

# GLOBAL HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE REPORT 2013



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# Acknowledgements

## Thank you

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The GHA report 2013 was co-authored by Oliver Buston (Consultant) and Kerry Smith (Programme Manager) with extensive data analysis and research from GHA team members: Chloe Stirk, Dan Sparks, Daniele Malerba (Data Lead) and Hannah Sweeney, while Jenny Claydon coordinated editorial production. Editorial guidance was provided by Executive Directors, Judith Randel and Tony German, and Director of Research, Analysis and Evidence, Dan Coppard.

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# Foreword

Welcome to the Global Humanitarian Assistance (GHA) Report 2013 from all of us at Development Initiatives. This is our 10th report and we hope its information will help you in your work to achieve the best possible outcomes for people affected by disasters and crises. The overall objective of Development Initiatives' work is to end poverty by 2030. Our contribution is to increase access to and promote the use of reliable information, particularly on financial flows. We focus on extreme poverty and the links between conflict, insecurity, vulnerability and humanitarian crises.

Since 2000, GHA reports have tried to respond to the demand for better information on financing by reporting on resources allocated to humanitarian situations. At [www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org](http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org) you can find all the data series that inform our analysis, briefings and reports on specific crises (such as Syria), issues and themes (such as decision-making), and 48 country profiles of both donors and recipients of humanitarian assistance. We also have a free, friendly helpdesk (via phone or email) that provides support in using and applying the data.

Why do we do this? Firstly, we know there is a demand for easy access to information on financing, gathered together in one place, and for a shared evidence base on resources. But we also do it because we know that funding matters, and is about more than money. It affects behaviour and the architecture for response, the power and influence of different groups, priorities and capacity development, and it is used to signal approval or disapproval. Funding is also one of the few things over which the providers of humanitarian assistance have control.

In the GHA Report 2013 you will find answers to the basic questions about the way that the world finances response to crisis and vulnerability. How much humanitarian assistance is there? Is it enough? Who provides it? Where does it go? What is it spent on? You will see the increasingly diverse range of actors, the application of technologies, the focus on transparency and access to information, and the relationship with building resilience.

But most of all you will see that humanitarian assistance does not exist in a vacuum, either for the recipient or the donor. For most people it targets, vulnerability, poverty, insecurity and crises are inextricably linked in their daily lives. Similarly, humanitarian assistance is just one part of a range of responses from an international community that includes governments, foundations, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), companies and individuals as well as military and security forces. This international response is of course not the whole picture either – domestic governments, churches, local NGOs, security and armed forces and local people may all be present.

In May 2013 the United Nations High-Level Panel on the Post-2015 Development Agenda set 'End Poverty' as the first goal and 'Leave no one behind' as the first of five 'transformative shifts'. These goals are about the people with whom humanitarians work on a daily basis: people in endemic, long-term, dollar-a-day poverty, many of whom are left behind because of crisis and insecurity. We know that aid and humanitarian assistance will continue to be needed to end poverty, but we also know that the end of poverty will need to be sustained. The social impact of downturns and crises will hit the most vulnerable hardest and humanitarian capacity will be essential to prevent these crises resulting in long-term poverty. The strategic role of humanitarian assistance in achieving and sustaining the end of poverty needs to be reflected in an aid architecture fitted to the next 20 years, not that of the past 60.

I hope very much that you find the report and website useful and my colleagues and I would be delighted to hear from you if you have feedback or suggestions.




Judith Randel  
Executive Director, Development Initiatives

# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY


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# HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE IN NUMBERS

How much humanitarian assistance was given?




Where does it come from?



↑ Turkey US\$775 million  
Largest increase 2012

↓ United States US\$483 million  
Largest decrease 2012

international humanitarian assistance is channelled through



How does it get there?





# NEEDS


What was the need?

## NEEDS MET


Highest  
**Zimbabwe**  
86%

Lowest  
**Liberia**

38%  
2012



Targeted beneficiaries



Where does humanitarian assistance go?

## Top 5 recipients



## What is it spent on?

Cash transfer programmes  
**US\$76 million**



Disaster prevention and preparedness  
**US\$532 million**



↑ Somalia  
US\$851 million  
Largest increase 2011

↓ Haiti  
US\$2.6 billion  
Largest decrease 2011

Note: Using latest available data

# Executive summary

2012 was the “year of recurring disasters”,<sup>1</sup> which repeatedly hit places characterised by the intersection of chronic poverty, conflict and exposure to regular shocks and stresses. There were none of the ‘mega-disasters’, in terms of fatalities, on the scale of previous years, such as the Japanese tsunami in 2011 or the Haiti earthquake in 2010.

In 2012, 76 million people were targeted by the UN as needing humanitarian assistance – compared with 93 million people in 2011 – and many more will have been affected by smaller-scale disasters.

The international humanitarian response fell by 8% from US\$19.4 billion in 2011 to US\$17.9 billion in 2012, with assistance provided by governments falling by 6% from US\$13.8 billion to US\$12.9 billion. The reduction in humanitarian assistance was most marked for members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC), with a fall of 11% from 2011.

Despite fewer people targeted as needing humanitarian assistance in 2012, the requirements for the United Nations (UN) Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) remained similar to the 2011 level. Only 62.7% of these needs were funded, making 2012 the year when the smallest proportion of needs were met for over a decade. However, the difference between the best-funded and worst-funded CAP appeals remains wide – from 86% to 38%.

Humanitarian assistance from most donors fell and from some it fell dramatically: Spain reduced its humanitarian assistance by half, Japan by 38% and the United States by 11%. Because the United States is such a large donor, this translated to a fall of US\$483 million. However, the United States remained the largest donor of humanitarian assistance by volume, providing US\$3.8 billion in 2012 – 29% of all humanitarian assistance from governments. Luxembourg and Sweden were the most generous DAC donors as a proportion of their gross national income (GNI), providing 0.16% and 0.14% respectively. Turkey was the fourth largest government donor of humanitarian assistance in 2012, contributing over US\$1 billion – 0.13% of its national wealth.

Official development assistance (ODA) and ODA-like flows from non-DAC donors continued to rise, and their contribution to humanitarian assistance increased to US\$1.4 billion, thanks mainly to Turkey’s contribution. In 2011 (the most recent year for which data are available) private giving fell by 10% but, at US\$5.7 billion, it remained significantly higher than in 2009, the year before the large 2010 peak.

In addition to the resources allocated to international humanitarian assistance, many countries contributed by hosting refugees, among them some of the world’s poorest economies. For example, Pakistan hosted over 1.7 million refugees in 2011, Iran 886,468, Syria 755,454 and Kenya 566,487.

Domestic governments appeared to be taking a much stronger role in response to crises, especially natural disasters, within their own borders. China and India were home to a reported 78% of all people affected by disasters between 2002 and 2011, but received very little international humanitarian assistance.

Pakistan, Somalia, and West Bank and Gaza Strip received the largest amount of international humanitarian assistance in 2011, the most recent year for which comprehensive data are available.

For the past five years, just over half of all humanitarian assistance has been channelled through multilateral organisations and funds, and nearly a quarter through NGOs. In 2012 4.9% of humanitarian assistance was channelled via pooled funds: 2.4% via the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and, at country level, 2.1% via common humanitarian funds (CHFs) and 0.5% through emergency response funds (ERFs).

This year, the true impact of the 2010–2012 period of severe food insecurity and famine in Somalia was finally and devastatingly revealed, with the UN and FEWS NET estimating that 257,500 people died as a result between October 2010 and March 2012. A reflection

on the failure of the international community to respond in a timely and effective way to the crisis in Somalia has informed much of the recent evolution of humanitarian thinking.

The response to the Haiti earthquake in 2010 was swift from both government and private donors. However, this year's report shows how formerly high profile crises such as Haiti can quickly slip down the priority list with acute need remaining unfunded.

Although response can be slow when ongoing vulnerability tips into emergency in countries facing long-term chronic problems, it is still the case that these countries receive the bulk of the world's humanitarian assistance. GHA has been publishing data since 2009 that show how humanitarian assistance is 'long term'. In 2011 55% of official humanitarian assistance went to countries categorised as 'long-term recipients' – countries that regularly receive humanitarian assistance year on year – with 33% going to those classed as 'medium-term recipients' (see 'Data and Guides' section for classifications).

In the main, this assistance still tends to be planned over short-term projects but in 2013 the Somalia consolidated appeal presented a three-year planning horizon for 2013–2015: a major advance in the quest for more predictable financing for chronic crises. The amount of money spent on disaster prevention and preparation, although increasing, is still small – just under 5% in 2011.

The incidence of violent conflict also went up in 2011 (the most recent year for which data are available) and was concentrated in Sudan, Nigeria, Pakistan and Mexico; Syria will add to that list in 2012/13. At the time of writing the human impact of civil war in Syria was rising relentlessly. There were 1.6 million Syrian refugees in neighbouring countries and 4.25 million internally displaced persons. On 7 June 2013 the UN launched a US\$5.2 billion humanitarian appeal for the Syria crisis, the largest in history.

The interconnected nature of risks associated with natural disasters, conflict and insecurity, and extreme poverty is increasingly recognised. Finance and response, however, are still often conceptualised and organised in silos that classify activities and situations into components like emergency relief, post-conflict, recovery, early recovery, instability, fragility and transition.

Resilience is high on the policy agendas of many government donors who increasingly see the importance of tackling fragility, poverty, and vulnerability to conflict and disaster by enhancing the resilience of communities and livelihoods. The move towards resilience thinking and programming marks a collective recognition of the need to deal with complexity and work with longer timeframes. Research suggests that over a 20-year period in Kenya, every US\$1 spent on disaster resilience resulted in US\$2.90 saved in the form of reduced humanitarian spend, avoided losses and development gains.<sup>2</sup>

A growing number of donors are implementing cash transfer programmes, believing that they enable people to make choices about their own needs, can boost local markets, are quick to deliver and are cost effective. The European Union (EU) has made cash and voucher programmes a priority and all European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) food assistance programmes in Haiti and Pakistan now contain a cash or voucher element.

Several actors are striving to increase access to information as a tool for improving humanitarian response and improved accountability. Investments are being made in transparency, especially on resources. New technologies are now being applied, not just talked about, for early warning, crisis mapping and advice. The UN's Transformative Agenda has been designed to improve leadership, coordination and accountability.

The Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2013 is split into three sections. The first section (chapters 1–5) analyses recent trends in humanitarian assistance. The second section (chapter 6) provides a snapshot of recent emergencies and their human impact. The final section (chapter 7) explores a number of efforts to strengthen the response to people in crises. These include principles, standards and accountability frameworks guiding response; efforts to increase transparency; the use of technology to empower beneficiaries; and a focus on resilience.



## THE STORY

In 2012 the Philippines recorded the highest number of disaster-related fatalities: 2,415 people died, largely as a result of Typhoon Bopha. However, some longer-term investments are being made to minimise risk and vulnerability to disasters. In 2011 the Philippines was the largest recipient of disaster prevention and preparedness funding.

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# HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE TO CRISIS

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# 1 HOW MUCH HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE WAS GIVEN?

The international humanitarian response declined from US\$19.4 billion in 2011 to US\$17.9 billion in 2012. The scale of humanitarian needs fell marginally in 2012, but the funding gap in the United Nation's (UN) Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) was at its widest in over a decade.

Government donors, which include European (EU) institutions, provide the largest share of the total international humanitarian response. Their contributions declined by 5.9% in 2012, from US\$13.8 billion to US\$12.9 billion.

## WHAT IS HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE?

'Humanitarian assistance' is the assistance and action designed to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain and protect human dignity during and in the aftermath of emergencies. The characteristics that mark it out from other forms of foreign assistance and development aid are:


- it is intended to be governed by the principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence
- it is intended to be 'short term' in nature and provide for activities in the 'immediate aftermath' of a disaster. In practice it is often difficult to say where 'during and in the immediate aftermath of emergencies' ends and other types of assistance begin, especially in situations of prolonged vulnerability.

Traditional responses to humanitarian crises, and the easiest to categorise as such, are those that fall under the aegis of 'emergency response':

- material relief assistance and services (shelter, water, medicines etc.)
- emergency food aid (short-term distribution and supplementary feeding programmes)
- relief coordination, protection and support services (coordination, logistics and communications).

We report what others themselves report as 'humanitarian' but try to consistently label and source this.

FIGURE 1.1: INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE, 2007–2012



Note: Data on private voluntary contributions for 2012 is a preliminary estimate (see Data & Guides for further details). DAC data for government donors in 2012 is preliminary. Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC, UN OCHA FTS data and GHA's unique data set for private voluntary contributions (see Data & Guides section for methodology)

# How much was needed?

There is no comprehensive and comparable evidence base on the scale and severity of humanitarian needs. However, major appeals for international humanitarian financing are useful barometers to illustrate the scale of needs and the funding response in some of the world's major humanitarian crises.

Funding requirements in the 2012 CAP were similar to 2011, although there were no 'mega-disasters', in terms of fatalities, on the scale of those in previous years. There were 21 appeals in the CAP in 2012, the same number as in 2011, and more than in 2010 (19). 2012 was a year of a large number of smaller-scale crises. There were a number of appeals for countries affected by the Sahel food crisis such as Burkina Faso, Mali and Mauritania.

## UN CAP AND MEASURING NEED

The UN CAP is the largest annual appeal for humanitarian financing. It provides a consensus-based costing and prioritisation of humanitarian financing requirements across a range of humanitarian crises, from a broad base of participating organisations, including UN agencies and NGOs.

Among the drawbacks of using the CAP as a measure of overall financing need is that it responds to supply as well as demand: agencies will understandably ask for more or less depending on how much they think will be available. Another is that the size of the CAP is limited by capacity constraints of UN agencies: agencies will not ask for money to address needs that they do not think they have the ability or capacity to meet.

Some efforts have been made to improve the measurement of need in the CAP. In 2012 several appeals included humanitarian 'dashboards' providing summary analysis of humanitarian needs, coverage and gaps. Many of these dashboards

incorporate basic outcome-level indicators (crude mortality rate, under-five mortality rate, morbidity rate, under-five global acute malnutrition, and under-five severe acute malnutrition), which enable comparisons of humanitarian needs across crises and over time. Kenya, Somalia, Chad, Yemen, the Philippines and Afghanistan carried out multi-cluster assessments that informed their 2012 CAP appeals. Many countries also now compile their appeals using the Online Project System (OPS), which maps projects by geographic location and number of beneficiaries targeted. This allows coordinators to better track gaps and duplication.

The CAP only represents part of total global financing requirements. Only crises considered high priority are included and not all financing requirements in a crisis are targeted in an appeal.

FIGURE 1.2: REVISED REQUIREMENTS TO UN CAP, 2000–2012





FIGURE 1.3: AVERAGE FUNDING REQUIREMENTS PER UN CAP AND NUMBER OF APPEALS, 2000–2013



Note: 2013 data subject to change. Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS

In 2012 there was just one flash appeal in response to a sudden-onset emergency (Lesotho food insecurity), compared with six in 2011. The biggest appeals in 2012 were for South Sudan, Somalia and Sudan, each with revised requirements of over US\$1 billion (see figure 1.7).

At the time of writing there were four fewer appeals in the UN CAP in 2013 than in 2012, down from 21 to 17, although this number could rise during the year. Average requirements have risen by almost US\$100 million and are the second largest of the decade.


Initial funding requirements for the 2013 UN CAP were at a record high of US\$8.6 billion. And even before

the mid-year revision, requirements had been further revised upwards to just under US\$8.8 billion to reflect increased need. So far the largest upward revisions have been for the Philippines (up US\$76.3 million), Mali (up US\$39.3 million) and occupied Palestinian territories (oPt) (up US\$27.3 million).

Funding requirements for 2013 are dominated by Somalia and South Sudan. In 2013 Somalia was the subject of a three-year CAP, with requirements of US\$1.3 billion for the first year. However, one of the world's largest current humanitarian crises, the conflict in Syria and refugee crises in neighbouring countries, is not included in the UN CAP.

# Was enough given?

FIGURE 1.4: UN CAP REVISED REQUIREMENTS, FUNDING AND UNMET NEEDS, 2000–2013



Note: Revised requirements for 2013 are subject to change as crises evolve during the course of the year. Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS data


The core humanitarian principles that underpin the work of most of the international humanitarian community provide unequivocal guidance on the basis for allocating humanitarian funding: humanitarian assistance should be provided in accordance with assessed needs and capacities and it

should be allocated on a proportionate basis. In 2012 only US\$5.6 billion of the US\$8.9 billion funding requirement of the CAP was funded (see figure 1.4).

The proportion of humanitarian financing needs met in the UN appeal in 2012 (62.7%) was slightly less than

in 2011 (63.3%), and the lowest for a decade. This extends further the year-on-year downward trend in the share of funding needs met since 2007.

FIGURE 1.5: PROPORTION OF UN CAP APPEAL NEEDS MET AND UNMET, 2000–2012



Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS data

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**FIGURE 1.6: REQUIREMENTS PER TARGETED BENEFICIARY IN THE UN CAP, 2010–2013**

Note: Target beneficiary figures are estimates and based on the latest available appeal documents. Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS and UN CAP appeal documents

There were 70.7 million targeted beneficiaries for the UN CAP in 2013. This compares with 76.1 million in 2012, 92.9 million in 2011 (when the West Africa UN appeal targeted an estimated 32 million), and 75.6 million in 2010.

In 2013, requirements in the UN CAP per targeted beneficiary were US\$124. This was higher than the two previous years but lower than the 2010 figure of US\$149 per beneficiary (see figure 1.6).


Funding levels for different country appeals is uneven. Currently, Somalia is the appeal with the largest funding requirement in the CAP, but only 16% of Somalia's requirements are funded, making it the second lowest-funded CAP in 2013 at the time of writing.

While Syria is not included in the CAP, it does have two UN appeals – the Syria Humanitarian Action Response Plan (SHARP) and the Regional Response Plan (RRP) – and two

appeals launched by the governments of Lebanon and Jordan. Total requirements are US\$5.2 billion.

The Syria UN appeals are included in the graph below to show the size of the appeal and the relatively high level of funding it has received so far (28%) when compared with UN CAP appeals, such as Somalia.

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**FIGURE 1.7: FUNDING VERSUS REVISED REQUIREMENTS, UN CAP APPEAL AND SYRIA SHARP AND RRP, 2013, US\$ MILLIONS**

Note: Data for revised requirements in 2013 are subject to change. Data downloaded 24 May 2013. Syria appeal data downloaded 10 June 2013.  
Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS data

The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS) also tracks humanitarian funding to a series of appeals made outside the CAP. These are mainly joint UN and national government appeals for countries and crises whose fundraising needs are considered to be lower priority, or where the government elects for an appeal not to be included in the CAP. These crises do not usually undergo the same coordination and consolidation as the CAP.


In 2012 there were five humanitarian appeals and action plans outside of the CAP, compared with just three in 2011.

On average, non-CAP appeals fulfil less of their requirements than CAP appeals. This is not surprising as appeals outside the CAP by definition tend to be considered lower priority. This is not always the case. Syria is an example of a 'high priority' crisis that is not included in the CAP. Only 36% of the original requirements for the five non-CAP appeals launched in

2012 were met. The levels of funding varied greatly between each appeal. More than half of the SHARP's 2012 requirements were met, while only 18% of the Pakistan Early Recovery Framework's 2012 requirements were reached.


There are currently four appeals outside the CAP for 2013: Cuba, Zimbabwe and two for Syria (SHARP and RRP).

FIGURE 1.8: FUNDING TO APPEALS NOT IN THE CAP, 2001–2013



Note: Data for 2013 was downloaded on 5 June 2013 and is subject to change. Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS data

FIGURE 1.9: FUNDING TO IFRC EMERGENCY APPEALS AGAINST REQUIREMENTS, 2007–2012



Source: Development Initiatives based on IFRC annual reports

The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies' (IFRC) primary focus is to respond to natural disasters. The IFRC appeal for 2012 was relatively small at just US\$43 million, reflecting a reduction in natural disaster-related needs in 2012 (see figure 1.9).

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) runs its own appeals, which are not integrated or aligned with the UN CAP process. The most recent income data we have are for 2011, when the ICRC appeal was the largest on record, US\$1.1 billion, and was 95% funded.

Funding requirements for the ICRC's emergency appeal in 2012 were 7.4% less than initial requirements for 2011, indicating a reduction in anticipated needs in 2012.

FIGURE 1.10: FUNDING TO ICRC EMERGENCY APPEALS AGAINST REQUIREMENTS, 2006–2012



Note: 2012 requirements based on initial budgets, no income data currently available. Source: Development Initiatives based on ICRC annual reports



## THE STORY

Floods in Bangladesh are not one-off emergencies; they are a recurring threat to vulnerable communities. In flood-affected areas, where it is impossible to grow crops, communities and NGOs are developing innovative solutions to grow food on flooded land. They build rafts out of water hyacinth and cover these in soil and cow dung in which seedlings can be raised, ready to plant after the flood waters recede.

These 'floating gardens' are helping families to plan their futures without the fear of losing their livelihoods during the next monsoon.

### CREDIT

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## 2 WHERE DOES HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE COME FROM?

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Government donors give the largest amount of humanitarian assistance, on average accounting for over 70% of the international humanitarian response since 2007. Preliminary figures for 2012, however, suggest that government contributions have fallen from US\$13.8 billion to US\$12.9 billion.

OECD DAC donors provide the majority of governments' international humanitarian assistance (over 90% since 2007), but the balance is slowly shifting. While non-DAC donors' contributions fluctuate over time, they are increasing, and cushioned the overall reduction in humanitarian financing from governments in 2012. Turkey, in particular, contributed just over US\$1 billion in 2012, ranking it the fourth largest government donor that year after the United States (US\$3.8 billion), EU institutions (US\$1.9 billion) and the United Kingdom (US\$1.2 billion).

For a more complete picture of humanitarian financing it is essential to know the humanitarian contributions of all government donors. Turkey's increase in 2012 shows how humanitarian assistance from one country, for which better data are only just becoming available, can have a significant impact on the overall picture. It is likely that a significant proportion of Turkey's contribution was spent on housing Syrian refugees within Turkey. Without the full picture it is difficult for the humanitarian community (including beneficiaries) to know how much money is available, where it is going, how to coordinate response with other actors, and how to be accountable to beneficiaries.

Individual and private donors also play a critical, although little understood, role in global humanitarian assistance. Private donors are thought to have provided more than a quarter of all humanitarian assistance over the past five years, largely in the form of voluntary contributions from the public to NGOs.

International humanitarian response must be set in the context of growing and increasingly institutionalised domestic response to crises and investment in disaster risk reduction (DRR). Although significantly under-reported, evidence suggests that domestic response by the governments, communities and civil societies of countries hit by emergencies is critical, especially in the first 72 hours.

# Government donors

In 2012 governments, including EU institutions, gave US\$12.9 billion in humanitarian assistance, with the majority coming from OECD DAC donors. Contributions from OECD DAC donors fell by 11% in 2012, with humanitarian assistance from several donors, including the United States, Japan and Spain falling dramatically. Meanwhile, contributions from governments outside of the OECD DAC group increased by 73%, from US\$798 million to US\$1.4 billion, largely due to Turkey's contribution.

## OECD DAC MEMBERS

There are currently 26 members of the OECD DAC. Two members joined in 2013. Iceland joined in March and has been reporting to the DAC since 1990. The Czech Republic joined in May and is the first EU member to join since Greece in 1999. It has been reporting to the DAC since 1993.

