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Turning off the Taps: The Termination of State Sponsorship

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ABSTRACT

Why do some states terminate their sponsorship of rebel movements while others are persistent in their provision of support? In the past, most research on external support to insurgents has focused on why states choose to sponsor rebel groups and particularly how this affects conflict duration. However, we know little about the termination of such support. This is surprising given that support has been shown to make armed conflicts more intractable and tremendous efforts are made in condemning and sanctioning such behavior. This study constitutes the first large-N analysis of support termination, employing survival analysis on global data of state support to rebel movements between 1975–2009. Surprisingly, the findings indicate that only some of the factors that explain support provision can offer insights into its termination. In particular, support is more likely to be terminated when no ethnic kinship bonds exist between the rebel movement and the government of the supporting state. Many decisions to withdraw support also seem to coincide with the transition from the Cold War. Threats and sanctions from other states appear largely ineffective. The study contributes to our understanding of the international dimensions of civil war and the role and motives of third parties.

KEYWORDS

external support termination; state sponsorship; rebel patronage; third party interventions; international dimensions of civil war

Introduction

Why do some states terminate their sponsorship of rebel movements while others are persistent in their provision of support? While most research has focused on the question of why states provide material support to rebels, we know little about why states stop providing support.[1] This is surprising given that other states, human rights organizations and international bodies such as the UN frequently condemn and sanction states with the explicit aim of terminating rebel patronage. Findings from previous research accentuate the need to address the question of support termination. Civil conflicts with external support tend to be longer, more deadly and less likely to end in a negotiated settlement.[2] Rebels that receive assistance are more prone to target civilians, less likely to enter into agreements, and less likely to embrace democracy if they become the new executive.[3] Outside support serves to strengthen the group's capacity for violence at the same time as it can make the group less dependent on its local constituency. Moreover, conflicts with external support often trigger interstate disputes.[4] Given all of the negative effects that external support has on conflict dynamics, we need to explore what factors that are associated with its termination.

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State support at the outset of a civil war does not necessarily translate into sustained assistance over the entire duration of the conflict. Access to external resources from state sponsors fluctuates over time and this has important consequences for the dynamics of conflict. In comparison to state governments which often possess numerous options for revenue generation and troop supply, rebel groups have no comparable bureaucratic structure or state treasury. This makes supplies from external state sponsors crucial as the presence or absence of such resources contributes to the organizational capacity of the rebel group. This in turn shapes the group's calculations as to whether continued struggle or alternative options such as negotiations are preferable.[5]

While some state sponsors terminate their support, others provide persistent support throughout the duration of the armed conflict. The main backers of the rebel group National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA)— the United States and Zaire— terminated their support in the beginning of the 1980s after previously having provided the group with funding, weapons and other types of support. This termination contributed to the collapse and disintegration of the rebel movement.[6] Nicaragua on the other hand maintained a close relationship with the rebel group Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) in El Salvador from its creation. The group thus benefited greatly from consistent weapon supplies, training and logistical support.[7] These two cases highlight the fact that external state support varies over time and across cases. However, we know almost nothing about why and when states choose to withdraw their support to rebel groups. This is noteworthy, especially in light of the many negative consequences of external support to rebel movements identified by previous research.

This article provides the first large-N analysis of this phenomenon by employing survival analysis on global data on state sponsorship to rebel groups in active armed conflicts between 1975–2009. To this end, it draws on data from the UCDP External Support Dataset.[8] I identify and test two clusters of explanatory factors and their effect on support termination. First, I identify a set of factors previous research has found to be associated with support provision and examine whether these can offer insights into the dynamics of termination. Since most of the factors in this first cluster (such as strategic rivalries or ethnic kinship ties) demonstrate very little variation over time, they can tell us something about which dyads are likely to experience terminations but little in regard to when support is likely to end. I thus propose a second cluster of factors that I refer to as triggers, which move beyond the time-invariant explanations offered by previous research. Examples include sanctions or threats made by other states. These factors focus on changes that may more directly decrease the willingness and/or opportunity of the state sponsor.

Surprisingly, the results demonstrate that several factors that are robust predictors of support provision in previous research are not necessarily related to the termination of support, namely: interstate rivalries, support to the government side and the regime type of the state sponsor. This suggests that the explanations for the provision and termination of support are to some degree distinct. However, some factors that explain support provision can offer insights into its termination. Ethnic kinship ties and the impact of the Cold War seem to consistently matter. Governments are more likely to terminate their support to rebel movements if they do not belong to the same ethnic group. Moreover, many state sponsors ended their support during the transition from the Cold War. State sponsors differ in how reliable they are and states that have previously ended their support for a rebel movement are more likely to withdraw it again if support was reintroduced.

Interestingly, most factors that could constitute potential triggers for support termination do not have any discernable impact. State sponsors seem to be generally unmoved by domestic shocks such as economic hardship, leadership shifts and the outbreak of armed conflict within their own borders. Similarly, threats or sanctions from other states appear ineffective in altering the behavior of the sponsors.

The article proceeds as follows. The next section elaborates on previous research on state sponsorship of rebel groups. I survey the general literature on support provision since many scholars have by addressing this question also implicitly rendered theoretical expectations as to why external support might be terminated. Based on this I formulate some initial hypotheses. The following section then discusses potential triggers as to when support is likely to be terminated and presents additional hypotheses. After this, the research design and data structure are described before turning to the results. The article ends with some concluding remarks.

External support to rebel groups

Intrastate conflicts are seldom purely internal. The categorization of conflicts as "internal" was questioned by scholars already in the 1960s and it is now becoming a well-established empirical fact that many, if not most, conflicts experience some type of external involvement.[9,10] Outside states often seek influence by supporting the warring parties either directly, through participating with troops, or indirectly, through supplying the belligerents with arms, money, military advisors etc. Contemporary examples include the civil wars in Syria, Ukraine and Yemen in which the rebel groups rely heavily on resources provided by external state sponsors. Building on the broader intervention literature, a strand of research that addresses the question of state support to rebel groups and its adverse effects on conflict dynamics has emerged in recent years.[11]

I acknowledge that the negative influences of external support on conflict dynamics are by no means limited to state support to rebels. State support to governments can have equally detrimental effects and often both parties in a civil war receive support simultaneously.[12] However, I focus on rebel support as it differs from support to governments when it comes to the decision-making process and potential costs. Support to rebels violates the principle of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other states while support to governments is often invited and welcomed by the incumbent regime and justified under provisions of security assistance and counter-terrorism efforts. Thus, while rebel support is convention- breaking and often covert, regime support is often overt and carried out under bilateral or multilateral agreements between states. States may support governments because of alliance commitments, security agreements and economic interdependence, but this is seldom the case when it comes to rebel groups. Exploring the termination of external support to governments would hence require a focus on several factors that do not directly have any bearing on the termination of state support to rebel groups.

