KU LEUVEN

FACULTY OF ENGINEERING SCIENCE

The best master's thesis ever

First Author
Second Author

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Supervisor
Prof. dr. ir. Knows Better

Assessors
Ir. Kn. Owsmuch
K. Nowsrest

Assistant-supervisors
Ir. An Assistent
A. Friend

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Preface

I would like to thank everybody who kept me busy the last year, especially my promoter and my assistants. I would also like to thank the jury for reading the text. My sincere gratitude also goes to my wive and the rest of my family.

First Author
Second Author

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Abstract

The `abstract` environment contains a more extensive overview of the work. But it should be limited to one page.

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List of Abbreviations and Symbols

Abbreviations

DL   Discrete Logarithm
$\mathcal{PPT}$ Probabilistic Polynomial Time
NIZK   Non-Interactive Zero Knowledge
PoK   Proof of Knowledge
AoK   Argument of Knowledge
PSSS   Packed Shamir Secret Sharing
PVSS   Publicly Verifiable Secret Sharing
PPVSS   Pre-Constructed Publicly Verifiable Secret Sharing
PPPVSS   Packed Pre-Constructed Publicly Verifiable Secret Sharing

Symbols

q prime number
$\mathbb{G}$ Cyclic group of order q
$\mathbb{Z}_q$ Modular ring with q elements
$\mathbb{Z}_q[X]$ Univariate polynomial ring in the variable X with coefficients in $\mathbb{Z}_q$
$\mathbb{Z}_q[X]_t$ Set of polynomials in $\mathbb{Z}_q[X]$ of degree t
$\mathbb{Z}_q[X]_{\leq t}$ Set of polynomials in $\mathbb{Z}_q[X]$ of degree at most t
λ Security Parameter
$negl$ Negligible function
$\mathcal{O}$ Big-O notation

Chapter 1

Literature Review

In 1979, Shamir introduced a threshold secret sharing scheme called Shamir Secret Sharing scheme [21], which is now a well-known and widely used secret sharing scheme to this day because of its numerous applications in cryptography. It was first of its kind to have Information Theoretic (IT) security under certain assumptions against passive adversaries who can only see the secret shares of the parties they have corrupted. In reality, however, the adversaries are usually stronger than just being passive, moreover, they possess the power to manipulate the share values of the corrupted parties itself. Shamir's scheme is not tailored to defend against active adversaries as one cannot verify the correctness of the shares. This led to numerous inventions of Verifiable Secret Sharing (VSS) schemes, which not only does allow the parties to verify the correctness of the shares shared by the dealer but also allows the parties to verify the correctness of the shares when opened by the parties during the reconstruction phase. Because of the feature of verifiability, VSS schemes can defend the applications against active adversaries.

There are many VSS schemes ([11], [12]) in the literature which are based on Shamir Secret Sharing scheme. Throughout the years, many advancements have been made in the field of VSS schemes, and as of writing this report the efficient VSS schemes are Π_F, Π_P and Π_{LA} [4], each of which have distinct security features. In VSS, only shareholders can actually verify the correctness of the shares. Certain applications demand to have verifiability feature available to anyone, which is solved by Publicly Verifiable Secret Sharing (PVSS) schemes. PVSS is an extension of VSS, where the correctness of the shares can be verified by anyone. Many cool applications exist today which use PVSS schemes, such as, e-voting [20], randomness beacons [8], etc. In [5], authors have noticed that the Schoenmakers' PVSS scheme used for the e-voting application in [20] is actually more than a PVSS scheme, and they coined the term Pre-Constructed Publicly Verifiable Secret Sharing (PPVSS) scheme. PPVSS is a special type of PVSS where the dealer additionally publishes a commitment to the secret itself. The authors have also shown that any PVSS scheme can be transformed into a PPVSS scheme with minimal changes, and constructed a PPVSS Λ_{RO} from the PVSS Π_S [4] as an example, where they used Λ_{RO} to build an efficient e-voting application.

With PPVSS, one can build versatile applications and also can improve the efficiency of existing applications. In ALBATROSS [9], authors built a randomness beacon application using a PVSS. We have an intuition that an efficient randomness beacon application can be built using a scheme based on PPVSS on certain conditions. In this report, we will introduce Packed PPVSS (PPPVSS) along with its security proofs and give an example based on Λ_{RO}, which will be used to improve ALBATROSS in many cases.

Chapter 2

Preliminaries

2.1 Notation

Let $(\mathbb{G}, \times)$ be a cyclic group of prime order q with hard Discrete Log (DL) and its generator being g. Also, we write $\mathbb{Z}_q[X]_d$ to denote the set of all d degree polynomials univariate in X with coefficients in the finite field $\mathbb{Z}_q$. For remainder of the chapter we let $n > t$ for some positive integers n and t.

2.2 Coding Theory

This subsection is a brief recall of linear codes and their properties.

Definition 2.2.1 (Codeword). *A **codeword** of length n is a vector $c \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$.*

Definition 2.2.2 (Linear Code). *[15] If $\mathcal{C}$ be a vector subspace of $\mathbb{Z}_q^n$ with dimension k, then $\mathcal{C}$ is said to be a **linear code**(/ linear $q-$ary code) of length n and dimension k.*

In the remainder of the subsection, we let $\mathcal{C}$ be a linear $q-$ary code of length n and dimension k.

Definition 2.2.3 (Hamming distance). *The hamming distance d of two codewords of equal length is the number of positions at which the codewords differ. Also, the hamming distance of $\mathcal{C}$, $d(\mathcal{C})$ is defined to be the minimum hamming distance of any two codewords in $\mathcal{C}$.*

Definition 2.2.4 (Hamming weight). *The hamming weight wt of a codeword c is the number of non-zero positions in c. Also, the hamming weight of $\mathcal{C}$, $wt(\mathcal{C})$ is defined to be the minimum hamming weight of any codeword in $\mathcal{C}$.*

Lemma 2.2.1. *[15] Given a tuple of codewords of equal length n, (u, v, w), let $d(u, v)$ and $wt(w)$ denote the hamming distance of u, v and the hamming weight of w respectively. Then $d(u, v) = wt(u - v)$ and $d(u, v) \leq d(u, w) + d(w, v)$.*

Definition 2.2.5 (error). *A vector r is said to be an **error** of a codeword $c \in \mathcal{C}$ if $r = c + e$ for some $e \neq 0$ and e is called error term of r.*

It is trivial to observe that the hamming distance of error r of $c \in \mathcal{C}$ is the minimum of the hamming distances of r with each codeword in $\mathcal{C}$.

Definition 2.2.6 (Detectable Error). *An error r of $c \in \mathcal{C}$ is said to be **detectable** in $\mathcal{C}$ if $r \notin \mathcal{C}$, otherwise it is said to be an **undetectable**.*

Theorem 2.2.1. *[15] An error r of $c \in \mathcal{C}$ is detectable if the hamming distance of c and r is less than the hamming distance of $\mathcal{C}$, more precisely $d(r, c) < d(\mathcal{C})$.*

Proof. Consider the negation of the statement, i.e., the hamming distance of c and r is less than the hamming distance of $\mathcal{C}$ and r is an undetectable error in $\mathcal{C}$, mathematically we have $d(r, c) < d(\mathcal{C})$ and $r \in \mathcal{C}$. The distance of any two codewords in $\mathcal{C}$ should be at least $d(\mathcal{C})$ implying $d(r, c) \geq d(\mathcal{C})$, which is a contradiction to the negation of our statement. □

The theorem 2.2.1 says that any error of a codeword in $\mathcal{C}$ is detectable as long as their hamming distance is strictly less than the hamming distance of $\mathcal{C}$ itself.

Definition 2.2.7 (Correctable Error). *A detectable error r of $c \in \mathcal{C}$ is said to be **correctable** if one can obtain its error term e such that $c + e = r$.*

Theorem 2.2.2. *[15] One can find the error term e of the detectable error r of $c \in \mathcal{C}$ if $wt(e) < \frac{d(\mathcal{C})}{2}$.*

Proof. We have the following triangular inequality from lemma 2.2.1 for any $w \in \mathcal{C}$ with $w \neq c$:

$$d(\mathcal{C}) \leq d(w, c) \leq d(w, r) + d(r, c). \tag{2.1}$$

From the equation (2.1), we get

$$d(w, r) \geq d(\mathcal{C}) - d(r, c). \tag{2.2}$$

Since, $w \neq c$ we always will have

$$d(w, r) > d(r, c). \tag{2.3}$$

. From the equations (2.2) and (2.3), we have the following result:

$$d(\mathcal{C}) - d(r, c) > d(r, c) \implies d(\mathcal{C}) > 2d(r, c) \iff d(\mathcal{C}) > 2wt(e).$$

□

If one wants to correct a detectable error of a codeword in $\mathcal{C}$ then from theorem 2.2.2, its hamming distance with the codeword should be strictly less than half the hamming distance of $\mathcal{C}$ itself.

Definition 2.2.8 (Dual Code)**.** *The vector subspace $\mathcal{C}^{\perp}$ is called a Dual (Code) of $\mathcal{C}$ if it is orthogonal to $\mathcal{C}$.*

Definition 2.2.9 (Generating Matrix)**.** *The $k \times n-$matrix $\mathcal{G}$ is said to be a generating matrix of $\mathcal{C}$ if it generates $\mathcal{C}$, more precisely, the rows of G form a basis for $\mathcal{C}$. Also, $\mathcal{G}$ is said to be in its **standard form** if it is of the form*

$$\mathcal{G} = \begin{bmatrix} I_k & P \end{bmatrix},$$

where I_k is the $k \times k$ identity matrix and P is some $k \times (n-k)$ matrix.

Definition 2.2.10 (Parity Check Matrix)**.** *Consider the linear transformation ϕ as follows:*

$$\phi : \mathbb{Z}_q^n \to \mathbb{Z}_q^{n-k},$$

*where kernel of ϕ is $\mathcal{C}$. Then the matrix associated to ϕ, $\mathcal{H}$, is called the **parity check matrix** of $\mathcal{C}$.*

Lemma 2.2.2. *[15] If $\mathcal{G}$ is a generating matrix of $\mathcal{C}$ in its standard form, i.e., $\mathcal{G} = \begin{bmatrix} I_k & P \end{bmatrix}$, then $\mathcal{H}$ being a parity check matrix of $\mathcal{C}$ is given by*

$$\mathcal{H} = \begin{bmatrix} -P^T & I_{n-k} \end{bmatrix},$$

where I_{n-k} is the $(n-k) \times (n-k)$ identity matrix where P^T is the transpose of P.

One can easily check if a codeword is in $\mathcal{C}$ by multiplying it with its corresponding parity check matrix $\mathcal{H}$.

2.2.1 Reed Solomon Codes

Consider the set of all univariate polynomials in X of degree at most t over $\mathbb{Z}_q$, denoted by $\mathbb{Z}_q[X]_{\leq t}$. It is trivial to observe that $\mathbb{Z}_q[X]_{\leq t}$ is isomorphic to the $t+1$ dimensional vector space $\mathbb{Z}_q^{t+1}$, where each vector consists the coefficients of a unique polynomial in $\mathbb{Z}_q[X]_{\leq t}$. Now, consider the following set of codewords determined by the evaluation of the polynomials in $\mathbb{Z}_q[X]_{\leq t}$ at n **distinct** points $x_1, \ldots, x_n \in \mathbb{Z}_q$:

$$RS = \{(f(x_1), \ldots, f(x_n)) : f \in \mathbb{Z}_q[X]_{\leq t}, x_i \neq x_j \text{ for } i \neq j\}. \quad (2.4)$$

Lemma 2.2.3. *Assume $n > t$. The hamming distance of any two codewords in RS is at least $n-t$. Furthermore, RS is a linear code of length n and dimension $t+1$.*

Proof. For $n > t$, saying that the hamming distance of any two codewords is at least $n-t$ is same as saying that the two codewords in RS are equal in at most t positions. Assume by contradiction that there exists two **distinct** t degree polynomials f, g in $\mathbb{Z}_q[X]$ with corresponding codewords in RS are equal in $t+1$ positions, i.e., their hamming distance is $n-t-1$. As $\mathbb{Z}_q$ is an integral domain, any $t+1$ distinct points

in the set $\mathbb{Z}_q \times \mathbb{Z}_q$ will determine a unique t degree polynomial in $\mathbb{Z}_q[X]_t$. As a consequence, we should have $f = g$ in $\mathbb{Z}_q[X]$ which is a contradiction.

The remainder of the proof is by a consequence of the first part. More precisely, each codeword in RS determined by a polynomial in $\mathbb{Z}_q[X]_{\leq t}$ is actually a unique representation of the polynomial itself as it consists at least $t+1$ distinct evaluations of that polynomial where $n > t$. That is, RS is isomorphic to $\mathbb{Z}_q[X]_{\leq t}$ as a vector space which has dimension $t + 1$. $\qquad\square$

Definition 2.2.11 (Reed Solomon Code). *The $q-$ary linear code RS of length n and dimension $t+1$ defined in* (2.4) *with minimum hamming distance $n-t$ is called a $[n, t+1, n-t]-$**Reed Solomon Code** [18] in $\mathbb{Z}_q$.*

Corollary 2.2.1. *All errors in a $[n, t + 1, n - t]-$Reed Solomon (RS) code are detectable if their hamming distances with RS are at most t and $2t < n$. Moreover, all errors of hamming distance with RS being at most t can be corrected if $3t < n$.*

Proof. We have that any error of RS has hamming distance at most t with RS. From theorem 2.2.1, any error of a codeword in RS is detectable if its hamming distance is strictly less than the hamming distance of RS itself, i.e., $t < n - t$, which is equivalent to $2t < n$.

To be able to correct the errors of hamming distance at most t with RS, we need $t < \frac{n-t}{2}$ from theorem 2.2.2 which is equivalent to $3t < n$. $\qquad\square$

In this report, we will use $[n, t + 1, n - t]-$Reed Solomon code of the following form:

$$RS = \{(f(1), \ldots, f(n)) : f \in \mathbb{Z}_q[X]_{\leq t}\}. \tag{2.5}$$

2.3 Packed Shamir Secret Sharing

(n, t, ℓ)-Packed Shamir secret sharing ([14],[6]) scheme is a threshold secret sharing scheme which is a variant of (n, t)-Shamir's secret sharing scheme [21] where $n > 2t + \ell - 1$. In a nutshell, the $t + \ell - 1$ degree secret polynomial with coefficients in $\mathbb{Z}_q$ which evaluates to ℓ secrets is secret shared amongst n parties such that any $t + \ell$ parties can reconstruct back the secret polynomial. Recall that Shamir's secret sharing scheme requires at least $t + 1$ parties to reconstruct the secret polynomial in contrast to the $t + \ell$ parties in the Packed Shamir secret sharing scheme. The scheme is summarized in the Figure 2.1.

One can observe that all the secret shares of a secret polynomial chosen by the dealer form a codeword in $[n, t + \ell, n - t - \ell + 1]-$RS code. If the adversary is malicious and can corrupt at most t parties, then from corollary 2.2.1, the honest shareholders can detect the errors if $2t \leq n - \ell$ and moreover all such errors can be corrected if $3t \leq n - \ell$. Also, one can use the Berlekamp-Welch algorithm [23] to correct the errors.

But Shamir secret sharing scheme is designed particularly to defend against passive adversaries and not against malicious adversaries. A class of threshold secret

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Packed Shamir Secret Sharing

Given ℓ secrets to share amongst n parties, where at most t of them can be *(passively)* corrupt, the (n, t, ℓ)-Packed Shamir secret sharing scheme description is as follows:

Sharing Algorithm:

- Dealer constructs the secret polynomial $f \in \mathbb{Z}_q[X]_{t+l-1}$ via the lagrange interpolation by choosing $t + \ell$ elements in $\mathbb{Z}_q$ where ℓ of them are secrets, $\{s_i\}_{i=0}^{\ell-1}$, with $f(-i) = s_i$ for all i and remaining t are chosen uniformly at random in $\mathbb{Z}_q$.

- Each party P_i receives their share $f(i)$ from the Dealer for each $i \in \{1, \ldots, n\}$

Reconstruction Algorithm:

- Any $\mathcal{Q}$ set containing at least $t + \ell$ parties can use the lagrange interpolation to compute $\{s_i\}_{i=0}^{\ell-1}$ as follows:

$$s_m = \sum_{i \in \mathcal{Q}} f(i) \left[\prod_{j \in \mathcal{Q}, j \neq i} \frac{-m - j}{i - j} \right] \quad , m \in \{0, \ldots, \ell - 1\}$$

- The secrets $\{s_i\}_{i=0}^{\ell-1}$ are outputted as the result.

FIGURE 2.1: Packed Shamir Secret Sharing

sharing schemes which are designed to defend against malicious adversaries is Verifiable Secret Sharing (VSS). There are many VSS schemes in the literature, and as of writing this report the efficient VSS schemes based on Shamir secret sharing are Π_F, Π_P and Π_{LA} [4] which are alternatives to the original VSS schemes from Feldman [12], Pedersen [16] and the more recent ABCP [3]. VSS schemes based on Shamir secret sharing allow shareholders to verify the correctness of the shares obtained during both the sharing and reconstruction phases. This enables these VSS schemes to defend against malicious adversaries who can actively corrupt t parties as long as $t \leq \frac{n-1}{2}$ (In contrast to $t < \frac{n}{3}$ in Shamir secret sharing). Publicly Verifiable Secret Sharing (PVSS) is an extension of VSS where anyone can verify the validity of the secret shares during the sharing phase. More recently, Pre-Constructed Publicly Verifiable Secret Sharing (PPVSS)[5] was proposed which is an extension of PVSS. The main tools used in VSS, PVSS and PPVSS schemes are the **Sigma Protocols** which we overview in the next section 2.4.

2.4   Zero Knowledge Proofs

The agenda of this subsection is to give a brief formal background about some important primitives used in the PVSS ,Π_S [4], and the PPVSS ,Λ_{RO} [5], schemes. A *Zero Knowledge Argument of Knowledge* (ZK AoK)[7] is a protocol between a prover and a verifier where the prover tries to convince the verifier that a statement is true without revealing any information about why it is true. Unlike the Zero Knowledge Proof of Knowledge (ZK PoK) where the prover cannot cheat the verifier even with unbounded computational power, a ZK AoK requires the prover to be computationally bounded to not be able to cheat any verifier.

