURE 7: TOP 10 OECD DAC DONORS OF CONFLICT, PEACE AND SECURITY AID, 2006–2008



Source: OECD DAC

stabilisation and state-building efforts may necessarily involve political and partial decisions. Several donor governments have elaborated 'whole of government' approaches to stabilisation, which call upon their diplomatic and defence capacities as well as their aid departments. (See Figure 7.)

Deployable domestic civilian response capacity is a growing area of interest for many donor governments in support of foreign stabilisation and peacebuilding objectives.

Civilian response capacity is a key element of the European Common Security and Defence Policy with civilian experts drawn from member states deployed to EU-led stabilisation

missions, often focussing on security sector reform including building policing and rule of law capabilities. Some member states have developed rosters or pools of experts to meet their EU and other international obligations to civilian capacity deployment.

In addition to formalising training and recruitment processes to meet international obligations to peacekeeping and stabilisation missions, the potential value that could have been added to the stabilisation of Iraq and Afghanistan after the military invasions has also played a role in convincing donors beyond the EU to develop their own pools of civilian experts. (See panel below).

**AUSTRALIA** announced its intention to create a response corps in October 2009 and expects to have a team of up to 500 civilian experts, with skills in finance, law and justice, engineering, health administration and community development, operational by 2011. The Australian Civilian Response Corps will be housed within AusAid.

**CANADA** The Canadian government is currently developing a whole-of-government civilian deployment mechanism that will likely focus on deploying Canadian government officials and currently works with CANADEM to support deployment of non-governmental civilian experts.

**CANADEM** International Civilian Reserve is a government-funded NGO roster of 10,000 experts deployed into international organisations working in areas of human rights, elections, the rule of law, democratisation, governance, security and policing, counter-trafficking, child protection, engineering, water and sanitation and humanitarian aid. Established in 1997, CANADEM aims to support peace, order and good governance.

**DENMARK** The Danish Emergency Management Agency (DEMA), which manages the Danish domestic fire and rescue services, also deploys humanitarian/disaster response civilian experts and logistics support at the request of, and funded by, the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Rosters of police officers, whose deployment is funded by the Ministry of the Interior, are also maintained.

**FINLAND** Finland maintains a roster of civilians and police officers with deployments tasked and funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Crisis Management Centre, housed within the Ministry of Interior, is responsible for recruiting and training civilian experts for deployment to international peacebuilding and stabilisation missions.

**NETHERLANDS** The Dutch civilian expert pool, managed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, deploys experts in security

sector reform, rule of law, and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR). Other deployable civilians in policing and military policing are distributed across the Ministries of the Interior and Defence.

**SWEDEN** Sweden maintains pools of civilian personnel available for deployment across a number of government agencies including police, prison and probation services. Through the Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) the Swedish government deploys civilians to international operations with expertise on humanitarian assistance, mine action, search and rescue and disaster preparedness.

**SWITZERLAND** The Swiss Expert Pool for civilian peacebuilding is managed by the Federal Department for Foreign Affairs and comprises 630 expert volunteers deployed in support of civilian peacebuilding activities as election monitors, police advisors or specialists in the field of constitutional matters, mediation, rule of law, human rights and humanitarian law.

**UNITED KINGDOM** The Civilian Stabilisation Group (CSG), created in 2008, is a roster of more than 1,000 experts with skills in the provision of basic infrastructure, policing, the rule of law and security sector reform. The CSG is housed under the cross-departmental Stabilisation Unit that is jointly managed by the Ministry of Defence, Foreign Office and Department for International Development. Deployments are funded under the peacekeeping budget and the cross-departmental Conflict Pool fund.

**UNITED STATES** The Civilian Response Corps was formed in 2005. Now with more than 500 experts on its roster, it is housed within the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) in the Department of State. As part of an ongoing shift towards increased civilian control of stabilisation activities within the United States government, S/CRS will receive a significantly increased budget in 2011.

The OECD DAC's eligibility criteria for security-related expenditure emphasises support for democratic governance and civilian control of security systems. This excludes a range of technical capacity-building activities and material support that government donors may wish to fund in support of building a state's capacity to ensure security of its citizenry and borders. DAC eligibility criteria also does not include any funding in support of non-UN peacekeeping missions.

Several donor governments have established internal funding pools or programmes, separate from their normal aid funding mechanisms, which are devoted to peacekeeping, stabilisation and peacebuilding activities, and from which they can fund both ODA-eligible and non-ODA eligible activities.

Currently, the Netherlands, United Kingdom, Canada and EU maintain internal pooled funds that manage ODA and non-ODA eligible funds in support of peacebuilding. Australia and Denmark are considering setting up similar mechanisms.

The pooled donor funds for peacebuilding and stabilisation peacekeeping funds of the United Kingdom and the Netherlands are by far the largest of their kind and show a strong interest in Afghanistan and, in the case of the United Kingdom, Iraq. All funds demonstrate a strong commitment to peacebuilding and stabilisation in sub-Saharan Africa.

**UK CONFLICT POOL** The UK government created two cross-departmental 'conflict prevention pools' in 2001 focussing on Africa and the rest of the world. The October 2007 Comprehensive Spending Review established a further fund, the Stabilisation Aid Fund (SAF), focused on Afghanistan and Iraq. In 2010 the SAF and conflict pools were merged to create a single conflict pool, jointly managed by the Department for International Development (DFID), Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO).

In addition to a focus on immediate tactical stabilisation, efforts alongside the military in Iraq and Afghanistan, the conflict pool funds a range of conflict prevention, stabilisation and discretionary peacekeeping activities, including support for the UN Rule of Law Unit, Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Peacebuilding Support Office.

Approximately 30% of the conflict pool's expenditure funds non-ODA eligible activities. The ODA-eligible component represented around 2% of the United Kingdom's total ODA in 2007/8 and 2008/9.

**NETHERLANDS STABILITY FUND** Established in 2004, the fund is managed jointly by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry for Development Cooperation. Its function is to rapidly provide funding for activities promoting peace, security and development in conflict-affected areas. Thematic focus includes conflict prevention, conflict mediation, peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities including security sector reform (SSR) and DDR programmes.

Geographical focus includes the Horn of Africa, the Great Lakes region, Afghanistan and the Western Balkans. The fund grew from EUR58.3 million in 2004 to EUR100.1 million in 2008.

Between the fund's inception in 2004 and 2009, 30% of funds expended have been non-ODA eligible. The ODA-eligible component averages around 2.4% of total Dutch ODA in 2008, falling to 1.5% in 2009.

**CANADA'S GLOBAL PEACE AND SECURITY FUND (GPSF)** Established in 2005, the GPSF is housed within the intergovernmental Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START) Secretariat, managed by Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada (DFAIT). The GPSF is divided into four thematic programmes: the Global Peace and Security Program (GPSP); the Global Peace Operation Program (GPOP); the Glyn Berry Program (GBP); and the Canadian Police Arrangement.

In 2008, it was the GPOP that channelled the vast majority of GPSF funding – over 80%, or US\$123.5 million of the US\$151.6. Overall, the GPSF focused on programmes in Afghanistan (26.2% of the funding) but sizeable shares were also spent in West Africa and the Americas (18% and 14.2% respectively). Over 16% of the funding was spent on thematic programmes.

GPSF has a total budget of US\$148 million (CA\$169 million) for 2009/10.


**EC INSTRUMENT FOR STABILITY (IFS)** Established in 2007, the IFS supports both long-term thematic EC policy concerns to address specific global and trans-regional threats and also maintains a crisis response mechanism.

In 2008, US\$53 million was expended through the long-term mechanism and US\$134 million through the crisis response mechanism. The crisis response mechanism prioritises programmes in Africa, followed by Asia (including Afghanistan), the Middle East and Georgia and thematic interests include a support to regional peacekeeping capacity, rule of law and transitional justice, security sector reform, support to interim administrations, post crisis needs assessments and disaster recovery programmes.

**EC AFRICAN PEACE FACILITY (APF)** Established in 2004 and working in tandem with the IFS, the APF funds the cost of AU and sub-regional organisation peacekeeping costs as well as activities to build the capacity of the AU security infrastructure.

EUR300 million was earmarked under the 10th European development fund for funding the APF for the period 2008-2010

FIGURE 8: FUNDING CHANNELLED THROUGH POOLED DONOR FUNDS FOR PEACEBUILDING AND STABILISATION ACTIVITIES, 2008



Note: data for UK covers UK tax year 2008/9 and includes Global Conflict Pool and Stabilisation Aid Fund for Afghanistan and Iraq. Apart from expenditure in Afghanistan, data from Canada is not disaggregated by country. Note data for UK covers UK tax year 2008/9 and includes Global Conflict Pool and Stabilisation Aid Fund for Afghanistan and Iraq. Apart from expenditure in Afghanistan, data from Canada is not disaggregated by country. Source: Development Initiatives based on data from: UK Department for International Development; Hansard reporting on UK House of Commons Debates; Government of the Netherlands; European Union; United Nations Development Program (UNDP); SMART (Canada); and World Bank

## THE MILITARY AS A HUMANITARIAN ACTOR

Humanitarian and military actors find themselves crowded in closer proximity than they had been accustomed to in an increasing number of humanitarian crises. This trend has been driven by changes in external operating environments and internal changes amongst military actors, concerning both their perceptions of their mandates and, in some cases, their means of achieving military objectives.

Natural disasters have increased in frequency and severity and domestic and foreign militaries are offering their logistical and technical capacities on an increasingly regular basis, particularly in large-scale emergencies. The first large scale international military response to a natural disaster was in response to Hurricane Mitch in 1998 where 12 foreign militaries deployed assets. In the recent response to the earthquake in Haiti in 2010, 42 national militaries deployed troops, assets and relief goods.

Determining the financial contribution of military actors to humanitarian assistance efforts on a comparable basis is difficult, not least because militaries consider activity costs differently. A number of militaries calculate additional marginal costs and may charge these to humanitarian or foreign affairs budgets. These marginal costs are allowable as ODA under OECD DAC rules but may not always be reported or easily distinguishable in DAC-reported data. Investment and recurrent costs of military contributions to humanitarian assistance are often absorbed by existing military budgets and not disaggregated in financial reports from the overall costs of meeting primary military tasks.

The UK government for example reported spending a total of around US\$21 million on humanitarian responses through the Ministry of Defence (MoD) to the Indian Ocean earthquake-tsunami, Hurricane Katrina in the United States and the Pakistan earthquake in 2005/6, whereas the operations supporting response to Hurricane Omar in the Caribbean and Hurricane Gustav in the Turks and Caicos Islands in 2008/9 were absorbed by the existing Atlantic Patrol Task military budgets and therefore not reported as additional costs to the UK tax payer.

Moreover the costs, marginal or otherwise, of military contributions to humanitarian operations are rarely publicly available and are most commonly reported if at all as in-kind contributions.

The global war on terror has driven a significant up-turn in involvement of military actors in traditionally civilian fields of engagement including direct delivery of relief supplies, emergency health, water and sanitation as well as funding and implementation of early recovery activities, as an adjunct to military activities and objectives.

These policies are confined principally to Iraq and Afghanistan, and concern the United States and to a lesser extent other donor governments participating in the NATO ISAF force in Afghanistan, but this trend accounts for such a huge volume of resources and has prompted such polarising debate between humanitarian and military actors that it warrants separate study.

### HAITI 2010: THE MILITARY CONTRIBUTION TO THE HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE

In addition to the more than 1,000 civilian organisations registered with UN OCHA in the first stages of the humanitarian response to the earthquake in Haiti in January 2010, 34 national militaries plus the UN DPKO's resident MINUSTAH, deployed troops and assets to support the humanitarian response. Contributing forces were: Argentina; Belgium; Bolivia; Bulgaria; Brazil; Canada; Chile; Colombia; Dominican Republic; France; Guatemala; Ireland; Israel; Italy; Jamaica; Japan; Jordan; Luxemburg; Mexico; Nicaragua; Nigeria; Norway; Portugal; Peru; Puerto Rico; Russia; Korea; Spain; Sweden; Taiwan; Uruguay; the United Kingdom; the United States; Venezuela; and the UN DPKO's MINUSTAH. Contributions to the operation were diverse: from Australian air traffic controllers, to Colombian field hospitals, from Jamaican engineers to French fire fighters, national militaries made huge and costly contributions in the form of ships, helicopters, planes, trucks, heavy lifting equipment, man-power and technical expertise that were critical to the entire humanitarian response.

We will most likely never know the true cost of military contributions to the humanitarian response, but as an indication, the largest military contribution to Haiti, from the US Department of Defense (DoD), was reported to have cost US\$285 million, just under 6% of the total US\$1.2 billion contributions reported by UN OCHA.

TABLE 3: BUDGETARY ALLOCATIONS OF FUNDING FOR US GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS INVOLVED IN SUPPORTING STABILISATION-RELATED ACTIVITIES IN 2010. ALL FIGURES US\$ BILLION


USAID		STATE DEPARTMENT		DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE	
Civilian Stabilisation Initiative (CSI)	0.03	Foreign Military Financing (FMF)	4.20	Global Train and Equip (Section 1206)	0.35
Transition Initiatives (OTI)	0.06	Peacekeeping Operations (PKO)	0.33	Security and Stabilisation (Section 1207)	0.10
		International Military Education and Training (IMET)	0.11	Support to Foreign Forces (Section 1208)	0.04
		Economic Support Fund (ESF)	6.34	Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund	-
		Civilian Stabilisation Initiative (CSI)	0.12	Iraq and Afghanistan Security Forces Funds	6.60
		Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities (CIPA)	2.13	Cooperative Threat Reduction	0.42
Complex Crises Fund (CCF)	0.05	International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE)	1.60	Commander's Emergency Response Program	1.20
		Non proliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR)	0.75	Counter Terrorism Fellowship Program	0.04
		Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund		Combatant Commander's Initiative Fund	0.05
				Drug Interdiction and Counterdrug Activities	1.50
				Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid Program (OHDACA)	0.11
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>0.14</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>15.57</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>10.41</b>

Note that the State Department Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund and the DoD Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund each received multi-year budgetary allocations in 2009 that expire in 2010 and 2011 respectively, therefore no appropriations were made in 2010 though both funds remained operational. Source: USAID and Department of State estimated enacted amounts; DoD enacted budget figures, Henry L. Stimson Center; OHDACA FY2010 appropriated budget stated by DSCA in FY2011 budgetary justification request

Since 2001 and US-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States Department of Defense (DoD) has been granted increasing responsibility for channelling and implementing security-related foreign assistance. A proliferation of similarly mandated funds has grown up across the DoD and the US Department of State. (See Table 3.)

Aid spent through the United States DoD where the military is actively engaged is primarily guided by military doctrine and tactical advantage rather than by poverty reduction or humanitarian goals and as such operates independently of donor principles of aid harmonisation and impartial needs driven humanitarian financing.