Support to rebels is often depicted in principal-agent terms in which the supporting state is seen as the principal and the rebel movement acts as the agent.[13] This means that it takes two in order for external support to be provided. The state sponsor must offer support and the rebel group needs to accept this offer. However, when it comes to termination, it is sufficient that either the supporter or the receiver alter their position for change to occur. While creating the initial relationship might require the consent of

both actors, breaking it only requires that one party is willing to do so. Considering that external support contributes to rebel group capacity and offers strategic advantages, we should expect that rebel groups would rarely stop accepting support. External resources help to reduce the asymmetric power relation between the rebel group and the government at the same time as they increase the group's bargaining power vis-à-vis the state.[14] Assuming that a rebel movement acts in a rational manner, it is likely to prefer more over fewer resources as long as these are not associated with any increased costs.

Earlier studies have highlighted reduced legitimacy in the eyes of the local constituency and decreased autonomy as potential costs rebel groups face when accepting support.[15] However, it is highly unlikely that rebels would terminate a fruitful sponsorship to regain legitimacy since the principal reputational damage would already have been caused by the prior decision to accept external sponsors. The possibility of recovering legitimacy by refuting support at a later stage seems doubtful. Decreased autonomy by the rebel group might be more closely linked to support termination but it should be preceded by the supporting state putting pressure or new demands on the group. Based on this reasoning, I assume that the state sponsor is by far the most central actor of the two when it comes to the termination of support. This does not mean that the agency of the rebel group is unimportant. It merely implies that the decision to terminate support ultimately rests with the state sponsor. The performance and behavior of the rebel group can naturally influence the calculus of the supporter.

The termination of external support

What can previous research tell us about support termination? Since there is basically no existing research on support termination I leverage previous research on why support is provided to formulate some initial hypotheses. In essence we should expect that support would no longer be provided when the determinants as to why it was given in the first place are no longer present. This means that we will need to use the flip sides of the theoretical arguments provided in the literature on why support is provided. I then go on to explore common conceptions about when we could think that states would end their support to generate additional hypotheses regarding triggers. I will now turn to some of the main explanations offered.

The most prevalent explanation for why rebel support is provided focuses on strategic rivalries between states in the international system. Rebel movements are seen as foreign policy tools used by states to weaken their rivals. Empowerment of rebel groups is hence an indirect conflict tactic employed by states.[16] Rivals such as India and Pakistan, Iraq and Iran or Ethiopia and Eritrea have consistently provided support to each other's rebel groups over the years. The state rivalry explanation for external support has become so established in the literature that many scholars now strictly limit their empirical investigation to states engaged in rivalries.[17] This suggests that support termination should be more likely if there is no rivalry between the supporter and the government involved in a civil war.

H1: The absence of state rivalry increases the probability of support termination

Another explanation, partly related to that of interstate rivalries, asserts that external support to a rebel group can be seen as a direct response to another state's support of the

government side. Support to one of the warring parties often provokes support to the other party— a dynamic that Regan refers to as "balanced interventions".[18] Several scholars have pointed to the importance of relationships between different outside states as a key motivating factor for support provision.[19] In essence, this explanation predicts that states seek to support the weaker side in conflicts to balance the power of the state supporting the stronger side. Although similar to the logic of interstate rivalries this explanation goes beyond the dyad that consists of the supporting state and the government in civil war. Here, the important relationship (or rivalry) is located outside of this dyad. The dynamics during the Cold War largely follow this pattern as the two superpowers of the time often backed opposing sides. For instance, when the Soviet Union offered support to the Afghan regime in the late 1970s, the United States "balanced" by intervening on the side of the rebels. The balancing mechanism should however not be at work if there was no support to the government side.

H2: No support to the government side increases the probability of support termination

Some scholars have also stressed the importance of ethnic kinship ties between the supporting country and the rebel group.[20] Here the provision of external support is motivated by affinity rather than enmity. This argument is conditioned on the ethnic group in the supporting state actually holding a position of executive power and therefore being able to influence foreign policy decision-making. According to this logic, a government of a state would be more supportive if it shared ethnic ties with the rebel group. Members of ethnic groups care about the welfare of other group members well beyond borders.[21] The presence of a shared ethnicity can decrease the probability of divergent preferences and hence lead to a closer connection between the supporting state and the rebel group.[22] The inverse to this would be that support is more likely to be terminated if no such connections exist.

H3: The absence of kinship ties increases the probability of support termination

The regime type of the state sponsor influences the decision to offer support. Autocratic states are generally more likely to offer support to rebel movements than democracies.[23] An autocratic supporter is less constrained than its democratic counterpart with regard to policy choices. Democratic states have a harder time getting away with supporting a rebel movement without it becoming publicly known and they are typically more responsive to the public, which also suggests that terminations might be more common compared to autocracies. The decision of the United States to end the support of the Contras in Nicaragua in the late 1980s reflected a concern voiced by Congress and the public on the effectiveness of such aid.[24] In addition, it has been suggested that democratic sponsors are more sensitive than autocratic states to atrocities committed by rebel groups.[25]

H4: A democratic supporter increases the probability of support termination

Several scholars have accounted for the frequent provision of external support during the Cold War, particularly in many armed conflicts located in the 'third world'.[26] The structure of the international system divided into a Western and an Eastern bloc which both channeled support that fueled various ideological struggles around the world was an

environment conducive of support provision. However, as the Cold War came to an end with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Berlin Wall it is likely that the international system changed as many antagonistic relationships faded away. Hence, we would expect a systemic difference in that support termination would be more likely in the aftermath of the Cold War.

H5: The post-Cold War period is more conducive of support termination

These factors highlight important variation across units. However, the proposed explanations are structural in that they do not vary significantly over time. State rivalries usually last several decades, support to the government side tends to be persistent, regime types tend to be stable and ethnic kinship ties rarely change over time. I will investigate the explanatory power of these factors as a first step and then I will move on to look at more proximate changes that might be more closely related to the timing of support termination. The next section discusses such proximate shifts and proposes a second set of factors that vary over time and that potentially could account for when support ends.

Triggers—When external support ends

To identify triggers, i.e. dynamic factors that might be able to account for when support would terminate, I propose that the opportunity and willingness framework from foreign policy analysis initially developed by Most and Starr provides a useful framework to think about changes that could affect the likelihood of support termination.[27] The main benefit of this framework is that it puts the spotlight on the decision-making process of the most important actor: the state sponsor. The theory is based on the assumption that states act in the international arena when they can (opportunity) and when they want to (willingness). Behavioral variation thus depends on the fact that not all states share similar preferences nor do they have equal capacities to pursue those preferences. The notion of opportunity is described as "possibilities that are available to any entity within any environment, representing the total set of environmental constraints and possibilities."[28] Willingness on the other hand is related to "a decision-maker's calculations of advantage and disadvantage, costs and benefits, considered on both conscious and unconscious levels".[29] Instead of using the framework as it often has been used in the past (i.e. relating factors that increase the actor's willingness and/or opportunity to make an event more likely) I will use the reversed logic and try to identify shifts that might *decrease* the opportunity or willingness of the supporting state. It is important to note however that changes do not necessarily have to come from within the supporting state but can just as well be related to changes in its external environment. It is of key importance however that these changes have consequences that affect the calculations of the state sponsor. The act of terminating support could either (1) be a conscious move in which the supporting state actively chooses to withdraw it or (2) stem from a situation in which the sponsor is no longer capable of providing support. While the first points to decreased willingness, the second highlights reduced opportunities.

