

Digital forensic analysis of encrypted database files in instant messaging applications on Windows operating systems

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Agenda

1. Introduction
2. Our analysis framework
3. Analysis of example IMs
4. Conclusion

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Instant messengers (IM) everyday



- We are using instant messengers every day.
- There are a lot of users (WeChat: 1.1 billion, Telegram: 200 million, and Facebook Messenger: 1.3 billion users by 2019).

Who can see our messages?




- Government agencies can obtain messages to use as criminal evidence.
- Government agencies can censor messages.
- Hackers can steal messages from us.




How can messages be obtained?

1. Network packet analysis
2. Server database analysis
3. Client database analysis



How can messages be obtained?

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- Network traffic is securely protected by well designed security protocols.
- Overall, it is **not easy to analyze** the securely protected network traffic.

How can messages be obtained?

1. Network packet analysis 2. Server database analysis 3. Client database analysis



Messenger



Messenger
server



2. Server database
analysis

- It is hard for the attacker to access the server.
- Because of the privacy issue, many messengers **do not store the messages** in the server over a certain time period (e.g., 3 days for KakaoTalk).

How can messages be obtained?

1. Network packet analysis
2. Server database analysis
3. Client database analysis



Messenger



Messenger
server

3. Client database
analysis

- All messages are stored in database files in the client device.
- In our research, we focused on analyzing the client chat database.

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
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What databases are used in IM

- There are various database types in instant messengers.
 - Contacts
 - Chats
 - Calls
 - Photos
 - Video




Interaction with database in IM




- To minimize network overhead, chat databases are stored in local files in the client device.

Chat database file on client side



- If chat database files are not encrypted (e.g., in WhatsApp), it is easier to analyze!
- However, in some messengers, the database files are **encrypted**.
- The number of IMs using the encryption feature is increasing over time.

Use of encryption key




- After login, encryption key can often be (temporarily) created (in memory).
- After logout, the encryption key can be deleted from memory.
- In such cases, it is hard to obtain the encryption key.

Adversary model




Physical Attacker




- The attacker can obtain the **encrypted** database file.
- The attacker's goal is to obtain the database **encryption key**.

Key observations in the encryption key generation

- To securely generate the dynamic encryption key, most IMs used the following parameters for key generation.
 - 1) Device specific **local parameters**: UUID, HDD serial number, ...
 - 2) **Externally obtained parameters** after login: user password, user key stored at the server, ...



Overall procedure



How to obtain the encryption key

1. Find the (encrypted) chat database files in the target IM.
2. Check whether the chat database files are encrypted.
3. Find the code locations to encrypt/decrypt the chat database files during the execution of the IM.
4. Identify the cryptographic algorithms (e.g., AES, SHA256) used in encrypting chat database files by examining the assembly codes and the dynamic behaviors of the IM.
5. Analyze the procedure of generating an encryption key.

Agenda


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Target messengers



- KakaoTalk is the most popular messenger in South Korea with 49.8 million users.

- NateOn is also popular in South Korea with 15 million users.



- QQ is the most popular messenger in China with 899 million users.


Example 1. KakaoTalk



KakaoTalk



NateOn



QQ

Experiment environment

- Environment and tools
 - VMware workstation 12
 - Windows 7
 - OllyDbg v1.10
 - KakaoTalk (version 2.0.8.990 ~ 2.5.6.1545)
 - Current version (3.0.0.2110)
 - Packed by *Themida*

Database file path

	chatLogs_10098632700025.edb	2016-06-20 0:26	EDB File	0x00
	chatLogs_1048214			
	chatLogs_1077249			
	chatLogs_108505449560507.edb			
	chatLogs_1085054			
Offset(h)	00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F			
00000000	E1 0E A4 52 33 E1 02 4D 0E 4E C5 B9 F9 C5 6E 2A			á.»R3á.M.NÅ¹ùÅn*
00000010	B1 04 8F E6 0F 2B DF C8 F2 F4 0C A4 4D 7E A4 D3			±..æ.+ßÈòô.»M~»Ó
00000020	5D 0A 24 FE A1 7B 66 B8 2F 27 A6 74 47 EC C9 C8].\$þ;{f./'!tGiÉÈ
00000030	BA A1 54 00 21 68 D8 95 F8 76 AA C1 EB 22 43 86			°;T.!hØ•øv=Áé"C†
00000040	97 AC 4F 0B BE FA A4 35 ED 38 A6 78 F1 FD 25 99			—O.%ú*x5i8;xñý%™
00000050	03 1A 30 F9 E5 E4 9F 62 C4 1D E1 CF BD 20 2F B3			..0ùåäÄbÅ.áÍ% /³
00000060	BE 0E E8 DF 07 BD 9A 22 02 27 78 5B 2B 1D 14 2E			%.èB.%š".'x[+...
00000070	F6 B0 51 A9 D5 E8 29 EA 4D 5E A4 AE 74 E6 D8 02			ö°QøÖè)êM^x@tæØ.
00000080	00 E9 95 80 84 34 21 C6 C3 BF 56 6E 85 69 7F 24			.é•€,,4!ÆÄçVn...i.\$
00000090	20 7E C1 51 B5 9A 46 3E 0D C9 C0 65 37 66 5D 57			~ÁQušF>.ÉÀe7f]W
000000A0	96 34 C0 FF 11 1A F8 23 BA F1 28 74 EA 85 FA 2F			-4Ày..ø#ºñ(tê...ú/
000000B0	A4 F3 F5 C0 11 11 D1 22 9F 96 CE 2A 44 8C AE DA			»óÖÀ..Ñ"Y-í*DøøÙ
000000C0	31 0C 12 EF 70 CD 90 8B 89 78 95 18 1E C6 C4 03			1..ipí.<%x*..ÆÀ.