FIGURE 9: US AID CHANNELLED THROUGH DOD AND REPORTED TO THE OECD DAC, 2008



US\$bn	AFGHANISTAN	IRAQ
CERP (humanitarian)	0.0	0.0
CERP (non-humanitarian)	0.6	0.1
Other DoD funding	0.1	1.1
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>0.7</b>	<b>1.3</b>

Note that this represents only the ODA-eligible elements of total DoD aid to these countries, not the total amount spent. Source: OECD DAC


The United States DoD is a major aid donor in Iraq and Afghanistan with large volumes of funds routed through the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP). With a total budget of US\$1.2 billion for 2010 (which also includes the Philippines), the CERP exceeds the combined total requested in the UN consolidated appeal for Afghanistan (US\$871 million) and the humanitarian action plan for Iraq (US\$194 million). (See Figure 9.)

In Afghanistan, officially reported development and humanitarian aid flows are dwarfed by security-related funding and military spending. (See Figure 10.)

Despite the significant cost of military involvement in overseas humanitarian assistance and development aid to domestic taxpayers, there is very often no information publicly available as to the actual amounts of money involved nor the targeting, cost efficiency and overall effectiveness of these contributions.



FIGURE 10: SELECTED INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL FLOWS TO AFGHANISTAN, 2001-2008



Source: Development Initiatives analysis based on data from: US Congressional Research Service report on The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11, 28 September 2009; Henry L. Stimson Centre; NATO; UK Ministry of Defence; and OECD DAC

## THE FUTURE OF CONFLICT RESPONSE

Conflict continues to shape the demand for and environment in which humanitarian assistance operates, but key external political and military trends over the last decade have shaped environments, actors and patterns of funding in new and distinct ways.

There is an emergent trend in conflict-affected states for the confluence between humanitarian and development action to take the form of stabilisation and state-building activity.

However, despite a decade of growth, the immediate future of stabilisation funding is uncertain. Of the leading donors, the UK and Dutch conflict and stability pooled funds are facing diminished budgets in 2011 and the United States is

considering the very future and nature of many of the security-related funds in Afghanistan and Iraq currently housed within the DoD.

Demand for peacekeeping operations and for the expanded remit of their civilian activities will likely remain high but this growing funding responsibility is placing additional pressure on donor governments at a time when they are still in or recovering from recession.


While donor governments are alert to the need to address root causes of conflict, and policy and practice are burgeoning, the availability of funding may prove a limiting factor in this otherwise growing field.

## THE CHALLENGE OF COUNTING THE MILITARY

In order to estimate the volume of funds the US military is spending in Afghanistan a frighteningly complicated series of calculations has been made and a range of caveats have to be understood.

Firstly the US DoD figures are reported budgetary appropriations not actual expenditure; US DoD funds to support Afghan Security services are likely much higher but because of lack of access to expenditure records, it is not possible to disaggregate funding for Afghanistan from other DoD global budgets. NATO member contributions to the Afghan National Army Trust Fund are included as a yearly average of the total sum reported by NATO for the period February 2007–January 2010. 'Military operations' includes the budgeted amounts for US Operation Enduring Freedom and US contribution to NATO ISAF (minus the appropriated budgetary amounts for the United States Afghan Security Force Fund and excluding Foreign Aid and Diplomatic Operations) plus the UK budgeted amount for participation in NATO ISAF plus the budgeted amount for NATO ISAF itself. This represents a only a partial picture of total foreign military spending since the cost of military operations for the remaining 38 NATO ISAF participating nations is not included. NATO support to Afghan security forces through Afghan National Army Trust Fund is taken as an average of the figure of NATO-reported US\$135 million between 2007 and 2009.

# SCALE OF NEEDS: AN OVERVIEW





# SCALE OF NEEDS

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Funding according to need lies at the heart of humanitarian intervention. The justification for treating humanitarian situations as a special case rests on the concept that need and need alone should determine the response.

Between 2007 and 2009 at least US\$44.7 billion was spent on humanitarian assistance – money from governments, tax payers, private giving and humanitarian organisations themselves. We know that many identified humanitarian needs went unmet. And we know that the needs that were identified did not cover all crises and emergencies. What we don't know is whether that US\$44.7 billion would have met global humanitarian needs had it been allocated differently, or whether it was simply not enough.

Donor governments are in charge of allocating a large proportion of humanitarian aid, and both individually and collectively are responsible for some very significant humanitarian interventions, such as providing US\$1 billion year-on-year to fund ICRC or supporting Sudan's humanitarian appeals of close to US\$6.6 billion over the last five years. Yet these donors still have only finite resources. They have, however, also committed to fund according to need and to do this they have to know what the priorities are so that they can ration their funding, taking account of a scale of need that combines the severity and urgency of a crisis and the number of people affected.

People living through crises should be able to expect that all of their needs up to a certain threshold are being taken into account – not just those in a single sector like food, or education, or protection. Yet if the aspiration to ensure that basic humanitarian needs are met transparently on a global basis is to be more than just rhetoric – and where those involved in administering and implementing aid are responsible to both tax payers and recipients – then a scale of need based on accepted standards and thresholds seems essential.

## WHAT DO WE KNOW NOW ABOUT FUNDING ACCORDING TO NEED?

We know that spending per person varies widely across different crises, even when the nature of those crises is in some ways very similar.

The earthquake that struck Haiti in January 2010 is a prime example of how acute differences can be in the scale of funding for similar contexts. By the end of April 2010, the level of funding that Haiti received in response to the earthquake had reached US\$2.8 billion. If we put that in relation to the number of people affected, three million according to the UN and government of Haiti, this would equate to US\$933 per person. (See Figure 1.)

Yet if we use data from the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) to compare this to earthquakes of significant scale and to other disasters to have befallen Haiti, we would get a quite different picture. After the cyclones that hit the country just 18 months before the earthquake, a total of US\$128 million of humanitarian aid was

spent on the estimated 1.7 million people affected. This is equivalent to US\$72 dollars per person – even lower than the \$108 spent per person in response to the Peruvian earthquake of 2007. The reason for the difference between funding for the Haitian and Peruvian earthquakes might seem obvious enough given that Peru, unlike Haiti, is a country with a functioning infrastructure and governance. It therefore required much less international intervention. However there does not seem to be an obvious explanation for the difference between the US\$72 per person in response to cyclones in Haiti in 2008 and the US\$993 per person in response to the earthquake in 2010. Was the need per person really US\$861 more in 2010 than it was in 2008?


It is the funding for the Indian Ocean earthquake-tsunami where we see even greater discrepancies between funding for each individual affected compared with any other crisis. Here just over

### CRED EM-DAT DISASTER DATABASE

The CRED EM DAT database of the human impact and cost of natural disasters is the most widely referenced, extensive (with over 15,000 entries) and publicly available source of natural disaster information, informing for instance ISDR, UNDP and World Bank disaster analysis as well as the annual IFRC World Disasters Report. Data is sourced from UN agencies, NGOs, insurance companies, research institutes and press agencies.


CRED data only includes the impact of natural and man-made disasters, not including conflict or slow burning chronic emergencies such as gradual desertification and ecological collapse, which may result in significant humanitarian needs and displacement.

FIGURE 1: FUNDING LEVELS COMPARED TO PEOPLE AFFECTED



Source: UN OCHA FTS and CRED

FIGURE2: HUMANITARIAN FUNDING RECEIVED PER PERSON BASED ON TOTAL POPULATION IN STATES RANKED BY THE ECHO GNA AT THE SAME LEVELS OF MOST VULNERABLE AND CRISIS-AFFECTED, 2009



Source: ECHO GNA 2009/10 and UN OCHA FTS

2.3 million people were affected (less than Haitian earthquake) and yet more than US\$6 billion of humanitarian aid was spent. The assistance is equivalent to a remarkable US\$2,670 per person affected – nearly three times more than the amount per person affected following the Haiti earthquake and more than 37 times more than following the Haiti cyclones. We are left with two key questions. Firstly, what justifies the difference between the Indian Ocean earthquake-tsunami response and the Haiti response? Secondly, are the amounts being spent appropriate? Is the US\$993 of humanitarian aid per person after the Haiti earthquake not enough, about right or far too much?

The ECHO Global Needs Assessment (GNA) index allows us to switch focus away from natural disasters to countries that are ranked at the same level of both vulnerability and crisis, almost all of which suffer from, or have suffered from, recent conflict. (See Figure 2.)

A comparison of the amounts of humanitarian funding received per person demonstrates considerable variation in funding levels across crises the GNA considers to be similarly affected. People in Somalia and Zimbabwe received similar amounts per person (US\$62 and US\$58 per person) and given the needs

in the countries at the time this may seem appropriate. Yet the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) with its multiple humanitarian needs received only US\$10 per person, which is even less than the US\$14 for Kenya.

Variations in the amount of funding received in a given crisis, whether in response to an earthquake in Haiti or for a complex emergency such as Sudan, do not necessarily mean a lack of fairness. There are a number of critical variables that influence the real cost of delivering humanitarian assistance including the ability of humanitarian actors to access populations and the relative operating costs involved in delivering assistance. For example, delivering aid to Somalia will be very much more expensive than to neighbouring Kenya, with its developed markets, transport infrastructure and relative security. But again the question remains: is it right that people living within a humanitarian crisis in Somalia received four times as much humanitarian assistance as the people living in similar crisis in the Central African Republic (CAR)?

The caveats to this data are important. For example, CRED data is reliant on voluntary reporting from a variety of sources; it defines the term 'affected'

## GLOBAL NEEDS ASSESSMENT (GNA) INDEX

Moving beyond a simple headcount of disaster affected people, the EU has developed a comparable index of 139 crisis and vulnerable-affected states that aggregates data from a wide range of sources with indicators spanning development, poverty, natural and man-made disasters, population displacement, under-nourishment, mortality rates and levels of donor funding. This GNA index identifies the most vulnerable countries, which are most likely to be worst affected by disasters and then assesses the extent to which these countries are affected by crises and humanitarian needs remain unmet. These combined indices, plus a further 'Forgotten Crises Assessment' inform ECHO's funding prioritisation.

as being people in need of immediate humanitarian assistance – but the scale, severity and nature of their need for humanitarian assistance is assessed and defined by the various reporting agencies according to their own criteria. CRED data is also not able to answer questions relating to how much humanitarian assistance is needed to meet the needs of these ‘affected’ populations, which will vary tremendously depending on the context.

The GNA is based on a robust set of indices of vulnerability and crisis but it has its own limitations if we use it to try and understand whether funding is proportionate to need. Firstly it does not provide us with the exact number of people in a given country that are suffering from this vulnerability and crisis and who are therefore in need. Rarely is humanitarian funding to a recipient country for a whole population but rather for people living in specific part of the country or region. The GNA, whilst providing a set of affected countries based on a comprehensive use of indicators, is not designed to supply an accurate picture of the number of people affected, the scale of a country’s needs, or the severity of those needs.

Crucially neither the GNA nor the CRED analysis show whether funding levels are appropriate to the situation or if funding is according to need. What they do is to allow us to highlight apparent discrepancies in funding levels received for similar crises. To examine funding according to need we actually require a measure of the need itself.

The UN consolidated appeals process (CAP), at least in its better individual flash and consolidated appeals, gives us both a combined estimate for funding requirements (which is not exactly the same as needs) and the number of people targeted for the humanitarian aid requested.

The four countries ever present in the CAP in the last ten years (DRC, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda) represent a significant share of the total humanitarian aid requested and granted through the appeals process: US\$17 billion requested and US\$11.9 billion granted between 2004 and 2009. Sudan alone represents more than half of the total of both requested and granted. (See Table 2.)

## THE UN HUMANITARIAN APPEAL AND THE CONSOLIDATED APPEALS PROCESS (CAP)

Coordinated by the United Nations (UN), the CAP is undertaken in a country or region to raise funds for humanitarian action as well as to plan, implement and monitor activities. Two different kinds of appeal are generated by the CAP: consolidated appeals and flash appeals.

Consolidated appeals include projected activities for the following year, and often pertain to conflict or post-conflict scenarios where the needs of that year are relatively predictable. These country and regional consolidated appeals are then amalgamated by the UN, with the launch of the Humanitarian Appeal each November for the following year.


Flash appeals are a rapid strategic and fundraising tool based on immediately identified needs – these may be issued following sudden onset disasters such as earthquakes and cyclones. It is not unusual for there to be both a consolidated and flash appeal for the same country in the same year, usually when a sudden natural event brings additional humanitarian need, such as when severe flooding affected Sudan and Uganda in 2007.

TABLE 2: UN CONSOLIDATED APPEAL FUNDING AND REQUIREMENTS FOR DRC, SOMALIA, SUDAN AND UGANDA, 2004-2009

	DRC	SUDAN	SOMALIA	UGANDA
Funding requirements (US\$bn)	3.5	9.7	2.5	1.6
Funding received (US\$bn)	2.3	6.6	1.7	1.2
Number of people affected according to the CAP	43,674,799	28,500,000	10,720,000	9,695,000
Funding requested per person (US\$)	78.9	339.7	233.7	161.6
Funding received per person (US\$)	52	233	159.3	127.7

Source: UN OCHA FTS

FIGURE 3: REQUESTED AMOUNT PER PERSON INSIDE THE UN CAP, 2004-2009



Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS data


Do the figures the CAP presents allow us to understand the extent to which funding is allocated according to need for these priority complex emergencies? A problem from the start is the articulation of beneficiary numbers. These lack uniformity; sometimes appeal documents list a total number of beneficiaries; other appeals list the number of people affected within a sector. This makes comparability both within and across appeals a challenge. To obtain an estimate of CAP beneficiaries we have had to investigate some of the appeals in detail and to make judgements on individual numbers in order to avoid double- or under-counting the total population to which the appeal is directed. (See Figure 3.)

That aside, the figures do highlight clear trends over time. Firstly in terms of amounts requested the figures per person have tended to come together

over time. The difference between the highest and lowest amounts per person for Sudan has halved, falling from US\$587 in 2005 to US\$254 in 2009. Indeed figures for all appeal requirements over the last three years have been relatively stable for all but Uganda, which has seen a drop of more than US\$150 per person.

From 2007 through to 2009 increasingly similar amounts of humanitarian aid per person were reported as received inside the CAP to Sudan, Somalia and Uganda, with all three much closer to DRC's figure of US\$53 per person. The amounts received per person in DRC have been relatively stable for the last three years. (See Figure 4.) The trend downwards is not driven by diminishing humanitarian aid however since only Uganda has seen a fall; rather there has been a substantial increase in beneficiaries within the CAP, four

FIGURE 4: AMOUNTS RECEIVED PER PERSON INSIDE THE CAP, 2004-2009



Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS data

million more for DRC in 2009 compared to 2008 and one million more for both Somalia and Sudan. The difference between the highest and lowest is still significant however with humanitarian aid per person in DRC still US\$64 per person less than in any of the other three protracted crises.

