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Guarded Atomic Swaps

  1. Introduction

For users, who want to buy or sell tokens for bitcoins, guarded atomic swaps provide an alternative to the multi-step process of offering, reserving and paying for tokens via the traditional distributed exchange.

Most notably, atomic swaps resolve the following issues of the traditional distributed exchange:

  • a buyer may accept a traditional offer, but has to wait until the transaction confirms, and only then he or she can continue with the payment - the actual success rate is low, and less than 20 % of accepted offers were finalized in the past

  • a buyer can accept offers, but never finalize the trade, and intentionally or not, this freezes tokens for time periods of usually 10 blocks or more, which can be abused to black out the market, by targeting or shutting down sellers or offers

  • the traditional exchange requires fees to pay for accepting an offer, to make abuse expensive, but at the same time it's not certain, whether an offer is really going to be reserved, or if it might be taken by someone else in the meantime

To overcome these issues, the actual swap of tokens for bitcoins is an atomic one-step process, which either succeeds or fails: if a buyer makes a successful payment, then it is guaranteed he or she receives the tokens in exchange, and if an offer was already taken, then the payment transaction is rejected right from the start, removing the need of reserving tokens, which may, or may not be purchased by the accepting party.

Swap offers can be published on- or off-chain.

Balance based systems, such as Omni or Counterparty, in contrast to output based systems, such as Open Assets, face the challenge that tokens to be sold may be double-spent via a second transaction, which is unrelated to the swap transaction. As mitigation tokens are temporarily guarded and locked by a m-of-m multi signature script, which is signed off by one or multiple oracles and the seller of the tokens, to simulate the properties of an output based system.

The trust and dependency on the oracles is greaty reduced by minimizing the scope of their role: an oracle uses a private key to sign a transaction exactly only once, to sign a modifiable and extendable "wild card" transaction, which can be re-used as building block. Therefore, even if an oracle vanishes or stops it's service, a seller is still able to unlock tokens, or modify a swap offer.

When combining the concept of locking tokens and atomic swaps, the minimum number of blockchain confirmations can be reduced from two (for offering and reserving tokens) to one (for locking tokens), without the need for fancy fees or a multi-step purchase process. Given the properties of the traditional exchange, the effective number of confirmations is likely much higher in practise due to the waiting for confirmations, when accepting an offer, so the confirmation time in blocks may as well be reduced from 10 to 1.

While oracles and an order server introduce third-party dependencies, it is thinkable to embed the behavior of oracles into the Omni protocol at some point in the future, although the author believes this initial trade-off provides a good chance to test atomic swaps in the context balance based systems, before introducing new consensus rules.

  1. Actors and goals

2.1. Buyer:

A buyer is a person who wants to learn about outstanding swap offers and purchase tokens for bitcoins.

2.2. Seller:

A seller is a person who offers and wants to sell tokens for bitcoins, list offers, modify offers or revoke offers.

2.3. Oracle server:

An oracle, in this context, is an agent who guards and locks tokens, to prevent double-spending.

2.4. Order server:

An order server is an agent who facilitates the listing of swap offers, and wants to ensure all listings are up-to-date and valid.

2.5. Scammer:

A scammer is a malicious party and may try to steal tokens or bitcoins.

2.6. Mutator:

A mutator is a malicious party who may abuse transaction malleability to mess with Bitcoin transactions.

2.7. Operator:

An operator maintains the system or one or multiple agents, and wants to provide a reliable and verifiable service.

  1. Use cases

The following sections describe each process in detail.

3.1. Swap client:
  1. UC-Client-1: Create destination
  2. UC-Client-2: Prepare funding
  3. UC-Client-3: Sign transaction stub
  4. UC-Client-4: Send funding transaction
  5. UC-Client-5: Unlock tokens
  6. UC-Client-6: Create swap offer
  7. UC-Client-7: Accept swap offer
3.2. Oracle server:
  1. UC-Oracle-1: Create new and unique key-pair incomplete
  2. UC-Oracle-2: Sign transaction stub incomplete
3.3. Order server:
  1. UC-Order-1: Publish swap offer incomplete

  2. UC-Order-2: Revoke swap offer incomplete

  3. UC-Order-3: List swap offers incomplete

  4. API


4.1. Oracle server:
  1. API-Oracle-1: Get new and unique public key
  2. API-Oracle-2: Sign transaction stub
4.2. Order server:
  1. API-Order-1: Publish a swap offer incomplete

  2. API-Order-2: Revoke a swap offer incomplete

  3. API-Order-3: List available swap offers incomplete

  4. Limitations


5.1. No partial filling of orders:

Guarded atomic swaps don't support partial filling of orders, and when finalizing a swap, then the whole amount is exchanged.

While it is possible to change the desired amount of bitcoins by modifying the swap transaction, the amount of tokens for sale is fixed, based on the amount of tokens sent to the locked destination.

5.2. No escrow of bitcoins:

In it's current form, the system is intended for selling tokens for bitcoins, but not bitcoins for tokens.

This is due to the fact that the Bitcoin protocol is not "token aware". However, it is thinkable to use oracles to detect token carrying transactions at some point in the future, at the cost of less control and full trust in the oracles.

  1. Risks

6.1. Seller and oracle operator are malicious:

If the oracle doesn't honor it's role, and starts to sign outputs other than "locked" outputs, and if seller and oracle operator are both malicious, then they may cooperate and wait until a bitcoin payment arrives, and try to move tokens to another destination (via another output). If this is successful, the buyer would end up with uncolored coins and no tokens.

This risk can be mitigated by using more than oracle server, maintained by different and independent operators.

6.2. Compromised infrastructure:

A compromised infrastructure could lead to the exposure of private signing keys or modifications of the software, potentially breaking locks.

This risk can be mitigated by using more than oracle server, hosted by different service providers (e.g. Amazon AWS, Microsoft Azure, Google Cloud Computing, ...).

6.3. Transaction malleability:

TODO

6.4. Censorship of orders:

Order server operators may decide to block or delay certain orders.

Orders can generally published anywhere, and there is no strict need to use a centralized order system, although it seems more convenient. It is thinkable to publish incomplete swap offers on-chain, at the cost of additional transaction fees, or to use more than one independent order service.

6.5. Tokens may be stuck in a locked destination:

A seller may lose an already signed transaction stub. Given the properties of the signing oracles, subsequent signing requests are rejected, and the resposibility lies in the hand of the seller.

This is primarily an issue of awareness and promoting backup strategies. It is further thinkable that oracles may store and publish signed transaction stubs, which is safe to do, as all transactions from locked destinations require signatures from the oracle(s) and the seller.

If additional tokens are sent to a locked destination, after a swap completed, they are locked forever and can not be retrieved.

6.6. Agents may shutdown and stop providing service:

Tokens are only sent to a locked destination after the lock was verified and the oracle signed the transaction. Therefore, an oracle may vanish at any time, without introducing the risk of locking tokens indefinitely.

If an order service shuts down, then it is an extreme form of 6.4. (censorship of orders), which may be mitigated by using a redundant infrastructure.

  1. FAQ

7.1. Who is in control of the oracles and servers?

In theory it could be anyone, and any user is free to choose one or more service providers he or she trusts. In practise it is thinkable that the first services are provided by the Omni developers (e.g. via Omni Chest and Omni Wallet).

  1. Related discussions