The other members are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, South


Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States and EU institutions.

A number of government donors report to the OECD DAC and have done so for a number of years, but are not members. These include Bulgaria, Chinese Taipei, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Israel, Kuwait, Lithuania, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Malta, Poland, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Thailand, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates.


FIGURE 2.1: HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE FROM GOVERNMENT DONORS, 2000–2012



FIGURE 2.2: TOP 20 GOVERNMENT CONTRIBUTORS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, 2003–2012



## G20 MEMBERS



Notes: Not to scale. GNI and per citizen values cannot be calculated for EU institutions. Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC, UN OCHA FTS, ECOSOC and World Bank data

TABLE 2.1: TOP 30 GOVERNMENT DONORS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, 2012

	INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, 2012 US\$m	SHARE OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, 2012	INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE PER CITIZEN, 2012, US\$	INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AS A SHARE OF TOTAL ODA, 2012	INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AS % OF GNI, 2012
US	3,805	29.4%	12	12.7%	0.02%
EU institutions	1,880	14.5%	n/a	10.0%	n/a
UK	1,167	9.0%	18	8.6%	0.05%
Turkey	1,039	8.0%	14	41.1%	0.13%
Sweden	784	6.1%	82	14.5%	0.14%
Germany	757	5.9%	9	5.4%	0.02%
Japan	606	4.7%	5	5.7%	0.01%
Canada	521	4.0%	15	9.2%	0.03%
Norway	509	3.9%	101	10.7%	0.10%
Australia	442	3.4%	19	8.1%	0.03%
Netherlands	426	3.3%	25	7.2%	0.05%
France	408	3.2%	6	3.2%	0.01%
Switzerland	374	2.9%	47	11.7%	0.05%
Denmark	315	2.4%	56	10.9%	0.09%
Italy	312	2.4%	5	11.1%	0.01%
Spain	230	1.8%	5	11.0%	0.02%
Belgium	220	1.7%	20	9.0%	0.04%
Finland	185	1.4%	34	13.2%	0.07%
Ireland	137	1.1%	30	15.9%	0.08%
Saudi Arabia	90	0.7%	3	5.1%	0.02%
Luxembourg	74	0.6%	142	16.4%	0.16%
Austria	61	0.5%	7	5.2%	0.01%
Brazil	54	0.4%	0.3	0.5%	0.003%
Russia	50	0.4%	0.3	8.4%	0.003%
UAE	42	0.3%	5	4.5%	0.01%
New Zealand	40	0.3%	9	9.1%	0.03%
Qatar	36	0.3%	19	n/a	0.02%
Greece	33	0.3%	3	9.4%	0.01%
China	27	0.2%	0.02	1.5%	0.0004%
Portugal	25	0.2%	2	4.1%	0.01%


Note: For countries where ODA data are not available for 2012, the most recent year has been used. For Brazil, China and Russia, ODA refers to ODA-like flows and is 2011 data. Data for Brazil are from 2009. Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC, UN OCHA FTS, World Bank and UNDESA.

The United States dominates the top 30 governments in terms of its contribution to humanitarian assistance over the past 10 years, giving one third of all humanitarian assistance over this period.

There are a number of different ways of comparing the generosity


of donors. The largest donor in terms of absolute volumes in 2012 was the United States; however, when looking at the proportion of gross national income (GNI) that countries gave as humanitarian assistance, Luxembourg and Sweden were the most generous.

**FIGURE 2.3: BREAKDOWN OF GOVERNMENT AND EU INSTITUTIONS' CONTRIBUTIONS TO INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, 2012**



Note: Data from this graph should not be aggregated to calculate international humanitarian assistance from government donors.  
 Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC and UN OCHA FTS data

FIGURE 2.4: PROPORTIONAL CHANGES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE FROM TOP 10 DONORS, 2003–2012



Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC data

The year-on-year stability of financing over the last decade differs significantly between donors. For example, Japan more than tripled its humanitarian assistance in 2004 (and 2011), yet by 2007 it was half the volume it was in 2003. On the other hand, the United States, while fluctuating in some years, shows more stable trends.


Between 2011 and 2012 a number of donors have either substantially increased or decreased their humanitarian contributions. For example, Turkey increased its contributions by US\$775 million, whereas the United States decreased its contributions by US\$483 million. Of the top 15 donors to show a decline in their humanitarian contributions in 2012, 11 were OECD DAC donors.

TABLE 2.2: TOP 15 LARGEST CHANGES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE FROM GOVERNMENT DONORS AND EU INSTITUTIONS, 2011–2012

INCREASE	US\$m	DECREASE	US\$m
Turkey	+775	US	-483
Switzerland	+36	Japan	-371
Brazil	+31	Spain	-232
Qatar	+25	UAE	-151
Russia	+22	Germany	-90
Canada	+20	China	-60
Denmark	+18	Australia	-50
EU institutions	+17	Italy	-50
Luxembourg	+7	Belgium	-49
Finland	+6	Sweden	-41
Ireland	+5	UK	-38
Saudi Arabia	+4	Norway	-36
Sri Lanka	+4	France	-27
New Zealand	+3	India	-16
Austria	+3	Algeria	-16

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC and UN OCHA FTS data

FIGURE 2.5: OFFICIAL HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AS A SHARE OF ODA FROM DAC DONORS, 2000–2012




Note: 2012 data are partial and preliminary. Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC data

Official humanitarian assistance from OECD DAC donors decreased in 2012 and also decreased as a percentage of ODA, from 10% in 2011 to 9% in 2012. ODA from OECD DAC countries has also decreased, from US\$133.7 billion in 2011 to US\$128.5 billion in 2012. This means that in 2012 humanitarian assistance was a smaller slice of a smaller pie.

The global economic crisis has hit the world's richest countries hard. In this context there have been increased discussions of the role of those non-DAC donors that have experienced strong economic performance in recent years. Non-DAC donor contributions to humanitarian assistance increased to nearly US\$1.4 billion in 2012, mainly thanks to Turkey's contribution of just over US\$1 billion (see figure 2.6).


This is in the context of increases in wider ODA and ODA-like flows from non-DAC donors. Levels of humanitarian assistance from non-DAC donors have been volatile as donors respond to particular crises (although this could reflect reporting). Peaks in humanitarian assistance from resource rich non-DAC donors like Gulf States (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Qatar) also appear to coincide with high oil prices in 2008 (see figure 2.7).

FIGURE 2.6: HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE FROM NON-DAC DONORS, 2000–2012



Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS and OECD DAC data

FIGURE 2.7: ODA AND ODA-LIKE FLOWS FOR GULF STATES, BRICS, TURKEY AND OTHER NON-DAC DONORS



Notes: Gulf States excludes ODA from Qatar. BRICS refer to Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC data, current prices

## In focus: Gulf States

Humanitarian assistance from Gulf States (Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Qatar) peaked in 2001 (US\$658.0 million) and in 2008 (US\$777.8 million). These peaks were driven by large donations from Saudi Arabia. In 2001 98% of humanitarian assistance from Gulf States was from Saudi Arabia to the West Bank and Gaza Strip; in 2008 US\$338.8 million was from Saudi Arabia to the World Food Programme (WFP).

While Saudi Arabia gives a significant amount of humanitarian assistance, there is no single agency in charge of coordination and there is currently limited internal capacity to manage humanitarian processes and response. Saudi Arabia has no humanitarian assistance policy and is not actively engaged in international humanitarian mechanisms or coordination networks.

The 2008 peak in humanitarian assistance from Gulf States (US\$777.8 million) corresponds to peak oil prices. Since 2008 assistance has declined year-on-year to US\$180.3 in 2012, the lowest since 2004.

In 2009 the UAE was the largest Gulf State donor, giving US\$352.6 million of which US\$107.7 million was channelled to Sudan, US\$101.9 million to Pakistan and US\$81.8 million to Syria. The UAE was also the largest donor in 2011 (US\$193.3 million).

In 2012 Qatar's share of humanitarian contributions among Gulf State donors increased to 20% from 4% the previous year (US\$36.4 million). While the majority of this funding is coded as regional, further analysis shows that it was mainly in response to the humanitarian crisis in Syria.

It is worth highlighting that due to the voluntary nature of reporting through the UN OCHA FTS not all flows from non-DAC donors are captured, and we would expect humanitarian assistance from Gulf States to be far higher than the reported amount.

The trend in humanitarian assistance from Gulf States is quite different from the trend in wider ODA from the same donors. Both humanitarian assistance and ODA peaked in 2008 and then fell


sharply in 2009. However, whilst ODA increased to US\$6.0 billion in 2011, humanitarian assistance continued to fall (see figure 2.9). It may be that the increase in ODA is in part due to better reporting.

Collectively Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and UAE gave US\$46.9 billion in ODA between 2000 and 2011; Saudi Arabia was the largest donor, giving a total of US\$32.8 billion in this period. In 2011 it gave US\$5.1 billion and was ranked the 10th largest government donor.

Around 35% of humanitarian assistance from Gulf States donors between 2003 and 2012 went to three recipients – Pakistan, West Bank and Gaza Strip and Sudan (see figure 2.10). The top 10 recipients of humanitarian assistance reflect regional priorities as well as cultural and religious ties between these types of donors and recipients. For further discussion of donor preferences in terms of culture, history and regional proximity see chapter 3 'Where does humanitarian assistance go?'

FIGURE 2.8: HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE FROM SAUDI ARABIA, UAE, KUWAIT AND QATAR, 2000–2012



**FIGURE 2.9: ODA FROM SAUDI ARABIA, UAE AND KUWAIT, 2000-2011**

Note: Currently no data for Qatar. Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC data, constant 2011


Pakistan is the largest recipient of Gulf States' humanitarian assistance, and received a significant proportion of funding from Saudi Arabia (US\$200.6 million) and UAE (US\$77.6 million) in response to the 2010 floods.

At the time of writing the Gulf States represented 26% of total

contributions to the Syria crisis. Kuwait is one of the largest government donors, having contributed US\$324 million so far.

In recent years, Gulf State donors have channelled an increasing amount of humanitarian assistance multilaterally. For example, in 2010 Saudi Arabia

channelled US\$50 million to the Haiti ERF and in 2013 Kuwait gave US\$12 million to the Syria emergency response fund (ERF).

**FIGURE 2.10: TOP 10 RECIPIENTS OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE FROM GULF STATE DONORS, 2003–2012**

Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS data

# Individual and private donors

According to GHA's research into private funding of humanitarian agencies, individual and private donations have represented up to 26% of all international humanitarian assistance between 2007 and 2011, totalling over US\$20 billion over the five years. In 2010, private funding increased by 85% from the previous year; from US\$3.4 billion to US\$6.3 billion, largely in response to the Haiti earthquake. Yet despite there being no major disasters the following year, private funding in 2011 fell by just 10%, suggesting humanitarian organisations have been relatively successful in retaining their private donors. NGOs saw less of a reduction in their private funding between 2010 and 2011 than did the Red Cross or UN agencies, dropping just 5% from US\$5.4 billion to US\$5.2 billion (see figure 2.11).


As the main channel for private support, NGOs have seen their net private income increase significantly since 2006, despite modest reductions in 2009 (a relatively quiet year for emergencies) and in 2011 (following a major peak in 2010).

UN agencies and Red Cross organisations present a rather more fluctuating trajectory over the same period, with sharp increments in 2010 and pronounced falls in private voluntary contributions in 2011. UN agencies lost 30% of their private income in 2011. The Red Cross has suffered even more severely with a 57% reduction in private income.


Individuals are overwhelmingly the largest and most consistent source of private funding, and provided over three-quarters of all private humanitarian funding in the five years between 2007 and 2011. Private individual contributions include regular subscriptions and one-off donations to humanitarian organisations, as well as donations made in response to major funding appeals.

Foundations such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and the IKEA Foundation, and private corporations like Crédit Suisse Group, ING and Microsoft Corporation, each provided similar levels of funding from 2007 to 2011, at US\$1.4 billion and US\$1.5 billion respectively.

**FIGURE 2.11: TOTAL PRIVATE VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS FOR HUMANITARIAN CRISES BY TYPE OF RECIPIENT ORGANISATION, 2006–2011**



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**FIGURE 2.12: TOTAL PRIVATE CONTRIBUTIONS BY DONOR TYPE, 2007–2011**

Source: Development Initiatives research

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### GHA PRIVATE FUNDING STUDY

There is currently no single initiative that systematically collects information on private funding worldwide. Different initiatives track private contributions on a national level (see “Tracking private funding from foundations”, overleaf), but methodologies differ and direct aggregation of data is not possible. The GHA programme has developed a methodology which allows us to estimate the global volume of private funding, and to understand how this funding is raised and spent and by which part of the international aid system (see Data and Guides section for methodology).

Our information sources are:

- direct information and analysis of annual reports for a unique data set of 78 NGOs that form part of nine representative and well-known NGO alliances and umbrella organisations, such as Oxfam International
- direct information and analysis of annual reports for five key UN agencies with humanitarian mandates: the WFP, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) and the World Health Organization (WHO)
- direct information and analysis of annual reports for the IFRC and the ICRC.

The ‘ratcheting up’ effect of mega-disasters on humanitarian funding is clearly evident. Official humanitarian assistance peaks in response to a major crisis and usually falls back again in the following year or two, but it generally remains higher than it was before the crisis. The extent to which private funding was sustained in the year after its major increase in response to the Haiti earthquake is remarkable. Humanitarian agencies were able to mobilise private voluntary contributions in response to the severe food insecurity crisis in the Horn of Africa, as well as ongoing emergencies in Haiti and Pakistan, at significantly higher levels than previously. Although the data do not reveal the reasons for the increase, anecdotal evidence from NGOs suggests that the Haiti crisis raised the awareness of a new constituency of support for humanitarian response, who then became regular supporters of humanitarian agencies, later contributing to other less-covered disasters. This pattern of funding is often seen in new government donors who typically start giving humanitarian assistance in response to either a crisis within their borders or a mega-disaster and then expand to other places.

### Tracking private humanitarian funding from foundations

There are a number of country-level initiatives attempting to monitor and record private giving by foundations (see right). While these various sources of data each provide a snapshot of private giving in an individual country or region, the information they collect is neither uniform nor exhaustive – methodologies differ and direct aggregation of data is not possible. Where there is reporting by private foundations, information on domestic versus international spending is often hard to come by.

The lack of standard reporting by private funders contributes to the overall inadequacy of information available on funding to humanitarian

### PRIVATE HUMANITARIAN DONORS

Because of limitations in GHA data we use UN OCHA FTS when considering total humanitarian funding by the largest private donors, and the largest recipient countries of private humanitarian funding. While total private funding reported to the FTS is low compared with our own research, a number of the larger foundations and private sector donors do report their humanitarian funding.

Since 2000, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation has reported US\$69.3 million in humanitarian assistance to the FTS. The second largest private foundation donor

reporting was the UAE-based Khalifa Bin Zayed Al Nehayan Foundation (US\$41.7 million). Between them, these two donors gave just over 50% of all funding from foundations reported to the FTS in this period. Of the private sector donors reporting to the FTS, the Business Roundtable – an association of US companies that make up almost one-third of the US stock market – has donated the most since 2000, made up of a single US\$58.0 million donation to China in 2008 in response to the Sichuan Earthquake.

emergencies, particularly from private donors. Without improved reporting and better information, it remains impossible for response agencies and governments to allocate funding and resources according to need.

We know there are large resource flows going to humanitarian emergencies from sources other than institutional donors or the private foundations that choose to report to the DAC and/or FTS, which are currently going unreported. For us to gain a better understanding of what resources are available and where, private foundations need to publish information on what they fund in a comprehensive, uniform way that compares with the reporting of institutional donors.

A report on private foundations by the United Kingdom’s International Development Committee last year noted, “the precise volume, distribution and targeting of foundation spending are currently unclear. Compared to official donors, foundation reporting is weak.”<sup>3</sup>

## US FOUNDATION CENTER

The US Foundation Center records information on grants made by private foundations in the US, but its publicly available data are selective and do not represent the total amount given. Because of the incomplete nature of the data available through the database, and the fact that the data excludes all other forms of private giving (such as corporate giving and donations from individuals), it does not present a full picture of private US foundation funding of humanitarian assistance.

## CHINA FOUNDATION CENTER

The China Foundation Center is currently working with the US Foundation Center to improve the quality of its data. The China Foundation Center's Index has an impressive set of data, and its recent publication "The Chinese Foundations Developing Trends

2011" gives a comprehensive analysis of financial revenue and expenditure of foundations (although it is domestically focused). The report finds 2,591 Chinese foundations in 2011, receiving an income of US\$4.6 billion, with over 80% of income on average coming from private donations, and 92% of funds coming from within China. The data report that 100% of these funds are spent domestically.

## BRAZILIAN ASSOCIATION OF CORPORATE FOUNDATIONS

The Brazilian Association of Corporate Foundations (GIFE) is composed of around 140 members, including institutes, foundations and corporations. The GIFE quantitative census, conducted every two years, presents data on sources of funds, allocation of resources, and volume of investment, among other things.

The US Foundation Center says for "a true picture of funding to emerge and for philanthropy's contribution to making a better world be known, data about foundation funding must be part of this larger narrative". For further discussion of the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI)<sup>4</sup> and other transparency initiatives see chapter 7 "Strengthening the response to people in crisis".

## BETTER DATA FROM FOUNDATIONS

The Hewlett Foundation became the first foundation to publish its data to IATI in 2011, and more foundations and private funders are expected to follow suit as awareness builds around the value of making the information publicly available.

The US Foundation Center is already able to map data provided by US foundations and share it publicly to IATI fields. This means that any

of the foundations electronically reporting their grants data to the Foundation Center can opt into the IATI reporting programme. Increased participation in this will be a significant step forward, enabling data from US foundations to be directly compared with information from other sources, and helping to create a fuller picture of what resources are going where.


# Domestic government response

The governments of countries hit by emergencies are often the first to respond, especially in the first critical 72 hours. Domestic response covers both a government's emergency response to a crisis in-country as well as national government investments in prevention and DRR. However, data on this aspect of emergency response are particularly weak. Analysis of UN OCHA FTS data shows that in 2012 Zimbabwe provided US\$10.0 million, Pakistan US\$7.0 million, and the Philippines US\$6.8 million of humanitarian assistance in their own countries.

In 2008 US\$40 million of domestic resources are recorded as channelled through the WFP for food assistance for internally displaced people in Iraq.

Of the top 15 domestic government funders of emergency response recorded in the UN OCHA FTS over the last decade, the largest recorded contribution – by some margin – is by Sudan. This snapshot clearly does not include the vast majority of emergency response funded by domestic


**FIGURE 2.13: DOMESTIC HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE FLOWS OVER TIME, 2003–2012**



Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS data

governments. We would expect China, India, and Japan to all have made large expenditures on domestic relief, for example.

**FIGURE 2.14: TOP 15 DOMESTIC DONORS TO HUMANITARIAN CRISES, 2003–2012, US\$ MILLIONS**



Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS

## HOW COUNTRIES RESPOND TO AND PREPARE FOR DOMESTIC DISASTERS

Domestic actors are often able to respond more quickly to emergencies compared with the international community; have a deep and current knowledge of the country, history and context; are able to speak local languages; and are committed to operate long term. There is growing consensus on the importance of governments and local authorities playing a leading role, not only in response to disasters, but also in having the capacity to implement effective DRR measures.

Building the resilience of nations and communities to disasters was the overarching goal set by governments in the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA), 2005 – 2015. Priority 1 of the HFA is “to ensure that disaster risk reduction is a national and a local priority with a strong institutional basis for implementation.”

Governments have the primary responsibility to protect their people and progress has been made in many countries in setting up both national institutions and legislation focusing on DRR.

**Bangladesh:** The Department of Disaster Management was established in November 2012 to reduce Bangladesh's vulnerability to disasters by: undertaking risk reduction activities; responding to disasters; conducting humanitarian assistance programmes in a manner that enhances the capacity of the poor and disadvantaged; and strengthening and coordinating government and non-government DRR and emergency response programmes.

**Pakistan:** In response to the Government of Pakistan's commitment to address the issues of DRR, in 2007 it launched the National Disaster Risk Management Framework and established the National Disaster Management

Authority. The system promotes a devolved and decentralised approach to managing disasters. The District Disaster Management Authorities act as the first line of response in the event of a disaster. The National Disaster Risk Management Framework acts as a guide to activities needed to strengthen policies, institutions and capacities in the area of risk management.

**The Philippines:** The Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act, 2010 mandates a proactive DRR framework that is more responsive to the needs of local people. Local development councils now have power to allocate 5% of their budget to DRR activities, which enables some flexibility and independence from the national government.

**Indonesia:** Indonesia's investments in DRR have been heralded as a notable success story in recent years. This includes developing a National Action Plan for DRR in 2005; establishing a National Agency for Disaster Management; developing a legal framework for disaster management in 2007; and integrating DRR in development plans since 2007, including allocating an earmarked DRR budget. The result of this investment was evident following the 7.6 magnitude earthquake that hit Aceh province in January 2012 – there was minimal damage and, most importantly, there were no fatalities. Local response worked efficiently, tsunami warnings and evacuations were timely.

## In focus: Turkey

Turkey is susceptible to natural disasters such as earthquakes and often spends significant domestic resources responding to emergencies within its own boundaries. In 1999 the Marmara region of Turkey was hit by an earthquake which killed around 18,000 people and affected over 1.3 million. In October 2011 a 7.2-magnitude earthquake struck the country, killing hundreds and injuring thousands; it is estimated that over 40,000 people were affected.

Turkey is a recipient of ODA and in 2011 it received its highest volume to date, US\$3.2 billion. The largest contribution was US\$2.8 billion from EU institutions, up from US\$313.6 million in 2010. However, volumes of official humanitarian assistance to Turkey are relatively small, peaking at US\$70.2 million in 2000 (following the earthquake) and standing at US\$47.7 million in 2011. The largest humanitarian donor in 2011 was Japan, giving US\$18.6 million.

Turkey is also a donor. While the figures for 2012 are only preliminary (and subject to change), ODA from Turkey has grown substantially in recent years, almost doubling between 2011 and 2012. Turkey's contributions in 2012 make it the 15th largest government donor. Official

humanitarian assistance has also significantly increased to US\$1.0 billion in 2012, making up over 40% of total ODA and ranking it the 4th largest donor that year (see figure 2.16).

It is likely that a large proportion of humanitarian assistance from Turkey in 2012 has gone to the surrounding region, especially due to the escalating Syrian crisis on Turkey's doorstep. It is possible that a significant volume is also being spent housing refugees within Turkey itself.


Turkey is housing an increasing number of refugees from Syria. By 10 June 2013 just under 350,000 Syrian refugees were registered in Turkey, and the figure is rising.


The humanitarian contribution that many countries make by receiving refugees is rarely counted or visible in analyses of international humanitarian assistance. The ODA rules allow DAC donors to count the first year's cost of supporting refugees within their borders as part of their ODA. But data from UNHCR shows that 87% of refugees were hosted by non-DAC donor countries.

### BETTER DATA

While Turkey's ODA and humanitarian assistance have grown substantially in recent years, particularly in 2012, it also demonstrates improvements in reporting. In this year's GHA analysis we have used OECD DAC data for Turkey (and the Czech Republic) as it is much more comprehensive, is available for more than 10 years and has larger volumes than those reported through the UN OCHA FTS. For example, in 2012 just US\$10 million in humanitarian assistance from Turkey was reported through the FTS compared with US\$1.0 billion in the OECD DAC. While we encourage donors to report their contributions to existing databases in order to provide a more comprehensive picture of flows, it highlights the current limitations with data gathering and the need for standardised information that is comparable, timely and disaggregated. One way of achieving this is to get more donors, agencies, NGOs and private organisations to publish their information to the IATI format.