While the CAP does report on funding requirements for a large number of global crises, it does not provide an estimate of the scale of global humanitarian need. It remains a collection of prioritised projects for a particular set of beneficiaries rather than a full representation of multi-sector needs for the entirety of the population that is affected and in need. The CAP is one-step removed; it highlights what the organisations present in the country feel they could do with programming they believe they could undertake for the people they believe they could reach. The true scale and severity of need remains out of reach. (See the section on the UN CAP for more details of its methodology and the information it provides for us on funding according to need.)

To conclude, the tools we have available are not enough for us to fully understand the real nature of need. There is no clear relationship between humanitarian funding and needs, and no mechanism or tool exists for us to understand the relationship of need to funding on a global scale. We do remain hugely aware of the difference between US\$2,670 humanitarian aid per person spent on the Indian Ocean earthquake-tsunami response in 2005 compared to the US\$53 per person for the continuing crisis in DRC in 2009.

## THE CHALLENGE OF MEASURING NEED

The principle of delivering humanitarian assistance on an impartial and needs-driven basis rests on the assumption that it is in fact possible to assess and measure needs in a comprehensive and comparable way. Making informed decisions and allocating resources in accordance with needs requires a global and holistic measurement of humanitarian needs referenced against comparable standards as well as an indication of how much it would reasonably cost to meet those needs.

Currently however, gaps exist in each of these critical sets of information, which means that donors must often rely on ad hoc needs assessment information supplied by NGOs and UN agencies on the ground and on their own experience and analysis to attempt to allocate funds in accordance with needs. Performance against donor commitments to fund according to need is by extension difficult to evaluate. But why is it so difficult to measure needs in a comprehensive and comparable way?

Although there are examples of large, sector-wide and relatively comprehensive needs assessments on a country or crisis basis (especially in support of recovery, like the post-disaster needs assessment (PDNA)), the motivation for the overwhelming majority of assessments conducted is to gather information to plan and fundraise for specific humanitarian programming interventions - not to build a comprehensive comparable picture of all humanitarian needs.

In practice, humanitarian organisations face trade-offs between having adequate information quickly enough to enable an appropriate and timely



humanitarian response in rapid onset emergencies and collecting data of high technical standards that permit higher level analysis and tracking of needs. In protracted emergencies humanitarian actors may struggle to effectively monitor changes in humanitarian needs over extended time periods and populations where routine surveillance is absent.

Much of the information on humanitarian needs moreover is not shared publicly but confined to a private conversation between donor and prospective implementing partner. There is a perception that it is legitimate to keep needs assessments private. They are very rarely shared with the people whose needs have been assessed, and not routinely with other partners and donors. Our research reveals that there is an unwillingness to provide access to needs assessments and a sense of surprise that they should be in the public domain.

Many different organisations are involved in humanitarian response and they have different mandates and priorities. Naturally all are committed to their own goals, they are each much more aware of the needs in their sector, and they want those needs prioritised. The reality is that they are competing for scarce resources and needs assessments are a vital part of the pitch for funding. This provides a disincentive to share.

However, at least in the area of the technical development and agreement of standards, thresholds and assessment methodologies, a cross contextual comparison of needs is theoretically possible, at least in individual sectors such as food, health or water and sanitation. These standards and indicators are not yet sufficiently widely adopted or aligned to allow cross-comparisons of needs assessments on a global level. But there are some promising examples.

## SIGNIFICANT NEEDS INITIATIVES

### NEEDS ASSESSMENT TASK FORCE (NATF) AND THE HUMANITARIAN DASHBOARD

Recognising the proliferation of recent initiatives to improve needs assessment process and standards, the UN convened the NATF under the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) in March 2009. Co-chaired by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and OCHA, NATF aims to harmonise and promote cross-sector needs assessment initiatives. The NATF is expected to publish, in 2010, an operational guidance containing standard procedures and indicators agreed by the global clusters to be used in rapid needs assessments in 2010. In addition to the operational guidance, IASC is developing a humanitarian dashboard meant to help simplify the process of data analysis for humanitarian decision-makers. The tool will visually present consolidated information from needs assessments based on the set of indicators outlined in the guidance. The objective is to allow the humanitarian country team (HCT) to rapidly identify needs and to better articulate its response.

### ASSESSMENT CAPACITIES PROJECT (ACAPS)

The need for strengthening HCT capacities in needs assessment led to the creation in December 2009 of ACAPS. Under the auspices of the NATF, ACAPS is expected to address systemic deficiencies in current common assessment approaches by developing and deploying a core of trained experts that will support timely, high quality and coordinated multi-sectoral needs assessments and assessment preparedness on behalf of the HCT. The international humanitarian operation underway in Haiti witnessed the first deployment of the ACAPS team.

### THE STANDARDIZED MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT OF RELIEF AND TRANSITION (SMART) PROGRAM

SMART is an interagency initiative, led by USAID and UNICEF, to improve the monitoring and evaluation of humanitarian assistance interventions and to improve the evidence base of decision making. The programme pilots an approach to routinely collect, analyse and disseminate information on the nutrition, mortality and food security status of people receiving humanitarian assistance. SMART is funded by USAID. Its findings are fed into CRED's CE-DAT database.

SMART methodology is based on crude death rate (CDR) and nutritional status of children under five. These are the most vital, basic public health indicators of the severity of a humanitarian crisis. They monitor the extent to which the relief system is meeting the needs of the population and the overall impact and performance of the humanitarian response.

### INTEGRATED FOOD SECURITY AND HUMANITARIAN PHASE CLASSIFICATION (IPC)

IPC is a standardised scale that integrates food security, nutrition and livelihood information into a clear statement about the severity of a crisis and implications for humanitarian response.

Developed for Somalia, where baseline information and routine monitoring were conspicuously absent and where the norm hovers around crisis levels and therefore the ability to track potentially deteriorating trends is critical, the IPC is now in regular use in six countries (Burundi, Cote d'Ivoire, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan and Nepal). The IPC offers tools to establish consensus on levels of food insecurity at the national level, but on the basis of its core internationally accepted standards, enables comparison between countries.

## THE UN CONSOLIDATED APPEALS PROCESS (CAP) AND FUNDING ACCORDING TO NEED

The most consistently used and accessible measure of humanitarian needs remains the UN CAP, which many donors use to guide their prioritisation of finite humanitarian funds across the many competing global humanitarian crises.

CAP requirements individually are taken as an assessment of need for each situation and collectively the requirements can be taken as a proxy for global humanitarian need.

However, while the CAP continues to evolve and improve in its analysis and articulation of needs, it was never designed as a global comparable measure of needs. It is more of a coordination and planning tool for a particular crisis with a budget attached. An appeal document typically describes what humanitarian programmes are possible and with what priority within the existing capacity and ambition of humanitarian response actors. It does not actually articulate the full scale and range of needs but rather the activities to meet needs that the actors in the CAP believe they could implement.

### THE CHALLENGE OF COMPARABILITY

While a CAP appeal may be a useful consensus-based presentation of priority needs within a context, they do not capture a comprehensive assessment of all humanitarian needs within a crisis and are not easily comparable across contexts, since they are not consistently pegged against globally comparable standards. To date in 2010, only nine of twelve CAP appeals present comparable figures for the key humanitarian indicator, under-five mortality per 1,000 live births.

Requirements are not just a function of needs but also of the ability of the agencies involved to meet them. Many of the rising requirements of 2009 and 2010 were the result not only of deterioration in humanitarian situations but also improved access and opportunities for humanitarian intervention. In Kenya and Zimbabwe, food needs increased and vulnerability worsened. Security in Somalia continued to deteriorate and vulnerability to deepen; operating costs increased. Improving security in Iraq meant new opportunities to support return and resettlement. Meanwhile military offensives against militants in north-west Pakistan rapidly displaced more than two million people and the

humanitarian consequences of the three-week Gaza war that started at the end of 2008 continued to be felt throughout 2009.

### A PARTIAL PICTURE, PARTIALLY FUNDED

A large part of the picture of humanitarian need is outside of the purview of the UN appeals process. After the Haiti earthquake the UN appealed for US\$1.5 billion of humanitarian aid and the country has received more than US\$2.8 billion, but only US\$800 million has been allocated to the appeal needs. Are contributions to the disaster not being properly directed to priority needs? Were the appeal requirements simply wrong?

The answer here lies partly in the partial nature of the CAP. Firstly, although NGO participation in the CAP increased from four NGOs in 2000 to 389 in 2009, the CAP remains a part of the centralised system that falls under UN coordination. There are many organisations, including significant actors such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Médecins Sans Frontiers (MSF), that choose to carry out their own needs assessment and fundraising independently of the UN process. The funds raised by these two organisations alone in 2008 amounted to more than US\$1.8 billion, all of which were for activities that were outside the needs defined as priorities within the CAP. Governments and affected communities are also only minor partners in the needs identification and prioritisation process. These needs, and projects designed to meet them, do not therefore appear in the CAP.


The CAP represents only a select subset of total global humanitarian needs each year. Some needs are never included. In 2009 around 36.9% (US\$4.1 billion) of the total (US\$11.1 billion) reported to UNOCHA FTS was for funding that was not requested inside a CAP appeal. Some money that is 'outside the CAP', US\$2.7 billion in 2009, includes money for the same crises but has not actually been requested for the priority projects listed inside the CAP. There is a substantial amount of humanitarian funding that is not connected to a CAP appeal in any way. Not every emergency, especially those that tend to be smaller and without media attention, is deemed

### OUTSIDE THE APPEAL

UN OCHA's Financial Tracking Service (FTS) records funding allocated to (or 'inside') CAP appeals as well as other funding to crises outside the appeals. The share of funding allocated 'inside' and 'outside' the appeal is a rough indication of the extent to which funding is following need. However there are two different senses of 'outside'; firstly one to mean money meant for a crisis but not for the UN appeal of that crisis and secondly funding that is not at all connected to a UN appeal.

For example, after the Haiti earthquake, the UN appeal was for US\$1.5 billion. We know that the appeal generated US\$800 million of funding in direct response to the appeal requirements. However, a further US\$2 billion was raised in response to the earthquake – this will have been classified as 'outside' of the appeal because it was not for priority projects listed in the UN appeal document. Further, if there were major floods in Haiti later this year but no appeal was launched, humanitarian aid given would also be called outside of the appeal.

FIGURE 5: APPEAL REQUIREMENTS AND VOLUME OF FUNDING INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE CAP



Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS data

to be important or large enough or beyond the national capacity to respond and thus warrant a CAP. Neither does the CAP include very much of the early responses to crises, such as the provision of search and rescue, logistics, immediate donations of food and non-food items. There are other appeals that for various reasons (such as direct funding to recipient governments) are not part of the CAP process; in 2009 this included the Sumatra Earthquake, Nepal Humanitarian Transition, Syria Arab Republic Drought Response, Tajikistan Floods, Mudflows, Food Security. These appeals raised collectively US\$274 million.


Perhaps the most obviously striking trend we can see is the marked increase in total CAP funding requests, from just under US\$2 billion in 2000 to US\$9.7 billion in 2009 – close to a five-fold increase. Have needs actually increased by so much over the last ten years or has the CAP improved its geographic scope, the range of crises it works in and perhaps also its comprehensiveness and articulation of need? Alternatively, are we talking about a gradual increase in what funds can be mobilised rather than changes in needs?

The comparison of appeal requirements to funding is particularly revealing. As we discuss later the full volume of appeal requirements tend to be funded about 70% year on year, regardless of

the actual request. However, the funding profiles years on year are very different.

Funding for the same crisis of the appeal but not for the appeal priorities has always been less than the funding of those priorities except for 2005 when the Indian Ocean earthquake-tsunami affected countries received substantial amounts of money for non-appeal activities. Another exceptional year was 2008 when there were large amounts of money that went outside of the appeals process and were not even for crises articulated by the appeals; this is accounted for partly for by contributions to Ethiopia (more than US\$800 million) and China for the Sichuan earthquake (just over US\$300). However there does appear to have been signs of the CAP being more comprehensive. Certainly funding for crises for which there have been appeals but not for the priorities of those appeals has gradually diminished. In 2006, the year after the exceptional Tsunami, 33.3% of total funding was outside of appeal priorities whilst by 2009 it was only 17.3%. This suggests that the CAP is more likely to account for the bulk of the needs in individual crises. Yet also in terms of overall funding the CAP would appear to be more comprehensive; in 2009 it accounted for 63% of the total funding, the highest it has over the entire decade. Does this suggest progress is being made? (See Figure 5.)

FIGURE 6: APPEAL FUNDING AS SHARE OF FUNDING FOR CRISES IN DRC, SOMALIA, SUDAN, UGANDA



Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS data

Certainly it would appear so if we look at the four ever present consolidated appeal countries, this time looking specifically at funding within individual crises. The percentage of money for these crises that has been allocated to priorities inside the appeal for each of these countries has fluctuated over time with Uganda having perhaps the best results over a ten year period (see figure 6). What has improved significantly is the share of funding for the three other crises which has been allocated to priorities inside the appeal. In the middle of the decade often only around 50% to 60% of funds were allocated inside the appeal. All four of the appeals have now pushed towards 90%. In 2009 just over US\$2.9 billion was funded within the CAP out of the total of US\$3.2 billion total humanitarian aid for those crises. In 2009, for each US\$10 of funds going to these crises US\$9 is allocated to priorities inside the CAP.

#### DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO: INSIDE THE APPEALS PROCESS


Until 2006, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) was the archetypal protracted and consistently underfunded emergency. But as the country readied itself for elections, the UN country team developed a unique humanitarian action plan (HAP) that marked a radical departure from the established UN CAP.

2006 was not only a politically historic year for DRC. A groundswell of donor and UN reform shaped the way in which humanitarian needs were measured and articulated and both of these factors drove a dramatic change in the volumes and ways in which donors funded humanitarian needs. The country had been selected to pilot the application of the 2003 Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) principles and was subject to a range of UN reforms in leadership, coordination, needs assessment and funding.

Rather than a list of UN and NGO funding requests, the HAP in DRC was based on a comprehensive picture of the massive humanitarian needs, derived from a multi-sector assessment carried out across most of the country with the participation of a wide range of humanitarian and domestic actors. Regional action plans with a 'precise inventory of humanitarian needs by region' were developed to provide context-appropriate prioritised plans by region.

The total amount of funds requested to meet this comprehensive survey of needs and concomitant proposed humanitarian responses was three times that requested in 2005. Although the appeal was only 51% funded, the amount of money that was received was more than double that of the previous year, demonstrating the powerful influence of a comprehensive assessment and articulation of humanitarian need.

