Increasing Intergroup Trust:
Endorsements and Voting in Divided Societies

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Abstract

Can endorsements persuade voters to transcend politicized identity cleavages to support candidates from other groups? We argue that the persuasive power of cleavage-bridging endorsements depends on the ability of politicians to elicit ingroup trust on behalf of outgroup candidates. The activation of ingroup trust increases the likelihood of voting for outgroup candidates by changing both instrumental and affective assessments about the nature of the voter-candidate relationship. To assess these claims, we provide evidence from Kenya, where simulated radio news segments experimentally manipulated the ethnic relationship among voters, endorsers, and candidates. We find that voters who hear endorsements from ingroup politicians are significantly more likely to vote for outgroup candidates and view them as trustworthy. We further find that the trust premium transferred from ingroup endorsers to outgroup candidates leads voters to regard them as non-discriminatory representatives who care about their wellbeing.

1 Introduction

In many societies with politicized identity cleavages, ascriptive loyalties are thought to so strongly determine individual vote choice that democratic elections can be reduced to "an ethnic head count" (Horowitz, 1985, 196). A large body of scholarship suggests that the politicization of identity leads voters – whether driven by innate communal attachment, divergent group preferences, or the imperatives of zero-sum competition – to support ingroup candidates without regard to party ideology or incumbent performance, especially when control of state resources are at stake (Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972; Lijphart, 1977; Rothschild, 1981). Such identity-based voting has been regularly documented across a range of contexts, including in Latin America (Madrid, 2012), South Asia (Chandra, 2007), and Sub-Saharan Africa (Elischer, 2013).

But scholars have also long known that identity alone is insufficient to account for some forms of political mobilization. Factors such as class (Scott, 1985), ideology (DeNardo, 2014), and demographics (Acosta, 2014) can shape the individual choices that add up to collective outcomes. Studies of electoral behavior indicate that voters are not solely or primarily guided by group membership even where identity cleavages are salient (Weghorst and Lindberg, 2013; Long and Gibson, 2015). In Mali, Dunning and Harrison (2010) show that cross-cutting social cleavages can attenuate coethnic favoritism when voters evaluate politicians. In Ghana, Long and Hoffman (2013) find that voter evaluations of party performance are more important determinants of vote choice than ethnicity, and Ichino and Nathan (2013) show that voters residing in areas dominated by another ethnic group are less likely to vote for the party associated their own group. In Uganda, both Conroy-Krutz (2013) and Carlson (2015) show that voters condition their preferences over candidates based on their performance in delivering public goods.

Yet, whether or not performance considerations enter voters' calculations, demographic reality ultimately imposes itself where identity-based voting is considered a defining feature of elections. Candidates for office are often compelled to seek out votes from other groups because their own groups are not large enough to ensure a winning coalition (Ferree, 2010b). And many, if not most, voters simply will not have the option of voting for an ingroup candidate. Under such conditions,

candidates can attempt to become competitive across cleavages by securing the endorsement of leaders representing voters from other groups (Arriola, 2012; Koter, 2013). In racially polarized Guyana, for example, an Afro-Guyanese presidential candidate might rely on the endorsement of an Indo-Guyanese political leader to expand his base of support.[1] In Nigeria, where ethnic rivalries divide the electorate, a Fulani incumbent president might turn to the endorsement of an Igbo traditional leader to shore up his reelection bid in the country's southeast.[2] In Sri Lanka, where a civil war was fought along ethnic lines for over two decades, a Sinhalese presidential candidate can hope that the endorsement of ethnic Tamil party leaders will increase his national vote share.[3]

While candidates appear to regularly use cleavage-bridging endorsements to increase their vote share, it remains unknown to what extent endorsements influence voter behaviors and attitudes. It may well be that endorsements have little to no effect on voters' perceptions of outgroup candidates. Voters may refuse to believe that outgroup candidates can be faithful representatives, regardless of who endorses them. Or, voters may be willing to cross cleavages in casting their votes without regard to whom supports outgroup candidates. In this respect, the causal effects of cleavage-bridging endorsements have yet to be fully understood: Are such endorsements effective in persuading voters to support outgroup candidates? Can endorsements affect how voters perceive outgroup candidates?

We contribute to the literature on voter behavior in divided societies by examining the impact of political endorsements made across identity cleavages. We argue that cleavage-bridging endorsements can persuade voters to support outgroup candidates – but only when those endorsements come from ingroup members. Endorsements from ingroup members derive their influence from the trust that a shared group identity creates. In this respect, ingroup trust mediates the impact of cleavage-bridging endorsements. By claiming that an outgroup candidate will treat them as if they were an ingroup representative, the ingroup endorser is effectively asking voters to transfer the trust placed in her to the outgroup candidate. Moreover, we contend that the activation of trust through cleavage-bridging endorsements affects how voters end up perceiving outgroup candidates. Because

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[1]"Guyana's opposition coalition launches electoral campaign against racism," EFE Newswire, 5 March 2015.
[2]"Buhari in Abia, says: I'll do more for Nigerians if re-elected," The Sun (Nigeria), 30 January 2019.
[3]"Presidential candidate stage set for Sajith's nomination," Daily Mirror (Sri Lanka), 25 September 2019.

trust operates through cognitive as well as affective processes, endorsements can induce voters to view outgroup candidates as more than politically instrumental partners; they become seen as individuals genuinely concerned about the voter's wellbeing.