FIGURE 2.15: ODA TO TURKEY, 2000–2011



**FIGURE 2.16: ODA FROM TURKEY, 2000–2012**


Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC data

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs oversees Turkey's development institutions and policy priorities and the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency is the principal body for administering aid. Humanitarian aid is administered through the Turkish Red Crescent (Kizilay) and Turkey's Disaster and Emergency Management Office.

Turkey's humanitarian assistance has concentrated on a small number of recipients in recent years, with Pakistan, Somalia and Iraq making up 67% between 2007 and 2011.

In 2011 Somalia was the largest recipient of Turkey's humanitarian assistance receiving US\$77.7 million and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip

Erdogan became the first non-African leader to visit Somalia in over 20 years. While a number of donors and NGOs operate from regional hubs in Nairobi, Kenya, Turkey's aid agencies are more visible on the ground in Somalia working on a range of initiatives with a variety of actors, including the private sector.

**FIGURE 2.17: TOP 10 RECIPIENTS OF TURKEY'S OFFICIAL HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, 2007–2011**

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC data



## THE STORY

It was not until 2013 that the world learned the true human impact of the severe food insecurity and famine in Somalia where an estimated 257,500 people died between October 2010 and March 2012. It is widely acknowledged that the international community's response was too slow.

Dadaab, in north-eastern Kenya, is the world's largest refugee camp; 20 years after the camp was set up it now houses half a million refugees, the majority of whom are from Somalia. In 2013, Somalia received a three-year UN consolidated appeal process, the first of its kind, which is a major advance in the quest for more predictable funding.

### CREDIT

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### 3 WHERE DOES HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE GO?

Pakistan, Somalia and West Bank and Gaza Strip received the largest amount of international humanitarian assistance in 2011. In the absence of ‘mega-disasters’ – in terms of fatalities – on the scale of previous years, international humanitarian assistance was less concentrated.

Although donors have committed to “allocate humanitarian funding in proportion to needs”,<sup>5</sup> funding choices remain skewed by other priorities including media coverage, proximity, cultural ties, economic significance and geopolitical importance.


Private and individual donors, like government donors, tend to respond to rapid-onset acute humanitarian situations where a clear ‘trigger’ plunges people into crisis over protracted situations of chronic need where people are consistently living close to or in humanitarian crisis.

## Recipient countries

In 2011, the most recent year for which comprehensive data are available, Pakistan, Somalia and West Bank and Gaza Strip received the largest volume of international humanitarian response, US\$3.4 billion or 27% of country-allocable assistance.

In response to the Tohoku earthquake in 2011, Japan received US\$600 million in humanitarian assistance from private, individual and non-DAC donors, ranking it the sixth largest recipient that year.

FIGURE 3.1: TOP 10 RECIPIENTS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE, 2011



Somalia saw the largest increase in international humanitarian assistance from 2010 to 2011 (US\$851 million), while Haiti saw the biggest decline as the emergency response to the 2010 earthquake tailed off (US\$2.6 billion). International humanitarian assistance to Pakistan fell by US\$769 million in 2011.

Over the last decade Sudan has been the largest recipient of humanitarian assistance by some distance, receiving US\$10.6 billion over the period. Humanitarian assistance is usually planned and organised over relatively short time horizons – six months or a year. This is because the historical driving force behind humanitarian assistance has been response to acute crisis. In practice, as GHA has identified in 'Taking the Long View' (GHA 2009), most


humanitarian assistance is long term, going to the same people and places year after year. Looking at phases of humanitarian response can draw attention away from the volumes of funding over time. Different questions are likely to be raised about the effectiveness and impact of \$10.6 billion invested over 10 years, and 10 annual programmes. This is clearly important in protracted crises when humanitarian assistance is often financing basic services for people in extreme poverty and reducing endemic vulnerability as well as responding to acute need. Further information is available in our briefing paper on 'South Sudan: funding according to need' (2010).

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TABLE 3.1: LARGEST CHANGES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE TO RECIPIENT COUNTRIES FROM 2010 TO 2011, US\$ MILLIONS

INCREASE	US\$m	DECREASE	US\$m
Somalia	+851	Haiti	-2,612
Japan	+600	Pakistan	-769
Libya	+519	Sudan	-404
South Sudan	+483	Sri Lanka	-85
Kenya	+233	Chile	-69
West Bank & Gaza Strip	+189	Niger	-63
Afghanistan	+126	Kyrgyz Republic	-56
Côte d'Ivoire	+118	Zimbabwe	-47
Yemen	+105	DRC	-44
Iraq	+88	Chad	-31
Liberia	+67	Uganda	-30
Tunisia	+49	Papua New Guinea	-27
Djibouti	+28	Jordan	-27
DPRK	+27	Timor-Leste	-20
Indonesia	+26	Bangladesh	-20

FIGURE 3.2: TOP 20 RECIPIENTS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE, 2002–2011



Note: Not to scale. Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC and UN OCHA FTS data

## In focus: Syria

### The scale of the crisis

More than two years after the start of the conflict, UN OCHA estimates that 6.8 million people are in need (an increase of 5.8 million people over the past year). Moreover, more than 93,000 people have been killed since the conflict began, with an average of 5,000 per month since July 2012.

The number of refugees is continuously increasing. UNHCR estimates that approximately one million people have fled Syria since the start of the year, and more than 1.6 million since the beginning of the conflict. The majority of refugees end up in neighbouring countries (474,669 in Jordan; 513,560 in Lebanon; 376,640 in Turkey; 158,669 in Iraq; 79,267 in Egypt). Around 51% of the refugees are children and 76% of refugees are living in urban areas outside camps. Among the 525,000 Palestinian refugees in the country, UNRWA estimates that 424,000 require humanitarian assistance, with the number increasing fast.


The UN estimates that by the end of 2013, over half the Syrian population will be in need of humanitarian assistance.

At the same time the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) is large and fluid, as many Syrians have been displaced multiple times. Since early 2013, the number of IDPs in Syria has more than doubled, from an estimated 2 million to 4.25 million people, 46% of whom are children; UNHCR estimates that the number of children could reach 3.45 million by the end of 2013. The majority of IDPs are from Aleppo and Rural Damascus – 1,250,000 and 705,200 people respectively.

UN agencies, together with ministries, the Red Cross and international NGOs, also estimate that 4 million people in Syria are food insecure; among other needs, they also underlined the necessity to provide safe drinking water for 10 million people and sanitation for 5 million.

This increasing scale of the crisis is being addressed by a broadening humanitarian partnership, which now includes 14 UN agencies, and 14 international NGOs.

**FIGURE 3.3: SHARP AND RRP FUNDING, 2013**



Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS data

## Humanitarian assistance


UN CAP appeals tend to involve strong collaboration with crisis-affected country governments. This is not possible with the Syrian regime, hence Syria is not included in the UN CAP. The two main funds for Syria are the Syrian Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan (SHARP) for people inside the country, and the Syria Regional Response Plan (RRP) for refugees in the region. After a recent revision, the UN estimates that US\$1.4 billion is needed for 2013 for the SHARP and US\$3.0 billion for RRP. Including the two appeals from the governments of Lebanon and Jordan (US\$449 million and US\$380 million respectively) the total value of US\$5.2 billion represents the largest ever UN appeal. As of 5 June 2013, US\$1.2 billion had been contributed to these two appeals, with funding of the RRP and SHARP standing at 28% and 29% respectively.<sup>6</sup>

At their UK Summit on 18 June 2013, G8 leaders confirmed additional contributions of almost US\$1.5 billion to meet humanitarian needs in Syria and its neighbours.

At the time of writing, the United States, Kuwait and the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) had contributed the largest volumes of humanitarian assistance in 2013.


In 2013 a new Emergency Response Fund (ERF) for Syria was established. ERFs enable a wide range of donors, especially those without a strong country presence, to make a contribution and enable funding to be allocated responsively to changing needs and to support local organisations as appropriate. As of 10 June 2013, donors had contributed nearly US\$37.5 million to the ERF; the principal donor has so far this year been Kuwait, with US\$12.0 million. The ERF has allocated US\$15.5 million to projects in Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq.

**FIGURE 3.4: TOP 10 DONOR CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE SYRIA CRISIS, 2013**



Note: The 'other donors' category includes previous years' carry-over stocks (i.e. stocks physically in-country at 31 December) and carry-over contributions (i.e. funds committed by the donor at 31 December), not spent or used in the previous year, and now to be applied to projects in the current year. Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS data

FIGURE 3.5: INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE BY REGION, 2002–2011



Note: Data based on OECD DAC regions and excludes Asia and Africa regional humanitarian assistance to unspecified recipients. Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC and UN OCHA FTS data

Sub-Saharan Africa is the region that has consistently received the largest percentage of humanitarian assistance, having received 46% of international humanitarian assistance since 2002. However, in 2010 this share dropped to 33% due to the proportion that went to North and Central America as result of the Haiti earthquake – which increased from 2% in 2009 to 24% in 2010.

In 2010 the Haiti CAP received 73% of funding requirements. In the same year, countries in sub-Saharan Africa with a UN CAP appeal had, on average, only 61% of funding requirements met, with less than 50% for the Central African Republic and Zimbabwe appeals (see figure 3.5).


## IRAQ: 10 YEARS ON

2013 marks 10 years since the start of the Iraq war. Despite the presence of large numbers of foreign troops, creating a transitional government and successfully completing elections, Iraq descended into sectarian violence. In May 2013 the UN recorded the highest number of civilian and security personnel fatalities since June 2008, with an estimated 1,045 killed. In 2011, 1.4 million refugees came from Iraq, the second largest number of refugees in the world. It is estimated that over 110,000 civilians have been killed as a result of the 2003 invasion and subsequent years of violence (Iraq Body Count).

Iraq was the largest recipient of official humanitarian assistance in both 2003 and 2004. In 2003 it received US\$1.2 billion, which at the time was the largest amount received by any recipient country in a single year on record. Official humanitarian assistance steadily declined from 2004 falling to US\$195.8 million in 2010 before rising again to US\$296.1 million in 2011. Between 2002 and 2011 Iraq was the sixth largest recipient of official humanitarian assistance globally.

ODA to Iraq peaked at US\$9.2 billion in 2005 before falling back to US\$1.9 billion in 2011, making it the 12th largest recipient of ODA that year.

FIGURE 3.6: OFFICIAL HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND OTHER ODA EXCLUDING DEBT RELIEF TO IRAQ, 2000–2011



Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC data

# Donor preferences: winners and losers

Humanitarian assistance is often concentrated in a few countries that receive high profile coverage. This was particularly striking in 2010 when large volumes of assistance flowed to Haiti and Pakistan in the aftermath of disasters there. The following graph shows how assistance to other countries fell in the same year. Principle 11 of the Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative (GHDII) states that donors should "Strive to ensure that funding of humanitarian action in new crises does not adversely affect the meeting of needs in ongoing crises".<sup>7</sup> However, funding envelopes are clearly not infinite, and the data show that the amount donors were willing to give in 2010 determined flows to ongoing crises as much as the extent of humanitarian need.

The impact of donor preferences is also apparent in the considerable variations between the best and worst-funded CAP appeals each year.

In 2012 86% of the Zimbabwe CAP was funded, the highest percentage of any CAP. The largest donors to Zimbabwe were the US (US\$49.1 million) and the UK (US\$24.9 million) and the majority of funding, US\$133 million, (65% of total) went to 'assistance for food insecure vulnerable groups'. Liberia was the worst-funded CAP in 2012, receiving only 38% of requirements. The largest donors to Liberia were Japan (US\$13 million) and the US (US\$13 million), making up 70% of all funding (see figure 3.8).

Haiti has experienced a significant drop in requirements met since 2010, falling from 73% met to 46% in the 2012 CAP. Haiti was a "donor darling" for one year only. Figure 3.9 shows the proportion of needs met in terms of funding to Haiti CAP appeals over time. Once the world's attention moved on from the Haiti earthquake, funding for ongoing needs and transitory/recovery activities did not materialise in large volumes.

Whether a country is well funded or not changes over time. Although Zimbabwe and Somalia were respectively the best-funded countries in 2012 and 2011, with over 85% of needs met, in some years they have been among the worst funded. This is not only about funding according to need, it can reflect access to affected people, capacity to respond and the political and human rights situation in a country. Few donors want to give development assistance to countries with oppressive governments or egregious human rights abuses. In those circumstances, they prefer to give humanitarian assistance, even if the activities they are supporting could, in other countries, be part of the development agenda.

FIGURE 3.7: INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE TO TOP 10 RECIPIENTS, 2002–2011






FIGURE 3.8: SHARES OF NEEDS MET IN BEST AND WORST-FUNDED CAP APPEALS, 2000–2012




Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS data

FIGURE 3.9: PROPORTION OF NEEDS MET, HAITI CAP APPEALS, 2004–2013



Note: Data for 2013 are partial. Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA CAP data

FIGURE 3.10: FUNDING VERSUS UNMET REQUIREMENTS UN CAP APPEALS, 2012



Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS data


It is a donor's prerogative to allocate funds where they identify needs. But without adequate coordination there is a danger that individual donor decisions will not add up to rational coverage at a global level and there will be losers. Overcoming inequitable distribution of resources between crises is a key part of the Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) agenda and a number of initiatives have been developed to help allocate funding better in response to the scale and severity of crises. The most widely used index is the European Commission's Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid & Civil Protection (ECHO) 'Forgotten Crises' Assessment. This is part of a suite of analytical tools developed by the EC in support of their commitment to fund in accordance with assessed needs, and is designed to provide evidence to guide the annual funding allocations decision-making process.

It is often argued that Gulf State donors channel funding to crises that are both regionally significant and culturally linked. Our 'In focus: Gulf States' (pp 28–29) analysis supports this assumption – with large proportions of their assistance going to predominantly Muslim countries in or near the Middle East. However, this is not just a pattern of spending

associated with donors from the Gulf States – donor governments, both DAC and non-DAC, allocate humanitarian assistance according to regional proximity, historical ties, language and culture. For example, a high proportion of Australia's ODA and humanitarian


assistance is allocated to the Oceania region and Belgium concentrates a significant proportion of its ODA and humanitarian assistance on former colonies in the Great Lakes region, compared with other DAC donors (see figures 3.11).

FIGURE 3.11: PROPORTION OF OFFICIAL HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND OTHER ODA FROM AUSTRALIA TO OCEANIA AND FROM BELGIUM TO THE 'GREAT LAKES' REGION, 2007–2011



Note: 'Great Lakes' includes Burundi, DRC and Rwanda. Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC and UN OCHA FTS data (bilateral)

FIGURE 3.12: DONOR SHARES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE TO 20 LARGEST RECIPIENTS, 2002–2011



Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC and UN OCHA FTS data


The mix of funding between private, DAC, and other government donors can vary quite significantly for different emergencies. For example, private donor funding for Haiti between 2002 and 2011 made up 31% of total contributions and non-DAC donor contributions to Pakistan in the same period were 16%. This is significant because funding is about more than money – it affects which institutions and organisations are supported and strengthened and who sits round the table when needs are being discussed. For instance, non-DAC donors tend to give a much higher proportion of their humanitarian assistance to governments than DAC donors do, while NGOs are more likely to be engaged with civil society partners.

Some emergencies attract much more public attention and individual and private funding than others. The Haiti earthquake generated a significantly larger volume of private donation than any other emergency over the last decade (excluding contributions to the Indian Ocean tsunami which is often categorised as regional rather than country specific). In 2010 Haiti received more than twice as much private money in one year (US\$1.3 billion) than did the second largest recipient (Pakistan) over the past 10 years (US\$606 million). The

top three recipients of private money over the past 10 years (Haiti, Pakistan and Japan) received 32% (US\$2.5 billion) of all funding in this period. This would suggest that private funding is

more concentrated on a select number of recipients and disasters. Over half the US\$1.2 billion of private money disbursed in 2011 went to Japan (US\$578 million).

FIGURE 3.13: TOP 10 RECIPIENTS OF PRIVATE AND INDIVIDUAL DONOR FUNDING, 2003–2012



Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS data



## THE STORY

For communities that are vulnerable to natural disasters, early warning systems are often life-saving means of communication. Innovative information and communications technology is helping this process, but radios, televisions and loud speakers are just as effective in communities with limited mobile coverage and high rates of poverty and illiteracy.

Reducing risk and disaster preparedness have become increasingly common elements of donor discussions. Many people agree that financing measures to reduce risk and increase preparedness can lessen impact, quicken recovery and save money in the long term. However, there still appears to be a gap between rhetoric and policy recognition on the one hand, and action and investment on the other.

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## 4 WHAT IS HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE SPENT ON?

The mix between emergency relief, food aid and other types of relief varies between different emergencies. In recent years, cash transfers and vouchers have been used to respond to a growing number of emergencies.

US\$532 million of spending on 'disaster prevention and preparedness' (DPP) was reported from OECD DAC donors in 2011. This was the highest volume of DPP funding since reporting started in 2004. But it still only represented 4.7% of international humanitarian assistance. Data on DPP expenditure and on wider disaster risk reduction (DRR) spending is weak and difficult to track. This year's GHA analysis develops a new forensic model to explore DRR funding in more detail, and calls for better data in this area.


### Types of expenditure

Between 2007 and 2011 the largest proportion of humanitarian assistance was spent on material relief and assistance which comprises shelter; water, sanitation and health services; supply of medicines and other non-food relief items; and assistance to refugees and internally displaced people in


developing countries other than for food or protection. The second largest proportion was in the form of food aid.

One notable point is how small the proportion spent on prevention and preparedness is, although this proportion has increased over time.

FIGURE 4.1: DAC DONORS' BILATERAL HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE BY EXPENDITURE TYPE, 2007–2011



**FIGURE 4.2: BREAKDOWN OF EXPENDITURE TYPE FOR TOP 10 RECIPIENTS OF BILATERAL HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE FROM DAC DONORS, 2007–2011**



Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC CRS data

The mix of expenditure types is very different for different emergencies. Ethiopia and Kenya were the countries where the largest proportion was

spent on food aid. Iraq and West Bank and Gaza Strip were the recipients with the largest proportion spent on material relief and assistance.

## REFORMING US FOOD AID

In early 2013 the United States outlined in its 2014 budget proposal the need for major reforms in its food aid programmes, to ensure cost effectiveness. While a large proportion of food (at least 55%) would continue to be purchased and sent from the United States, if the US Farm Bill is passed, funding from the International Disaster Assistance budget may "also be used to purchase food from markets near crises, or for interventions such as cash transfers and vouchers".<sup>8</sup>

Analysis from a Development Initiatives paper, 'US food aid valuation', found that when comparing the overall cost per tonne of US food aid distributed in 2010 with the estimated cost of purchasing and distributing the same commodities from the local markets of recipient countries, sorghum and wheat were universally cheaper in all local markets studied, with local

rice cheaper in half the markets [GIEWS].<sup>9</sup> Rice was cheaper in two of the four local markets of recipient countries included in the study.

Afghanistan received 43,750 metric tonnes of wheat flour and wheat grain from the United States in 2010, costing US\$30.3 million. If the wheat had been purchased locally it would have cost US\$16.3 million; a potential saving of US\$14 million.

Pakistan produced particularly high quantities of rice in 2010, contributing to a lower than usual local cost per tonne. Consequently, rice purchased and distributed locally would have cost US\$489.5 per metric tonne, compared with the US\$703.3 it cost to send rice from the United States.

Sorghum sent to Chad cost US\$922.7 per metric tonne, compared with US\$292.9 using the local market.

Major fluctuations in local market prices – particularly in crisis-affected countries – can mean that in certain situations it is more cost effective for the US to export home-grown food aid rather than purchasing and distributing food from the recipient country's local market. The high local cost of rice in Haiti in 2010 compared with the comparatively low cost of sending over rice produced in the United States demonstrates this. However, in the vast majority of cases it would be more cost effective to purchase food aid in the local markets of recipient countries.

When done appropriately, buying locally should both allow food to reach recipients more quickly and boost market economies in recipient countries. Where markets are functioning properly with stable food prices, cash transfers may again be more appropriate.

# Cash transfers

Using cash transfers and vouchers can be a rapid and cost-effective way to deliver assistance in humanitarian crises. Under the right conditions it can empower beneficiaries to make decisions and choices about their own needs as well as boost local markets and economies without detrimental inflationary side effects.

A growing number of donors are implementing cash-based programmes and developing appropriate policies.

- The UK's Department for International Development's (DFID) Bilateral Aid Review 2010–2011 announced increased commitments to cash transfer programmes (CTPs) with significant funding to Kenya, Pakistan, Ethiopia and Bangladesh.<sup>10</sup>

- The EU has made cash and voucher programmes a sector priority. Between 2007 and 2010 the proportion of funding to these types of programmes more than doubled and now all ECHO food assistance programmes in Haiti and Pakistan contain a cash or voucher element.<sup>11</sup>

- In 2008 the WFP implemented its policy on "Vouchers and Cash Transfers as Food Assistance Instruments: Opportunities and Challenges". Since then its cash and voucher programming has increased substantially with the number of planned projects increasing from five interventions in 2008 to 35 in 2010.<sup>12</sup>

As the use of CTPs in humanitarian situations has gained increasing recognition, the focus has shifted to the feasibility of scaling up and measuring the effectiveness of these types of approaches.<sup>13</sup>

While the data on CTPs are not complete, funding appears to be volatile and emergency-specific although this could reflect levels of reporting. There was a large peak in funding in 2010 of US\$262.4 million, mainly in response to the major crises in Haiti and Pakistan.

FIGURE 4.3: HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO CASH TRANSFER PROGRAMMES BY TYPE, 2008–2012




TABLE 4.1: TOP 10 GOVERNMENT DONORS OF HUMANITARIAN CASH TRANSFER PROGRAMMES, 2008–2012, US\$ MILLIONS

RANK	2008	US\$m	2009	US\$m	2010	US\$m	2011	US\$m	2012	US\$m
1.	US	31	EC	47	US	151	US	22	US	49
2.	EC	9	US	40	EC	21	EC	15	UK	14
3.	France	1	UK	12	UK	11	Canada	11	EC	11
4.	UK	0.7	Kuwait	6	Sweden	7	Belgium	5	Japan	6
5.	Canada	0.5	France	6	Canada	6	Sweden	3	Canada	4
6.	Luxembourg	0.1	Switzerland	5	Netherlands	4	Ireland	3	Sweden	3
7.			Canada	5	Australia	3	Germany	3	Australia	2
8.			Netherlands	4	Brazil	3	Netherlands	2	Germany	1
9.			Belgium	4	Norway	3	Italy	1	Switzerland	1
10.			Sweden	3	Spain	2	Australia	1	Belgium	1

Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS data

Between 2008 and 2012 the majority of humanitarian assistance for CTPs was channelled through multilateral organisations, with the UNRWA being the largest multilateral channel distributing US\$237.6 million in this way, of which over 80% was for cash for work programmes in West Bank and Gaza Strip.

The second largest channel of delivery was via NGOs and civil society organisations (CSO) (US\$191.8 million). Of this, Save the Children distributed US\$40.7 million and Mercy Corps distributed US\$27.1 million. For each, there was a peak in funds in 2010.