FIGURE 7: HUMANITARIAN FUNDING INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE UN APPEAL IN DRC



Source: UN OCHA FTS

This new approach to capturing and articulating humanitarian needs through the appeal worked in tandem with two significant UN reform inspired funding developments:

- a common humanitarian fund, set up in 2006 with the aim of enabling the allocation of funding in accordance with needs identified in the humanitarian action plan, intended to ensure more equitable funding to under-funded activities
- the UN's Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) – DRC has been the leading or second largest recipient of CERF funds, often under the 'under-funded emergencies' window since 2006.

While other factors, including progress in the peace process and massively influential NGO advocacy regarding the scale of humanitarian needs and lack of civilian protection, had major influence on donor decisions to increase funding to DRC, the HAP, common humanitarian fund (CHF) and the CERF have resulted in a dramatic overall increase in humanitarian funding to DRC and an increased proportion of funding received inside the UN appeal, from only 5% in 2000 to 91% in 2009. Changes in the appeal and modes of funding have also provided important corrective checks to improve the allocation of donor funding in accordance with assessed need at the global level, increasing funding to DRC through the CERF, and at national level, allocating funding through the common humanitarian fund to neglected sectors.

The appeal in DRC has undergone further evolution since 2006, pegging regional assessments and prioritisation against indicators and thresholds agreed at national cluster level. When these thresholds are breached it is incontrovertible that a humanitarian response is needed.


Although there has been progress in measuring and articulating humanitarian needs, DRC appeals remain underfunded. The reality of meeting needs on an impartial basis is extremely challenging, with agencies struggling to shift their existing capacity to areas of highlighted need outside of the historically well-served east of the country.

**HAITI 2010: OUTSIDE THE APPEALS PROCESS**

The huge earthquake that struck Haiti on 12 January 2010 mobilised an extensive international operation with up to 1,000 organisations soon working alongside the Haitian government to provide humanitarian relief to the more than


three million people severely affected by the disaster. Only three days after the earthquake, UN OCHA launched a preliminary appeal seeking to raise more than a half a billion dollars for the relief operation. On 18 February 2010 OCHA launched a US\$1.5 billion revision of that appeal, comprising the financial requirements and activities of 76 aid organisations for a one-year period. With the initial flash appeal having received 100% funding plus existing funding for some of the projects presented in the revision, unmet requirements for the Haiti emergency in 2010 were US\$768 million by the time of the launch of the revised appeal, and US\$725 million three months after the disaster. However, some 700 organisations and individuals have reported financial contributions or in-kind donations to the Haiti earthquake response for activities not included in the appeal. In fact, the total support received outside of the appeal is almost three times the funding within the appeal and exceeds the total appeal requirements. (See Figure 8.)

FIGURE 8. REQUIREMENTS AND FUNDING INSIDE AND OUTSIDE OF THE HAITI EARTHQUAKE FLASH APPEAL, 2010



Source: UN OCHA FTS

FIGURE 9: REVISED REQUIREMENTS AND FUNDING INSIDE AND OUTSIDE OF THE HAITI FLASH APPEAL, 2008




Source: UN OCHA FTS

The magnitude of the disaster and the media attention drawn to it, were clearly a factor in the surge of solidarity with Haiti. But when the country endured an unusually harsh hurricane season in 2008, levels of funding for the emergency were far from those experienced in the first few months following the earthquake in 2010. In a period of just one week in late August/early September, Hurricanes Gustav, Hanna and Ike and tropical storm Fay swept across Haiti, causing widespread destruction. Needs assessments estimated that more than 100,000 houses had been destroyed or severely damaged, that up to 800,000 people were in dire need of humanitarian and rehabilitation assistance, and as much as 15% of gross domestic product (GDP) had been lost as a result of the disaster. Yet international support fell

far short of the UN's assessment of humanitarian needs and 40% of the appeal requirements went unmet (see figure 9). In a similar way, the March 2004 flash appeal launched following the increase of armed violence throughout the country and the precarious access to food and basic social services received only 43% of the funding requested. Later that same year, devastating floods led to a new flash appeal, where 53% of requirements went unmet.

A similar surge of solidarity to that shown in the wake of the Haiti earthquake followed the Indian Ocean earthquake-tsunami that decimated parts of South East Asia in December 2004. The media attention was, again, a powerful driving force behind the international response. (See Figure 10.)

FIGURE 10: REVISED REQUIREMENTS AND FUNDING INSIDE AND OUTSIDE OF THE INDIAN OCEAN EARTHQUAKE-TSUNAMI FLASH APPEAL, 2005



Source: UN OCHA FTS



Whilst giving is commendable in response to the core humanitarian aim of saving lives, alleviating suffering and maintaining human dignity, it may also pose challenges for the effectiveness of the humanitarian delivery by falling outside the coordination mechanisms of the recipient country. However, the significance of funding received outside the appeal should not be underestimated or undervalued: even when the volume greatly exceeds the requirements inside the appeal, it doesn't necessarily follow that this funding wasn't needed or didn't play a vital role in alleviating human suffering.

### WHAT DOES THE CAP TELL US?

Caveats notwithstanding then, the CAP offers a useful tool to consider patterns in donor funding in relation to the needs presented within the appeal.


Funding levels for the CAP over the last eight years have been remarkably consistent with the combined CAP requirements funded to between 64.3% and 72.3%. (See Figure 11.)

However, while the proportion of needs funded has remained consistent, the total amounts requested vary significantly (see Figure 12):

- the increase in requirements in 2002 is largely attributable to a US\$1.8 billion appeal for Afghanistan
- the Iraq war in 2003 led to a US\$2.2 billion appeal
- 2005 was the year of the Indian Ocean earthquake-tsunami and the devastating South Asia earthquake, collectively requiring US\$2 billion
- although the overall number of appeals declined from 30 to 22, funding requirements increased dramatically in 2008 – due to increased requirements for the recurrent crises subject to CAP appeals, such as DRC, Sudan and Somalia
- in 2009, requirements shot up again, possibly due to the reintroduction of a consolidated appeal for Afghanistan for the first time since 2002.

The food and fuel crises, alongside the worsening of chronic vulnerability and the weakening of local safety nets may also partially account for the increased requirements in 2008 and 2009. According to the UN Humanitarian Appeal 2010, “...the sharp spike in hunger has hit the poorest people in CAP countries hardest. Countries with major and protracted humanitarian crises can


FIGURE 11: UN CAP APPEAL NEEDS MET AND NOT MET AS A PERCENTAGE OF REVISED REQUIREMENTS, 2000 –2010



Source: UN OCHA FTS



FIGURE 12: UN CAP APPEAL REQUIREMENTS, FUNDING AND UNMET NEEDS, 2000–2009



Source: UN OCHA FTS


ill afford the increased expenditures necessary to mitigate food insecurity because of their reduced scope for typical coping mechanisms such as currency devaluation, borrowing, or increased inflows of official development aid or migrant remittances”.

The 2010 CAP requirements in the first three months of the year already equalled 92% of the total requirements of the 2009 appeal and were 25% more than the total requirements in 2008. This is due to the largest humanitarian appeal ever launched by the UN (US\$7.1 billion) and the revised Haiti flash appeal, which alone seeks to raise US\$1.5 billion. (See Figure 12.)

Flash and consolidated appeals show very different patterns in terms of average requirements. While consolidated appeals follow a steadily increasing curve over the 2000–2010 period independently of the number of appeals in each year, flash appeals vary greatly from one year to the next. (See Figure 13.)

Consolidated appeals have had an average share of 88.7% of the UN CAP process requirements since 2003, with little variation between years. In the same period, flash appeals have represented an average of 11.5% of the CAP, with striking highs and lows from one year to the other. Thus flash

FIGURE 13: AVERAGE REQUIREMENTS PER UN CAP APPEAL, 2000–2010



Source: UN OCHA FTS

appeals in 2005 saw a 76.5% increase over 2004 and dropped by 190% the following year. The unpredictable nature of natural disasters accounts for much of this shifting trend. However, while consolidated appeals seem to have become increasingly able to address underlying causes for humanitarian crises, international response to natural disasters remains reactive rather than proactive, and prevention and preparedness still struggle to receive due attention and funding.

Funding responses vary significantly across individual appeals with the smallest appeals typically the worst funded year on year. This is perhaps the clearest indication of divergence in donor


funding in accordance with needs as presented in the UN appeal. (See Figure 14.)

Over the seven years between 2003 and 2009 the volume of funds requested for consolidated appeals has been US\$373 billion (89.7% of the total including flash appeals) and the funds granted add up to US\$26.6 billion. Consolidated appeals are clearly the largest part of the CAP. However, although there are individually well or poorly funded appeals, the overall percentage of coverage for both types of appeal is very similar with combined flash appeals funded 71.7% and consolidated 70.4%

CONSOLIDATED APPEALS	NUMBER OF APPEALS	REVISED REQUIREMENTS (US\$m)	AMOUNT FUNDED (US\$m)	% FUNDED
2003	2	31	16	50.7
2004	9	451	179	39.8
2005	10	2,181	1,766	81
2006	5	188	197	104.5
2007	15	373	213	57
2008	12	839	592	70.6
2009	7	242	121	50.2
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>5804</b>	<b>3859</b>	

CONSOLIDATED APPEALS	NUMBER OF APPEALS	REVISED REQUIREMENTS (US\$m)	AMOUNT FUNDED (US\$m)	% FUNDED
2003	25	5,189	3,942	76
2004	22	2,967	2,017	68
2005	15	3,798	2,255	59.4
2006	17	4,873	3,186	65.4
2007	15	4,769	3,507	73.5
2008	10	6,249	4,491	71.9
2009	15	9,471	6,879	72.6
	<b>132</b>	<b>44,681</b>	<b>28,583</b>	

FIGURE 14: THE SHARE OF NEEDS MET IN THE INDIVIDUAL BEST AND WORST UN CAP APPEALS, 2000–2010



Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS data

Source: UN OCHA FTS

## MAPPING FUNDING TO NEEDS


Important change is underway within global clusters to agree common indicators and thresholds for humanitarian need that would enable cross-comparison of core information across local and national contexts and across time. Understanding the scale and severity of needs with respect to internationally agreed standards in nutrition, health, water and sanitation, will also provide decision-makers with critical information to deliver better informed and more equitable humanitarian response.

But, while very welcome and important, improved technical approaches will not be enough. There need to be strong incentives to counteract the individual organisational interests, which treat needs data as an asset to be used in the competition for funding. Already citizen feedback and citizen monitoring in disasters is becoming a reality. That direct, real-time information will be a challenge to the current situation where

needs data, usually collected using public money, is not in the public domain and is not accessible to the people whose needs are being assessed.

In the meantime the UN appeals process remains our best guide to understanding the articulation of need and the funding for that need but it has major drawbacks. Evaluating whether humanitarian needs beyond the gaze of this process are adequately measured, articulated and met is challenging. The range of data sources that enable us to look at trends in disaster impacts, vulnerability and needs on a global level is limited. And each has significant limitations when applied to the question of whether humanitarian assistance is equal to humanitarian needs. However it is also clear that these tools, as limited as they are in some ways, provide a clear message that funding remains inequitable.

GLOBAL TRENDS:  
THE STRETCHING OF  
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE





# GLOBAL TRENDS II

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In 2000 humanitarian aid reported by governments in response to all crises was US\$6.9 billion. By 2009 it had reached US\$11.2 billion – an increase of US\$4.4 billion (some 65%) over just 10 years.

What is behind this increase? Is it because of an increase in humanitarian need? If we use the UN consolidated appeals process (CAP) as our proxy for need it might appear so. The cost of meeting needs identified in the 14 appeals in 2000 totalled US\$1.9 billion. By 2009 the 22 appeals requested a total of US\$9.7 billion to meet all the need identified. This is an increase of US\$7.8 billion over 10 years, almost fivefold, and a much faster rate of growth than that of humanitarian aid from governments.

What is happening here? Is there really five times more humanitarian need now than there was ten years ago?

# THE FUTURE OF HUMANITARIAN AID?

## HUMANITARIAN AID RISES BUT NEEDS RISE FASTER

It is true that the UN CAP has become more comprehensive and captures a larger share of global humanitarian need than it did ten years ago. But there are other changes too. UN appeals only cost the needs that the appealing agencies think they can meet.

The fivefold increase in appeal requirements since 2000 may also reflect increased capacity to meet a wider range of needs. The type of need that humanitarian assistance is being asked to meet has expanded as protracted crises, countries in transition and basic services for people in fragile environments have become a standard part of humanitarian responsibilities.

Although humanitarian assistance from governments exceeds the funds requested through the UN CAP, around 30% of known needs have remained unmet every year. Accumulated unmet need over the decade amounts to US\$15.6 billion. These unmet needs clearly add to the requirements for future funding in subsequent years and may increase vulnerability, leading to an even greater need for humanitarian assistance.


## MORE NEED OR MORE NEED RECOGNISED?

The evidence shows that natural disasters have been on the increase over the last 30 years with a peak in events and the number of people affected between 2000 and 2005. After that the number of disasters and people affected flattens out. Whilst there is a picture of more and more disasters affecting more and more people, the scale of increase is not the same as the sharp upturn in identified needs towards the end of this decade. (See Figure 2.)

Neither is there a clear upward trend in the number of countries in conflict or post-conflict situations. 32 countries were affected by conflict in 2008, the same number as in 2000. The peak in the number of conflict-affected countries over the last decade was between 2003 and 2005.


It certainly does not seem as if the recent upswing in needs and humanitarian response to those needs is due to the increased number of disasters or conflicts. Beyond the fact that needs may be rising within existing conflicts (something that our analysis does not take into account), what is driving this upswing? There are two broad options:

FIGURE 1: UN CAP APPEAL FUNDING AND REQUIREMENTS; HUMANITARIAN AID FROM GOVERNMENTS, 2000-2009



Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC and OCHA FTS data

FIGURE 2: THE NUMBER OF NATURAL DISASTERS AND PEOPLE AFFECTED, 1980-2008



Source: CRED

needs have become increasingly better identified as the decade has reached its close; or perhaps the kinds of needs being articulated and funded are different to those in 2000.

For example an element of new needs being articulated could be 'early recovery,' which as a concept and as a global cluster did not exist in 2000 or even in 2003 when UN appeals increased substantially. It now features prominently in almost all appeals. It is also where the lines between humanitarian and other spending are hard to draw.

The other possibility is that our only global expression of need is catching up with the actual need on the ground. Perhaps the bulk of the increase of need over ten years is because humanitarian need was not so well articulated before.

Our analysis has highlighted improvements in the comprehensiveness of the UN appeals. Whilst the most recent UN appeals do not show an increased percentage of total requirements met the sums being funded through these appeals have increased significantly, from US\$1.1 billion to US\$7 billion over the decade. Individual appeals now also account for a much higher share of total funding for an emergency. This is particularly evident in the spending for complex emergencies in conflict-affected countries.

