

Information Assurance In A Distributed Forensic Cluster

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
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Information Assurance in a Distributed Forensic Cluster

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Introduction

- As data quantities increase we will need to adopt alternative models in our forensic processing environments.
- We believe that Distributed Processing will play a key part in this.
- We believe existing practice breaks down in a distributed system.
- We're going to show our design for a framework that provides data assurance in a distributed storage environment.





"Forensic Soundness"

- It's a key part of our discipline
- It's quite hard to define
- Existing standards and frameworks are a little vague
- It's all down to accepted Best Practice
- It's achieved by implementing 'controls'



'Internal Controls' on the Forensic Process

- By **Property**, eg. cryptographic hashes, sizes, name!
- By Location, eg. on specific media, network storage
- By Authority, eg. order and response form
- By **Access Control**, eg. write blocker, password
- By Separation of Process, eg. crime scene and lab work
- By Checklist, eg. have all the tasks been completed?
- By Audit, but this is after the process





At the bedrock of Forensics


The Forensic Image

- It's a snapshot at a point in time
- It is complete, including Boot Sectors, Unallocated space, HPA, HPC areas
- Rather like the pieces of a Jigsaw, the parts form a whole.
- We can measure it with SHA-1 etc





'Traditional' Architectures





A time of Great Change


- In 'the Golden Age' life was so simple (Simson Garfinkel, 2010)
- 3V Volume, Variety and Velocity (Gartner, 2007)
- We now have Desktops, notebooks, netbooks, Virtualisation,
 Cloud storage, Cloud Processing, Smart Phones, Tablets, SatNav, USB Sticks,
 Memory cards, Terabyte drives, games machines, Cameras, etc.
- We find it difficult to cope with the sheer volume of data
- We have a backlog





'Traditional' Architectures


Based around a 'Forensic Image'



This is limited to SATA3 and 32 cores?

Forensic Image Stores

SATA3 = 600MB/s
SSD Read = 500MB/s
If 1 Core can process 4 MB/s
This could occupy 150 cores
Processor constrained






Anticipated Developments

- Multi tera-byte crime scenes
- Multi-Agency Access
- Multi Device Analysis
- Complex processing, image and object recognition Semantic meaning of text usage profiling
- Google had the same type of Problem





Google/Apache Hadoop



A processing Model - Map/Reduce A File System - HDfs


- Split the data as whole files (SIPs/DEBs) across the cluster
- Don't move the data Run the program where the data is stored






Solutions and Opportunities

Distributed processing is one that interests me





Distributed Architecture








We lose "The Image"

- Distributed storage of acquired information packages is in direct conflict with 'the image'
- The image's integrity comes, primarily, from it's wholesomeness
- We lose the integrity we have enjoyed for 20 years
- We need to re-establish Assurance






Distributed Data needs to appear as a single file system










FUSE File-Systems

Virtual File System EXT3 File System Native File System Application Program Ext3 mkdir < pass onto ... **EXT3 Normal Code** rmdir < pass onto ... EXT3 Normal Code open < pass onto ... EXT3 Normal Code read < pass onto ... EXT3 Normal Code write < pass onto ... EXT3 Normal Code 6 getattr < pass onto ... EXT3 Normal Code readdir < pass onto ... EXT3 Normal Code opendir≤ pass onto ... EXT3 Normal Code






FUSE File-Systems


Virtual File System EXT3 File System Native File System Application Program Ext3 mkdir < pass onto ... EX13 Normal Code rmdir < pass onto ... EXT3 Normal Code EXT3 Normal Code open < pass onto ... read < pass onto ... EXT3 Normal Code write < pass onto ... EX13 Normal Code 6 getattr < pass onto ... EXT3 Normal Code readdir < pass onto ... EXT3 Normal Code opendir≤ pass onto ... EXT3 Normal Code





FUSE File-Systems

Application Program





FUSE File System in Forensics

- Forensic discovery auditing of digital evidence containers,
 Richard, Roussev & Marziale (2007)
- Selective and intelligent imaging using digital evidence bags. In: Proceedings of the sixth annual digital forensics research workshop (DFRWS), Lafayette, IN; Aug 2006. Turner P.
- Affuse (Simson Garfinkel)
- MountEWF
- Xmount for VirtualBox or VMWare format disk images.