Let Y, X and W be three sets with R being a ternary relation on $Y \times X \times W$. Consider the three PPT interactive algorithms (*Setup*, P, V), where *Setup* returns a common reference string (CRS) σ when input 1^λ. Given σ, the following is the CRS-dependent language of the relation R.

$$L_\sigma = \{x \in X : \exists w \in W, (\sigma, x, w) \in R\},$$

where we call w a witness for a statement x if $(\sigma, x, w) \in R$. Also, let $\mathcal{R}$ be a PPT algorithm that returns an element in the relation R when input 1^λ.

Given a relation R and its corresponding language, a $\sum$**-protocol** is a 3-round *interactive* protocol between two Probabilistic Polynomial Time (PPT) algorithms, a prover P and a verifier V. For some statement in the language of R, in the first round P sends a commitment a to V. To which V sends a challenge d to P in the second round and finally P responds back with the response z to V in the third round. V outputs **true** or **false** upon the proof verification on transcript $trans := (a, d, z)$. Informally, with a $\sum$−protocol a prover P tries to convince a verifier V that they know a witness w for a given statement x in the language without revealing any information about w. To state it formally, a $\sum$−protocol is supposed to satisfy *completeness*, *Honest Verifier Zero Knowledge* (HVZK) and *Special Soundness* which are defined as follows.

Definition 2.4.1 (Completeness)**.** *A $\sum$−protocol is said to be **complete** for $\mathcal{R}$ if the honest verifier V always accepts the honest prover P for any statement in the language defined by R.*

Definition 2.4.2 (HVZK)**.** *A $\sum$−protocol is said to be Honest Verifier Zero Knowledge(**HVZK**) for $\mathcal{R}$ if there exist a PPT algorithm $\mathcal{S}$ that simulates trans of the scheme corresponding to a given statement, x, in the language that has witness w. That is, given x,*

$$trans(P(x,w) \leftrightarrow V(x)) \approx trans(\mathcal{S}(x) \leftrightarrow V(x)) \qquad , \text{ for any witness } w \text{ of } x.$$

Where $trans(P(\cdot) \leftrightarrow V(\cdot))$ is the transcript of the $\sum$−protocol amongst P and V and $\approx$ denotes the indistinguishability of the two transcripts.

Definition 2.4.3 (Special Soundness)**.** *A $\sum$−protocol is said to satisfy **Special Soundness** for $\mathcal{R}$, if there exists a PPT extractor $\mathcal{E}$ for any two valid transcripts,*

(a, d, z) *and* (a, d', z'), *corresponding to a given statement* x *in the language with only a unique witness* w *and* $d \neq d'$ *such that* $\mathcal{E}(a, d, z, d', z')$ *outputs the witness* w.

It is shown that a public-coin, complete, HVZK, special soundness $\sum -$protocol can be made into a Non Interactive Zero Knowledge (NIZK) Proof of Knowledge (PoK) or Argument of Knowledge (AoK) in the Random Oracle (RO) model using Fiat-Shamir transform [13]. In the following subsections, we recall two important NIZK PoK schemes which are used in Π_S and Λ_{RO} schemes. Also, we will introduce a NIZK AoK scheme which will be used in one of our new protocols.

2.4.1 Chaum-Pedersen Protocol for DL Equality

Recall $\mathbb{G}$ being the cyclic group of prime order q with hard Discrete Logarithm (DL). For some $g, h \in \mathbb{G}$ consider the following relation:

$$R_{DLEQ} = \{(g, h, a, b), x : a = g^x, b = h^x\}.$$

In [10], Chaum and Pedersen proposed a NIZK PoK scheme for the DL Equality relation, R_{DLEQ}. Informally, a prover P can convince a verifier V that they know x such that it can be used with both g and h to obtain a and b respectively. This protocol is widely used in many cryptographic applications like threshold decryption, e-voting and Randomness Beacons. We summarize the protocol in Figure 2.2.

Chaum-Pedersen Protocol for DLEQ

Let g be the group generator sampled in the setup phase, $[(g, h, a, b), x] \in R_{DLEQ}$ and $\mathcal{H}$ be a Random Oracle (RO).

Prover

- Samples $r \in_R \mathbb{Z}_q$ uniformly at random and sets $c_1 = g^r$ and $c_2 = h^r$.

- Sets $d \leftarrow \mathcal{H}(a, b, c_1, c_2)$, where $\mathcal{H}$ is an agreed upon Random Oracle (RO).

- Sets $z \equiv r + dx \pmod{q}$ and returns the proof(/transcript) $\pi := (d, z)$.

Verifier

- Checks if $d \leftarrow \mathcal{H}(a, b, \frac{g^z}{a^d}, \frac{h^z}{b^d})$ and outputs **true** or **false** accordingly.


FIGURE 2.2: Chaum-Pedersen NIZK PoK for DLEQ

2.4.2   NIZK PoK for Polynomial DL

Recall $\mathbb{G}$ being the cyclic group of prime order q with hard Discrete Logarithm (DL) and g being its generator. Consider the following relation for some polynomial $f \in \mathbb{Z}_q[X]_t$ with degree $t < n$:

$$R_{PDL} = \{(g, x_1, \ldots, x_n, F_1, \ldots, F_n), f(X) : (F_i = g^{f(x_i)}, 1 \leq i \leq n) \wedge (x_i \neq x_j, i \neq j)\}.$$

The R_{PDL} is based on the Polynomial Discrete Logarithm formally introduced in [4], and we recall its definition in the following.

Definition 2.4.4 (Polynomial Discrete Logarithm). *Let g be a generator for the prime order q cyclic group $\mathbb{G}$. Given $F_1, \ldots, F_n$ and distinct elements $x_1, \ldots, x_n$ in $\mathbb{Z}_q$, find a polynomial $f \in \mathbb{Z}_q[X]$ with degree at most t, where $F_i = g^{f(x_i)}$ for $1 \leq i \leq n$ and $t \leq n - 1$.*

In other words, an algorithm $\mathcal{A}$ is said to have an advantage ϵ in solving PDL if

$$Pr[\mathcal{A}(x_1, \ldots, x_n, g, g^{f(x_1)}, \ldots, g^{f(x_n)})] \geq \epsilon,$$

where $f \in \mathbb{Z}_q[X]$ is at most a t degree polynomial with $t \leq n - 1$ and the probability is over a chosen random generator g of $\mathbb{G}$ with $q = |\mathbb{G}|$ being prime and distinct $x_1, \ldots, x_n$ elements in $\mathbb{Z}_q$.

Theorem 2.4.1. *[4] Let $[(g, x_1, \ldots, x_n, F_1, \ldots, F_n), f(X)] \in R_{PDL}$ where $f \in \mathbb{Z}_q[X]_{\leq t}$. Assuming PDL is hard, for $0 \leq t \leq n - 1$, the protocol π_{PDL} 2.3 (described in figure 2.3) is a NIZK PoK for R_{PDL} in the RO model.*

In [4], Baghery formally introduced a NIZK PoK scheme for the Polynomial DL relation, R_{PDL}, which is a generalization of Schnorr's ID protocol [19]. Informally, a prover P can convince a verifier V that they know a t degree polynomial f such that it can be used with g to obtain F_i for $1 \leq i \leq n$. This protocol is used to construct the PPVSS Λ_{RO} [5], which was essential in building an efficient e-voting protocol. We summarize the protocol in Figure 2.3.

In the next section we will give a brief overview of the Pre-Constructed Publicly Verifiable Secret Sharing (PPVSS).

2.5   Pre-Constructed Publicly Verifiable Secret Sharing

Pre-Constructed Publicly Verifiable Secret Sharing (PPVSS) was first introduced in [5], which was used as a building block to construct an efficient e-voting protocol alternative to Schoenmakers' e-voting protocol. Interestingly, the authors in [5] observed that the Schoenmakers' e-voting protocol, though not efficient in practice, published in 1999 is an unusual application as it is based on a PVSS, which led them to discover that the underlying PVSS used is actually a PPVSS. What sets PPVSS apart from standard PVSS schemes is that it can be used to build versatile applications, such as e-voting, randomness beacons etc., and can also improve efficiency of some existing protocols. The subtle difference between PPVSS and PVSS is that

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π_{PDL}

Let g be a group generator sampled in the setup phase, $[(g, x_1, \ldots, x_n, F_1, \ldots, F_n), f(X)] \in R_{PDL}$ and $\mathcal{H}$ be a random oracle (RO).

Prover

- Samples $r \in_R \mathbb{Z}_q[X]_t$ uniformly at random and sets $\Gamma_i = g^{r(x_i)}$ for $1 \leq i \leq n$.

- Sets $d \leftarrow \mathcal{H}(F_1, \ldots, F_n, \Gamma_1, \ldots, \Gamma_n)$, where $\mathcal{H}$ is an agreed upon Random Oracle (RO).

- Sets $z(X) \equiv r(X) + df(X) \pmod{q}$ and returns the proof(/transcript) $\pi := (d, z(X))$.

Verifier

- First checks if z is at most a t degree polynomial in $\mathbb{Z}_q[X]_t$. If so, they proceed with the next step.

- Checks if $d \leftarrow \mathcal{H}(F_1, \ldots, F_n, \frac{g^{z(x_1)}}{F_1^d}, \ldots, \frac{g^{z(n)}}{F_n^d})$.

- If first two steps are correct then they output **true**, otherwise **false**.

FIGURE 2.3: A NIZK PoK for Polynomial DL based on Schoenmakers' PVSS

the secret itself is committed by the prover along with all its corresponding secret shares.

TODO Definition of PPVSS.

We now will recall Λ_{RO}, the PPVSS scheme introduced in [5] which is actually based on Π_S[4] in figure 2.4.

The security guarantees of Λ_{RO} are explained in [5] which follows from the security guarantees of Π_S, also the authors replaced Schoenmakers' (P)PVSS with Λ_{RO} in the original e-voting protocol[20] and showed that they achieved improvement in the verification phase (7 to 30 times faster in implementation for some parameters).

2.6 Conclusion

In summary, we recalled some basic concepts of linear codes and Reed Solomon codes as an example. We then recalled the Packed Shamir secret sharing scheme which is a generalization of the Shamir Secret Sharing scheme [21] that was originally designed to defend against passive adversaries and showed its correspondence with Reed Solomon codes. As one of the goals of this thesis is to explore threshold

secret sharing schemes that can defend against malicious adversaries, we then briefly recalled PPVSS [5]. Moving forward, in the next chapter we will introduce a new scheme called Packed Pre-Constructed Publicly Verifiable Secret Sharing (PPPVSS) scheme and give two examples whose inspiration is drawn from Λ_{RO}.

Λ_{RO} [5]

Initialization: All parties $\{P_i\}_{i=1}^n$ and dealer D agree on the prime field $\mathbb{Z}_q$, a group $(\mathbb{G}, \times)$ of order q with a generator g, random oracle $\mathcal{H}$. Also, each party P_i registers their public key PK_i in the public ledger and all agree on a commitment key or a public key, $PK_0 \neq g$, whose secret key is known to a target person.

Share:

- Dealer D samples a t-degree polynomial $f \in \mathbb{Z}_q[X]$ uniformly at random and sets g^{f_0} as the secret to be shared, where $f_0 = f(0)$.

- For each $1 \leq i \leq n$, D computes $f(i) = f_i$ and uses PK_i to encrypt the secret share $PK_i^{f_i} = y_i$. D also encrypts(/commits) to the secret g^{f_0} using the encryption(/commitment) key PK_0 to obtain $y_0 = PK_0^{f_0}$.

- D uses the PDL proof scheme 2.4.2 to generate π_{PDL} as follows:

  - Samples a $t-$degree polynomial $r \in \mathbb{Z}_q[X]$ uniformly at random and computes $c_i = PK_i^{r_i}$ where $r_i = r(i)$ for $0 \leq i \leq n$.
  - Using $\mathcal{H}$, $d = \mathcal{H}(y_0, \ldots, y_n, c_0, \ldots, c_n)$ is computed.
  - Sets $z(X) = r(X) + df(X)$, hence $\pi_{PDL} = (d, z(X))$ is obtained.

- D broadcasts the encryptions of the shares along with the encryption(/commitment) of the secret with π_{PDL} which proves the validity of the encrypted shares and encrypted(/committed) secret, i.e., broadcasts $\{y_i\}_{i=0}^n$ and $(d, z(X))$.

Verification: Given public keys $\{PK_i\}_{i=1}^n$ and public(commitment) key PK_0, any entity can check π_{PDL} to verify the correctness of the encrypted shares $\{y_i\}_{i=1}^n$ and y_0 being the encryption(/commitment) of the secret. They will output **true** or **false** based on the verification of the proof. The procedure is outlined as follows:

- The entity checks if $z(X)$ is a $t-$degree polynomial or not.

- Checks if $d = \mathcal{H}(y_0, y_1, \ldots, y_n, \frac{PK_0^{z(0)}}{y_0^d}, \frac{PK_1^{z(1)}}{y_1^d}, \ldots, \frac{PK_n^{z(n)}}{y_n^d})$.

- Outputs **true** if both of the above checks are satisfied, otherwise **false**.

Reconstruction: There are two approaches to reconstruct the secret g^{f_0} based on the cooperation of the dealer D which are as follows:

- **Optimistic Reconstruction:** D publishes f_0, then any verifier (not necessarily shareholders) when given g, PK_0, y_0 can check if $y_0 = PK_0^{f_0}$ and returns g^{f_0} if the check passes, if not they return **false**.

- **Pessimistic Reconstruction:** If D refuses to reveal f_0, then any set $\mathcal{Q}$ consisting at least $t + 1$ shareholders will do the following (which is same as the reconstruction step in the PVSS Π_S protocol):

  - Each party $P_i \in \mathcal{Q}$ decrypts their share y_i using their private key SK_i corresponding to PK_i to obtain g^{f_i}. Then they publish g^{f_i} along with a DLEQ proof 2.4.1, π_{DLEQ} which proves that the g^{f_i} is the correct decryption of y_i.
  - If $\mathcal{Q}$ consists at least $t + 1$ honest parties, they can use the lagrange interpolation to compute the secret g^{f_0} as follows:

$$g^{f_0} = \prod_{i=1}^{t+1} g^{f_i^{\lambda_i}} = g^{\sum_{i=1}^{t+1} f_i \cdot \lambda_i},$$

where $\lambda_i = \prod_{j \neq i} \frac{j}{j-i}$ are lagrange coefficients.

FIGURE 2.4: a Pre-Constructed Publicly Verifiable Secret Sharing (PPVSS) scheme

Chapter 3

More efficient publicly verifiable protocols

This chapter introduces a new PVSS scheme that is more efficient in terms of verification time than the state-of-the-art PVSS Π_S [4]. We noticed that the PVSS version where the secret is g^{f_0} can never be secure against a malicious dealer who has access to unbounded computational power. This is because a computationally unbounded dealer can always cheat shareholders by giving them a fake proof of knowledge about the public-key encryptions of the secret.

Due to this reason, we can use ZK AoK proof systems to improve the overall efficiency of PVSS schemes. In the remainder of this chapter, we will introduce a new NIZK AoK proof system and use it to construct a new PVSS scheme which is based on Π_S. As a consequence, we will also give a new PPVSS scheme.

3.1 Proof Systems based on polynomial DL

In this subsection, we will give two NIZK AoK proof systems. The first one is a variant of the NIZK PoK for the polynomial DL problem which originally was introduced in [4]. The latter is inspired from the same work but it is based on a slightly different version of the polynomial DL problem.

3.1.1 Version 1

Consider the set $\{g_i\}_{i=1}^n$ containing n distinct generators (obtained as CRS) of the prime order q cyclic group $\mathcal{G}$ different from g with g also being a generator of $\mathbb{G}$, where $n < \varphi(q)$ and $\varphi(q)$ is the total number of distinct generators of the cyclic group $\mathbb{G}$. Consider the following relation for some polynomial $f \in \mathbb{Z}_q[X]_t$ with $0 \leq t < n$:

$$R_{PDL}^{mod} = \{(g_1, \ldots, g_n, g, x_1, \ldots, x_n, F_1, \ldots, F_n), f(X) : F_i = g_i^{f(x_i)}, 1 \leq i \leq n\}, \tag{3.1}$$

where all x_i's are distinct in $\mathbb{Z}_q$. The R_{PDL}^{mod} is inspired from R_{PDL} where CRS is included in the relation. Also, the aforementioned relation is based on a slightly different version of the original polynomial DL problem introduced in [4], defined as follows.

Definition 3.1.1 (*variant-* Polynomial Discrete Logarithm problem)**.** *Let*

$\{g_i : g_i \neq g\}_{i=1}^n$ *be a set of distinct generators for the prime order q cyclic group $\mathbb{G}$ generated by g. Given $F_1, \ldots, F_n$ and distinct elements $x_1, \ldots, x_n$ in $\mathbb{Z}_q$, find a polynomial $f \in \mathbb{Z}_q[X]$ with degree at most t, where $F_i = g_i^{f(x_i)}$ for $1 \leq i \leq n$ with $t < n$.*

In other words, an algorithm $\mathcal{A}$ is said to have an advantage ϵ in solving variant-PDL if

$$Pr[\mathcal{A}(x_1, \ldots, x_n, g, g_1, \ldots, g_n, g_1^{f(x_1)}, \ldots, g_n^{f(x_n)})] \geq \epsilon,$$

where $f \in \mathbb{Z}_q[X]$ is at most a t degree polynomial with $t < n$ and the probability is over distinct generators $g, g_1, \ldots, g_n$ of $\mathbb{G}$ chosen at random and distinct $x_1, \ldots, x_n$ elements in $\mathbb{Z}_q$.

(TODO reduction to PDL)

Now consider the CRS dependent language of R_{PDL}^{mod} as follows:

$$L_{g_1, \ldots, g_n}^{PDL} = \{(g, x_1, \ldots, x_n, F_1, \ldots, F_n) : \exists f \in \mathbb{Z}_q[X]_t,$$
$$[(g_1, \ldots, g_n, g, x_1, \ldots, x_n, F_1, \ldots, F_n), f(X)] \in R_{PDL}^{mod}\}.$$

We now present our NIZK AoK proof system π_{PDL}^{AoK} for the relation R_{PDL}^{mod} in the figure 3.1.