### COMPLEX EMERGENCIES DOMINATE SPENDING

Complex emergencies certainly account for the greater part of requirements with US\$4.3 billion (2003-2009) requested for UN flash appeals (sudden onset emergencies, most often for natural disasters) whilst UN consolidated appeals (always for complex emergencies) have accounted for US\$37.3 billion. 2009 was the UN's largest appeal to date at US\$9.7 billion, despite being a relatively mild year for natural disasters. Much of this increase in requirements has been due to five long-term conflict-affected appeal countries – DRC (which saw a 28% in requirements), Chad (26%), Somalia (29%) Palestine/OPT (78%) Zimbabwe (24%).

As we have seen, conflict-affected countries not only account for the greater proportion of needs but also for the far greater proportion of spending. In 2008, US\$7.8 billion of humanitarian aid was spent in conflict-affected countries, equating to 75.8% of their overall spending of US\$10.3 billion.

These sums should not be examined in isolation from the substantial funding for other activities that are intimately related with the provision of humanitarian assistance.


NO. OF CONFLICT-AFFECTED COUNTRIES			
1999	21		
2000	32		
2001	29		
2002	31		
2003	35		
2004	34		
2005	35		
2006	32		
2007	32		
2008	32		

	HA ALLOCABLE BY COUNTRY (US\$ BILLION)	HA TO CONFLICT-AFFECTED COUNTRIES	% OF TOTAL
1999	5.8	2.7	46.7%
2000	5.0	3.0	60.0%
2001	5.6	3.4	61.1%
2002	6.1	4.0	65.3%
2003	7.2	5.5	77.1%
2004	7.2	5.6	78.1%
2005	9.1	7.3	79.5%
2006	8.6	7.0	80.9%
2007	7.9	6.0	75.7%
2008	10.3	7.8	75.3%
TOTAL	72.9	53.0	71.7%

For details and methodology behind conflict-affected countries see: Conflict and the Military. Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC data

FIGURE 3: HUMANITARIAN AID FROM GOVERNMENTS AND ODA SECURITY SPENDING AND UN PEACEKEEPING OVER THE LAST TEN YEARS; PRIVATE CONTRIBUTIONS, 2006-2008




Note: We have used 2008 expenditure to estimate ODA security expenditure and private contributions for 2009. We do not have adequate data for private contributions prior to 2006. Source: Development Initiatives based on SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations database, UN OCHA FTS and OECD DAC

## HUMANITARIAN AID IN CONTEXT

It's not just humanitarian aid that has risen over the last ten years. Government spending on security-related areas – for a wide range of activities that enable people to not only live their lives in peace but actually receive the humanitarian aid they require – has also increased and quite significantly more than humanitarian aid itself. (See Figure 3.)

Spending on UN peacekeeping alone increased just under three times to US\$7 billion by 2009. Security-related official development assistance (ODA) – spending that is not classified as humanitarian and includes elements such as demobilisation and demining – has also increased significantly: from just US\$820 million in 2000 to US\$3.8 billion in 2008, a four and a half times

FIGURE 4: HUMANITARIAN AID FROM GOVERNMENTS AND ODA SECURITY SPENDING AND UN PEACEKEEPING OVER THE LAST TEN YEARS IN SUDAN



Source: Development Initiatives based on SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations database, UN OCHA FTS and OECD DAC



increase. If we added humanitarian aid to this other directly-related funding we would see an increase from US\$10 billion to US\$26.3 billion between 2000 and 2009, the bulk of which went to complex and protracted emergencies. (See Figure 4.)

At a country level the changes in overall spending and the complexity of spending can be startling. In 2000, as the war between North and Southern liberation movements in Sudan continued, the international community was spending less than US\$140 million

on humanitarian aid and only US\$1.2 million on security-related ODA, with no peace to keep and thus no peacekeepers. The upward trend in expenditure is remarkable; humanitarian aid alone, driven only in part by the Darfur crisis, has been more than US\$1.3 billion for four of the last five years, an eightfold increase since 2000. Upon the signing of the peace agreement in 2005 overall spending on all these elements had already reached US\$2.5 billion and, by 2008, total expenditure had reached US\$4.1 billion.

## HUMANITARIAN AID OVER TIME

### THE PREPONDERANCE OF CONFLICT

Conflict and post-conflict situations have accounted for the bulk of overall spending since 2000. Even Indonesia and Ethiopia, countries that have suffered from particularly severe natural events, have received substantial funds to address conflict-related humanitarian need and both countries feature in our list of conflict-affected states – Ethiopia for every year of the decade and Indonesia for eight of the last ten years. In fact, of the 20 top recipients of humanitarian aid over the last decade, only three (Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), Zimbabwe and Jordan (most often to support Iraqi refugees) are not on our list of conflict-affected countries. Of the remaining 17 nations, six have appeared on that list seven or eight times, one (Iraq) has appeared nine times and seven countries have been ever-present as conflict-affected.

Not all these countries have continued to suffer from significant conflict or post-conflict humanitarian need. There have been some positive trends; by 2009, Serbia, Angola and Burundi were all receiving a fraction of the humanitarian aid that they had been receiving earlier in the decade. Neither Angola nor Burundi has a peacekeeping mission and, whilst Serbia still has a peacekeeping mission with military supplied by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the numbers of soldiers is set to fall to 5,000 this year, down from 38,000 in 2002.

### CONCENTRATIONS OF SPENDING OVER TIME

Humanitarian aid is heavily concentrated on relatively few countries. The top

eight recipient countries – Sudan, Palestine/OPT, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Iraq, Pakistan, Somalia and DRC – have accounted for almost exactly half of all humanitarian spending from governments in the last ten years: US\$37.8 billion. Whilst these countries all suffer from some natural disasters, it is the conflict-affected countries suffering from protracted crises that account for the bulk of spending.

There are plenty of negatives. Some countries which had earlier spikes in aid, Afghanistan and Iraq in particular, continue to receive a large amount of humanitarian financing. There are also plenty of countries (most of which are complex, conflict-related emergencies) that have seen their steady increase in aid hit a peak in 2008/9: Sudan, Uganda, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia and DRC.

And these increasing volumes of humanitarian aid are accompanied by increasing volumes of security-related aid. The bulk of this money is also being spent in the same countries year on year and, of these, the majority are unsurprisingly conflict-affected. In almost all cases the amount of humanitarian aid is particularly significant for it is either the largest (or at least a very important) share of total aid being spent.

### COUNTRIES RELY ON HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE FOR A SIGNIFICANT SHARE OF TOTAL AID


Over the last ten years the humanitarian aid of all but two top 20 recipients has been more than 10% of their total ODA. For some countries humanitarian aid is the larger part of ODA. Three countries receive more than 50% of total aid in the form of humanitarian assistance (Sudan,

Somalia and DPRK). Another 10 receive between 20% and 50% of their ODA as humanitarian.

On the one hand it is probably not surprising that so many of these countries receive such a proportion of their ODA in the form of humanitarian financing – after all, almost all are in crisis. However the question should

be asked whether, when humanitarian aid is a significant share year on year, it is being used to address these crises in the right way. Some donors and organisations have been asking whether their humanitarian aid is just acting as a bulwark against the most extreme deprivation when it could be contributing more to reducing vulnerability over time.

FIGURE 5: TOP 20 RECIPIENTS OF HUMANITARIAN AID, 2000-2009, SORTED BY SHARE OF ODA THAT HAS BEEN IN THE FORM OF HUMANITARIAN AID OVER THE PERIOD



Data for ODA relates to 1999-2008. Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC and UN OCHA FTS data

## THE STRETCHING OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

Of course one of the key challenges of counting humanitarian assistance is the variety of wide and narrow definitions used to describe and account for it. For example, the OECD DAC definition of humanitarian aid (“to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain human dignity”) allows for many differences in interpretation. Whilst this makes counting and presenting the details of this financing a challenge, it also highlights the increasingly blurred nature of humanitarian funding in many contexts. So, whilst ‘humanitarian aid’ can mean search and rescue, immediate emergency food and non-food distributions and emergency healthcare, it can also mean food or cash for labour, the provision of education, healthcare services or the means to have a livelihood. Humanitarian aid is not just immediate response or the first fruits of recovery; it is also being used to deliver basic services on a yearly basis to countries in protracted crises. Our analysis of sector spending over the decade has shown that food and multi-sector funding follows a quite clear pattern of responsiveness to sudden crisis (usually natural disasters). Other sectors have a slower but gradual increase of spending over time - spending that is largely in the same conflict-affected countries year on year.

This spending may not get so much attention. Basic humanitarian delivery in the aftermath of a disaster still has more focus from the media and, in a way, the humanitarian system itself – there exist significant pressures nationally from the public and politicians to respond to large and sudden needs. Yet the bulk of humanitarian aid is being spent in the same countries year on year and not on simple provision of aid but on much more substantial programming.

In contexts with unresolved political/security crises, humanitarian assistance, far from being a short-term life-saving intervention, seems in reality to be a vehicle for the medium- or even long-term provision of basic services, food and livelihoods assistance. Both funding requirements and humanitarian aid for many of these conflict-affected countries has grown significantly since 2000; humanitarian aid expenditure in Afghanistan and Palestine has doubled; in Uganda and Somalia it has increased four-fold; in DRC it has increased fivefold; and in Sudan, it is at least eight times higher.

### WHAT DOES THIS MEAN FOR EFFECTIVENESS?

All these facts about where and how humanitarian assistance has been spent challenge the conventional public and political perception of what it is. When people think of humanitarian assistance they think about rapid response to a crisis, where time is of the essence and exceptional need has arisen from exceptional circumstances. But for many countries humanitarian aid is the norm for many years. Despite this reality, humanitarian ways of working are not determined by the long-game; humanitarian aid is designed to be programmed and reprogrammed in relatively short cycles (usually a year maximum) and to meet immediately identified needs.

The bridge between humanitarian assistance and longer term development is reducing vulnerability and building resilience. This year’s UN humanitarian appeal articulated the dilemma from the humanitarian perspective: “How should the humanitarian system identify crises that should trigger humanitarian action and be eligible for humanitarian methods and resources? Does the fact of a crisis being rooted in extreme chronic vulnerability, and in stresses that do not amount to the usual image of a ‘disaster,’ mean that it is a ‘poverty’ problem and should be addressed only with developmental methods and resources?”

Reducing vulnerability, building resilience, providing education and other services in hard-to-reach areas are all contributions to immediate and longer term poverty reduction and the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) whether they are financed from humanitarian or development assistance or from other funds altogether.

This contradiction between the expectations and the reality of humanitarian spending raises questions about the outcomes. If humanitarian aid is financing activities that go beyond keeping people alive and protecting human dignity, if humanitarian aid is providing basic services and supporting recovery, what sort of improvements should we be seeing as a result? If many of the poorest people are living their lives vulnerable to repeated crises, is an aid architecture that draws firm lines between humanitarian and development activities going to serve them well?

# MAP OF AID PLAYERS



## NOTES

This map is illustrative and intends to show the main groups of people involved in humanitarian crises. It does not intend to suggest linear connections or funding relationships.

**Aid recipients** receive assistance from a multiplicity of sources and sometimes aid goes through several intermediaries before it reaches them. They have little opportunity to give international actors direct information about what they require or have received.

**Governments** provide humanitarian funding through the UN, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, NGOs, public-private partnerships and the governments of affected countries.

The UN manages some funding mechanisms, provides direct support to aid recipients and also channels some of its funding to other delivery agencies (including NGOs) for implementation.

**NGOs** provide direct support, mobilise resources and advocate for actions and policies. International NGOs deliver directly to recipients but also work through local NGOs.

**National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies** might deliver aid directly, and/or provide support to each other, and/or to the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), and/or to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

**Private donors** provide money to the UN, international NGOs, local NGOs, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and directly to affected communities and individuals.

**Military** actors are sometimes deployed to support humanitarian response to natural disasters and are also often present in humanitarian crises in peacekeeping missions and security operations. Peacekeeping missions vary widely in their engagement with humanitarian crises according to context, mandate and mission character, with activities ranging from limited information sharing to direct programme implementation.

# DATA & GUIDES

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## WHY IS COUNTING HUMANITARIAN AID SO COMPLICATED?

Counting humanitarian aid is complicated because of the number of different people involved in donorship and delivery, all of whom define, channel, account for and report their contributions in different ways. There is no central repository of information. This makes it difficult to research and provide a simple answer to a simple question ("How much humanitarian aid is there?"), and tracking the money through the system impossible.

At every level choices are made about where, how and when to spend money. These choices will affect which organisations are supported, which people are prioritised and what type of need is met. More transparent data on how money is channelled through the system is a precondition for increased efficiency and effectiveness.

But the most important gap in the data is information about what has actually been delivered on the ground. We do not have systematic feedback from people affected by crises on what they have received and when. Without this feedback or aggregated data on what commodities and services have been delivered, the effectiveness and efficiency of the humanitarian response is hard to measure.

Stage one on the path of being able to track humanitarian aid from taxpayer to government to beneficiary is transparency by the donor. In some ways humanitarian assistance is ahead of official development assistance (ODA or 'aid') as a whole since there is already a lot of real-time reporting. But all donors should make their humanitarian transactions fully transparent in a timely way, to common standards and in a form which makes them accessible to people and organisations in affected countries. Launched in September 2008 at the High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Accra, the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) aims to deliver a step shift in the availability of, and access to, information on aid flows by committing donors to work together to agree an accessible standard for the publication of information about aid including:

- an agreement on what will be published
- a common system for categorising different types of aid spending/commitments with all participants using the same terminology and definitions so that it will be easier to share and compare information
- a common electronic format that will make it easy to share information so that donors are not producing lots of different reports for different purposes but can publish data once in a form that allows it to be used in many different ways
- a code of conduct that will set out what information donors will publish and how frequently, how users may expect to access that information, and how donors will be held accountable for compliance.


The movement for improved reporting processes and increased transparency is gaining momentum and there are a number of organisations and governments working towards similar goals. In the meantime, we work with the best information we have and try to be clear about what it tells us and what it doesn't. Using mainly data from the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and UN OCHA's Financial Tracking Service (FTS), we provide an indication of the main trends, sometimes using proxy measures and imputations. We think that the data we provide is a good start – but we know that it only captures part of the picture in terms of overall volume. It is not comprehensive. So we complement this with information from other sources through desk and, increasingly, field-based research. Our work to provide better information on funding flows – notably in the areas of delivery, domestic response, conflict and the military, needs and on non-DAC governments – is ongoing.

### DEFINING HUMANITARIAN AID

'Humanitarian aid' is generally taken to mean the aid and action designed to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain and protect human dignity during and in the aftermath of emergencies. It is supposed to be governed by the principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence. By UN resolution, each state has the responsibility to take care of the victims of natural disasters and other emergencies, so humanitarian aid is usually taken to mean international response that is provided with the consent of the affected country.