We assess our theoretical claims through an experimental design that estimates the effects of endorsements on voter evaluations of candidates. We conducted the randomized experiment in Nakuru County, Kenya, where electoral mobilization has historically followed identity lines among members of the Kalenjin and Kikuyu ethnic groups. The experiment employed simulated radio news segments modeled after actual Kenyan media coverage of election campaigns to manipulate the ethnic relationship among voters, candidates, and endorsers. The experimental manipulation of ethnicity was subtle: only the last name of the candidate and the endorser was randomized to be either Kalenjin or Kikuyu.

We find evidence that cleavage-bridging endorsements can positively affect intergroup behavior and attitudes. Voters who hear an endorsement from an ingroup politician are significantly more likely to report being willing to vote for the outgroup candidate. The magnitude of this effect is large enough to offset the expected preference for an ingroup candidate under certain conditions. We find evidence for the role of trust as a mechanism through which endorsements operate. Voters who hear an ingroup endorsement for an outgroup candidate are more likely to perceive the candidate as trustworthy. These voters believe that the endorsed outgroup candidate is more likely to be non-discriminatory, representing the broader interests of their constituency rather than the candidate's own group. Additionally, we find that endorsements can influence affective evaluations. Cleavage-bridging endorsements lead voters to perceive outgroup candidates as more likable (a measure of ingroup bias (Misch, Paulus and Dunham, 2021)) as well as caring about them (a measure of affective trust (McAllister, 1995)).

Our findings have implications for the study of democratic stability in divided societies. While scholars often attribute the fragility of democracy to intergroup conflict (Snyder, 2000), little experimental research has been conducted to examine how "real world" interventions might help to mitigate identity-based political competition (Paluck and Green, 2009). It turns out that the salience

of identity does not need to be diminished to engineer normatively desirable outcomes like inter-group cooperation. Our findings also have implications for understanding individual voter behavior in divided societies. While the logic we employ is largely derived from instrumentalist theories of voting, we suggest that this framework may not be able to satisfactorily account for important shifts in voter attitudes in divided societies. Understanding why and how voters' affective perceptions of intergroup relations might change could provide an important complement to the existing instrumentalist approaches that characterize much of the existing scholarship.

We proceed by elaborating on the role of trust in cleavage-bridging endorsements in divided societies. We then describe the empirical context and the research design. We present the experimental results along with discussions of mechanisms and heterogeneous treatment effects. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for understanding political behavior.

2   The Role of Trust in Cleavage-Bridging Endorsements

Identity is a politically powerful heuristic wherever voters expect their membership in ethnic, racial, or religious groups to condition their access to state resources. According to instrumentalist theories of voting, a candidate's group membership is an important consideration for voters who believe that elected officials will use identity-based criteria in allocating scarce public goods and services (Bates, 1987; Posner, 2005; Chandra, 2007; Ferree, 2010a; Nathan, 2019). Under such circumstances, voters expect candidates who share their identity to follow through on distributive campaign promises because, after the election, their common group membership provides for norms of reciprocity to induce compliance as well as sanctioning mechanisms to punish reneging (Berman, 1998; Habyarimana et al., 2009). By contrast, voters rationally expect candidates from other groups, if they are installed in office, to leave them empty handed (Bratton, 2008).

The challenge for candidates seeking broad-based electoral support is that their campaign promises will be seen merely as cheap talk by voters from other groups. To make their promises more credible to outgroup voters, candidates often must turn to endorsements from the leaders, officials, and politi-

cians who represent them. Such cleavage-bridging endorsements allow candidates to publicly signal their intent to equitably distribute state resources across groups and serve all constituents, regardless of their identities.

Prior research suggests that voters will respond to endorsements that bridge politicized identity cleavages when they perceive their individual fate as linked to group identity (Dawson, 1995). In the United States, for example, while Latino voters typically prefer to vote for Latino candidates (Barreto, 2007), Barreto et al. (2008) show that endorsements by Latino officials serve to coordinate Latino votes for non-Latino presidential candidates in Democratic Party primaries. Benjamin (2017) finds that endorsements by Black leaders can move Black voters to support non-Black candidates when race is salient in local elections in which partisan cues are absent. Similarly, voters appear to follow cleavage-bridging endorsements in countries where party systems are too new, fragmented, or unstable for partisan affiliation to meaningfully convey programmatic information. In Indonesia, legislative candidates seek out endorsements from local ethnic associations to cultivate a personal reputation for attending to the needs of targeted outgroup voters (Fox, 2018). In Democratic Republic of Congo, presidential candidates use endorsements from regional party leaders to form electoral alliances that can attract support from outgroup voters nationwide (Makutu and Tshimanga, 2014). In Benin, the non-coethnic spouses of presidential candidates serve as surrogates who can secure electoral support from voters in their respective groups (Adida et al., 2016).

In this context, we seek to refine and supplement the logic of instrumental voting in cleavage-bridging endorsements. First, we explain the central role of ingroup trust in mediating the impact of endorsements aimed at persuading voters to support outgroup candidates. While the standard instrumentalist framework would lead us to expect endorsements to work when endorsers and voters are members of the same group, the existing scholarship largely leaves unstated exactly why and how ingroup trust facilitates cross-cleavage political behavior. Second, in stressing the role of trust, we suggest that cleavage-bridging endorsements may induce voter beliefs about inter-group relations that go beyond standard instrumentalist expectations. The voter who has been convinced to cross a politicized cleavage does not only expect the outgroup candidate to treat her fairly (or not discrim-

inate against her) in the allocation of state resources; she might also perceive her relationship with that candidate in qualitatively different terms.

