



# SUPPLY CHAIN ATTACKS

## – Reflections on risk mitigation

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11th May 2022



# INTRODUCING GRUNDFOS

6 CLEAN WATER  
AND SANITATION




13 CLIMATE  
ACTION



be  
think  
innovate

GRUNDFOS 

# One man's ambition



## 1945

*“The world is full of problems that  
can be solved in a better way”*

*Poul Due Jensen*



# Grundfos in brief



**1945**

when it all  
started



**#1**

pump manufacturer  
in the world



**19,000**

employees



**100+**

companies  
worldwide



**16,000,000**

units produced  
per year



**DKK 26.3**

billion net  
turnover in 2020




# Solutions for applications across all customer segments



## Commercial buildings

Air conditioning  
Heating  
Hot water recirculation  
Water pressure boosting  
Water disinfection  
Wastewater



## District energy

District cooling  
District heating



## Domestic buildings

Hot water recirculation  
Groundwater intake  
Heating  
Water pressure boosting  
Rainwater harvesting  
Wastewater



## Industrial processes

Biofuel  
Bottle washing  
CIP/SIP  
Cooling  
Desalination  
Filing  
Leach mining



## Industrial utilities

Temperature control  
Boiler systems  
Fire protection  
Heating  
Water supply  
Water treatment  
Wastewater



## HVAC OEM

Boiler  
Cooling  
Domestic Hot Water (DHW)  
Heat pump  
Heating Interace Units (HIU)  
Solar thermal  
Space Heating



## Municipal water supply

Drinking water treatment  
Irrigation  
Ground water intake  
Solar water solutions  
Surface water intake  
Community water supply  
Water distribution



## Municipal wastewater

Flood control  
Wastewater treatment  
Wastewater transport



## Agriculture and irrigation

Fertigation & Chemigation  
Drip micro spray  
Frost protection  
Irrigation groundwater supply  
Livestock watering  
Pivot pressure boosting  
Solar boosting and water supply solutions



# Intelligent solutions for pump systems and water technology

## GRUNDFOS iSOLUTIONS



High **energy efficiency**

Improved **reliability**


Complete **system overview and control**

Customer specific **digital offerings**





# Simple might be complex



# The vast supply chain landscape

## Hardware suppliers

- Smartphones, servers, laptops, ...

## Hardware component suppliers

- Chipsets (communication, security, processor, storage, ...)

## Software suppliers


- Cloud, operating systems, protocol stacks, UI components, ...

## Software tools suppliers

- Develop, control, compile, build, test, deploy, ...

## Production facilities

- Putting it all together...





# The legislation and standards landscape - excerpts



**Executive Order**  
Enhancing Software  
Supply Chain Security <sup>1)</sup>

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**NIS2**  
Addresses security of  
supply chains <sup>2)</sup>

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**IEC 62443-4-2**  
Security requirements  
for externally provided  
components <sup>3)</sup>

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**IoT SF**  
Secure Supply  
Chain Production <sup>4)</sup>

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1) <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/05/12/executive-order-on-improving-the-nations-cybersecurity/>

2) [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS\\_BRI\(2021\)689333](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS_BRI(2021)689333)

3) DS/EN IEC 62443-4-1:2018

4) IoT-SF Framework Compliance Version 2.0

# The inventory overview


*Why is having an incomplete inventory of your web assets a problem?  
Because you can't protect something if you don't know you have it.*

*Tanya Janca, <https://wehackpurple.com/the-importance-of-inventory/>*

## The inventory must be

- Automatically obtained
- Complete
- Current
- Reliable
- Searchable
- Providing an overview
- Providing details
- Possible to integrate in your CI/CD pipeline
- **Helping in decision-making**

## DEPENDENCY



*xkcd.com, <https://xkcd.com/2347/>*



# Practical examples 1)

Log4J / Log4Shell  
ua-parser-js  
Azure OMI / OMIGOD

## Using a Software Composition Analysis tool to verify security risks

<https://thehackernews.com/2022/01/researchers-find-bugs-in-over-dozen.html>

### *Researchers Find Bugs in Over A Dozen Widely Used URL Parser Libraries*

- *Belledonne's SIP Stack (C, CVE-2021-33056)*
- *Video.js (JavaScript, CVE-2021-23414)*
- *Nagios XI (PHP, CVE-2021-37352)*
- *Flask-security (Python, CVE-2021-23385)*
- *Flask-security-too (Python, CVE-2021-32618)*
- *Flask-unchained (Python, CVE-2021-23393)*
- *Flask-User (Python, CVE-2021-23401)*
- *Clearance (Ruby, CVE-2021-23435)*

# Practical examples 2)

Log4J / Log4Shell  
ua-parser-js  
Azure OMI / OMIGOD

## Using a Software Composition Analysis<sup>\*)</sup> tool to verify security risks

<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/current-activity/2021/10/22/malware-discovered-popular-npm-package-ua-parser-js>

*“CISA urges users and administrators using compromised ua-parser-js versions 0.7.29, 0.8.0, and 1.0.0 to update to the respective patched versions: 0.7.30, 0.8.1, 1.0.1 ”*

<https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/dev-corrupts-npm-libraries-colors-and-faker-breaking-thousands-of-apps/>

*“... users of 'colors' and 'faker' NPM projects should ensure they are not using an unsafe version. Downgrading to an earlier version of colors (e.g. 1.4.0) and faker (e.g. 5.5.3) is one solution.”*

<sup>\*)</sup> In Grundfos an SCA tool is also used to help identifying license risks with Open-source software, but this a completely different presentation... ☺



# Remaining challenges

## Despite the tools already available, there are shortcomings

- Authenticity of the 3<sup>rd</sup> party software
  - Components, build tools, etc.
  - Existing versions do not change
  - Trust indications for new versions
- Update speed of intelligence databases
- Intelligence databases coverage
- Better support in your everyday life working with DevSecOps
- ...





# Thank you.

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