Humanitarian aid is given by governments, individuals, NGOs, multilateral organisations, domestic organisations and private companies. Many of these try to differentiate their humanitarian assistance from development assistance, but they

FIGURE 1: HUMANITARIAN SHARES OF ODA IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA, HAITI AND SUDAN, 1995-2008



The graph shows declining amounts of ODA spent on humanitarian activities in Bosnia-Herzegovina (a crisis that has a clear beginning, middle and end); high amounts of development aid spent on humanitarian activities in Sudan (a crisis that is more protracted); and more sporadic expenditure on humanitarian aid in Haiti (which has suffered sudden onset crises whether conflict-related or as a consequence of natural disaster). Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC data

draw the line in different places and on different criteria. In practice it is often difficult to say where 'during and in the immediate aftermath of emergencies' ends and other types of assistance begin, especially in situations of prolonged vulnerability. The reality is that many types of assistance are needed and an effective response will need to draw on all the approaches, tools and mechanisms that are available, not only those that fall within a specific category defined by the donor.

Traditional definitions of humanitarian aid usually point to its 'short-term' nature and the provision of funding for activities in the 'immediate aftermath' of a disaster. But the reality is that most humanitarian aid is spent in conflict-affected countries over a longer term. (See Figure 1.)

Traditional responses to humanitarian crises, and the easiest to categorise as such, are those that fall under the aegis of 'emergency response' – material relief assistance and services (shelter, water, medicines etc.); emergency food aid (short-term distribution and supplementary feeding programmes); and relief coordination, protection and support services (coordination, logistics and communications). It might also apply to reconstruction relief and rehabilitation (repairing pre-existing infrastructure as opposed to longer-term activities designed to improve the level of infrastructure) and disaster prevention and preparedness (disaster risk reduction, early warning systems, contingency stocks and planning). Under OECD DAC reporting criteria, these have very clear cut off points – for example, non-emergency food security is defined as 'development' aid; and 'disaster preparedness' excludes longer term work such as prevention of floods or conflicts.

But unlike the DAC, other donors, data sources, researchers and reporters might draw 'humanitarian' lines in different places.

The GHD principles enable donors to use instruments that bypass state structures to provide assistance in countries where they might not be able to spend development aid. Some tension may lie between the GHD and Fragile States principles because emergency needs usually continue alongside the need for state-building and peace-building activities. This means balancing the humanitarian principles of neutrality and impartiality with the need to make inherently political choices about building

Examples of principles that guide work in both humanitarian and development contexts:

- the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness/Accra Agenda for Action (AAA)
- the Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States
- Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD).

the capacity of certain sets of actors, engaging with former combatants and security sector reform. The GHD principles state that donors will “strengthen the capacity of affected countries and local communities to cope with humanitarian crises” (which is in line with the Paris principles).

Donor coordination features in all three sets of principles but is a major challenge, particularly in emergency and post-conflict situations and where there is no agreed set of objectives for donors to coordinate around. Donors have found pooled funding mechanisms like the common humanitarian funds useful in facilitating donor coordination though the governing bodies of these mechanisms do not always involve government counterparts. But coordinating funding through a pooled mechanism is not the same as, or a substitute for, an agreed strategy and shared objectives.

## DIFFERENT DEFINITIONS OF HUMANITARIAN AID

### Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD)

The definition of humanitarian assistance agreed in Stockholm in 2003 reaffirmed the distinctive purpose and principles of humanitarian action. The purpose of humanitarian assistance is to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain human dignity. For donors signing up to GHD principles, their humanitarian assistance must be allocated on the basis of need and without discrimination (impartial). It must not favour any side in a political dispute (neutral). Humanitarian objectives are autonomous from political, economic or other objectives (independent). 36 donors are now signed up to the principles. [www.goodhumanitarianandonorship.org](http://www.goodhumanitarianandonorship.org)

### Development Assistance Committee (DAC)

In line with the GHD definition, and within the overall context of official development assistance (ODA, or ‘aid’), the DAC defines humanitarian aid as the assistance designed to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain and protect human dignity during and in the aftermath of emergencies. To be classified as humanitarian, aid should be consistent with the humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence. [www.oecd.org](http://www.oecd.org)

### United Nations

“Humanitarian assistance must be provided in accordance with the Humanitarian Principles namely: Humanity: Human suffering must be addressed wherever it is found, with particular attention to the most vulnerable in the population, such as children, women and the elderly. The dignity and rights of all victims must be respected and protected. Neutrality: Humanitarian assistance must be provided without engaging in hostilities or taking sides in controversies of a political, religious or ideological nature. Impartiality: Humanitarian assistance must be provided without discriminating as to ethnic origin, gender, nationality, political opinions, race or religion. Relief of the suffering must be guided solely by needs and priority must be given to the most urgent cases of distress. Adherence to these principles reflects a measure of accountability of the humanitarian community.” UN General Assembly resolution 46/182, 1991.

Since 1991, various legislative decisions have been made in order to recognise a changed humanitarian environment – internal displacement, access, protection, safety and security of humanitarian personnel, humanitarian-military relations, and the frequency and magnitude of natural disasters. [ochaonline.un.org](http://ochaonline.un.org)

### Forum on Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER)

“The range of activities designed to reduce human suffering in emergency situations, especially when local authorities are unable or unwilling to provide relief. Actions include: the provision of food, shelter, clothing, medication through organised facilities; evacuating the innocent and vulnerable from conflict or emergency zones; restoring basic amenities (water, sewage, power supplies); and burying remains.” [www.fewer-international.org](http://www.fewer-international.org)

### UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)

Aid that addresses the immediate needs of individuals affected by crises and is provided mainly by non-governmental and international organizations. [www.unhcr.org](http://www.unhcr.org)




## REPORTING HUMANITARIAN AID EXPENDITURE

Individuals, NGOs, local and national governments, UN agencies and international organisations all provide assistance in response to humanitarian crises. While each may be obliged to report according to local or national accountability regulations (to comply with audits for example), there is no universal obligation to define, channel, account for or report humanitarian aid contributions in the same way. Unlike development assistance, which is guided by the principles of developing country government ownership and alignment with national strategies, humanitarian aid largely bypasses recipient state structures. It is channelled through many different organisations before it is visible to people affected by disasters. This makes humanitarian aid difficult to both quantify and track.

Of the main players in humanitarian aid, only one group is obliged to report its humanitarian expenditure to strict criteria and along comparable lines each year – that's the European Commission and 23 government donors that comprise the OECD DAC. They report their ODA, which includes humanitarian aid, to the Development Co-operation Directorate (DCD) each year. DAC data allows us to say how much humanitarian aid DAC donors are giving, where they are spending it, who they spend it through, and how it relates to their other ODA. Aggregate information is published in OECD DAC Stat tables. More detailed, project-level reporting is published in the Creditor Reporting System (CRS). All data is available online for download. (See diagram below).

Reporting to the other main source of information on humanitarian aid, UN OCHA's FTS, is voluntary. FTS receives data from donor governments and recipient agencies, and also gathers information on specific pledges carried in the media or donor web sites, or quoted in pledging conferences. There is considerable cross-checking and data reconciliation involved, but the reporting criteria are not the same as for the OECD DAC, where expenditure has to be allocated to strict humanitarian aid type codes. Government donors might voluntarily report information to the FTS in addition to their 'official' reporting to the DAC – but the figures cited might not match because the definitions include different things and the totality might not be captured by the FTS.




While providing coverage of contributions to a great many implementing organisations (900 in the case of UN OCHA FTS alone in 2008) and countries (192 in the case of the DAC and 120 in the case of UN OCHA FTS in 2008), not all government contributions are captured, and not all contributions from private sources are captured. To illustrate the point further, the number of non-DAC donor governments reporting aid to the FTS can vary from year to year (53 in 2000, 98 in 2005, 90 in 2009, for example) – this can considerably skew any analysis. Some humanitarian aid contributions are undercounted, some are totally uncounted, and supplementary information has to be gathered from elsewhere.

Some non-DAC donors are setting up databases to capture both inward and outward flows of aid money (e.g. Mexico and Colombia). The United Arab Emirates' Office for the Coordination of Foreign Aid (OCFA) is retrospectively recoding all aid flows in line with OECD DAC and FTS codes and definitions.

Individuals and private donors (such as the corporate sector, for example), contribute to humanitarian crises in the form of taxes (spent by governments and reported through DAC and/or FTS) and also directly to NGOs, the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement or a UN agency. While contributions in this latter category are likely to be captured by individual organisations and published in audited accounts, there is certainly no single source of information on how much these private contributions amount to.

Direct cash transfers to friends, families and communities affected by humanitarian crises might be captured in the form of remittance data, compiled by World Bank. However, remittances are private flows and not subject to international reporting, so this information is not necessarily comprehensive, or specific to humanitarian situations.




## DATA SOURCES: WHERE DO WE GET OUR INFORMATION FROM?

Our data on expenditure in 2008 has come from:

- 23 DAC governments and the European Commission (EC) as reported through the OECD DAC
  - accounts for 70% of our global humanitarian assistance figure
  - tells us how much was given to point of first recipient
  - gives us a destination country and region where specified/earmarked by donor
- 96 non-DAC governments reporting to (or having had their aid reported to) UN OCHA FTS
  - coverage varies from year to year: contributions from 53 non-DAC governments were captured in 2000, 98 in 2005 and 90 in 2009
- private contributions made to five UN agencies (UNHCR, UNRWA, WFP, FAO and UNICEF), stemming from annual reports and our direct requests to them for information
- private contributions made to 48 NGO groupings, stemming from annual reports and our direct requests to them for information
- private contributions made to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), as reported in their audited accounts and annual reports
- private contributions made to Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, based on a response to a direct request for information from us.

GLOBAL HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE DATA SOURCES, 2008




	US\$		DATA SOURCE		
<b>INTERNATIONAL NGOS</b>				5.7	bn
• From non-DAC donors	4.4	m	UN OCHA FTS		
• From DAC donors to international NGO bodies (inc operational NGOs and research institutes)	402.2	m	OECD DAC CRS		
• From DAC donors to national NGOs registered in the donor country	1,551.1	m	OECD DAC CRS		
• From private contributions	3,700.0	m	Estimated income based on our own research on a Study Set of 48 NGOs		
<b>LOCAL NGOS</b>				47.3	m
• From DAC donors to national NGOs in developing countries	47.3	m	OECD DAC CRS		
<b>INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (ICRC)</b>				646.0	m
• DAC government funding	611.1	m	OECD DAC CRS in government chapter and in the overall total; we used ICRC annual report data in the delivery agencies chapter (US\$953.7 million)		
• Non-DAC government funding	2.3	m	UN OCHA FTS		
• Private funding	32.7	m	ICRC annual report		
<b>INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT SOCIETIES (IFRC)</b>				227.5	m
• DAC government funding	29.8	m	OECD DAC CRS in the government chapter and overall total; we used data provided by IFRC in the delivery chapter (US\$110.9m)		
• Non-DAC donor funding	6.4	m	UN OCHA FTS		
• Private funding	191.3	m	Information provided to Development Initiatives by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies		
<b>NATIONAL RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT SOCIETY (DONOR COUNTRIES)</b>				252.7	m
• From DAC donors to National Societies (donor countries)	157.8	m	OECD DAC CRS		
• From non-DAC donors to National Societies (donor countries)	94.9	m	UN OCHA FTS		
• All other donors to National Societies (donor countries)	0.1	m	UN OCHA FTS (details for eight of 186 National Societies)		
<b>AFFECTED COUNTRY'S NATIONAL RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT SOCIETY</b>				4.0	m
• From DAC donors to National Societies (recipient countries)	1.4	m	OECD DAC CRS		
• From non-DAC donors to National Societies (recipient countries)	1.4	m	UN OCHA FTS		
• All other donors to National Societies (recipient countries)	1.1	m	UN OCHA FTS (details reported for 20 affected National Societies)		
<b>UN AGENCY FUNDS AND ORGANISATIONS</b>				7.8	bn
• From DAC donors to multilateral organisations and UN agencies	6,922.5	m	OECD DAC CRS		
• From non-DAC donors to multilateral organisations and UN agencies	670.7	m	UN OCHA FTS		
• From private contributions	188.2	m	Estimated income based on our research of UNHCR, UNRWA, WFP, FAO and UNICEF		
<b>PUBLIC SECTOR (GOVERNMENTS/GOVERNMENT AGENCIES IN EITHER DONOR OR AFFECTED COUNTRY)</b>				2.1	bn
• DAC donors	1,728.6	m	OECD DAC CRS		
• Non-DAC donors	348.7	m	UN OCHA FTS		
<b>OTHER/NOT CODED</b>				457.2	m
• DAC donors	454.2	m	OECD DAC CRS		
• Non-DAC donors	3.1	m	UN OCHA FTS		
<b>TOTAL</b>				17.2	bn

The US\$256 million discrepancy in the US\$16.9 billion total and the US\$17.2 billion detailed breakdown is due to a discrepancy in the aggregate DAC1 and DAC2 tables (used to provide our DAC donor humanitarian aid figure) and the DAC CRS (used to provide a breakdown of DAC donor humanitarian aid)

## QUICK COMPARISON OF OECD DAC AND UN OCHA FTS DATA

Looking at the graph on humanitarian aid expenditure captured by the DAC and FTS suggests that they have captured similar volumes of DAC donor contributions in 2008 and 2009 – but this does not mean that they are capturing the same things. For example, contributions to the military for human rights training cannot count as ODA and is therefore not captured by the DAC – but it might be reported by a donor or agency as humanitarian expenditure to the FTS.


