

Rapid Forensic Imaging of Large Disks with Sifting Collectors

Ву

Jonathan Grier and Golden Richard

Presented At

The Digital Forensic Research Conference **DFRWS 2015 USA** Philadelphia, PA (Aug 9th - 13th)

DFRWS is dedicated to the sharing of knowledge and ideas about digital forensics research. Ever since it organized the first open workshop devoted to digital forensics in 2001, DFRWS continues to bring academics and practitioners together in an informal environment. As a non-profit, volunteer organization, DFRWS sponsors technical working groups, annual conferences and challenges to help drive the direction of research and development.

http:/dfrws.org

Rapid Forensic Imaging with Sifting Collectors

or, "How we can image 99% of the evidence in 8% of the time."



Legal Disclaimer

Some technologies presented here may be patent pending



The Volume Challenge


Quote	Source
"Today's Golden Age of computer forensics is quickly coming to an end The growing size of storage devices means that there is frequently insufficient time to create a forensic image investigations are becoming slower Today a 2TB hard drive can be purchased for \$120 but takes more than 7 hours to image"	Forensics researcher Dr. Simson L. Garfinkel of the Naval Postgraduate School (Garfinkel 2010)
"The leading challenge for digital forensic investigations is that of scale the mere acquisition, extraction and pre-processing of the data sources create a long list of technical problems and long turnaround times."	Forensics examiner Andrew Case (Case et al. 2008)
"It took two days to consolidate the various target media onto a pair of 2TB drives and thirteen hours to clone and hash each drive using the very latest drive- to-drive tools."	Forensics attorney Craig Ball, The End of Digital Forensics? (Ball 2011)
"By far we think the biggest challenge is the sheer volume of data . The existing acquisition methodologies and software tools will not be able to scale as quickly as the datasets which are being acquired. Unfortunately, there are no easy solutions to these problems new paradigms for these huge datasets will be heroes in the forensics community"	Robert Botchek, founder and former president of Tableau (Botchek 2008)
"Police managers must find a way to examine an increasing number of digital devices, each containing an immense volume of data There is an unacceptable backlogwaiting for examination."	First Sergeant Charles L. Cohen of the Indiana State Police (Cohen 2007)


Existing options

	Full Disk Imaging	Live Forensics & Triage
Which evidence is preserved:	Entire disk	Reports, results, and files the examiner chooses to copy
Adequate speed	Up to ten hours per disk	✓
Reproducible	✓	*
Verifiable	✓	*
Duplicates evidence automatically	✓	*
Duplicates at device level	✓	*
Duplicates entire disk	✓	*
Alternate lines of investigation are possible in the future	✓	*











Goals:

Automatically locate and collect the forensically relevant sectors

• Produce a forensically sound, verifiable, device level, bit-for-bit duplicate of these sectors

- Be analyzed **using existing forensic tools** (with minor adaptations)
- At 5-10x the speed and 10-20% the size of traditional imaging.

	Full Disk Imaging	Live Forensics & Triage	Sifting
Which evidence is preserved:	Entire disk	Reports, results, and files the examiner chooses to copy	Identified sectors & regions
Adequate speed	Up to ten hours per disk	✓	✓
Reproducible	√	*	✓
Verifiable	✓	×	✓
Duplicates evidence automatically	√	×	√
Duplicates at device level	√	*	✓
Duplicates entire disk	√	*	*
Alternate lines of investigation are possible in the future	✓	*	?



How do we get there?

1. Identify "relevant" sectors

2. Produce a **device level**, sector-by-sector, bit-by-bit, **verifiable image**, compatible with existing tools



1				
1				
1				
1				
1				
1				
1				
1				
1			1	
1				
	•			











Finding relevant sectors



Definition 1. A region is *forensically relevant* if and only if the conclusions of an associated investigation are substantially altered if the region's contents are replaced with random values.


Relevance is therefore not a property of a region alone, but a region in the context of a forensic investigation.

1. Perform a forensic investigation in a fully reproducible manner

That is, the procedure must be an **effective procedure** (using Turing's classic definition: a fully defined procedure, which results in a quantifiable, definite conclusion).