The agency of a state lies in the agency of its political leaders.[30] In the end, foreign policy choices are made by humans occupying positions of political power so it is therefore not inconceivable to assume that their perceptions and ideas matter. Changes in a state sponsor's leadership may therefore have important consequences for support

provision. As new leaders come to power with different policy preferences than their predecessors they may be reluctant to continue the provision of support to a particular rebel movement. In essence, leadership shifts within the supporting state can alter the willingness of the state sponsor to continue providing support. A period of political transition provides a window of opportunity for major policy changes.[31] The emergence of new leadership in the Soviet Union in the late 1980s is usually seen as an important factor for the dissolution of the USSR, the end of the Cold War and the subsequent termination of support to many Marxist rebel groups. President Mikhail Gorbachev's new policy preferences promoting openness, restructuring, democratization and economic development are a prime example of how leadership shifts have the ability to widely change the foreign policy goals of a particular country. However, it is similarly possible that new leaders just continue the same policies as their predecessors when they assume power. For a policy change to occur it is thus crucial that the new leader wants to distance herself from policy choices made by the previous regime. This would be more likely when the leadership transition is combined with a change in the support base of the leader. If the new leader relies on different societal groups to stay in power than her predecessor, she is much more likely to be detached from their policy decisions.

H6: Leadership shifts involving a change in support base increase the probability of support termination

States also need to have the capabilities necessary to ensure continued support. It is possible that some state sponsors maintain a willingness to provide support but are forced to terminate it based on reduced capabilities. Periods of economic hardship in which the national economy is suffering might affect the capability of the state sponsor to continue support provision. A period of economic recession can call for a reallocation of resources in which the state needs to use its resources for more acute issues than rebel sponsorship. Thus a contraction of a state's economy might lead to a reevaluation of the decision to provide support. Libya's fading support to rebel movements abroad in the 1990s coincided with a stagnating economy because of a substantial drop in the price of crude oil— the country's most important export— as well as economic mismanagement by the country's leadership.[32]

H7: Economic hardship increases the probability of support termination

Other domestic shocks than economic downturns can also affect the opportunity of the state sponsor to continue the provision of material support. The outbreak of an armed conflict within the territory of the supporter might force a reassessment of how resources are used. Political instability at home might force the sponsor to shift its resources to address domestic unrest rather than contributing to acts of destabilization abroad. For example, the war in Afghanistan in 2001 is likely to have disrupted some of the support that the Taliban regime was channeling to various rebel groups in neighboring Pakistan.

H8: The outbreak of an armed conflict within the state sponsor increases the probability of support termination

Allegations of rebel support sometimes come to the attention of the international community. Following this, other states might decide to issue threats of sanctions in order to force the state sponsor to change its policy. Some scholars have found that naming and shaming has a significant impact on states' use of repressive tactics against their own population so it is possible that a similar effect exists in regard to rebel patronage.[33] The behavioral change is not necessarily caused by the act of shaming itself but threats can function as a signal for possible future actions. Issuing threats could be interpreted as a first step on a ladder of potential actions against the supporter (such as sanctions or military involvement). As threats hence have the potential to become costly and have dire consequences the leadership within the state sponsor would take this information into account and consider support termination a viable option to limit future costs. Military threats made by Turkey are said to be one of the main motivations why Syria abandoned its support of PKK in 1998. This led to the expulsion of the organization's leader Abdullah Ocalan, which subsequently facilitated his capture and weakened the organization.[34]

If state sponsors ignore the threats made by other states they could potentially face sanctions. The sanctions implemented by the European Union towards Russia because of its support of separatists in Eastern Ukraine are one contemporary example of this.[35] Previous research on the success of sanctions has found mixed results, but few scholars have looked specifically at sanctions targeting rebel patronage.[36] If effective, economic sanctions could have a substantial impact on the economy of the state sponsor which in turn would reduce the capacity of the targeted state to provide support. The decision of Libya to end much of its support to various rebel organizations was at least partly influenced by the implementation of economic sanctions.[37]

H9: Threats of sanctions towards the state sponsor increase the probability of support termination

H10: Sanctions against the state sponsor increase the probability of support termination

Research design and data

I use a Cox proportional hazards model to estimate the effects of the independent variables on the risk of state-sponsored support to rebel movements terminating at a particular point in time given that the support has lasted up until that point.[38] Since I have no strong theoretical expectations about the shape or nature of the baseline hazard rate it would be inappropriate to use a parametric model. As long as time in itself is not of substantive importance, but rather a nuisance parameter, there is no reason why one would prefer a parametric model over the Cox model.[39] If the distribution of failure times is parameterized incorrectly the interpretations afforded parametric models might not hold. Furthermore, the Cox model has the advantage of being able to handle data with coterminous events (tied data).[40]

I define the universe of cases as all years in which an internal armed conflict was active and in which a rebel group initially received support from an external state.[41] To identify years of external support I rely on data from the UCDP External Support—Disaggregated/Supporter v.1.0–2011 Dataset.[42] This dataset has three main advantages. First, it is time-varying. This allows me to account for how external support varies over

both space and time. Second, it encompasses all important forms of material support. Many of the alternative datasets are limited to certain forms of support (such as troop support since many studies limit their investigation to military interventions). Third, it focuses on instances of intentional support given to strengthen a particular party in a conflict and this serves the aim of this study well. Its main source of information is the Factiva database which carries over 28, 000 different newswires, newspapers and other sources and has global coverage. In addition, books, case studies, journals, UN reports, NGO publications (Human Rights Watch, Amnesty etc.) and online databases were also consulted. The subset of the data I use only includes states as supporters and it is limited to confirmed instances of external support to rebels.[43]

An observation enters the dataset the first year that a rebel group receives external support. The failure time starts the following year. In survival analysis, a specific observation is at any given point in time "at risk" of experiencing a certain event. In this study, that event is the termination of state support. The units which are not observed experiencing the event, i.e. when no transition is made from having support to losing it, are treated as right-censored at the end of the period. The dataset contains some discontinuous intervals of risk since the data are limited to years with active armed conflict. Survival analysis can accommodate this.[44] In this case we might see discontinuous intervals of risk due to periods in which the conflict is inactive. If for instance Cuba provides external support to ANC in South Africa 1981–83 and 1985–8, we would simply continue counting the duration of support as if 1984 did not exist. This is reasonable since we do not observe inactive conflict years.[45] The survival time represents the duration of support before it is terminated. It is important to note that all conflicts remained active the year after support was last observed. This assures that the termination of support is not merely related to the fact that the armed conflict itself ended. I allow for repeated failures, which allows me to account for those instances in which support is withdrawn for a year or more but then provided once more; a period of at least one year is required for it to be considered an entirely new act of support. Finally, since the main factors explored concern the state sponsor, the standard errors are clustered on the supporter.