2.1 Leveraging Ingroup Trust in Endorsements

Voters who lack knowledge about candidates have an incentive to rely on information provided by endorsers they trust (Popkin, 1994; Lupia, McCubbins and Arthur, 1998). Endorsements derive their force from the fact that voters place stock in information sources that share their interests and values (Taber and Lodge, 2006; Iyengar and Hahn, 2009). The voter uncertain about which candidates will deliver on their promises can increase the likelihood of choosing the superior candidate by relying on information from sources known to share her perspective. In countries where the electorate is divided by social cleavages, an endorsement helps to alleviate informational constraints that voters otherwise face when assessing outgroup candidates for whom they will have less reliable information. Endorsements thus provide voters with the information necessary to approximate voting with complete information (Lupia, 1994).

When voters perceive endorsers as sharing their interests, as occurs when they have a common group identity, they are more likely to believe that they themselves would have reached the same voting decision if they had complete information. Such a belief frees voters from the burden of having to acquire costly information on multiple candidates and instead allows them to rely on cues conveyed through endorsements (Brady and Sniderman, 1985; Huckfeldt et al., 1995). Voters can infer the benefits to be gained from different candidates by simply looking at who is endorsing them. Focusing on these relational properties of endorsements helps to explain why certain types of endorsements are unlikely to influence how voters perceive a candidate. In an ethnically polarized society, for example, voters are unlikely to be swayed by an endorsement from an outgroup politician because they will not believe that the endorser's interests are aligned with their own. Likewise, voters are unlikely to be swayed by an endorsement for an ingroup candidate if no new information is revealed about the candidate's distributive behavior in office.

For an endorsement to persuade a voter to overcome her identity-based priors about outgroup

candidates, the endorsement must be issued by a trusted source that shares the voter's biases. An endorsement from a trusted source that challenges a voter's intuition will be interpreted as a particularly strong signal that she should reconsider her choices (Calvert, 1985). Updating occurs because individuals pay closer attention, and are more likely to invest in learning, when confronted with incongruent information that interrupts normal cognitive associations (Marcus and MacKuen, 1993; Marcus, Neuman and MacKuen, 2000). The voter who hears an ingroup politician endorse an outgroup candidate should be more likely to update her priors precisely because she has received a piece of information from a trusted source that is unexpected, given their shared group interests.

The persuasive power of cleavage-bridging endorsements stems from ingroup trust. Voters are willing to consider supporting an outgroup candidate because they are making the calculated decision to believe in the ingroup endorser's intentions. Voters will make themselves vulnerable in this way if they can reasonably infer that the ingroup endorser, due to their common group membership, will make choices in a benevolent, predictable way that advances their shared interests (Berman, 1998; Herrera and Kydd, 2017; Platow et al., 2012). This expectation is bolstered when their shared identity provides complementary social ties that help identify as well as sanction any dishonesty (Habyarimana et al., 2009). The lack of social ties should lead voters not to trust an outgroup endorser, especially if they have no means to detect or punish any potential betrayal of that trust (Robinson, 2020).

Ingroup trust mediates the impact of a cleavage-bridging endorsement because the ingroup endorser — by publicly vouching for an outgroup candidate — is ultimately encouraging voters to transfer the trust placed in her to the outgroup candidate. [4] In this way, the endorser leverages an ingroup trust premium to close the trust gap that would normally prevent voters from even considering the outgroup candidate as a viable electoral option. The endorsement allows voters to envision their potential relationship with the outgroup candidate to be comparable to what they have with the ingroup endorser. The ingroup endorser is effectively promising that the outgroup candidate will treat

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[4]Voters are more likely to follow through in transferring their trust from endorser to candidate if both are perceived as sharing similar characteristics, forming part of a common category, and engaging in repeated interactions (Lickel et al., 2000).

them as if they were also members of her group. Voters should follow the endorser's advice as long as they reasonably expect that supporting the candidate will ensure their access to state resources.

2.2 The Relational Impact of Endorsements

We argue that the activation of trust through cleavage-bridging endorsements can generate new beliefs about the nature of a voter's relationship with an outgroup candidate. In the standard instrumentalist framework, voters rationally expect an endorsed outgroup candidate to address their needs because that is what their political relationship entails: constituency service is exchanged for electoral support. But what is overlooked in this framework is the fact that trust itself is multidimensional, operating through cognitive as well as affective processes (McAllister, 1995; Wang, Indridason and Saunders, 2010; Schaubroeck, Lam and Peng, 2011). A cleavage-bridging endorsement — by convincing voters to transfer their trust from an ingroup endorser to an outgroup candidate — may also induce voters to perceive the outgroup candidate in affective terms, namely, as someone who is personally concerned about their wellbeing. In this respect, the candidate is believed to address voter needs not solely because she is embedded in an instrumental political relationship. Rather, the endorsement persuades voters to believe that the candidate genuinely cares about them.

We draw on insights from social psychology to explain how voters exposed to cleavage-bridging endorsements might develop affective evaluations about outgroup candidates. The scholarship on contact theory suggests that intergroup prejudice can be reduced when contact is defined by a set of facilitating conditions: equal status, cooperative interaction, common goals, and authority support (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006; Paluck, Green and Green, 2019).[5] These very conditions broadly define cleavage-bridging endorsements because they typically involve two politicians (equal status) publicly affirming their intent to work together (cooperative interaction) to implement a shared political platform (common goals). When issued by a recognized ingroup leader (authority support), the endorsement gives group members permission to participate in similar political cooperation.

