

## Part 3

# Advanced Static Analysis


How can we use a disassembler (IDA Pro free) to learn more about the malware's functionality?

"Read" the book. «What is it about?» «Who did it?»  
Language: Assembly

# What now?

## Advanced Static Analysis

- code is still not running
- Disassembly
  - "To take apart", Merriam Webster Dictionary
  - Translate from machine code into a symbolic language (assembly code) so we can figure out how the program works.
- IDA Pro
  - Powerful disassembler with debugging capabilities
  - Especially good for static analysis



# Levels of Abstraction




Figure 4-1: Code level examples

# Recap: Microprocessor

- **Microprocessor:** CPU, RAM, I/O and busses
- CPU: controlling the operation by fetching, decoding and executing one by one
- **Program:** Set of instructions
- **Instructions:** opcode and operand
  - Opcode: Specifies instruction type
  - Operand: operation (mem location or register)
- CPU has some basic operations
  - Transfer (transfers data on buses between memory locations)
  - Arithmetic, logic and shift (done by ALU between working register and memory locations)

# Instructions

- Building blocks of assembly programs
- Mnemonic (opcode) followed by operands (zero or more)

**Table 4-1: Instruction Format**

Mnemonic	Destination operand	Source operand
mov	ecx	0x42

- Move into ecx register the value 42 (hex)
- mov ecx 0x42 (assembly language)
- B942000000 (machine code in hex)
- Machine code (binary)
- 10111001 01000010 00000000 00000000 00000000

# Types of Instructions

- Data Transfer
  - MOV, XCHG, ...
- Arithmetic, logic and shift
  - ADD, SUB, SHR, AND, OR, MUL, DIV, ...
- Branching and conditional
  - JMP, CALL, CMP, ...
- For more:  
<http://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/processors/architectures-software-developer-manuals.html>

# Challenge 3

**Ultimate:** Understand everything

**More realistic:**

**At what memory location do you find the function that achieves X?**

**Explain the purpose of the function found at memory location Y.**

# Challenge 3 The big picture

- Use Ida Pro Free and graphic view to get the big picture
- How to get an overview?
  - Dont get lost in details
  - Follow function calls
    - Look at API's. What understanding can you get?  
<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/api/index>
    - Unknown calls: Must follow to understand
  - "Anything" inbetween function calls
    - Prepare input (arguments/parameters)
    - Use output (results)

# Suggested approach

- Open spybot.exe in IDA
- <space> graphical view
- Options-general-Disassembly- line prefix
- Options-general-Disassembly- auto comments
- Highlight by clicking on <call>

# Public start

NUL

```
; Attributes: bp-based frame


public start
start proc near

var_30= word ptr -30h
var_18= dword ptr -18h
var_4= dword ptr -4

mov    eax, large fs:0
push   ebp
mov    ebp, esp
push   0FFFFFFFh
push   offset unk_41201C
push   offset sub_40109A
push   eax
mov    large fs:0, esp
sub    esp, 10h
push   ebx
push   esi
push   edi
mov    [ebp+var_18], esp
push   eax
fnstcw [esp+30h+var_30]
or     [esp+30h+var_30], 300h
fldcw  [esp+30h+var_30]
add    esp, 4
push   0
push   0
push   offset dword_412028
push   offset dword_412024
push   offset dword_412020
mov    dword_412014, esp
call   _GetMainArgs
push   dword_412028
push   dword_412024
push   dword_412020
mov    dword_412014, esp
call   sub_407AA8
add    esp, 10h
xor    ecx, ecx
mov    [ebp+var_4], ecx
push   ecx          ; int
call   exit
```

NUL


```
leave
ret
start endp ; sp = -3Ch
```




# Public start

- Block 4011CB – Public start
  - Scroll down – click once on <call> - highlights it
  - For now: Initialization and calls 407AA8
  - go to 407AA8 (double click), esc gets you back
- Block 407AA8
  - Overview (ctrl scroll button)
  - Highlight opcode <call>
  - Function calls (ignore for now)
    - GetCommandLineA (407AAD)
    - Strchr (407ABF)
    - GetModuleHandleA (407AF9)
  - Call to 401250 – follow it