FClusterfs – A wish list

- The ability to store extended directory/file meta data
- We want unaltered legacy software to run. New software requires no new skillset. Sculptor, bulk_extractor etc will still work
- Gives access to files on remote servers where they're stored as whole files
- The ability to handle multi storage volumes from different media
- Has end to end encryption built-in
- Tracks movements and processing: Logging.
- Is Read Only to the user
- Highly tailorable access control at volume, directory and file levels






Existing FUSE File-Systems

- MySQLfs Substitutes an SQL database for the file-system
- CurlFTPfs Mounts an ftp/ssh/sftp/https server
- Loggedfs Records all file access activity
- eCrypts Encrypts and decrypts data per file on the fly
- ROfs a read only file system






Distributed Data appearing as a single file system






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FClusterfs



Remote Connection – Slower - Ethernet
Local Connection – Faster – SATA
RAM Connection – even faster – BUS speed!



fclusterfs

- --mysql_user=me
- --mysql_password=mypassword
- --mysql_host=25.63.133.244
- --mysql_database=fclusterfs
- --volume=74a8f0f627cc0dc6
- --audituser='Investigator Name' /home/user/Desktop/fsmount



FClusterfs – MySQL Tables

inodes

inode	bigint(20) unsigned
fsfilename	varchar(1024)
inuse	int(11)
deleted	tinyint(4)
mode	int(11)
uid	int(10) unsigned
gid	int(10) unsigned
atime	int(10) unsigned
mtime	int(10) unsigned
ctime	int(10) unsigned
size	bigint(20)

Our Submission Information Package (SIP/DEB)

Header Section

```
<investigator>Nick Pringle</>
<case>A Villainous Crime</>
<date-time>12/May/2013 14:25:23</>
<description>This is a small 1GB memory stick taken from the desk of the suspect</><ScanStartedAt>Friday, November 29 2013. 13:42:52 GMT</>
<ThisFileScannedAt>Friday, November 29 2013, 13:42:52 GMT
<VolumeSerialNo>74a8f0f627cc0dc6</>
<VolumeLabel>My Label</>
<FileName>/mhash/lib/kevgen s2k.c</>
<NTFSDumpFileAttributes>
Dumping attribute $STANDARD INFORMATION (0x10) from mft record 150 (0x96)
                         Resident
                         Attribute flags:
                                                   0x0000
                         <FileAttributes> ARCHIVE (0x00000020)</>
Dumping attribute $FILE NAME (0x30) from mft record 150 (0x96)
                         Resident:
                                                                            Yes
                         Resident flags:
                                                                            0x01
                         Parent directory:
                                                   136 (0x88)
                         File Creation Time:
                                                   Sat Jul 20 18:25:53 2013 UTC
                         File Altered Time:
                                                   Sat Jul 20 18:25:53 2013 UTC
                         MFT Changed Time:
                                                   Sat Jul 20 18:25:53 2013 UTC
                         Last Accessed Time:
                                                   Sat Jul 20 18:25:53 2013 UTC
Dumping attribute $DATA (0x80) from mft record 150 (0x96)
                         Resident:
                                                                            No
                                                   0x0000
                         Attribute flags:
                                                   2 (0x2)
                         Attribute instance:
                         Compression unit:
                                                   0(0x0)
                         Actual Data size
                                                  6066 (0x17b2)</>
                         Allocated size:
                                                                            8192 (0x2000)
                         <<<Initialized size>>>:
                                                   6066 (0x17b2)
<TotalRuns>1</><Fragments>1</>
```