The unit of analysis is the supporter-receiver dyad year. An example is United States-Contras in 1982. There are 350 dyads in the dataset with 1248 observations; of these roughly 16% (200) constitute terminations. The time period covered is 1975–2009, which is determined by data availability. Figure 1 illustrates the data graphically.

It is evident from Figure 1 that external support to rebel groups is not just a Cold War phenomenon. Although support has decreased dramatically in the aftermath of the Cold War, this reduction is mainly a result of the general trend that the number of armed conflicts has also declined since the 1990s. There is a rather even dispersion of support terminations over the years and the fall of the Soviet Union only accounts directly for a minor fraction of all support terminations. We see a significant reduction of rebel support after 2001. It is possible that the Global War on Terror has made it more politically costly for states to provide support to rebel groups as many of these groups were increasingly denoted as terrorists after 9/11.

The failure event *support termination* is based on the first year in which support was no longer observed. This ensures that the independent variables occur before the year of termination. The failure event in combination with the failure time (the duration of support in years) constitutes the dependent variable in this study, capturing the time from support onset to termination.



Figure 1. Patterns of support termination

To assess interstate rivalries I use an updated version of Thompson's data on strategic rivalries.[4647] The rivalry dataset is based on qualitative accounts, particularly foreign policy histories of governments, belligerent public statements and acts of aggression between countries. If the supporter and target state are considered rivals, the variable *rivalry* takes on the value of (1) and (0) otherwise. In order to determine the effect of ethnic kinship ties I rely on data from Forsberg to identify the ethnicity of rebel groups and match this with data on ethnic groups in power from the Ethnic Power Relations dataset for each state sponsor.,[4849] If the rebel group and the government of a state sponsor share the same ethnicity, the variable *ethnic kinship* takes on the value of (1) and (0) otherwise. *Government support* intends to capture balancing behavior outside the supporter-target dyad. This will be assessed by including a measure of external support to the government side in the conflict and the data come from the UCDP External Support— Primary Warring Party Dataset v.1.0–2011.[50] The variable takes the value (1) if there is at least one confirmed instance of external support to the government in a given year and (0) otherwise.[51] To determine whether there might be a structural difference in the international system during the Cold War period I have added a Cold War dummy that breaks in 1989 denoted *Cold War*. To see whether most terminations are associated more directly with the transition from the Cold War I also included a variable looking specifically at this change. Thus, *end of Cold War* is a binary variable in which observations in the year of transition from the Cold War (1989) are given the value (1) and all other observations (0). In addition, I specifically model whether previous instances of support termination influence the probability that support will be withdrawn once more. This binary variable is denoted *previous termination*.

The data on leadership shifts comes from the Archigos dataset on leaders v. 2.9.[52] Data about changes in the support base of the leader comes from the "Change in Source of Leader Support Data" (CHISOLS).[5354] Using these two sources I create a dummy variable called *leadership shift* that denotes whether there was a leadership transition which also involved a change in the support base of the leader. Economic hardship was measured using data from the World Development Index on yearly GDP growth, collected from the Quality of Government dataset.[55] This has been supplemented with calculations based on the Expanded Trade and GDP Data 4.1 to reduce the amount of observations with missing

data.[56] To facilitate interpretation I have recoded this variable to measure the degree of *economic hardship*, which is a continuous measure of the amount of negative GDP growth within the state sponsor any given year. Data on threats as well as sanctions targeting the state sponsors come from the Threat and Imposition of Sanctions dataset.[57] To measure *threats* I include a binary variable that denotes whether the state sponsor was threatened by sanctions specifically because of its support of non-state armed groups. The binary variable measuring the implementation of *sanctions* however includes all sanctions that have been imposed against the state sponsor regardless of rationale as long as they were deemed to have had major or severe economic costs for the target. This is appropriate since I want to capture the reduced capacity of the state.

Results

What factors are associated with the termination of external support? Table 1 reports the results from the Cox proportional hazards model.

I turn first to the initial cluster of factors derived from previous research on support provision. All predictions except the one in regard to regime type are in the hypothesized direction. However, they vary in terms of statistical significance. Ethnic kinship ties between the state sponsor and the rebel group is significant and demonstrates a large effect. States are more likely to end support if there are no ethnic kinship ties between the state sponsor and the

Table 1. External support termination 1975–2009.

	DV: Support termination
Rivalry	0.66
	(−1.60)
Government support	0.79
	(−0.70)
Government support (time)	0.71*
	(1.80)
Ethnic kinship	0.33**
	(−2.48)
Democratic supporter	0.82
	(−0.49)
End of Cold War	2.82***
	(2.73)
Leadership shift	1.61*
	(1.76)
Economic hardship	0.98
	(−0.86)
Conflict onset in sponsor	1.86
	(1.46)
Threat of sanctions	0.41
	(−1.16)
Implemented sanctions	0.90
	(−0.41)
Previous termination	1.57**
	(2.14)
Observations	1183
Subjects	317
Failures	185

Hazard ratios reported. A ratio with a value above 1 indicates an increased risk for support termination, while a value below 1 indicates a decreased risk for support termination. z-statistics in parentheses; * p<0.1 ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

rebel movement. The presence of ethnic ties decreases the hazard ratio of support termination by roughly 67 percent. This means that not only are ethnic kinship ties associated with the provision of external support, as indicated by previous research, but transnational bonds also make support less likely to be terminated once it has been provided. This finding contributes to the ethnic conflict literature as it provides yet another insight into the transnational dimension of these particularly entrenched conflicts.

Interstate rivalries as well as support to the government side do not reach conventional levels of statistical significance. However, the hazard ratios are in line with our theoretical expectations. The variables related to the Cold War demonstrate that the end of the global competition between the United States and USSR has led to an international environment that is more conducive to support termination. State sponsors were more likely to stop their patronage at the time of transition from the Cold War: the hazard ratio increases by as much as 182 percent during this year. The hazard ratio for support termination in the aftermath of the Cold War is also higher than during the Cold War.[58]

The regime type of the state sponsor does not seem to influence the probability of support termination. Democratic states are not any more likely than autocratic states to stop supporting rebels. States do however differ in how reliable they are as backers. States that have previously withdrawn their support at a certain point in time are much more likely to do so again if they offer that particular group renewed support. State sponsors with a history of previous withdrawal/s have a hazard ratio that is approximately 57 percent higher than the baseline.

