

Practical Analyzing the Relation of Wallet Addresses in Bitcoin

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Goal and Contributions

- Goal and Contributions
 - Tracing suspicious activity of crime in Cryptcurrencies
 - Providing useful information and analyzing infrastructure
 - Supporting Cryptocurrencies forensics for law enforcement
 - Easily finding specific wallet address (address) relations
- Evaluation: Practical investigation process in Bitcoin
 - Rethinking at some cybercrime cases
 - Market Place: Bitcoin information in SilkRoad
 - Ransomware: Address relations in cryptolocker
 - DD4BC: Address relations and limitation
- Discussion: Analyzing limitation in Cryptocurrencies

Outline

- Background and Problem
 - Cryptocurrencies Trend
 - Bitcoin information and relation of cybercrime
- Analyzing Overview
 - Scope and purpose for cryptocurrencies forensics
- Related Works
 - Practical tools and methods from private sector and academic
- Approach
 - Bitcoin analyzing methods: Address, Transaction, Block relations
 - Graphical viewing: useful information for law enforcement
- Evaluation
 - Showing Some cybercrime cases at our analyzing result
- Discussion
 - Limitation of Cryptocurrencies forensics
- Summary and Future Trend

- Cryptocurrencies Trends
 - The number of cryptocurrencies: 643 currencies, 1986 Markets




Fig1. https://coinmarketcap.com

Fig 2 http://money.visualcapitalist.com/tag/bitcoin/

- Cryptocurrencies' Problem in Bitcoin case
 - Bitcion becomes defects currency in cybercrime



Fig.3 Cryptolocker case http://arstechnica.com/security/2013/10/youre-infected-if-you-want-to-see-your-data-again-pay-us-300-in-bitcoins/



https://www.bestvpnz.com/silk-road-shut-down-by-fbi/



Fig.5 DD4BC https://www.neustar.biz/blog/ddos-extortion-and-bitcoin Copyright INTERPOL. 2016

- Many advantages for users
 - Complex architecture : Blockchain, Peer-to-Peer network




Fig. 6 Blockchain https://bitcoin.org/en/developer-guide




Fig.7 Global Bitcoin Nodes Distribution https://bitnodes.21.co/

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- Many advantages for users
 - Pseudo anonymity: wallet address (address), exchange




Fig.8 Sample case of address and payment

Fig.9 The extended bitcoin network showing various node types, gateways, and protocols http://chimera.labs.oreilly.com/books/1234000001802/ch06.html

Analyzing overview

- Scope and Purpose
 - Tracing suspicious activity of crime in Cryptcurrencies
 - Providing useful information and analyzing infrastructure
- Motivations
 - Support practical cryptocurrencies investigation process
 - Easily investigate address relation without knowledge
- Goal
 - Detect the relations of addresses and point of exchange
- Approach : Practical Analyzing
 - Real time creating whole indexed data of Blockchain
 - Graphical and user friendly interface for investigator

Related Works

Practical tools and methods from private sector and academic




Fig.10 Sample of Chainalysis

Fig.11 Sample of Blockchain.info

Related Works

Practical tools and methods from private sector and academic




Fig.12 walletexplorer.com




FIGURE 3.3: Building blocks of BitIodine

Fig.13 Bitlodine


M. Spagnuolo, "Bitlodine: Extracting Intelligence from the Bitcoin Network," 2013.

Approach: Practical Analyzing in Our System

- Target
 - Wallet Address, Transaction, Block relation
- Bitcoin Analyzing method
 - Search: target, Bitcoin flow, specific date and amount (BTC,USD)
 - Statistics: weekly, hourly, yearly activity
 - Tagging: attribution of address
 - Clustering: group of addresses (transaction input based)
- Graphical viewing
 - Cluster Relation
 - Understanding each group connection, trend
 - Address Relation
 - Handling Bitcoin flow in each address

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Bitcoin Analyzing Process Overview




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Other information 12

Evaluation: Case Study 01, SilK Road

- Silk Road Market Place: Shut down by <u>FBI</u> October 2013
- Addresses: leaked at forum
 - 1LDNLreKJ6GawBHPgB5yfVLBERi8g3SbQS, 6 hops -> 1933 ...
 - 1933phfhK3ZgFQNLGSDXvqCn32k2buXY8a



output,1HR42TZ27g O

1933phfnK3 Otput,15inHoGs3o O 15inHoGs3o O

output,1K191X5eVs O

Still Active? in 2014-

Fig. 14 BTC Balance of 1933. Copyright INTERPOL. 2016 I

Fig. 15 Relation of 1933...