<run>1</><cluster1>242416</><sha1>A8724ACDB2135FE66EB7BE554CCF16091FBC2664</>

<run>1</><cluster2>242417</><sha1>D7A6B1A3F17E33A1F15BF8B815EC4B13410EFED3</>

<WholeFileSHA1>FC0198EF2F7782EF9EA8568853E6E3A48B86256D

Data Section

<data>

begin-base64 777 FC0198EF2F7782EF9EA8568853E6E3A48B86256D.cpt Dlevh4eFxd761tZ1zaPShNPDvGkB1FZn8UJiMY3zLCOAWKyj5CiPQSQOEGdU KzhQCN3oG0Xh27lSvvdHHwA7cCSeRS012Sv74NF16GixZ4f8gx7fMwtV73Ld W9K53EwHUGnbHUw6WEOm0wh9ch8QvJcPcPvW3oldQAA0HEBaB45I3XOaAr95 Yq37pBkMblDlC+/fu5ueFt6volcPM9tD53GrO0G0T/6wAaPAqNEDWcCZTzti bRH+FELEM9rxZidX8/glPd/UBXbgZ/ljSlsknlsZG+KMZhJg1AWxmniKj633 A0geD/Fnv9gi1i7f2RhCWrd78v2fXKt4YA/nM4osibDh1o9QsiGTitrkdFM4 fy4rHA6w98UdIwvROiH+roMKx0twdiDqy+zlvqvSohF9PKMn5Nq7Y4KLw19k p53JixBHilkoKefebVTybKNxNMh6c4QiNZucKQqRQWvVIYMqwqVbzqWiJQPM 5Mzhks7qDqZCx5s5Qll99w9fczGwurXn9yMjnNzGurFG32fo8ve/hoEAgsO6 slJ3/suViTtD+L97BrPgrsnkSv/gOr3aldEfstRgiA0A/v7ApAP6zDOe0TXD HHZ3OkRfopu4HAv+k234k6HQRkvveoS2T53Jz6HrCSplAh2xapMiRiTl5PF+ EpiHiyy3w8zX5oAqNMdkm/Nwv+CwESi8JnAbaCkcOEbiusNfjtxsF/SnaDPq CzX2ezaKu9ElvLcqYDJA2vcQFw4MXy3Vr4qXNdq456Ael7nJbtfARZFrchq8 /bhN5itxLOda8/BjMlsA9zE9cXAPUM3W5bANniu75AXkbrl6yQDpsO5Kdf0Y </data>



<NTFSInodeGeneralInfo>

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FClusterfs – MySQL Tables

VolumeListing

ID	bigint(20)
VolumeID	varchar(45)
FSRootInode	bigint(20)
keytext	varchar(1024)
ScanDateTime	char(27)
IssuedDateTime	datetime
ExpiresDateTime	datetime
Device	varchar(45)

serveraccessinfo

Password	varchar(45)
User	varchar(45)
IP	varchar(45)
Protocol	varchar(45)
ID	int(11)

inodes

inode	bigint(20) unsigned				
VolumeID	varchar(45)				
fsfilename	varchar(1024)				
inuse	int(11)				
deleted	tinyint(4)				
mode	int(11)				
uid	int(10) unsigned				
gid	int(10) unsigned				
atime	int(10) unsigned				
mtime	int(10) unsigned				
ctime	int(10) unsigned				
size	bigint(20)				
SHA1	varchar(40)				
originallocation	varchar(1024)				
firststorageprotocol	varchar(10)				
firststorageserver	varchar(45)				
firststoragefilename	varchar(1024)				
firststorageinplace	tinyint(4)				
firststoragearrivaldatetime	datetime				
fi rageur rked	inyir				


tree

inode	bigint(20) unsigned
VolumeID	char(45)
parent	int(10) unsigned
name	varchar(255)

metadata

inode	bigint(20)		
metadata	longtext		
VolumeID	varchar(45)		