I now turn to the triggers and the question of timing. When is support likely to end? The results contradict commonly held beliefs. Surprisingly, the results do not support any of the hypotheses regarding triggers. Leadership shifts increase the hazard ratio of termination by roughly 61 percent in the hypothesized direction but do not reach standard levels of statistical significance and are not robust to alternative model specifications.[59] Economic hardship— measured as negative GDP growth within the state sponsor— does not have any significant effect on external support termination. It might not be enough that a particular country suffers from negative GDP growth in a given year. Since rebel support is a rather low-cost foreign policy choice a state might have to face a much more severe situation before economic prerogatives influence their capabilities to the extent that they become unable or unwilling to provide support.[60] The onset of an armed conflict in the supporting state is also not sufficient to impact the termination of support. It is hard to imagine any other disruption that would have a more pronounced effect on the state sponsor's capacity than the outbreak of an armed conflict within its own borders. Yet sponsors are not likely to end their support to rebels even when they are confronted with significant domestic troubles. This suggests that support termination is more likely to be connected to changes in a state sponsor's incentive structure rather than its capabilities.

In general it seems difficult for other states to pressure state sponsors to cease their support. The results indicate that both threats of sanctions and the implementation of major sanctions do not affect the probability that a state sponsor withdraws its support to a particular rebel movement. This finding is in line with most scholars' general assessment about the effectiveness of sanctions, namely, that sanctions rarely produce the preferred policy outcome.[61] It is still possible that other forms of naming and shaming or back-door diplomacy may impact on support termination but these factors are difficult to capture with a large-N research design.

The results highlight two larger points. First, explanations used to explain the provision of support cannot equally well explain its termination. Ethnic kinship ties and the impact of the Cold War are the only factors from previous research that are robust across all different model specifications. This suggests that the provision and termination of support have partly separate causes. Second, factors that we might think of as being potential triggers for support termination do not have any significant effect. State sponsors seem to be generally unmoved by leadership shifts, economic hardship, the outbreak of armed conflict, threats and sanctions. This means that further research is needed to uncover other potential mechanisms that can account for exactly when external support is likely to come to an end.

Robustness and extensions

A number of robustness checks and extensions were conducted in order to further evaluate the results. All tests as well as descriptive statistics and diagnostics are available in the online appendix. I used tests based on the Schoenfeld residuals to check for duration dependence. The test indicated that the government support variable violated the proportional hazards assumption assumed by the main model. In order to address this I included an interaction term between the offending covariate and a function of time as suggested by Box-Steffensmeier and Jones.[6263]

State sponsors may care about the performance and behavior of the rebel group. As an extension I estimated additional models that included two time-varying factors related to rebel group dynamics that could affect the calculations of the state sponsor. Because of limited data availability these variables restrict the sample size to less than half of its original size. The first factor measures whether the rebel group is becoming weaker. It is possible that support would be terminated if a rebel group no longer meets the expectations of the supporter. State sponsors prefer viable challengers and are thus more likely to abandon "sinking ships," i.e. rebel groups which are declining vis-à-vis the targeted government. There is an endogeneity problem in testing this proposition empirically. Without more fine-grained data or case study work it is impossible to assess if a weaker rebel group leads to support termination or if the decision to terminate support weakens the group. I did however conduct a crude test using data on the ratio of rebel troops to the number of government troops reported by the UCDP. To more specifically get at the decline in performance I coded a dummy variable which indicated whether the rebel group was performing worse than in the previous year. Observations denoted (1) meant that the troop ratio was reduced compared to the previous year and (0) meant that there was no change or that the group gained strength vis-à-vis the government. Although a rudimentary test, the model offered some support for the idea that rebel capacity matter for state sponsors. The hazard ratio increased with 54 percent and was significant at the 0.05 level. With the caveat that there may be reverse causality, this finding suggests that state sponsors are more likely to retract their support as the strength of the rebel group declines.[64]

Salehyan et al. (2014) have shown that democracies are less likely to support rebels that commit war crimes and atrocities.[65] Following the same logic it is possible that democratic sponsors would respond by withdrawing their support if rebels committed atrocities against civilians. To examine this argument I include a continuous measure of how many civilians the rebel group killed during a particular year. This measure is based on

data from the UCDP One-Sided Violence Dataset v.4–2014 and thus restricted to the time period after 1989.[66] I use an interaction term between this new variable and the regime type of the state sponsor to test the proposition above. The sample size is now limited to roughly a third of its original size. The findings suggest that democratic states are not more likely than autocratic states to punish groups that commit one-sided killings. Democratic sponsors do not withdraw their support as the rebel group deliberately targets civilians. In another supplementary test I included measures of the number of other rebel groups involved in the same conflict and the number of other state sponsors supporting the same group. This test demonstrated that the number of involved actors had no discernable impact on the termination of support. Future research might find it fruitful to expand on these extensions by incorporating more factors regarding rebel and conflict dynamics and how these may influence the willingness or opportunity of the state sponsor.

Conclusion

This study is the first to address which factors might be linked to the termination of external state support to rebel movements— a hitherto neglected but highly policy-relevant question. A more comprehensive understanding of support termination is central if we want to limit the often negative impact of external states' involvement in intrastate conflicts. The findings suggest that many of the factors used to explain the provision of support cannot equally well account for its termination. However, especially one factor commonly used to explain why support is provided also speaks to the question of termination. State sponsors are significantly more likely to withdraw their support if there are no ethnic kinship ties between the supporting government and the rebel movement. Furthermore, the overall structure of the international system matters. Support terminations are more prevalent after 1989 and many occurred specifically in the transition period from the Cold War. State sponsors also differ in how reliable they are as backers based on past practice. States that have previously ceased their support are more likely to withdraw their support if it was ever reintroduced at a later stage of the conflict.

Since the factors mentioned above do not vary considerably over time they cannot tell us exactly when state sponsorship is likely to be terminated. Hence, I suggested that we should explore proximate causes that more directly have the potential to decrease the willingness and/or opportunity of the state sponsor to provide support. Of the potential triggers explored I found that they had generally no discernable impact. States are rather persistent in their sponsorship of rebel groups. Leadership changes, economic hardship, domestic instability, threats or sanctions do not alter the willingness and opportunity of the external state to provide support.

Since this study provided the first large-N examination of factors associated with external support termination there are plenty of avenues for future research. In general, scholars should pay closer attention to the termination and duration of state sponsorship instead of the past almost exclusive focus on its initial provision. Future research should understand external support as a dynamic process and seek to disentangle what influences the level of commitment of state sponsors at various points in time. We also need to pay more attention to support provided to governments and explore how the decision-making process to terminate this type of support differs from rebel patronage. Moreover, it could prove useful to differentiate between various forms of external support to see if effects differ. As different forms of

support might entail different costs, it is possible that some types of support are more susceptible to termination than others. Further efforts should also be devoted to identifying and specifying the triggers as to when support termination is most likely to occur. To this end it might be useful to explore if regional dynamics as well as rebel access to natural resources affect the calculations of the supporter. Only with a more comprehensive understanding of when states are likely to stop supporting rebel movements will we be able to mitigate the many negative effects related to outside involvement.

