Game Theoretical Analysis of Resource Allocation in the InterPlanetary File System

David Grisham

1 Introduction

The Internet is perhaps the largest and most consistent network that has ever existed. Unfortunately, it predominantly runs on the outdated hypermedia distribution protocol HTTP. The goal of the InterPlanetary File System (IPFS) is to upgrade the Internet to a distributed peer-to-peer system, thereby making it more robust and permanent. This new Internet would be a network of peers, as opposed to clients and servers, all sharing data between one another. In order for such a system to thrive, users must be cooperative and willing to share data with their peers. The goal of this project is to analyze the resource allocation options of peers interacting in an IPFS network. A combination of analytical and empirical methods will be used to glean insights into the generally intractable allocation decisions that users are presented with when participating in an IPFS network.

1.1 IPFS

IPFS is a peer-to-peer hypermedia distribution protocol developed by Protocol Labs. It is a content-addressed, versioned filesystem. While a variety of use cases exist for such a protocol, the most ambitious goal of the project is to replace HTTP as the primary file exchange protocol used in the Internet. This could ultimately result in the decentralization of the Internet.

IPFS synthesizes various technologies developed since the Internet's inception. These technologies include Git, BitTorrent, distributed hash tables (e.g. Kademlia), and self-certified filesystems. The IPFS stack is shown in Figure 1. One way to conceptualize an IPFS network is as a Git repository shared within a torrent-esque swarm.



Figure 1: The IPFS Stack – Bitswap is at the exchange layer.

1.2 Bitswap

Bitswap is the block exchange protocol of IPFS. The most direct inspiration of this submodule is the BitTorrent peer-to-peer file distribution protocol. Bitswap is the layer of IPFS that incentivizes users to share data. A Bitswap reciprocation function determines which peers to send data to, and in what relative quantities. The input to the reputation function is a set of metrics that may be used to weight peers – e.g. peer bandwidth, reputation, and/or location. The output is a set of weights, one for each peer, that assign the relative resource allocations for the peers. These weights are periodically recalculated to reflect changes in both the network and peer behavior.

1.3 Objectives

For this project, I will take the initial steps toward understanding the behavior of users in an IPFS network as predicted by game theoretical models. This will involve a combination of analytical and empirical analyses, along with implementation of these ideas in the IPFS software. The analytical work will focus on repeated games and, potentially, evolutionary games, while the empirical work will take a simulation-based approach. I intend to use these methods to classify various Bitswap reciprocation functions and determine useful allocation behavior under certain conditions.

2 System Model

This section details the model currently used to describe Bitswap in this work. §2.1 models the IPFS network as a graph; §2.2 mathematically describes the peer-wise reputations and user interactions; and §2.3 formulates the problem as a game.

2.1 Network Graph

We model an IPFS swarm as a network $\mathcal N$ of $|\mathcal N|$ users. The graphical representation consists of

- \bullet nodes representing users, and
- unweighted, undirected edges, each of which represents a peering between two users.

A user's neighborhood is their set of peers, i.e. the set of nodes that the user is connected to by an edge. User i's neighborhood is denoted by \mathcal{N}_i , where $\mathcal{N}_i \subseteq \mathcal{N}$.

2.2 Reputation

We break Bitswap interactions into discrete rounds, with a single round denoted by a nonnegative integer t. The following two points describe the way data distribution takes place in this Bitswap model. Each of these points simplifies the problem from the real-world scenario.

- 1. Each user j distributes exactly B_j bits, where $B_j > 0$, to each of their peers in a given round (and has sufficient resources to do so).
- 2. All users always have unique data that all of their peers want. So, when a user allocates b bits to a particular peer, that user has at least b bits that the peer wants.

We define b_{ij}^t as the total number of bits sent from user i to peer j from round 0 to t-1. User i maintains a Bitswap $ledger\ l_{ij}^t$, for each of its peers $j\in\mathcal{N}_i$, that stores the amount of data exchanged in both directions, i.e. $l_{ij}^t=(b_{ij}^t,b_{ji}^t)$.