Address Output Tree

Evaluation: Case Study 02, CryptoLocker

- Ransomware: CryptoLocker requires 2 BTC to victims
- Address
 - 1KP72fBmh3XBRfuJDMn53APaqM6iMRspCh
 - 18iEz617DoDp8CNQUyyrjCcC7XCGDf5SVb




Fig.16 Search Result of 2.0 BTC




Fig.17 BTC Balance of 18iE...

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Evaluation: Case Study 02, CryptoLocker


- Ransomware: CryptoLocker requires 2 BTC to victims
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 - 1KP72fBmh3XBRfuJDMn53APaqM6iMRspCh
 - 18iEz617DoDp8CNQUyyrjCcC7XCGDf5SVb




Fig.19 Relation of 1KP7... Fig. 18 Transaction Stats of 1KP7... 2016/8/8

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- Extortion: DD4BC (DDoS for Bitcoin)
- Relation Overview




- DD4BC Addresses -> 1FsVcdeHb...
 - 1H2bstU3yCpqJyrNzHSrnperZnTMSwLa5K, 3hops to 1Fs...



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Address Output Tree click or right click to expand or search

- Extortion: DD4BC (DDoS for Bitcoin)
- Tumbling / Mixing Address
 - 1FsVcdeHbpvUVT3gjeuVR2ZSDnpcsJMsLL -> 3Bgk1oHeo...





3Bgk1oHeomvu6bo4q6RKA6xoA8X8B342Y7

Address Path Graph click or right click to expand or search

Tumbling / Mixing Address


3Bgk1oHeomvu6bo4q6RKA6xoA8X8B342Y7 -> 3Q5r9gVn....





3Q5r9gVn1Trj5TVPT5nKs3tKmnDcS9tBe2

- Exchange Address?
 - 3Q5r9gVn1Trj5TVPT5nKs3tKmnDcS9tBe2




Discussion

- Limitation of Cryptocurrencies Forensics
 - Knowledge Requirement
 - Cryptography: Hash, Signature, Public Key Crypt, ...
 - Network: TCP/IP, P2P, Tor, VPN, ...
 - Bitcoin: Blockchain, address / transaction mechanism
 - Tumbling / Mixing Service
 - It breaks up any Bitcoin flow and address relations
 - Data size
 - The number of unique address is increasing
 - Total Transaction is huge

Discussion

Tumbling / Mixing Service



Discussion

- Data size: Over 60GBytes (raw db size)
 - Address (2009-2015): 32,611 -> 57,723,195
 - Transaction (2016.06): 134,449,708




Fig.22 The number of unique address




Fig.23 Total number of transactions https://blockchain.info/charts/n-transactions-total

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Summary and Future Trend

- Cryptocurrencies is new field of Forensics
 - In cybercrime, Bitcoin becomes de fact currency
 - No silver bullet and no one solution
- Our approach of investigation
 - Focusing macro / micro information of Bitcoin flow
 - Using outside information: Forum, Marketplace, Chat, and so on
 - Practical methods are important
 - Combine public tools and private tool
 - Collaboration with private, public sectors and academic people

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- ⇒We continue to tackle with detection and tracing "suspicious" activity
- Future Trend
 - Cryptocurencies forensics: Tumbling, Exchange, Miner analyzing
 - Bitcoin Transaction Pattern Recognition, Big Graph Handling

Clustering of Addresses

Assumption

- If sender wallet addresses in same transaction input, these are managed by one user
 - e.x. Addr1 and Addr2 sent BTC to Addr3 in Tx1
 - One user has Addr1 and Addr2

Reason

- Bitcoin client supports multi wallet addresses (public/private key)
- Bitcoin client requires a private key to sent BTC to other wallet address
 - Transaction input is signed by wallet address's private key
- Bitcoin client doesn't support other Bitcoin client's BTC sending
 - It needs wallet address's private key
- Sender wallet addresses in same transaction, these are managed by one user
 - These wallet addresses' private key are in same environment