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Notes

1. In this article I will use the terms "state sponsorship", "external support" and "rebel patronage" interchangeably - all referring to when an external state interferes in another state's domestic political conflict by providing material aid to the rebel movement. The support could encompass a range of activities such as the provision of safe havens, weapon deliveries, logistics, financial backing or direct military interventions with troops.
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37. Collins (see note 36 above).
38. A two-stage model with one equation to explain the provision of support and a second equation that would focus on the duration of support is not helpful at this stage. Such models require that we can identify at least one specific factor that would explain the provision of support that we know for certain is unrelated (exogenous) to the duration of support. That is, we need a variable that affects selection but not outcome. The current state of research cannot help us do this decisively. We need to conduct far more research on the topic of support termination before we could correctly specify such models.
39. Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (see note 39 above), 99.
40. I employ the Efron method for ties.
41. I define an active intrastate armed conflict as a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year.
42. Högbladh, Pettersson, and Themnér (see note 8 above).

43. If there were allegations of support at a year identified as a termination, this observation was treated as missing. This was done in order to assure that years were not mistakenly coded as terminations just because a lack of reliable data.
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45. A few observations experienced the failure event directly after a period of inactive conflict. In order not to bias my results, these observations were treated as missing data since it was not possible to reasonable assess when support ended.
46. Thompson (see note 21 above).
47. The temporal domain of the updated rivalry dataset is 1816–2010. I thank the author for generously sharing these data.
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51. Although these factors can vary in theory it occurs too rarely to model. If I transform these variables to account for temporal changes such as when rivalries fade, when ethnic kinship ties disappear, and when support to the government side is terminated, the factors have so little variation that they need to be omitted from the model. In total there was 1 observation that experienced a fading rivalry, 2 observations in which kinship ties disappeared and 39 observations in which support to the government side was withdrawn. While the last one would have enough observations to model, it cannot be included as it constitutes a perfect correlation in that support is never terminated when government support is withdrawn.
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58. This finding is based on an alternative model specification, as it is not possible to include the transition as well as the post-Cold War period in the same model.
59. This finding is sensitive to changes in the model specification as the result does not hold in bivariate regression and its statistical significance decreases further in certain robustness checks (see the online Appendix).
60. An alternative measure related to *severe* economic hardship converting the last quartile of the observations (those with the worst economic decline) into a dummy variable generated the same result.
61. cf. George Tsebelis, "Are Sanctions Effective? a Game-Theoretic Analysis," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 34, no. 1 (1990): 3–28; T Clifton Morgan and Valerie L. Schwebach, "Fools Suffer Gladly: the Use of Economic Sanctions in International Crises," *International Studies Quarterly* 41, no. 1 (1997): 27–50; Pape, (see note 37 above); Drezner, (see note 37 above).
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63. I used the most established convention and employed an interaction with the log of time. After this transformation, Harrel's rho test holds for the entire model as well as for each individual variable (see online Appendix, Table A1).
64. However, running the model with the continuous troop ratio variable or the troop numbers of the rebels did not indicate any effect.
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Appendix

Table A1. Descriptive statistics.

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Support termination	1148	0.174	0.379	0	1
Duration of support	1248	4.917	3.566	1	15
Rivalry	1248	0.175	0.381	0	1
Leadership shift	1238	0.045	0.208	0	1
Government support	1208	0.772	0.420	0	1
Government support (time)	1207	0.857	0.847	0	2.639
End of Cold War	1248	0.039	0.194	0	1
Post-Cold War	1248	0.385	0.487	0	1
Ethnic kinship	1236	0.112	0.315	0	1
Economic hardship	1243	0.438	4.953	0	64.997
Democratic supporter	1238	0.174	0.379	0	1
Threat of sanctions	1248	0.014	0.119	0	1
Conflict onset in sponsor	1248	0.018	0.135	0	1
Sanctions	1248	0.200	0.400	0	1
Previous termination	1248	0.075	0.263	0	1

Table A2. Harrel's rho test for proportional hazards.

	rho	chi2	P > *chi2*
Rivalry	−0.009	0.02	0.880
Leadership shift	0.098	2.07	0.150
Government support	−0.002	0.00	0.968
Government support (time)	0.024	0.13	0.718
End of Cold War	0.078	1.54	0.215
Ethnic kinship	0.025	0.17	0.682
Economic hardship	0.020	0.17	0.682
Democratic supporter	−0.054	1.71	0.191
Threats of sanctions	−0.030	0.28	0.596
Conflict onset in sponsor	−0.004	0.00	0.951
Sanctions	0.011	0.06	0.811
Previous termination	0.057	0.83	0.362
Global Test	6.05	0.914	

Note A2: This test evaluates the assumption that hazards could be considered proportional. The test for all individual variables as well as the global test for the model is insignificant which suggest that the proportional hazards assumption is not violated.

Table A3. Various clustering options of standard errors (main model: sponsor).

	Sponsor	Dyad	No clustering
Rivalry	0.66	0.66*	0.66*
	(−1.60)	(−1.72)	(−1.77)
Government support	0.79	0.79	0.79
	(−0.70)	(−0.97)	(−1.07)
Government support (time)	0.71*	0.71*	0.71*
	(−1.80)	(−1.68)	(−1.68)
Leadership shift	1.61*	1.61	1.61
	(1.76)	(1.60)	(1.47)
End of Cold War	2.82***	2.82***	2.82***
	(2.73)	(3.09)	(3.14)
Democratic supporter	0.82	0.82	0.82
	(−0.49)	(−0.95)	(−0.94)
Ethnic kinship	0.33**	0.33***	0.33***
	(−2.48)	(−2.72)	(−2.64)
Economic hardship	0.98	0.98	0.98
	(−0.86)	(−1.00)	(−1.09)
Threat of sanctions	0.41	0.41	0.41
	(−1.16)	(−0.88)	(−0.88)
Implemented sanctions	0.90	0.90	0.90
	(−0.41)	(−0.52)	(−0.55)
Conflict onset in sponsor	1.86	1.86	1.86
	(1.46)	(1.50)	(1.34)
Previous termination	1.57**	1.57**	1.57**
	(2.14)	(2.05)	(1.99)
Observations	1183	1183	1183
Subjects	317	317	317
Failures	185	185	185

Hazard ratios reported. A ratio with a value above 1 indicates an increased risk for support termination, while a value below 1 indicates a decreased risk for support termination. z-statistics in parentheses;
* $p < 0.1$ ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Note A3: The main model is clustered on the state sponsor which theoretically makes most sense. The other models (which are included as robustness checks) cluster the standard errors on the supporter-receiver dyad or employs no clustering.

Table A4. Parametric and discrete time models.