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[5]Scacco and Warren (2018), however, find that that contact may not necessarily reduce outgroup prejudice; contact instead may attenuate discrimination produced as a result of more intense ingroup bonding.

While voters themselves rarely directly participate in or observe the endorsement act, they may still indirectly absorb its effects. Research suggests that intergroup contact need not occur in person for its positive effects to take hold; prejudice can be reduced even when it is not feasible for individuals to communicate directly (Wright et al., 1997; Lemmer and Wagner, 2015). Whether transmitted through social networks or mass media, the knowledge that an ingroup member has a positive relationship with an outgroup counterpart may be sufficient to shift perceptions about the desirability of contact. Representations of successful intergroup contact make future interactions more likely by increasing information about the outgroup, reinforcing norms of contact, and reducing anxieties about their interactions (Ensari and Miller, 2002; Ramiah et al., 2014). For example, in the aftermath of Rwanda's genocidal violence, Paluck (2009) and Bilali and Vollhardt (2013) show that even exposure to fictional examples of positive intergroup contact can reshape beliefs about outgroup members.

Cleavage-bridging endorsements, as a form of indirect or vicarious contact, enable voters to perceive their relationship with outgroup candidates in affective terms. Experimental studies in social psychology repeatedly show that indirect contact can do more than lead individuals to reduce their prejudices or stereotypes of others; it can elicit positive feelings and intentions toward outgroup members (Pagotto et al., 2013; Vezzali et al., 2012). Similarly, by creating the anticipation of cooperative interactions (Misch, Paulus and Dunham, 2021; Zhou et al., 2018), endorsements can trigger voters to begin developing positive sentiments about outgroup candidates. Voters who learn to view endorsed outgroup candidates as allies in a cooperative partnership will then apply to them the attitudes and behaviors normally reserved for ingroup members (Aron et al., 1991; Tausch et al., 2007; Tropp, 2008; Pietraszewski, Cosmides and Tooby, 2014).

2.3 Testable Hypotheses

The discussion presented above suggests a set of straightforward testable hypotheses consistent with the expectations of instrumental voting. In this regard, voters should be more likely to express support for an outgroup candidate endorsed by an ingroup politician. Endorsements from outgroup politicians should not be expected to affect support for an outgroup candidate.

Here we add our three refinements regarding the role of trust in endorsements.

First, if our claim about trust is correct, we should expect to find that endorsements operate through a trust mechanism: outgroup candidates should be viewed as more trustworthy when endorsed by an ingroup politician. Since voters follow endorsers they consider to be honest and dependable (Druckman, 2001; Morin, Ivory and Tubbs, 2012; Botero et al., 2015), the endorsement also likely induces voters to view the outgroup candidate as being trustworthy precisely because an ingroup politician has vouched for her. By extension, we expect the voter's trust in the ingroup politician to mediate the other outcomes associated with the endorsement.

Second, the trust transferred by an ingroup endorser should also influence voter expectations about an outgroup candidate's distributive behavior in office. Again, this is consistent with theories of instrumental voting. If voters follow an endorsement when they believe the endorser shares their interests (Arceneaux and Kolodny, 2009; Boudreau, 2009), an ingroup endorsement should convince them that the outgroup candidate will not discriminate against them in the distribution of state resources once elected.

Third, our affect-related claims about trust should lead us to find that voters attach positive affect towards endorsed outgroup candidates who they come to view as quasi-ingroup members who care about their personal well-being.

3   Research Design

3.1   Empirical Context

We assess the effects of cleavage-bridging endorsements on voting through a survey-based experiment conducted in Nakuru County, Kenya.[6] Politics have been highly ethnicized in Kenya since independence, when the country's major ethnic groups initially allied with different parties to compete for power. Political competition then largely played out along ethnic lines in both single-party

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[6]The research protocol was approved by the XXXXXXX [institution redacted for peer review] Office for the Protection of Human Subjects, under protocol number 2015-09-7517. The pre-analysis plan for this project is registered at the Evidence in Governance and Politics (EGAP) design registry under protocol ID XXXXXXXXXX [redacted for peer review, anonymized pre-analysis plan submitted to JoP pursuant to new guidelines].

and multiparty eras (Ajulu, 2002; Opalo, 2019), partly because officeholders became accustomed to channeling valuable development resources toward their own coethnics (Jablonski, 2014; Kramon and Posner, 2016).

Kenyan politicians continue to cultivate electoral support on the basis of ethnicity (Bratton, 2008), but increasingly competitive elections have also compelled them to become pragmatic in seeking to win over outgroup voters to form viable winning coalitions (Horowitz, 2016). Multiethnic electoral alliances have become a regular feature of national elections (Arriola, 2012), exposing a larger number of Kenyan voters to cleavage-bridging endorsements in the process. At our study site, Nakuru, members of the two largest ethnic groups – Kikuyu and Kalenjin – would certainly have heard or witnessed endorsements that were relevant to their identities. In 2013, for example, presidential candidate Uhuru Kenyatta, a Kikuyu, selected William Ruto, a Kalenjin, to be his vice-presidential running mate. In the same election, Kinuthia Mbugua, a Kikuyu candidate for Nakuru County's governorship, selected Joseph Kibore Rutto, a Kalenjin, to be his running mate for deputy governor.