# 407AA8 overview/structure



# Block 401250 overview



- Block 401250
  - 401287: Call unknow function 402B81
  - Two arguments
  - "random" string – "tsm...fpn"
  - Number 33 (length of th erandom string – coinsident?)
  - Function 402B81 – deobfuscation?
  - 4012B0 conditional jump based on eax
    - Eax is the result of strstr
    - Input is result of function 402B81 and "ExistingFileName"
  - Both paths eventually end up in 401482
    - Directly (eax is zero)
    - Indirect (eax is not zero) – follow this first

# Block 401250


```

00401250
00401250
00401250 ; Attributes: bp-based Frame
00401250
00401250 sub_401250 proc near
00401250
00401250 Data= byte ptr -8ACh
00401250 hKey= dword ptr -7A8h
00401250 PathName= byte ptr -7A4h
00401250 File= byte ptr -6A0h
00401250 NewFileName= byte ptr -59Ch
00401250 WSAData= WSAData ptr -498h
00401250 var_30h= byte ptr -30h
00401250 ThreadId= dword ptr -20Ch
00401250 Buffer= byte ptr -208h
00401250 ExistingFileName= byte ptr -104h
00401250
00401251 push    ebp
00401251 mov     ebp, esp
00401253 sub    esp, 8ACh      ; Integer Subtraction
00401259 push    ebx
0040125A push    esi
0040125B push    edi
0040125C push    104h        ; nSize
00401261 lea     eax, [ebp+ExistingFileName] ; Load Effective Address
00401267 push    eax          ; lpFilename
00401268 push    0             ; hModule
0040126A call    GetModuleFileNameA ; Call Procedure
0040126F push    104h        ; uSize
00401274 lea     eax, [ebp+Buffer] ; Load Effective Address
0040127A push    eax          ; lpBuffer
0040127B call    GetSystemDirectoryA ; Call Procedure
00401280 push    21h
00401282 push    offset aTsnDqeXiieRAuq ; "tsn~äqà(ðë;ñ++++++|||+a~-!00Fpn"
00401287 call    Deobfuscate      ; Call Procedure
0040128C push    21h
0040128E push    offset aTsnDqeXiieRA_0 ; "tsn~äqà(ðë;ñ++++++|||+a~-!00Fpn"
00401293 call    Deobfuscate      ; Call Procedure
00401298 lea     eax, [ebp+Buffer] ; Load Effective Address
0040129E push    eax          ; char *
0040129F lea     eax, [ebp+ExistingFileName] ; Load Effective Address
004012A5 push    eax          ; char *
004012A6 call    strstr        ; Call Procedure
004012A8 add     esp, 18h      ; Add
004012A8 or     eax, eax      ; Logical Inclusive OR
004012B0 jnz    loc_4014B2      ; Jump if Not Zero (ZF=0)

```

- Block 4012B6
  - call sprintf – make string \wuaumqr.exe
- Block 40133D
  - Start of big loop that ends in 40131B
  - Block 40131D looks very similar to Block 4012B6
  - 40134D CopyFileA
    - Copies the file ExistingFileName to NewFileName
    - First time in the loop from spybot to wuaumqr?
    - Return Zero if fail
  - Fail: goto 4012D8 – eventually takes you to 40131B (the big loop)
  - Success: goto 401356

# Block 4012B6 and 40133D



```
004012B6 push    offset Data      ; "wuaumqr.exe"
004012BB lea     eax, [ebp+Buffer] ; Load Effective Address
004012C1 push    eax
004012C2 push    offset a$        ; "%s\\%s"
004012C7 lea     eax, [ebp+File]  ; Load Effective Address
004012CD push    eax            ; char *
004012CE call   sprintf         ; Call Procedure
004012D3 add    esp, 10h        ; Add
004012D6 jmp    short loc_40133D ; Jump

0040133D
0040133D loc_40133D:           ; bFailIfExists
0040133D push    0
0040133F lea     eax, [ebp+File] ; Load Effective Address
00401345 push    eax            ; lpNewFileName
00401346 lea     eax, [ebp+ExistingFileName] ; Load Effective Address
0040134C push    eax            ; lpExistingFileName
0040134D call   CopyFileA       ; Call Procedure
00401352 or     eax, eax        ; Logical Inclusive OR
00401354 jz     short loc_4012D8 ; Jump if Zero (ZF=1)
```

