

The best master's thesis ever

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Thesis submitted for the degree of Master of Science in Cybersecurity

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Preface

I would like to thank everybody who kept me busy the last year, especially my promoter and my assistants. I would also like to thank the jury for reading the text. My sincere gratitude also goes to my wive and the rest of my family.

 $First\ Author\\ Second\ Author$

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Abstract

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List of Abbreviations and Symbols

Abbreviations

DL Discrete Logarithm

PPT Probabilistic Polynomial Time NIZK Non-Interactive Zero Knowledge

PoK Proof of Knowledge

AoK Arguement of Knowledge

PSSS Packed Shamir Secret Sharing PVSS Publicly Verifiable Secret Sharing

PPVSS Pre-Constructed Publicly Verifiable Secret Sharing

PPPVSS Packed Pre-Constructed Publicly Verifiable Secret Sharing

Symbols

q prime number

 \mathbb{G} Cyclic group of order q

 \mathbb{Z}_q Modular ring with q elements

 $\mathbb{Z}_q[X]$ Univariate polynomial ring in the variable X with coefficients in \mathbb{Z}_q

 λ Security Parameter negl Negligible function \mathcal{O} Big-O notation

Literature Review

In this chapter we sequently recall Packed Shamir secret sharing, Sigma (\sum) Protocols and Publicly Verifiable Secret Sharing (PVSS) followed by the recent scheme introduced in [3], namely, Pre-Constructed Publicly Verifiable Secret Sharing (PPVSS) which has versatile applications and also improves efficiency in existing applications. The agenda of this chapter is to give enough background before describing our Packed PPVSS (PPPVSS) scheme and its corresponding security guarantees in the next chapter.

1.1 Introduction

1.2 Preliminaries

1.2.1 Notation

Let \mathbb{G} be a cyclic subgroup of prime order q with its generator being g, isomorphic to a subgroup of the multiplicative modular group \mathbb{Z}_p^* , where p is prime. Also, we write $Z_q[X]_d$ to denote the set of all d degree polynomials univariate in X with coefficients in the finite field \mathbb{Z}_q .

1.2.2 Packed Shamir Secret Sharing

 (n,t,ℓ) -Packed Shamir secret sharing ([7],[4]) scheme is a threshold secret sharing scheme which is a variant of (n,t)-Shamir's secret sharing scheme [8]. In a nutshell, the $t+\ell-1$ degree secret polynomial with coefficients in \mathbb{Z}_q which evaluates to ℓ secrets is secret shared amongst n parties such that any $t+\ell$ parties can reconstruct back the secret polynomial. Recall that Shamir's secret sharing scheme requires at least t+1 parties to reconstruct the secret polynomial in contrast to the $t+\ell$ parties in the Packed Shamir secret sharing scheme. The scheme is summarized in the Figure 1.1.

Packed Shamir Secret Sharing

Given ℓ secrets to share amongst n parties, where at most t of them can be (passively) corrupt, the (n, t, ℓ) -Packed Shamir secret sharing scheme description is as follows:

Sharing Algorithm:

- Dealer constructs the secret polynomial $f \in \mathbb{Z}_q[X]_{t+l-1}$ via the lagrange interpolation by choosing $t+\ell$ elements in \mathbb{Z}_q where ℓ of them are secrets, $\{s_i\}_{i=0}^{\ell-1}$, with $f(-i) = s_i$ for all i and remaining t are chosen uniformly at random in \mathbb{Z}_q .
- Each party P_i receives their share f(i) from the Dealer for each $i \in \{1, \ldots, n\}$

Reconstruction Algorithm:

• Any Q set containing at least $t+\ell$ parties can use the lagrange interpolation to compute $\{s_i\}_{i=0}^{\ell-1}$ as follows:

$$s_m = \sum_{i \in Q} f(i) \left[\prod_{j \in Q, j \neq i} \frac{-m - j}{i - j} \right] \quad , m \in \{0, \dots, \ell - 1\}$$

• The secrets $\{s_i\}_{i=0}^{\ell-1}$ are outputted as the result.

Figure 1.1: Packed Shamir Secret Sharing

1.2.3 Sigma Protocols

The agenda of this subsection is to give a brief formal background about some important primitives used in the PVSS , Π_S [2], and the PPVSS , Λ_{RO} [3], schemes. Let X and W be two sets with R being a relation on $X \times W$, and $L = \{x \in X : \exists w \in W, xRw\}$ be the language defined by R where xRw says that w is a witness for a given $x \in L$. Also, let \mathcal{R} be a PPT algorithm such that $\mathcal{R}(1^{\lambda})$ outputs pairs (x, w) with $x \in L$ and xRw where λ is a security parameter.