The United States is the largest government funder of CTPs, and gave US\$292.6 million between 2008 and 2012. However, funding in 2012 still only represented just over 1% of its humanitarian assistance in that year. Kuwait is the largest non-DAC donor to CTPs and gave US\$6.5 million in 2009 to West Bank and Gaza Strip, which represented approximately 16% of its humanitarian assistance.

West Bank and Gaza Strip was the largest recipient of CTPs over this period, with Somalia receiving the most in 2012.

## VOUCHERS

The Cash Learning Partnership defines a voucher as “a paper, token or electronic card that can be exchanged for a set quantity or value of goods, denominated either as a cash value (e.g. US\$15) or predetermined commodities or services (e.g. 5 kg maize; milling of 5kg of maize). They are redeemable with preselected vendors or in ‘fairs’ created by the agency”. The majority (45%) of vouchers used in humanitarian assistance between 2008 and 2012 were food vouchers, approximately US\$78.6 million.<sup>14</sup>

TABLE 4.2: TOP 10 RECIPIENTS OF HUMANITARIAN CASH TRANSFER PROGRAMMES, 2008–2012, US\$ MILLIONS

Top 10	2008	US\$m	2009	US\$m	2010	US\$m	2011	US\$m	2012	US\$m
1	Afghanistan	31	West Bank & Gaza Strip	141	Haiti	94	West Bank & Gaza Strip	37	Somalia	33
2	West Bank & Gaza Strip	9	Kenya	7	Pakistan	69	Somalia	16	West Bank & Gaza Strip	22
3	Burundi	3	Somalia	4	West Bank & Gaza Strip	65	Pakistan	6	Mali	14
4	Haiti	0.8	Afghanistan	3	Niger	8	Kenya	4	Lesotho	10
5	Somalia	0.7	Pakistan	2	Kyrgyzstan	6	Afghanistan	3	Niger	7
6	Myanmar	0.6	Bangladesh	2	Somalia	3	Côte d'Ivoire	3	Mauritania	6
7	Sri Lanka	0.5	Zimbabwe	1	Sudan	3	Yemen	3	Pakistan	5
8	Uganda	0.1	Sudan	1	Sri Lanka	3	DRC	2	Chad	5
9	Ecuador	0.1	Indonesia	1	Syria	3	Philippines	1	Yemen	4
10	Bolivia	0.04	Burundi	0.4	Zimbabwe	1	Cambodia	1	Djibouti	3

Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS data


# Financing disaster risk reduction

Reducing risk has become an increasingly common element of donor policy following the adoption of the Hyogo Framework for Action in January 2005, just three weeks after the Indian Ocean tsunami. A number of countries have written specific policy documents focusing on DRR, and others now recognise DRR in their most recent development and humanitarian policies. Many governments have also provided funds to the two main international bodies on DRR, namely the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR) and the World Bank's Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR).


While donors agree that financing measures to reduce risk can lessen impact, quicken recovery and save money in the long term, a significant gap remains between rhetoric and policy recognition on the one hand, and action and investment on the other.

It is extremely difficult to track spending on DRR; US\$532 million spent on DPP was reported from OECD DAC donors in 2011. This was the highest volume on DPP since reporting started in 2004, but it still only represented 4.7% of humanitarian assistance. Moreover, the increase in funding may be due in part to improved reporting, with 24 out of 25 donors reporting in 2011 compared with only 17 out of 23 in 2007.

**FIGURE 4.4: DAC DONOR GOVERNMENT SPENDING ON DISASTER PREVENTION AND PREPAREDNESS AND AS A PROPORTION OF BILATERAL HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, 2007–2011**



**FIGURE 4.5: DISASTER PREVENTION AND PREPAREDNESS FUNDING FROM TOP 10 DAC DONORS AND AS A PROPORTION OF BILATERAL HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, 2011**



Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC data


We know that this is not the full picture. For example, it is possible to identify contributions towards DPP in humanitarian assistance projects which are not coded as DPP (i.e. they have been coded as relief or reconstruction). Using a forensic method that examines all projects (detailed in the 'Data & Guides' section) to pull out relevant investments reveals a further US\$77 million in spending that would appear to contribute at least partially to DRR in 2011 alone. We have classed this as "partial disaster prevention and preparedness".

Using this new methodology reveals that in 2011 DAC donor governments' DPP funding averaged 5.4% of their total bilateral humanitarian spending. The proportion of funding allocated to DPP in 2011 was noticeably high for a number of donors, including Australia (19%), Norway (12%), Japan

(10%) and EU institutions (8%). Some major donors appear to spend a much smaller proportion of their humanitarian assistance on DPP, including the United States (2%), the United Kingdom (2%), and France (1%).


This is still only a partial picture, however. For example, we know that donors spend money on DRR from their wider ODA budgets, not just from their humanitarian assistance budgets, often linking DRR with environmental protection and climate change adaptation. Using the forensic methodology described above, a further US\$712 million was identified in wider DAC ODA budgets that contributed to DRR-related activities in 2011. This accounted for 0.7% of DAC donor governments' bilateral development spending in 2011 (excluding humanitarian assistance).

**FIGURE 4.6: DAC DONOR GOVERNMENT DRR SPENDING AS A PROPORTION OF TOTAL BILATERAL DEVELOPMENT SPENDING, 2011**



Note: excluding humanitarian assistance and debt relief. Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC CRS data

FIGURE 4.7: DAC DONORS' DRR AND DPP ODA EXPENDITURE BY SECTOR, 2011



Source: Development initiatives based on OECD DAC CRS data

The method we use for quantifying DRR is prone to both bias and omission. Our estimation for DRR expenditure in development projects is potentially generous as we include total funding to the project even though DRR is likely to be just one element. Conversely, donors may be committing more to DRR than is officially reported in the OECD DAC, as their interpretations of sector definitions and reporting practices may differ. Due to these caveats, we analyse humanitarian and development funding separately.

## Improving DRR data and measurement

Data on DRR are poor and, as illustrated by the way donors report such activities, hard to measure. This is partly because DRR can be mainstreamed through other sectoral aid investments. In total, DRR funding

from DAC donors was reported in over 100 different sub-sectors, both development and humanitarian, in 2011.

The current data sources available do not provide a simple and robust tool for analysing this complicated picture. The recently launched Disaster Aid Tracking (DAT) portal is an initiative managed by the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery that aims at collaborative development of a global system for tracking investments in DRR.<sup>15</sup> At the 2013 'Global Platform' meeting in Geneva, the introduction of a DRR-related 'marker' in the OECD DAC's Creditor Reporting System (CRS) was muted as another way to improve DRR tracking. Support from a variety of stakeholders including the OECD and donors would be needed to implement this.

# Conflict, peace and security

## CONFLICT PREVENTION

DRR policy and funding has predominantly focused on natural disasters. The resilience agenda has resulted in increased attention on the link between natural disasters and conflict; this is summarised in the Overseas Development Institute's 2013 paper 'When disasters and conflicts collide'.<sup>16</sup>

- Conflict and fragility increase the impact of natural disasters
- Conflict undermines the capacity of government and non-government actors to provide adequate protection from natural hazards
- Governments can exacerbate post-disaster suffering by inhibiting aid on security grounds or (mis)appropriating humanitarian aid to support political objectives.

There has been growing attention from some donors on the need to understand and integrate conflict prevention and DRR to encapsulate a wider understanding of risk. The United Kingdom's new humanitarian policy is an example of integrating conflict prevention and DRR in the agency's wider work on resilience.

The interconnected nature of risks associated with natural disasters, conflict and insecurity, and extreme poverty is increasingly recognised. Finance and response, however, are still often conceptualised and organised in silos that classify activities and situations into components like emergency relief, post-conflict, recovery, early recovery, instability, fragility and transition. Strengthening

resilience has to be based on a good understanding of the multiple and interlocking risks and vulnerabilities that characterise the lives of people and communities. An integrated response will be assisted by better data and information on the range of interventions and finance that can be harnessed to work together to support resilience.

FIGURE 4.8: BILATERAL ODA FROM DAC DONORS TO GOVERNMENT AND CIVIL SOCIETY, AND CONFLICT, PEACE AND SECURITY, 2002–2011





FIGURE 4.9: BILATERAL ODA FROM DAC DONORS TO CONFLICT, PEACE AND SECURITY, 2007–2011, US\$ BILLIONS



Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC CRS data

In the past 10 years DAC donors have given increased priority to activities aimed at building the capacity of states to govern and support peace and security in their ODA spending, which is reflected in substantial volumes. For example, spending on government and civil society more than tripled from US\$5.0 billion in 2002 to US\$15.2 billion in 2011. Investments in conflict, peace and security reached US\$3.4 billion in 2011 – the equivalent of 2.8% of ODA.

A further breakdown of ODA in the conflict, peace and security sub-sector shows that the largest proportion in the past five years has gone to civilian peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution (US\$7.7 billion or 47%) (see figure 4.9).



## THE STORY

Using cash transfers and vouchers can be a rapid and cost-effective way to deliver assistance in humanitarian crises. Delivering assistance in this way can empower beneficiaries to make decisions and choices about their own needs. It also boosts local markets and economies. In Tamil Nadu in India, Sri Lankan refugees are each given a monthly cash grant of 1,000 rupees.

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# 5 HOW DOES HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE GET THERE?

Humanitarian assistance can be channelled into a country through multilateral organisations and funds, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, NGOs, the private sector and also the military. Often it goes through many intermediaries before arriving at a beneficiary.


In aggregate, funding to pooled mechanisms fell slightly in 2012, but there was significant variation among donors. This overall picture masked major changes in funding patterns. Canada made no contribution to pooled funds in 2012, while Spain made dramatic cuts. The difference was made up by increases from other donors and by a significant number of new donors to pooled funds. A group of UK NGOs have set up their own emergency response fund in an effort to speed up response and improve coordination.

## Channels of delivery

Between 2007 and 2011 more than half of international humanitarian assistance (53%) was channelled through multilateral organisations and funds. Of this, the largest proportion of DAC donor contributions went to UN agencies, with WFP receiving the

largest share, followed by UNHCR. In the same period 24% was channelled through NGOs, a large proportion of which went to donor country-based NGOs. This overall mix between different channels of delivery has remained fairly constant in recent years.

FIGURE 5.1: FIRST LEVEL RECIPIENT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE, 2007–2011



# HUMANITARIAN FUNDING CHANNELS





FIGURE 5.2: FIRST LEVEL RECIPIENT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE BY DONOR TYPE, 2007–2011



Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC and UN OCHA FTS data

The mix is different for different types of donor. Private donors are more likely to channel money through NGOs and the Red Cross than government donors. DAC donors are more likely to use NGOs than are non-DAC donors.


### CHANNEL OF DELIVERY

Humanitarian assistance flows through many intermediaries en route to the person affected by the crisis or disaster and currently it is not possible to trace funding all the way through the system. The **channel of delivery** refers to the first implementing partner who will then take responsibility for allocating funding either

inside or outside their own organisation. Where several levels of implementation are involved (e.g. when the donor allocates funds to a UN agency that then hires a national implementer who in turn may hire a local implementer), the first level is reported as the channel of delivery (OECD DAC).

# Private money

FIGURE 5.3: HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE FROM PRIVATE SOURCES BY CHANNEL OF DELIVERY, 2000–2012



Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS data

The majority (51%) of private money reported to UN OCHA FTS since 2000 has been channelled through NGOs. However, this is largely due to the exceptionally large volume of private money raised by and channelled through NGOs in 2005 and 2010 in response to the Indian Ocean tsunami and the Haiti earthquake. Multilateral organisations channelled the second largest share in this period (24%).


The public sector has consistently received the lowest share of private humanitarian funding.

## CHANNELS OF DELIVERY: PRIVATE MONEY

Due to limitations in the private funding data on delivery agencies, collected through GHA's unique data set, in this section we refer to the

delivery channels of private money as reported to UN OCHA FTS in order to estimate proportions flowing through the different channels.


FIGURE 5.4: PRIVATE HUMANITARIAN FUNDING BY CHANNEL OF DELIVERY, 2000–2012



Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS data

# Pooled funds

FIGURE 5.5: TOTAL FUNDING TO POOLED FUNDS, 2008–2012



Source: Development Initiatives based on UNOCHA FTS and CERF data

In 2005 the humanitarian community began to develop new financing mechanisms to help ensure that humanitarian assistance could be allocated more quickly and more responsively. The window of opportunity for effective use of funds in complex crises is often very small and financing mechanisms that allow funds to be responsive to changes in the local situation and priorities are valuable. Pooled funds also allow for more coordination and coherence, with funding following agreed priorities. Many countries and individuals want to respond to crises but often lack the presence on the ground or the analytical capacity to allocate resources optimally. Pooled funds give them a vehicle to do that.

The share of funding allocated to pooled funds should not be considered the only measure of their added value. A number of countries face procedural obstacles to making contributions to pooled or basket funding, but they can still take advice from the UN

Humanitarian Coordinator and allocate their money on the basis of that. Even countries that do not wish to follow the priorities in the plan can improve the use of pooled fund finances simply by being transparent about their own financing. This allows others to use their funds more effectively in the knowledge of what is already being financed.

Money channelled through pooled humanitarian funds, as a proportion of the international humanitarian response, has gradually increased, from 4.2% in 2010 to 4.9% in 2012. In 2012, 2.4% was channelled via the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), 2.1% via common humanitarian funds (CHF) and 0.5% through emergency response funds (ERF).

## Central Emergency Response Fund

The CERF was created in 2006 and is a global fund intended to provide a rapid response when a disaster strikes. CERF also spends money in countries where it has identified an underfunded crisis.

While the CERF had a funding target of US\$450 million, contributions declined from US\$466.8 million in 2011 to US\$425.6 million in 2012. The number of donors reduced from 84 to 74. Spain cut its contribution by 87%.

South Sudan, Pakistan, and Syria were the largest recipients of CERF funding in 2012.

## Common humanitarian funds

CHFs are national level funds managed by the UN Humanitarian Coordinator. Funds are allocated according to the needs and priorities identified at recipient country level. CHFs typically allocate funds to projects in a UN humanitarian workplan or action plan.

CHF contributions increased from US\$362.2 million in 2011 to US\$376.2 million in 2012. In 2012 the CHF in Sudan was split into two funds - one for Sudan (US\$73.1 million) and one

for South Sudan (US\$118.2 million). Germany, Poland and the African Union all made their first ever contributions to a CHF (to Somalia). Australia's contribution to CHFs nearly doubled to US\$20.6 million and Ireland's contribution increased from US\$14.1 million to US\$22.3 million. Spain's contributions declined by 76% and Italy made no contribution. The UK was the largest donor for the seventh year in a row.

## Emergency response funds

ERFs are also managed at country level and exist in countries that may not have a UN humanitarian workplan and may not regularly participate in the UN appeals process. ERFs are able to finance small-scale projects, allowing national NGOs to access funds directly.

ERF contributions increased from US\$70.7 million in 2011 to US\$84.5 million in 2012. The increase in contributions in 2012 was partly due to the introduction of the Syria ERF which received the largest contribution of US\$27.9 million. Ethiopia saw the largest drop in funding to its ERF, which fell from US\$43.4 million in 2011 to US\$27.6 million in 2012.

There were eight new donors (African Union, Estonia, Germany, Korea, Latvia, Luxembourg, Poland and

## SYRIA EMERGENCY RESPONSE FUND

Launched in June 2012, the Syria ERF provides humanitarian assistance to those affected by the crisis inside Syria as well as those in the neighbouring countries of Jordan, Iraq and Lebanon. It is estimated that around 70% of funds will be used for activities inside Syria.

Since its inception, 16 government donors have funded the Syria ERF, of which six are new contributors to ERFs. There have been further contributions from private individuals. As of June 2013, total funding reached US\$37.5 million, assisting 1.3 million people in the region. At the time of writing, the largest donors in 2013 were Kuwait (US\$12 million) and Belgium (US\$5.9 million). In 2012 Germany contributed US\$15.5 million.

Romania), six of whom contributed only to the Syria ERF.


There are 13 ERFs in total. Spain maintained its contributions of US\$2.8 million to the ERFs despite reduced funding to other pooled funds.

TABLE 5.1: TOP 10 RECIPIENTS OF CERF FUNDING, 2008–2012

	2008	US\$m	2009	US\$m	2010	US\$m	2011	US\$m	2012	US\$m
1.	DRC	41	Somalia	61	Pakistan	52	Somalia	53	South Sudan	40
2.	Ethiopia	32	DRC	30	Haiti	37	Ethiopia	46	Pakistan	37
3.	Myanmar	28	Zimbabwe	27	Niger	35	Pakistan	32	Syria	36
4.	Kenya	26	Kenya	26	DRC	29	South Sudan	23	DRC	31
5.	Pakistan	19	Sudan	26	Sudan	24	Kenya	23	Niger	25
6.	Afghanistan	18	Sri Lanka	24	Chad	23	Chad	23	Yemen	23
7.	Haiti	16	DPRK	19	Kenya	20	Sudan	18	Sudan	20
8.	Sudan	16	Ethiopia	16	Ethiopia	17	Côte d'Ivoire	16	Myanmar	17
9.	Nepal	13	Philippines	12	Sri Lanka	16	Sri Lanka	16	Burkina Faso	15
10.	Sri Lanka	12	Niger	12	Yemen	15	Niger	16	Chad	15
% of total		52%	63%		64%		62%		54%	
Total top 10 recipients		221	252		266		266		259	
Total all recipients		429	397		415		426		477	

Source: Development Initiatives based on CERF data

FIGURE 5.6: TOP 10 DONOR CONTRIBUTORS TO HUMANITARIAN POOLED FUNDS, 2012



Note: OECD DAC data for 2012 is preliminary. Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS, CERF and OECD DAC data

In both 2011 and 2012 the top four donors to pooled funds were the United Kingdom, Sweden, Norway and the Netherlands. Having previously been a strong supporter of the CERF, in 2012 Canada did not contribute to any of the UN's main pooled humanitarian funds (the CERF, the


ERF or a CHF). However, in 2013 it has reported a contribution to the CERF of US\$28.8 million.

Sudan was the largest recipient of pooled funds in 2011 with the majority of those flowing via the CHF [at this time the CHF served both Sudan

and South Sudan as the latter only became an independent country in July that year].

Pakistan received US\$1.4 billion in international humanitarian assistance in 2011, but only 2.3% was channelled through pooled funds (see figure 5.7).

FIGURE 5.7: TOP 10 RECIPIENTS OF MONEY CHANNELLED THROUGH POOLED FUNDS, 2011



Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS, CERF and OECD DAC data

## NGO EMERGENCY RESPONSE FUND

While in theory pooled funds should enable the rapid release of funding in an emergency, they are often slow to administer (for NGOs CERF funding channelled via UN agencies can take up to 13 weeks to release) and only cover crises and countries that the UN has some kind of presence in.

Because of the constraints in NGOs accessing rapid funds through the CERF, in 2010 the Consortium of British Humanitarian Agencies (CBHA) developed a pilot humanitarian pooled fund for NGOs – the CBHA ERF. It was “designed as a fast and independent civil society response to save more lives in humanitarian crises using a peer management system to improve impact and coordination”.<sup>17</sup>

With an initial start-up budget of £8 million from DFID for a range of activities, the fund allocated approximately £4 million to 12 agencies between 2010 and 2012, and is estimated to have reached 1.1 million people. Programmes funded by the CBHA ERF have to deliver assistance within seven days of the start of a response and complete within 30.

There have been a number of positive independent reviews on the CBHA ERF process. By reaching smaller, lower profile crises such as in South Kordofan, CBHA delivers greater funding according to need. CBHA also has faster disbursement and start-up times. For example, in the Horn of Africa the CBHA ERF released funds more than six

months earlier than other appeals in the region. CBHA often has lower transaction costs, with more donor money being spent on the ground. Over half of all grants have been channelled to local partner organisations.

The CBHA ERF is looking to scale up its ambitions and establish an NGO-managed global humanitarian fund with a significantly larger pot of money.

TABLE 5.2: CBHA ERF FUNDING TO EMERGENCIES, 2010–2012

EMERGENCY	ALLOCATIONS	TOTAL [GBP]
Bangladesh floods 2011	5	325,000
Central America floods 2011	2	219,981
Horn of Africa drought 2011	4	555,814
India Orissa floods 2011	4	222,000
Ivorian refugee crisis 2011	4	197,045
Kyrgyzstan conflict 2010	4	160,425
Myanmar: Cyclone Giri 2010	5	449,351
Pakistan floods 2010	8	750,000
Pakistan floods 2011	3	200,000
Somalia drought 2011	5	442,876
South Kordofan 2011	2	189,258
Sri Lanka floods 2011	6	285,291
<b>Total: 12</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>3,997,041</b>

Source: CBHA

# Military spending

TABLE 5.3: HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE CHANNELLED VIA DONOR DEFENCE AGENCIES, 2007–2011, US\$ MILLIONS

DONOR	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	TOTAL
US	132	190	132	564	137	1,156
Australia	38	85	–	–	–	123
Spain	16	1	43	1	–	62
Canada	–	0.1	3	53	–	56
Austria	1	29	20	–	–	50
Korea	9	5	2	2	1	19
Denmark	1	0.7	–	–	–	2.0
Finland	1	0.5	0.4	–	–	1.8
Greece	0.2	–	–	0.1	1	1.5
UK	–	–	–	1	–	1.0
Netherlands	1	–	–	–	–	1.0
Belgium	–	–	–	0.4	–	0.4
Ireland	0.1	–	–	–	–	0.2
Japan	–	–	–	0.2	–	0.2
Switzerland	0.05	–	–	–	–	0.05
Germany	–	–	–	–	0.0003	0.0003
<b>Total</b>	<b>199</b>	<b>312</b>	<b>200</b>	<b>622</b>	<b>140</b>	<b>1,473</b>

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC CRS data

The UN Oslo Guidelines state that military involvement in humanitarian crises should be a last resort. However, the last decade has seen the relative normalisation of the involvement of military actors in the delivery of humanitarian assistance. With the introduction of the UN ‘integrated mission’ model, civilian and peacekeeping staff now explicitly work alongside one another.

The United States dominates volumes of humanitarian funding channelled through donor defence agencies, spending almost US\$1.2 billion over the five-year period from 2007 to 2011. Australia was the second largest donor via defence agencies, with all of its resources channelled in this way spent in Afghanistan.

The US\$461.7 million channelled via military actors to Haiti in 2010

represented 31% of all aid channelled in this way by OECD DAC donors between 2007 and 2011.

The United States was the only donor to channel funds to Pakistan via military actors in 2011 for the Pakistan floods. This was channelled through the Department of Defense Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid.

TABLE 5.4: RECIPIENTS OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE CHANNELLED VIA MILITARY ACTORS, 2007–2011

2007	US\$m	2008	US\$m	2009	US\$m	2010	US\$m	2011	US\$m
Afghanistan	62	Afghanistan	123	Afghanistan	73	Haiti	462	Pakistan	79
Iraq	49	Iraq	42	Chad	20	Afghanistan	23	Haiti	15
Lebanon	21	Chad	29	Lebanon	13	Iraq	19	Libya	2
Sudan	2	Lebanon	18	Iraq	11	Pakistan	16	Lebanon	2
Chad	1	Myanmar	13	Georgia	9	Chile	6	Philippines	0.8
Pakistan	1	China	2	Myanmar	3	Indonesia	5	Egypt	0.3
Ethiopia	0.8	Pakistan	2	China	1	Lebanon	2	Iraq	0.1
Serbia	0.7	Georgia	2	Kosovo	0.5	DRC	0.2	Colombia	0.01
Indonesia	0.5	Bolivia	0.8	Pakistan	0.5	Philippines	0.2	Bolivia	0.01
Liberia	0.3	Serbia	0.5	Peru	0.4	Guatemala	0.1	Ecuador	0.01

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC data



## THE STORY

Ten years after Iraqi refugees fled to Syria to escape the fighting in their country, Syrian refugees have come to the Domiz camp in Iraq in search of food and safety.