Now we define the debt ratio d_{ji} from user i to peer j as

$$d_{ji}^{t} = \frac{b_{ij}^{t-1}}{b_{ii}^{t-1} + 1}$$

 d_{ji}^t can be thought of as peer *i*'s reputation from the perspective of user *j*. This reputation is then considered by user *j*'s reputation function $S_j(d_{ji}^t, \mathbf{d}_j^{-i,t}) \in \{0,1\}$, where $\mathbf{d}_j^{-i,t} = (d_{jk}^t \mid \forall k \in \mathcal{N}_j, k \neq i)$ is the vector of debt ratios for all

of user j's peers in round t excluding peer i. The reputation function considers the relative reputation of peer i to the rest of j's peers, and returns a weight for peer i. This weight is used to determine what proportion of j's resources to allocate to peer i in round t. Given all of this, we can calculate b_{ji}^{t+1} given b_{ji}^{t} and peer j's vector of debt ratios \mathbf{d}_{i}^{t} :

$$b_{ji}^{t+1} = b_{ji}^{t} + \frac{S_{j}(d_{ji}^{t}, \mathbf{d}_{j}^{-i,t})}{\sum_{k \in \mathcal{N}_{i}} S_{j}(d_{jk}^{t}, \mathbf{d}_{j}^{-k,t})} B_{j}$$

2.3 Game Formulation

The game model presented here is the product of multiple iterations that approached a balance between the accuracy of the model to the problem and model complexity. Previous modeling approaches included tools from evolutionary game theory and statistical mechanics on the high complexity end, and repeated games on the low accuracy end. While the current model uses a repeated game model as well, the strategy space has been modified to better fit the Bitswap scenario.¹

All users in the network participate in the Bitswap game. The players in this game are the users in the IPFS network, and each player's strategy is the reciprocation function they choose to assign weights to their peers. The strategy space, then, is the space containing all pure functions of the form $S_j(d_{ji}^t, \mathbf{d}_j^{-i,t}) \in \{0,1\}$. The Bitswap game is an infinitely repeated, incomplete information game in which users exchange data. One game takes place between each pair of peers for each round t. The players are the IPFS users in the network \mathcal{N} . The utility of player i in round t is the sum of all of the data that i is sent by its peers in that round:

$$u_i^t = \sum_{j \in \mathcal{N}_i} (b_{ji}^t - b_{ji}^{t-1})$$

3 Preliminary Results

This section details the results obtained so far. The simulator is described first (§3.1), followed by the analytical work (§3.2), and finally the implementation progress (§3.3).

 $^{^1{\}rm A}$ description of the model from the previous iteration can be found at https://github.com/dgrisham/masters/tree/master/deprecated/analysis.

3.1 Strategy Simulator

The strategy simulator is a Python tool to empirically test whether a Bitswap reciprocation function might be a Nash equilibrium under a particular set of conditions. As of now, the simulation is restricted to a network of exactly three nodes. We enumerate the users 0, 1, and 2. All users are connected to all other users (i.e. the network is a fully connected graph). The simulation parameters are:

- A Bitswap reciprocation function to test, rf. Currently, the following reciprocation functions are supported (descriptions are provided as Python lambda functions the exp and tanh functions are from the numpy library):
 - Linear
 * lambda x: x
 Sigmoid
 * lambda x: 1 / (1 + exp(1-x))
 Tanh

* lambda x: tanh(x)

- An initial set of ledgers, initial_ledgers. The following initial ledger types are currently supported:
 - Ones: Every user has sent 1 bit to each of their peers.
 - Split: Every user has sent one round's worth of data to their peers, split evenly between the peers. For example, given $B_0 = 10$, 0 will have sent 5 bits to both peer 1 and peer 2.
 - Proportional: Every user has sent one round's worth of data to their peers, weighted by the data resource of the peers. For example, given $B_0 = 100$, $B_1 = 50$, and $B_2 = 150$, B_0 will have sent $\frac{50}{50+150}100 = 25$ bits to peer 1 and $\frac{150}{50+150}100 = 75$ bits to peer 2.
- A set of resources, resources, where resources[i] gives the total amount of data i will send its peers in each round.
- The resolution of the deviation, deviation, whose purpose is described below.

3.1.1 Simulation Description

The simulation takes place over a single 'non-deviating' run followed by one or more 'deviating' runs. During the non-deviating run, peer 0 follows the allocation determined by rf. In the deviating runs, peer 0 tries other allocations to see if it can achieve a better payoff than the non-deviating case. Both types of runs are described in more detail next.

Non-deviating run: Each user sends data to their peers for round t=0 based on the allocations given by rf and initial_ledgers. Then, we calculate the amount of data peer 0 receives in the following round, t=1. This amount of data is 0's payoff p_0 .