But along with voting for various multiethnic electoral alliances – with Kikuyu and Kalenjin politicians being allies in some elections and rivals in others – Nakuru's residents have experienced the inter-ethnic antagonisms associated with living in "a contested space" (Hassan and O'Mealia, 2018, 166). Historical tensions stemming from group competition over land have persisted over time. Kikuyu migrants began moving to the area in large numbers following resettlement programs initiated by the post-independence government in the 1960s, provoking resentment and resistance among the locally rooted Kalenjin community (Lynch, 2011). Consequently, identity and land remain salient issues that politicians have inflamed through campaign rhetoric at election time (Kanyinga, 2009; Kasara, 2013). A Nakuru resident interviewed by Klaus (2020, 14) succinctly captures how some politicians have exploited these issues to mobilize voters: "Issues of land are connected with politics because the politician sees the presence of other communities in a region as a threat to his [victory] in the area since most people vote along tribal lines. So he will try his best to eliminate them. He does this by inciting his community, telling them that the other community is not supposed to be living there."

Intergroup tensions exacerbated by electoral competition have periodically escalated to outright violence in Nakuru. Both Kikuyu and Kalenjin politicians have been implicated in fomenting ethnically targeted attacks that have killed scores and displaced hundreds of thousands from the area. In the run-up to the 1992 presidential election, Kalenjin politicians incited violent attacks aimed at driving Kikuyu residents from their plots of land as well as preventing them from voting for the Kikuyu opposition candidate competing against the Kalenjin incumbent (Hassan and O'Mealia, 2018). After the contentious 2007 presidential election in which a Kikuyu presidential incumbent faced a Kalenjin-endorsed ethnic Luo candidate, violence broke out once again as ethnically targeted attacks erupted across Nakuru (Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, 2008). Nakuru was one of the areas most affected by the 2007-2008 postelection violence, accounting for an estimated 263 to 431 lives (18% to 29%) of the approximately 1,500 killed nationally (Klaus, 2020). A household survey conducted by Klaus (2020, 214-216) in Nakuru reveals that 51% of respondents recall violence during the 2007 election and 55% heard politicians encourage their followers to "kick out the other tribe" as part of that campaign.

Given the competing influences to which Nakuru residents have been exposed over the past two decades – multiethnic electoral alliances versus ethnically targeted political violence – it remains unknown what impact cleavage-bridging endorsements might actually have on voters. Even if voters are willing to follow endorsements from ingroup politicians, as the instrumental logic would predict, it may well be that they do so without changing their perceptions of outgroup candidates. We must establish empirically whether ingroup trust mediates the impact of an endorsement along with their associated instrumental and affective effects on voter attitudes.

3.2   Experimental Design

To identify the causal effect of cleavage-bridging endorsements on voter evaluations of candidates, we presented a simulated radio news segment embedded in a large-scale survey of respondents randomly selected across Nakuru County. The segment presented respondents with a fictitious candi-

date announcing his campaign for Nakuru's governorship in the 2017 election.[7] The county governor is a consequential position under Kenya's 2010 constitution. Powers devolved to county governments provide governors with considerable authority over the distribution of local resources; they directly control at least 15% of total government revenue in Kenya (Cheeseman, Lynch and Willis, 2016). The county governor is thus an executive who has the power to channel resources to coethnics or distribute them across groups.

We opted for an audio rather than a video treatment because most Kenyans receive their news from the radio. According to Round 7 of the Afrobarometer, 70% of Kenyans receive their daily news from the radio.[8] To enhance the treatment's realism, the radio news segment was modeled after typical coverage of election campaigns in Kenyan popular media.[9] The segment consisted of an introduction by a news presenter, a brief excerpt of a campaign speech by the candidate at a rally, and an endorsement made by a local politician attending the rally.[10] The segment included real-world sound effects such as theme music to cue the respondent to the program's beginning and end, clapping and cheering during the candidate's speech at the rally, and background street noise during the endorser's statement.[11]

The endorser presented in the news segment is a Member of the County Assembly (MCA), which is an elected position in the local legislature. While politicians at all levels make endorsements, we opted for an MCA rather than a member of parliament (MP) because voters would be more likely to know the name of their local MP and be possibly swayed by factors such as incumbency or personality. It is possible that constituents might know MCAs from their own local wards, but it is highly unlikely that they would be able to correctly identify all MCAs in the Nakuru County Assembly.

The experimental manipulation involved varying the identities of the candidate and endorser as well as the content of the endorsement. Per convention, we manipulated the respondent's eth-

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[7]At the time of the study, Kenya's 2017 elections were a year away, but numerous candidates had already started declaring their intention to challenge incumbent governors, including Nakuru County Governor Kinuthia Mbugua.

[8]The data are available at http://afrobarometer.org/.

[9]The radio news script is in Appendix A.

[10]Each of treatments was delivered in a consistent manner with voice actors using a similar tone and pace throughout. As a result, the edited audio recordings are all within two seconds in length of each other. The exceptions are recordings for which the non-endorsement script was much shorter by design.

[11]Audio clips of the simulated news segment will be included in the replication files.

nic relationship vis-à-vis the candidate and endorser by varying the last names of both candidate and endorser (Dunning and Harrison, 2010; McCauley, 2014). Last names in Kenya often convey an individual's ethnicity. For the candidate, we either used Mwangi, a Kikuyu name, or Koech, a Kalenjin name. These two names are the two most common last names found for each group in the 2013 Nakuru County voter registration list. For the endorser, we used Njoroge, a Kikuyu name, or Korir, a Kalenjin name, which were the second most common names in the same voter list for each respective ethnic group. Moreover, voice actors were selected to ensure that they did not have identifiable accents in English or Kiswahili that would cue respondents to their ethnic identities other than through our treatment.