Theorem 3.1.1 (A NIZK Arguement of Knowledge for R_{PDL}^{mod})**.** *Consider* $(g, x_1, \ldots, x_n, F_1, \ldots, F_n) \in L_{g_1, \ldots, g_n}^{PDL}$, *where $L_{g_1, \ldots, g_n}^{PDL}$ is the CRS dependent language defined by the relation R_{PDL}^{mod}, with its corresponding witness being $f \in \mathbb{Z}_q[X]_{\leq t}$. Assuming variant-PDL is computationally hard, for $0 \leq t < n$, the protocol π_{PDL}^{AoK} (described in figure 3.1) is a NIZK AoK for R_{PDL}^{mod} in the RO model.*

Proof. The corresponding proof is similar to the proof of theorem 2.4.1 given in [4]. Formally, we will prove the security of the interactive setting (i.e., without *RO* being used) and then using Fiat-Shamir transform it can be extended to the non-interactive setting in the *RO* model.

- ***Correctness***: If both prover and verifier are honest, then we have

$$\prod_{i=1}^n g_i^{z(i)} = \prod_{i=1}^n g_i^{r(i)+df(i)}$$
$$= (\prod_{i=1}^n g_i^{r(i)})(\prod_{i=1}^n g_i^{f(i)})^d$$
$$= \Gamma[\prod_{i=1}^n F_i]^d. \tag{3.2}$$

π_{PDL}^{AOK}

Let $(g, x_1, \ldots, x_n, F_1, \ldots, F_n) \in L_{g_1,\ldots,g_n}^{PDL}$ be a statement with its corresponding witness being $f \in \mathbb{Z}_q[X]_t$ where $L_{g_1,\ldots,g_n}^{mod-PDL}$ is the CRS dependent language defined by the relation R_{PDL}^{mod} and $\mathcal{H}$ be a random oracle (RO).

Prover

- Samples $r \in_R \mathbb{Z}_q[X]_t$ uniformly at random and sets $\Gamma = \prod_{j=1}^{n} g_i^{r(x_i)}$.

- Sets $d \leftarrow \mathcal{H}(F_1, \ldots, F_n, \Gamma)$, where $\mathcal{H}$ is an agreed upon Random Oracle (RO).

- Sets $z(X) \equiv r(X) + df(X) \pmod{q}$ and returns the proof(/transcript) $\pi := (d, z(X))$.

Verifier

- First checks if z is a t degree polynomial in $\mathbb{Z}_q[X]$. If so, they proceed with the next step.

- Checks if $d \leftarrow \mathcal{H}(F_1, \ldots, F_n, \frac{\prod_{i=1}^{n} g_i^{z(x_i)}}{[\prod_{i=1}^{n} F_i]^d})$.

- If first two steps are correct then they output **true**, otherwise **false**.

FIGURE 3.1: A NIZK AoK for Polynomial DL

The aforementioned computations imply that verification returns *true* and honest verifier accepts the honest prover.

- ***Special Soundness***: Let $(\Gamma, d, z(X))$, $(\Gamma, d', z'(X))$ be any two acceptable transcripts where response polynomials will differ as a consequence of different challenge values. We have the following from equation 3.2:

$$\prod_{i=1}^{n} g_i^{z(x_i)} = \Gamma \left[\prod_{i=1}^{n} F_i\right]^d, \prod_{i=1}^{n} g_i^{z'(x_i)} = \Gamma \left[\prod_{i=1}^{n} F_i\right]^{d'};$$

as $d \neq d'$, $d - d'$ is always invertible in the field $\mathbb{Z}_q$. This further implies the following:

$$\prod_{i=1}^{n} g_i^{z(x_i)-z'(x_i)} = \left[\prod_{i=1}^{n} F_i\right]^{d-d'} \iff \prod_{i=1}^{n} g_i^{\frac{z(x_i)-z'(x_i)}{d-d'}} = \prod_{i=1}^{n} F_i. \qquad (3.3)$$

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As both transcripts are acceptable the verification should be successful in both cases, then we have

$$F_i := g_i^{\frac{z(x_i)-z'(x_i)}{d-d'}}, 1 \leq i \leq n. \tag{3.4}$$

Hence, equation 3.8 imply that $f_i = \frac{z(x_i)-z'(x_i)}{d-d'}$ for $1 \leq i \leq n$. Moreover, as $z(X)$ is at most a t degree polynomial in $\mathbb{Z}_q[X]$, an extractor $\mathcal{E}$ can construct the unique t-degree polynomial $f \in \mathbb{Z}_q[X]$, being the witness (resp. solution) for R_{PDL}^{mod} relation (resp. *variant*-PDL problem), from any $t + 1$ evaluation points in $\{f_i\}_{i=1}^n$ whenever $n > t$.

- ***Honest Verifier Zero Knowledge (HVZK)***: Given the statement $(g, x_1, \ldots, x_n, F_1, \ldots, F_n) \in L_{g_1,\ldots,g_n}^{PDL}$ and a challenge value d, a simulator $\mathcal{S}$ can choose a polynomial $z' \in \mathbb{Z}_q[X]_t$ uniformly at random and sets $\Gamma' = \frac{\prod_{i=1}^n g_i^{z'(x_i)}}{[\prod_{i=1}^n F_i]^d}$. Now, $\mathcal{S}$ returns $(\Gamma', z'(X))$ as the simulated proof. As $z(X)$ is a random degree t-polynomial in $\mathbb{Z}_q[X]$ and $z'(X)$ is chosen uniformly at random, the simulated proof of $\mathcal{S}$ is indistinguishable from the real one.

As the interactive scheme is public coin, satisfies *completeness*, (computational) *Special Soundness* and (computational) *HVZK*, then in the random oracle (*RO*) model, using Fiat-Shamir transform [13], it can be turned into a NIZK Argument of Knowledge for R_{PDL}^{mod} (defined in equation 3.1). □

3.1.2   Version 2

Consider the set $\{g_i\}_{i=-(\ell-1)}^n$ containing $n+\ell$ distinct generators (obtained as CRS) of the prime order q cyclic group $\mathcal{G}$ different from g with g also being a generator of $\mathbb{G}$, where $n + \ell < \varphi(q)$ and $\varphi(q)$ is the total number of distinct generators of the cyclic group $\mathbb{G}$. Consider the following relation for some polynomial $f \in \mathbb{Z}_q[X]_{t+\ell-1}$ with $t \leq n$:

$$R_{mod-PDL} = \{(g_{-(\ell-1)}, \ldots, g_n, g, x_{-(\ell-1)}, \ldots, x_n, F_0, \ldots, F_n), f(X) :$$

$$F_0 = \prod_{i=-(\ell-1)}^{0} g_i^{f(x_i)}, F_i = g_i^{f(x_i)}, 1 \leq i \leq n\}, \tag{3.5}$$

where all x_i's are distinct in $\mathbb{Z}_q$. The $R_{mod-PDL}$ is based on *modified*-PDL (inspired from the PDL in [4]) which is defined in the following.

Definition 3.1.2 (*modified*- Polynomial Discrete Logarithm problem)**.** *Let $\{g_i : g_i \neq g\}_{i=-(\ell-1)}^n$ be a set of distinct generators for the prime order q cyclic group $\mathbb{G}$ generated by g. Given $F_0, \ldots, F_n$ and distinct elements $x_{-(\ell-1)}, \ldots, x_n$ in $\mathbb{Z}_q$, find a polynomial $f \in \mathbb{Z}_q[X]$ with degree at most $t + \ell - 1$, where $F_0 = \prod_{i=-(\ell-1)}^{0} g_i^{f(x_i)}$ and $F_i = g_i^{f(x_i)}$ for $1 \leq i \leq n$ with $t \leq n$.*

In other words, an algorithm $\mathcal{A}$ is said to have an advantage ϵ in solving modified-PDL if

$$Pr[\mathcal{A}(x_{-(\ell-1)}, \ldots, x_n, g, g_{-(\ell-1)}, \ldots, g_n, \prod_{i=-(\ell-1)}^{0} g_i^{f(x_i)}, g_1^{f(x_1)}, \ldots, g_n^{f(x_n)})] \geq \epsilon,$$

where $f \in \mathbb{Z}_q[X]$ is at most a $t + \ell - 1$ degree polynomial with $t \leq n$ and the probability is over distinct generators $g, g_{-(\ell-1)}, \ldots, g_n$ of $\mathbb{G}$ chosen at random and distinct $x_{-(\ell-1)}, \ldots, x_0, \ldots, x_n$ elements in $\mathbb{Z}_q$.

It is intuitive to observe that the *modified*-PDL problem can be reduced to the Discrete Logarithm (DL) problem. **(TODO reduction to DL)**

Now consider the CRS dependent language of $R_{mod-PDL}$ as follows:

$$L_{g_{-(\ell-1)},\ldots,g_n}^{mod-PDL} = \{(g, x_{-(\ell-1)}, \ldots, x_n, F_0, \ldots, F_n) : \exists f \in \mathbb{Z}_q[X]_{t+\ell-1},$$

$$[(g_{-(\ell-1)}, \ldots, g_n, g, x_{-(\ell-1)}, \ldots, x_n, F_0, \ldots, F_n), f(X)] \in R_{PDL}^{mod}\}.$$

We will now present a new NIZK AoK $\pi_{mod-PDL}^{AoK}$ for the aforementioned relation $R_{mod-PDL}$ in the figure 4.3.

Theorem 3.1.2 (A NIZK Arguement of Knowledge for $R_{mod-PDL}$)**.** *Consider $(g, x_{-(\ell-1)}, \ldots, x_n, F_0, \ldots, F_n) \in L_{g_{-(\ell-1)},\ldots,g_n}^{mod-PDL}$, where $L_{g_{-(\ell-1)},\ldots,g_n}^{mod-PDL}$ is the CRS dependent language defined by the relation $R_{mod-PDL}$, with its corresponding witness being $f \in \mathbb{Z}_q[X]_{\leq t+\ell-1}$. Assuming modified-PDL is computationally hard, for $0 \leq t + \ell \leq n$, the protocol $\pi_{mod-PDL}^{AoK}$ (described in figure 4.3) is a NIZK AoK for $R_{mod-PDL}$ in the RO model.*

Proof. The corresponding proof is similar to the proof of aforementioned theorem 3.1.1. Formally, we will prove the security of the interactive setting (i.e., without *RO* being used) and then using Fiat-Shamir transform it can be extended to the non-interactive setting in the *RO* model.

- ***Correctness***: If both prover and verifier are honest, then we have

$$\begin{aligned}
\prod_{i=-(\ell-1)}^{n} g_i^{z(i)} &= \prod_{i=-(\ell-1)}^{n} g_i^{r(i)+df(i)} \\
&= (\prod_{i=-(\ell-1)}^{n} g_i^{r(i)})(\prod_{i=-(\ell-1)}^{n} g_i^{f(i)})^d \\
&= \Gamma \prod_{i=-(\ell-1)}^{0} g_i^{f(i)} \left[\prod_{i=1}^{n} F_i\right]^d \\
&= \Gamma \left[\prod_{i=0}^{n} F_i\right]^d
\end{aligned}$$

$$(3.6)$$

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π_{PDL}^{mod}

Let $(g, x_{-(\ell-1)}, \ldots, x_n, F_0, \ldots, F_n) \in L_{g_{-(\ell-1)},\ldots,g_n}^{mod-PDL}$ with its corresponding witness being $f \in \mathbb{Z}_q[X]_{\leq t+\ell-1}$ where $L_{g_{-(\ell-1)},\ldots,g_n}^{mod-PDL}$ is the CRS dependent language defined by the relation $R_{mod-PDL}$ and $\mathcal{H}$ be a random oracle (RO).

Prover

- Samples $r \in_R \mathbb{Z}_q[X]_{t+\ell-1}$ uniformly at random and sets $\Gamma = \prod_{i=-(\ell-1)}^{n} g_i^{r(x_i)}$.

- Sets $d \leftarrow \mathcal{H}(F_0, \ldots, F_n, \Gamma)$, where $\mathcal{H}$ is an agreed upon Random Oracle (RO).

- Sets $z(X) \equiv r(X) + df(X) \pmod{q}$ and returns the proof(/transcript) $\pi := (d, z(X))$.

Verifier

- First checks if z is at most a $t + \ell - 1$ degree polynomial in $\mathbb{Z}_q[X]$. If so, they proceed with the next step.

- Checks if $d \leftarrow \mathcal{H}(F_0, \ldots, F_n, \frac{\prod_{i=-(\ell-1)}^{n} g_i^{z(x_i)}}{[\prod_{i=0}^{n} F_i]^d})$.

- If first two steps are correct then they output **true**, otherwise **false**.

FIGURE 3.2: A NIZK AoK for the *modified* Polynomial DL

The aforementioned computations imply that verification returns *true* and honest verifier accepts the honest prover.

- ***Special Soundness***: Let $(\Gamma, d, z(X))$, $(\Gamma, d', z'(X))$ be any two acceptable transcripts where response polynomials will differ as a consequence of different challenge values. We have the following from equation 4.3:

$$\prod_{i=-(\ell-1)}^{n} g_i^{z(x_i)} = \Gamma \left[\prod_{i=0}^{n} F_i \right]^d, \quad \prod_{i=-(\ell-1)}^{n} g_i^{z'(x_i)} = \Gamma \left[\prod_{i=0}^{n} F_i \right]^{d'};$$

as $d \neq d'$, $d - d'$ is always invertible in the field $\mathbb{Z}_q$. This further implies the following:

$$\prod_{i=-(\ell-1)}^{n} g_i^{z(x_i)-z'(x_i)} = \left[\prod_{i=0}^{n} F_i \right]^{d-d'} \iff \prod_{i=-(\ell-1)}^{n} g_i^{\frac{z(x_i)-z'(x_i)}{d-d'}} = \prod_{i=0}^{n} F_i. \quad (3.7)$$

As both transcripts are acceptable the verification should be successful in both cases, then we have

$$F_i := g_i^{\frac{z(x_i) - z'(x_i)}{d - d'}}, 1 \le i \le n, \tag{3.8}$$

and

$$F_0 := \prod_{i = -(\ell-1)}^{0} g_i^{\frac{z(x_i) - z'(x_i)}{d - d'}}. \tag{3.9}$$

As long as $n \ge t + \ell$, any extractor can use equation 3.8 to compute a unique $t + \ell - 1$ degree polynomial $f(X)$ from distinct evaluations $f_i = \frac{z(x_i) - z'(x_i)}{d - d'}$, for $1 \le i \le n$, via language interpolation. See that $f \in \mathbb{Z}_q[X]_{t+\ell-1}$ is the witness for $R_{mod-PDL}$ relation (resp. solution for *modified*-PDL problem).

- ***Honest Verifier Zero Knowledge (HVZK)***: Given the statement

  $(g, x_{-(\ell-1)}, \ldots, x_n, F_0, \ldots, F_n) \in L^{mod-PDL}_{g_{-(\ell-1)}, \ldots, g_n}$ and a challenge value d, a simulator $\mathcal{S}$ can choose a polynomial $z' \in \mathbb{Z}_q[X]_{t+\ell-1}$ uniformly at random and sets $\Gamma' = \frac{\prod_{i=-(\ell-1)}^{n} g_i^{z'(x_i)}}{[\prod_{i=0}^{n} F_i]^d}$. Now, $\mathcal{S}$ returns $(\Gamma', z'(X))$ as the simulated proof. As $z(X)$ is a random degree $t + \ell - 1$-polynomial in $\mathbb{Z}_q[X]$ and $z'(X)$ is chosen uniformly at random, the simulated proof of $\mathcal{S}$ is indistinguishable from the real one.

As the interactive scheme is public coin, satisfies *completeness*, (computational) *Special Soundness* and (computational) *HVZK*, then in the random oracle (*RO*) model, using Fiat-Shamir transform [13], it can be turned into a NIZK Argument of Knowledge for R^{mod}_{PDL} (defined in equation 4.1). □

3.2 A Publicly Verifiable Secret Sharing scheme

In this section, we will present a new Publicly Verifiable Secret Sharing (PVSS) scheme, which is efficient in terms of verification time in comparison to the state-of-the-art PVSS Π_S [4]. It is important to note that the optimization comes with the cost of a slightly longer secret sharing time, but it can be neglected in practice. In a nutshell, we trade for more group multiplications in the sharing phase for a significant reduction in the number of group exponentiations in the verification phase.

Also, our new PVSS scheme is based on the NIZK AoK proof system π^{AoK}_{PDL} found in figure 3.1. We denote our new PVSS scheme as $\Pi^{compact}_S$ and can be found in figure 4.8.

$\Pi_S^{compact}$

Initialization: All parties $\{P_i\}_{i=1}^n$ and dealer D agree on the prime field $\mathbb{Z}_q$, a group $(\mathbb{G}, \times)$ of order q with a generator g, random oracle $\mathcal{H}$. Also, each party P_i registers their public key PK_i in the public ledger, where $PK_i = g^{SK_i}$ with SK_i being their corresponding secret key.

Share:

- Dealer D samples a t-degree polynomial $f \in \mathbb{Z}_q[X]$ uniformly at random and sets g^{f_0} as secret where $f_0 = f(0)$.

- For each $1 \le i \le n$, D encrypts $f(i) = f_i$ with PK_i to obtain $y_i = PK_i^{f_i}$.

- D uses π_{PDL}^{AOK} 4.2.2 to generate AoK π_{share}^{AoK} to prove that the encryptions are valid, which is done as follows:

    – Samples a $t-$degree polynomial $r \in \mathbb{Z}_q[X]$ uniformly at random and computes a single commitment $c = (\prod_{i=1}^n PK_i^{r(i)})$.

    – Using $\mathcal{H}$, $d = \mathcal{H}(y_1, \ldots, y_n, c)$ is computed.

    – Sets $z(X) = r(X) + df(X)$, hence $\pi_{share}^{AoK} = (d, z(X))$ is obtained.

- D broadcasts the encryptions of the shares along with π_{share}^{AoK} which proves the validity of the encrypted shares, i.e., broadcasts $\{y_i\}_{i=1}^n$ and $(d, z(X))$.

Verification: Given public keys $\{PK_i\}_{i=1}^n$, any entity can check π_{share}^{AoK} to verify the correctness of encrypted shares $y_1, \ldots, y_n$. They will output **true** or **false** based on the verification of the proof. The procedure is outlined as follows:

- The entity checks if $z(X)$ is a $t-$degree polynomial or not.