The human impact of the Syrian crisis is growing exponentially. There are now over 1.6 million Syrian refugees and about 51% of them are children. The United Nations has launched its largest appeal to date, requesting US\$5.2 billion to meet the needs of Syrians both in country and in the region.

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# **RECENT EMERGENCIES**

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and their human impact



## **6 RECENT EMERGENCIES AND THEIR HUMAN IMPACT**

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2012 saw none of the 'mega-disasters', in terms of fatalities, of the scale of previous years such as the Japanese Tsunami in 2011, the earthquake in Haiti in 2010, or the floods in Pakistan in the same year. Instead, 2012 was described as the year of recurring disasters that repeatedly hit particular locations characterised by the intersection of chronic poverty, conflict and exposure to regular shocks and stresses.

Incidents of conflict have been increasing, meaning that numbers of refugees, asylum seekers, and internally displaced people remain high. Food and energy prices have nearly returned to their pre-economic crisis levels, increasing the cost of international response.

It was only in 2013 that the true scale of the 2010–2012 severe food insecurity and famine in Somalia was revealed, with an estimated 257,500 deaths. A joint report of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization's (FAO) Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit for Somalia (FSNAU) found that approximately 4.6% of Somalia's population died as a result of the severe food insecurity. This was on top of the 290,000 'baseline' deaths that occurred in the same period.

The human impact of the crisis in Syria has increased exponentially. In December 2011 there were approximately 19,900 Syrian refugees. By 10 June 2013 UNHCR estimated that the total number of Syrian refugees had reached 1.6 million, of whom over 1.4 million had been registered. The UN estimates that by the end of the year, half the Syrian population will be in need of humanitarian assistance.

The requirement for humanitarian assistance varies year on year and is driven in part by the number, scale and severity of disasters and conflicts, and by the number of people affected. It is not a direct correlation, however, not least because a large proportion of the world's disaster-affected populations live in countries such as China and India that use predominantly domestic resources to respond to humanitarian need.

# 'Natural' disasters

Initial data suggest that in 2012 the reported number of natural disasters rose slightly. The initial reported number of people affected by natural disasters for 2012 is 111 million; this number is likely to be significantly revised (see box). There were no mega-disasters similar in scale to those in previous years, in terms of fatalities. It is important to note that these numbers are indicative and incomplete, particularly for the most recent years.

Over the past 10 years, more people have been affected by floods (56%) than by any other sort of natural disaster. However, earthquakes such as those in Haiti (2010), Sichuan (2008), and Kashmir (2005) are reported as being by far the biggest killers (see figure 6.2).


## UNDER-REPORTING OF THE HUMAN IMPACT OF DISASTERS

In the IFRC 2012 World Disasters Report, researchers from the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT) note that: "For natural disasters over the last decade, data on deaths are missing for around one-fifth of reported disasters; data on people affected are missing for about one-quarter of disasters; and data on economic damages are missing for 80% of disasters. The figures should therefore be seen as indicative.

Relative changes and trends


are more useful to look at than absolute, isolated figures". To deal with some of the challenges with data collection in natural disasters, EM-DAT uses retrospective analysis and revises data initially provided immediately after disasters with more advanced tallies, which are sometimes only published years after the disaster happens.<sup>18</sup>

**FIGURE 6.1: NUMBER OF PEOPLE AFFECTED BY DISASTERS, BY REGION AND NUMBER OF REPORTED DISASTERS, 2003–2012**




Note: Data for 2012 are partial. Source: Development Initiatives based on EM-DAT CRED data

FIGURE 6.2: NUMBER OF PEOPLE AFFECTED BY DISASTER TYPE, 2003–2012



Source: Development Initiatives based on EM-DAT CRED data

FIGURE 6.3: NUMBER OF PEOPLE KILLED BY DISASTER TYPE, 2003–2012



Source: Development Initiatives based on EM-DAT CRED data

In 2012 floods reportedly affected the largest number of people (58%) including those in Manila, the Philippines and in China. Pakistan experienced widespread flooding for the third year in a row. Other disasters included the drought in the Sahel, and Hurricane Sandy, which had wide geographic impact affecting thousands of people in the United States and across the Caribbean. Many of these disasters are not one-off events; they are repeated tragedies regularly hitting particular locations.

China and India accounted for 44% of people affected by natural disasters in 2012 as Asia continued to be the continent most heavily impacted by disasters.

In 2012 the highest reported levels of mortality caused by natural disaster occurred in the Philippines, where 2,415 people lost their lives, largely as a result of Typhoon Bopha. However, it is important to note that mortality figures are imprecise. Data on droughts and famines are particularly

poor as there is no universal definition of a drought and we are not yet able to determine effectively the excess mortality that they cause. For example, estimates now suggest that there were 257,500 excess deaths during the period of severe food insecurity and famine that hit Somalia between 2010 and 2012.

Table 6.1 shows the number of people affected and the number of people killed by emergencies in the 20 countries that received the largest volumes of humanitarian assistance over the past 10 years. Bangladesh was the country where most people were affected. Haiti suffered by far the largest number of deaths.

## SAHEL CRISIS

Serious drought in the Sahel in 2012 yet again affected many countries in the region, pushing up food prices and forcing widespread population displacement.


According to the Food and Agriculture Organization, 18.7 million people were severely affected by food and nutrition insecurity in 2012 across a number of countries in the Sahel region.<sup>19</sup> While the worst of the crisis was averted and mitigated last year, in 2013 approximately 10 million people are still considered food insecure. An appeal from UN agencies and humanitarian partners was launched in early 2013 aimed at tackling the continued food and nutrition crisis. At the beginning of 2013, US\$1.6 billion had been requested to provide life-saving aid and livelihood support in countries including Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Gambia, Cameroon and Nigeria.<sup>20</sup>

**TABLE 6.1: DISASTER PROFILES OF THE TOP 20 RECIPIENTS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, 2003–2012**

COUNTRY	NUMBER AFFECTED	NUMBER KILLED
Bangladesh	75,476,910	8,700
Pakistan	46,890,036	79,907
Ethiopia	34,937,534	1,963
Kenya	19,392,341	1,509
Somalia	11,258,290	1,785
Indonesia	10,506,123	180,022
Sudan	9,136,988	3,017
Sri Lanka	7,965,742	36,532
Haiti	5,675,754	236,304
Chad	4,996,410	1,429
Afghanistan	4,698,516	3,661
Zimbabwe	3,916,464	4,615
Uganda	3,271,967	1,191
Myanmar	3,247,383	139,186
DRC	376,573	3,589
South Sudan	157,000	47
Iraq	79,099	73
Yemen	31,930	354
Lebanon	17,015	1
West Bank and Gaza Strip	2,000	-
<b>Total</b>	<b>242,034,075</b>	<b>703,885</b>
<b>% of global total</b>	<b>13%</b>	<b>63%</b>

# Food and energy prices

FIGURE 6.4: COMMODITY PRICES, 1990–2013



Source: Development Initiatives based on World Bank data

Energy and food prices have increased dramatically over the past 10 years and spiked in 2008. Prices fell back as a result of the economic crisis, but have rebounded strongly. As global demand increases and global supply remains constrained, it is likely that prices will continue to increase.

Implications will be diverse and played out over a number of years as the knock on effects of increased malnutrition rates and other consequences become apparent. What is clear is that higher prices increase the cost of the international response to emergencies as the cost of key relief commodities increases.

# Conflict

The most recent data available for conflict are for 2011, when the number of incidents of violent conflict increased from 77 to 98. The highest number of incidents of active conflict occurred in Sudan (10), Nigeria (9), Pakistan (8) and Mexico (8). We would expect 2012 and 2013 data to show Syria as having a large number of incidents of active conflict.

Government conflicts increased from 31 in 2010 to 37 in 2011. This was mainly due to 'new' conflicts in Cambodia, Côte d'Ivoire, Libya, Nigeria, Senegal, South Sudan and Syria joining the list of ongoing conflicts.

Non-state incidents increased from 27 to 38 and included 'new' countries such as Syria, the Philippines, CAR, DRC, Egypt, Guinea, India, Côte d'Ivoire as well as increased incidents for Kenya, Mexico, Nigeria and Sudan. Non-state incidents went down for Somalia, from five to three.

One-sided incidents increased from 19 to 23. New countries not featured in 2010 include Bahrain, DRC, Guatemala, Côte d'Ivoire, Libya, Syria, Uganda, Vietnam and Yemen. Countries with an increase in incidences on the previous year include Afghanistan, Nigeria and Somalia.

The regions with the largest number of violent conflicts in 2011, as in previous years, were sub-Saharan Africa and Asia.

After reaching a record high in 2010, international humanitarian assistance for natural disasters dipped in 2011 to levels similar to 2009. Meanwhile humanitarian assistance to conflict-affected states has risen fairly consistently over the last decade and was nearly four times larger in 2011 than in 2000.

## UPPSALA CONFLICT DATA PROGRAM DEFINITIONS<sup>21</sup>

### GOVERNMENT

The party controlling the capital of the state.

### NON-STATE CONFLICT

The use of armed force between two organised armed groups, neither of which is the government of a state, which results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year.

### ONE-SIDED VIOLENCE

The use of armed force by the government of a state or by a formally organised group against civilians that results in at least 25 deaths in a year.

FIGURE 6.5: NUMBER OF ACTIVE CONFLICTS, 1990–2011





FIGURE 6.6: NUMBER OF INCIDENTS OF VIOLENT CONFLICT BY REGION, 1990–2011




Source: Development Initiatives based on Uppsala data

The set of 'conflict-affected' countries includes those that are 'post-conflict'. Humanitarian spending often increases in countries where multilateral peacekeeping operations are present. This may be part of the reason for the increase in funding to conflict-affected states, because improved security and political stability create more opportunities for humanitarian programming.

Increasing incidence of attacks on humanitarian aid workers and associated adaptations (including remote management, sub-contracting, and the trend towards investing in heavily fortified operating bases and in some cases hiring private security protection) are also likely to have driven up the cost of providing assistance in such environments.


FIGURE 6.7: INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE RECEIVED BY CONFLICT-AFFECTED STATES, 2000–2011



Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC, UN OCHA FTS and Uppsala data

# Refugees and displaced people

TABLE 6.8: GLOBAL FORCED DISPLACEMENT BY CONFLICT OR PERSECUTION, 2002–2011



Source: Development Initiatives based on UNHCR data

The increasing incidence of conflict in 2011 – which saw major conflicts in Libya, Côte d'Ivoire, Sudan and Somalia – contributed to the displacement of 800,000 new refugees and 3.5 million new internally displaced persons (IDPs) – a 20% increase in new IDPs from 2010. However, there were also relatively high repatriation numbers, and by the end of 2011 the total number of internally displaced people was 26.4 million: 1.1 million fewer than the previous year. In total, 42.5 million people were considered to have been forcibly displaced due to conflict and persecution, of whom 15.2 million were refugees. However, not all of the displaced people were in a humanitarian crisis situation.

Of the 15.2 million refugees, 9.8 million were classified as being “of concern” to the UNHCR; the third highest level since 2004.


Of the refugees considered to be of concern to UNHCR, Pakistan hosted the highest number in any country in the world – 1.7 million.

Over 50% of all refugees in 2011 were from Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia.

## PERSONS OF CONCERN TO UNHCR


This is a generic term used to describe all persons whose protection and assistance needs are of interest to UNHCR. These include refugees under the 1951 Convention, persons who have been forced to leave their countries as a result of conflict or events seriously disturbing public order, returnees, stateless persons, and, in some situations, internally displaced persons. UNHCR's authority to act on behalf of persons of concern other than refugees is based on General Assembly resolutions.

FIGURE 6.9: NUMBER OF REGISTERED REFUGEES BY HOST COUNTRY, 2011




Source: Development Initiatives based on UNHCR data

FIGURE 6.10: NUMBER OF REGISTERED REFUGEES BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN, 2011



Source: Development Initiatives based on UNHCR data

FIGURE 6.11: NUMBER OF REGISTERED SYRIAN REFUGEES, DECEMBER 2011 TO JUNE 2013



Source: Syria Regional Refugee Response portal, UNHCR data

In December 2011 there were approximately 19,900 Syrian refugees. By 10 June 2013 the UNHCR had estimated that the total number of Syrian refugees exceeded 1.6 million, of whom over 1.4 million had been registered.

## COLOMBIA

Colombia has the highest recorded number of IDPs in the world, with at least 3.9 million people – 8.5% of the population – displaced since 1996, and between 150,000 and 200,000 continuing to be displaced each year.

The majority of IDPs have been forced from their homes as a result of the complex ongoing conflict involving left-wing guerrilla groups, right-wing paramilitary groups and the Colombian government's armed forces. The vast majority (92%) of all displacement has been in rural areas, with land taken from civilians by guerrilla and paramilitary groups often to be used for the illegal narcotics trade.

Protracted displacements of individuals and families account for 93% of all displacement, and mass

displacements (50 people or more) make up the remaining 7%. Afro-Colombians and indigenous people are disproportionately affected by the conflict – in 2010, an estimated 83% of the displaced population were from Afro-Colombian or indigenous communities, yet these groups make up only 5% of the general population.

Displacement varies from year to year depending on security levels, occurring wherever the conflict is currently active. There is some disagreement over IDP figures between the Government of Colombia – which only began officially counting IDPs in 2000 – and civil society organisations, which have been monitoring figures since 1985. The government has counted 3.6 million displaced people since 2000, but civil society monitoring organisations

estimate that 5.2 million Colombians have been internally displaced since 1985 (IDMC).

No official IDP figures have been publicly shared by the Colombian government since December 2011, complicating the international community's response and contributing to a reduction in the visibility of the issue of forced displacement. UN OCHA in Colombia has been attempting to monitor IDP events itself in an effort to keep track of IDP figures, and in 2012 it recorded over 40,000 new cases of IDPs. This is higher than it recorded in 2011, but is believed to represent just one seventh of all displacements taking place.

## Displacement caused by natural disasters

Natural disasters account for a large number of the world's displaced people. The number of people displaced by natural disasters each year varies significantly, with annual totals in the past five years ranging from 16 million to 42 million (32.4 million in 2012, almost twice as many as the previous year). The variance is mostly due to the relative scale and frequency of the biggest displacement-causing natural disaster events. In 2012 there were eight such disasters which each displaced over one million people. These eight disasters accounted for 68% of all displacements caused by natural disasters that year, with the largest – the first period of monsoon flooding in India – displacing 6.9 million, and the second largest – the rainy season floods in Nigeria – displacing 6.1 million.


Climate and weather-related hazards were responsible for 98% of all displacements caused by natural disasters in 2012, and 93% in 2011.

The top five countries with the largest number of people displaced by natural disasters in 2012 were China, India, Pakistan, Philippines and Nigeria; these same countries are also the top five for the five-year period from 2008 to 2012.

81% of global displacement in the past five years occurred in Asia. However, in 2012 8.2 million people were newly displaced in Africa, over four times more than in any of the previous four years (Internal Displacement and Monitoring Centre (IDMC)).<sup>22</sup>

Disaster-induced displacement impacts on both the richest and poorest countries: two and a half million people have been displaced in high-income countries such as the United States and Japan in the past five years. But 98% of people displaced by disasters between 2008 and 2012 were in middle and lower income developing countries (IDMC).

FIGURE 6.12: TOP 20 COUNTRIES WITH THE HIGHEST DISASTER-INDUCED DISPLACEMENT, 2008–2012



# In focus: Horn of Africa famine and timely response


The dire effects of the international community's delayed response to the 2011 food crisis in the Horn of Africa – despite advanced warnings – has led to a number of recent changes in humanitarian policy and practice when responding to forewarned emergencies.

## Somalia

The severe food insecurity and famine is estimated to have claimed 257,500 lives in Somalia between October

2010 and March 2012, half of which were children under the age of five (FSNAU). The following graph shows contributions through the UN Somalia CAP, with a peak in funding, US\$241.6 million, in July 2011. This coincides with the date that the famine was officially declared by the UN, and the month with the highest number of excess deaths recorded at 33,000. While the original requirements for the Somalia CAP 2011 were just over US\$500 million, requirements were later revised to over US\$1 billion.

**FIGURE 6.13: FUNDING TO SOMALIA CAP APPEALS AND NUMBER OF EXCESS DEATHS IN SOMALIA, OCTOBER 2010 TO MAY 2013**



Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS, FEWS NET and FSNAU data

While the famine was declared over by the UN in February 2012, it is estimated that 3.8 million people are still in need of life-saving assistance. In late 2012 the UN announced a three-year CAP for Somalia, the first of its kind. The donor response to the new three-year consolidated appeal for Somalia will be a fundamentally important test-case of donor commitment to putting their money behind their policy commitments to support longer-term flexible financing in chronic crises and build resilience to shocks (see chapter 7 'Strengthening the response to people in crises' for more information on the Somalia three-year CAP).

## Why was response delayed in the Horn?

Figure 6.14 overleaf shows the international funding response to four different emergencies – two rapid-onset “triggered” crises (the 2005 Indian Ocean tsunami and the 2010 Haiti Humanitarian Appeal in response to the earthquake), and two slow-onset protracted crises (the Somalia 2011 famine appeal and the 2011 Kenya Emergency Humanitarian Response Plan) – and the differences in speed of the international funding response. The graph clearly demonstrates a more delayed response to slower-onset crises and shows that higher profile emergencies, such as Haiti and the Indian Ocean tsunami, received a greater proportion of funds early on in the crisis, compared with Kenya and Somalia where contributions trickled in over the same period.

One of the explanations for the slow response to complex crises is a culture of risk aversion. There is huge pressure on those allocating resources to avoid waste and investments that put taxpayers' money at risk. Consequently donors often demand hard evidence – that cannot be given – of a crisis before authorising a response and are reluctant to commit funding to something that remains a possibility. This is not unique to institutional donors – the same response pattern was also

seen domestically in Kenya during the 2011 food crisis. The Kenyan Red Cross launched an appeal early in the year in response to warnings but struggled to raise significant amounts as the government had not yet raised the official alarm. Significant funds were only raised via the public after the 'Kenya for Kenyans' campaign was launched some months later, in July. By this point, malnutrition rates had already reached emergency levels in some areas and hundreds of thousands of people were at risk of dying. Within four weeks of launching the appeal, more than KES1 billion was raised in donations from the Kenyan public.

After the introduction of strict US counter-terrorism legislation in 2009 there was an 88% reduction in US funding for Somalia, with aid agencies apparently reluctant to apply due to concerns of not being able to comply with its requirements. US funding for Somalia had previously made up 40% of all aid financing in the country, so this reduction had a huge impact on resources available until the restrictions were eased in July 2011.

The delay was further exacerbated by political problems, with the conflict in Somalia seriously hampering the humanitarian community's ability to respond, and in Kenya, an early reluctance by the Kenyan government to officially act further delayed the response there. Political negotiations over the number of people affected in Ethiopia also had an effect.

As long as the funding community continues to respond to acute humanitarian situations with a clear 'trigger' plunging people into crisis over protracted situations of chronic need in which people are consistently living close to or in humanitarian crisis, avoidable disasters like the 2011 Horn of Africa crisis will continue to take place.

## Lessons learnt

- More preventative action needs to be taken.
- Greater flexibility and collaboration between development and humanitarian funding and programming would help define the responsibility for addressing underlying vulnerability to crises more clearly, and would better enable programmes to act to prevent crises from escalating into situations of acute need.
- A framework is needed to enable improved response to early warnings of a complex crisis.
- Better use of cash transfers and safety net programmes is needed.
  - The crisis in Somalia was not solely caused by a shortage of food as a result of the drought, but rather by a food shortage combined with market failure caused by the conflict. This pushed food prices up, so people could no longer afford to buy it.
  - In Ethiopia, an early response to warnings and early scaling-up of the Productive Safety Net Programme helped significantly reduce the overall impact of the crisis. The cost per beneficiary in areas where the scaled-up programme was employed was estimated in the 2012 GHA report at US\$53, compared with US\$169 where a traditional humanitarian food aid response was used.
- Multi-year humanitarian funding cycles are needed in areas of persistent need.
- Improved willingness by the humanitarian response community is needed to employ new programming ideas such as cash transfers at scale in a crisis, where evidence exists to show they are more effective.

## Action already taken


The **Nairobi Strategy**, developed by African leaders and international partners at the Summit on the Horn of Africa in September 2011, outlined a number of commitments to address many of the issues brought to light by the 2011 crisis. It was agreed that the crisis reflected “long-term under investment in drought-prone areas” and a new approach was required in which policies and programmes would have a “primary objective of building resilience to future climatic and economic shocks.”

“The new approach and focus should be preventive rather than reactive, and should be holistic, rather than emergency oriented. It should recognise existing frameworks and mechanisms for disaster risk reduction, namely the Hyogo Framework for Action and the Africa Strategy and Programme for Action 2006–2015. It should encompass the continuum of relief, recovery, reconstruction, innovation and long-term development towards sustainable development to ensure drought resilience and ensuring food security.” **The Nairobi Strategy**

Aid agencies such as **Oxfam** are advocating for long-term development programmes to take greater responsibility for responding to forecasts of crisis in order to reduce the impact before it hits, and to build this into their own programming.

In its 2012 humanitarian appeals for the Horn of Africa region, **UN OCHA** included a greater number of early recovery and resilience-building projects, including cash transfer programming.

The **European Union** launched its ‘Supporting the Horn of Africa’s Resilience’ (SHARE) initiative in response to the effects of the delayed response to the 2011 crisis. SHARE is a €270 million joint humanitarian-development programme aiming to boost resilience in Horn of Africa countries by addressing recovery from drought, and ultimately to improve people’s and communities’ ability to respond to persistent and acute emergencies.

**FIGURE 6.14: FUNDING RESPONSE TO RAPID ONSET AND COMPLEX DISASTERS**

Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OHCA FTS data

## Continuing challenges

Funding for recovery and resilience-building programmes remains challenging: in 2011, these types of projects were only 27% funded. Most humanitarian funding continues to go towards immediate life-saving support and fails to prevent the loss of assets experienced by vulnerable households in humanitarian crisis, effectively trapping them in chronic poverty.

Though it is still too early to measure the impact of the three-year CAP on Somalia's ability to respond to persistent crises, it is clear that longer-term investment would allow agencies to invest more in longer-term planning and preventative measures, over time leading to better outcomes.

In this time of increased pressure on international aid budgets, however, governments can more easily justify funding immediate life-saving interventions over long-term development and preventative programming. While our understanding of the importance of long-term crisis prevention is improving, greater incentives are needed for donors to invest in early action. This will require an improved understanding of the effectiveness of different early intervention measures, a willingness to invest more money up-front to long-term programming, and for more responsibility to be taken by the development community for DRR and resilience-building work.



## THE STORY

Mobile subscriptions have increased dramatically in many crisis-prone areas. In Sudan unique mobile subscribers have grown substantially in recent years, with the number of subscriptions per 100 people rising from 0.5 in 2002 to 56.1 in 2011.

