



If Error Rate is Such a Simple Concept, Why Don't I have One for My Forensic Tool Yet

By

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Introduction

- Daubert – criteria to assess admissibility of scientific testimony
 - Tested
 - Peer review
 - Error rate & controls
 - General acceptance
- The first idea (using tool test results) for establishing an error rate doesn't work.



First try for an Error Rate Fails

- Consider disk imaging . . .
 - Let n be total bits acquired
 - Let k be number of incorrectly acquired bits
 - Then k/n looks like an error rate.
- But, how to determine n & k is hard.
- Doing lots of acquires may not get a representative sample of drives that might be imaged.



Outline

- Typical errors seen during testing
- Measurement & Statistical Errors
- Sources of Errors
- An Example
- Establishing Error Rates
- Summary



Disk Imaging Behaviors

- Some sectors omitted
 - 1024 sectors for Quantum Sirocco (SafeBack)
 - 5040 sectors for Quantum Sirocco (EnCase 3)
 - 1 sector if drive has an odd number of sectors (dd Linux)
 - Last 8 sectors of NTFS logical drive (FTK)
 - Last sector of NTFS logical drive (EnCase 4, 5 & 6) and seven sectors prior to last sector are a repeat from earlier in the image.
 - Sectors around a faulty sectors replaced by zeros
 - HPA & DCO

Testing a Hypothesis –

Does entity X have attribute A?

- Statistical process
- A Matrix of possibilities

Test Result	Reality	
	X has A	X does not have A
X has A	Accept	False Positive aka Type I Error
X does not have A	False Negative aka Type II Error	Reject

Error rate for each type of error is the probability of the error occurring.



Sources of Error

- The theory of measurement error identifies two classes of errors: measurement (random process) & systematic (non-random)
- For forensic tools that implement some algorithm . . .
 1. An algorithm may have a theoretical (random process) error rate
 2. An implementation of an algorithm may have systematic (non-random) errors
 3. The execution of a procedure may have a blunder that affects the result
- Daubert is mostly interested in the first two.



Error Source Example

- Hashes or checksums (with useful attributes) can be computed for a file.
 - Same files have the same hash
 - A different hash means files are different
 - However, the same hash is possible for different files
- Hashes or checksums can be used to determine if:
 - A file has changed, or
 - If two files might be the same with some error rate.

An Algorithm To Compare A Pair Of Files With Only One File

- A hash or checksum can be used to determine if any file in a set of files match a given file.
 1. Let c be the hash of the given file
 2. For each file, f , in the set ...
 - i. Compute, h , the hash of f
 - ii. Compare c to h
 - iii. If c matches h , then declare c equals h
- Hashes can collide (two different files with same hash)
- The error rate (type I) of file matches is related to the size of the hash (number of bits)
- The error rate (type II) for identifying two identical files as different is zero.

Comparing Randomly Selected Files

Chance of hash or checksum for a random file matching a given value

Algorithm	Chance of Collision
CRC-16	1 in 32,768
CRC-32	1 in 2,147,483,648
MD5 (128 bits)	1 in 170141183460469231731687303715884105728
SHA-1	1 in 2^{159}
SHA-256	1 in 2^{255}



Implementation Errors

- A variety of implementation errors are possible, some are quite subtle.
 - One common error occurs as follows:
 - Hash algorithm is implemented in a UNIX environment. It works for any file.
 - Same program is moved to MS Windows environment. It works fine for any *binary* file, but computes a different (wrong) value for any *text* file (Windows adds a character to the end of each line of text).

What is the error rate?

- In the science of measurement error analysis an implementation error is called a *systematic error*.
- The distribution of text and binary files varies from computer to computer.
- There is no random distribution to the manifestation of the error.
- The implementation error is triggered only under some set of conditions.
- A tool may have implementation errors, but the algorithm being implemented has a statistical error rate.



Human Errors

- Human errors (blunders) occur
- Difficult to quantify
- Good processes have built in checks to detect blunders



Error Rate for Disk Imaging

- Forensic tools often have multiple requirements.
- Each requirement may generate a separate error rate.
- Separate the algorithm from the implementation.
- Algorithm is . . . Read and make a copy of every accessible sector on the drive. The error rate is zero.
- The implementation may have a many different systematic errors.
- Alternate algorithm . . . Add an attempt to read additional (not accessible) sectors – Unknown error rate.



Other Error Rates

- Write blocking
- String Searching
- File Recovery and Carving



Summary & Observations

- Distinguish between intended algorithm and actual implementation
- Algorithm may have an error rate (statistical in nature)
- Implementations have systematic errors
- Most digital forensic tool functions are simple collection, extraction or searching operations with a zero error rate for the algorithm.
- Tools tend to have minor problems, usually omitting data, sometimes duplicating existing data.
- An implementation's systematic errors can be revealed by tool testing.
- To satisfy the intent of Daubert, tools should have the types of failures and triggering conditions characterized.

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