- Checks if $d = \mathcal{H}(y_1, \ldots, y_n, \frac{\prod_{i=1}^n PK_i^{z(i)}}{[\prod_{i=1}^n y_i]^d})$.

- Outputs **true** if both of the above checks are satisfied, otherwise **false**.

Reconstruction: Any set $\mathcal{Q}$ consisting $t + 1$ honest shareholders will do the following:

- Each party $P_i \in \mathcal{Q}$ decrypts their share y_i using their private key SK_i corresponding to PK_i to obtain g^{f_i} and then they publish g^{f_i} along with a DLEQ proof 2.4.1, π_{DLEQ} which proves that g^{f_i} is the correct decryption of y_i.

- They can use the lagrange interpolation to compute the secrets g^{f_0} as follows:

$$g^{f_0} = \prod_{i \in \mathcal{Q}} (g^{f_i})^{\prod_{k \in \mathcal{Q}, k \ne i} \frac{-k}{i}} = g^{\sum_{i \in \mathcal{Q}} f_i \prod_{k \in \mathcal{Q}, k \ne i} \frac{-k}{i}}.$$

FIGURE 3.3: $\Pi_S^{compact}$, a compact version of Π_S

3.3 A Pre-Constructed Publicly Verifiable Secret Sharing scheme

As any PVSS scheme can be modified to a Pre-Constructed PVSS scheme, we will present a new PPVSS scheme constructed from the PVSS scheme $\Pi_S^{compact}$. Our new PPVSS scheme is based on the same NIZK AoK proof system π_{PDL}^{AoK}, which

$\Pi_S^{compact}$ is based on. We denote our new PPVSS scheme as $\lambda_{RO}^{compact}$ and can be found in figure 3.4.

$\Lambda_{RO}^{compact}$

Initialization: All parties $\{P_i\}_{i=1}^n$ and dealer D agree on the prime field $\mathbb{Z}_q$, a group $(\mathbb{G}, \times)$ of order q with a generator g, random oracle $\mathcal{H}$. Also, each party P_i registers their public key PK_i in the public ledger, where $PK_i = g^{SK_i}$ with SK_i being their corresponding secret key. Additionally, all parties agree on a commitment key h_0 or a public key PK_0 of a target entity.

Share:

- Dealer D samples a t-degree polynomial $f \in \mathbb{Z}_q[X]$ uniformly at random and sets g^{f_0} as the secret.

- For each $1 \leq i \leq n$, D encrypts g^{f_i}, where $f(i) = f_i$, with PK_i to obtain $y_i = PK_i^{f_i}$. D also commits(/encrypts) to the secret g^{f_0} using the commitment(/encryption) key to obtain $y_0 = h_0^{f_0}$ (or $y_0 = PK_0^{f_0}$).

- D uses π_{PDL}^{AoK} to generate AoK, π_{share}^{AoK} to prove that all encryptions of secret shares and commitment (or encryption) of the secret are valid, which is done as follows:

  - Samples a $t-$degree polynomial $r \in \mathbb{Z}_q[X]$ uniformly at random and computes $c = h_0^{r(i)}(\prod_{i=1}^n PK_i^{r(i)})$(or $c = \prod_{i=0}^n PK_i^{r(i)}$).
  - Using $\mathcal{H}$, $d = \mathcal{H}(y_0, \ldots, y_n, c)$ is computed.
  - Sets $z(X) = r(X) + df(X)$, hence $\pi_{share}^{AoK} = (d, z(X))$ is obtained.

- D broadcasts the encryptions of the shares and commitment(/encryption) of the secret along with π_{share}^{AoK} which proves validity of the encrypted shares and committed(/encrypted) secret, i.e., broadcasts $\{y_i\}_{i=0}^n$ and $(d, z(X))$.

Verification: Given public keys $\{PK_i\}_{i=1}^n$ and commitment(/public) key h_0 or PK_0, any entity can check π_{share}^{AoK} to verify the correctness of the encrypted shares and commitment(/encryption) of the secret. They will output **true** or **false** based on the verification of the proof. The procedure is outlined as follows:

- The entity checks if $z(X)$ is a $t$degree polynomial or not.

- Checks if $d = \mathcal{H}(y_0, \ldots, y_n, \frac{h_0^{z(0)}(\prod_{i=1}^n PK_i^{z(i)})}{[\prod_{i=0}^n y_i]^d})$ or $d = \mathcal{H}(y_0, \ldots, y_n, \frac{\prod_{i=0}^n PK_i^{z(i)}}{[\prod_{i=0}^n y_i]^d})$.

- Outputs **true** if both of the above checks are satisfied, otherwise **false**.

Reconstruction: There are two approaches to reconstruct the secret g^{f_0} based on the cooperation of the dealer D which are as follows:

- **Optimistic Reconstruction:** D publishes f_0, then any verifier (not necessarily a shareholder) when given h_0 or PK_0, $\{y_i\}_{i=0}^n$ can check if $y_0 = h_0^{f_0}d$ (or $y_0 = PK_0^{f_0}$) and returns g^{f_0} if the check passes, if not they return **false**.

- **Pessimistic Reconstruction:** If D refuses to reveal f_0, then any set $\mathcal{Q}$ consisting at least $t+1$ shareholders will do the following:

  - Each party $P_i \in \mathcal{Q}$ decrypts their share y_i using their private key SK_i corresponding to PK_i to obtain g^{f_i} and then they publish g^{f_i} along with a DLEQ proof (see Chaum-Pedersen protocol), π_{DLEQ} which proves that g^{f_i} is the correct decryption of y_i.
  - If $\mathcal{Q}$ consists at least $t+1$ honest parties, they can use the lagrange interpolation to compute the secrets g^{f_0} as follows:

$$g^{f_0} = \prod_{i \in \mathcal{Q}} (g^{f_i})^{\prod_{k \in \mathcal{Q}, k \neq i} \frac{-k}{i}} = g^{\sum_{i \in \mathcal{Q}} f_i \prod_{k \in \mathcal{Q}, k \neq i} \frac{-k}{i}}.$$

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FIGURE 3.4: $\Lambda_{RO}^{compact}$, a compact version of Λ_{RO}

Chapter 4

Packed Pre-Constructed Publicly Verifiable Secret Sharing

In most of the real time distributed applications, each participant runs as a dealer once to share their secrets with other participants. To retrieve back the secret, remaining participants need to open their shares and perform a bunch of operations to reconstruct the secret, which requires a lot of communication amongst the participants. During the whole time of secret reconstruction one could have asked to the dealer itself to reveal the secret which will save a lot of time and communication. This is the main motivation behind the work of *Pre-Constructed Publicly Verifiable Secret Sharing* (PPVSS) [5], where the authors have given the complete description of PPVSS and an example Λ_{RO} to improve the original e-voting protocol proposed by Schoenmakers [20].

In this chapter we will introduce Packed Pre-Constructed Publicly Verifiable Secret Sharing (PPPVSS) which merely is an extension to the notion of PPVSS. As Packed Shamir Secret Sharing 2.3 allows a dealer to share multiple secrets encoded in a single polynomial, we want to add this feature to PPVSS. In the subsequent sections we will give our definitions for PPPVSS and provide with two constructions based on packed secret sharing scheme 2.3 along with the security guarantees our schemes can achieve.

4.1 Definitions

The following definition directly follows the definition of PPVSS in [5].

Definition 4.1.1 (Packed Pre-Constructed Publicly Verifiable Secret Sharing (PP-PVSS))**.** *A Packed PPVSS scheme should have four algorithms, namely, Initial, Share, Verify and Reconstruction whose descriptions are as follows:*

- ***Initial*** $(1^\lambda) \to (\{PK_i, SK_i\}_{i=1}^n \sqcup \{h_j \ or \ (PK_j, SK_j)\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0)$: *When given* 1^λ, *each party* P_i *for* $1 \le i \le n$ *registers their public key* PK_i *in a public ledger*

and withholds the corresponding secret key sk_i. Also, all parties and the dealer D agree on ℓ commitment keys or public keys whose secret keys are known to some target people. Note that the message space of the public-key scheme is a subgroup of $(\mathbb{G}, \times)$.

- **Share** $(n, t, \{f_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^{0}, \{PK_i\}_{i=1}^{n} \bigsqcup \{h_j \text{ or } PK_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^{0})$

  $\rightarrow (\{y_i\}_{i=-(\ell-1)}^{n}, \pi_{PPPVSS})$:

  It secret shares $\{f_j\}_{j=(\ell-1)}^{0}$ to obtain the shares $\{f_i\}_{i=1}^{n}$. For $1 \leq i \leq n$, uses the public key PK_i to encrypt f_i and obtain the encrypted share y_i. Now, it uses the commitment key h_j (or public key PK_j) to commit(/encrypt) f_j to obtain y_j for $-(\ell-1) \leq j \leq 0$. In the next step, it uses a NIZK proof π_{PPPVSS} protocol to prove that $\{y_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^{0}$ is a set of valid commitments(/encryptions) of ℓ secrets and $\{y_i\}_{i=1}^{n}$ has valid encryptions of the corresponding shares. Finally, it returns $(\{y_i\}_{i=-(\ell-1)}^{n}, \pi_{PPPVSS})$.

  OR

  $\rightarrow (\{y_i\}_{i=0}^{n}, \pi_{PPPVSS})$:

  It secret shares $\{f_j\}_{j=(\ell-1)}^{0}$ to obtain the shares $\{f_i\}_{i=1}^{n}$. For $1 \leq i \leq n$, uses the public key PK_i to encrypt f_i and obtain the encrypted share y_i. Now, it uses the commitment key h_j (or public key PK_j) to commit(/encrypt) f_j for $-(\ell-1) \leq j \leq 0$ and performs the group operation $\times$ to multiply all the commitments(/encryptions) to obtain y_0. In the next step, it uses a NIZK proof π_{PPPVSS} protocol to prove that y_0 is a valid well-formed commitment of ℓ secrets and $\{y_i\}_{i=1}^{n}$ has valid encryptions of the corresponding shares. Finally, it returns $(\{y_i\}_{i=0}^{n}, \pi_{PPPVSS})$.

- **Verify** $(n, t, \ell, \{y_i\}_{i=-(\ell-1)}^{n}, \pi_{PPPVSS}) \rightarrow$ **true/false**: *This algorithm(which can be performed by anyone) checks if the NIZK proof π_{PPPVSS} is valid for $\{y_{-(\ell-1)}, \ldots, y_0, \ldots, y_n\}$ and then returns true, otherwise false.*

  OR

  Verify $(n, t, \ell, \{y_i\}_{i=0}^{n}, \pi_{PPPVSS}) \rightarrow$ **true/false**: *This algorithm(which can be performed by anyone) checks if the NIZK proof π_{PPPVSS} is valid for $\{y_0, y_1, \ldots, y_n\}$ and then returns true, otherwise false.*

- **Reconstruct**: *There are two approaches based on cooperation of the dealer D and are as follows:*

  - **(Optimistic)** $Reconstruction^{opt}[\{h_j, f_j, r_j, y_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^{0} \text{ or } \{PK_j, SK_j, y_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^{0}]$

    $\rightarrow (\{f_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^{0} \text{ or } false)$:

    * *Given the input a verifier checks if $\{y_j\}_{j=-(\ell 01)}^{0}$ is a valid set of commitments of the ℓ secrets. If so, it returns $\{f_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^{0}$; otherwise it returns $false$.*

∗ *Given the public keys with their corresponding secret keys,*
$\{(PK_j, SK_j)\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^{0}$ *a verifier checks if* $\{y_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^{0}$ *is a valid set of encryptions of the* ℓ *secrets. If so, it returns* $\{f_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^{0}$; *otherwise it returns false.*

OR

(Optimistic) $Reconstruction^{opt}[(\{h_j, f_j, r_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^{0}, y_0)$ *or* $(\{PK_j, SK_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^{0}, y_0)]$
$\to (\{f_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^{0}$ *or false):*

∗ *Given the commitment keys* $\{h_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^{0}$, y_0 *and* ℓ *secrets,* $\{f_j, r_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^{0}$, *a verifier checks if* y_0 *is a valid well-formed commitment of the* ℓ *secrets constructed by taking the product of commitment of* ℓ *secrets. If so, it returns* $\{f_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^{0}$; *otherwise it returns false.*

∗ *Given the public keys with their corresponding secret keys,*
$\{(PK_j, SK_j)\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^{0}$ *a verifier checks if* y_0 *is a valid well-formed commitment of the* ℓ *secrets constructed by taking the product of encryptions of* ℓ *secrets. If so, it returns* $\{f_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^{0}$; *otherwise it returns false.*

− **(Pessimistic)** $Reconstruction^{pes}[\{y_i, SK_i\}_{i\in\mathcal{Q},|\mathcal{Q}|=t+\ell}] \to (\{f_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^{0}$ *or false)):* *Given any* $t+\ell$ *encrypted shares along with corresponding secret keys, it outputs the secrets* $\{f_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)^0}$ *or false. This can be done in two phases as follows:*

∗ ***Decryption of the shares***, *each party* $P_i \in \mathcal{Q}$ *decrypts* y_i *to obtain* f_i *using its secret key* SK_i. *Then it generates a NIZK proof* π_i^{Dec} *which proves that* f_i *is the correct decryption of* y_i. *Now,* P_i *publishes* (f_i, π_i^{Dec}).

∗ ***Share pooling***, *a verifier* V *(not necessarily from the shareholders) checks if proof* π_i^{Dec} *is correct for each* $P_i \in \mathcal{Q}$. *If any check fails, then* V *returns false; otherwise* V *applies a reconstruction procedure to the set of valid shares,* $\{f_i\}_{i\in\mathcal{Q},|\mathcal{Q}|=t+\ell}$, *and returns* $\{f_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^{0}$.

We need following security guarantees (inspired from PPVSS [5]) for a PPPVSS to be called secure:

- **Correctness**: If the dealer and parties follow the protocol, then the ***Verify*** algorithm returns ***true*** and the ***Reconstruct*** algorithm returns $\{f_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^{0}$ irrespective of which approach. For any integer $n \geq t+\ell$ with $t > 0$, a PPPVSS is said to be correct for

$\left(\{PK_i, SK_i\}_{i=1}^{n} \sqcup \{h_j \text{ or } (PK_j, SK_j)\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^{0}\right) \leftarrow$**Initial** (1^λ) when it satisfies either of the two formal definitions based on the output of the *Share* algorithm and they are as follows:

- When *Share* algorithm outputs ℓ commitments(/encryptions) of the secrets, then

$$
Pr\left[
\begin{array}{ll}
(\{y_i\}_{i=-(\ell-1)}^{n}, \pi_{PPPVSS}) & \leftarrow \textbf{\textit{Share}}\big(n, t, \{f_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^{0}, \{PK_i\}_{i=1}^{n} \sqcup \\
& \quad \{h_j \text{ or } PK_j\}_{j=-(l-1)}^{0}\big) : \\
\textbf{\textit{true}} & \leftarrow \textbf{\textit{Verify}}(n, t, \ell, \{y_i\}_{i=-(\ell-1)}^{n}, \pi_{PPPVSS})
\end{array}
\right] = 1,
$$

$$
Pr\left[
\begin{array}{ll}
(\{y_i\}_{i=-(\ell-1)}^{n}, \pi_{PPPVSS}) & \leftarrow \textbf{\textit{Share}}\big(n, t, \{f_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^{0}, \{PK_i\}_{i=1}^{n} \sqcup \\
& \quad \{h_j \text{ or } PK_j\}_{j=-(l-1)}^{0}\big), \\
\{f_j'\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^{0} & \leftarrow Reconstruction^{opt}[\{h_j, f_j, r_j, y_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^{0} \\
& \quad or \; \{PK_j, SK_j, y_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^{0}] \bigvee \\
\{f_j'\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^{0} & \leftarrow Reconstruction^{pes}[\{y_i, SK_i\}_{i \in \mathcal{Q}, |\mathcal{Q}|=t+\ell}] : \\
& \quad f_j' = f_j, -(\ell-1) \le j \le 0
\end{array}
\right] = 1,
$$

- When *Share* algorithm outputs a single commitment corresponding to the ℓ secrets, then

$$
Pr\left[
\begin{array}{ll}
(\{y_i\}_{i=0}^{n}, \pi_{PPPVSS}) & \leftarrow \textbf{\textit{Share}}\big(n, t, \{f_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^{0}, \{PK_i\}_{i=1}^{n} \sqcup \\
& \quad \{h_j \text{ or } PK_j\}_{j=-(l-1)}^{0}\big) : \\
\textbf{\textit{true}} & \leftarrow \textbf{\textit{Verify}}(n, t, \ell, \{y_i\}_{i=0}^{n}, \pi_{PPPVSS})
\end{array}
\right] = 1,
$$

$$
Pr\left[
\begin{array}{ll}
(\{y_i\}_{i=0}^{n}, \pi_{PPPVSS}) & \leftarrow \textbf{\textit{Share}}\big(n, t, \{f_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^{0}, \{PK_i\}_{i=1}^{n} \sqcup \\
& \quad \{h_j \text{ or } PK_j\}_{j=-(l-1)}^{0}\big), \\
\{f_j'\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^{0} & \leftarrow Reconstruction^{opt}[(\{h_j, f_j, r_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^{0}, y_0) \\
& \quad or \; (\{PK_j, SK_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^{0}, y_0)] \bigvee \\
\{f_j'\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^{0} & \leftarrow Reconstruction^{pes}[\{y_i, SK_i\}_{i \in \mathcal{Q}, |\mathcal{Q}|=t+\ell}] : \\
& \quad f_j' = f_j, -(\ell-1) \le j \le 0
\end{array}
\right] = 1,
$$

- **Verifiability**: If **Verify** returns **true**, then **(Optimistic)** $Reconstruct^{opt}$ and/or **(Pessimistic)** $Reconstruct^{pes}$ output being $\{f_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^{0}$ are the actual secrets of whom the shares are encrypted. Moreover, $\{y_i\}_{i=1}^{n}$ are valid encryptions of the shares of actual secret shares of those ℓ secrets with high probability and either of the following two statements is true.

