

The Simpler the Better? Threshold Effects of Energy Labels on Property Prices and Energy Efficiency Investments

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An aerial photograph of a winding asphalt road that curves through a dense, green forest. The road is bordered by a concrete guardrail on the left and a steep, rocky embankment on the right. The forest is composed of various types of trees, creating a textured canopy. The lighting is soft, suggesting an overcast day or late afternoon. A semi-transparent dark blue rectangle is overlaid on the left side of the image, containing the word 'REPLICATION' in white capital letters.


REPLICATION

01

Introduction

Context and Motivation

- Energy efficiency is central to climate policy
- In the UK, all homes for sale or rent must have an Energy Performance Certificate (EPC)
- The EPC includes:
 - A SAP score (1–100), where higher means better efficiency
 - A letter-grade (A–G) based on fixed thresholds
- Simplified labels help consumers, but can also mislead through attention bias and heuristic reasoning



Introduction

- **Research Questions:**

- Do EPC rating thresholds generate discrete jumps in housing prices, independent of true energy efficiency?
- Do sellers invest more when their home is just below a threshold?

- **Contribution to the literature:**

- Threshold effects on prices and investments
- Attention bias and heuristic behavior
- Strategic upgrades by sellers
- Policy design implications

Methodology

Data and Sample

- Administrative dataset: 7+ million residential transactions (England & Wales, 2012–2022)
- Merged from:
 - Land Registry: prices, location, property features
 - EPC Register: SAP score and letter band
 - Urban–rural classification
- Focus on sales after July 2012 (EPC made mandatory in ads).
- Subsample of ~161,000 homes with two EPCs used for investment analysis.



Methodology

- Method: **Regression Discontinuity Design** (RDD)
 - Running variable: SAP score
 - Treatment: crossing EPC threshold (e.g. 54 → 55)
 - Outcome: change in price & EE investment probability
- **Causal inference:** comparing similar homes around the cutoff
- **Estimation:** local linear regressions, optimal bandwidths
- **Robustness checks:**
 - Strategic upgrade exclusion
 - Covariate balance
 - Placebo thresholds
 - Donut hole
 - IV using initial SAP score

Letter	SAP score
A	92 – 100
B	81 – 91
C	69 – 80
D	55 – 68
E	39 – 54
F	21 – 38
G	1 – 20

Empirical Strategy

Baseline local linear RDD model adjusted for covariates (Table 3) :

$$P_{igt} = \alpha + \tau T_{igt} + \beta_- SAP_{igt} + \beta_+ T_{igt} \times SAP_{igt} + \mathbf{X}'_{igt} \boldsymbol{\gamma} + \kappa_g + \lambda_t + \varepsilon_{igt},$$

where τ captures the **percentage jump** in price exactly at the band threshold.

Baseline RDD Linear Probability Model adjusted for covariates (Table 4) :

$$I_{igt} = \alpha + \tau T_{igt} + \beta_- SAP_{igt}^0 + \beta_+ T_{igt} \times SAP_{igt}^0 + \mathbf{X}'_{igt} \boldsymbol{\gamma} + \kappa_g + \lambda_t + \varepsilon_{igt}.$$


where τ measures the **discontinuous change** in retrofit probability at the cutoff.

Main Results: Threshold Effects on Property Prices

Table 3—Local Linear RDD Estimates for Price Discontinuities

	(1)	(6)
[F–E]		
τ	0.029***	0.007***
Robust SE	(0.003)	(0.001)
Effective N	113,639 245,331	88,883 187,296
[E–D]		
τ	0.019***	0.011***
Robust SE	(0.002)	(0.001)
Effective N	404,837 740,804	404,572 740,328
[D–C]		
τ	0.009***	0.004***
Robust SE	(0.001)	(0.000)
Effective N	886,646 964,063	886,028 963,158

Figure 3. Price per Square Meter (log) by SAP Score




Threshold effect of **2.9%** \approx Average price increase of **£8,500**
(for a 102m² property priced at £2,890/m²)

Main Results: Threshold Effects on EE Investment

Table 4—Local Linear RDD Estimates for Discontinuities in EE-Investment Probabilities