- Block 401356 (copy success)
  - Creates a directory "kazaabackupfiles
  - Mostly registry related operations
  - Call 402BD7 also mostly registry operations
  - Ignore for now
- Block 401458
  - Conditional jump (end of indirect route to 401482)
  - Compares array of strings with zero
  - Value of esi decideds which entry of array we point to
  - Esi large enough we will point to zero
  - Double click on off\_4120E8 and a list of 14 filenames are shown
  - Done with all 14: goto 401462
  - Not done: goto 40140D

# Block 401356


NUL

```

00401356 push    2          ; dwFileAttributes
00401358 lea     eax, [ebp+File] ; Load Effective Address
0040135E push    eax          ; lpFileName
0040135F call    SetFileAttributesA ; Call Procedure
00401364 call    sub_402BD7    ; Call Procedure
00401369 lea     eax, [ebp+Buffer] ; Load Effective Address
0040136F push    eax          ;
00401370 push    offset aSKazaabackupfi ; "%s\\kazaabackupfiles\\"
00401375 lea     eax, [ebp+PathName] ; Load Effective Address
0040137B push    eax          ; char *
0040137C call    sprintf      ; Call Procedure
00401381 lea     eax, [ebp+PathName] ; Load Effective Address
00401387 push    eax          ;
00401388 push    offset a012345S ; "012345:%s"
0040138D lea     eax, [ebp+Data] ; Load Effective Address
00401393 push    eax          ; char *
00401394 call    sprintf      ; Call Procedure
00401399 add    esp, 18h     ; Add
0040139C push    0            ; lpSecurityAttributes
0040139E lea     eax, [ebp+PathName] ; Load Effective Address
004013A4 push    eax          ; lpPathName
004013A5 call   .CreateDirectoryA ; Call Procedure
004013AA lea     eax, [ebp+hKey] ; Load Effective Address
004013B0 push    eax          ; phkResult
004013B1 push    offset SubKey ; "SOFTWARE\\KAZAA\\LocalContent"
004013B6 push    80000001h   ; hKey
004013BB call    RegCreateKeyA ; Call Procedure
004013C0 push    [ebp+hKey]   ; hKey
004013C6 call    RegCloseKey ; Call Procedure
004013CB lea     eax, [ebp+hKey] ; Load Effective Address
004013D1 push    eax          ; phkResult
004013D2 push    offset SubKey ; "SOFTWARE\\KAZAA\\LocalContent"
004013D7 push    80000001h   ; hKey
004013DC call    RegOpenKeyA ; Call Procedure
004013E1 push    7Fh         ; cbData
004013E3 lea     eax, [ebp+Data] ; Load Effective Address
004013E9 push    eax          ; lpData
004013EA push    1            ; dwType
004013EC push    0            ; Reserved
004013EE push    offset ValueName ; "Dir0"
004013F3 push    [ebp+hKey]   ; hKey
004013F9 call    RegSetValueExA ; Call Procedure
004013FE push    [ebp+hKey]   ; hKey
00401404 call    RegCloseKey ; Call Procedure
00401409 xor    esi, esi    ; Logical Exclusive OR
0040140B jmp    short loc_401458 ; Jump

```

# Block 401458



```
00401458
00401458 loc_401458:           ; Compare Two Operands
00401458 cmp    off_4120E8[esi*4], 0
00401460 jnz    short loc_401400 ; Jump if Not Zero (ZF=0)
```