  - $\{y_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^{0}$ are valid commitments(/encryptions) of those ℓ secrets with high probability. More formally, given λ, for any integers $n \ge 2t+\ell$, $\ell \ge 1$ and $t > 0$, a PPPVSS is said to be verifiable if for any $\mathcal{PPT}$ adversary

$\mathcal{A}$, we have:

$$Pr\begin{bmatrix} \left(\{PK_i, SK_i\}_{i=1}^n \sqcup \quad \{h_j \text{ or } (PK_j, SK_j)\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0\right) \leftarrow \textbf{Initial } (1^\lambda), \\ (\{y_i\}_{i=-(\ell-1)}^n, \pi_{PPVSS}) \quad \leftarrow \mathcal{A}\left(n, t, \{f_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0, \{PK_i\}_{i=1}^n \sqcup \right. \\ \left. \{h_j \text{ or } PK_j\}_{j=-(l-1)}^0\right), \\ \{f_j'\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0 \quad \leftarrow Reconstruction^{opt}[\{h_j, f_j, r_j, y_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0 \\ or \{PK_j, SK_j, y_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0] \bigvee \\ \{f_j'\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0 \quad \leftarrow Reconstruction^{pes}[\{y_i, SK_i\}_{i\in\mathcal{Q}, |\mathcal{Q}|=t+\ell}] : \\ \textbf{\textit{true}} \quad \leftarrow \textbf{\textit{Verify}}(n, t, \ell, \{y_i\}_{i=-(\ell-1)}^n, \pi_{PPVSS}) \\ \bigwedge f_j' \neq f_j \quad \text{for some } -(\ell-1) \leq j \leq 0 \end{bmatrix} \leq negl(\lambda),$$

where $\mathcal{Q}$ is the set of honest parties.

– y_0 is a valid well-formed commitment of the same ℓ secrets constructed by taking a product of valid commitments (/ciphers) of ℓ secrets under $\{h_j \text{ or } PK_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0$. More formally, given λ, for any integers $n \geq 2t+\ell$, $\ell \geq 1$ and $t > 0$, a PPPVSS is said to be verifiable if for any $\mathcal{PPT}$ adversary $\mathcal{A}$, we have:

$$Pr\begin{bmatrix} \left(\{PK_i, SK_i\}_{i=1}^n \sqcup \quad \{h_j \text{ or } (PK_j, SK_j)\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0\right) \leftarrow \textbf{Initial } (1^\lambda), \\ (\{y_i\}_{i=0}^n, \pi_{PPVSS}) \quad \leftarrow \mathcal{A}\left(n, t, \{f_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0, \{PK_i\}_{i=1}^n \sqcup \right. \\ \left. \{h_j \text{ or } PK_j\}_{j=-(l-1)}^0\right), \\ \{f_j'\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0 \quad \leftarrow Reconstruction^{opt}[(\{h_j, f_j, r_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0, y_0) \\ or (\{PK_j, SK_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0, y_0)] \bigvee \\ \{f_j'\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0 \quad \leftarrow Reconstruction^{pes}[\{y_i, SK_i\}_{i\in\mathcal{Q}, |\mathcal{Q}|=t+\ell}] : \\ \textbf{\textit{true}} \quad \leftarrow \textbf{\textit{Verify}}(n, t, \ell, \{y_i\}_{i=0}^n, \pi_{PPVSS}) \\ \bigwedge f_j' \neq f_j \quad \text{for some } -(\ell-1) \leq j \leq 0 \end{bmatrix} \leq negl(\lambda),$$

where $\mathcal{Q}$ is the set of honest parties.

- **IND1-Secrecy (Indistinguishability of Secrets)**: Before reconstruction phase, any amount of public information along with secret keys of at most t parties excluding $\{SK_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0$ will give absolutely no information about the secrets $\{f_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0$. More formally, for integers $n > 1$ and $t + \ell \leq n$, the PPPVSS is said to satisfy *IND1-Secrecy* if for any $\mathcal{PPT}$ adversary $\mathcal{A}$ corrupting at most t parties, excluding the owners of $\{SK_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0$, has negligible advantage in the following game [5] played against a challenger.

  – The challenger runs **_Initial_** (1^λ) of PPPVSS to obtain $\{PK_i, SK_i\}_{i=1}^n \sqcup \{h_j \text{ or } (PK_j, SK_j)\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0$ and sends all public information along with secret information of all corrupted parties to $\mathcal{A}$.

  – The challenger chooses two set of secrets, $s_0 = \{f_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0$ and $s_1 = \{f_j'\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0$ at random in the space of secrets. Furthermore, it chooses $b \in \{0, 1\}$ uniformly at random and runs

Share $(n, t, s_0, \{PK_i\}_{i=1}^n \bigsqcup \{h_j \text{ or } PK_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0)$ algorithm of the PP-PVSS scheme and obtains $(\{y_i\}_{i=0}^n, \pi_{PPPVSS})$ or $(\{y_i\}_{i=-(\ell-1)}^n, \pi_{PPPVSS})$. Finally, it sends all public information generated in *Share* phase together with s_b.

– $\mathcal{A}$ guesses a bit $b' \in \{0, 1\}$.

The advantage of $\mathcal{A}$ is defined to be $|Pr[b' = b] - \frac{1}{2}|$.

It can be seen that PPPVSS is a natural extension of PPVSS, where we secret share possibly *more than one* secret in contrast to *only one* secret in PPVSS. But one has to be very careful in the case where they obtain the commitment of the secrets which is obtained via multiplication of encryptions (/commitments) of actual secrets. More precisely, y_0 should be well formed, i.e., a dealer should not be able to cheat to obtain y_0 by taking multiplications of random group elements, it precisely has to be multiplication of encryptions (/commitments) of the actual secrets.

A general construction of Shamir based PPVSS is given in [5], and we extend this idea to give two Packed Shamir based PPPVSS outlined in figures 4.1 and 4.2. In next section, we will give a practical PPPVSS scheme.

4.2   NIZK AoK protocols for PDL problem

4.2.1   Version 1

Consider the set $\{g_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0$ containing ℓ distinct generators chosen uniformly at random of the prime order q cyclic group $\mathcal{G}$ different from g, where $\ell < \varphi(q)$ and $\varphi(q)$ are the total number of distinct generators of the cyclic group $\mathbb{G}$. Consider the following relation for some polynomial $f \in \mathbb{Z}_q[X]_{t+\ell-1}$ with $t \leq n$:

$$R_{PDL}^{mod} = \{(g, \{g_j, x_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0, \{x_i\}_{i=1}^n, \{F_i\}_{i=0}^n), f(X) :$$

$$F_0 = \prod_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0 g_j^{f(x_j)}, F_i = g^{f(x_i)}, 1 \leq i \leq n\}, \quad (4.1)$$

where all x_i's are distinct in $\mathbb{Z}_q$. The R_{PDL}^{mod} is based on *modified*-PDL (inspired from the PDL in [4]) which is defined in the following.

Definition 4.2.1 (*modified*- Polynomial Discrete Logarithm). *Let* $\{g_j : g_j \neq g\}_{j=-(\ell)-1}^0$ *be a set of distinct generators for the prime order q cyclic group $\mathbb{G}$ generated by g. Given $F_0, \ldots, F_n$ and distinct elements $x_{-(\ell-1)}, \ldots, x_0, \ldots, x_n$ in $\mathbb{Z}_q$, find a polynomial $f \in \mathbb{Z}_q[X]$ with degree at most $t + \ell - 1$, where $F_0 = \prod_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0 g_j^{f(x_j)}, F_i = g^{f(x_i)}$ for $1 \leq i \leq n$ and $t \leq n$.*

In other words, an algorithm $\mathcal{A}$ is said to have an advantage ϵ in solving modified-PDL if

$$Pr[\mathcal{A}(x_{-(\ell-1)}, \ldots, x_0, \ldots, x_n, g, \{g_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0, \prod_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0 g_j^{f(x_j)}, g^{f(x_1)}, \ldots, g^{f(x_n)})] \geq \epsilon,$$

where $f \in \mathbb{Z}_q[X]$ is at most a $t + \ell - 1$ degree polynomial with $t \leq n$ and the probability is over distinct generators $g, g_{-(\ell-1)}, \ldots, g_0$ of $\mathbb{G}$ chosen at random and distinct $x_{-(\ell-1)}, \ldots, x_0, \ldots, x_n$ elements in $\mathbb{Z}_q$.

We now will present a new NIZK AoK for the aforementioned relation R_{PDL}^{mod}, which is inspired from 2.3, in the figure 4.3.

Theorem 4.2.1 (A NIZK Arguerment of Knowledge for R_{PDL}^{mod}). *Let*
$(g, \{g_j, x_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0, \{x_i\}_{i=1}^n, \{F_i\}_{i=0}^n) \in L_{PDL}^{mod}$ *be a statement with its corresponding witness being $f \in \mathbb{Z}_q[X]_{\leq t+\ell-1}$ where L_{PDL}^{mod} is the language defined by the relation R_{PDL}^{mod}. Assuming modified-PDL is computationally hard, for $0 \leq t \leq n$, the protocol π_{PDL}^{mod} (described in figure 4.3) is a NIZK AoK for R_{PDL}^{mod} in the RO model.*

Proof. The corresponding proof is similar to the proof of theorem 2.4.1 given in [4]. Formally, we will prove the security of the interactive setting (i.e., without *RO* being used) and then using Fiat-Shamir transform it can be extended for the non-interactive setting in the *RO* model.

- **Correctness**: If both prover and verifier are honest, then for $1 \leq i \leq n$ we have

$$
\begin{aligned}
g^{z(i)} &= g^{r(i)+df(i)} \\
&= g^{r(i)}(g^{f(i)})^d \\
&= \Gamma_i F_i^d,
\end{aligned} \tag{4.2}
$$

and

$$
\begin{aligned}
\prod_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0 g_j^{z(j)} &= \prod_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0 g_j^{r(j)+df(j)} \\
&= (\prod_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0 g_j^{r(j)})(\prod_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0 g_j^{f(j)})^d \\
&= \Gamma_0 F_0^d.
\end{aligned} \tag{4.3}
$$

The aforementioned equations imply that verification returns *true* and honest verifier accepts the honest prover.

- **Special Soundness**: Let $(\Gamma_0, \ldots, \Gamma_n, d, z(X))$, $(\Gamma_0, \ldots, \Gamma_n, d', z'(X))$ be two acceptable transcripts where response polynomials will differ as a consequence of different challenge values. For $1 \leq i \leq n$ we have the following from equation 4.2:

$$
g^{z(x_i)} = \Gamma_i F_i^d, g^{z'(x_i)} = \Gamma_i F_i^{d'};
$$

which implies

$$
g^{z(x_i)-z'(x_i)} = F_i^{d-d'} \iff g^{\frac{z(x_i)-z'(x_i)}{d-d'}} = F_i, \tag{4.4}
$$

[*if and only if because* $d - d'$ *is always invertible in* $\mathbb{Z}_q$ *for* $d \neq d' \pmod{q}$]. Similarly, we have the following from equation 4.3:

$$\prod_{j=-(\ell-1)}^{0} g_j^{z(x_j)} = \Gamma_0 F_0^d, \quad \prod_{j=-(\ell-1)}^{0} g_j^{z'(x_j)} = \Gamma_0 F_0^{d'};$$

implying

$$\prod_{j=-(\ell-1)}^{0} g_j^{z(x_j)-z'(x_j)} = F_0^{d-d'} \iff \prod_{j=-(\ell-1)}^{0} g_j^{\frac{z(x_j)-z'(x_j)}{d-d'}} = F_0. \tag{4.5}$$

Hence, equations 4.4 and 4.5 imply that $f_i = \frac{z(x_i)-z'(x_i)}{d-d'}$ for $-(\ell-1) \leq i \leq n$. Moreover, as $z(X)$ is at most a $t + \ell - 1$ degree polynomial in $\mathbb{Z}_q[X]$, an extractor $\mathcal{E}$ can construct the unique $t + \ell - 1$-degree polynomial $f \in \mathbb{Z}_q[X]$, being the witness (resp. solution) for R_{PDL}^{mod} relation (resp. *modified*-PDL problem), from any $t + \ell$ evaluation points in $\{f_i\}_{i=-(\ell-1)}^{n}$ whenever $n \geq t$.

- **Honest Verifier Zero Knowledge (HVZK)**: Given the statement

  $(g, \{g_j, x_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^{0}, \{x_i\}_{i=1}^{n}, \{F_i\}_{i=0}^{n}) \in L_{PDL}^{mod}$ and a challenge value d, a simulator $\mathcal{S}$ can choose a polynomial $z' \in \mathbb{Z}_q[X]_{\leq t+\ell-1}$ uniformly at random and sets $\Gamma_i' = \frac{g^{z'(x_i)}}{F_i^d}$ for $1 \leq i \leq n$ and $\Gamma_0' = \frac{\prod_{j=-(\ell-1)}^{0} g_j^{z(x_j)}}{F_0^d}$. Now, $\mathcal{S}$ returns $(\{\Gamma_i\}_{i=0}^{n}, z'(X))$ as the simulated proof. As $z(X)$ is a random up to degree $t + \ell - 1$-polynomial in $\mathbb{Z}_q[X]$ and $z'(X)$ is chosen uniformly at random, the simulated proof of $\mathcal{S}$ is indistinguishable from the real one.

As the interactive scheme is public coin, satisfies *completeness*, (computational) *Special Soundness* and (computational) *HVZK*, then in the random oracle (*RO*) model, using Fiat-Shamir transform [13], it can be turned into a NIZK Argument of Knowledge for R_{PDL}^{mod} (defined in equation 4.1). $\qquad\square$

4.2.2   Version 2

Consider the set $\{g_i \neq g\}_{i=1}^{n}$ containing n distinct generators chosen uniformly at random of the prime order q cyclic group $\mathcal{G}$ generated by g, where $n < \varphi(q)$ and $\varphi(q)$ is the total number of distinct generators of the cyclic group $\mathbb{G}$. Consider the following relation for some polynomial $f \in \mathbb{Z}_q[X]_t$ with $t < n$:

$$R_{PDL}^{mod-v1} = \{(\{g_i, x_i, F_i\}_{i=1}^{n}, g), f(X) : F_i = g_i^{f(x_i)}, 1 \leq i \leq n\}, \tag{4.6}$$

where all x_i's are distinct in $\mathbb{Z}_q$. The R_{PDL}^{mod-v1} is based on *modified-v1*-PDL (inspired from the PDL in [4]) which is defined in the following.

Definition 4.2.2 (*modified-v1- Polynomial Discrete Logarithm*)**.** *Let*
$\{g_i \neq g\}_{i=1}^n$ *be a set of distinct generators for the prime order q cyclic group* $\mathbb{G}$ *generated by* g*. Given* $\{F_i\}_{i=1}^n$ *and distinct elements* $x_1, \ldots, x_n$ *in* $\mathbb{Z}_q$*, find a polynomial* $f \in \mathbb{Z}_q[X]$ *with degree at most t, where* $F_i = g_i^{f(x_i)}$ *for* $1 \leq i \leq n$*.*

In other words, an algorithm $\mathcal{A}$ *is said to have an advantage* ϵ *in solving modified-v1-PDL if*

$$Pr[\mathcal{A}(x_1, \ldots, x_n, g, g_1, \ldots, g_n, g_1^{f(x_1)}, \ldots, g_n^{f(x_n)})] \geq \epsilon,$$

where $f \in \mathbb{Z}_q[X]$ *is at most a t degree polynomial with* $t < n$ *and the probability is over distinct generators* $g, g_1, \ldots, g_n$ *of* $\mathbb{G}$ *and distinct* $x_1 \ldots, x_n$ *elements in* $\mathbb{Z}_q$*.*

We now will present a new NIZK AoK for the aforementioned relation R_{PDL}^{mod-v1}, which is inspired from 2.3, in the figure 4.4.

Theorem 4.2.2 (A NIZK Arguement of Knowledge for R_{PDL}^{mod-v1})**.** *Let*
$(\{g_i, x_i, F_i\}_{i=1}^n, g) \in L_{PDL}^{mod-v1}$ *be a statement with its corresponding witness being* $f \in \mathbb{Z}_q[X]_{\leq t}$ *where* L_{PDL}^{mod-v1} *is the language defined by the relation* R_{PDL}^{mod-v1}*. Assuming modified-v1-PDL is computationally hard, for* $0 \leq t < n$*, the protocol* π_{PDL}^{mod-v1} *(described in figure 4.3) is a NIZK AoK for* R_{PDL}^{mod-v1} *in the RO model.*

Proof. The corresponding proof is similar to the proof of theorem 4.2.1. Formally, we will prove the security of the interactive setting (i.e., without *RO* being used) and then using Fiat-Shamir transform it can be extended for the non-interactive setting in the *RO* model.

- ***Correctness***: If both prover and verifier are honest, then we have

$$\prod_{i=1}^n g_i^{z(i)} = g_i^{r(i)+df(i)}$$
$$= \prod_{i=1}^n g_i^{r(i)}(g_i^{f(i)})^d$$
$$= \Gamma(\prod_{i=1}^n F_i)^d, \tag{4.7}$$

which imply that verification returns *true* and honest verifier accepts the honest prover.

- ***Special Soundness***: Let $(\Gamma, d, z(X))$, $(\Gamma, d', z'(X))$ be two acceptable transcripts where response polynomials will differ as a consequence of different challenge values. Then we have the following from equation 4.7:

$$\prod_{i=1}^n g_i^{z(x_i)} = \Gamma(\prod_{i=1}^n F_i)^d, \prod_{i=1}^n g_i^{z'(x_i)} = \Gamma(\prod_{i=1}^n F_i)^{d'};$$

which implies,

$$\prod_{i=1}^{n} g_i^{z(x_i)-z'(x_i)} = (\prod_{i=1}^{n} F_i)^{d-d'} \iff \prod_{i=1}^{n} g_i^{\frac{z(x_i)-z'(x_i)}{d-d'}} = \prod_{i=1}^{n} F_i, \qquad (4.8)$$

[*if and only if because $d - d'$ is always invertible in $\mathbb{Z}_q$ for $d \neq d'$ (mod q)*]. Hence, equations 4.8 and 4.7 imply that $f_i = \frac{z(x_i)-z'(x_i)}{d-d'}$ for $1 \leq i \leq n$. Moreover, as $z(X)$ is exactly a t-degree polynomial with high probability in $\mathbb{Z}_q[X]$, an extractor $\mathcal{E}$ can construct the unique t-degree polynomial $f \in \mathbb{Z}_q[X]$, being the witness (resp. solution) for R_{PDL}^{mod-v1} relation (resp. *modified-v1*-PDL problem), from any $t + 1$ evaluation points in $\{f_i\}_{i=1}^{n}$ whenever $n > t$.

