

Fast Contraband Detection In Large Capacity Disk Drives

Ву

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Paper Fast contraband detection in large capacity

disk drives

Structure Background to and motivation for this

research

Review of existing solutions

The theory behind our design

Experiments and results


Questions





Kryder's Law - the areal density has been increasing at 40% per year and is nowhere near fundamental limits.

Garfinkel [1] - existing digital forensic tools do not scale



Roussev, Quates and Martell [2] - acquisition of a fast 3 TB hard disk - over 11 hours.



11 hours



Triage - a fast initial scan by sampling a digital device, conducted perhaps under severe time and resource constraints, to prioritise the device for possible further detailed investigation

- Be 99.9% accurate
- Give results in a reasonable time
- Execute on low specification legacy equipment.





Clusters not files

Files - Access slow
Relies on file system metadata so
no deleted files, partitions or unallocated space

Clusters – Sample clusters from the whole address space of the disk. Sorted in order thus allowing a sequential pass over the disk. File system agnostic

RAM based reference data set



Existing 'Triage' Solutions





triage-ir



Internet history, the registry, file metadata, recently used files, image files.....file hashing and lookup. Disk imaging!

"freeing forensic analysts from the routine task of acquiring forensic evidence" Casey et al. [3]



Using sdhash similarity digests rather than simple hashing, (Roussev et al. [4])

"Similarity digests could only be used in the field in a selective manner, e.g., using a reference database of up to 1 GB."

bulk extractor

Uses optimised database *hashdb* – specifically designed for the purpose.

Can do random sampling.



Reference Data Set (Contraband)

Police Scotland Child Pornography Image Database

- 5.1 million images Category 1 (the most serious)
- 1 million images Categories 2 to 5

Average image size 100 KiB =>25 × 4 KiB clusters

6 million × 25 cluster hashes = 150 million hashes


MD5 hash - 128 bits = 16 bytes

150 million × 16 bytes = 2.4 GB !!!!




Bloom Filters


- 1. A bit array
- 2. A set of hash functions




 $h_1('Jupiter') = 3, h_2('Jupiter') = 12, h_3('Jupiter') = 11$



 $h_1(\text{`Venus'}) = 11, h_2(\text{`Venus'}) = 2, h_3(\text{`Venus'}) = 8$







Lookup -

$$h_1('Saturn') = 1$$
, $h_2('Saturn) = 3$, $h_3('Saturn') = 8$
 $h_1('Mars') = 11$, $h_2('Mars') = 3$, $h_3('Mars') = 8$!!

Values important to the design of our Bloom filter:

m = the number of bits in the array which represents the Bloom filter.
Initially all bits are set to 0

n = the number of elements added to the filter

 $k = the number of independent hash functions <math>h_1, h_2, \ldots, h_k$ used

p = the probability of a false positive

Since $m = 2^4$ note that 4 bits are required for each hash



$$p = P(false\ positive) \approx \left(1 - e^{-\frac{kn}{m}}\right)^k$$
 (Mitzenmacher and Vadhan [5])

False positive probabilities for varying values of m and k (number entries in filter = 200 million)


Filter size (MiB)

				,		
k	512	600	700	800	900	1024
4	0.000834149	0.000466407	0.000263157	0.000159487	0.000102189	0.000062537
6	0.000209786	0.000091112	0.000039869	0.000019271	0.000010073	0.000004912
8	0.000087538	0.000030242	0.000010473	0.000004100	0.000001769	0.000000696
10	0.000051133	0.000014373	0.000004016	0.000001292	0.000000466	0.00000149
12	0.000037893	0.000008855	0.000002034	0.000000546	0.000000166	0.000000044
14	0.000033433	0.000006629	0.000001274	0.000000289	0.000000075	0.00000017
_16	0.000033607	0.000005763	0.000000942	0.000000183	0.000000041	0.000000008



1 GiB array = 2^{30} bytes = 2^{33} bits So 33 bit hashes are required

SHA-384 algorithm generates a 384 bit hash We 'slice off' 8 × 33 bit independent hashes



SHA-384, 384 bits



Calculating sample size:


Disk size n clusters

Target size t clusters

Sample size k clusters

Probability of a 'hit' = p = 99.9%

Sampling k items from n with no replacement – The Urn Problem - Hypergeometric Distribution





Target size 4 MiB – Probability of at least one target cluster in sample Sample Size

_		100000	200000	300000	400000	500000	600000	700000	800000	900000	1000000
	120	0.96	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
(GB)	250	0.79	0.96	0.99	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Size	320	0.71	0.91	0.97	0.99	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Disk	500	0.54	0.79	0.90	0.96	0.98	0.99	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
	1000	0.32	0.54	0.69	0.79	0.86	0.90	0.94	0.96	0.97	0.98

Target size 20 MiB - Probability of at least one target cluster in sample Sample Size

_		100000	200000	300000	400000	500000	600000	700000	800000	900000	1000000	
_	120	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	
<u>5</u>	250	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	
Size	320	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	
Jisk	500	0.98	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	
	1000	0.86	0.98	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	






100 MB real images added to filter





Testing

4 MB of random images from real image set added to each test drive



Sampled for contraband



Core i3 Desktop PC Sampling Accuracy and Speed

				False	Time
Disk and Size	Target Size	Samples	Hits	Positives	min:sec
250 GB SSD	4 MB	416700	31	0	00:42
250 GB SSD	20 MB	79700	7	0	00:07
250 GB USB HDD	4 MB	416700	7	0	35:02
250 GB USB HDD	20 MB	79700	4	0	08:31
1 TB HDD	4 MB	1666600	6	1	108:54
1 TB HDD	20 MB	318900	8	2	27:42

Intel Atom Netbook Sampling Accuracy and Speed

				False	Time
Disk and Size	Target Size	Samples	Hits	Positives	min:sec
250 GB SSD	4 MB	416700	8	0	09:33
250 GB SSD	20 MB	79700	12	0	01:54
250 GB USB HDD	4 MB	416700	5	0	44:34
250 GB USB HDD	20 MB	79700	7	0	11:04



Triage – a fast initial scan by sampling a digital device ✓

- Be 99.9% accurate ✓
- Give results in a reasonable time ✓
- Execute on low specification legacy equipment ✓

However -



We have used random data for initial testing which eliminated false positives due to <u>non-distinct blocks</u>.

Real data will have non-distinct blocks (Young et al. [6]). Initial testing shows possibly 1% of blocks could be common. This problem is currently being addressed by Garfinkel et al..

In the mean time we read two blocks for every sample. If a hit – process block 2. If both hits – it's a hit, otherwise false positive.

Sector alignment had not proved a problem. Some researchers have read two disk clusters at a time then do 8 filter lookups instead of one – one for each sector offset.

We have successfully used wmic.exe



Thankyou.



References

- [1] S. Garfinkel, "Digital forensics research: The next 10 years," Digital Investigation, vol. 7, pp. S64–S73, Aug. 2010.
- [2] V. Roussev, C. Quates, and R. Martell, "Real-time digital forensics and triage," *Digital Investigation*, vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 158 167, 2013.
- [3] E. Casey, G. Katz, and J. Lewthwaite, "Honing digital forensic processes," *Digital Investigation*, vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 138–147, Sep. 2013.
- [4] V. Roussev, C. Quates, and R. Martell, "Real-time digital forensics and triage," *Digital Investigation*, vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 158 167, 2013.
- [5] M. Mitzenmacher and S. Vadhan, "Why simple hash functions work: exploiting the entropy in a data stream," *Proceedings of the 19th Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms*, pp. 746–755, 2008.