Technology is driving innovation in how people and communities respond to crises and how the wider world supports them – through crisis mapping, early warning, SMS, twitter and mobile money.

CREDIT  
© Ton Koene

# **STRENGTHENING THE RESPONSE**

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to people in crisis



# 7 STRENGTHENING THE RESPONSE TO PEOPLE IN CRISIS

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International humanitarian assistance is governed by established principles but it is not static and does not exist in a vacuum. The number of humanitarian donors has proliferated, with over 100 countries contributing to the CERF in 2010 – a number of them also receiving assistance. Many humanitarian donors also spend significant resources on security, peace-building and development assistance. Domestic response is clearly on the rise with governments wanting to take more control over humanitarian interventions in their own countries.

Wider development assistance has become increasingly concerned with fragile states. The UN High-Level Panel on the Post-2015 Development Agenda has prioritised ending absolute poverty by 2030. Many of the people currently living on less than \$1.25 a day are vulnerable to, and affected by, disaster and conflict. As the “Listening Project”<sup>23</sup> has shown, none of those interviewed were concerned about whether assistance is defined as humanitarian or development.

Many of the things that humanitarian assistance is trying to enable are extremely difficult to achieve – dignity, security, provision of basic needs in situations of extraordinary trauma and challenge. However, there are things in the control of providers of humanitarian assistance that could improve humanitarian outcomes. This chapter is about those things.

- Access to information is key to improving resource allocation, planning, coordination, local ownership and empowerment – as well as the allocation of funding according to need. It can also enable more effective use of the contributions of different actors including the military, non-governmental agencies, and domestic governments.
- Transparency is a precondition for accountability and feedback. Knowing what resources have been allocated and where enables people to exercise greater choice over what is delivered, how it is spent and whether it is relevant to them.
- Principles and standards provide a benchmark against which progress can be measured.
- New technologies allow a whole set of different relationships and vehicles for response – mobile money, warning messages, information and guidance for responders.
- Resilience has become a byword at the G20 and the G8; understanding and dealing with risk are now high on the agenda. It is significant that the World Bank’s World Development Report in 2011 was on fragile states and in 2014 will be on risk.

Progress in these areas can improve humanitarian outcomes. The lessons learned can also influence the bigger debates about poverty and security. Humanitarian assistance is of course valid in its own right, but it is also necessary to achieve, and to sustain, an end to global poverty.

# Principles, standards, and accountability frameworks guiding response

## Making sense of multiple principles, standards, and accountability frameworks

Over the past two decades, the humanitarian sector has increasingly sought to become more professional. An outcome of this is a proliferation of principles, standards and accountability frameworks. A mapping exercise conducted by the Joint Standards Initiative in 2013 estimated that there are approximately 71 initiatives in existence today. However, the figure is more likely to be at least 119, as a Humanitarian Accountability Partnership study conducted in 2007 found 70 initiatives of which only 22 are the same as the Joint Standards Initiative study. While the intended purpose of the standards was to guide more effective response within an agreed framework, it has resulted in difficulties in trying to implement multiple standards in practice.

In response to current limitations the Joint Standards Initiative, led by three leading humanitarian standards initiatives – Humanitarian Accountability Partnership, People In Aid, and the Sphere Project – is looking at ways to improve quality and accountability in the sector and ultimately to improve humanitarian action to people affected by crises. In conjunction with the Joint Standards Initiative, the Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response, the authors of the Red Cross Code of Conduct and Sphere, are currently exploring the possibility of externally verifying or certifying humanitarian organisations against a harmonised set of humanitarian standards.

## Good Humanitarian Donorship

It has been over 10 years since the launch of the Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative (GHDI), which agreed a set of principles that donors should aspire to in order to improve their humanitarian response. 41 countries have endorsed the principles to date.

In January 2013 a report commissioned by the then co-chairs of the GHD group, the Czech Republic and Denmark, was published assessing 10 years of GHDI.<sup>24</sup> The report highlights the benefit of having an agreed set of principles and a low-cost space for donor dialogue, sharing and learning. However, it points out that although the number of GHDI signatories has grown, the existence of the principles has driven only limited change in donor practice.

# Transformative agenda

In 2005 a major advance to reform the humanitarian system was initiated by the Emergency Relief Coordinator and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee and resulted in the Humanitarian Reform Process. The purpose was to improve predictability, accountability and responsibility in the humanitarian system. While there have been some developments and reform in the sector, a number of weaknesses remain, and were particularly apparent in the response to the Haiti earthquake and Pakistan floods. There was growing awareness of the need for a more efficient and coordinated response to disasters. This led to the Transformative Agenda being developed in December 2011 and the Transformative Agenda Protocols in December 2012.

The Transformative Agenda is “a set of concrete actions aimed at transforming the way in which the humanitarian community responds to emergencies. It focuses on improving the timeliness and effectiveness of the collective response through stronger leadership, more effective coordination structures, and improved accountability for performance and to affected people.”<sup>25</sup>

It focuses on three core areas – leadership, coordination and accountability and aims to:

- strengthen leadership capacities at all levels of the response
- improve strategic planning that clarifies the collective results that the humanitarian community aims to achieve
- strengthen needs assessments, information management, planning, monitoring and evaluation for a more effective and strategic response
- improve cluster coordination, performance and participation, as well as a more clearly defined cluster-activation procedure
- enhance accountability for the achievement of collective results, based on an agreed performance and monitoring framework linked to the strategic plan
- strengthen accountability to affected communities, to be implemented at field level through a defined inter-agency operational framework.

# Transparency and access to information

Real-time information on resources is particularly important in humanitarian crises. Accurate information assists rapid response and the ability to both deploy funds in response to opportunities and urgent need, and to fill gaps. Pooled funds; UN OCHA's long-term investments in humanitarian information centres (using GIS systems and new technologies); and the real-time updated information in the UN OCHA FTS are all examples of the drive for better access to information – often well in advance of similar initiatives in the development field.

As resources have become larger and more diversified, the need for information on all finances for crisis situations has become more pressing. At the same time there are a number of initiatives which make this practically possible. At the DAC High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan in 2011, donors signed up to publishing their aid transactions to a common international standard. This means common definitions and a machine-readable electronic format, so that the data from all actors in the aid delivery chain can be easily accessed and compared. This common standard combines the efforts of the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) and the OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System and Forward Spending Survey; donors are committed to publishing by 2015.

One of the huge benefits of greater transparency will be the ability to trace resources through to the ultimate beneficiary. There is a lack of breadth and depth to much of the available data, with a particular lack of information on non-governmental and private actors and on government actors beyond aid ministries.

There are a number of databases that track humanitarian assistance as well as initiatives that look at ways to improve the quality of this information. Better quality, more comparable and timely data on humanitarian flows would improve donor response and enable a more comprehensive picture of humanitarian contributions through the system – tracking not only inputs but outputs and eventually outcomes, thus contributing to a more efficient and effective system.

## INTERNATIONAL AID TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE (IATI)

IATI is a multi-stakeholder initiative that seeks to improve the transparency of information on aid to increase its effectiveness in addressing poverty. IATI's vision is to provide a single common format for the transparent reporting of all activities by all participants in the delivery of development cooperation. Launched at the High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in 2008 in Accra, there are currently over 150 organisations, 37 signatories and 22 partner countries publishing information to the IATI format. At the 2013 G8 Summit France, Italy and Japan committed to implement IATI.

In 2013, IATI is working with UN OCHA and others (see below) to improve its capacity for the reporting of humanitarian activities. This will involve adding additional fields to accurately map funding processes, operational frameworks, and activity details. IATI's current concept of timeliness is based on the delivery of development cooperation and is not yet able to take into account the daily (or in some cases even more frequent) reporting requirements of humanitarian operations.

## OTHER INITIATIVES TO IMPROVE DATA ON HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

### Humanitarian eXchange Language (HXL), UN OCHA

HXL is an exchange-based approach being developed by UN OCHA that aims to streamline information flows during crisis response. The initiative aims to build a single data exchange language that improves and simplifies the processes of collating and reporting humanitarian needs and response data in situations affected by crisis. HXL does not require changes to existing information management tools and procedures in use in a given humanitarian organisation, but uses an open export format that allows organisations to publish their data in a machine-readable format. IATI and HXL are working together to link the financial humanitarian assistance flows being tracked through IATI, to the delivery of services and equipment in the field recorded through HXL.

### Financial Tracking Service (FTS)

The UN OCHA FTS is a global, real-time database recording reported international humanitarian assistance (including that for NGOs and the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, bilateral aid, in-kind aid, and private donations), mainly in response to UN CAP and flash appeals. Its focus on UN appeals means it is able to indicate to what extent populations in crisis receive humanitarian aid in proportion to their needs.

FTS is managed by UN OCHA and all FTS data are provided by donors or recipient organisations. FTS currently publishes all of its data through IATI, and is working with IATI to develop and improve the transparent reporting of humanitarian assistance.


### INTOSAI, the Working Group on Accountability for and Audit of Disaster-related Aid and IFAF

In the aftermath of the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004, the International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI) set up a task force to establish an audit trail for tsunami-related assistance. The task force found that a lack of a clear information structure and a lack of a specific audit framework hampered accountability and transparency in humanitarian assistance. In 2007 INTOSAI established the Working Group on Accountability for and Audit of Disaster-related Aid (WG AADA) to propose improvements in the transparency and accountability of humanitarian aid. The Working Group is currently composed of 23 members, and is chaired by the European Court of Auditors.

The WG AADA has developed the Integrated Financial Accountability Framework (IFAF) for making publicly available audited, ex-post, final data on humanitarian assistance for a defined period of time using simple, standardised and comparable IFAF tables.

IFAF's ultimate aim is to construct a global picture of humanitarian assistance, showing all receipts and payments related to a given humanitarian crisis in the same format. Individual donations can thus be traced all the way through the humanitarian system. In May 2013, IATI and INTOSAI published a joint proposal demonstrating the complementary nature of the two initiatives, in which IFAF committed to publishing their aggregated, audited data through IATI.

## How technology can improve response



The number of mobile subscriptions in the top 20 recipient countries of humanitarian assistance has increased dramatically in recent years and is now estimated to be 63 subscriptions per 100 people. The lack of physical infrastructure in these countries has driven demand for access to this virtual infrastructure and has catalysed great innovation in its use.

Mobile and internet technologies are allowing a wider number of geographically dispersed people, their ideas and data to be connected faster than ever before. This is passively engaging and actively encouraging new participants, new partnerships and new ways of working. These developments have the potential to change the balance of power, participation and accountability in the humanitarian system.

It is important to note, however, that for large swathes of people in the poorest countries the cost of mobile contracts and internet connectivity remains prohibitive even for the poor quality of service available.

Information and communications technology (ICT) is increasingly enabling people in affected communities to:

- collect, manage and distribute information
- manage information to make decisions
- leverage their own networks and resources
- act on their right to influence, shape and direct humanitarian assistance
- build on and extend social capital/direct contacts with different groups of people.

### LIFESAVING SMS IN HAITI

Borne out of the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, the Trilogy Emergency Relief Application (TERA) system is a two-way communication system that enables the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies to send SMS messages to defined segments of a population. It estimates that it has sent 100 million messages to nearly 3.3 million people in Haiti with critical advice on cholera prevention, first aid and, most recently, Hurricane Sandy preparedness. Of the 74% of people in Haiti who reported receiving Red Cross messages in 2011, 96% said that they found the information useful and 83% said they took action as a result.<sup>26</sup>

Digital data deliberately created, passively collected, and shared/housed via mobile and internet presents a huge opportunity to gain richer, real-time insights that can complement traditional data sources. This should improve understanding of crisis behaviour, enable more accurate mapping of people and needs in a disaster, and facilitate a faster, more targeted and appropriate response. A current example is the World Food Programme's Syria Crisis Map.<sup>28</sup>

Technical advances are automating the categorisation of incoming reports and the translation of material so that data can be processed to better inform decisions for all involved in preparing for and responding to crises – from life-saving information such as early warnings and vaccination and food distribution points to leveraging resources and providing feedback.

Formal and informal associations of people from diaspora communities, private and social enterprise, academia – and sometimes representing all of these at once – are forming to lend skills to information management and the application of ICTs in the humanitarian context. These can take many shapes and forms, on voluntary and for-profit bases, to develop and build new applications, apply business analytics and share risk-management methodologies.

## EARLY WARNING OF EARTHQUAKES USING TWITTER

The US Geological Survey (USGS) Twitter Earthquake Detection (TED) has reduced the time needed to pinpoint the epicentre of a quake from twenty minutes to just three or four. It has also built a system that automatically and rapidly estimates the distribution of shaking, the number of people and settlements exposed to shaking, and the range of possible fatalities and economic losses.<sup>27</sup>

## CRISIS MAPPING IN TYPHOON PABLO


"Days before Typhoon Pablo made landfall in the Philippines, the government began to inform its citizens about what Twitter hashtags to follow and tweet during the emergency event. After the typhoon hit land, the UN OCHA activated the Digital Humanitarian Network and tasked its stand-by volunteer task force with monitoring and analysing all tweets generated in the first two days of the event. This analysis had to be completed and results submitted to the UN within 12 hours.

The task force used crowdsourcing and the Pybossa microtasking platform to isolate and analyse over 20,000 tweets providing information and video footage about damage that was done during the disaster. The results of this analysis were then taken by UN OCHA and used to generate its first ever crisis map to be generated solely from social media data. It was used as part of the coordinated damage assessment support that was led by UN OCHA."

Lillian Pierson<sup>29</sup>

# Resilience and long-term approaches

FIGURE 7.1: OFFICIAL HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE FROM DAC DONORS TO CHRONICALLY POOR COUNTRIES, 1990–2011



Note: Countries classed as chronically poor are from the 2008–2009 Chronic Poverty Report, which is based on classifications of chronically poor countries from 1970 to 2003. Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC data and Chronic Poverty Report 2008–2009


Humanitarian assistance tends to be conceptualised as a short-term intervention, and planning cycles tend to be short and designed to respond to immediate needs. However, the reality is that most humanitarian assistance goes to countries that are chronically poor, that experience recurring disasters, and that have been receiving humanitarian assistance for many years. This poses a challenge to humanitarian practitioners to think differently and plan over a longer time frame.

The volume of humanitarian assistance to the top 10 recipients of long-term humanitarian assistance, including Sudan, Afghanistan, and Ethiopia, has increased significantly over the past 15 years. This demonstrates the importance of making longer-term investments beyond humanitarian assistance, such as DRR and resilience, in order to reduce the vulnerabilities and minimise the risks for people living in crisis.

## LONG-TERM HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

We consider a long-term humanitarian assistance recipient to be a country that has received an above-average share of its ODA in the form of humanitarian assistance for 8 or more of the past 15 years.

**FIGURE 7.2: LONG, MEDIUM AND SHORT-TERM RECIPIENTS OF OFFICIAL HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE FROM DAC DONORS, 1990–2011**



Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC data

### SOMALIA'S THREE-YEAR CAP APPEAL

The Somalia consolidated appeal presents a three-year planning horizon (2013–2015), a major advance in the quest for more predictable financing for chronic crises. This provides the opportunity for donors and implementing agencies to demonstrate their commitment and ability to build resilience within a more enabling funding environment.

The 2012 Somalia CAP was the second largest that year, in terms of volume, after South Sudan, with revised requirements of just under US\$1.2 billion. However, it was the fifth worst-funded that year, with only 57.7% of funding requirements met.

Funding requirements for the first year of the new three-year Somalia CAP are US\$1.3 billion, an increase from US\$1.2 billion revised requirements in 2012. This increase is due to the emphasis on resilience and supporting local communities to move from a crisis situation to find sustainable solutions. Funding for basic services, safety nets and resilience programmes will target 3.8 million Somalis with resilience numbers increasing throughout the life of the CAP. As of June 2013, 25% of the needs had been met, which represents approximately US\$339 million in funding.

# Resilience

Resilience is high on the policy agendas of many government donors who increasingly see the importance of tackling fragility, poverty, and vulnerability to conflict and disaster by enhancing the resilience of communities and livelihoods. The move towards resilience thinking and programming marks a collective recognition of the need to deal with complexity and work with longer time frames. The UNDP defines this approach as a “transformative process of strengthening the capacity of people, communities and countries to anticipate, manage, recover and transform from shocks” One recent study<sup>30</sup> found that in Kenya – over a 20-year period – every US\$1 spent on disaster resilience resulted in US\$2.90 saved in the form of reduced humanitarian spend, avoided losses and development gains.

## WHAT DONORS ARE DOING ON RESILIENCE

### Australia

At the Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction in 2009, Australia launched ‘Investing in a Safer Future: A Disaster Risk Reduction policy for the Australian aid program’. Its goal is “reduced vulnerability and enhanced resilience of countries and communities to disasters”.<sup>31</sup>

Ausaid’s Pacific Risk Resilience Programme aims to strengthen the resilience of Pacific island communities to disasters and climate change-related risk. It plans to initially operate across four countries: Fiji, Solomon Islands, Tonga and Vanuatu.

### EU

The EU’s first communication on resilience was issued in 2012, ‘The EU approach to resilience: learning from food security crises’, and focused on lessons learned from the Horn of Africa crisis.<sup>32</sup> Resilience is considered a key area that can bridge the gap between humanitarian assistance and development. Investing in resilience is seen as cost effective and in countries facing recurrent crises, increasing resilience will be a central aim of EU external assistance.

### Japan

In 2008 the Japan International Cooperation Agency published the ‘Building Disaster Resilient Societies’ report.<sup>33</sup> Japan has played a lead role in supporting global DRR efforts through the provision of financial support to both the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR) and the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR), and by hosting major international conferences and events including the World Conference on Disaster Reduction in Kobe in 2005, where the Hyogo Framework for Action was outlined. Japan will also host the Third World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction in 2015, which will aim to establish resilience as a key element of the post-Millennium Development Goal framework.

At the fourth session of the Global Platform for DRR in May 2013, Mr Yoshitami Kameoka, Parliamentary Secretary of the Japan Cabinet Office said “I believe it is the mission of Japan to disseminate the knowledge and lessons obtained through past disasters such as the Great East Japan Earthquake”.<sup>34</sup>

## The Netherlands

In its forthcoming round of multi-annual planning, the Netherlands intends to focus on DRR. Since early 2013 the Netherlands has funded the 'Partners for Resilience programme', an alliance of Dutch NGOs aimed at strengthening resilience and capacity at the local level. The funding scheme has also stimulated partnerships between different NGOs and links between DRR, climate adaptation, and environment policies. The choice of water and food security as among the key priorities of the new Dutch development cooperation policy has increased opportunities to integrate DRR into development policy. The Netherlands actively supports the UNISDR and the GFDRR.

## Sweden

Reducing risk is a priority of the Swedish International Development Agency's (Sida) humanitarian policy. They consider reducing risk as a key component of humanitarian assistance, and integral in successful long-term development assistance efforts. Sweden recognises both the challenges and importance of linking relief, recovery and development. It aims to enhance resilience in vulnerable countries at both the policy and field level by using innovative ways to connect humanitarian and development efforts.<sup>35</sup>

An example of Sida's recent (2013) focus on resilience, in one of its priority humanitarian countries, includes the allocation of US\$22 million towards disaster preparedness and greater resilience among vulnerable groups in Somalia.<sup>36</sup> Sweden has also demonstrated commitment to global efforts to reduce risk. They are the third largest donor to GFDRR, contributing US\$32 million between 2006 and 2012, and are also the top donor to UNISDR, providing US\$29 million in the same period.

## United Kingdom


In 2011, DFID outlined its approach to resilience in 'Defining Disaster Resilience: an approach paper'.<sup>37</sup> Here DFID emphasises how using resilience as a concept enables stronger dialogue and cross-fertilisation of ideas between different disciplines and programming areas, including DRR, climate change adaptation, social protection, working in fragile contexts and humanitarian preparedness and response. DFID has now committed to build disaster resilience into all its 28 country programmes by 2015.

DFID's scaling up of aid in Pakistan includes a US\$50 million project, 'Resilience support to Pakistan', which involves supporting a better response to natural disasters by building resilience in government, supporting Pakistan to be better prepared to cope with humanitarian crises, and supporting the UN to improve the performance of the humanitarian system.

The UK co-chairs with UNDP an informal group of 'Political Champions' to promote greater focus and investment in disaster resilience.

## United States

In December 2012 the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) launched its policy document 'Building Resilience to Recurrent Crisis – USAID policy and programme guidance'.<sup>38</sup> At its core is the idea that we are likely to find recurrent crises in places where chronic poverty and exposure to shocks and stresses intersect. While the initial focus has been in the Horn of Africa, Asia is highlighted as a region where this approach is needed. The next phase of USAID's work in this area will prioritise a select number of countries to build a greater evidence base for effective resilience.



## 2011 FUNDING FLOWS TO TOP HUMANITARIAN RECIPIENTS

Humanitarian financing does not exist in a vacuum. It is just one element of support to a country in crisis. This image demonstrates how the flow of humanitarian financing can be dwarfed by others in volume and significance.

Note: Due to limited data, the visual represents just 15 of the top 20 recipients of international humanitarian assistance between 2002 and 2011. This includes Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, Ethiopia, Haiti, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Lebanon, Myanmar, Pakistan, Sudan, Sri Lanka and Uganda

Not to scale

# Humanitarian assistance in the context of all resources

While for people in crises humanitarian assistance is an essential and often life-saving resource, it represents a small proportion of all the financial flows into, and resources generated in, countries that are vulnerable to crisis. When considering how to strengthen emergency preparedness and response, particularly in the context of declining aid budgets, it is important to consider the contribution these other resources can make. This implies two things: first, ensuring that humanitarian assistance is spent on the things it is best at; and second, harnessing these other resources so that they contribute as much as they can to reducing vulnerability, increasing resilience and increasing domestic capacity to anticipate and respond to crises.

It is often the case that the same person vulnerable to humanitarian crises is also poor, and a disaster increases their risk of being plunged further into poverty for a protracted period of time. Strengthening safety nets, investing longer term and developing national policies to protect and reduce the risk of vulnerability are paramount, as is the need to understand all resources that are available to help minimise risk and contribute to ending poverty. Humanitarian assistance cannot be seen as an isolated resource flow that is purely short term and life saving. As we know, humanitarian assistance is often going to the same recipients year-on year and many of these crises are predictable. The humanitarian sector is looking at ways to bridge the relief–development divide, by investing in longer-term resilience and DRR programmes, and this is to be commended. It is also essential that all actors work together. As the OECD states, “working in silos no longer makes sense – if we are to deal with these risks properly, donors, development actors, and states will need to work more closely together ... to help empower individuals, communities and developing nations with the tools and conditions they need, and the components of resilience to all risks, no matter what their origin” (OECD factsheet).<sup>39</sup>

Transparency of all resources from all actors for ending poverty is essential to understand the needs on the ground, the scale of the response, and assess the impact of assistance.



## THE STORY

In drought prone areas of Ethiopia, Moringa cabbage trees, which are drought resistant, are being planted enabling many households to reduce their levels of food insecurity throughout the year.

Resilience is high on the policy agendas of many government donors who increasingly see the importance of tackling fragility, poverty, and vulnerability to conflict and disaster by enhancing the resilience of communities and livelihoods. The move towards resilience thinking and programming marks a collective recognition of the need to deal with complexity and work with longer time frames.