- **Honest Verifier Zero Knowledge (HVZK)**: Given the statement $(\{g_i, x_i, F_i\}_{i=1}^{n}, g) \in L_{PDL}^{mod-v1}$ and a challenge value d, a simulator $\mathcal{S}$ can choose a polynomial $z' \in \mathbb{Z}_q[X]_t$ uniformly at random and sets $\Gamma' = \frac{\prod_{i=1}^{n} g_i^{z'(x_i)}}{(\prod_{i=1}^{n} F_i)^d}$ for $1 \leq i \leq n$. Now, $\mathcal{S}$ returns $(\Gamma', z'(X))$ as the simulated proof. As $z(X)$ is a random t-degree polynomial in $\mathbb{Z}_q[X]$ and $z'(X)$ is chosen uniformly at random, the simulated proof of $\mathcal{S}$ is indistinguishable from the real one.

As the interactive scheme is public coin, satisfies *completeness*, (computational) *Special Soundness* and (computational) *HVZK*, then in the random oracle (*RO*) model, using Fiat-Shamir transform [13], it can be turned into a NIZK Argument of Knowledge for R_{PDL}^{mod-v1} (defined in equation 4.6). $\qquad\square$

4.3 Practical PPPVSS schemes

The scheme we present in figures 4.5 and 4.6, which are direct extensions of Λ_{RO} [5] (which originally is based on Π_S [4]), also find one more of our scheme in figure 4.7. Fundamentally, we make use of the NIZK PoK protocols, π_{DLEQ}, π_{PDL}, and the NIZK AoK protocols, $\pi_{PDL}^{mod}, \pi_{PDL}^{mod-v1}$, to construct our PPPVSSs. We give its security proofs in the following.

Theorem 4.3.1. Λ'_{RO} *is secure.*

Proof. This directly follows from the proof of Λ_{RO} in [5] as we mainly make use of π_{PDL} and π_{DLEQ}. For the sake of completeness, we give the proof as follows:

- **Correctness**: Assume the dealer D and parties $\{P_i\}_{i=1}^{n}$ follow the protocol. Given a setup from initial phase of the protocol for an input 1^λ we have $(y_{-(\ell-1)}, \ldots, y_n, (d, z(X)))$ from the sharing phase of the Λ'_{RO} where $y_i = h_i^{f_i}$ (or $y_i = PK_i^{f_i}$) for $-(\ell - 1) \leq i \leq 0$ and $y_i = PK_i^{f_i}$ for $1 \leq i \leq n$, d is an output from the random oracle $\mathcal{H}$ for the input $(y_{-(\ell-1)}, \ldots, y_n, c_{-(\ell-1)}, \ldots, c_n)$ and $z(X) = r(x) + df(X)$ is a $t + \ell-$degree polynomial such that $f(X)$ is the secret polynomial, $r(X)$ is the polynomial (also secret to D) chosen uniformly

at random, $c_i = h_i^{r(i)}$ or $c_i = PK_i^{r(i)}$ for $-(\ell-1) \le i \le 0$ and $c_i = PK_i^{r(i)}$ for $1 \le i \le n$.

Now with $(y_{-(\ell-1)} \dots, y_n, (d, z(X)))$, a verifier checks that the following part of the verification phase evaluates to d when additionally given with ℓ commitment keys for the secrets and n public keys for the shares:

$$\mathcal{H}(y_{-(\ell-1)} \dots, y_n, \frac{h_{-(\ell-1)}^{z(-(\ell-1))}}{y_{-(\ell-1)}^d}, \dots, \frac{h_0^{z(0)}}{y_0^d}, \frac{PK_1^{z(1)}}{y_1^d}, \dots, \frac{PK_n^{z(n)}}{y_n^d})$$

$$=\mathcal{H}(y_{-(\ell-1)}, \dots, y_n, \frac{h_{-(\ell-1)}^{r(-(\ell-1))+df(-(\ell-1))}}{h_{-(\ell-1)}^{df(-(\ell-1))}}, \dots, \frac{h_0^{r(0)+df(0)}}{h_0^{df(0)}}, \frac{PK_1^{r(1)+df(1)}}{PK_1^{df(1)}}, \dots, \frac{PK_n^{r(n)+df(n)}}{h_n^{df(n)}})$$

$$=\mathcal{H}(y_{-(\ell-1)}, \dots, y_n, h_{-(\ell-1)}^{r(-(\ell-1))}, \dots, h_0^{r(0)}, PK_1^{r(1)}, \dots, PK_n^{r(n)}).$$

Verifier computes d even when up to ℓ public keys of some target entities are used instead of the commitment keys for the secrets.

Moreover, the reconstruction phase always yields $\{g^{f_i}\}_{i=-(\ell-1)}^0$ in both the approaches. Explicitly, it is clear in the optimistic phase that yields $\{g^{f_i}\}_{i=-(\ell-1)}^0$ after one checks $\{y_i = h_i^{f_i}\}$ or $y_i = PK_i^{f_i}$ for $-(\ell-1) \le i \le n$, when given $(g, \{y_i, f_i, h_i \text{ or } PK_i\}_{i=-(\ell-1)}^0)$. The Pessimistic case also yields $\{g^{f_i}\}_{i=-(\ell-1)}^0$ which inherently is the reconstruction step from the PVSS Π_S [4]. In essence, we just proved that if the dealer and parties follow the protocol, then verification step returns true and the Reconstruction phase returns the actual secrets.

- **Verifiability**: We need to show that if verify algorithm returns true then for $1 \le i \le n$, y_i is a valid encryption of i'th share of the secrets $\{g^{f_i}\}_{i=-(\ell-1)}^0$ which is intended to party P_i and for $-(\ell-1) \le i \le 0$, y_i is the valid commitment(/encryption) of the secret g^{f_i} and reconstruct algorithm returns $\{g^{f_i}\}_{i=-(\ell-1)}^0$ irrespective of the approach with high probability. The trick to do that is to leverage the special soundness property of underlying proof systems.

Assuming verification phase outputs true, consider two acceptable transcripts $(c_{-(\ell-1)}, \dots, c_n, d, z(X))$ of the interactive version of the NIZK PoK π_{PDL} output by the dealer during the sharing phase as follows (WLOG assume the secrets are encrypted using the ℓ encryption keys of some target entities).

$$PK_i^{z(i)} = c_i y_i^d, PK_i^{z'(i)} = c_i y_i^{d'}, \text{ for } -(\ell-1) \le i \le n;$$

this implies,

$$PK_i^{z(i)-z'(i)} = y_i^{d-d'} \iff PK_i^{\frac{z(i)-z'(i)}{d-d'}} = y_i \text{ for } -(\ell-1) \le i \le n.$$

If all the $n \geq 2t + \ell$ checks for verification pass, then it means that $\{y_i\}^n_{-(\ell-1)}$ are valid encryptions(/commitments) of ℓ secrets and encryptions of n shares, as a consequence if any set $\mathcal{Q}$ of $t + \ell$ honest parties decrypt the encryptions of their shares to reconstruct secrets via pessimistic approach, then the following is obtained,

$$g^{\frac{z(i)-z'(i)}{d-d'}} = F_i \text{ for } i \in \mathcal{Q}, |\mathcal{Q}| = t + \ell.$$

After the DLEQ proofs π_{DLEQ} are checked, as with high probability $z(X), z'(X)$ are exactly $t + \ell - 1$ degree polynomial, an extractor having access to the two acceptable transcripts can construct the secrets from $f_i = \frac{z(i)-z'(i)}{d-d'}$ which are ℓ evaluations of the (with high probability) $t + \ell - 1$-degree polynomial $f(X) = \frac{z(X)-z'(X)}{d-d'}$. This implies that pessimistic approach yields the actual secrets $\{g^{f_i}\}^0_{i=-(\ell-1)}$ with high probability.

Similarly, the optimistic approach also yields the actual secrets $\{g^{f_i}\}^0_{i=-(\ell-1)}$ with high probability as a consequence of special soundness of π_{PDL}.

- **IND1-Secrecy**

$\square$

Theorem 4.3.2. *Assuming DDH and PDL assumptions are true, Λ^{packed}_{RO} is secure*

Proof. We want to prove the *Correctness, Verifiability* and *IND1-Secrecy* properties and it follows directly as in the PPVSS Λ_{RO}.

- **Correctness**: Assume the dealer D and parties $\{P_i\}^n_{i=1}$ follow the protocol. Given a setup from initial phase of the protocol for an input 1^λ we have $(y_0, y_1, \ldots, y_n, (d, z(X)))$ from the sharing phase of the Λ^{packed}_{RO} where $y_0 = \prod^0_{j=-(\ell-1)} h_j^{f_j}$ (or $y_0 = \prod^0_{j=-(\ell-1)} PK_j^{f_j}$), $y_i = PK_i^{f_i}$, d is an output from the random oracle $\mathcal{H}$ for the input $(y_0, y_1, \ldots, y_n, c_0, c_1, \ldots, c_n)$ and $z(X) = r(x) + df(X)$ is a $t + \ell$−degree polynomial such that $f(X)$ is the secret polynomial, $r(X)$ is the polynomial (also secret to D) chosen uniformly at random and $c_0 = \prod^0_{j=-(\ell-1)} h_j^{r(j)}$ (or $y_0 = \prod^0_{j=-(\ell-1)} PK_j^{r(j)}$), $c_i = PK_i^{r(i)}$.

  Now with $(y_0, y_1, \ldots, y_n, (d, z(X)))$, a verifier checks that the following part of the verification phase evaluates to d for ℓ commitment keys:

$$\mathcal{H}(y_0, y_1, \ldots, y_n, \frac{\prod^0_{j=-(\ell-1)} h_j^{z(j)}}{y_0^d}, \frac{PK_1^{z(1)}}{y_1^d}, \ldots, \frac{PK_n^{z(n)}}{y_n^d})$$

$$= \mathcal{H}(y_0, y_1, \ldots, y_n, \prod^0_{j=-(\ell-1)} \frac{h_j^{r(j)+df(j)}}{h_j^{df(j)}}, \frac{PK_1^{r(1)+df(1)}}{PK_1^{df(1)}}, \ldots, \frac{PK_n^{r(n)+df(n)}}{h_n^{df(n)}})$$

$$= \mathcal{H}(y_0, y_1, \ldots, y_n, \prod^0_{j=-(\ell-1)} h_j^{r(j)}, PK_1^{r(1)}, \ldots, PK_n^{r(n)}).$$

Verifier computes d even when ℓ public keys of some target entities are used instead of ℓ commitment keys.

Moreover, the reconstruction phase always yields $\{g^{f_j}\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^{0}$ in both the approaches. Explicitly, it is clear in the optimistic phase that yields $\{g^{f_j}\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^{0}$ after one checks $y_0 = \prod_{j=-(\ell-1)}^{0} h_j^{f_j}$ (or $y_0 = \prod_{j=-(\ell-1)}^{0} PK_j^{f_j}$) when given $(g, \{h_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^{0}, y_0, \{f_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^{0})$. The Pessimistic case also yields $\{g^{f_j}\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^{0}$ which inherently is the reconstruction step from the PVSS Π_S [4]. In essence, we just proved that if the dealer and parties follow the protocol, then verification step returns true and the Reconstruction phase returns the actual secrets.

- **Verifiability**: We need to show that if verify algorithm returns true then for $1 \leq i \leq n$, y_i is a valid encryption of i'th share of the secrets $\{g^{f_j}\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^{0}$ which is intended to party P_i, y_0 is the commitment of ℓ secrets and reconstruct algorithm returns $\{g^{f_j}\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^{0}$ irrespective of the two approaches.

  Observe the NIZK PoK of PDL 2.4.2, $\pi_{PDL} = (d, z(X))$ for thane following two cases;

    - Suppose ℓ public keys of target entities are used to generate y_0, then π_{PDL} gives a ZKP for a witness of $(g, -(\ell-1), \ldots, 0, 1, \ldots, n, F_1, \ldots, , SK_1 f_1, \ldots, SK_2 f_2)$

  it gives a ZKP of a witness for

$\square$

Theorem 4.3.3. $\Lambda_{RO}^{packed-compact}$ *is secure.*

4.4 A compact PVSS scheme

The relation π_{PDL}^{mod-v1} has more potential that a new PVSS can be constructed on top of it. We present it in the figure 4.8.

Theorem 4.4.1. $\Pi_S^{compact}$ *is secure.*

In the next chapter, we will revisit the randomness beacon [9] protocol based on PVSS, where we replace the PVSS based on Packed Shamir secret sharing with our PPPVSS.

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a PPPVSS based on Packed Shamir secret sharing 2.3

Initialization: All parties $\{P_i\}_{i=1}^n$ and dealer D agree on the prime field $\mathbb{Z}_q$. Also, each party P_i registers their public key PK_i in the public ledger and all agree on a set of commitment keys or public keys, $\{h_j$ or $PK_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0$, whose secret keys are known to target entities with the cipher text space being a group $(\mathcal{G}, \times)$. More importantly, all entities agree on two NIZK proof protocols, one for the dealer during sharing phase π_{PPPVSS}^{share} and the other for Pessimistic reconstruction phase π_{PPPVSS}^{pes}.

Share:

- Dealer D samples a $t + \ell$-degree polynomial $f \in \mathbb{Z}_q[X]$ uniformly at random and sets $\{f(j) = f_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0$ as the set of all secrets.

- For each $1 \leq i \leq n$, D computes $f(i) = f_i$ and and encrypts it with PK_i to obtain $y_i = Enc(PK_i, f_i)$. D also encrypts(/commits) to the secrets $\{f_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0$ using the encryption(/commitment) keys $\{h_j$ or $PK_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0$ to obtain $\{y_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0$.

- D uses the agreed upon proof system π_{PPPVSS}^{share} to prove that they have encrypted the shares and commitments(/encryptions) of ℓ secrets corresponding to the correct polynomial that evaluates to ℓ secrets.

- D broadcasts $\{y_{-(\ell-1)}, \ldots, y_0, \ldots, y_n, \pi_{PPPVSS}^{share}\}$.

Verification: Given public keys $\{PK_i\}_{i=1}^n$ and commitment(/public) keys $\{h_j, PK_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0$, any entity can check π_{PPPVSS}^{share} to verify the correctness of the encrypted shares $\{y_i\}_{i=1}^n$ and $\{y_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0$ being the commitments(/encryptions) of the ℓ secrets, and outputs **true** or **false** accordingly.

Reconstruction: Similar to [5], there are two approaches to reconstruct the secrets $\{f_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0$ based on the cooperation of the dealer D which are as follows:

- **Optimistic Reconstruction:** D publishes $\{f_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0$, then any verifier (not necessarily shareholders) when given $\{y_j, h_j$ or $PK_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0$ can check if each y_j is a valid commitment(/encryption) of the secret f_j and returns **false** if the check fails; otherwise returns $\{f_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0$.

- **Pessimistic Reconstruction:** If D refuses to reveal $\{f_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0$, then any set $\mathcal{Q}$ consisting at least $t + \ell$ shareholders will do the following:

  - Each party $P_i \in \mathcal{Q}$ decrypts their share y_i using their private key SK_i corresponding to PK_i to obtain f_i and then they publish f_i along with proof π_{PPPVSS}^{pes} which proves that the f_i is the correct decryption of y_i.

  - If $\mathcal{Q}$ consists at least $t + \ell$ honest parties, they can use the lagrange interpolation to compute the secrets $\{f_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0$ as follows:

  $$f_j = \sum_{i \in \mathcal{Q}} f_i \left[\prod_{k \in \mathcal{Q}, k \neq i} \frac{-k-j}{i-j} \right] \qquad , j \in \{-(\ell-1), \ldots, 0\}$$

  where $\lambda_i = \prod_{k \neq i} \frac{k}{k-i}$ are lagrange coefficients.

FIGURE 4.1: a PPPVSS based on Packed Shamir secret sharing

PPPVSS based on Packed Shamir secret sharing 2.3

Initialization: All parties $\{P_i\}_{i=1}^n$ and dealer D agree on the prime field $\mathbb{Z}_q$. Also, each party P_i registers their public key PK_i in the public ledger and all agree on a set of commitment keys or public keys, $\{h_j \text{ or } PK_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0$, whose secret keys are known to target entities with the cipher text space being a group $(\mathcal{G}, \times)$. More importantly, all entities agree on two NIZK proof protocols, one for the dealer during sharing phase π_{PPPVSS}^{share} and the other for Pessimistic reconstruction phase π_{PPPVSS}^{pes}.

Share:

- Dealer D samples a $t + \ell$-degree polynomial $f \in \mathbb{Z}_q[X]$ uniformly at random and sets $\{f(j) = f_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0$ as the set of all secrets.

- For each $1 \leq i \leq n$, D computes $f(i) = f_i$ and and encrypts it with PK_i to obtain $y_i = Enc(PK_i, f_i)$. D also encrypts(/commits) to the secrets $\{f_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0$ using the encryption(/commitment) keys $\{h_j \text{ or } PK_j\}$ and multiplies them together to obtain y_0.

- D uses the agreed upon proof system π_{PPPVSS}^{share} to prove that they have encrypted the shares and committed to the ℓ secrets corresponding to the correct polynomial that evaluates to ℓ secrets.

- D broadcasts $\{y_0, \ldots, y_n, \pi_{PPPVSS}^{share}\}$.

Verification: Given public keys $\{PK_i\}_{i=1}^n$ and commitment(/public) keys $\{h_j, PK_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0$, any entity can check π_{PPPVSS}^{share} to verify the correctness of the encrypted shares $\{y_i\}_{i=1}^n$ and y_0 being the commitment of the ℓ secrets, and outputs **true** or **false** accordingly.

Reconstruction: Similar to [5], there are two approaches to reconstruct the secrets $\{f_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0$ based on the cooperation of the dealer D which are as follows:

- **Optimistic Reconstruction:** D publishes $\{f_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0$, then any verifier (not necessarily shareholders) when given $\{h_j \text{ or } PK_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0, y_0$ can check if y_0 is the valid product of the commitment(/encryptions) of the secrets $\{f_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0$ and returns **false** if the check fails; otherwise returns $\{f_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0$.