- The databases are stored in a pre-configured file system path, and the user cannot change it.
 - chatLogs_[random value].db: chat database file
 - TalkUserDB.db: contact database file


Database encryption process

0073B4DB	. 8B4D 10	MOV [EAX], ECX	C0 C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 CA CB CC CD CE CF
0073B4DE	. 8B71 04	MOV ECX, [EAX+0x4]	63 7C 77 7B F2 6B 6F C5 30 01 67 2B FE D7 AB 76
0073B4E1	. 8B51 08	MOV ECX, [EAX+0x8]	0040D8C0 CA 82 C9 7D FA 59 47 F0 AD D4 A2 AF 9C A4 72 C0
0073B4E4	. 3350 08	XOR ECX, ECX	0040D8D0 B7 FD 93 26 36 3F F7 CC 34 A5 E5 F1 71 D8 31 15
0073B4E7	. 3370 04	XOR ECX, ECX	0040D8E0 04 C7 23 C3 18 96 05 9A 07 12 80 E2 EB 27 B2 75
0073B4EA	. 57	PU:	0040D8F0 09 83 2C 1A 1B 6E 5A A0 52 3B D6 B3 29 E3 2F 84
0073B4EB	. 8B39	MOV ECX, [EAX+0x9]	0040D900 53 D1 00 ED 20 FC B1 5B 6A CB BE 39 4A 4C 58 CF
0073B4ED	. 3338	XOR ECX, ECX	0040D910
0073B4EF	. 894D E4	MOV DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+0xC], ECX	MOV DWORD PTR S: S-Box of AES-128 encryption
0073B4F2	. 8B49 0C	MOV ECX, [EAX+0xC]	MOV ECX, DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+0xC]
0073B4F5	. 3348 0C	XOR ECX, ECX	XOR ECX, DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+0xC]

Assembly codes of AES-128 encryption

- With the assembly codes and S-Box for AES-128, we can guess that AES-128-CBC algorithm was used.
- We also figured out the chat database file format (SQLite format 3).

Extraction of encryption key and IV



Key: 3a4ddec7a813e86796a42b282e24457f
IV: 342e1eea12095623400123408bc914e2

- Through the dynamic analysis, we found which values are used for the encryption key and IV.
- With those values, we tried to trace back the key generation procedure.

How to generate the key

Repeat until 512 bytes

1) $S_u = K_{PRAGMA} || N_u = \text{LSBg+UoITpP...+np6TN/yQ==12345LSBg+UoITp...==123}$

2) $K_u = MD5(S_u) = 3a4dddec7a813e86796a42b282e24457f$

3) $IV = MD5(\text{Base64}(K_u)) = MD5(\text{Ok3ex6g...RFfw==}) = 342e1eea...08bc914e2$

- K_u is used as the encryption key.
- The input of the hash function (S_u) is the PRAGMA key combined with the user sequence number (N_u) given by the server.

How to generate the PRAGMA key

1) $UUID = 03000200 - 0400 - 0500 - 0006 - 000700080009$,
 $MN(Model\ Name) = Samsung\ SSD\ 850\ EVO\ 250GB$
 $SN(Serial\ Number) = S21RNXAGA03016Z$

2) $C = E_{K_{built-in}}(UUID \parallel MN \parallel SN) = 0x71efab84c9d810dbe810 \dots$

3) $K_{PRAGMA} = \text{Base64}(SHA512(C)) = \text{vaQP/y1VSZWD/}\cdots\text{==}$

- PRAGMA key generation codes **temporarily appear** in memory to protect the key generation procedure.
 - Dynamic analysis is necessary.