# Array of hardcoded filenames

```


*.data:004120D4 ; char *off_4120D4
.data:004120D4 off_4120D4      dd offset aRegedit_exe ; DATA XREF: sub_403802:loc_4038B0†r
.data:004120D4
.data:004120D4
*.data:004120D8
*.data:004120DC | 
*.data:004120E0
*.data:004120E4
*.data:004120E8 off_4120E8
*.data:004120E8
*.data:004120E8
*.data:004120E8
*.data:004120EC
*.data:004120F0
*.data:004120F4
*.data:004120F8
*.data:004120FC
*.data:00412100
*.data:00412104
*.data:00412108
*.data:0041210C
*.data:00412110
*.data:00412114
*.data:00412118
*.data:0041211C
*.data:00412120
*.data:00412121
*.data:00412122
*.data:00412123
*.data:00412124 ; int vKey
.data:00412124 vKey           dd 8          ; DATA XREF: sub_4016A2+986†r
.data:00412124
*.data:00412128
*.data:00412129
*.data:0041212A
*.data:0041212B

```

IDA VIEW A

- Block 40140D
  - 401452 CopyFileA  
Copies ExistingFileName to NewFileName
  - ExistingFileName = spybot.exe
  - NewFileName = off\_4120E8[esi\*4]  
This is a reference to 14 filenames at 4120E8 offset by  
esi\*4
  - 401457 increments esi for next file until all spybot.exe  
has been copied to all 14 names, then continue to  
401462

# Loop to copy 14 files



- Block 4012D8 (fail copy)
  - GetTickCount (ms since startup)
    - Antidebug – check if debugged, i.e. execution takes too long
    - Does it look like this is the purpose here?  
Used as seed for the "initialize random number generator"
  - Look at loop 401304 to 401303
    - Continues until esi=edi
    - esi increments by 1 each iteration in 401303
    - edi is 4 less than eax (401314 & 401316)
    - eax=all one in 40130A
    - Loop 40130D increments aex until byte ptr to ecx+eax is zero
    - Ecx is string DATA (wuaumqr.exe)
    - Block 4012E8 randomly change one and one byte in DATA
- Randomly change each letter in wuaumqr (you would have seen this if you ran spybot twice in a row)
- When done cont large loop 40133D and CopyFileA (40134D)

# Block 4012D8

```
004012D8 add    esp, 10h      ; Add
004012D6 jmp    short loc_401330 ; Jump
```



```
00401330
00401330 loc_401330:          ; bFailIfExists
00401330 push   0
0040133F lea    eax, [ebp+File] ; Load Effective Address
00401345 push   eax           ; lpNewFileName
00401346 lea    eax, [ebp+ExistingFileName] ; Load Effective Address
0040134C push   eax           ; lpExistingFileName
0040134D call   CopyFileA    ; Call Procedure
00401352 or    eax, eax      ; Logical Inclusive OR
00401354 jz    short loc_4012D8 ; Jump if Zero (ZF=1)
```



```
156 push  2          ; dwFileAttributes
158 lea    eax, [ebp+File] ; Load Effective Address
15E push  eax         ; lpFileName
15F call   SetFileAttributesA ; Call Procedure
164 call   sub_402BD7    ; Call Procedure
169 lea    eax, [ebp+Buffer] ; Load Effective Address
16F push  eax
170 push  offset aKazaabackupFi ; "%s\\kazaabackupfiles\\"
175 lea    eax, [ebp+PathName] ; Load Effective Address
17B push  eax         ; char *
17C call   sprintf     ; Call Procedure
181 lea    eax, [ebp+PathName] ; Load Effective Address
```



```
004012D8
004012D8 loc_4012D8:          ; Call Procedure
004012D8 call   GetTickCount
004012D9 push  eax           ; unsigned int
004012DE call   srand        ; Call Procedure
004012E3 pop   ecx
004012E4 xor    esi, esi      ; Logical Exclusive OR
004012E6 jmp    short loc_401304 ; Jump
```

- Block 401462
  - 401476: ShellExecute
    - Open the content of lpFile (file or folder)
  - 40147D: ExitProcess
    - Ends the calling process and all its threads
    - NB! Does not terminate child processes

So how do we get to 401482?