One concern with the subtle priming of ethnic relationships through last names is whether respondents can accurately identify the ethnicity of the individuals portrayed in the segment. Successful priming is critical to our study because we are interested in how an individual's perception of her ethnic ties to the candidate and the endorser shapes her willingness to cross ethnic boundaries to cast a vote. To verify that these perceptions were sufficiently manipulated, we asked respondents to identify the candidate's ethnicity and name as well as the endorser's after answering all other post-treatment questions. Respondents identified the ethnicity and name of both individuals with nearly perfect accuracy. Despite having only been primed of candidate and endorser identities during the treatment—as well as choosing from among 15 ethnic categories—respondents correctly identified both ethnicities and names more than 90% of the time. Respondents identified candidates at a slightly better rate than endorsers, but these differences are statistically indistinguishable.

Our experimental design is a 2 × 2 factorial design with an additional four control conditions in which we omit the endorsement for the candidate entirely or include the endorsement without disclosing the last name of the endorser. This yields a total of eight treatment and control conditions, which are graphically presented in Figure 1.[12]

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[12]We also randomly varied the type of appeal made by the endorser, emphasizing either public goods or private benefits as part of the endorsement. We find no effects based on appeal type, as reported in Appendix I. These results, however, are not central to our main theoretical claims regarding endorsements as such.

Figure 1: Experimental Design: Subjects Assigned to Main Treatment and Control Conditions

3.3 Survey Administration

The experiment, which was embedded within a face-to-face survey, was carried out using tablet devices in respondents' homes. Upon consent, respondents were exposed to a randomly selected recording that contained one of the eight treatment and control conditions.[13] The probability of assignment into the main experimental conditions (T1 through T4) was double that of being assigned to one of the control conditions (C1 through C4). Once respondents listened to the radio news segment, they answered a battery of questions related to their opinions of the candidate, their own political participation, and other demographic information. Following the administration of the post-treatment survey, respondents were debriefed about the fictitious nature of both the candidate and endorser portrayed in the segment. Respondents received a mobile phone airtime voucher worth 100 Kenyan shillings (US$1.10) after completing the interview as compensation for their time. After each successful interview, enumerators skipped a predetermined number of households and repeated the process

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[13]Respondents had the option of completing the survey in either English or Kiswahili.

until the day's target was reached.

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Demographics					
Female	1,806	0.524	0.500	0	1
Ethnicity (Kikuyu)	1,806	0.811	0.392	0	1
Ethnicity (Kalenjin)	1,806	0.189	0.392	0	1
Religion					
Protestant	1,806	0.758	0.428	0	1
Catholic	1,806	0.199	0.399	0	1
Muslim	1,806	0.011	0.105	0	1
Traditional	1,806	0.005	0.070	0	1
Other	1,806	0.027	0.163	0	1
Political Characteristics					
Voted in Prior Election	1,799	0.834	0.372	0.000	1.000
Party Member	1,805	0.332	0.471	0.000	1.000
TNA Party Member	598	0.776	0.417	0.000	1.000
URP Party Member	598	0.144	0.351	0.000	1.000
Feel Close to Party	1,805	0.520	0.500	0.000	1.000
Close to TNA	938	0.769	0.422	0.000	1.000
Close to URP	938	0.151	0.359	0.000	1.000
Asset Ownership					
Owns Radio	1,805	0.890	0.313	0.000	1.000
Owns TV	1,805	0.794	0.404	0.000	1.000
Owns Vehicle	1,805	0.324	0.468	0.000	1.000
Owns Mobile	1,805	0.914	0.280	0.000	1.000

Respondents were recruited within Nakuru County to vary their urban and rural conditions: Nakuru Town, Gilgil, Njoro and Elburgon/Molo.[14] Nakuru Town is one of Kenya's largest cities, while the other others are predominately rural in nature. A total of 1,806 interviews were completed across the four study sites over a period of 21 days: 1055 (58%) of these were completed in urban Nakuru Town, and the remaining 755 (42%) were completed in the rural areas in the outskirts of Nakuru and Gilgil, Njoro, and Elburgon/Molo. The sample was ethnically 81% Kikuyu and the remaining 19% was Kalenjin; 52% was female.[15] Table 1 presents summary statistics of the respondent sample on a set of

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[14]A map of the area is found in Appendix Figure A1.

[15]The sample's ethnic composition is comparable to the proportion of Kalenjins and Kikuyus in the 1989 Kenyan census

demographic, religious, political, and economic characteristics.

Respondents were recruited through a random-walk protocol modeled after the Afrobarometer protocol for household survey sampling.[16] Within each location, estates were chosen at random after listing them in pairs and randomly choosing which would be sampled.[17] After the estates were identified, enumerators started from previously selected landmarks and executed a random-walk protocol to identify households where interviewing would begin. In each household, enumerators followed the Kish grid method to determine which individual over the age of 18 would be interviewed. After being selected, respondents were administered a short screening questionnaire that determined eligibility. Only those who were of voting age, residents of Nakuru County, and either from the Kalenjin or Kikuyu ethnic group were eligible to participate in the experiment.

3.4   Outcomes of Interest

The main dependent variable is vote preference. The survey asked respondents about the likelihood that they would vote for the gubernatorial candidate presented in the radio news segment on a scale from 1 to 7, ranging from completely unlikely to completely likely. The average likelihood of voting for the candidate is 4.58, pooled across all treatment and control conditions, with a standard deviation of 1.51.