- 2. Randomize a particular region
- 3. Repeat the investigation

The **region is relevant**, in the context of this investigation, if and only if, **the conclusions differ**.




Expected relevance:

The a priori **probability measure** (between 0 and 1)

that an *unread* region known to have certain properties is relevant,

in the context of a particular investigation.



How do we get there?

1. Identify "relevant" sectors

2. Produce a **device level**, sector-by-sector, bit-by-bit, **verifiable image**, compatible with existing tools



How do we find them?




How do examiners find them?



Focusing procedure



Focusing procedure





Focusing procedure

compressible vs. incompressible



Compressible focusing procedure

1. Definable in advance (not requiring spontaneous judgment)



Compressible focusing procedure

1. Definable in advance (not requiring spontaneous judgment)

2. Metadata, not exhaustive search



Focusing procedure	Example	Can it be defined in advance?	
Known artifact	Examine known artifacts, such as Firefox's history, stored in known	Y	Y
	folders		
MAC timestamps	Examine only files created within a certain timeframe	Y	Y
Anomalous file name	Examine files in the WINDOWS directory that are anomalous or mis-	Y	Y
or location	spelled		
Autoruns	Examine files that run automatically on boot	Y	Y
Hash based file	Examine files with hashes corresponding to known malware or con-	Y	N
search	traband		
Keyword based sec-	Search disk for keywords of interest	N	N
tor search			



approximating superset













locality













```
/Outlook/
                                                            /Outlook/
/Thunderbird/Profiles/
                                                            /Temporary Internet Files/Content.IE5
/App.*/Windows Live Mail/
                                                            /Cookies
/AIMLogger/
                                                            /History/History.ie5
                                                            /Local Settings/History/History.IE5
/My Chat Logs/
/My Received Files/
                                                            /Temporary Internet Files/
                                           NPSjean
                                                                                                       Misconduct
\.(pst|ost|pab|mab|emx|nsf|edb)$
                                                            (?i)\.(pst|ost|ppt|pptx|jpg|png)$
\.(mbox|em||msg|xls|xlsx)$
                                                            (?i)^sam$
^SAMS
                                                            (?i)^security$
^SECURITY$
                                                            (?i)^software$
^SOFTWARE$
                                                            (?i)^ntuser\.dat$
^NTUSER\.DAT$
                                                            (?i)^system$
^SYSTEM$
```



approximating superset



testing results



Figure 1: Conventional image – SAM file is present




Figure 2: Sifted Image – SAM file is fully extent. Data matches conventional image.






Figure 5: Results for conventional image.





Figure 6: Results for sifted image. Nearly all of the evidence obtained by osTriage from the conventional image is obtained from the sifted image as well.





quantitative testing



Disk	Profile	Acceleration	Tool	Accuracy	Comprehensiveness
NIST CFReDS Hacking Case (4.6 GB)	Registry	4.5x	log2timeline	100%	100%
	Registry	4.5x	Regripper	100%	100%
	IEHistory	5.0x	Pasco	100%	100%
	Email	3.7x	Bulk_extractor	100%	95%
	Registry	4.5x	Mactime	100%	100%
NPS DOMEXUSERS (40 GB)	Registry	13x	log2timeline	100%	54%
	Registry	13x	Regripper	100%	100%
	IEHistory	13x	Pasco	100%	100%
	Email	11x	Bulk_extractor	100%	57%
	Registry	13x	Mactime	100%	100%



investigative testing



synthetic case: 3.2x acceleration 100% accuracy 100% comprehensiveness



real case, disk 1: 2.9x acceleration 100% accuracy 99% comprehensiveness



real case, disk 2: error



real case, disk 3: 9.6x acceleration 100% accuracy 100% comprehensiveness



in the real world



Multiple Applications

reproducible triage: fast imaging: bypass blank regions examiner driven comprehensiveness acceleration new'niche: profile driven collection

Questions? Want to pilot?

Jonathan Grier jgrier@grierforensics.com