FIGURE 2: DIFFERENT EXPRESSIONS OF HUMANITARIAN AID FOR DAC DONORS, 2004-2008



Source: UN OCHA FTS and OECD DAC

	FTS	DAC STATISTICS
STRENGTHS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Analysis of flows within a country/crisis</li> <li>Aid management – since data is real time</li> <li>Capturing flows from non-DAC donors and private contributors</li> <li>Countries with a UN consolidated appeal process (CAP) appeal – data more complete and better validated</li> <li>Project level data</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Measuring ODA trends to specific countries, sectors and from donors, as well as ODA performance against targets</li> <li>Comparisons over time on alike-with-like basis</li> <li>Comparisons between donors</li> <li>Comparisons between recipient countries</li> </ul>
WEAKNESSES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Comparisons over time</li> <li>Like-with-like comparisons of donor countries</li> <li>Like-with-like comparisons of recipient countries – particularly CAP and non-CAP</li> <li>Inconsistent reporting – frequency and between donors</li> <li>Lack of definitions/reporting codes (especially outside CAP)</li> <li>Status of contributions (pledges and commitments)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Only includes DAC donors and a few OECD members that report voluntarily</li> <li>DAC data is slow to be published – limited preliminary data is published in April for the preceding year, but full datasets are not published until December</li> <li>Matching inputs with outcomes</li> <li>Aid management in recipient countries</li> <li>Tracking aid beyond recipient government level</li> </ul>
RISKS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Under /over/double-counting flows</li> <li>Omissions of key financial flows</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Misinterpretations of data arising from the treatment of ODA flowing through multilateral agencies</li> <li>Omissions of key financial flows</li> <li>Differentiation between humanitarian and development assistance</li> </ul>

FIGURE 3: DIFFERENT EXPRESSIONS OF AID FROM THE UNITED STATES TO A SELECTION OF COUNTRIES, 2008



Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS and OECD DAC data

## SPECIFIC NOTES ON FTS USE IN GH A REPORT 2010

- We downloaded FTS data for 2000-2009 using 'Make Custom Table' function between 8 March and 6 April 2010. FTS online data can change on a daily basis – so we use downloaded data for our analyses in order to try and ensure consistency in our data throughout the workstreams and throughout the year.
- At the time of download, some donors had not submitted their final reports for 2009 and not all ECHO reports had been processed – US\$480m in EC contributions were recorded as 'pledges' at that stage, which could by now be captured as commitments/contributions in the database.
- Care should be taken not to assume that an agency is 'underfunded' inside the appeal just because the FTS data might look like it is:
  - money sits in the 'pledges' column until it has been confirmed as received by the appealing agency, and some agencies are slower at doing this than others
  - money might also sit in the 'pledges' column until it has been **processed**
- e.g. UNRWA had US\$60m in outstanding pledges for 2009. Its appeal requirement was only 72% covered, with US\$125m requirements uncovered. This outstanding requirement might be reduced by half if the outstanding pledges are fulfilled and converted into contributions 'inside the appeal'
  - some US\$853m were outstanding in pledges at data download, including:
    - US\$388m labelled as 'UN agencies, NGOs or Red Cross, details not yet provided';
    - US\$278m in pledges to WFP.
- US\$394 million was still classified as 'Sector not yet specified' for 2009 inside the CAP (5.7% of overall appeal funding) – a figure that rises to US\$770m in terms of all humanitarian aid reported through the FTS.

## SPECIFIC NOTES ON OECD DAC USE IN GH A REPORT 2010

- The data was downloaded on 24 April 2010.
- Although the DAC data now includes Korea as a DAC country in its table summary lines ("DAC Countries, Total"), we have treated it as a non-DAC donor within this report, which focuses on data to 2009 – Korea officially joined the DAC in January 2010.
- Data for 2009 is preliminary and partial – full final data for the year (which will allow us data on recipient countries in 2009 and provide a breakdown of activities, as well as enabling us to publish a non-estimated humanitarian aid figure for DAC donors) will not be published until December 2010
- We make a distinction between 'DAC countries' and 'DAC donors' – where the latter includes the European Commission as a donor.

## OTHER DATABASES USED IN THIS REPORT

### Aid Information Management Systems (AIMs) and Donor Assistance Databases (DADs)

AIMS and DADs were established to enable recipient countries to record and track incoming aid from international donors. Of the 46 such databases, 19 are available online: Cambodia, Afghanistan, Kurdistan, Pakistan, Thailand, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, India, Central African Republic (CAR), Iraq, Kyrgyzstan, Papua New Guinea, Sierra Leone, Vietnam, Mozambique, Nicaragua, South Africa, Uzbekistan and Palestine/OPT.

### CRED EM-DAT Disaster Database

The Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED), which is located within the School of Public Health of the Université Catholique de Louvain (UCL), Brussels, is a leading repository of information on the impact of disasters. One of CRED's core data projects is the EM-DAT disaster database, which contains data on the impact of 16,000 mass disaster events dating back to 1900. Populations. Data is sourced from UN agencies, NGOs, insurance companies, research institutes and press agencies. EM-DAT is complemented by CE-DAT – CRED's database on complex emergencies, which serves as a unique source of health indicators (primarily mortality, malnutrition and measles vaccination coverage rates) for monitoring conflict-affected.

## Stockholm International Peace Research International (SIPRI)

Established in 1966, SIPRI is an independent international institute dedicated to research into conflict, armaments, arms control and disarmament. It manages data on:

- international relations and security trends
- multilateral peace operations – UN and non-UN peace operations since 2000, including location, dates of deployment and operation, mandate, participating countries, number of personnel, costs and fatalities
- military expenditure of 172 countries since 1988, allowing comparison of countries' military spending: in local currency, at current prices; in US dollars, at constant prices and exchange rates; and as a share of GDP
- transfers of major conventional arms since 1950.

## UN CERF

Our data on the CERF is taken from the UN CERF website.

## UNDP Human Development Report (HDR)

HDR uses the Human Development Index (HDI) to measure human development by averaging a small set of simple indicators of health, education and living standards. We used HDR/HDI data in our case studies in this report.

## The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)

UCDP has been recording data on ongoing violent conflicts since the 1970s. Its definition of armed conflict – “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year” – is becoming a standard in how conflicts are systematically defined and studied. It has been operating an online database on armed conflicts and organised violence since 2004.

# CALCULATIONS AND METHODOLOGY


## GOVERNMENTS

### OECD DAC donors

The term ‘DAC donors’ includes the European Commission as well as DAC governments. Korea officially joined the DAC donor group on 1 January 2010. For the purposes of this report, Korea has been excluded from the DAC donor figures and classified as a non-DAC donor.

In DAC reporting humanitarian aid is a sector of ODA. Other ODA sectors include things like agriculture, governance, health, education, water and sanitation – these other sectors are sometimes collectively known as ‘development assistance’.

FIGURE 4: GHA'S CALCULATION OF HUMANITARIAN AID FROM DAC DONORS, 2000-2009



Humanitarian aid data for 2009 is preliminary. Data on multilateral ODA to UNHCR, UNRWA and WFP for 2009 will not be published until December 2010. Our figure is therefore estimated, based on 2008 data. Source: OECD DAC

DAC-reported humanitarian aid includes expenditure on: emergency response (material relief assistance and services, emergency food aid and relief and coordination services); reconstruction and rehabilitation; and disaster prevention and preparedness.

But although the humanitarian aid expenditure reported to the DAC includes governments' expenditure through NGOs, multilateral UN agencies and funds, public private partnerships and public sector agencies, it does not take account of DAC donors' core, totally unearmarked contributions that are made in the form of multilateral ODA contributions to UN agencies with almost uniquely humanitarian mandates. In order to calculate DAC donor humanitarian aid expenditure, we add:

- humanitarian aid as reported in DAC1 Official and Private Flows, item I.A.1.5 (net disbursements)
- total ODA disbursements to UNHCR, UNRWA and WFP, as recipients, reported in DAC2a ODA Disbursements
  - we do not include all ODA to WFP but apply a percentage in order to take into account that WFP also has a 'developmental' mandate
  - humanitarian aid reported to UNICEF, UNFPA, UNDP and 'Other UN' in DAC2a tables is also included in our calculation.

#### **Is the EC a donor or multilateral recipient?**

The EC functions both as a donor agency and as a multilateral recipient of EU member state funds. It provides direct donor support to developing countries as well as playing a "federating" role with other EC institutions and EU member states.

We treat the EC as a donor within our DAC donor analyses. However, totally unearmarked ('multilateral') ODA to the EC is a core component of some donors' overall ODA/humanitarian aid contributions – so we calculate the EC's humanitarian aid (including its own unearmarked multilateral ODA to UNHCR, UNRWA and WFP as a donor) and apportion a share of this to each DAC EU member state – Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.

#### **CERF and country-level pooled funding**

DAC donor contributions to the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and country-level pooled funding are reported to the respective funds and also captured as part of the donors' official aid reporting to the DAC. However, while funding to country-level pooled funds is allocable by country (funding to Haiti through the emergency response fund (ERF) will be included in a donor's funding for Haiti, for example), funding for CERF is, by definition, not allocable by country. So, in order to give a more comprehensive overview of a donor's humanitarian contributions to a country, and to ensure that decisions to provide funding through pooled mechanisms do not result in under-reporting of a donor's contribution to a country, we impute the amount that is de facto contributed via the CERF and add it to their humanitarian aid on a country-by-country basis.

Our imputation of donor contributions to an affected country via the CERF is simple: Norway contributed 14.3% of funding to the CERF in 2007. The CERF allocated US\$5.4 million to Afghanistan. Therefore Norway contributed 14.3% of US\$5.4 million – or US\$0.8 million.

#### **Totals allocable by country and region**

There is a difference in a donor's humanitarian aid expenditure and the total allocable by country or by region from that donor. The main reasons are: (i) some humanitarian aid is for regional/cross-border assistance and is not allocable to one specific country (ii) the DAC data we use for analysis of humanitarian expenditure is based on DAC1 and shows grants, whereas the DAC data which shows the disbursements allocated to each recipient country is based on DAC2a and includes loans (iii) disbursements to multilateral agencies (shown in a donor's official expenditure) each year will not be the same as disbursements made by multilateral agencies which may include expenditure from reserves or income received in previous years.



## DELIVERY AGENCIES

Delivery agencies include UN and other international organisations and NGOs. We use data from the DAC CRS and UN OCHA FTS to provide information on delivery agency income from government donors. In order to complement our picture of delivery agency income from government sources, we analyse:

- information and audited accounts provided to us by a study set of 48 NGOs that are part of 11 representative and well known NGO alliances and federations
- information and audited accounts from the annual reports of five UN agencies (UNHCR, UNRWA, WFP, FAO and UNICEF) – FTS data was used to complete UNRWA expenditure for activities outside Palestine/OPT; all financial data for activities inside Palestine/OPT were obtained directly from the UNRWA office in the West Bank
- information provided to us by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

The time period covered in our research is 2007 and 2008, except where data for 2006 and 2009 is been used for comparative purposes. The actual financial figures are guided by the accounting years of the organisations concerned and those may vary considerably ranging from a calendar year, to year ending 31 March, 30 June or 30 September. Different accounting/financial years have been combined in the analysis and in practice the figures represent more than a 12-month period.

### The NGO Study Set

The number of organisations included in the Study Set may vary in the different sections of the chapter and has always been clearly stated in the notes to the figures and tables representing the data sets.

For some NGO alliances and umbrella organisation figures provided by their members are only for reporting and not accounting purposes so may not match those in the audited accounts of each individual NGO member.

## DOMESTIC RESPONSE

Our work on domestic response has been informed by our case studies in Uganda and Bangladesh (see [www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org](http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org) for full details). Some data has been drawn from the FTS (which recorded domestic response from 44 countries between 2000 and 2009) and AIMS.

TABLE 1: NGO STUDY SET

ORGANISATION	NUMBER MEMBER ORGANISATIONS
Action Contre la Faim	3
CARE	1
Concern	3
International Medical Corps	2
International Rescue Committee	3
Médecins Sans Frontières	19
Mercy Corps	1
Norwegian Refugee Council	1
Oxfam	13
Save the Children	1
World Vision	1

Source: Development Initiatives

## BASIC CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS

<b>Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF)</b>	A global-level humanitarian pooled fund established by the United Nations to enable more timely and reliable humanitarian assistance to those affected by natural disasters and armed conflicts.
<b>Cluster approach</b>	A mechanism for sector coordination introduced by the UN in December 2005 to 'enhance the ability of the ERC (globally) and the humanitarian coordinators (on the ground) to manage humanitarian response effectively'.
<b>Commitment</b>	A commitment refers to the firm – but not necessarily legally binding – pledges of assistance made by donors.
<b>Common humanitarian action plan (CHAP)</b>	A strategic plan for humanitarian response in a given country or region.
<b>Common humanitarian funds (CHFs)</b>	CHFs are UN-managed country-level pooled mechanisms. Funding received is totally unearmarked. This allows money to be allocated on the basis of needs (as defined in the emergency's humanitarian action plan).
<b>Conflict-affected</b>	A set of conflict-affected states was derived for each of the years between 1999 and 2009 using the Uppsala Conflict Data Programme's (UCDP) database to determine the incidence of active conflict in a given year (both involving state actors and where no state actor is involved but where more than 25 battle deaths resulted) and where the presence of a multilateral peacekeeping mission (excluding purely civilian missions) and no recurrence of violence in that year indicates a country in post conflict.
<b>Consolidated appeal</b>	A tool for structuring a coordinated humanitarian response to complex and/or major emergencies within UN OCHA's consolidated appeals process (CAP).
<b>Consolidated appeals process (CAP)</b>	The objective of the CAP is to set a common strategy and to implement a coordinated response to complex emergencies and natural disasters. The ability to fulfil this objective depends on the extent to which the programmes within the CAP are funded. See also 'consolidated' and 'flash' appeal.
<b>Constant prices</b>	Constant (real terms) figures show how expenditure has changed over time after removing the effects of exchange rates and inflation. DAC deflators along with annualised exchange rates, are available at: <a href="http://www.oecd.org/dac">www.oecd.org/dac</a> . The base rate year used by the DAC during 2010 is 2008.
<b>Country-level pooled funds</b>	Pooled financing mechanisms that operate at country level and are for response to crises within that country. They include CHFs and ERFs.
<b>Debt relief</b>	Debt relief can be counted as part of a DAC donor's official development assistance (ODA). It can take the form of cancellation, rescheduling, refinancing or reorganisation.
<b>Development Assistance Committee (DAC)</b>	<p>The DAC is the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD. Its members are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Commission. These members have 'agreed to secure an expansion of aggregate volume of resources made available to developing countries and to improve their effectiveness'.</p> <p>Korea joined the DAC in January 2010. It is treated as a non-DAC donor for the purposes of this report.</p>
<b>Development Co-operation Directorate (DCD)</b>	The DCD (Development Co-operation Directorate) acts as the secretariat for the DAC, providing technical and operational support on: good practice and development co-operation issues; mobilising official development assistance (ODA) financing for development and poverty reduction; statistics on the global development cooperation effort; and increasing aid effectiveness.
<b>Disaster Response Emergency Relief Fund (DREF)</b>	A humanitarian fund managed by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies for quick response to disasters.