The survey posed a series of follow-up questions regarding attributes of the endorser and the candidate to determine whether trust is a key aspect of an endorsement. Respondents were asked about the endorser's trustworthiness on a 1-7 scale, ranging from completely untrustworthy to completely trustworthy. For the gubernatorial candidate, respondents were also asked to assess his trustworthiness on a scale from 1 to 7.

For the instrumental evaluations we expect to be associated with endorsements, respondents were

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of Nakuru District. The sample's slight over-representation of women (52%) is a consequence of the prevalence of female single-individual households in Nakuru Town.

[16]For highly rural locations in Molo/Elburgon, a random-walk protocol was infeasible due to large distances between households. In these locations, enumerators were instructed to interview a respondent after every 300 meters of walking in a designated direction from the preselected departure point.

[17]For Nakuru Town, an official list of estates was secured from the Nakuru County Office of Planning. For Gilgil, Njoro, and Elburgon/Molo, the list of estates was collected by surveying a number of local residents prior to sampling.

asked to state the extent to which they agreed that the candidate's loyalty would "primarily lie with all people in the county, regardless of tribe or group." This question was also posed on a 1 to 7 scale from completely disagree to completely agree. Respondents were also asked whether they agreed that the candidate would "take care of my group" on the same 1-7 scale. Both questions are meant to gauge voter expectations about the candidate's behavior in office.

For the affective evaluations, respondents were asked to what extent they considered the candidate to be likable, a measure of ingroup bias in studies of social psychology (Misch, Paulus and Dunham, 2021). Respondents were also asked if they thought the candidate "cares about me," a measure of affective trust (McAllister, 1995)). Both questions were measured on a 1-7 scale. Descriptive statistics on these and auxiliary outcomes are presented in Appendix Table A1.

4 Empirical Analysis

We take an intention-to-treat analysis approach that compares the average responses among respondents assigned to treatment and control conditions. By doing so, we intentionally disregard that some respondents did not comply with the treatment, that is, they did not receive the treatment manipulation as intended. While this creates the possibility that the results presented here underestimate the treatment effect, we take the high compliance rates reported in the previous section as reason to expect that substantive findings will remain unchanged even if we account for non-compliance and calculate the complier average causal effect (CACE).

4.1 Endorsement Effects on Voter Support

The first part of our analysis examines the effects of endorser ethnicity on voter evaluations of candidates. Table 2 presents the average evaluations by the ethnic relationship between the endorser and respondent. References hereafter to coethnic or non-coethnic relationships will always be made with respect to the respondent. As shown in Table 2, we find that assignment to an endorsement issued by the respondents' coethnic has no discernible effect on the evaluation of a candidate from her own

ethnic group. The difference in evaluations between a coethnic candidate endorsed by a coethnic versus a non-coethnic are statistically indistinguishable from zero. This null result suggests that, when evaluating a candidate from her own group, the respondent derives no additional information by knowing the ethnicity of the endorser.

Table 2: Endorser Ethnicity Effects: Support for Coethnic and Non-Coethnic Candidates

|	Coethnic candidate	Non-coethnic candidate
(1) Coethnic endorser	4.92 (0.08)	4.56 (0.09)
(2) Non-coethnic endorser	4.89 (0.08)	4.07 (0.09)
Difference in means : (1)–(2)	0.03 (0.11)	0.49*** (0.12)
Wilcoxon Test (P-value)	p = 0.437	p < 0.001
KS Test (P-value)	p = 0.525	p < 0.001

Notes: Cells report average answers to the question, "On a scale from 1 to 7... how likely are you to vote for the candidate?" Differences-in-means are assessed using a standard two-tailed t-test with estimated standard errors reported in parentheses. ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05.

We find, however, that respondent evaluations of non-coethnic candidates are positively influenced after hearing an endorsement that comes from one of their own coethnics. An endorsement issued by a coethnic has a statistically significant and positive effect on the respondent's evaluation of a non-coethnic candidate. The mean evaluation of the non-coethnic candidate with a coethnic endorsement (4.56) is almost 0.5 larger than the mean evaluation of the non-coethnic candidate with a non-coethnic endorsement (4.07) at p<0.0001. This result suggests that an otherwise indifferent voter might be more likely to support the non-coethnic candidate after hearing an endorsement by a coethnic. Given that the experimental estimates for candidate coethnicity effects range from 0.37 to 0.82 on a 7-point scale, the effect of a coethnic endorsement on a non-coethnic candidate is substantively large.[18] Since this outcome is measured on a Likert-type scale, we subject these findings to a series of robustness checks with non-parametric tests, as shown in Table 2. Both the two-sample Wilcoxon-

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[18]See Table A4 in the appendix.

Mann-Whitney rank sum test and the two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, which is known to be highly conservative when used for discrete distributions (Conover, 1972), support the findings from our parametric tests.

Figure 2: Evaluations of Coethnic and Non-Coethnic Candidates by Endorser Coethnicity

Notes: The bar graphs represent the proportion of respondents who replied that they were "somewhat," "very," or "completely" likely to vote for a candidate for each treatment condition. The error bars are 95% confidence intervals for the means. The difference in means is derived from a standard two-tailed t-test. ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05.