### CREDIT

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# DATA & GUIDES

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# Methodology and definitions

## HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

'Humanitarian assistance' is the assistance and action designed to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain and protect human dignity during and in the aftermath of emergencies. The characteristics that mark it out from other forms of foreign assistance and development assistance are:

- it is intended to be governed by the principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence
- it is intended to be 'short-term' in nature and provide for activities in the 'immediate aftermath' of a disaster. In practice it is often difficult to say where 'during and in the immediate aftermath of emergencies' ends and other types of assistance begin, especially in situations of prolonged vulnerability.

Traditional responses to humanitarian crises, and the easiest to categorise as such, are those that fall under the aegis of 'emergency response':

- material relief assistance and services (shelter, water, medicines etc.)
- emergency food aid (short-term distribution and supplementary feeding programmes)
- relief coordination, protection and support services (coordination, logistics and communications).

Humanitarian assistance can also include reconstruction relief and rehabilitation (repairing pre-existing infrastructure as opposed to longer-term activities designed to improve the level of infrastructure) and disaster prevention and preparedness (disaster risk reduction, early warning systems, contingency stocks and planning). Under the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) reporting criteria, humanitarian assistance has very clear cut-off points – for example, 'disaster preparedness' excludes longer-term work such as prevention of floods or conflicts. 'Reconstruction relief and rehabilitation' includes repairing pre-existing infrastructure but excludes longer-term activities designed to improve the level of infrastructure.

Humanitarian assistance is given by governments, individuals, NGOs, multilateral organisations, domestic organisations and private companies. Some differentiate their humanitarian assistance from development or other foreign assistance, but often do so according to different criteria according to different criteria. We report what others themselves report as 'humanitarian' but try to consistently label and source this.

## Methodology

### International humanitarian response

International humanitarian response is used to describe the contributions of:

- international governments
- individuals, private foundations, trusts, private companies and corporations.

### International humanitarian assistance from governments

Our definition of government funding for humanitarian crises comprises:

- the humanitarian assistance expenditure of the 26 OECD DAC members – Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European institutions – as reported to the OECD DAC as part of an annual obligation to report on ODA flows
- expenditure by ‘other governments’ as captured by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA)’s Financial Tracking Service (FTS), excluding the Czech Republic and Turkey (see below).

In 2013 two governments became members of the OECD DAC: Iceland in March and the Czech Republic in May. Due to the timing of these announcements and GHA’s cut-off point for downloading UN OCHA FTS data (5 April 2013), Iceland is included in our analysis as an OECD DAC donor and the Czech Republic is coded as a non-DAC donor.

In 2013 we revised our methodology for using UN OCHA FTS data for our analysis of non-DAC donors’ humanitarian assistance. We found that data on humanitarian assistance from Turkey and the Czech Republic were much more comprehensive when reported through the OECD DAC than the UN OCHA FTS and have therefore substituted this data. Humanitarian assistance data are available from the OECD DAC for a long period – 10 years or more – and the figures are significantly higher than those reported to the UN OCHA FTS. However, when analysing non-DAC donors’ channels of delivery we have used UN OCHA FTS data for Turkey and the Czech Republic.

Our labelling of ‘governments’ is driven by the way in which they report their expenditure (see ‘Data sources’ section). ‘Other governments’ are sometimes referred to as ‘non-DAC donors’, ‘non-traditional donors’, ‘emerging donors’ or ‘South–South development partners’.

### Private contributions

Private contributions are those from individuals, private foundations, trusts, private companies and corporations.

In our ‘Where does humanitarian assistance come from?’ section, the private contributions are funds raised by humanitarian organisations – including NGOs, UN agencies and the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement – for the purpose of financing humanitarian activities. Data for the period 2007–2011 were collated directly from a unique data set of organisations and complemented by figures from annual reports. The data set for this period included 78 NGOs made up of ten representative alliances and umbrella organisations; five key UN agencies with humanitarian mandates (World Food Programme (WFP), United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) and the World Health Organization (WHO)); and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC).

Our estimation of total private voluntary contributions is made up of an estimate of total private income for all humanitarian NGOs, we calculate the annual share that our data set NGOs represents of all humanitarian NGO funding reported to UN OCHA FTS, plus the private income reported by the five UN agencies and the private income of the IFRC and ICRC.

Data for 2012 is not yet available; an estimate has been produced using preliminary data and projections.

Note: for OECD DAC donors, we make an adjustment to the DAC-reported humanitarian assistance figure so that it takes account of each donor’s multilateral (core and totally unearmarked) ODA contributions to UNHCR, UNRWA and WFP – see ‘total official humanitarian assistance’ below. For the Czech Republic, we use its bilateral humanitarian assistance and do not include the imputed multilateral calculation.

TABLE 1: NGOS INCLUDED IN GHA UNIQUE DATA SET – REPRESENTATIVE ALLIANCES AND UMBRELLA ORGANISATIONS

ORGANISATION	NUMBER OF MEMBER ORGANISATIONS IN THE DATA SET
Action Contre la Faim	3
Canadian Foodgrains Bank	1
Caritas	35
Concern	3
Danish Refugee Council	1
Medecins Sans Frontieres	19
Mercy Corps	2
Norwegian Refugee Council	1
Oxfam	13
<b>Total</b>	<b>78</b>

### Total 'official' humanitarian assistance

Total 'official' humanitarian assistance is a sub-set of ODA. In this report, we use it when making comparisons with other development assistance. It takes account of humanitarian expenditure through NGOs, multilateral UN agencies and funds, public-private partnerships and public sector agencies – and, in order to take account of multilateral ODA contributions to UN agencies with almost uniquely humanitarian mandates, we make the following calculation:

- humanitarian assistance as reported in DAC1 Official and Private Flows, item 'Hist: Humanitarian aid grants' (net disbursements)
- total ODA disbursements to UNHCR, UNRWA and WFP, as recipients, reported in DAC2a ODA Disbursements (we do not include all ODA to WFP but apply a percentage in order to take into account the fact that WFP also has a 'developmental' mandate).

For EU15 donors, total official humanitarian assistance includes imputations of humanitarian assistance through the EU institutions. This is taken into account when we calculate our total international humanitarian assistance figures.

### Disaster risk reduction (DRR)

The use of the term 'disaster risk reduction' in this report is taken from UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) terminology: 'systematic efforts to analyse and manage the causal factors of disasters'. Investments in DRR can be tracked using the OECD DAC's Creditor Reporting System (CRS), though this is not easy. Each funding transaction reported to the OECD DAC CRS is allocated a five-digit purpose code, which identifies the specific sectors or areas of the recipient's economic or social development that the transfer is intended to foster. However, there is no specific DRR code within the CRS database, so a forensic method has been used to pull out relevant investments.

A purpose code for one element of DRR has existed since 2004: this falls within humanitarian assistance under 'disaster prevention and preparedness' (DPP), and data reported under the DPP code (74010) can be easily identified. All funding reported to the flooding prevention/control purpose code (41050) is also included in the final estimate of DRR.

Accounting for DRR measures that are sub-components of development and humanitarian projects that are not coded 74010 or 41050 is more challenging. To identify these, we search through short and long project descriptions referencing 40 key terms selected from recent literature on DRR and the websites of key DRR-focused organisations (e.g. UNISDR). After each term search, the project descriptions are scanned and those not related to DRR removed (for example, results for 'prevention' include projects with a DRR focus such as flood prevention, but also HIV/Aids prevention, which are excluded).

Note: all of our humanitarian assistance categories include money spent through humanitarian financing mechanisms such as the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and country-level pooled funds. Where necessary, we impute amounts spent through the CERF in specific countries back to the donor (for example, if Norway contributed 10% of CERF funding in 2011 and the CERF allocated US\$10 million to Afghanistan, US\$1 million would be added on to Norway's other humanitarian expenditure on projects in Afghanistan).

## Other definitions and classifications

### Cash transfers

Our analysis of cash transfers in humanitarian financing is based on UN OCHA FTS data. There is currently no specific code for cash transfers within the database so we manually apply a word search to the data on the project name and description column in the FTS. We use the following search criteria to pull out information on cash transfers: cash, cash transfer, unconditional cash, conditional cash, cash grant, voucher, cash for work (CfW) and tokens.

### Conflict-affected countries

A set of conflict-affected states was identified for each of the years between 1990 and 2011 using the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)'s database to determine the incidence of active conflict in a given year. This incorporated both cases where state actors were involved and those where no state actor was involved, but where more than 25 battle deaths resulted. Where a multilateral peacekeeping mission has been present (excluding purely civilian missions) with no recurrence of violence for up to seven consecutive years, a country is deemed to be post-conflict.

Non-state conflict is defined as "the use of armed force between two organised armed groups, neither of which is the government of a state, which results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year". One-sided violence is defined as "the use of armed force by the government of a state or by a formally organised group against civilians which results in at least 25 deaths in a year".

### Domestic response

This includes the actions taken in response to humanitarian crises, to transfer resources to those most affected within an affected country, by domestic institutions (both informal and formal) and individuals either living there or temporarily resident elsewhere. We currently use data from the UN OCHA FTS to analyse domestic spending in humanitarian situations.

### Governance and security ODA

This is a sub-set of the social services and infrastructure sector grouping of aid activities – within sector-allocable ODA – that is sub-divided into two further discrete groups of activities.

- The first grouping, the governance and civil society set of activities, is primarily concerned with building the capacity of recipient country governments – in areas including public sector policy and administrative management, public finance management, decentralisation and support to sub-national governments, legal and judicial development – as well as a range of thematic activities including support to elections, democratic participation and civil society, media and free flow of information, human rights and women's equality. In 2010 anti-corruption organisations and institutions and support to legislatures and political parties were added to the list of activities in this grouping.
- The second grouping is concerned with conflict prevention and resolution, peace and security and includes activities supporting security system management and reform, removal of land mines and other explosive remnants of war, prevention and demobilisation of child soldiers, reintegration of demobilised military personnel, small arms and light weapons control, civilian peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution and participation in international peacekeeping operations.

### Long-term humanitarian assistance countries (LTHACs)

Long-term humanitarian assistance countries are defined as those receiving a greater than average (10.8%) proportion of ODA excluding debt relief in the form of humanitarian assistance for more than eight years between 1997 and 2011.

## Naming conventions

The OECD DAC and the UN have different naming conventions for countries. For example, OECD DAC data refers to the West Bank and Gaza Strip and UN data refers to the occupied Palestinian territories (oPt). For our GHA analysis we use West Bank and Gaza Strip to refer to both the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and the oPt. However, for UN appeals we refer to the name of the appeal - occupied Palestinian territories (oPt).

## ODA and ODA-like flows from other government donors

Some donors outside of the OECD DAC group voluntarily report their ODA flows to the OECD DAC, which are recorded in 'Table 33'. This includes ODA reported by members of the OECD who are not DAC members (the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Israel, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Turkey) and other government donors outside of the OECD (Bulgaria, Chinese Taipei, Cyprus, Kuwait, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Thailand and the United Arab Emirates). The Czech Republic became an OECD DAC member in May 2013 but is coded as a non-DAC donor in this year's analysis but using OECD DAC data.

The OECD DAC has reported data on 'ODA-like flows' from Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) who do not report to the DAC, based on their own research in 'Table 33a'. These flows may not fully conform to the ODA definition and are considered by the DAC to be concessional flows for development cooperation; figures are derived from official government sources.

## Official development assistance (ODA)

ODA is a grant or loan from an 'official' source to a developing country (defined by the OECD) or multilateral agency (defined by the OECD) for the promotion of economic development and welfare. It is reported by members of the DAC, along with several other government donors and institutions, according to strict criteria each year. It includes sustainable and poverty-reducing development assistance (for sectors such as governance and security, growth, social services, education, health, and water and sanitation).

In this report we express our total ODA figures net of debt relief unless expressly stated otherwise.

## Other official flows (OOFs)

Other official flows are official sector transactions reported by governments to the OECD DAC that do not meet the ODA criteria, in that their primary purpose is not development-motivated, or when their grant element is below the 25% threshold that would make them eligible to be recorded as ODA. Transactions classified as OOFs include export- and investment-related transactions, rescheduling of OOF loans, and other bilateral securities and claims.

# Data sources

## OECD DAC

OECD DAC data allows us to say how much humanitarian assistance donors reporting to the OECD Development Co-operation Directorate (DCD) give, where they spend it, who they spend it through and how it relates to their other ODA.

Aggregate information is published in OECD DAC Stat tables.

Detailed, project-level reporting is published in the Creditor Reporting System (CRS).

The data in this report was downloaded on 18 April 2013. Data for 2012 is preliminary and partial – full final data for the year (which will include data on recipient countries in 2012 and provide a breakdown of activities, as well as enabling us to publish a non-estimated humanitarian aid figure for DAC donors) will not be published until December 2013.

We make a distinction between 'DAC countries' and 'DAC donors' – where the latter includes the European institutions.

OECD DAC data is in constant 2011 prices.

## UN OCHA FTS

We use UN OCHA FTS data to report on humanitarian expenditure of governments that do not report to the OECD DAC (excluding Turkey and Czech Republic) and to analyse expenditure relating to the UN Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP). We have also used it to analyse private contributions and money spent through NGOs, the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement or a UN agency.

Note: UN OCHA FTS and OECD DAC data are not comparable.

As well as being the custodian of data relating to UN CAP appeals, UN OCHA FTS receives data from donor governments and recipient agencies and also gathers information on specific pledges carried in the media or on donor websites, or quoted in pledging conferences.

Data for 2000–2012 was downloaded on 5 April 2013. Data for 2013 was downloaded on 24 May 2013 and is in current prices.

## UN CERF website

Our data on the CERF is taken from the UN CERF website.

## CRED EM-DAT disaster database

The Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) is a leading repository of information on the impact of disasters. One of CRED's core data projects is the EM-DAT disaster database, which contains data on the impact of 16,000 mass disaster events dating back to 1900. Data is sourced from UN agencies, NGOs, insurance companies, research institutes and press agencies. We use this data to generate analysis of the incidence and impact of natural disasters in developing countries.

## Stockholm International Peace Research International (SIPRI)

SIPRI is an independent international institute dedicated to research into conflict, armaments, arms control and disarmament. SIPRI manages publicly accessible databases on:

- multilateral peacekeeping operations – UN and non-UN peace operations since 2000, including location, dates of deployment and operation, mandate, participating countries, number of personnel, costs and fatalities

- military expenditure of 166 countries since 1988, allowing comparison of countries' military spending: in local currency, at current prices; in US dollars, at constant prices and exchange rates; and as a share of gross domestic product (GDP).
- transfers of major conventional arms since 1950
- arms embargoes implemented by international organisations or groups of nations since 1998.

We use this data to track international expenditure on multilateral peacekeeping operations.

## The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)

UCDP has been recording data on ongoing violent conflicts since the 1970s. Its definition of armed conflict – 'a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year' – is becoming a standard in how conflicts are systematically defined and studied. It has been operating an online database on armed conflicts and organised violence since 2004.

## International Monetary Fund (IMF)

We downloaded data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF)'s World Economic Outlook (WEO) database in April 2013 for general government expenditure data. Calculations have been made (subtracting ODA flows from general government revenues data downloaded from the IMF WEO), to avoid double-counting grants.

## World Bank

The World Bank Data Bank includes different datasets such as inflows and outflows of remittances, population and gross national income (GNI). The Global Economic Monitor (GEM) provides prices and indices relating to food, energy and other commodities – fundamental in understanding fluctuations and trends.

## United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)

UNCTAD is the United Nations' body focusing on trade. Its online database provides statistics on trade flows and foreign direct investment (FDI).

## Internal Displacement and Monitoring Centre (IDMC)

The IDMC, established in 1998 by the Norwegian Refugee Council, is the leading international body monitoring internal displacement worldwide. Through its work, the Centre contributes to improving national and international capacities to protect and assist the millions of people around the globe who have been displaced within their own country as a result of conflicts or human rights violations.

IDMC's report "Global Estimates 2012 – People displaced by disasters" is this report's primary source for the number of people displaced by disasters.

## United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)

The UNHCR was established in 1950 by the United Nations General Assembly. The agency is mandated to lead and coordinate international action to protect refugees and resolve refugee problems worldwide. Its primary purpose is to safeguard the rights and well-being of refugees. It strives to ensure that everyone can exercise the right to seek asylum and find safe refuge in another country with the options of returning home voluntarily, integrating locally or resettling in a third country. It also has a mandate to help stateless people.

We have used the UNHCR's statistical database to analyse refugees' countries of origin and host countries. We have used annual reports to give estimates of refugees, asylum seekers and internally displaced persons.

## International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) annual reports

The ICRC, established in 1863, works worldwide to provide humanitarian assistance for people affected by conflict and armed violence and to promote laws that protect victims of war. An independent and neutral organisation, its mandate stems essentially from the Geneva Conventions of 1949. Based in Geneva, Switzerland, it employs some 12,000 people in 80 countries; it is financed mainly by voluntary donations from governments and from national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies.

We use ICRC annual reports to show funding to ICRC's appeals.

## International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies' (IFRC) annual reports

The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) is the world's largest humanitarian network, reaching 150 million people in 187 national societies through the work of over 13 million volunteers. It focuses on acting before, during and after disasters and health emergencies to meet the needs and improve the lives of vulnerable people.

The IFRC carries out relief operations to help victims of disasters, and combines this with development work to strengthen the capacities of its member national societies. The IFRC's work focuses on four core areas: promoting humanitarian values, disaster response, disaster preparedness, and health and community care.

The IFRC issues annual and emergency appeals. Plans are launched at the beginning of each year to fund programmes that meet an identified need that year; programme updates and annual reports report on these activities. Emergency appeals are issued during the year in response to disasters. Operations updates, interim narratives, financial reports and final reports report on these activities.

We use IFRC annual reports to show funding to emergency appeals.

## Consortium of British Humanitarian Agencies (CBHA)

The CBHA is a ground breaking initiative for strengthening the coordination and capacity of the NGO sector to deliver appropriate, high quality, and quicker humanitarian assistance to populations affected by disaster. The consortium consists of 18 NGOs who have committed to implementing activities which support this objective. The CBHA received an initial two-year funding of £8 million from DFID for various streams of work. The longer-term vision is to work with more donors to increase the size of the emergency response fund and be able to provide more assistance to more communities, to save lives and help them recover from disasters.

## Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET)

The Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) is a USAID-funded activity that collaborates with international, regional and national partners to provide timely and rigorous early warning and vulnerability information on emerging and evolving food security issues. FEWS NET professionals in Africa, Central America, Haiti, Afghanistan and the United States monitor and analyse relevant data and information in terms of its impacts on livelihoods and markets to identify potential threats to food security. FEWS NET then uses a suite of communications and decision support products to help decision makers act to mitigate food insecurity.

We have used FEWS NET data to show the estimated number of excess deaths that occurred in Somalia between October 2010 and March 2012.

## Chronic Poverty Research Centre

The Chronic Poverty Research Centre (CPRC) was an international partnership of universities, research institutes and NGOs, which completed a 10-year programme in 2011. Its research has deepened understanding of the causes of chronic poverty, and provided analysis and policy guidance on the reduction of chronic poverty.

The CPRC's 2008–2009 report identified chronically poor countries, with five main traps that underpin chronic poverty – insecurity, limited citizenship, spatial disadvantage, social discrimination and poor work opportunities – and outlined key policy responses to these. In this year's GHA report we show humanitarian assistance to countries classified as chronically poor.

Further details and guides to our methodology and classifications can be found in the Data section of our website:

[www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org](http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org)

# Acronyms and Abbreviations

AU	African Union
CAP	Consolidated Appeals Process
CAR	Central African Republic
CBHA	Consortium of British Humanitarian Agencies
CERF	Central Emergency Response Fund
CHF	Common humanitarian fund – a country-level pooled fund mechanism
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CRS	Creditor Reporting System (DAC)
CSO	Civil society organisation
CTP	Cash transfer programme
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
DPP	Disaster prevention and preparedness
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DRR	Disaster risk reduction
EC	European Commission
ECHO	Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection
ERF	Emergency response fund – a country-level pooled funding mechanism
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FSNAU	Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit for Somalia
FTS	Financial Tracking Service (UN OCHA)
GDP	Gross domestic product
GFDRR	Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery
GHA	Global Humanitarian Assistance (the programme)
GHD	Good Humanitarian Donorship
GNI	Gross national income
HXL	Humanitarian eXchange Language
IATI	International Aid Transparency Initiative
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally displaced person
IDMC	Internal Displacement and Monitoring Centre
IFAF	Integrated Financial Accountability Framework
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INTOSAI	International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions
LTHAC	Long-term humanitarian assistance countries
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
ODA	Official development assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
ROC	Republic of Congo
RRP	Regional Response Plan
SHARE	Supporting the Horn of Africa's Resilience'
SHARP	Syria Humanitarian Action Response Plan
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UN	United Nations
UNDESA	United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNISDR	United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction
UN OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization

# Reference tables

TABLE 8.1: UN CONSOLIDATED APPEAL PROCESS (CAP) APPEAL, 2000-2012

UN CAP APPEAL SUMMARY											2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012				
Revised requirements (US\$ billions)	1.9	2.6	4.4	5.2	3.4	6.0	5.2	5.1	7.1	9.8	11.3	8.9	8.9														
Funding (US\$ billions)	1.1	1.4	3.0	4.0	2.2	4.0	3.5	3.7	5.2	7.0	7.2	5.6	5.6														
Unmet need (US\$ billions)	0.8	1.1	1.4	1.3	1.2	2.0	1.7	1.4	2.0	2.8	4.0	3.3	3.3														
% needs met	59.2%	55.4%	67.5%	75.8%	64.3%	67.2%	66.6%	72.4%	72.3%	71.6%	64.3%	63.3%	62.7%														
Number of appeals in year	14	18	24	27	31	25	24	30	23	23	19	21	21														
Average requirements per appeal (US\$ millions)	137	142	182	193	110	239	216	171	310	424	592	425	423														
Average funding per appeal (US\$ millions)	81	79	123	147	71	161	144	124	224	304	381	269	265														
CONSOLIDATED APPEALS														2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	
Revised requirements (US\$ billions)	1.9	2.6	4.4	5.2	3.0	3.8	4.9	4.8	6.3	9.5	7.7	8.1	8.8														
Funding (US\$ billions)	1.1	1.4	3.0	3.9	2.0	2.3	3.2	3.5	4.6	6.8	4.7	5.2	5.5														
Unmet need (US\$ billions)	0.8	1.1	1.4	1.2	0.9	1.5	1.7	1.3	1.7	2.6	3.0	3.0	3.3														
% needs met	59.2%	55.4%	67.5%	76.0%	68.0%	59.3%	65.4%	73.6%	72.5%	72.2%	61.0%	63.5%	62.7%														
Number of appeals in year	14	18	24	25	22	15	17	15	13	15	15	15	20														
Average requirements per appeal (US\$ millions)	137	142	182	208	135	253	287	318	484	631	512	543	442														
Average funding per appeal (US\$ millions)	81	79	123	158	92	150	187	234	351	456	312	345	277														
FLASH APPEALS														2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	
Revised requirements (US\$ billions)	-	-	-	-	0.03	0.5	2.2	0.3	0.4	0.8	0.3	3.6	0.8														
Funding (US\$ billions)	-	-	-	-	0.02	0.2	1.8	0.3	0.2	0.6	0.1	2.5	0.5														
Unmet need (US\$ billions)	-	-	-	-	0.02	0.3	0.4	0.05	0.2	0.2	0.1	1.0	0.3														
% needs met	-	-	-	-	50.7%	39.8%	81.0%	85.3%	57.2%	70.8%	51.6%	71.3%	61.6%														
Number of appeals in year	-	-	-	-	2	9	10	7	15	10	8	4	1														
Average requirements per appeal (US\$ millions)	-	-	-	-	16	50	218	46	25	84	35	894	129														
Average funding per appeal (US\$ millions)	-	-	-	-	8	20	177	39	14	59	18	637	79														