	(1)	(6)
[F–E]		
τ	–0.008***	–0.008***
Robust SE	(0.001)	(0.001)
Effective N	79,049 156,927	62,081 119,802
[E–D]		
τ	–0.003***	–0.003***
Robust SE	(0.001)	(0.001)
Effective N	310,795 559,013	310,546 558,606
[D–C]		
τ	–0.001***	–0.001***
Robust SE	(0.000)	(0.000)
Effective N	908,484 706,590	762,101 648,402

Figure 6. Proportion of Properties That Received EE Investments by SAP Score—Sales before April 2018



Threshold effect of **-0.8%** \approx A relative **reduction of 19.5%** in upgrade likelihood
(4.1% of properties in the sample carry out EE upgrades)

EXTENSION



02

Motivation & Research Question

Main Findings:

- **Significant price discontinuities** at band thresholds suggesting inattention to the SAP rating
- Sellers are **more likely to make an EE investment** if they are right below a threshold



The Gap:

There are **no evidences against strategic minimal upgrades** («minimum investment needed to jump over the next band»)



*Do property owners **strategically** make minimal energy efficiency **investments** just sufficient **to cross** EPC rating band **thresholds and capture** potential price **premiums**?*

Hypothesis

Sellers whose **initial EPC score** is **just below a** rating band **threshold** are **more likely to make *an investment*** (confirmed by the authors' findings)

Sellers whose initial EPC score is just below a rating band threshold are **more likely to make an investment that just crosses the threshold**, rather than exceeding it by a large margin (i.e., a "**strategic upgrade**")

Specifically, the **closer a property's initial SAP score** is **to a threshold** from below, the **higher the probability of** observing a "**strategic upgrade**"

Data & Sample Overview

Source

Same novel administrative dataset of UK property sale transactions as Sejas-Portillo et al. (~7M obs.)


Sample

Properties that underwent pre-sale retrofitting and excluding transaction after Apr 2018 (due to policy changes)

Starting Variables







SAP (energy efficiency) score before and after retrofit, property characteristics (type, size, rooms), location (region, urban/rural) and sale date (year, month)

Number of Observations



Descriptive Distributions I

Distribution of SAP Ratings by Starting Band



Low starting band (G & F) tend to **overshoot** and invest aiming at jumping more than one band

Middle starting band (E & D) invest **retrofit** mostly to the **next SAP band**

High starting band (C & B) invest lightly. They **do not jump bands** (on average)

Running and Outcome Variables

What a «strategic upgrade» is ?


It is the **outcome variable** representing an energy efficiency investment improving the SAP score **just enough** to cross into the next EPC rating band

How is it identified?

It is binary variable: 1 If the property's initial SAP score is **just below** a threshold, and the final SAP score is **just above** it. 0 otherwise

What «distance to threshold» is?

It is the **running variable** measuring how many SAP points the initial score is below the next SAP rating band



Regression Framework

Estimate whether properties that start closer to an EPC threshold are more likely to *strategically upgrade*

$$\textit{StrategicUpgrade}_i = \alpha + \beta \cdot \textit{DistToThreshold}_i + \gamma' X_i + \epsilon_i$$



X_i : covariates (property type, region, sale date...)

ϵ_i : error term

Looping in each band including only observation starting 1 – k point below the threshold, ensuring focus on a local decision margin

We predict a **$\beta < 0$** \rightarrow the closer the initial SAP score to the next cutoff the higher the chance of a strategic upgrade

Effect of Proximity to Threshold on Strategic Upgrades



β □ Estimated effect of being 1 SAP point closer to the threshold on the probability of upgrading strategically

α □ Estimated probability of a strategic upgrade at cutoff


C-B & D-C □ Strong and significant results (1-point reduction in dist_to_threshold increases the change of strategic_upgrade by 6-9%)

F-E & G-F □ Weak results, mostly because of the higher jumps not captured by our sliding window


Heterogeneity Analysis

$$StrategicUpgrade_i = \alpha + \beta \cdot DistToThreshold_i + \sum_j \delta_j \cdot DistToThreshold_i \times \mathbf{1}[Interacted_i = j] + \gamma'X_i + \epsilon_i$$

$Interacted_i = PropertyType_i \text{ or } PriceGroup_i$



Flats are more likely to be strategically retrofit in band C-B and less in D-C. The other results are non-significant at 95% CI.