- First execution start a copy of itself that will arrive at 401482, but the initial code is terminated



NTNU

## **Block 401482 and onwards**

Is this where the keylogger is? We have not seen it yet

- Block 401482
  - Get ExistingFileName
- Block 40148B
  - Loop, find length of ExistingFileName
- Block 401492
  - Length ExistingFileName stored in edi
  - Get Data
- Block 40149D
  - Loop, find length of Name



# Block

401482


40148B

401492

40149D

4014A4

4014D7



- Block 4014A4
  - Length Name into edx
  - How are edx and edi used?
  - sprintf?
  - CreateMutexA and GetLastError: infected before?
- Block 4014D7
  - ExitProcess if infected before (mutex exist)
- Block 4014DE
  - LoadLibraryA
- Block 4014EE
  - GetProcAddress: RegisterServicesProcess
- Block 40150C
  - GetProcAddress: CreateToolhelp32Snapshot
  - GetProcAddress: Process32First
  - GetProcAddress: Process32Next

# Block

## 4014DE


## 4014EE

## 401502

## 40150C

## 40153C

## 401551



- Block 40153C
  - WSAStartup version 101h
- Block 401551
  - WSAStartup version 1
- Block 40156C, 401582, 401598
  - Loops imul 348, 532, 120
  - Repeat 30, 40, 30
  - And , 0 - could this be clearing memory areas?

# Block

## 401563

## 40156A


## 40156C

## 401580

## 401582

## 401596

## 401598



# Polling Keys

- Block 4015A9
  - CreateThread (4015BD): StartAddress 4037CD
    - Loop, sleep X ms
    - Call 403802 (unknown)
  - Call function 402AEA (4015D3): (unknown)
  - CreateThread (4015EC): StartAddress 402BBD
    - Loop, sleep 30 sec
    - Call 402BD7 (unknown registry operations)
  - **CreateThread (401613): StartAddress 4030E0**
    - **Keylogger functionality (polling keys) – finally ☺**
  - Call function 402AEA (4015D3): (unknown)

