



Evaluating Commercial Counter-Forensic Tools

By

Matthew Geiger


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Evaluating Commercial Counter-Forensic Software

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Roadmap



- What do these tools do and why do they exist?
- Why are they important to us? Legal significance
- Who produces and sells them?
- Outline of testing procedures
- Summary of results, examples
- Implications for forensic practitioners

Counter-Forensic Landscape


- More than a dozen commercial software packages
- Designed to eliminate specific records and files but leave system otherwise functional
 - Overwrite deleted data to thwart recovery
 - Cope with system files, like the Registry
- Aimed at users that may not be proficient

Who Produces Them?

The vendor marketplace:

- Competitive
- Wide range of enterprises
 - Unincorporated entities
 - Well-financed companies
- Marketed as:
 - Safeguarding privacy
 - Protecting corporate data
 - Helping avoid consequences






Legal Trends



- Counter-forensic tools increasingly reported as factors in legal action
- Courts have grappled with how to treat the use of these tools:
 - US v. H. Marc Watzman, 2003
 - Kucala Enterprises v Auto Wax Co., 2003
 - UK v. Timothy Pickup, 2004
 - U.S. v. Robert Johnson, 2005
 - State of Missouri v. Zacheriah Tripp, 2005

Testing the Tools



- Six software packages:
 - **Cyberscrub**
 - **Window Washer**
 - **SecureClean**
 - **Evidence Eliminator**
 - **Windows & Internet Cleaner**
 - **Acronis Privacy Expert**
- Reference system created – Windows XP Pro
- Typical user activity generated
- Bitstream image of test system duplicated as starting point for each tool test

Design Goals




- **Technical**
 - Accepted forensic tools and practices
 - Readily reproducible and extensible
 - Evaluate each tool's performance in an identical environment
- **Strategic**
 - Common technical challenges = common practices?
 - Common practices = common flaws?
- **Not** an exhaustive catalog of tool performance

Results: Some Significant Flaws

- All the tested tools missed some degree of potential evidentiary data
- First test version of *Window Washer* left almost everything recoverable
- Two broad classes of failures:
 - Implementation flaws / bugs
 - Inability to keep up with evolving systems and applications – data targets changing

Window Washer



1st test version of Window Washer failed to wipe deleted files

Evidence Eliminator

- Evidence Eliminator created temp directory while processing locked files – but then neglected to purge its contents
- Files included IE history and cache index

URL	http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A9659-2004Oct29_2.html
User name	Anon Nym
Page title	Bin Laden Warns U.S. Voters (washingtonpost.com)
Last Accessed (UTC)	10/30/2004 7:05:26 PM
Last Modified (UTC)	10/30/2004 7:05:26 PM
Last Checked (UTC)	10/30/2004 7:05:28 PM
Expires (UTC)	11/8/2004 7:05:28 PM
Hits	2
Use Count	0

Acronis Privacy Expert

Acronis Privacy Expert purged Recycle Bin but overlooked INFO file listing its former contents

Filename	Dc17.txt
Original Name	C:\Documents and Settings\Anon Nym\My Documents\Copy (27) of secret.txt
Date Recycled	10/23/2004 2:31:40 PM
Removed from Bin	Yes


Filename	Dc18.doc
Original Name	C:\Documents and Settings\Anon Nym\My Documents\Copy (2) of secret document.doc
Date Recycled	10/26/2004 3:31:25 PM
Removed from Bin	Yes

Other Examples

- Several tools missed:
 - Outlook Express e-mail selected for deletion
 - Scattered files in IE cache, or IE history / cache index
- Two tools incompletely wiped unallocated space
- Test user data was left in pagefile by a few tools

Buggy Software

- Several tools have *serious functional flaws*
- Shortfalls in QA and testing
 - Relevant to the next class of flaws
 - Not limited to smaller companies
- *Many failures would not be noticeable to users*
 - May reduce pressure to fix, increase lifespan of bugs
 - Difficult for users to validate performance




Complexity Failures

$$\textit{Complexity} = (\# \textit{ of applications}) * (\Delta / t \textit{ of those applications})$$

- Challenge of locating & deleting usage records rises with the number of applications covered
- But programs, including operating systems, are continually evolving
- And some of these changes affect their data storage – and how to eliminate it

Committed by Competition

- Yet, marketing & competition based on number of third-party programs handled
- Some tools provide “plug-ins” to purge activity records for more than 100 separate applications



Examples of “Complexity” Failures

- Tools failed when the location and/or format of user data was changed
 - For example, Evidence Eliminator’s Napster plug-in missed activity files created by Napster Light
 - Many of the tools don’t report the version of the application they have been designed to handle
- All but two tested tools missed copies of the registry preserved in Windows restore points, a feature new in XP

More Examples: Prefetch Folder

- Windows prefetch folder was also commonly overlooked – only Evidence Eliminator wiped this area
- Layout.ini and/or NTOSBOOT-BOOTFAAD.pf files disclosed path structure, file names of deleted material

From Layout.ini file:

C:\WINDOWS\SYSTEM32\DRIVERS\PARVDM.SYSC:\WINDOWS\SYSTEM32\DRIVERS\ETC\H
OSTSC:\WINDOWS\FONTS\FRAMD.TTF
C:\DOCUMENTS AND SETTINGS\ANON NYM\RECENT\WORLD DOMINATION
DATABASE.LNK
C:\DOCUMENTS AND SETTINGS\ANON NYM\RECENT\SECRET DOCUMENT.LNK
C:\DOCUMENTS AND SETTINGS\ANON NYM\RECENT\SUPER PRIVATE.LNK
C:\DOCUMENTS AND SETTINGS\ANON NYM\RECENT\PARTIAL SECRETS.LNK
C:\DOCUMENTS AND SETTINGS\ANON NYM\RECENT\PRIVACY REPORT.LNK
C:\DOCUMENTS AND SETTINGS\ANON NYM\RECENT\300X250_1.LNK
C:\DOCUMENTS AND SETTINGS\ANON NYM\RECENT\WIRED 12_05 THE KINGMAKER.LNK

Operational Fingerprints

- Each tool creates a *distinct operational fingerprint* on filesystem, which may:
 - Identify the counter-forensic application used
 - Guide a search for residual data
 - Demonstrate the use of a tool in cases where use may have legal ramifications.

Note: These signatures exist even if a counter-forensic program was executed from another partition, or if its own files are eradicated

Tell-Tale Tracks

- Most common fingerprint is the way a tool renames files
- Action designed to replace file name, other metadata
- None of the tools tested duplicated another's scheme

<i>Window Washer 1</i>	Targeted files renamed with scrambled characters. But all assigned the same 3-character file extension of exclamation marks. Example: 8wVia7S2B39_nX_Xl9Xfw1DhrhS_Da_j.!!!
<i>Secure Clean</i>	Targeted files renamed with a six-digit numerical sequence that appears to be incremented by one for every file wiped. The numbers are preceded by the initials SC. The extension assigned was consistently T~P. Example: SC000043.T~P.

Implications

- The tested commercial counter-forensic tools leave potentially useful data
- Don't underestimate their ability to destroy data and present a significant obstacle
- Research such as this can help:
 - understand the behavior of these tools
 - identify and interpret the records a tool misses

Future Work

- Extend testing to similar counter-forensic tools and other versions of tested tools
- Expand the catalog of operational signatures and functional weaknesses
- How about a tool to automate the signature discovery process ?

Thanks