Given a relation R and its corresponding language L, a **Sigma** (\sum) **Protocol** is a 3-round *interactive* protocol between two Probabilistic Polynomial Time (PPT) algorithms, a prover P and a verifier V. For some $x \in L$ with xRw, in the first round P sends a commitment a to V. To which V sends a challenge d to P in the second round and finally P responds back with the response z to V in the third round. V outputs **true** or **false** upon the proof verification on transcript trans := (a, d, z). Informally, with a \sum -protocol a prover P tries to convince a verifier V that they

know a witness w for a given statement $x \in L$ without revealing any information about w. To state it formally, a \sum -protocol is supposed to satisfy *completeness*, *Honest Verifier Zero Knowledge* (HVZK) and *Special Soundness* which are defined as follows.

Definition 1.2.1 (Completeness). $A \sum -protocol\ is\ said\ to\ be\ complete\ for\ \mathcal{R}\ if$ the verifier V always accepts the honest prover P for any $x \in L$.

Definition 1.2.2 (HVZK). A \sum -protocol is said to be **HVZK** for \mathcal{R} if there exist a PPT algorithm S that simulates trans of the scheme corresponding to a given $x \in L$ with any witness w of x. That is, given $x \in L$,

$$trans(P(x, w) \leftrightarrow V(x)) \approx trans(S(x) \leftrightarrow V(x))$$
, for any witness w of x.

Where $trans(P(\cdot) \leftrightarrow V(\cdot))$ is the transcript of the $\sum -protocol$ amongst P and V and \approx denotes the indistinguishability of the two transcripts.

Definition 1.2.3 (Special Soundness). $A \sum -protocol\ is\ said\ to\ satisfy\ Special\ Soundness\ for\ \mathcal{R}$, if there exists a PPT extractor \mathcal{E} for any two valid transcripts, (a,d,z) and (a,d',z'), corresponding to a given $x\in L$ with only a unique witness w and $d\neq d'$ such that $\mathcal{E}(a,d,z,d',z')$ outputs the witness w.

It is shown that a public-coin, complete, HVZK, special soundness \sum –protocol can be made into a Non Interactive Zero Knowledge (NIZK) Proof of Knowledge (PoK) or Argument of Knowledge (AoK) in the Random Oracle (RO) model using Fiat-Shamir transform [6]. In the following subsections, we recall two important NIZK PoK schemes which are used in Π_S and Λ_{RO} schemes.

1.2.4 Chaum-Pedersen Protocol for DL Equality

Consider \mathbb{G} being the cyclic group of prime order q with hard Discrete Logarithm (DL). For some $g, h \in \mathbb{G}$ consider the following relation:

$$R_{DLEO} = \{(g, h, a, b), x : a = g^x, b = h^x\}.$$

In [5], Chaum and Pedersen proposed a NIZK PoK scheme for the DL Equality relation, R_{DLEQ} . Informally, a prover P can convince a verifier V that they know x such that it can be used with both g and h to obtain a and b respectively. This protocol is widely used in many cryptographic applications like threshold decryption, e-voting and Randomness Beacons. We summarize the protocol in Figure 1.2.

1.2.5 NIZK PoK for Polynomial DL

Consider \mathbb{G} being the cyclic group of prime order q with hard Discrete Logarithm (DL).

Chaum-Pedersen Protocol for DLEQ

Let $(g, h, a, b) \in L_{DLEQ}$ be a statement with its corresponding witness being x where L_{DLEQ} is the language defined by the relation R_{DLEQ} .

Prover

- Samples $r \in_R \mathbb{Z}_q$ uniformly at random and sets $c_1 = g^r$ and $c_2 = h^r$.
- Sets $d \leftarrow \mathcal{H}(a, b, c_1, c_2)$, where \mathcal{H} is an agreed upon Random Oracle (RO).
- Sets $z \equiv r + dx \pmod{q}$ and returns the proof(/transcript) $\pi := (d, z)$.

Verifier

• Checks if $d \leftarrow \mathcal{H}(a, b, \frac{g^z}{a^d}, \frac{h^z}{b^d})$ and outputs **true** or **false** accordingly.

FIGURE 1.2: Chaum-Pedersen NIZK PoK for DLEQ

1.3 Conclusion

The final section of the chapter gives an overview of the important results of this chapter. This implies that the introductory chapter and the concluding chapter don't need a conclusion.

The Next Chapter

The Final Chapter

Conclusion

The final chapter contains the overall conclusion. It also contains suggestions for future work and industrial applications.

Appendices

Appendix A

The First Appendix

Appendices hold useful data which is not essential to understand the work done in the master's thesis. An example is a (program) source. An appendix can also have sections as well as figures and references[1].

A.1 More Lorem

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Appendix B

The Last Appendix

Appendices are numbered with letters, but the sections and subsections use arabic numerals, as can be seen below.

B.1 Lorem 20-24

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