- **Pessimistic Reconstruction:** If D refuses to reveal $\{f_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0$, then any set $\mathcal{Q}$ consisting at least $t + \ell$ shareholders will do the following:

  - Each party $P_i \in \mathcal{Q}$ decrypts their share y_i using their private key SK_i corresponding to PK_i to obtain f_i and then they publish f_i along with proof π_{PPPVSS}^{pes} which proves that the f_i is the correct decryption of y_i.

  - If $\mathcal{Q}$ consists at least $t + \ell$ honest parties, they can use the lagrange interpolation to compute the secrets $\{f_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0$ as follows:

  $$f_j = \sum_{i \in \mathcal{Q}} f_i \left[\prod_{k \in \mathcal{Q}, k \neq i} \frac{-k-j}{i-j} \right] \qquad , j \in \{-(\ell-1), \ldots, 0\}$$

  where $\lambda_i = \prod_{k \neq i} \frac{k}{k-i}$ are lagrange coefficients.

FIGURE 4.2: PPPVSS based on Packed Shamir secret sharing

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π_{PDL}^{mod}

Let $(g, x_{-(\ell-1)}, \ldots, x_n, F_0, \ldots, F_n) \in L_{g_{-(\ell-1)}, \ldots, g_n}^{mod-PDL}$ with its corresponding witness being $f \in \mathbb{Z}_q[X]_{\leq t+\ell-1}$ where $L_{g_{-(\ell-1)}, \ldots, g_n}^{mod-PDL}$ is the CRS dependent language defined by the relation $R_{mod-PDL}$ and $\mathcal{H}$ be a random oracle (RO).

Prover

- Samples $r \in_R \mathbb{Z}_q[X]_{t+\ell-1}$ uniformly at random and sets $\Gamma = \prod_{i=-(\ell-1)}^{n} g_i^{r(x_i)}$.

- Sets $d \leftarrow \mathcal{H}(F_0, \ldots, F_n, \Gamma)$, where $\mathcal{H}$ is an agreed upon Random Oracle (RO).

- Sets $z(X) \equiv r(X) + df(X) \pmod{q}$ and returns the proof(/transcript) $\pi := (d, z(X))$.

Verifier

- First checks if z is at most a $t + \ell - 1$ degree polynomial in $\mathbb{Z}_q[X]$. If so, they proceed with the next step.

- Checks if $d \leftarrow \mathcal{H}(F_0, \ldots, F_n, \frac{\prod_{i=-(\ell-1)}^{n} g_i^{z(x_i)}}{[\prod_{i=0}^{n} F_i]^d})$.

- If first two steps are correct then they output **true**, otherwise **false**.

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Figure 4.3: A NIZK AoK for the *modified* Polynomial DL

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π_{PDL}^{mod-v1}

Let $(\{g_i, x_i, F_i\}_{i=1}^n, g) \in L_{PDL}^{mod-v1}$ be a statement with its corresponding witness being $f \in \mathbb{Z}_q[X]_{\leq t}$ where L_{PDL}^{mod-v1} is the language defined by the relation R_{PDL}^{mod-v1} and $\mathcal{H}$ be a random oracle (RO).

Prover

- Samples $r \in_R \mathbb{Z}_q[X]_t$ uniformly at random and sets $\Gamma = \prod_{i=1}^n g_i^{r(x_i)}$.

- Sets $d \leftarrow \mathcal{H}(F_1, \ldots, F_n, \Gamma)$, where $\mathcal{H}$ is an agreed upon Random Oracle (RO).

- Sets $z(X) \equiv r(X) + df(X) \pmod{q}$ and returns the proof(/transcript) $\pi := (d, z(X))$.

Verifier

- First checks if z is a t degree polynomial in $\mathbb{Z}_q[X]$. If so, they proceed with the next step.

- Checks if $d \leftarrow \mathcal{H}(F_1, \ldots, F_n, \frac{\prod_{i=1}^n g_i^{z(x_i)}}{(\prod_{i=1}^n F_i)^d})$.

- If first two steps are correct then they output **true**, otherwise **false**.

</div>

FIGURE 4.4: A NIZK AoK for Polynomial DL based on 2.3

Λ'_{RO}

Initialization: All parties $\{P_i\}_{i=1}^n$ and dealer D agree on the prime field $\mathbb{Z}_q$, a group $(\mathbb{G}, \times)$ of order q with a generator g, random oracle $\mathcal{H}$. Also, each party P_i registers their public key PK_i in the public ledger and all agree on a set of commitment keys or public keys, $\{h_j \text{ or } PK_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0$, whose secret keys are known to target entities.

Share:

- Dealer D samples a $t + \ell$-degree polynomial $f \in \mathbb{Z}_q[X]$ uniformly at random and sets $\{g^{f_j} : f_j = f(j)\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0$ as the set of all secrets.

- For each $1 \le i \le n$, D encrypts $f(i) = f_i$ with PK_i to obtain $y_i = PK_i^{f_i}$. D also commits(/encrypts) to the secrets $\{f_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0$ using the encryption(/commitment) keys $\{h_j \text{ or } PK_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0$ to obtain $\{y_j = h_j^{f_j}\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0$ (or $\{y_j = PK_j^{f_j}\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0$).

- D uses the PDL proof scheme 2.4.2 to generate π_{PDL} as follows:

  - Samples a $t + \ell-$degree polynomial $r \in \mathbb{Z}_q[X]$ uniformly at random and computes $\{c_j = h_j^{r(j)}\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0$ (or $\{c_j = PK_j^{r(j)}\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0$) and $c_i = PK_i^{r(i)}$ for $1 \le i \le n$.
  - Using $\mathcal{H}$, $d = \mathcal{H}(y_{-(\ell-1)} \ldots, y_0, \ldots, y_n, c_{-(\ell-1)}, \ldots, c_0, \ldots, c_n)$ is computed.
  - Sets $z(X) = r(X) + df(X)$, hence $\pi_{PDL} = (d, z(X))$ is obtained.

- D broadcasts the encryptions of the shares along with the commitment (or product of the encryptions) of the secrets with π_{PDL} which proves the validity of the encrypted shares and committed (/encrypted) secrets, i.e., broadcasts $\{y_i\}_{i=-(\ell-1)}^n$ and $(d, z(X))$.

Verification: Given public keys $\{PK_i\}_{i=1}^n$ and commitment(/public) keys $\{h_j \text{ or } PK_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0$, any entity can check π_{PDL} to verify the correctness of the encrypted shares $\{y_i\}_{i=1}^n$ and $\{y_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0$ being the commitments(/encryptions) of the secrets. They will output **true** or **false** based on the verification of the proof. The procedure is outlined as follows:

- The entity checks if $z(X)$ is a $t + \ell-$degree polynomial or not.

- Checks if $d = \mathcal{H}(y_{-(\ell-1)}, \ldots, y_0, \ldots, y_n, \frac{h_{-(\ell-1)}^{z(-(\ell-1))}}{y_{-(\ell-1)}^d}, \ldots, \frac{h_0^{z(0)}}{y_0^d}, \frac{PK_1^{z(1)}}{y_1^d}, \ldots, \frac{PK_n^{z(n)}}{y_n^d})$ or $d = \mathcal{H}(y_{-(\ell-1)}, \ldots, y_0, \ldots, y_n, \frac{PK_{-(\ell-1)}^{z(-(\ell-1))}}{y_{-(\ell-1)}^d}, \ldots, \frac{PK_0^{z(0)}}{y_0^d}, \frac{PK_1^{z(1)}}{y_1^d}, \ldots, \frac{PK_n^{z(n)}}{y_n^d})$.

- Outputs **true** if both of the above checks are satisfied, otherwise **false**.

Reconstruction: Similar to [5], there are two approaches to reconstruct the secrets $\{g^{f_j}\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0$ based on the cooperation of the dealer D which are as follows:

- **Optimistic Reconstruction:** D publishes $\{f_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0$, then any verifier (not necessarily a shareholder) when given $g, \{h_j \text{ or } PK_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0, y_{-(\ell-1)}, \ldots, y_0$ can check if $\{y_j = h_j^{f_j} \text{ or } PK_j^{f_j}\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0$ and returns $\{g^{f_j}\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0$ if the check passes, if not they return **false**.

- **Pessimistic Reconstruction:** If D refuses to reveal $\{f_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0$, then any set $\mathcal{Q}$ consisting at least $t + \ell$ shareholders will do the following:

  - Each party $P_i \in \mathcal{Q}$ decrypts their share y_i using their private key SK_i corresponding to PK_i to obtain g^{f_i} and then they publish g^{f_i} along with a DLEQ proof 2.4.1, π_{DLEQ} which proves that g^{f_i} is the correct decryption of y_i.
  - If $\mathcal{Q}$ consists at least $t + \ell$ honest parties, they can use the lagrange interpolation to compute the secrets $\{g^{f_j}\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0$ as follows:

$$g^{f_j} = \prod_{i \in \mathcal{Q}} (g^{f_i})^{\prod_{k \in \mathcal{Q}, k \ne i} \frac{-k-j}{i-j}} = g^{\sum_{i \in \mathcal{Q}} f_i \prod_{k \in \mathcal{Q}, k \ne i} \frac{-k-j}{i-j}}.$$

FIGURE 4.5: Λ'_{RO}, a packed version of Λ_{RO} [5]

Λ_{RO}^{packed}

Initialization: All parties $\{P_i\}_{i=1}^n$ and dealer D agree on the prime field $\mathbb{Z}_q$, a group $(\mathbb{G}, \times)$ of order q with a generator g, random oracle $\mathcal{H}$. Also, each party P_i registers their public key PK_i in the public ledger and all agree on a set of commitment keys or public keys, $\{h_j \text{ or } PK_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0$, whose secret keys are known to target entities.

Share:

- Dealer D samples a $t + \ell$-degree polynomial $f \in \mathbb{Z}_q[X]$ uniformly at random and sets $\{g^{f_j} : f_j = f(j)\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0$ as the set of all secrets.

- For each $1 \leq i \leq n$, D encrypts $f(i) = f_i$ with PK_i to obtain $y_i = PK_i^{f_i}$. D also encrypts(/commits) to the secrets $\{f_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0$ using the encryption(/commitment) keys $\{h_j \text{ or } PK_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0$ and multiplies them together to obtain $y_0 = \prod_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0 h_j^{f_j}$ (or $y_0 = \prod_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0 PK_j^{f_j}$).

- D uses the PDL proof scheme 2.4.2 to generate π_{PDL} as follows:

  - Samples a $t + \ell$-degree polynomial $r \in \mathbb{Z}_q[X]$ uniformly at random and computes $c_0 = \prod_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0 h_j^{r(j)}$ (or $c_0 = \prod_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0 PK_j^{r(j)}$) and $c_i = PK_i^{r(i)}$ for $1 \leq i \leq n$.
  - Using $\mathcal{H}$, $d = \mathcal{H}(y_0, \ldots, y_n, c_0, \ldots, c_n)$ is computed.
  - Sets $z(X) = r(X) + df(X)$, hence $\pi_{PDL} = (d, z(X))$ is obtained.

- D broadcasts the encryptions of the shares along with the commitment (or product of the encryptions) of the secrets with π_{PDL} which proves the validity of the encrypted shares and committed secret, i.e., broadcasts $\{y_i\}_{i=0}^n$ and $(d, z(X))$.

Verification: Given public keys $\{PK_i\}_{i=1}^n$ and commitment(/public) keys $\{h_j, PK_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0$, any entity can check π_{PDL} to verify the correctness of the encrypted shares $\{y_i\}_{i=1}^n$ and y_0 being the commitment(/product of the encryptions) of the secrets. They will output **true** or **false** based on the verification of the proof. The procedure is outlined as follows:

- The entity checks if $z(X)$ is a $t + \ell$-degree polynomial or not.

- Checks if $d = \mathcal{H}(y_0, y_1, \ldots, y_n, \frac{\prod_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0 h_j^{z(j)}}{y_0^d}, \frac{PK_1^{z(1)}}{y_1^d}, \ldots, \frac{PK_n^{z(n)}}{y_n^d})$ or $d = \mathcal{H}(y_0, y_1, \ldots, y_n, \frac{\prod_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0 PK_j^{z(j)}}{y_0^d}, \frac{PK_1^{z(1)}}{y_1^d}, \ldots, \frac{PK_n^{z(n)}}{y_n^d})$.

- Outputs **true** if both of the above checks are satisfied, otherwise **false**.

Reconstruction: Similar to [5], there are two approaches to reconstruct the secrets $\{f_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0$ based on the cooperation of the dealer D which are as follows:

- **Optimistic Reconstruction:** D publishes $\{f_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0$, then any verifier (not necessarily shareholders) when given $g, \{h_j \text{ or } PK_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0, y_0$ can check if $y_0 = \prod_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0 h_j^{f_j}$ (or $y_0 = \prod_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0 PK_j^{f_j}$) and returns $\{g^{f_j}\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0$ if the check passes, if not they return **false**.

- **Pessimistic Reconstruction:** If D refuses to reveal $\{f_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0$, then any set $\mathcal{Q}$ consisting at least $t + \ell$ shareholders will do the following:

  - Each party $P_i \in \mathcal{Q}$ decrypts their share y_i using their private key SK_i corresponding to PK_i to obtain g^{f_i} and then they publish g^{f_i} along with a DLEQ proof 2.4.1, π_{DLEQ} which proves that g^{f_i} is the correct decryption of y_i.
  - If $\mathcal{Q}$ consists at least $t + \ell$ honest parties, they can use the lagrange interpolation to compute the secrets $\{g^{f_j}\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0$ as follows:

$$g^{f_j} = \prod_{i \in \mathcal{Q}} (g^{f_i})^{\prod_{k \in \mathcal{Q}, k \neq i} \frac{-k-j}{i-j}} = g^{\sum_{i \in \mathcal{Q}} f_i \prod_{k \in \mathcal{Q}, k \neq i} \frac{-k-j}{i-j}}.$$

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FIGURE 4.6: Λ_{RO}^{packed}, a packed version of Λ_{RO} [5]

$\Lambda_{RO}^{packed-compact}$

Initialization: All parties $\{P_i\}_{i=1}^n$ and dealer D agree on the prime field $\mathbb{Z}_q$, a group $(\mathbb{G}, \times)$ of order q with a generator g, random oracle $\mathcal{H}$. Also, each party P_i registers their public key PK_i in the public ledger and all agree on a set distinct of commitment keys or public keys, $\{h_j$ or $PK_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0$, whose secret keys are known to target entities.

Share:

- Dealer D samples a $t + \ell$-degree polynomial $f \in \mathbb{Z}_q[X]$ uniformly at random and sets $\{g^{f_i} : f_i = f(i)\}_{i=-(\ell-1)}^0$ as the set of all secrets.

- For each $1 \leq i \leq n$, D encrypts $f(i) = f_i$ with PK_i to obtain $y_i = PK_i^{f_i}$. D also encrypts(/commits) to the secrets $\{f_j\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0$ using the encryption(/commitment) keys $\{h_i$ or $PK_i\}_{i=-(\ell-1)}^0$ and multiplies them together with encryptions of shares to obtain $y_0 = (\prod_{i=-(\ell-1)}^0 h_i^{f_i}) \prod_{i=1}^n y_i$ (or $y_0 = (\prod_{i=-(\ell-1)}^0 PK_j^{f_j})(\prod_{i=1}^n y_i)$).

- D uses the *modified-v1* PDL proof scheme 4.2.2 to generate π_{PDL}^{mod-v1} as follows:

  - Samples a $t + \ell - 1$ degree polynomial $r \in \mathbb{Z}_q[X]$ uniformly at random and computes $c_0 = (\prod_{i=-(\ell-1)}^0 h_i^{r(i)})(\prod_{i=1}^n PK_i^{r(i)})$ (or $c_0 = \prod_{i=-(\ell-1)}^n PK_i^{r(i)}$).
  - Using $\mathcal{H}$, $d = \mathcal{H}(y_0, c_0)$ is computed.
  - Sets $z(X) = r(X) + df(X)$, hence $\pi_{PDL}^{mod-v1} = (d, z(X))$ is obtained.

- D broadcasts the encryptions of the shares along with the commitment y_0 of the secrets and its shares with π_{PDL}^{mod-v1} which proves the validity of the encrypted shares and committed secret, i.e., broadcasts $\{y_i\}_{i=0}^n$ and $(d, z(X))$.

Verification: Given public keys $\{PK_i\}_{i=1}^n$ and commitment(/public) keys $\{h_i$ or $PK_i\}_{i=-(\ell-1)}^0$, any entity can check π_{PDL}^{mod-v1} to verify the correctness of the commitment y_0. They will output **true** or **false** based on the verification of the proof. The procedure is outlined as follows:

- The entity checks if $z(X)$ is a $t + \ell - 1$ degree polynomial or not.

- Checks if $d = \mathcal{H}(y_0, \frac{(\prod_{i=-(\ell-1)}^0 h_i^{z(i)})(\prod_{i=1}^n PK_i^{z(i)})}{y_0^d})$ or $d = \mathcal{H}(y_0, \frac{\prod_{i=-(\ell-1)}^n PK_i^{z(i)}}{y_0^d})$.

- Outputs **true** if both of the above checks are satisfied, otherwise **false**.

Reconstruction: There are two approaches to reconstruct the secrets $\{f_i\}_{i=-(\ell-1)}^0$ based on the cooperation of the dealer D which are as follows:

- **Optimistic Reconstruction:** D publishes $\{f_i\}_{i=-(\ell-1)}^0$, then any verifier (not necessarily shareholders) when given $\{h_i$ or $PK_i\}_{i=-(\ell-1)}^0, \{y_i\}_{i=0}^n$ can check if $y_0 = (\prod_{i=-(\ell-1)}^0 h_i^{f_i})(\prod_{i=1}^n y_i)$ (or $y_0 = (\prod_{i=-(\ell-1)}^0 PK_i^{f_i})(\prod_{i=1}^n y_i)$) and returns $\{g^{f_i}\}_{i=-(\ell-1)}^0$ if the check passes, if not they return **false**.

