### **The Remediation Ballet**



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### What is the remediation ballet?

- Incident Response is like choreography
- Keep all the pieces moving
- In sync, perfect timing
- Incident Response supports Remediation

## Your goal

- Every entity has different drivers & goals.
- One IR Goal: To become whole & functional again
- Stronger, better if possible
- Reputational damage minimized

This is why we have Incident Response

# There's incidents, and there's incidents.



### There's incidents, and there's incidents.

- Every day incidents can, should be playbooked Today let's call those "Mishaps"
- Larger, more complicated things are incidents.
  - Locky on a desktop? Mishap.
  - Phished account? Mishap.
  - APT Phished a domain admin last month? Incident.
- Listen to the pit in your stomach

## An everyday, ordinary incident

- **Car into hydrant**
- People hurt
- Transformer flooded
- **Electric** short
- \*\*Accident investigation



### Where to start?

- Shut off water first?
  Shut off power first?
  Help occupants first?
- Crispy water employee
  Power guy hit by truck
  Fried, soggy responders

Control traffic, cut water up street, shut off power, help occupants, investigate accident

## What this has to do with "Cyber" IR

There are lots of things needing done
Each depends on something else in parallel
Going in the wrong order may make things worse

## What this has to do with "Cyber" IR

If only someone had solved this problem before!



Developed by disaster experts

A flexible framework for doing this kind of thing

3 C's: Command, Control, Communications

### **Example: Communications**

Hurricane Katrina Response, NOLA Simple task: Find survivors, relay GPS coordinates

Lat: 30.0209844 Long: -90.0239323

N 30°01′15" x W 90°01′26"

NATO UTM z15, E 787039.4, N 3324842.4

- "Incident Commander" (incident Coordinator) is in charge
  - They appoint "Operations Lead"
  - Can appt "Communications Lead", "Planning Lead"
  - Can make up positions as needed, too
- IC: Strategic vision & coordinates the response
- Ops: Tactical approach to broad objectives

#### Incident Commander

- Will consult with management / stakeholders on decisions
- But must be **empowered** to make calls on the spot
- Builds a circle of advisors (Ops Lead, Lead techs)

Incident Commander **Operations Lead** Communications Lead PR / External Comms **Forensics Lead** Malware Analysis Internal / Employee Comms **Develop Indicators** Remediation Lead Understand infrastructure

Planning Lead

- Chain of command
- Non-ambiguous
- **Everything** is explicit
- Roles are defined, people know their job
- Handover is NOT AUTOMATIC

#### **WARNING:**

- The framework is for managing the incident
- Don't let it become "heavy"
- Or too light
- Manage to the degree warranted by the incident

### Let's do this!

Hey, why is the domain controller full of RAR files?



### Let's do this!

#### Initial reaction

- Confirm. Is this true?
- Declare incident, assign operations lead

#### Establish the "war room"

- Decide where/how to meet & communicate
  - o Email? IRC? Phone bridge? Videoconference?
  - In person always great if possible
- Take 5 minutes to collect your thoughts


### Let's do this!

Incident Commander Legal POC **Operations Lead** Communications Lead Planning Lead Who knows? Tools/Capabilities to What funding might we investigate? need? Brief everyone on Qualified staff? confidentiality aspects? How quickly can we hire surge help if needed? Enough staff? Prepare summary if needed for lawyers? Engage with Do we have access? CFO/Finance for surge Who does? Start controlling the needs? information spread

### Lets go through a major incident. Assumptions:

- We are thoroughly pwned
- We want to completely clean up with high certainty
- Org can tolerate some downtime but prefers as little as possible
- VIP's, some branches need to be working sooner than others

### A rough sketch of a large incident response



- PHASE 0 Forensics/Investigation
- IC Strategic need to determine:
  - Scope/extent of the compromise
  - Capabilities of malware/implants/attacker
  - Obligations, notification deadlines, etc
  - Likely business impact
- Ops focuses on finding not fixing (in this phase)

## Scope

- One system? A few? Trusted or untrusted?
- Opportunistic or Targeted?
- User creds leaked? What privs did they have?
- Remote access methods?
- What/When/How
  - Resist temptation to answer "Who" and "Why"

## **Capabilities**

- C2 Implant?
- How does the attacker hide? Where?
- More than one?
- Webshells?
- How much of your infra is "theirs" now?
- Accounts too!