# Block 4015A9

```

004015A9 lea    eax, [ebp+ThreadId] ; Load Effective Address
004015AF push   eax                ; lpThreadId
004015B0 push   0                 ; dwCreationFlags
004015B2 push   0                 ; lpParameter
004015B4 push   offset StartAddress ; lpStartAddress
004015B9 push   0                 ; dwStackSize
004015B8 push   0                 ; lpThreadAttributes
004015BD call   CreateThread      ; Call Procedure
004015C2 mov    ebx, eax
004015C4 push   offset byte_413960 ; char *
004015C9 push   1                 ; int
004015CB push   ebx                ; int
004015CC push   0                 ; int
004015CE push   offset aFAvKiller ; "F/AU Killer"
004015D3 call   sub_402AEA       ; Call Procedure
004015D8 lea    eax, [ebp+ThreadId] ; Load Effective Address
004015DE push   eax                ; lpThreadId
004015DF push   0                 ; dwCreationFlags
004015E1 push   0                 ; lpParameter
004015E3 push   offset sub_4020BD ; lpStartAddress
004015E8 push   0                 ; dwStackSize
004015EA push   0                 ; lpThreadAttributes
004015EC call   CreateThread      ; Call Procedure
004015F1 push   32h               ; size_t
004015F3 push   0                 ; int
004015F5 push   offset unk_40BC70 ; void *
004015FA call   memset            ; Call Procedure
004015FF lea    eax, [ebp+ThreadId] ; Load Effective Address
00401605 push   eax                ; lpThreadId
00401606 push   0                 ; dwCreationFlags
00401608 push   0                 ; lpParameter
0040160A push   offset sub_4030E0 ; lpStartAddress
0040160F push   0                 ; dwStackSize
00401611 push   0                 ; lpThreadAttributes
00401613 call   CreateThread      ; Call Procedure
00401618 mov    ebx, eax
0040161A push   offset aKeylog_txt ; "keylog.txt"
0040161F lea    eax, [ebp+Buffer] ; Load Effective Address
00401625 push   eax
00401626 push   offset aKeyloggerLoggi ; "Keylogger logging to %s\\%s"
0040162B lea    eax, [ebp+var_306] ; Load Effective Address
00401631 push   eax                ; char *
00401632 call   sprintf           ; Call Procedure
00401637 push   offset byte_413960 ; char *
0040163C push   2                 ; int
0040163E push   ebx                ; int
0040163F push   0                 ; int
00401641 lea    eax, [ebp+var_306] ; Load Effective Address
00401647 push   eax                ; char *
00401648 call   sub_402AEA       ; Call Procedure
0040164D add    esp, 44h          ; Add
00401650 xor    esi, esi          ; Logical Exclusive OR


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# Networking


- Block 40165E
  - Call function 402CE8 (Network functionality)
  - Argument: 209.126.201.20 (esi=0) or 209.126.201.22 (esi=1) alternating.
  - 401685 inc esi
  - 40165A cond jmp
    - Esi=1 goto 40165E, esi=2 goto 40165C set esi=0
  - In loop, sleep 5 sec until eax (result of 402CE8?) is 1
- Block 402CE8
  - Loop, sleep 40771Bh
  - Call function 407585 (Network Functionality)
    - socket, memset, htons, inet\_addr, gethostbyname, connect, closesocket
  - Call function 402E85 (Network)
    - IRC channel
    - hotmail.com




# Block 401652, 40165C, 40165E, 40167B, 401688



# Block 402CE8



# Block 407585




# Challenge: key logger?


Basic static and dynamic analysis suggest the malware has key logger functionality:


1. At what addresses are keys examined?
2. What keys are examined?
3. Goto loc: 403579. The conditional jump at 403580 defines two loops.
  1. What is the purpose of ebp+var\_4?
  2. What is the purpose of the short loop?
  3. What is the purpose of the longer loop?
  4. How often are keys polled?


# Answer

1. Key are examined using GetAsyncKeyState and GetKeyState
  1. GetAsyncKeyState (4032F3)  
Is a key up or down? Has the key been pressed since last time?
    1. What key? – EBX
    2. Where is EBX set? vKey function of EDI (click og see list)
    3. EDI set by EBP+var4
    4. EBP+var4 incremented in 403579
    5. CMP with 5Ch (92 keys checked)
  2. GetKeyState  
Is a key up or down? Is a key toggled on or off?
    1. 4032DB – 10h (shift key)
    2. 403306 – 14h (CAPS lock)
    3. 403332 - 14h (CAPS lock)
2. Loops
  1. EBP+var4: Counter, incremented in 403579 until it reaches 92 (5Ch)
  2. Short loop: For each iteration poll the key defined by EBP+var4. Also check some special keys (shift, CAPS lock, windows (5Bh) – Also includes code to write strings to stream – writing to keylog.txt?)
  3. Long loop: When all 92 keys (out of 255) are tested a larger loop is repeated  
Check what is the active window (GetForegroundWindow), write string to stream (4035AF) and retrieves the window text  
Sleep before short loop is repeated
  4. 40320D push 8 (8 ms pushed on stack before sleep is called)