FCluster Architecture Roles and Zones








Assurance Zones – Acquisition - Overview

- The cluster issues an "authority to image". This includes a "one time use" key to be used to encrypt the evidence.
- 2. The imaging device creates the image, SIP/DEB of the file directory and SIP/DEBs of the file data which are encrypted using the one time use key.
- 3. SIP/DEBs are pushed/pulled to the cluster








Assurance Zones – Acquisition – Detail 1 of 6

Vol	VolumeListing × inodes × tree × serveraccessinfo × audit × nodestate ×								
Filte	Filter:								
#	ID	Device	IssuedDateTime	ExpiresDateTime	ScanDateTime	VolumeID	FSRootInode	keytext	
1	193	Device003	2014-04-17 14:44:00	2014-04-30 00:00:00			0	qBf&fCd7HN+59otg13rBkq+t=%I2Kk9tv7y	
2	194	Device006	2014-04-17 16:48:00	2014-05-31 00:00:00			0	%00l-U2CU4c)7lUSv(Cin4+0QQSx8MVFwF8	
3	196	Device006	2014-04-17 16:48:00	2014-05-31 00:00:00			0	HJ7(qGMUxygF9xzsgv\$!^e27uIREg%f#kXS	
4	197	Device006	2014-04-17 16:48:00	2014-05-31 00:00:00	2014-04-18 19:19:43 +00:00	74a8f0f627cc0dc6	3365	Xt(VWtO2OXLH=j0P2Afd5qQQeH*V(d)Dmg	
5	198	Device006	2014-04-17 16:48:00	2014-05-31 00:00:00	2014-04-18 21:25:28 +00:00	1c0376672b6c06d3	451	c8R\$GBvBI*=Ve11Oe^fpAPI!aOzLY6mgMK=	
6	199	Device006	2014-04-17 16:48:00	2014-05-31 00:00:00			0	rem!ET4i(dHuqzkHl4Qkjel901TuV5Q7UavP′	
7	200	Device006	2014-04-17 16:48:00	2014-05-31 00:00:00			0	StTTo\$#(q3VELyS%maXRq4p441b)S#+fGS	
8	201	Device006	2014-04-17 16:48:00	2014-05-31 00:00:00	2014-04-18 20:20:56 +00:00	6449bf4a176afd35	3168	lv#6o^N447U+#ymTL91Du\$GSz=%=!Yan	
9	202	Device006	2014-04-17 16:48:00	2014-05-31 00:00:00			0	BMaz1a6objqq_U==WB+5B7\$hgr*Oz3j1\$z	
10	203	Device006	2014-04-17 16:48:00	2014-05-31 00:00:00	2014-04-18 21:21:20 +00:00	23ba7f8e25ef0f52	1154	*%MU5)9CRD5azoAI3tU_VX=!Nw4kLQsv+e	
11	208	Device006	2014-04-17 16:48:00	2014-05-31 00:00:00			0	%E=\$sfR6KW34Gmul=6P0EkNcrS8_qk^Pl0	
*	NULL	NULL	NULL	HULL	NULL	NULL	NULL	NULL	