## Obligations

- Customer notification deadlines (within X days...)
- Statutory? Contractural? What starts the counter?
- You'll need your favorite Lawyer here...
- If you determine notification obligations, you need a planning lead
  - A PM to track schedule

## **Impact**

- What's the impact of leaving the malware running while you study it?
- Study the attacker?
- What's the impact of killing the access/malware?
  - Kill too late, you've lost your data
  - Kill too early, you've tipped off the attacker

## A word on opportunity

- **Opportunity time**
- During cleanup/remediation we can harden too
  - IC + PL: What failures caused/contributed to this?
  - What missing controls can be speedily implemented?
  - Find the security-aware sysadmins and ask:
    - "Where's your list of things you've been asking them to do forever and they won't?"
    - "Which protections would have had an impact here?"

#### **Phase 1 - Core Services**

### C/C/R (Clear, Clean or Rebuild) the core services

- If rebuilding, rebuild in an air-gapped place & stage
- If you just need a clean config, prep it air-gapped on staging gear
- LDAP/AD servers, Mailserver
- Might be a good time for binary whitelisting/blacklisting

### **Phase 1 - Core Services**

#### **Mailserver**

 If users got phished / viruses, are they still latent in mailboxes not yet checked? Search + Quarantine!

### File Servers

- Checksum all malware/artifacts
- Recurse-checksum fileservers & Hunt

### **Credentials**

- User password changes; Privilege audits.
- Service accounts and SSH keys!


#### **Phase 1 - Core Services**

# Adjust the defensive posture

Consider a bulkheaded design for an improved network

Control RDP/VNC/SSH with 2FA proxies, GPO,

Puppet+iptables, etc



If only we'd built it with 6,001 hulls! When will humanity learn!?

### **Phase 2 - Network Services**

- "Core" vs "Edge"
- Clear/Clean/Rebuild + Harden:
  - Router/firewalls
  - Transit network gear
  - Edge network gear
  - Hey, have you considered VLANs yet?

### **Aside**

- Network core is clean/fixed/new
- Critical services are clean/fixed/new
- Now is when I like to do the sudden-death cutover

Nothing touches the new network until it's clean!

## Phase 3 - Apps & Services

### C/C/R + Harden:

- Wikis, repos, CAD, etc
  - Here's a good time to look into service accounts / trust in app land
  - Internal apps (payroll, salesforce, etc)
  - Check API token use/theft too!

#### **Phase 4 - Clients & General IT**

### C/C/R + Harden:

- Desktops, Laptops (VIP's first, etc)
- Anything with a filesystem
- Anything with a network connection

### **Phase 4 - Clients & General IT**

Forget something?





## **Phase 5 - Lay traps & Monitor**

### Attackers will come back

- Honeypot where a critical server once was?
- "Retire" compromised usernames, detect failed logins



- Many people will dual-role...
- Never combine IC & Ops Lead!
  - IC is stepping back, big picture
  - OL is leaning in, focus on details
  - Very hard to cycle between



## Some "Facts of Life" for responders

- Your stamina 12 hrs/day max. You'll burn out.
- Span of control: ~ 7-ish.
- "Point of Diminishing returns" on responder effort

#### Consider these at all times

- Calendar yourself time every X hours
- "How are things going? Do I need more help/resources?
- "Will I need to hand over?"

## How to tell if you're overwhelmed

- I'm annoyed at my Ops Lead
- "I don't have time for this!"

#### Balance debate with action

- Limited debate necessary for good decision making
- But avoid debate paralysis

#### **Handovers**

- Direct from role-to-role (eg, IC to IC, OL to OL)
- Explicit (Next cycle plans were X, Y, Z)
- Good notes are key
- "What would you be doing in the next 12 hours if you weren't handing over to me?"

Control squirrels / freelancers



## Feeding your staff

- Food comes to them or they will go to the food
- Disorganized, ad-hoc
- Plan to provide this



Control the "Hero burnout effect" on staff



.... Including yourself!

#### Conclusion

Studies show\* that engaging both the logical and artistic centers of the brain can help with information retention

With that in mind.....

\* I made this up. But I think it's true.

# **PS - Google IR is hiring!**