```
00403579
00403579 loc_403579:
00403579 inc      [ebp+var_4]
0040357C cmp      [ebp+var_4], 5Ch
00403580 jl       loc_4032D9
```



NTNU

# Questions?



# Challenge – Find Function

- How many times is the function **fopen** called?
- Go to the first (lowest address) fopen in the list?  
State the address. (The next 4 questions are related to this specific instance of fopen)
  - What is a prologue in general and specific for this instance of call fopen?
  - What is an epilogue in general and specific for this instance of call fopen?
  - What calling convention is used here? Explain how you found your answer.
  - Explain the purpose of the 4 next assembly instructions, after “call fopen”?

# Suggested approach

- Many ways to search for Fopen (jump name, search text)
- Fopen in names window, double click
- Choose xref to fopen ("x" or right click)
- All instances with address listed
- Choose lowest address (usually the first)

# fopen – 7 instances

Dire...	T.	Address	Text
Up	p	sub_4030E0+69	call fopen
Up	p	sub_4035AF+28	call fopen
Up	p	sub_40484B+22E	call fopen
Up	p	sub_404CE2+FB	call fopen
Up	p	sub_405FD0+3C	call fopen
Up	p	sub_40621E+1D4	call fopen
Up	p	sub_406847+285	call fopen

# Answer

# Challenge opcode knowledge

Explain the single instructions found at the following addresses. You do not have to find the actual value of arguments used, e.g. if eax is involved, it is enough to state that “the value of eax...”.

1. 403109
2. 403142
3. 403231
4. 403270
5. 403258
6. 4032FD
7. 403342
8. 403345

# Answer

1. 403109                mov [ebp+var\_AD8], eax  
Moves the value in EAX onto the stack, with offset var\_AD8 (local variable)
2. 403142                lea eax, [ebp+var\_AD4]  
Moves local variable ebp+var\_AD4 into ecx, i.e value on stack offset by var\_AD4 is put into ecx. NB! Not value at memory location found on the stack displaced by var\_660 (this is the difference between LEA and MOV)
3. 403231                or eax, 0FFFFFFFh (bitwise or)
4. 403270                push ds:dword\_40BF2C  
Global variable added to stack
5. 403258                add esp, 0Ch  
constant 0ch added to esp (moved stack pointer 3 32bit positions – clean up after function call)
6. 4032FD                test di, 8000h  
compares 16bit di med hex 8000
7. 403342                cmp ebx, 40h  
ZF satt hvis ebx er lik 40h
8. 403345                jle short loc\_40335C  
jump if dst<=src after cmp

# Challenge mutex

We suspect this sample to use mutex (also known as mutant)

- 1) Why do we suspect this?
- 2) What is the most likely purpose of using mutex/mutant?
- 3) What is the mutex/mutant for this sample?
- 4) Identify the address where the mutex is created.
- 5) How is the mutex used?

# Answer 3.4

1. CreateMutex part of kernel 32 library observed by basic static analysis.  
Did we see any strings that could be the MUTEX?
2. Malicious software sometimes uses mutex objects to avoid infecting the system more than once, as well as to coordinate communications among its multiple components on the host. Incident responders can look for known mutex names to spot the presence of malware on the system. To evade detection, some malware avoids using a hardcoded name for its mutex.
3. Name: kernel  
Look at the arguments pushed to stack before calling CreateMutex. Double click on Name

```
HANDLE CreateMutexA(  
    LPSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES lpMutexAttributes,  
    BOOL                 bInitialOwner,  
    LPCSTR               lpName  
)
```

4. Hardcoded in memory 412074
5. Tried to create the mutex. Check error messages.  
If error message = 0B7h (cmp) ZF=1 (set)  
ZF=0 continue  
ZF=1 call ExitProcess

What is error code 0B7h? ERROR\_ALREADY\_EXISTS

If mutex exists, terminate the process, since computer is already infected

**NUL**

```

004014A4 mov     edx, eax
004014A6 sub     edi, edx
004014A8 lea     edi, [ebp+edi+ExistingFileName]
004014AF push    edi          ; char *
004014B0 push    offset Data    ; "wuaumqr.exe"
004014B5 call    sprintF
004014B8 add    esp, 8
004014BD push    offset Name   ; "krnel"
004014C2 push    1             ; bInitialOwner
004014C4 push    0             ; lpMutexAttributes
004014C6 call    CreateMutexA
004014CB call    GetLastError
004014D0 cmp    eax, 0B7h
004014D5 jnz    short loc_4014DE
  
```

**NUL**

```

004014D7 push    0          ; uExitCode
004014D9 call    ExitProcess
  
```

**NUL**

```

004014DE
004014DE loc_4014DE:           ; "kernel32.dll"
004014DE push    offset LibFileName
004014E3 call    LoadLibraryA
004014E8 mov     ebx, eax
004014EA or     ebx, ebx
004014FC iż    short loc_40153C
  
```

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