Deviating runs: Users 1 and 2 allocate data to their peers for round t=0 based on rf and initial_ledgers, while user 0 tries every possible allocation, to a resolution of deviation (one allocation per run). So, if deviation is 1 and resources[0] = 10, user 0 will try the allocations (0, 10), (1, 9), (2, 8), ..., (10, 0), where the first element of each tuple represents the amount of data 0 sends to 1 and the second element is the amount 0 sends to 2. For each of these allocations, we calculate the payoff (amount of data) 0 gets in round t=1 as a result of the allocation.

The simulation outputs a plot where the x-axis is the proportion of user 0's data that 0 sent to 1 in round t=0 and the y-axis is the payoff that 0 received in round t=1 as a consequence of the allocation in t=0.

3.1.2 Results

Two example plots are shown in Figures 2 and 3. Figure 2 shows the output resulting from the linear reciprocation function, 'split' initial ledgers, and homogeneous² resource distribution [10, 10]. Figure 3 shows a similar setup, except with non-homogeneous resource distribution [10, 20, 10]. The bold plus sign marks the result in the non-deviating case; green (resp. red, blue) dots are deviating cases that gave a better (resp. worse, the same) payoff than the non-deviating case.

A single green dot on one of these plots proves that the reciprocation function is not an NE for the case the plot represents; no green dots, however, is *not* proof that the reciprocation function is an NE, since the simulation tests a subset of the possible allocations.

The simulation has indicated (but not proven) that each of the reciprocation functions is an NE when $B_1 = B_2$, and has proven that none of them are an NE otherwise. This is the primary results obtained from the simulation up to this point.

3.2 Analytical

The analytical work completed so far verifies a subset of the results from the strategy simulator. The payoff of user 0 in round t=1 of the strategy simulator is represented symbolically in the Wolfram language (used by Mathematica). This is done for each of the initial ledger cases described in section §3.1. Mathematica is then used to determine the optimal deviation d_{opt} from the allocation calculated by a given reciprocation function rf and resource distribution resources. d_{opt} is the deviation from rf that maximizes peer 0's payoff, p_0 . If $d_{opt} = 0$, then the optimal strategy is to not deviate from rf's allocation, which confirms that rf

²A homogeneous resource distribution is one where all resources[i] values are equal. In other words, all peers have the same amount of data to send in each round.




Figure 2: Proportion 0 sends to 1 vs. p_0 for linear reciprocation function, split initial ledgers, and resource distribution [10, 10]




Figure 3: Proportion 0 sends to 1 vs. p_0 for linear reciprocation function, split initial ledgers, and resource distribution [10, 20, 10]

is an NE under these conditions. Otherwise (when $d_{opt} \neq 0$), rf is not an NE under these conditions.

Unfortunately, the complexity of even the three node case makes symbolic calculation impractical in almost all non-trivial cases. d_{opt} can be calculated when testing the Linear reciprocation function, by far the simplest of the analyzed functions, with various resource distributions. Further, homogeneous³ resource distributions can be analyzed with more complicated reciprocation functions like Tanh and Sigmoid. However, non-homogeneous resource distributions mixed with reciprocation functions other than Linear immediately become too complex for symbolic analysis without further tuning.

The symbolic analysis done here has proven some of the results found in §3.1.2. In particular, we've proven that the Linear reciprocation function is an NE whenever $B_1 = B_2$; the complexity seems to be too great to prove this for the other functions. Additionally, we've proven that all three functions are NEs under homogeneous resource distributions and for any initial ledger distribution.

The output of the Mathematica notebook that shows these conclusions is included with this document.

3.3 Implementation

I have added the ability to specify a Bitswap strategy in go-ipfs⁴. go-ipfs is the primary, reference implementation of IPFS (written in the Go programming language) and the one that I will be using in my research. The Bitswap strategy is simply a Go function that takes a peer's reputation as input and produces a weight for that peer. These relative weights are then used in a single round of a weighted round robin queue, which distributes data to each of the peers in these relative quantities.

The next step is to set up a simulation testbed based in the InterPlanetary TestBed (IPTB). IPTB allows the initialization and control of IPFS nodes within docker containers. Network parameters such as bandwidth and jitter may be configured between the containers and, since the containers are hosted on the same machine, this provides a means of simulating IPFS nodes in a more stable environment than actual networks provide.

IPTB will serve two purposes:

1. Give a means of comparing my round-robin implementation of the Bitswap peer queue with the original data distribution implementation. This will help verify that the new implementation performs at least as well as the old so that we can confidently integrate it into go-ipfs.

³A homogeneous resource distribution is one where all resources[i] values are equal. In other words, all peers have the same amount of data to send in each round.