Assurance Zones – Acquisition – Detail 2 of 6






Assurance Zones – Acquisition – Detail 3 of 6

Volu	meListing × i	nodes× tree	e× serveraccessinfo×	audit× nodestate×				
Filter	:	♦ Edit:	Export:	Autosize: ‡A				
#	ID	Device	IssuedDateTime	ExpiresDateTime	ScanDateTime	VolumeID	FSRootInode	keytext
1	193	Device003	2014-04-17 14:44:00	2014-04-30 00:00:00			0	qBf&fCd7HN+59otg13rBkq+t=%l2Kk9tv
2	194	Device006	2014-04-17 16:48:00	2014-05-31 00:00:00			0	%00l-U2CU4c)7lUSv(Cin4+0QQSx8MVFw
3	196	Device006	2014-04-17 16:48:00	2014-05-31 00:00:00			0	HJ7(qGMUxygF9xzsgv\$!^e27uIREg%f#k
4	197	Device006	2014-04-17 16:48:00	2014-05-31 00:00:00	2014-04-18 19:19:43 +00:00	74a8f0f627cc0dc6	3365	Xt(VWtO2OXLH=j0P2Afd5qQQeH*V(d)Dm
5	198	Device006	2014-04-17 16:48:00	2014-05-31 00:00:00	2014-04-18 21:25:28 +00:00	1c0376672b6c06d3	451	c8R\$GBvBI*=Ve11Oe^fpAPI!aOzLY6mgM
6	199	Device006	2014-04-17 16:48:00	2014-05-31 00:00:00			0	rem!ET4i(dHuqzkHl4Qkjel901TuV5Q7Uav
7	200	Device006	2014-04-17 16:48:00	2014-05-31 00:00:00			0	StTTo\$#(q3VELyS%maXRq4p441b)S#+f
8	201	Device006	2014-04-17 16:48:00	2014-05-31 00:00:00	2014-04-18 20:20:56 +00:00	6449bf4a176afd35	3168	Iv#6o^N447U+#ymTL91Du\$GSz=%=!Y
9	202	Device006	2014-04-17 16:48:00	2014-05-31 00:00:00			0	BMaz1a6objqq_U==WB+5B7\$hgr*Oz3j1
10	203	Device006	2014-04-17 16:48:00	2014-05-31 00:00:00	2014-04-18 21:21:20 +00:00	23ba7f8e25ef0f52	1154	*%MU5)9CRD5azoAl3tU_VX=!Nw4kLQsv-
11	208	Device006	2014 94 17 16:48:00	2014-05-31 00:00:00			0	%E_\$sfR6KW34Gmul=6P0EkNcrS8_qk^
12	253	Device008	2014-04-21 20:41:00	2014-05-31 00:00:00	NULL		HULL	4S2g29lPUoO2p2lVhhz_;;;;vAE+pNlB
13	254	Device008	2014-04-21 20:41:00	2014-05-31 00:00:00	NULL		HULL	Rd5+VNJrXHztcR6w*z54DYIYUjQNH!kFon
14	255	Device008	2014-04-21 20:41:00	2014-05-31 00:00:00	NULL		HULL	dw)s=jmro!26j^6iL5z3fkPkNtzcfrsn^Mop
15	256	Device008	2014-04-21 20:41:00	2014-05-31 00:00:00	NULL		NULL	7p8WuYTC0m2h2%5Rxid5^wFOqT)CV=5
16	257	Device008	2014-04-21 20:41:00	2014-05-31 00:00:00	NULL		HULL	b6q^P+AgUT^90_lwnRyT4aMuUq%%C\$o
*	HULL	NULL	HULL	NULL	NULL	NULL	HULL	NULL