Property prices do not present statistically significant heterogeneities.


*Price groups defined as tertiles of log_price

** SS indicates statistically significant bars

Sensitivity Analysis


What happens when we widen what counts as a “just above threshold” retrofit?

Effect of Increasing the Right Window (Baseline Upper Bound = 4)



How far below the next threshold does a property need to start to matter?

Effect of Increasing the Left Window (Baseline Lower Bound = -7)



Conclusion

Key Findings

Sellers closer to the threshold are more likely to retrofit just to cross the next band ($\beta < 0$)

There is no strong evidence of heterogeneity among the tested regressors

Widening the «strategic interval» reduces the effect, mostly when shifting towards properties starting far from the next cutoff

Driver Mechanism

Buyers focus on letter bands highlighting partial inattention

Sellers target cheap and minimal upgrades hoping to «fool» the buyers

EPCs do not just inform market participants but shape their behaviour, specially closer to cutoff points

Policy Implications

Focus on defining a more granular bands to minimize partial inattention

Be aware of superficial compliance as the absence of long-term energy savings and deep retrofit harms optimal environmental outcome


Introduce SAP progress bars or upgrade potential indicators to reduce the market “cutoff obsession” encouraging holistic improvements

ANY QUESTIONS ?


Thank you for your attention. We would appreciate clarifying your doubts and curiosities

**BACK UP
SLIDES ...**

Why G-F and F-E have negligible results...?



More distributions :)



LPM/Logit Base Results


	Band	N_obs	Class_Share	LPM_coef	LPM_pval	Logit_coef (logodds)	Logit_coef (odds)	Logit_pval	LPM_lower_ci	LPM_upper_ci
5	B-A	148	0.155405	-0.136335	2.252289e-18	-1.032883	0.355979	2.509209e-08	-0.163159	-0.109511
4	C-B	5300	0.303208	-0.096475	7.670924e-208	-0.494277	0.610012	2.566629e-166	-0.102350	-0.090601
3	D-C	30677	0.404342	-0.061085	0.000000e+00	-0.261578	0.769836	0.000000e+00	-0.063808	-0.058361
2	E-D	30039	0.237058	-0.008668	2.063676e-12	-0.048160	0.952981	2.183871e-12	-0.011084	-0.006252
1	F-E	10257	0.121381	-0.002284	1.622122e-01	-0.021507	0.978722	1.622509e-01	-0.005487	0.000919
0	G-F	2359	0.066978	-0.001528	5.516726e-01	-0.024513	0.975785	5.515702e-01	-0.006561	0.003505

LPM with Covariates Results

	Band	N_obs	Class_Share	LPM_coef_cov	LPM_pval_cov	LPM_lower_ci_cov	LPM_upper_ci_cov
5	B-A	147	0.149660	-0.144395	4.708053e-16	-0.175215	-0.113575
4	C-B	5255	0.302569	-0.092474	3.166049e-190	-0.098384	-0.086565
3	D-C	30644	0.404484	-0.062024	0.000000e+00	-0.064748	-0.059301
2	E-D	30025	0.237102	-0.008695	1.799099e-12	-0.011112	-0.006278
1	F-E	10244	0.121535	-0.002524	1.237144e-01	-0.005738	0.000690
0	G-F	2356	0.067063	-0.001579	5.394356e-01	-0.006623	0.003465

```
# === LPM ===  
formula = """  
    strategic_upgrade ~ dist_to_threshold + leasehold +  
    total_floor_area + number_habitable_rooms + urban +  
    C(region) + sale_year + sale_quarter + C(property_type)  
    """
```