⁴https://github.com/ipfs/go-ipfs

2. Provide a highly configurable and isolated testbed for initial simulation purposes. The game-theoretical results will be compared to the interactions between nodes using IPTB.

The initial steps toward using IPTB for Bitswap testing are catalogued in the bitswap-tests repository⁵.

Finally, while the IPTB makes simulations simpler to run and understand, we ultimately want to implement this research in real networks. The simulations will be expanded to test IPFS nodes running on separate hosts where the unpredictability of network effects will become relevant. Currently, the best option for this is to use kubernetes-ipfs⁶. kubernetes-ipfs is a tool which allows the user to set up and control IPFS nodes running on separate devices via a DSL. While it would be preferable to use IPTB for this step rather than switching tools, the purposes of the tools are different enough that kubernetes-ipfs may be the better choice for the sake of time.

4 Plan

The objectives of this project are:

Analytical work

- 1. Repeated game analysis: Characterize smaller-scale systems analytically. This can be used to prove whether a particular strategy is a Nash equilibrium under certain conditions, encapsulate certain player dynamics as a function of network parameters, etc. The analytical results here reflect the simpler cases tested in the strategy simulator (discussed above).
- 2. Evolutionary game theory: If time allows, model the Bitswap game using evolutionary game theory to give a more sophisticated analysis of the large-scale dynamics.

• Simulations

- 1. **Strategy simulator**: Continue to build on the existing **strategy simulator**⁷ to empirically analyze strategies e.g. whether a particular strategy might be a Nash equilibrium in certain cases.
- 2. **Bitswap tests**: Continue work on writing tests that coordinate interactions between IPFS nodes and measure the resulting dynamics. These IPFS nodes run in Docker containers, so network conditions may be simulated by configuring the containers' network interfaces. *If time allows*, these tests will be extended to run on a network of separate machines so that actual network conditions (rather than

 $^{^5 \}rm https://github.com/dgrisham/bitswap-tests$

⁶https://github.com/ipfs/kubernetes-ipfs/

⁷https://github.com/dgrisham/strategy-sim

simulated) may be tested. This work leverages IPTB⁸ and is currently maintained in the bitswap-tests repository.

5 Timeline

5.1 April

5.1.1 Week 3 (4/16 - 4/20)

- Analytical results (via Mathematica notebook)
 - Characterize results
- Start thesis layout
- IPTB simulations
 - Preparation, figure out important test cases

5.1.2 Week 4(4/23 - 4/27)

- Thesis layout
- Analytical work
 - Figure out where to go based on results so far
- IPTB simulations
 - Preparation/running
 - Start working on visualizations for results

5.2 May

5.2.1 Week 1 (4/30 - 5/4)

- IPTB simulations
 - Re-evaluate progress and important test cases
 - Visualizations
- Analytical work
 - Continue trajectory from previous week
- Start writing thesis
 - Intro/background IPFS, Bitswap, motivation

5.2.2 Week 2 (5/7 - 5/11)

- IPTB simulations
- Analytical work

 $^{^8 \}rm https://github.com/ipfs/iptb$

- Figure out where to go based on results so far
- Thesis writing
 - Intro/background approach, explain why Bitswap analysis with game theory is hard

5.2.3 Week 3 (5/14 - 5/18)

- IPTB simulations
 - Re-evaluate progress and important test cases
- Analytical work
 - Continue trajectory from previous week
- Thesis writing
 - Explain analytical results, use graphs from strategy-sim if helpful

5.2.4 Week 4 (5/23 - 5/25)

- IPTB simulations
- Analytical work
 - Continue trajectory from previous week
- Thesis writing
 - Explain analytical results, use graphs from strategy-sim if helpful
 - Start describing IPTB simulation testbed

5.2.5 Week 5 (5/28 - 6/1)

- IPTB simulations
 - Re-evaluate progress and important test cases
- Analytical work
- Thesis writing
 - Explain analytical results, use graphs from strategy-sim if helpful
 - Start describing IPTB simulation testbed

5.3 June

- Continue IPTB simulations
 - Re-evaluate current state periodically
- Analytical work
 - Loop on re-orienting trajectory + moving forward
- Thesis writing
 - Characterize results as they come
 - Plots and visualizations
 - Go to writing center to review formatting

July **5.4**

- Analytical work should be done by this point
- Finish up simulations
- Primary focus: thesis
- Visualizations, for matting, explaining results, etc. • Tuesday, July $24^{\rm th}\colon$ Thesis submission due