Assurance Zones – Acquisition – Detail 4 of 6



Assurance Zones – Acquisition – Detail 5 of 6

```
Please wait. Reading the whole directory Structure
NTFS volume version: 3.1
Serial No is [6786b2132b5822fb]
Volume Name is []
Input Volume Cluster size : 4096 bytes
Current input volume size: 1072689152 bytes (1073 MB)
Current device size: 1072693248 bytes (1073 MB)
header mkdir /mnt/sdc1/evidence
header mkdir /mnt/sdc1/evidence/6786b2132b5822fb
Saving volume metadata, mv /mnt/sdc1/evidence/volume.meta /mnt/sdc1/evidence/6786b2132b5822fb/6786b2132b5822fb-filesystem.meta
NTFS Size 1072689152. 261887 Clusters of 4096 bytes
RegexWantedExtensions are .TXT$1.DOC$1.C$1.IPG$1.SCR$
Scanning volume ...
    9 candidate evidence items from 124 in total.
Copying high value targets
            9, File Name (videos etc), 8192 bytes long.
                                                             2 whole clusters and
                                                                                     0 bytes. Encrypting, uuencoding and packing into meta. Saved
                                                                                       2 whole clusters and 961 bytes. Encrypting, uuencoding and packing into meta. Saved
            File Name [/Videos etc/Version PC-3000 and DE.txt].
                                                                  9153 bytes long.
            9. File Name [/Picture 003.jpg], 3679659 bytes long.
                                                                                          1451 bytes. Encrypting, uuencoding and packing into meta. Saved
                                                                  898 whole clusters and
    4 of
            9, File Name [/Picture 002.jpg], 3646873 bytes long.
                                                                  890 whole clusters and
                                                                                          1433 bytes. Encrypting, uuencoding and packing into meta. Saved
            9, File Name [/Deepspar Data Recovery Course.doc], 160768 bytes long.
    5 of
                                                                                      39 whole clusters and 1024 bytes, Encrypting, unencoding and packing into meta, Sayed
                                                                                           3584 bytes. Encrypting, uuencoding and packing into meta. Saved
    6 of
            File Name [/Ace Contract.doc], 105984 bytes long.
                                                                    25 whole clusters and
            9, File Name [/185552-500-375.jpg], 44234 bytes long.
                                                                       10 whole clusters and
                                                                                              3274 bytes. Encrypting, uuencoding and packing into meta. Saved
            File Name [/186153-500-375.ipg]. 43611 bytes long.
                                                                       10 whole clusters and
                                                                                              2651 bytes. Encrypting, uuencoding and packing into meta. Saved
            9, File Name (195553-500-375.pg), 41729 bytes long.
    9 of
                                                                       10 whole clusters and
                                                                                               769 bytes, Encrypting, unencoding and packing into meta. Saved
          115, File Name [/$MFT], not selected as eviden
           115. File Name [/$MFTMirr], not selected as evidence
           115, File Name [/$LogFile], not selected as evidence.
    3 of
           115, File Name [/$Volume], not selected as evidence.
    4 of
           115. File Name [/$AttrDef], not selected as evidence.
           115. File Name [/.], not selected as evidence.
           115, File Name [/$Bitmap], not selected as evidence.
```






Assurance Zones – Acquisition – Detail 6 of 6

```
root@ubuntu:/mnt/sdc1/evidence# tree 23ba7f8e25ef0f52
23ba7f8e25ef0f52
       23ba7f8e25ef0f52-001D9EE55046AFC205CF15B81E2537BB392C7EB6.meta
       23ba7f8e25ef0f52-00464C159732F0386C73EB6D26E16E07A9EFBBCA.meta
       23ba7f8e25ef0f52-00E7DA8F157ABD94A266A115B96D621FE14BA66A.meta
       23ba7f8e25ef0f52-01260BAD52E8EBE7E78A8C1E1714FBD5A515C46D.meta
       23ba7f8e25ef0f52-016EE6BEE65E543D08296E2DFE0BCDAAD99B87BE.meta
       23ba7f8e25ef0f52-017E148DE26F4A0580399788A4F064E4D6B13713.meta
       23ba7f8e25ef0f52-026D05CD2DC77976D1EA8BAAF17E069DFF92356A.meta
       23ba7f8e25ef0f52-02F99EAB961BF330405770404ED21BBF05D512C7.meta
       23ba7f8e25ef0f52-033267D0363B50754425E0153DB8312B2C2E5999.meta
       23ba7f8e25ef0f52-03E7F306D937DFD991A059337683A11321456066.meta
       23ba7f8e25ef0f52-04C7F95EF38A66858AB56E386D4E1F7B8025548B.meta
       23ba7f8e25ef0f52-04C9E5EE4125175E412CBD4849C7FD6A44A5BB0A.meta
       23ba7f8e25ef0f52-04D0A247443DDAEDBB6F970FC36BC7B430B226EC.meta
       23ba7f8e25ef0f52-04DD028B2DFFBF04034811615C1DA3AB7DCF2BDE.meta
       23ba7f8e25ef0f52-05BFFC3543078E15208DCA467792223FA6442B41.meta
       23ba7f8e25ef0f52-0600BBA2ED5CF7D3326938F87B29702D575640A3.meta
```