	Main	Weibull	Poisson	Logit
Rivalry	0.66	0.63	−0.29	−0.37
	(−1.60)	(−1.63)	(−1.21)	(−1.24)
Government support	0.79	0.58**	−0.43*	−0.55
	(−0.70)	(−1.96)	(−1.65)	(−1.58)
Government support (time)	0.71*			
	(−1.80)			
Leadership shift	1.61*	1.54	0.37	0.62*
	(1.76)	(1.43)	(1.64)	(1.90)
End of Cold War	2.82***	2.11**	1.15***	1.72***
	(2.73)	(2.36)	(3.20)	(2.93)
Democratic supporter	0.82	0.79	−0.12	−0.20
	(−0.49)	(−0.48)	(−0.32)	(−0.40)
Ethnic kinship	0.33**	0.32**	−1.09**	−1.23**
	(−2.48)	(−2.18)	(−2.44)	(−2.53)
Economic hardship	0.98	0.98	−0.01	−0.02
	(−0.86)	(−0.80)	(−0.72)	(−0.76)
Threat of sanctions	0.41	0.50	−0.86	−1.01
	(−1.16)	(−1.01)	(−1.28)	(−1.38)
Implemented sanctions	0.90	0.91	−0.14	−0.18
	(−0.41)	(−0.37)	(−0.68)	(−0.65)
Conflict onset in sponsor	1.86	1.93	0.40	0.56
	(1.46)	(1.47)	(1.14)	(1.05)
Previous termination	1.57**	1.80***	0.43***	0.68**
	(2.14)	(2.62)	(2.65)	(2.40)
Time			−0.45**	−0.50*
			(−2.16)	(−1.85)
Time sq.			0.03	0.02
			(0.83)	(0.42)
Time cub.			0.00	0.00
			(0.13)	(0.57)
Observations	1183	1184	1119	1119
Subjects	317	322		
Failures	185	190		

For Cox and Weibull: Hazard ratios reported. A ratio with a value above 1 indicates an increased risk for support termination, while a value below 1 indicates a decreased risk for support termination. z-statistics in parentheses;
For Poisson & Logit: B-coefficients reported. t-statistics in parentheses;
* $p < 0.1$ ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Note A4: The main model is a Cox proportional hazards model as there are no strong theoretical expectations about the shape or nature of the baseline hazard rate. Parametric models are included for robustness.

Table A5. Additional variables with significantly reduced sample size.

	Main model	+civkill	+rebel decline
Rivalry	0.66	0.49	0.46**
	(−1.60)	(−1.62)	(−2.06)
Government support	0.79	1.64	0.64*
	(−0.70)	(1.15)	(−1.65)
Leadership shift	1.61*	0.49	0.68
	(1.76)	(−1.23)	(−0.34)
End of Cold War	2.82***		4.68***
	(2.73)		(3.78)
Democratic supporter	0.82	3.67***	1.43
	(−0.49)	(3.07)	(0.72)
Civilians killed		1.00	
		(−0.84)	
Dem. supp (time) * Civkill		0.99**	
		(−2.05)	
Rebel decline			1.53**
			(2.24)
Ethnic kinship	0.33**	0.29**	0.63
	(−2.48)	(−2.49)	(−0.89)
Economic hardship	0.98	1.01	0.99
	(−0.86)	(0.46)	(−0.27)
Threat of sanctions	0.41		
	(−1.16)		
Implemented sanctions	0.90	1.08	0.83
	(−0.41)	(0.27)	(−0.63)
Conflict onset in sponsor	1.86	0.95	2.44
	(1.46)	(−0.10)	(1.55)
Previous termination	1.57**	1.24	2.52***
	(2.14)	(0.92)	(3.88)
Observations	1183	430	650
Subjects	317	163	186
Failures	185	92	90

Hazard ratios reported. A ratio with a value above 1 indicates an increased risk for support termination, while a value below 1 indicates a decreased risk for support termination. z-statistics in parentheses;
* $p < 0.1$ ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Note A5: These models looks specifically at the effect on support termination of rebel group decline and civilian targeting. Some variables were omitted in the second and third model because of too little variation. The proportional hazards assumption assessed for each model and interactions with ln(time) have been introduced were appropriate but are not shown in the tables. The hazard ratios and significance levels of most variables are affected by the significantly reduced sample size.

Table A6. Additional test with number of involved actors

Number of rebel groups	0.90	0.87*	
	(–1.11)	(–1.68)	
Number of state sponsors	0.97		0.95
	(–0.53)		(–0.88)
Rivalry	0.62*		
	(–1.90)		
Government support	0.93		
	(–0.20)		
Government support (time)	0.69*		
	(–1.83)		
Leadership shift	1.52		
	(1.49)		
End of Cold War	2.95***		
	(2.68)		
Democratic supporter	0.92		
	(–0.21)		
Ethnic kinship	0.35***		
	(–2.62)		
Economic hardship	0.98		
	(–0.87)		
Threat of sanctions	0.38		
	(–1.21)		
Implemented sanctions	0.84		
	(–0.66)		
Conflict onset in sponsor	1.66		
	(1.29)		
Previous termination	1.33		
	(1.27)		
Observations	11838	1248	1248
Subjects	317	350	350
Failures	185	200	200

Hazard ratios reported. A ratio with a value above 1 indicates an increased risk for support termination, while a value below 1 indicates a decreased risk for support termination. z-statistics in parentheses; * p<0.1 ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Note A6: This model looks at whether the number of other rebel groups in the same conflict and the number of state sponsors supporting the same rebel group are related to the termination of support. The hazard ratios and significance levels of the variables suggest that the number of rebel groups involved in the conflict and the number of state sponsors each rebel groups are of little importance in explaining termination.

Appendix II. List of rebel groups and their state supporters.