TABLE 8.2: TOP 20 GOVERNMENT DONORS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, 2000-2012, US\$ MILLIONS

																			(PRELIM DATA) 2012
				2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012			
1.	US	US	US	2,043	2,068	3,421	2,908	3,845	US	US									
2.	EU institutions	EU institutions	EU institutions	1,166	1,201	1,083	1,126	1,449	EU institutions	3,805									
3.	UK	Saudi Arabia	UK	657	726	914	1,021	989	Japan	UK	1,880								
4.	Netherlands	UK	Germany	577	605	585	507	827	Germany	UK	UK	Germany	Germany	Germany	Germany	Japan	Turkey	1,167	
5.	Germany	Germany	Norway	518	581	420	460	558	Germany	Germany	Netherlands	Netherlands	Netherlands	Netherlands	Netherlands	Germany	Germany	1,039	
6.	Sweden	Sweden	Sweden	483	503	402	435	444	Netherlands	Netherlands	Netherlands	Netherlands	Netherlands	Netherlands	Sweden	Sweden	Sweden	784	
7.	Japan	Netherlands	Netherlands	430	429	398	325	367	Sweden	784									
8.	Norway	Norway	Japan	382	404	395	307	361	France	Japan	France	Sweden	France	Spain	Saudi Arabia	Norway	Norway	606	
9.	Italy	Italy	Italy	357	311	361	283	360	Norway	France	Norway	France	Spain	Spain	Saudi Arabia	Norway	Canada	521	
10.	Switzerland	France	Australia	299	307	324	279	331	Italy	Australia	Australia	Italy	Canada	Canada	Canada	Canada	Canada	509	
11.	Australia	Switzerland	France	241	274	298	262	262	Australia	Switzerland	Italy	Canada	Italy	France	Australia	Spain	Australia	509	
12.	France	Japan	Switzerland	240	249	277	257	241	Canada	Canada	Denmark	Australia	Denmark	Denmark	Norway	Norway	Norway	509	
13.	Canada	Canada	Canada	217	236	230	256	222	Switzerland	Australia	Switzerland	Denmark	Denmark	Denmark	Australia	Spain	Australia	442	
14.	Denmark	Australia	Denmark	185	211	152	207	218	Spain	Spain	Spain	Switzerland	Australia	Japan	Denmark	Netherlands	Spain	442	
15.	Spain	Denmark	Spain	162	181	136	171	154	Denmark	Denmark	Canada	Japan	Ireland	Denmark	Denmark	Denmark	Denmark	426	
16.	Belgium	Spain	Belgium	102	168	99	98	134	Belgium	Belgium	Turkey	Belgium	Saudi Arabia	Switzerland	Switzerland	Switzerland	Switzerland	408	
17.	Finland	Belgium	Finland	82	104	92	91	101	UAE	Finland	Belgium	Finland	Finland	Finland	Finland	Finland	Finland	374	
18.	Ireland	Finland	Ireland	59	88	49	59	85	Saudi Arabia	Finland	Saudi Arabia	Japan	Ireland	Finland	Finland	Finland	Finland	374	
19.	Austria	Ireland	Greece	39	56	36	54	64	Ireland	Ireland	Saudi Arabia	Ireland	Finland	Ireland	Finland	Finland	Finland	315	
20.	Greece	Luxembourg	Luxembourg	39	36	33	35	45	Turkey	Ireland	Turkey	Austria	UAE	Saudi Arabia	Ireland	Ireland	Ireland	315	

Note: Data for members of the OECD DAC, 2000-2011, includes their core ODA to UNHCR, UNRWA and WFP (as well as core ODA to EU institutions for EU15 members). It is expressed in constant 2011 prices. \*Data for 2012 is preliminary. Data for all other donors is taken from UN OCHA FTS and is in current prices (with the exception of Turkey and the Czech Republic which is based on OECD DAC data). All figures include contributions through the UN's Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and pooled funding mechanisms. Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC and UN OCHA FTS data

TABLE 8.3: TOP 20 RECIPIENTS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE FROM GOVERNMENTS DONORS AND PRIVATE CONTRIBUTIONS, 2000-2011, US\$ MILLIONS

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
1. Serbia 772	Serbia	West Bank & Gaza Strip 1,036	Afghanistan 1,029	Iraq 1,366	Iraq 1,172	Sudan 1,470	Sudan 1,476	Sudan 1,435	Sudan 1,536	Sudan 1,499	Haiti 3,145	Pakistan 1,426
2. States Ex-Gaza Strip 295	Afghanistan 608	West Bank & Gaza Strip 509	Ethiopia 842	Sudan 1,012	Pakistan 978	Indonesia 978	West Bank & Gaza Strip 622	West Bank & Gaza Strip 634	Afghanistan 943	West Bank & Gaza Strip 1,164	Pakistan 2,195	Somalia 1,107
3. West Bank & Gaza Strip 311	Serbia 329	Angola 296	Afghanistan 535	West Bank & Gaza Strip 501	Pakistan 842	Indonesia 578	DRC 443	DRC 921	Ethiopia 729	Ethiopia 921	Sudan 966	West Bank & Gaza Strip 849
4. Ethiopia 248	Ethiopia 229	Sudan 280	West Bank & Gaza Strip 501	Afghanistan 472	Iraq 753	Lebanon 561	Iraq 410	West Bank & Gaza Strip 672	Afghanistan 691	Ethiopia 662	Afghanistan 771	Afghanistan
5. Timor-Leste 185	DRC 199	DRC 278	Ethiopia 465	Sudan 385	Ethiopia 689	Pakistan 531	Ethiopia 352	West Bank & Gaza Strip 672	Afghanistan 691	Ethiopia 662	Afghanistan 771	Afghanistan
6. Afghanistan 182	Sudan 189	Ethiopia 250	Angola 336	DRC 303	Sri Lanka 595	DRC 468	Lebanon 346	Lebanon 563	Somalia 608	DRC 609	Afghanistan 645	Afghanistan 600
7. Mozambique 179	Iraq 187	Sierra Leone 190	DRC 273	Angola 231	West Bank & Gaza Strip 449	Iraq 314	Ethiopia 513	Ethiopia 513	Myanmar 606	DRC 486	Sudan 562	Sudan
8. Angola 174	India 170	States Ex-Yugoslavia 163	Eritrea 190	Liberia 186	Afghanistan 345	Bangladesh 296	Iraq 413	Iraq 413	Iraq 523	Kenya 304	Kenya 537	Kenya
9. Iraq 153	Bosnia-Herzegovina 167	Iraq 161	Burundi 160	Uganda 175	Ethiopia 369	Somalia 295	Zimbabwe 356	Zimbabwe 356	Kenya 425	Chad 292	Haiti 533	Haiti
10. Sudan 146	Angola 161	DPRK 155	Uganda 154	Burundi 175	Zimbabwe 228	Somalia 345	Pakistan 265	Pakistan 323	China 421	Somalia 256	Libya 520	Libya
11. Jordan 129	Sierra Leone 152	Somalia 145	Somalia 153	Somalia 171	Kenya 209	Kenya 267	Uganda 252	Uganda 263	Kenya 285	Niger 243	South Sudan 483	South Sudan
12. Bosnia-Herzegovina 129	States Ex-Yugoslavia 147	Jordan 133	Jordan 145	Iran 154	Eritrea 198	Eritrea 244	Uganda 244	Uganda 244	Kenya 323	Indonesia 338	Sri Lanka 221	DRC 442
13. DRC 105	Jordan 135	Serbia 124	Serbia 142	Uganda 143	Uganda 193	Uganda 186	Sri Lanka 227	Sri Lanka 227	Uganda 262	Indonesia 285	Sri Lanka 221	DRC 442
14. Tanzania 95	Mozambique 131	Tanzania 116	Sierra Leone 137	DPRK 141	Burundi 180	Burundi 162	Kenya 202	Kenya 202	Uganda 252	Sri Lanka 221	South Sudan 483	South Sudan
15. Somalia 92	Tanzania 123	Burundi 112	Tanzania 131	Eritrea 130	Liberia 155	Liberia 159	Haiti 198	Haiti 198	Uganda 224	Indonesia 285	Iraq 211	Iraq
16. India 87	Somalia 109	Kenya 100	DPRK 125	Jordan 117	India 137	India 125	Zimbabwe 171	Zimbabwe 171	Uganda 252	Sri Lanka 221	Iraq 211	Iraq
17. Lebanon 85	DPRK 108	Lebanon 98	Liberia 114	Chad 110	Liberia 117	Chad 117	Colombia 117	Colombia 117	Haiti 224	Indonesia 285	Iraq 211	Iraq
18. Indonesia 82	Kenya 96	Eritrea 93	Zimbabwe 98	Bangladesh 103	Angola 128	Angola 114	Jordan 116	Jordan 116	Uganda 252	Sri Lanka 221	Iraq 211	Iraq
19. Kenya 81	Lebanon 94	Kenya 91	Lebanon 88	Lebanon 98	Jordan 116	Jordan 116	Lebanon 115	Lebanon 115	Uganda 252	Sri Lanka 221	Iraq 211	Iraq
20. Eritrea 79	Guinea 90	Uganda 86	Kenya 82	Kenya 96	Niger 113	Niger 113	Bangladesh 115	Bangladesh 115	Lebanon 115	Lebanon 115	Lebanon 115	Lebanon

Source: OECD DAC data for DAC governments and EU institutions (including Turkey and the Czech Republic). All other data from UN OCHA FTS and UN CERF.

TABLE 8.4: TOP 20 GOVERNMENT DONORS OF OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE (ODA), EXCLUDING DEBT RELIEF, US\$ BILLIONS,

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
	US	US	US	US	US	US	US	US	US	US	US	US	US
1. Japan	14.7	14.0	15.1	16.1	22.7	22.4	22.1	23.0	27.1	29.5	30.9	28.6	29.8
2. US	12.4	11.9	11.5	10	EU institutions								
3. EU institutions	9.0	9.3	9.3	9.5	Japan	Japan	Netherlands	Japan	UK	UK	Japan	Germany	Germany
4. Germany	7.9	8.1	Germany	UK	Germany	Japan	Germany	Japan	UK	UK	UK	EU institutions	UK
5. France	5.8	6.1	UK	Germany	UK	Norway	Netherlands	Germany	France	Germany	Japan	Japan	Japan
6. UK	5.8	5.6	Netherlands	France	Netherlands	France	Sweden	UK	Japan	Japan	11.5	10.6	10.6
7. Netherlands	5.3	5.5	UK	Netherlands	Norway	Netherlands	France	France	Netherlands	Netherlands	Netherlands	Netherlands	Netherlands
8. Canada	3.3	3.2	Norway	Saudi Arabia	Saudi Arabia	Canada	Canada	Sweden	Spain	Spain	Spain	Canada	Australia
9. Denmark	3.2	3.1	Norway	Canada	Norway	UK	Canada	Sweden	Saudi Arabia	Saudi Arabia	Canada	Sweden	Sweden
10. Norway	3.0	3.1	Italy	Sweden	Sweden	Sweden	Germany	Norway	Sweden	Canada	Canada	Saudi Arabia	Canada
11. Sweden	2.9	3.0	Canada	Australia	Italy	Australia	Spain	Norway	Sweden	Canada	Norway	Australia	Norway
12. Australia	2.6	3.0	Sweden	Denmark	Spain	Australia	Denmark	Australia	Italy	Norway	Australia	Australia	Norway
13. Spain	2.4	2.5	Australia	Spain	Denmark	Denmark	Spain	Denmark	Australia	Australia	Australia	Australia	Switzerland
14. Switzerland	1.9	2.0	Spain	Denmark	Denmark	2.6	2.6	2.6	3.1	4.2	4.0	4.5	4.7
15. Italy	1.8	1.9	Switzerland	Switzerland	Switzerland	Switzerland	Switzerland	Denmark	Denmark	Denmark	Italy	Denmark	Italy
16. Belgium	1.4	1.5	Belgium	Italy	Italy	Saudi Arabia	Belgium	Belgium	Switzerland	Belgium	Italy	Denmark	Turkey
17. Finland	0.7	0.8	UAE	Belgium	UAE	Belgium	Saudi Arabia	Ireland	Belgium	Belgium	Switzerland	Switzerland	Belgium
18. UAE	0.6	0.7	Finland	UAE	Finland	Finland	Korea	Finland	Saudi Arabia	UAE	Finland	Finland	Korea
19. Austria	0.6	0.4	Ireland	Finland	Ireland	Ireland	Turkey	UAE	Ireland	Austria	Korea	Korea	Finland
20. Greece	0.5	0.4	Ireland	Austria	Austria	Austria	Ireland	0.8	0.9	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.4

Notes: Data for 2012 is preliminary. Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC data

TABLE 8.5: TOP 20 RECIPIENTS OF OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE (ODA), EXCLUDING DEBT RELIEF, US\$ BILLIONS

		2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
1.	China 2.5	India 2.7	Pakistan 2.9	Iraq 2.8	Iraq 5.4	Iraq 9.2	Iraq 6.0	Iraq 4.6	Iraq 4.9	Afghanistan 6.4	Afghanistan 6.6	Afghanistan 6.5	Afghanistan 6.5
2.	Vietnam 2.3	Pakistan 2.6	India 2.6	Vietnam 2.4	Afghanistan 2.8	Afghanistan 3.3	Afghanistan 4.1	Afghanistan 3.4	Ethiopia 4.1	Vietnam 4.1	Ethiopia 3.7	Ethiopia 3.6	Vietnam 3.6
3.	Indonesia 2.2	China 2.3	Tanzania 2.3	Vietnam 2.3	Indonesia 2.6	Pakistan 2.4	Pakistan 2.9	Vietnam 3.3	Iraq 3.3	Ethiopia 4.0	Tanzania 3.1	Ethiopia 3.5	Ethiopia 3.5
4.	Serbia 2.0	Vietnam 2.3	Vietnam 2.0	Afghanistan 2.1	China 2.1	Vietnam 2.4	Vietnam 2.3	Ethiopia 2.7	Vietnam 2.8	Tanzania 3.2	Vietnam 3.1	India 3.2	India 3.2
5.	India 2.0	Serbia 2.3	Afghanistan 2.0	Ethiopia 2.1	Tanzania 2.0	China 2.2	Sudan 2.3	Pakistan 2.4	Sudan 2.5	Iraq 2.9	Iraq 3.0	Haiti 3.0	Pakistan 3.2
6.	Bangladesh 1.6	Indonesia 2.1	Ethiopia 1.9	China 1.8	Ethiopia 2.0	Ethiopia 2.2	Ethiopia 2.1	Tanzania 2.4	Tanzania 2.4	Pakistan 2.7	India 3.0	Turkey 3.2	Turkey 3.2
7.	Mozambique 1.5	Ethiopia 1.7	Mozambique 1.9	Bangladesh 1.8	Bangladesh 1.7	India 2.2	Tanzania 2.1	Sudan 2.2	West Bank & Gaza Strip 2.4	India 2.7	Pakistan 3.0	Kenya 2.5	Kenya 2.5
8.	Egypt 1.5	Bangladesh 1.5	Indonesia 1.8	Indonesia 1.6	Pakistan 1.7	Pakistan 2.1	Mozambique 1.7	Mozambique 1.9	Mozambique 2.3	India 2.3	West Bank & Gaza Strip 2.7	Gaza Strip 2.5	Tanzania 2.4
9.	Tanzania 1.4	Tanzania 1.5	DRC 1.7	Serbia 1.5	Mozambique 1.6	Pakistan 1.8	Uganda 1.7	Uganda 1.9	Uganda 2.1	Bangladesh 2.4	Iraq 2.2	West Bank & Gaza Strip 2.5	West Bank & Gaza Strip 2.4
10.	Uganda 1.2	Mozambique 1.4	Tanzania 1.6	Jordan 1.5	Egypt 1.6	Tanzania 1.8	India 1.6	West Bank & Gaza Strip 1.8	Mozambique 2.0	DRC 2.4	Nigeria 2.2	DRC 2.3	DRC 2.3
11.	Ethiopia 1.1	Egypt 1.4	Egypt 1.4	Mozambique 1.5	Uganda 1.5	Mozambique 1.6	China 1.1.5	China 1.7	Uganda 1.7	Mozambique 2.1	DRC 2.1	Mozambique 2.1	Mozambique 2.1
12.	Bosnia -Herzegovina 1.0	Uganda 1.3	West Bank & Gaza Strip 1.4	Uganda 1.3	Serbia 1.4	Bangladesh 1.6	West Bank & Gaza Strip 1.5	Bangladesh 1.6	DRC 1.7	Uganda 1.9	Sudan 2.1	Iraq 1.9	Iraq 1.9
13.	Zambia 1.0	West Bank & Gaza Strip 1.1	States Ex-Yugoslavia 1.2	West Bank & Gaza Strip 1.3	West Bank & Gaza Strip 1.4	DRC 1.5	Indonesia 1.4	India 1.4	Pakistan 1.5	Kenya 1.9	Mozambique 2.1	Kenya 1.8	Kenya 1.8
14.	Ghana 0.9	Bosnia -Herzegovina 1.0	Bangladesh 1.2	Ghana 1.2	Ghana 1.3	Sri Lanka 1.4	Bangladesh 1.4	Kenya 1.4	China 1.5	Nigeria 1.8	Uganda 1.8	Nigeria 1.8	Nigeria 1.8
15.	Nicaragua 0.9	Ghana 1.0	Zambia 1.2	Bolivia 1.2	DRC 1.3	Uganda 1.4	DRC 1.4	Nigeria 1.2	Kenya 1.4	Ghana 1.7	Ghana 1.8	Haiti 1.7	Haiti 1.7
16.	West Bank & Gaza Strip 0.9	Bolivia 1.0	Uganda 1.1	Colombia 1.0	Sudan 1.2	Ghana 1.3	Ghana 1.3	Ghana 1.2	Kenya 1.4	Turkey 1.4	Kenya 1.7	Uganda 1.6	Uganda 1.6
20.	Thailand 0.9	Honduras 1.0	Serbia 1.1	Philippines 1.0	Bolivia 1.0	West Bank & Gaza Strip 1.2	Colombia 1.1	DRC 1.2	Indonesia 1.3	Zambia 1.3	Indonesia 1.5	Bangladesh 1.5	Bangladesh 1.5

Note: ODA from DAC donors and multilateral institutions. Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC data

TABLE 8.6: 20 LARGEST GOVERNMENT CONTRIBUTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, 2012

RANK	BIGGEST DONORS IN 2012 (US\$ m)	MOST GENEROUS COUNTRIES IN 2012 (% GNI)	MOST GENEROUS COUNTRIES IN 2012 (US\$ PER CITIZEN)	MOST GENEROUS COUNTRIES IN 2012 (% GNI)	MOST GENEROUS COUNTRIES IN 2012 (US\$ PER CITIZEN)	MOST PRIORITY TO HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE WITHIN OVERALL AID PROGRAMMES IN 2012 (% ODA)		
1.	US	3,805	Luxembourg	0.16%	Luxembourg	142	Turkey	41%
2.	EU institutions	1,880	Sweden	0.14%	Norway	101	Luxembourg	16%
3.	UK	1,167	Turkey	0.13%	Sweden	82	Ireland	16%
4.	Turkey	1,039	Norway	0.10%	Denmark	56	Sweden	14%
5.	Sweden	784	Denmark	0.09%	Switzerland	47	Finland	13%
6.	Germany	757	Ireland	0.08%	Finland	34	US	13%
7.	Japan	606	Finland	0.07%	Ireland	30	Switzerland	12%
8.	Canada	521	Switzerland	0.05%	Netherlands	25	Italy	11%
9.	Norway	509	Netherlands	0.05%	Liechtenstein	22	Spain	11%
10.	Australia	442	UK	0.05%	Belgium	20	Denmark	11%
11.	Netherlands	426	Belgium	0.04%	Australia	19	Norway	11%
12.	France	408	Australia	0.03%	Qatar	19	EU institutions	10%
13.	Switzerland	374	Canada	0.03%	UK	18	Greece	9%
14.	Denmark	315	New Zealand	0.03%	Canada	15	Kuwait	9%
15.	Italy	312	US	0.02%	Turkey	14	Canada	9%
16.	Spain	230	Qatar	0.02%	US	12	New Zealand	9%
17.	Belgium	220	Germany	0.02%	Monaco	10	Belgium	9%
18.	Finland	185	Saudi Arabia	0.02%	Germany	9	UK	9%
19.	Ireland	137	Spain	0.02%	New Zealand	9	Australia	8%
20.	Saudi Arabia	90	Liechtenstein	0.02%	Austria	7	Malta	8%

Notes: GNI and population data for OECD DAC members are based on data collected by the OECD DAC [in constant 2011 prices]; GNI and population data for donors who are not members of the OECD DAC are based on World Bank data [current prices]. ODA for all donors is based on OECD DAC data inclusive of debt relief except for Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) which is ODA-like concessional flows collected by the OECD DAC. All donors are based on preliminary data for 2012, excluding Bulgaria, BRICS, Cyprus, Kuwait, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, Saudi Arabia and Thailand, which is based on 2011 data, except for Brazil which is based on the latest available year, 2009. Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC data

TABLE 8.7: INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO TOP 20 RECIPIENTS, IN THE CONTEXT WITH OTHER OFFICIAL AND PRIVATE FLOWS IN 2011, US\$ MILLIONS

RANK	DOMESTIC FLOWS			OFFICIAL INTERNATIONAL FLOWS			PRIVATE FLOWS	
	GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE	PEACEKEEPING	OTHER OFFICIAL FLOWS	DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE	INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE	REMITTANCES	FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT	
Sudan	11,615	2,287	85	1,074	562	442		1,936
West Bank & Gaza Strip	n/a	15	8	2,357	849	1,545		214
Afghanistan	4,131	950	102	6,490	771	462		83
Pakistan	40,492	8	237	3,213	1,426	12,263		1,327
Ethiopia	4,280	-	154	3,508	681	513		206
Iraq	80,558	242	n/a	1,871	299	386		1,617
Haiti	2,089	587	31	1,703	533	1,551		181
DRC	4,392	1,456	-2,063	2,298	442	n/a		1,687
Somalia	n/a	152	0.1	985	1,107	n/a		102
Indonesia	155,258	-	17	379	168	6,924		18,906
Kenya	9,013	-	444	2,476	537	934		335
Sri Lanka	10,571	-	192	603	135	5,193		300
Zimbabwe	3,060	-	1	715	163	n/a		387
Lebanon	11,128	562	-129	441	139	7,531		3,200
Chad	2,722	-	15	468	261	n/a		1,855
Uganda	3,259	7	41	1,580	56	949		792
Jordan	9,393	-	26	729	155	3,453		1,469
Burundi	869	-	-	578	46	45		2
Myanmar	9,760	-	-1	375	92	127		850
Angola	38,067	-	33	198	9	0.2		-5,586

Notes: Top 20 recipients are for the period 2002-2011. All figures are net, therefore some values are negative. Source: Development Initiatives based on World Bank, SIPRI, IMF, UNCTAD, OECD DAC and UN OCHA FTS

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

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
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