- **Pessimistic Reconstruction:** If D refuses to reveal $\{f_i\}_{i=-(\ell-1)}^0$, then any set $\mathcal{Q}$ consisting at least $t + \ell$ shareholders will do the following:

  - Each party $P_i \in \mathcal{Q}$ decrypts their share y_i using their private key SK_i corresponding to PK_i to obtain g^{f_i} and then they publish g^{f_i} along with a DLEQ proof 2.4.1, π_{DLEQ} which proves that g^{f_i} is the correct decryption of y_i.
  - If $\mathcal{Q}$ consists at least $t + \ell$ honest parties, they can use the lagrange interpolation to compute the secrets $\{g^{f_j}\}_{j=-(\ell-1)}^0$ as follows:

$$g^{f_j} = \prod_{i \in \mathcal{Q}} (g^{f_i})^{\prod_{k \in \mathcal{Q}, k \neq i} \frac{-k-j}{i-j}} = g^{\sum_{i \in \mathcal{Q}} f_i \prod_{k \in \mathcal{Q}, k \neq i} \frac{-k-j}{i-j}}.$$

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Figure 4.7: $\Lambda_{RO}^{packed-compact}$, a compact version of Λ_{RO}^{packed}

$\Pi_S^{compact}$

Initialization: All parties $\{P_i\}_{i=1}^n$ and dealer D agree on the prime field $\mathbb{Z}_q$, a group $(\mathbb{G}, \times)$ of order q with a generator g, random oracle $\mathcal{H}$. Also, each party P_i registers their public key PK_i in the public ledger, where $PK_i = g^{SK_i}$ with SK_i being their corresponding secret key.

Share:

- Dealer D samples a t-degree polynomial $f \in \mathbb{Z}_q[X]$ uniformly at random and sets g^{f_0} as secret where $f_0 = f(0)$.

- For each $1 \leq i \leq n$, D encrypts $f(i) = f_i$ with PK_i to obtain $y_i = PK_i^{f_i}$.

- D uses π_{PDL}^{AOK} 4.2.2 to generate AoK π_{share}^{AoK} to prove that the encryptions are valid, which is done as follows:

    - Samples a $t-$degree polynomial $r \in \mathbb{Z}_q[X]$ uniformly at random and computes a single commitment $c = (\prod_{i=1}^n PK_i^{r(i)})$.

    - Using $\mathcal{H}$, $d = \mathcal{H}(y_1, \ldots, y_n, c)$ is computed.

    - Sets $z(X) = r(X) + df(X)$, hence $\pi_{share}^{AoK} = (d, z(X))$ is obtained.

- D broadcasts the encryptions of the shares along with π_{share}^{AoK} which proves the validity of the encrypted shares, i.e., broadcasts $\{y_i\}_{i=1}^n$ and $(d, z(X))$.

Verification: Given public keys $\{PK_i\}_{i=1}^n$, any entity can check π_{share}^{AoK} to verify the correctness of encrypted shares $y_1, \ldots, y_n$. They will output **true** or **false** based on the verification of the proof. The procedure is outlined as follows:

- The entity checks if $z(X)$ is a $t-$degree polynomial or not.

- Checks if $d = \mathcal{H}(y_1, \ldots, y_n, \frac{\prod_{i=1}^n PK_i^{z(i)}}{[\prod_{i=1}^n y_i]^d})$.

- Outputs **true** if both of the above checks are satisfied, otherwise **false**.

Reconstruction: Any set $\mathcal{Q}$ consisting $t+1$ honest shareholders will do the following:

- Each party $P_i \in \mathcal{Q}$ decrypts their share y_i using their private key SK_i corresponding to PK_i to obtain g^{f_i} and then they publish g^{f_i} along with a DLEQ proof 2.4.1, π_{DLEQ} which proves that g^{f_i} is the correct decryption of y_i.

- They can use the lagrange interpolation to compute the secrets g^{f_0} as follows:

$$g^{f_0} = \prod_{i \in \mathcal{Q}} (g^{f_i})^{\prod_{k \in \mathcal{Q}, k \neq i} \frac{-k}{i}} = g^{\sum_{i \in \mathcal{Q}} f_i \prod_{k \in \mathcal{Q}, k \neq i} \frac{-k}{i}}.$$

FIGURE 4.8: $\Pi_S^{compact}$, a compact version of Π_S

Chapter 5

Revisiting a Randomness Beacon Protocol

Randomness Beacon [17] is required in applications like e-voting [2] and anonymous messaging ([24],[22]) to provide fresh random values to all the parties. In 2020, Cascudo and David published ALBATROSS [9], the state-of-the art randomness beacon protocol based on a PVSS as a building block where each party in the randomness beacon protocol acts as a dealer once, so that all parties can influence the output randomness. Interestingly, we observed that each party is expected to reveal their secrets (they secret shared as a dealer) as part of the randomness beacon protocol, but to prove that the secrets are valid and not just some random evaluations of the secret polynomial they have to reveal the whole secret polynomial itself. As a consequence, if some entity wants to verify the secrets' validity then they have to simulate the whole sharing phase of the underlying PVSS protocol, which is very expensive because all the rest of the parties are expected to do the simulation of that party as a dealer. For reference, if there are n parties, then $n-1$ parties should simulate the sharing phase of the protocol, which in total is $\mathcal{O}(n^2)$ simulations.

In this chapter, we present our randomness beacon protocol in figures 5.1 and 5.2 which in many cases is efficient than ALBATROSS. To put simply, we replaced the building block being PVSS with our PPPVSS Λ_{RO} 4.6. In the subsequent sections, we will discuss the computational and communication costs of our protocol and compare it with the ALBATROSS. We will show that out protocol performs more efficient compared to ALBATROSS in many cases and also address the cases where we are not computationally efficient. More interestingly, we will show that in terms of communication, we outperform ALBATROSS.

5.1 Computational Complexity

See table 5.1 for an overview.

- In ALBATROSS, a dealer(as a part of **commit**) should compute $n(\mathbb{E}_x + \mathbb{P}_e)$

Randomness Beacon using PPPVSS

Our protocol with PPPVSS is run between a set $\mathcal{P}$ of n parties $P_1, \ldots, P_n$ who have access to a public ledger where they can post information for later verification. It is assumed that the Setup phase of Λ_{RO}^{packed} is already done and the public keys pk_i of each party P_i along with $\{\mathbb{P}_i\}_{i=1}^{\ell}$ being Commitment keys (or public keys of target people) to encrypt the ℓ secrets are already registered in the ledger. In addition, the parties have agreed on a Vandermonde $(n-2t) \times (n-t)$-matrix $M = M(\omega, n - 2t, n - t)$ with $\omega \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$.

1. **Commit:** For $1 \leq j \leq n$:

   - Shareholder P_j executes the Distribution phase of the PP-PVSS as Dealer for $\ell = n - 2t$ secrets, publishing commitments (/encryptions) of secrets, $y_{-(\ell-1)}^j, \ldots, y_{-1}^j, y_0^j$, and encryptions of shares $\{y_i^j\}_{i=1}^n$ along with π_{proof}^j, which is a NIZK PoK for proving the correctness of committed(/encrypted) secrets and encrypted secret shares on the public ledger, also learning the secrets $h^{s_0^j}, \ldots, h^{s_{-(\ell-1)}^j}$ and their corresponding exponents $s_0^j, \ldots, s_{-(\ell-1)}^j$.

2. **Reveal:**

   - Each shareholder checks the validity of the proof π_{proof}^j, i.e., the **verification phase of PPPVSS protocol**.

   - After a set $\mathcal{C}$ containing at least $n-t$ shareholders publish their shares in the public ledger, $P_j \in \mathcal{C}$ reveals ℓ secrets.

   - Every shareholder verifies the validity of secrets by reproducing the commitments using the commitment keys (/public keys of target people).

   - At this point, if every party in $\mathcal{C}$ has opened their secrets correctly, go to step 4' in Figure 5.2. Otherwise, proceed to step 3 in Figure 5.2.

FIGURE 5.1: Commit and Reveal phase of the Randomness Beacon using PPPVSS

commitments and to give a proof he should do an additional $n(\mathbb{P}_e + \mathbb{E}_x)$. Also, on dealer should do $l(\mathbb{P}_e + \mathbb{E}_x)$ for computing secrets and keeping it to himself. In total dealer needs to do $(2n + l)[\mathbb{E}_x + \mathbb{P}_e]$.

- In **Reveal**, a verifier should compute $2n\mathbb{E}_x$ which internally requires additional $n\mathbb{P}_e$, i.e., in total it requires $(n-1)n(2\mathbb{E}_x + \mathbb{P}_e)$ computations for

Protocol	Output size	Commit *(by Dealer)*	Reveal*(by shareholder)*	Recovery *(by shareholder)*
ALBATROSS, *Honest case*	l^2	$(2n+l)[\mathbb{E}_x+\mathbb{P}_e]$	**Share Verification -** $(n-1)n[2\mathbb{E}_x + \mathbb{P}_e]$ **Secret Verification -** $(n-1)(n+l)[\mathbb{E}_x + \mathbb{P}_e]$	-
with PPPVSS, *Honest case*	l^2	$2(n+l)[\mathbb{E}_x+\mathbb{P}_e]$	**Share Verification -** $(n-1)(n+l)[2\mathbb{E}_x + \mathbb{P}_e]$ **Secret Verification -** $(n-1)l\mathbb{E}_x$	-
ALBATROSS, *Robust case*	l^2	$(2n+l)[\mathbb{E}_x+\mathbb{P}_e]$	**Share Verification -** $(n-1)n[2\mathbb{E}_x + \mathbb{P}_e]$ **Secret Verification -** $(n-t-1)(n+l)[\mathbb{E}_x + \mathbb{P}_e]$	$[3+4(n-t)]t\mathbb{E}_x$
with PPPVSS, *Robust case*	l^2	$2(n+l)[\mathbb{E}_x+\mathbb{P}_e]$	**Share Verification -** $(n-1)(n+l)[2\mathbb{E}_x + \mathbb{P}_e]$ **Secret Verification -** $(n-t-1)l\mathbb{E}_x$	$[3+4(n-t)]t\mathbb{E}_x$

TABLE 5.1: Computational cost of dealer and shareholders, $\mathbb{E}_x$ =group exponentiation and $\mathbb{P}_e$ =polynomial evaluation in group G with order q, where q is a large prime

each verifier.

* In **Robust case** where t dealers do not open their polynomials, a verifier should verify $n-t$ polynomials of honest dealers, i.e., for each honest dealer, a verifier has to do $n\mathbb{P}_e$ to evaluate secret share exponents and does $n\mathbb{E}_x$ to get secret shares and cross checks them in the public ledger. Also, finally the verifier computes $l\mathbb{P}_e$ to get secret exponents and get l secrets by doing $l\mathbb{E}_x$. As there are $n-t$ honest dealers, the verifier has to compute $(n-t)(n+l)(\mathbb{E}_x + \mathbb{P}_e)$.

* In **Honest case**, everyone would have been honest and so each verifier has to do $(n-1)(n+l)(\mathbb{E}_x + \mathbb{P}_e)$.

- **Recovery** phase only exists if some party does not open the polynomial leading to PVSS reconstruction phase, in the worst case there should be reconstruction for the secrets of t malicious parties. Given a malicious shareholder who has not opened the secret polynomial, each shareholder/reconstructor has to decrypt their share, which requires $1\mathbb{E}_x$ and should give

a DLEQ proof that they have decrypted correctly, which additionally requires $2\mathbb{E}_x$; Also the re-constructor should verify DLEQ proofs of correct share decryption from $n - t$ honest shareholders requiring them to do $4(n - t)\mathbb{E}_x$. In total, each re-constructor requires $[3 + 4(n - t)]t\mathbb{E}_x$.

- Using PPPVSS in randomness beacon protocol, a dealer(as a part of **commit**) requires to do $(n + l)[\mathbb{E}_x + \mathbb{P}_e]$ and $(l - 1)\mathbb{M}_G$ to compute $\{y_i\}_{i=0}^n$. For generating the proof that y_i's are valid encryptions of the secret shares and also y_0 is a commitment of the l secrets, the dealer should do $(n + l)[\mathbb{E}_x + \mathbb{P}_e]$ which internally requires additional $(l - 1)\mathbb{M}_G$. In total, a dealer has to do $2[(n + l)[\mathbb{E}_x + \mathbb{P}_e] + (l - 1)\mathbb{M}_G]$.

  - In **Reveal**, a verifier should do $(n + l)(2\mathbb{E}_x + \mathbb{P}_e)$ and $(l - 1)\mathbb{M}_G$ for each proof. In total, a verifier has to do $(n-1)(n+l)[2\mathbb{E}_x+\mathbb{P}_e]+(n-1)(l-1)\mathbb{M}_{\mathbb{G}}$.

    * In **Robust case** with t malicious parties not opening the secret polynomials, a verifier should do $l\mathbb{E}_x + (l - 1)\mathbb{M}_G$ to verify each proof, so in total each verifier should do $(n - t - 1)[l\mathbb{E}_x + (l - 1)\mathbb{M}_G]$.

    * In **Honest case** where everyone is honest, a verifier will do $(n - 1)l(\mathbb{E}_x + \mathbb{M}_G)$.

  - The computational complexity of each re-constructor in **Recovery** phase is exactly same as in the case of ALBATROSS.

5.1.1   Computational Cost analysis

The dealer has to do a bit more work in the case of our protocol in contrast to ALBATROSS, more explicitly, they have to compute ℓ more group exponentiations and polynomial evaluations. But as a consequence, we decrease computational cost in the *Reveal* phase whenever $l < \frac{n(n-t-1)}{2(n-1)}$, roughly speaking, if the number of secrets are less than half of the honest parties then we always perform better in terms of computation when compared to the ALBATROSS.

5.2   Communication Complexity

Protocol	**Commit** *(by Dealer)*	**Reveal** *(by Dealer)*	**Recovery** *(by shareholder)*
ALBATROSS	$nG + (t + l)\mathbb{Z}_q$	$(t + l)\mathbb{Z}_q$	$1G + 1\mathbb{Z}_q + 1R_o$
with PPPVSS	$(n + 1)G + (t + l)\mathbb{Z}_q$	$l\mathbb{Z}_q$	$1G + 1\mathbb{Z}_q + 1R_o$

TABLE 5.2: Communication cost of dealer and (each) shareholder, R_o being the random oracle, G =group of order q and $\mathbb{Z}_q$ = modular group of order q, where q is a large prime

See table 5.2 for an overview.

- In ALBATROSS, a dealer (as a part of **commit**) should send n group elements as commitments, $t + l$ elements in $\mathbb{Z}/q\mathbb{Z}$ that defines the polynomial used in the ZKP and 1 extra element in $\mathbb{Z}/q\mathbb{Z}$ from RO.

    – In **Reveal**, an honest dealer would broadcast $t + l$ coefficients in $\mathbb{Z}/q\mathbb{Z}$ concerning the secret polynomial.

    – If some party has not revealed their polynomial, then in **Recovery** phase a re-constructor using PVSS reconstruction protocol should broadcast 1 element in group which is being the decrypted secret, for the proof of correct decryption, they have to broadcast 3 more group elements along with a polynomial which requires $t + l$ coefficients in $\mathbb{Z}/q\mathbb{Z}$ and 1 group element from RO.

- Using PPPVSS in randomness beacon protocol, a dealer (as a part of **commit**) should send $n+1$ group elements as commitments, $t+l$ elements in $\mathbb{Z}/q\mathbb{Z}$ that defines the polynomial used in the ZKP and 1 extra element in $\mathbb{Z}/q\mathbb{Z}$ from RO.

    – In **Reveal**, an honest dealer would broadcast l elements in $\mathbb{Z}_q$ concerning the exponents to construct the secret.

    – If some part has not revealed their secrets, then the communication cost of each re-constructor is exactly same as in the case of ALBATROSS.

5.2.1 Communication Cost analysis

The best to offer from our randomness beacon protocol is the communication cost. Though the dealer has to communicate only one extra group element compared to ALBATROSS in the commit phase, as a consequence for a fixed number of secrets the dealers' communication cost is constant as opposed to linear in number of corrupted parties in ALBATROSS.

Randomness Beacon using PPPVSS (cont.)

3. **Recovery:** Let $\mathcal{C}_a$ be the set containing at most t malicious shareholders(as Dealers) who did not open the exponents corresponding to their ℓ secrets, $\{h^{s_i^k}\}_{i=0}^{-(\ell-1)}$ for each $P_k \in \mathcal{C}_a$, in *Reveal* phase.

   - Every shareholder P_j should decrypt the secret share of each malicious shareholder(Dealer) in $\mathcal{C}_a$, and give a DLEQ proof 2.4.1 which asserts that the decryption is performed correctly,i.e., each shareholder should perform the *pessimistic* reconstruction phase of the PPPVSS Λ_{RO}^{packed} for every shareholder(Dealer) who has not revealed the exponents corresponding to their secrets.

4. **Output:** Let T be the $(n - t) \times \ell$ matrix with rows indexed by the shareholders in $\mathcal{C}$ and where the row corresponding to $P_a \in \mathcal{C}$ is $(h^{s_0^a}, ..., h^{s_{-(\ell-1)}^a})$.

   - Each computes the $\ell \times \ell$-matrix $R = M \circ T$ by applying FFTE to each column $T^{(j)}$ of T, resulting in column $R^{(j)}$ of R (since $R^{(j)} = M \circ T^{(j)}$ and M is Vandermonde) for $j \in [0, \ell - 1]$.

   - Shareholders output the ℓ^2 elements of R as final randomness.

4' **Alternative Output:** if every party in $\mathcal{C}$ has opened her secrets correctly in step *Reveal*, then:

   - Shareholders compute $R = M \circ T$ in the following way: Let S be the $(n - t) \times \ell$ matrix with rows indexed by the shareholders in $\mathcal{C}$ and where the row corresponding to $P_a \in \mathcal{C}$ is $(s_0^a, ..., s_{-(\ell-1)}^a)$. Then each party computes $U = M \circ S \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{\ell \times \ell}$ (using the standard FFT in $\mathbb{Z}_q$ to compute each column) and $R = h^U$.

   - Shareholders output the ℓ^2 elements of R as final randomness.

FIGURE 5.2: Recovery and Output phase of the Randomness Beacon using PPPVSS

Chapter 6

Conclusion

The final chapter contains the overall conclusion. It also contains suggestions for future work and industrial applications.

Appendices

Appendix A

The First Appendix

Appendices hold useful data which is not essential to understand the work done in the master's thesis. An example is a (program) source. An appendix can also have sections as well as figures and references[1].

A.1   More Lorem

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Appendix B

The Last Appendix

Appendices are numbered with letters, but the sections and subsections use arabic numerals, as can be seen below.

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