Summary of encryption process

1. Collect the device specific information.
2. Generate PRAGMA key from the collected information.
3. Get the **user sequence number** (the only external parameter for KakaoTalk) from the server after the user logins.
4. Generate encryption key and IV.

How to securely generate the encryption key

- KakaoTalk might use the following strategies.
 - ① Security by obscurity
 - (AES → SHA512 → Base64 → MD5 → Base64 → MD5)
 - ② Moving target
 - Use of device specific parameter
 - ③ Updatable key generation
 - Updatable built-in key
 - ④ External user data
 - Best security practice for disk encryption

How to securely generate the encryption key


- KakaoTalk might use the following strategies.
 - ① Security by obscurity

However, we might easily obtain external user data.

- ④ External user data
 - Best security practice for disk encryption

How to obtain user sequence number

1. Brute-force search to obtain the user sequence number of the target user.
2. Smarter way to obtain the user sequence number using automatic friend addition with the target user's phone number.




Brute-force search

- User sequence number is smaller than 300 million.
 - When we signed up the KakaoTalk at Jun 21st, the user sequence number is given 251,582,414.
- Through the brute-force attack, the user sequence number can be obtained within **8.4 hours** (10,000 trial per second).
- The user sequence number is related to the date when the user signed-up.
 - If you figure out the victim's registration date of KakaoTalk, guessing range of the user sequence number can be narrowed.

Smarter way to get the user sequence number

Assumption: Target user's phone number is given.

1. Add the target user as friend in KakaoTalk with the target user's phone number.




Smarter way to get the user sequence number

2. The target user's information is added to our contact database file that we can freely access.
3. We can extract the target user's user sequence number from the user's record in the contact database file.

User sequence number							
userId	type	nickName	profileImageUrl	lProfileImageU	inalProfileImag	statusMessage	linkedServices
7	[REDACTED]	2	102				
8	151741	2	:)	http://th-p.talk.kakao...	http://th-p.talk.kakao...	http://th-p.talk.kakao... ■(☞)	/ 번...
9	[REDACTED]	2	AJ	http://th-p.talk.kakao...	http://th-p.talk.kakao...	http://th-p.talk.kakao...	
10	[REDACTED]	2	BuJy	http://th-p.talk.kakao...	http://th-p.talk.kakao...	http://th-p.talk.kakao...	
11	[REDACTED]	2	Chan	http://th-p.talk.kakao...	http://th-p.talk.kakao...	http://th-p.talk.kakao...	빨리 일기를 바 라면 문자로
12	[REDACTED]	2	David	http://th-p.talk.kakao...	http://th-p.talk.kakao...	http://th-p.talk.kakao...	
13	[REDACTED]	2	Geumhwan	http://th-p.talk.kakao...	http://th-p.talk.kakao...	http://th-p.talk.kakao...	The reason I live story

Demo – KakaoTalk



How can we securely protect the external parameters?



KakaoTalk

UUID, MN, SN, User Sequence Number

Sequential, not random

1. User sequence number is not random, but sequential.
2. User sequence number is used as the primary key for contact database.

Use of **secure** external parameter





1. User sequence number is not random, but sequential.
 - Use a large space of random numbers for external parameters.
2. User sequence number is used as the primary key for contact database.
 - Use the external parameter for the encryption key purpose only.

Example 2. NateOn




KakaoTalk



QQ

Demo – NateOn




Example 3. QQ



KakaoTalk



NateOn




QQ

Experiment environment



- Environment and tools
 - VMware workstation 12
 - Windows 7
 - OllyDbg v1.10
 - QQ (version 2.1.1369.0)
- **Unfortunately, the encrypted database of QQ cannot be decrypted without the server**

DB format and encryption algorithm



OLE Structure



Encryption key generation algorithm



With *TGT Key*, QQ Messenger decrypts the encrypted database using TEA with modified block cipher mode.

* **Ticket Granting Ticket** or **Ticket to Get Tickets (TGT)** is a small, encrypted identification file with a limited validity period. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ticket_Granting_Ticket)

Encryption key generation algorithm



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
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Summary of analysis results

Messenger	Local parameters	External parameters	Decryption without user auth.
KakaoTalk	Device specific	User seq. number	O
NateOn	Fixed string	User seq. number	O
QQ	X	TGT key	X

- In KakaoTalk and NateOn, we can obtain messages without the user's password.
- In QQ, the encryption key for chat database files is stored at the server.

Big Brother is always watching you.



Thank you for listening our talk.