Assurance Zones – Metadata Import – Detail 1 of 6



Assurance Zones – Metadata Import – Detail 2 of 6




Assurance Zones – Metadata Import – Detail 3 of 6




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Assurance Zones – Metadata Import – Detail 4 of 6



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Assurance Zones – Metadata Import – Detail 5 of 6



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Assurance Zones – Metadata Import – Detail 6 of 6


secondstoragelastvalidated	thirdstoragenratecal	thirdstoragesonyer	thirdstoragefilename	thirdstoragoinplace	thirdstoragearrivaldatetime	thirdstoragouppacked	orag
Secondstoragelastvalidated	thirdstorageprotocol	thirdstorageserver	thirdstoragemename	thirdstoragempiace	thirdstoragearrivaldatetime	thirdstorageunpacked	-
NULL	unknown	unknown	unknown	NULL	NULL	NULL	·
NULL	unknown	unknown	unknown	NULL	NULL	NULL	·
NULL	unknown	unknown	unknown	NULL	NULL	NULL	·
NULL	unknown	unknown	unknown	NULL	NULL	NULL	
NULL	unknown	unknown	unknown	NULL	NULL	NULL	·
NULL	ftp	192.168.140.3	6d13a60005e973e5-55817B0CB6794938961C0CEF1D75794684B984EC	1	2014-04-28 15:01:36	1	
NULL	ftp	192.168.140.13	unknown	NULL	NULL	NULL	
NULL	ftp	192.168.140.96	unknown	NULL	NULL	NULL	·
NULL	unknown	unknown	unknown	NULL	NULL	NULL	·
NULL	unknown	unknown	unknown	NULL	NULL	NULL	·
NULL	unknown	unknown	unknown	NULL	NULL	NULL	·
MULL	ftp	192.168.140.13	unknown	NULL	NULL	NULL	
NULL	unknown	unknown	unknown	NULL	NULL	NULL	·
MULL	unknown	unknown	unknown	NULL	NULL	NULL	·
NULL	unknown	unknown	unknown	NULL	NULL	NULL	
NULL	ftp	192.168.140.74	unknown	NULL	NULL	NULL	"
NULL	unknown	unknown	unknown	NULL	NULL	NULL	·
NULL	unknown	unknown	unknown	NULL	NULL	NULL	·
NULL	unknown	unknown	unknown	NULL	NULL	NULL	
NULL	unknown	unknown	unknown	NULL	NULL	NULL	
NOLL	unknown	unknown	unknown	NULL	NULL	NULL	





Assurance Zones – Distribution - Overview


- Each SIP/DEB is read and only if it is expected, ie found in the inodes table, it is copied to the location as recorded in the inode table
- The SIP is unpacked, decrypted and header data added to the meta-data table
- The inodes table is updated with the storage data status
- In due course, the SIP/DEB will be replicated to 2 other locations and the inodes table updated accordingly.