<b>Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC)</b>	The UN Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator (USG/ERC) is responsible for overseeing all emergencies requiring UN humanitarian assistance. The USG/ERC may appoint a humanitarian coordinator (HC) in-country.
<b>Emergency response funds (ERFs)</b>	ERFs are emergency pooled funds operating in a number of countries. Managed by the UN they are designed to disburse funds rapidly to a range of actors in response to urgent and sudden need.
<b>Financial tracking service (FTS)</b>	The FTS is a global, real-time database that records bilateral and in-kind humanitarian aid. It has a special focus on consolidated and flash appeals. FTS is managed by the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). FTS data is provided by donor and recipient organisations.
<b>Flash appeal</b>	A part of the CAP, the flash appeal is a tool for structuring a coordinated humanitarian response to sudden onset emergencies. It is triggered by the UN's humanitarian coordinator in consultation with the IASC country team and following endorsement by the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) and the IASC. The government of the affected country is also consulted.
<b>Global humanitarian assistance</b>	A term used within the context of the Global Humanitarian Assistance (GHA) project to mean humanitarian aid from governments and private contributions.
<b>Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD)</b>	The GHD initiative was created by donor governments at a meeting in Stockholm in 2003 with the idea of working towards achieving efficient and principled humanitarian assistance. Signatories must allocate their humanitarian aid on the basis of need and without discrimination (impartiality); they must not favour any side in a political dispute (neutrality); and their humanitarian objectives must be autonomous from political, economic or other objectives (independent). 36 donors are now signed up to the principles.
<b>Global Needs Assessment (GNA) index</b>	Moving beyond a simple headcount of disaster-affected people, the European Union has developed a comparable index of 139 crisis and vulnerable-affected states that aggregates data from a wide range of sources with indicators spanning development, poverty, natural and man-made disasters, population displacement, under-nourishment, mortality rates and levels of donor funding. This GNA index identifies the most vulnerable countries, which are most likely to be worst affected by disasters and then assesses the extent to which these countries are affected by crises and humanitarian needs remain unmet.
<b>Government funding</b>	Government funding includes expenditure by DAC and non-DAC governments and the European Commission.
<b>Gross domestic product (GDP)</b>	The total market values of goods and services produced by workers and capital within a nation's borders.
<b>Gross national income (GNI)</b>	The total value of goods and services produced within a country (i.e. its gross domestic product (GDP)), together with income received from other countries (notably interest and dividends), less similar payments made to other countries.
<b>Humanitarian aid/assistance</b>	A generic term used to describe the aid and action designed to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain and protect human dignity during and in the aftermath of emergencies. We report what other people classify as 'humanitarian'.
<b>Inside the CAP appeal</b>	Funds given by donors for needs identified within a UN consolidated or flash appeal.
<b>Long-term humanitarian assistance countries</b>	Long-term humanitarian assistance countries are defined as countries receiving a greater than average (11.6% in 2008) proportion of ODA excluding debt relief in the form of humanitarian assistance for more than eight years between 1995 and 2008.
<b>Multilateral agency</b>	International institutions with governmental membership that conduct all or a significant part of their activities in favour of developing and aid recipient countries. They include multilateral development banks (e.g. the World Bank and regional development banks), UN agencies, and regional groupings (e.g. certain EU and Arab agencies).

<b>Multilateral ODA</b>	Multilateral humanitarian aid is funding given to UN agencies, international organisations or the EC to spend entirely at their own discretion within their mandate. It cannot be earmarked in any way.
<b>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)</b>	The OECD groups 30 member countries 'committed to democratic government and the market economy' and provides a forum where governments can compare and exchange policy experiences, identify good practices and promote decisions and recommendations.
<b>Official development assistance (ODA)</b>	ODA is a grant or loan from an 'official' (government) source to a developing country or multilateral agency for the promotion of economic development and welfare. It is reported by members of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) according to strict criteria each year. It includes sustainable and poverty-reducing development assistance (for sectors such as governance, growth, social services, education, health, and water and sanitation) as well as funding for humanitarian crises.
<b>Outside the CAP appeal</b>	There are two different senses of 'outside' the CAP appeal; firstly one to mean money meant for a crisis but not for the UN appeal of that same crisis and secondly funding that is not at all connected to any part of a UN appeal.
<b>Private donations</b>	Contributions from individuals, private foundations, trusts, private companies and corporations.
<b>Remittances</b>	Private transfers between individuals – often relatives or friends – in another country.
<b>UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)</b>	OCHA is the arm of the UN Secretariat that is responsible for bringing together humanitarian actors to ensure coherent response to emergencies. Its mission is to mobilise and coordinate effective and principled humanitarian action in partnership with national and international actors in order to alleviate human suffering in disasters and emergencies; advocate for the rights of people in need; promote preparedness and prevention; and facilitate sustainable solutions.

## ACRONYMS

AIMS	Aid information Management Systems
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
APF	Africa Peace Facility (EC)
AU	African Union
BDRCS	Bangladesh Red Crescent Society
CAP	Consolidated appeals process
CAR	Central African Republic
CBO	Community-Based Organisation
CERF	Central Emergency Response Fund
CERP	Commander's Emergency Response Program (US)
CHAP	Common humanitarian action plan
CHF	Common humanitarian fund - a country level pooled fund mechanism
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CRS	Creditor Reporting System (DAC)
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DANIDA	Danish International Development Assistance, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
DDR	Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration
DEMA	Danish Emergency Management Agency
DFAIT	Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (Canada)
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
DoD	Department of Defense
DPKO	UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DRC	Danish Refugee Council
DREF	Disaster relief emergency fund
DRT	Development Research and Training, Uganda
EC	European Commission
ECHO	Directorate General Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid (formerly European Community Humanitarian Aid department)
ECOSOC	UN Economic and Social Council
ERC	Emergency Relief Coordinator
ERF	Emergency response fund – a country-level pooled funding mechanism
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FTS	Financial Tracking Service (UN OCHA)
GDP	Gross domestic product
GHA	Global Humanitarian Assistance (the programme)
GHD	Good Humanitarian Donorship
GNI	Gross national income
GoB	Government of Bangladesh
GPSF	Global Peace and Security Fund (Canada)
HCT	Humanitarian Country Team
HIC	High income countries
HIPC	Heavily indebted poor countries debt initiative
HRF	Humanitarian response fund

IATI	International Aid Transparency Initiative
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
IfS	Instrument for Stability (EC)
IMC	International Medical Corps
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
IRC	International Rescue Committee
IRFFI	International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force (NATO led force in Afghanistan)
ITF	Iraq Trust Fund
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
LTHAC	Long-term humanitarian assistance countries
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MINUSTAH	United Nations Mission in Haiti
MONUC	United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
MSB	Government of Sweden Civil Contingencies Agency
MSF	Médecins Sans Frontières
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NCA	Norwegian Church Aid
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
NPA	Norwegian People's Aid
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
ODA	Official development assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OPT	Occupied Palestinian Territories
PDNA	Post Disaster Needs Assessment
SAF	Stabilisation Aid Fund (UK)
SALW	Small arms and light weapons
S/CRS	US State Department Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
SCF-UK	Save the Children United Kingdom
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SSR	Security sector reform
START	Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (Canada)
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UN	United Nations
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UN DESA	United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UN OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in Sudan
UNRWA	UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
WFP	World Food Programme




















## COUNTRY NAMING CONVENTIONS AND REGIONAL CLASSIFICATIONS


We use the following regional definitions, based on (1) DAC definitions and, where further disaggregation and/or other groupings are useful for our analyses, (2) UN DESA.


<b>EUROPE</b>	
<b>EASTERN EUROPE</b>	Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Ukraine
<b>NORTHERN EUROPE</b>	Channel Islands, Denmark, Estonia, Faeroe Islands, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, Isle of Man, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom
<b>SOUTHERN EUROPE</b>	Albania, Andorra, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Gibraltar, Greece, Holy See, Italy, Malta, Montenegro, Portugal, San Marino, Serbia, Slovenia, Spain, Former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia
<b>WESTERN EUROPE</b>	Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, Switzerland
<b>AFRICA</b>	
<b>EASTERN AFRICA</b>	Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Reunion, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Uganda, Tanzania
<b>MIDDLE AFRICA</b>	Angola, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Sao Tome Principe
<b>NORTHERN AFRICA</b>	Algeria, Egypt, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia, Western Sahara
<b>SOUTHERN AFRICA</b>	Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland
<b>WESTERN AFRICA</b>	Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Saint Helena, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo
<b>SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA (OR 'SOUTH OF SAHARA')</b>	A combination of East, Middle, Southern and Western Africa
<b>THE AMERICAS</b>	
<b>CARIBBEAN</b>	Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guadeloupe, Haiti, Jamaica, Martinique, Montserrat, Netherland Antilles, Puerto Rico, St Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, Turks and Caicos Islands, United States Virgin Islands
<b>CENTRAL AMERICA</b>	Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama
<b>NORTH AMERICA</b>	Bermuda, Canada, Greenland, Saint Pierre and Miquelon, United States
<b>SOUTH AMERICA</b>	Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Falkland Islands (Malvinas), French Guiana, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, Venezuela
<b>ASIA AND THE MIDDLE EAST</b>	
<b>EASTERN ASIA</b>	China, China Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China Macao Special Administrative Region, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Japan, Mongolia, Republic of Korea
<b>SOUTH-CENTRAL ASIA</b>	Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan
<b>SOUTH-EASTERN ASIA</b>	Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Viet Nam
<b>WESTERN ASIA</b>	Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Cyprus, Georgia, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Yemen
<b>AUSTRALIA/NEW ZEALAND</b>	Australia, New Zealand
<b>MELANESIA</b>	Fiji, New Caledonia, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu
<b>MICRONESIA</b>	Guam, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Northern Mariana Islands, Palau
<b>POLYNESIA</b>	America Samoa, Cook Islands, French Polynesia, Niue, Pitcairn, Samoa, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu, Wallis and Futuna Islands


## REFERENCE TABLES

TABLE 1: TOP 30 RECIPIENT COUNTRIES OF HUMANITARIAN AID, 2008

2008	GOVERNMENTS		FINANCING MECHANISMS		SUBJECT OF UN CAP APPEAL			LONG-TERM HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE?	
US\$M	DAC DONORS (DAC DATA)	NON-DAC DONORS	CERF	CHFS AND ERFS	REQ'S	FUNDING	% NEEDS MET		
SUDAN 	1,394.6	24.4	16.0	149.6	2,004.5	1,401.9	69.9%	64.7%	14
AFGHANISTAN 	868.4	3.5	18.2		662.5	476.5	71.9%	21.0%	11
ETHIOPIA 	828.6	0.9	31.5	68.2	583.4	400.5	68.6%	21.2%	12
PALESTINE/OPT 	792.7	91.6	5.0	2.5	736.5	565.8	76.8%	43.6%	14
SOMALIA 	562.6	4.1	11.7	12.5	477.1	348.8	73.1%	63.4%	14
DRC 	545.2	1.9	41.1	142.9	452.2	338.7	74.9%	29.4%	14
IRAQ 	379.2	2.9	11.6	21.1	317.9	257.6	81.0%	16.7%	10
MYANMAR 	359.6	68.0	28.4		374.4	265.4	70.9%	34.9%	12
ZIMBABWE		2.4	11.5	3.4	274.3	209.2	76.3%		
KENYA	301.8	2.3	26.0		207.6	136.9	66.0%	14.7%	11
LEBANON 	251.6	0.3	1.0		121.1	73.2	60.5%	40.5%	14
SRI LANKA 	245.4	0.0	12.5		118.7	107.3	90.4%		
CHAD 	243.3	0.6	12.3		114.3	73.0	63.9%		
UGANDA	240.5	1.2	5.7		58.1	25.3	43.5%		
HAITI 	203.8	0.9	16.0	5.5	26.9	15.4	57.2%		
PAKISTAN 	172.5	2.0	18.7		18.8	18.8	100.0%		
JORDAN	149.9	8.1	3.5		17.1	6.0	35.1%	20.8%	13
BANGLADESH	138.7	0.0	1.0		14.8	8.0	54.2%		
INDONESIA	135.7	0.0	-	1.5	5.1	5.1	100.0%		
DPRK	108.9	15.5	-					53.7%	14
SYRIA	106.9	5.1	7.6					38.5%	14
COTE D'IVOIRE 	104.1	0.3	12.1						
GEORGIA 	100.1	8.2	3.0						
CHINA	94.6	125.1	8.0						
LIBERIA 	90.7	0.1	1.9					38.8%	14
NEPAL 	86.1	0.1	12.6	0.1					
BURUNDI 	84.9	0.0	5.2					36.1%	14
COLOMBIA	83.5	0.1	1.8						

 Conflict-affected

 Average humanitarian aid share of total ODA, 1995-2008

 Number years where humanitarian aid share of total ODA greater than 11.6%

Funding provided through financing mechanisms comes from government and private sources.

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC and UN OCHA FTS data plus our own research



TABLE 2: TOP 40 DONORS OF HUMANITARIAN AID, 2008

2008	TOTAL	PER CITIZEN	OTHER ODA (EXCLUDING DEBT RELIEF)
TOP 40 DONORS	US\$m	US\$	US\$m
UNITED STATES	4,380.8	14.4	26,624.0
WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME	2,934	-	-
EC	2,009.8	4.1	14,628.2
UNHCR	1,597	-	-
UNITED KINGDOM	1,017.1	16.6	10,950.6
ICRC	1,006	-	-
MÉDECINS SANS FRONTIÈRES	974	-	-
GERMANY	751.1	9.1	11,387.8
UNICEF	749	-	-
SAUDI ARABIA	727.2	28.7	5,564.1
NETHERLANDS	632.9	38.6	6,868.9
SPAIN	629.0	14.2	6,525.3
SWEDEN	603.4	65.9	4,731.8
NORWAY	450.6	95.7	3,921.0
FRANCE	444.9	7.2	9,886.2
ITALY	416.9	7.1	3,970.8
CANADA	412.1	12.5	4,652.0
FAO	364	-	-
AUSTRALIA	306.3	14.6	2,698.0
DENMARK	295.4	54.1	2,707.2
IFRC	278	-	-
JAPAN	275.0	2.2	7,838.0
IRELAND	237.5	55.9	1,327.9
BELGIUM	221.6	21.1	2,284.9
SWITZERLAND	192.7	25.4	1,938.8
ACTION CONTRE LA FAIM INTERNATIONAL	181	-	-
SAVE THE CHILDREN UK	160	-	-
FINLAND	143.5	27.0	1,163.6
NORWEGIAN REFUGEE COUNCIL	131	-	-
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES	110.6	24.7	88.1
AUSTRIA	95.9	11.5	980.2
KUWAIT	95.6	32.8	283.2
GREECE	54.4	4.9	703.2
LUXEMBOURG	53.9	114.4	414.9
RUSSIAN FEDERATION	44.0	0.3	-
NEW ZEALAND	31.5	7.5	348.0
KOREA	30.7	0.6	792.0
PORTUGAL	27.6	2.6	619.7

Expenditure by delivery agencies comes from both government and private sources. Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC and UN OCHA FTS data plus our own research

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For further details on the content of this report including communication with the authors, as well as your questions or comments, please contact us by email ([gha@devinit.org](mailto:gha@devinit.org)) or visit our website at [www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org](http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org)

GHA Report 2010 presents the very latest data on financial flows to humanitarian crises. Chapters on conflict and the military, domestic response, the scale of needs, donor and recipient governments, pooled humanitarian funding and delivery agencies reveal the complexity of humanitarian response – multiple international and national actors working in highly varied contexts where the lines between humanitarian and other interventions is continually blurred.

How can an aid architecture that draws such firm lines between humanitarian and development activities serve the world's poorest people, many of whom are living their lives vulnerable to repeated crises?



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