Rebel group	Location	State sponsor/s
ADF	Uganda	Zaire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan
AFDL	Democratic Republic of Congo	Uganda, Zambia
al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya	Egypt	Sudan, Iran
Al-Itahad al-Islami	Ethiopia (Ogaden)	Sudan
al-Qaida	USA	Afghanistan
ANC	South Africa	Cuba, East Germany, Soviet Union, Tanzania, Angola, Mozambique, Zambia
APCO	Iran (Arabistan)	Iraq
ARS/UIC	Somalia	Eritrea
ASG	Philippines (Mindanao)	Pakistan
Baluchi separatists	Pakistan (Baluchistan)	Afghanistan
CNDD	Burundi	Zaire, Tanzania
CNDD-FDD	Burundi	Democratic Republic of Congo, Zimbabwe
CNDP	Democratic Republic of Congo	Rwanda
Contras/FDN	Nicaragua	United States, Honduras, Saudi Arabia, Taiwan
CPB	Myanmar	China
CPM	Malaysia	China
CPT	Thailand	China, Laos, Vietnam
Croatian irregulars	Bosnia and Herzegovina (Croat)	Croatia
Croatian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina	Bosnia and Herzegovina (Croat)	Croatia
Devrimci Sol	Turkey	Syria
EDU	Ethiopia	United States, Sudan, Saudi Arabia
EIJM – AS	Eritrea	Sudan
ELF	Ethiopia (Eritrea)	Libya, Sudan, Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia, South Yemen, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates
EPLF	Ethiopia (Eritrea)	Libya, Sudan, Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia, South Yemen, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates
EPRDF	Ethiopia	Sudan
EPRLF	Sri Lanka (Eelam)	India
ETA	Spain (Basque)	Algeria, Libya, Lebanon, South Yemen
FAN	Chad	United States, France, Sudan, Egypt
FAP	Chad	Libya
FDLR	Rwanda	Democratic Republic of Congo
FLEC-FAC	Angola (Cabinda)	Congo
FLEC-R	Angola (Cabinda)	Zaire
FLNC	Democratic Republic of Congo	Angola
FMLN	El Salvador	Cuba, Nicaragua, Soviet Union, Vietnam
FNLA	Angola	Zaire, South Africa, China, North Korea, USA
FPR	Rwanda	Uganda
FSLN	Nicaragua	Cuba
FUCD	Chad	Sudan
FUNA	Uganda	Sudan
FUNCINPEC	Cambodia	United States, China, Thailand, Singapore
GIA	Algeria	Sudan
GUNT	Chad	Libya
Hamas	Israel (Palestine)	Iran, Syria
Harakat-i Inqilab-i Islami-yi Afghanistan	Afghanistan	United States, United Kingdom, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, China, Pakistan
Hezbollah	Israel (Southern Lebanon)	Iran, Syria
Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan	Afghanistan	United States, United Kingdom, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, China, Pakistan
Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan - Khalis faction	Afghanistan	United States, United Kingdom, Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, China, Pakistan
Hizb-i Wahdat	Afghanistan	Iran
Hizbul Islam	Somalia	Eritrea
IMU	Uzbekistan	Afghanistan
IRA	UK (Northern Ireland)	Libya

(*Continued*)

(Continued).

Rebel group	Location	State sponsor/s
Islamic Legion	Chad	Libya, Sudan
Ittihad-i Islami Bara-yi Azadi-yi Afghanistan	Afghanistan	United States, United Kingdom, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, China, Pakistan
Jabha-yi Nijat-i Milli-yi Afghanistan	Afghanistan	United States, United Kingdom, Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, China, Pakistan
Jamiyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan	Afghanistan	United States, United Kingdom, Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, China, Pakistan
JEM	Sudan	Chad, Eritrea, Libya
JSS/SB	Bangladesh (Chittagong Hill Tracts)	India
Junbish-i Milli-yi Islami	Afghanistan	Iran, Uzbekistan
Kashmir insurgents	India (Kashmir)	Pakistan
KDP	Iraq (Kurdistan)	Iran, Syria
KDPI	Iran (Kurdistan)	Iraq
KIO	Myanmar (Kachin)	India
KNU	Myanmar (Karen)	India
KNUFNS	Cambodia	Vietnam
KPNLF	Cambodia	United States, China, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore
KR	Cambodia	China, Thailand
Lebanese Army (Aoun)	Lebanon	Iraq
LNM	Lebanon	Libya, Syria
LRA	Uganda	Sudan
LTTE	Sri Lanka (Eelam)	India
LURD	Liberia	Guinea, Uganda
Mahaz-i Milli-yi Islami-yi Afghanistan	Afghanistan	United States, United Kingdom, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, China, Pakistan
MEK	Iran	Iraq
MFDC	Senegal (Casamance)	Guinea-Bissau, Libya, Iraq
MJP	Ivory Coast	Liberia
MLC	Democratic Republic of Congo	Uganda
MNLF	Philippines (Mindanao)	Libya, Iran
MPIGO	Ivory Coast	Liberia
National Democratic Front	Yemen	South Yemen
NDA	Sudan	Uganda, Ethiopia, Eritrea
NDFB	India (Bodoland)	Bhutan, Bangladesh, Myanmar
NLFT	India (Tripura)	Bangladesh
NPFL	Liberia	Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso, Libya
NRA	Uganda	Libya
NSCN – IM	India (Nagaland)	Pakistan, Bangladesh, Myanmar
OLF	Ethiopia (Oromiya)	Somalia, Eritrea, Sudan
Palipehutu	Burundi	Tanzania, Rwanda
Palipehutu-FNL	Burundi	Democratic Republic of Congo
PALIR	Rwanda	Democratic Republic of Congo
PF	Rhodesia	Cuba, Soviet Union, Tanzania, Angola, Mozambique, Zambia, Botswana, Libya, China
PIJ	Israel (Palestine)	Iran, Syria
PKK	Turkey (Kurdistan)	Greece, Iran, Syria
PLA	India (Manipur)	Pakistan, Bangladesh
PLO	Israel (Palestine)	Soviet Union, Algeria, Libya, Iraq, Egypt, Syria, Yemen, China, North Korea, Pakistan
Polisario	Morocco (Western Sahara)	Algeria, Libya
PUK	Iraq (Kurdistan)	Syria
PWG	India	Pakistan
RCD	Democratic Republic of Congo	Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda
RCD-ML	Democratic Republic of Congo	Uganda
Rejectionist Front	Israel (Palestine)	Cuba, Soviet Union, Algeria, Libya, Iraq, Syria, South Yemen
Renamo	Mozambique	Kenya, Rhodesia, South Africa
Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh	Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh)	Armenia

(*Continued*)

(Continued).

Rebel group	Location	State sponsor/s
RUF	Sierra Leone	Burkina Faso, Liberia, Libya
SALF	Ethiopia (Arssi, Bale and Sidamo)	Somalia
SCIRI	Iraq	Iran
Serbian irregulars	Bosnia and Herzegovina (Serb)	Yugoslavia
Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina	Bosnia and Herzegovina (Serb)	Yugoslavia
Serbian Republic of Krajina	Croatia (Serb)	Yugoslavia
SLM/A	Sudan	Chad, Eritrea, Libya
SLM/A-Unity	Sudan	Chad
SNM	Somalia	Ethiopia
SPLM/A	Sudan	Uganda, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Libya, Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia
SSA/s	Myanmar (Shan)	Thailand
SSDF	Somalia	Ethiopia, Libya
SWAPO	South Africa (Namibia)	Cuba, Soviet Union, Angola, Zambia, Zimbabwe, China, North Korea
Taleban	Afghanistan	Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, Uzbekistan, Pakistan
TELO	Sri Lanka (Eelam)	India
TNV	India (Tripura)	Bangladesh
TPLF	Ethiopia	Sudan
UCK	Yugoslavia (Kosovo)	Albania
UFDD	Chad	Sudan
UIFSA	Afghanistan	Russia, Iran, Turkey, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, India
UNITA	Angola	United States, France, Togo, Congo, Zaire, South Africa, Morocco, Iran, Saudi Arabia, China, North Korea
UPDA	Uganda	Sudan
UTO	Tajikistan	Afghanistan
WSLF	Ethiopia (Ogaden)	Cuba, Soviet Union, Somalia, North Korea
ZANU	Rhodesia	Tanzania, Mozambique, China