Assurance Zones – Distribution – Detail 1 of 2







Assurance Zones – Distribution – Detail 2 of 2


						10
#	inode	metadata	VolumeID	result1	result2	
34	2698	<pre><cree></cree></pre> <case>A Villainous Crime <ate+time>12/May/2013 14:25:23 <description>This is a small IGB memory stick taken from the desk of the suspect <thisfilescannedat>Frida</thisfilescannedat></description></ate+time></case>	23ba7f8e25ef0f52	NULL	GIOLE.	
35	2699	<pre><investigator>Nick Pringle <case>A Villainous Crime <cate-time>12/May/2013 14:25:23 <date-time>12/May/2013 14:25:23 <description>This is a small 1GB memory stick taken from the desk of the suspect <thisfilescannedat>Frida</thisfilescannedat></description></date-time></cate-time></case></investigator></pre>	23ba7f8e25ef0f52	MOLL	TOOLS.	
36	2700	<pre><investigator>Nick Pringle <case>A Villainous Crime <cate-time>12/May/2013 14:25:23 <date-time>12/May/2013 14:25:23 <description>This is a small 1GB memory stick taken from the desk of the suspect <thisfilescannedat>Frida</thisfilescannedat></description></date-time></cate-time></case></investigator></pre>	23ba7f8e25ef0f52	nocc	HOUSE.	
37	2701	none yet	HULL	NULL	HULL	
38	2702	none yet	HULL	HOLL	HULL	
39	2703	none yet	HULL	HULL	HULL	
40	2704	none yet	HULL	HOLL	HULL	
41	2705	none yet	HULL	NOLL	HULL	
42	2706	none yet	NULL	NOLL	HULL	
43	2707	<pre><investigator>Nick Pringle <case>A Villainous Crime <case>A Villainous Crime <date-time>12/May/2013 14:25:23 <description>This is a small 1GB memory stick taken from the desk of the suspect <thisfilescannedat>Frida</thisfilescannedat></description></date-time></case></case></investigator></pre>	23ba7f8e25ef0f52	POLL	COLL	
44	2708	<pre><investigator>Nick Pringle <case>A Villainous Crime <date-time>12/May/2013 14:25:23</date-time></case></investigator></pre>	23ba7f8e25ef0f52	HULL	TOUC.	·






Assurance Zones – Processing - Overview

- 1. Using the processing table, a standard set of tasks is run on the data stored locally on the host
- 2. Results are usually recorded as XML formatted data in the results table within the same database referenced by inode number.






Assurance Zones – Processing – Detail 1 of 1




Audit

#	ID	DateTime	Investigator	Action	inode
749	2894	2014-04-18 19:27:30.713169324 +01:00	unpackfiles script	DEB unpack	1234
750	2895	2014-04-18 19:27:30.779951455 +01:00	movefiles script	DEB move	2692
751	2896	2014-04-18 19:27:30.896467988 +01:00	movefiles script	DEB move	2693
752	2897	2014-04-18 19:27:31.023123067 +01:00	movefiles script	DEB move	2696
753	2898	2014-04-18 19:27:31.155038482 +01:00	movefiles script	DEB move	2697
754	2899	2014-04-18 19:27:31.297371802 +01:00	unpackfiles script	DEB unpack	1241
755	2900	2014-04-18 19:27:31.338570715 +01:00	movefiles script	DEB move	2698
756	2901	2014-04-18 19:27:31.477117381 +01:00	movefiles script	DEB move	2699
757	2902	2014-04-18 19:27:28.790614283 +01:00	unpackfiles script	DEB unpack	1589
758	2903	2014-04-18 19:27:31.606249551 +01:00	movefiles script	DEB move	2700
759	2904	2014-04-18 19:27:31.690205399 +01:00	unpackfiles script	DEB unpack	1245
760	2905	2014-04-18 19:27:31.725864080 +01:00	movefiles script	DEB move	2707
761	2906	2014-04-18 19:27:31.854338524 +01:00	movefiles script	DEB move	2708
762	2907	2014-04-18 19:27:29.221416118 +01:00	unpackfiles script	DEB unpack	1591


Mounting the file system







Latency and Multi-threading and Parallel Processing





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Why is this the right approach?

- This could be achieved within an application program but each package would to implement it and gain approval.
- Working at file system level the efficacy is global
- Interaction with FClusterfs is unavoidable
- Fclusterfs controls data access and maintains Assurance





In Summary

- Distributed processing is a prime candidate to reduce the backlog but there are problems
- We lose 'the image'; one of the foundations that has evolved in digital forensics over the last 20 years
- We can replace it by learning from, not adopting, Hadoop





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Information Assurance in a Distributed Forensic Cluster Questions?