LPM with Covariates Results



Het Anal on property type

	Band	N_obs	Class_Share	LPM_coef_cov	LPM_pval_cov	dist_to_threshold:C(property_type) [T.Flat]_coef	dist_to_threshold:C(property_type) [T.Flat]_pval
5	B-A	147	0.149660	-0.112531	4.191119e-05	0.065637	1.785200e-01
4	C-B	5255	0.302569	-0.068805	1.758797e-17	-0.034556	1.054789e-04
3	D-C	30644	0.404484	-0.067478	1.183343e-113	0.027020	3.304629e-10
2	E-D	30025	0.237102	-0.008390	1.238195e-03	0.005143	2.633243e-01
1	F-E	10244	0.121535	-0.003326	2.691888e-01	0.009377	1.017407e-01
0	G-F	2356	0.067063	0.006625	1.680234e-01	-0.001281	8.772397e-01

dist_to_threshold:C(property_type) [T.Semi-detached]_coef	dist_to_threshold:C(property_type) [T.Semi-detached]_pval	dist_to_threshold:C(property_type) [T.Terraced]_coef	dist_to_threshold:C(property_type) [T.Terraced]_pval
-0.054999	0.210103	-0.027802	0.478864
0.004157	0.752775	-0.014687	0.184990
0.000266	0.946897	-0.001236	0.748768
-0.002430	0.473758	-0.000542	0.870650
0.003128	0.468916	-0.003064	0.465886
-0.012658	0.082652	-0.014293	0.027561

Het Anal on log_price

	Band	N_obs	Class_Share	dtc_coef_cov	dtc_pval_cov
5	B-A	147	0.149660	-0.153209	1.146198e-08
4	C-B	5255	0.302569	-0.092509	2.325254e-70
3	D-C	30644	0.404484	-0.063891	9.281777e-155
2	E-D	30025	0.237102	-0.009610	7.218192e-06
1	F-E	10244	0.121535	-0.005259	6.023754e-02
0	G-F	2356	0.067063	-0.006246	1.674930e-01

dist_to_threshold:C(price_group) [T.medium]_coef	dist_to_threshold:C(price_group) [T.medium]_pval	dist_to_threshold:C(price_group) [T.high]_coef	dist_to_threshold:C(price_group) [T.high]_pval
0.025533	0.436380	0.021521	0.548592
-0.006791	0.354977	-0.004098	0.577474
0.001829	0.591841	0.006556	0.053181
0.001558	0.607139	0.001357	0.652608
0.008630	0.031485	0.000564	0.887261
0.003762	0.549531	0.009579	0.133203

Robustness Analysis — Sorting at the Thresholds

Table 5—Distribution Manipulation Tests for Sorting at the Thresholds

	Final SAP Score	Initial SAP Score	Remove presale investment
	(1)	(2)	(3)
[F–E]			
τ	−0.205***	−0.080***	−0.166***
Robust SE	(0.024)	(0.020)	(0.022)
Effective N	11 12	11 12	11 12
[E–D]			
τ	−0.069***	−0.030	−0.031
Robust SE	(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.032)
Effective N	14 15	14 15	14 15
[D–C]			
τ	0.053	−0.028	−0.003
Robust SE	(0.071)	(0.067)	(0.066)
Effective N	11 12	11 12	11 12

Robustness Analysis — Sorting at the Thresholds

Table 6—Robustness Analyses for Sorting at the Thresholds						
	Donut-hole		IV		Including rating band increases	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
[F–E]						
τ	0.012	0.003	0.033***	0.008***	0.028***	0.005***
Robust SE	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.002)
Effective N	1,507,810	1,506,677	91,437 189,501	116,728 247,299	114,065 253,167	113,991 252,977
[E–D]						
τ	0.033	0.062	0.019***	0.011***	0.015***	0.008***
Robust SE	(0.014)	(0.021)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Effective N	4,249,542	4,246,691	284,670 554,628	284,484 554,280	408,939 772,189	408,673 771,704
[D–C]						
τ	0.190	0.147	0.008***	0.001***	0.007***	0.002***
Robust SE	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)
Effective N	4,308,980	4,301,817	877,998 984,028	877,370 983,096	903,294 1,026,699	902,667 1,025,756

Robustness Analysis — Covariate Balance Test




Figure 8. Covariate Balance Plots: Property Characteristics

Robustness Analysis — Covariate Balance Test




Figure 8. Covariate Balance Plots: Property Characteristics