To facilitate a more intuitive interpretation of the magnitude of coethnic endorsement effects, Figure 2 plots the proportion of respondents who reported being "somewhat," "very," or "completely" likely to vote for the candidate portrayed in the radio news segment for each treatment condition. Subfigure (a) shows that endorsements have a limited effect on voter evaluations of a coethnic candidate, regardless of endorser identity (coethnic or non-coethnic). A coethnic candidate endorsed by a coethnic endorser (73%) is around 7 percentage points more likely to be supported than a candidate endorsed by a non-coethnic (66%), but the difference is statistically indistinguishable at conventional levels.

By contrast, a cleavage-bridging endorsement by a coethnic substantially increases voter support

for the non-coethnic candidate, as shown in subfigure (b). In comparison to a candidate endorsed by a non-coethnic (43%), a candidate endorsed by a respondent's coethnic (59%) enjoys a 16 percentage point boost in voter support, an effect that is statistically significant at the $p<0.01$ level. The coethnic endorsement effectively brings voting intentions for a non-coethnic candidate up to the level of an unendorsed coethnic candidate (63%). The electoral advantage enjoyed by the endorsed non-coethnic candidate appears to be derived almost entirely from the coethnic relationship between the endorser and the voter. Underscoring the importance that voters appear to attach to the identity of the endorser, we find no observable effect for a non-coethnic endorsement when compared to an unendorsed non-coethnic candidate. The level of support enjoyed by both non-coethnic candidates is virtually identical (43% versus 44%), as shown in the second and third bars of subfigure (b)

The persistence of coethnic bias shown in Figure 2 suggests that the endorsement findings presented here are not merely the product of social desirability. Satisficing, choosing the middle option on a Likert scale, can result from social desirability when respondents attempt not to displease the enumerator (Garland, 1991). But the apparent preference that respondents exhibit for their own co-ethnic candidates – as illustrated when comparing across subfigures (a) and (b) – suggests that there is no such effect in our sample.[19] Given the content of the experimental manipulation, the effects reported here are more likely driven by coethnic endorsements rather than any information in the treatment script. The priming of ethnic relationships was made only by mentioning the personal names of candidates and endorsers. The radio news segment never mentioned ethnic groups, the nature of inter-ethnic relations, or the names of any parties that might serve as proxies for ethnic groups. Furthermore, the candidate and the endorser were fictitious, so the outcomes cannot be attributed to their respective personalities, parties, or platforms.

4.2 Endorsement Effects on Candidate Evaluations

We have argued that cleavage-bridging endorsements, beyond affecting voter support, should also positively influence how voters perceive non-coethnic or outgroup candidates. Our research design

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[19]See Table A4 in the appendix for a more comprehensive dealing of coethnicity effects.

does not give us full inferential leverage in this respect, but it does provide suggestive evidence toward that end. If our theoretical argument is to hold, we should be able to observe corresponding differences on questions in respondents' perceptions of non-coethnic candidates. In Figure 3, we present analyses that test our claims for coethnic (subfigure a) and non-coethnic (subfigure b) candidates in terms of trustworthiness and associated outcomes for instrumental and affective evaluations. For the instrumental evaluations, we focus on whether a cleavage-bridging endorsement will move respondents to perceive the non-coethnic candidate as being more likely to distribute resources fairly across ethnic groups. For the affective evaluations, we examine whether the endorsed non-coethnic candidate is perceived as being more likable (a measure of ingroup bias) and more likely to care about the respondent (a measure of affect-based trust).

We find robust evidence that a cleavage-bridging endorsement increases the level of trust afforded to non-coethnic candidates (ATE = 0.311, p < 0.05). A coethnic endorsement yields no comparable advantage in perceived trustworthiness for coethnic candidates. In this respect, the coethnic endorsement's differential effects suggest that voters are using the endorsement to update their perceptions of candidate attributes, but only when that endorsement is issued by a coethnic in support of a non-coethnic.

Consistent with the expectations of instrumental voting, our findings show that cleavage-bridging endorsements can positively influence voter expectations about how outgroup candidates will behave in office. Subfigure (a) shows that respondents are more likely to update their beliefs regarding whether the non-coethnic candidate will ensure their access to equitable distribution of resources. A non-coethnic candidate endorsed by a coethnic is significantly more likely to be perceived as being loyal to the entire county or constituency (ATE=0.483, p<0.05). Such a candidate is also seen by respondents as being more interested in taking care of the interests of the respondent's ethnic group (ATE=0.259, p<0.05).[20] Subfigure (a) shows that we find no evidence that a coethnic endorsement affects evaluations of a coethnic candidate's qualities.

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[20]We also conduct tests that examine the inverse of these outcomes, namely, whether the candidate "will be loyal to his own group" and "take care of his own group." As expected, the ATE are negative and statistically significant.

Figure 3: Treatment Effects on Candidate Evaluations

(a) Endorsement Effects: Coethnic Candidate
Treated: Coethnic Endorser, Control: Non–coethnic Endorser

(b) Endorsement Effects: Non–coethnic Candidate
Treated: Coethnic Endorser, Control: Non–coethnic Endorser

Notes: Each of the outcomes are recorded on a seven point Likert scale. The error bars are 95% confidence intervals for the differences-in-means. The difference in means is derived from a standard two-tailed t-test.

The results presented in Figure 3 further indicate that cleavage-bridging endorsements can generate positive affect among voters. We find that an endorsement issued by a coethnic in support of a non-coethnic candidate significantly increases the perceived likability of that candidate (ATE = 0.418,

p<0.05). Given that prior research in social psychology uses likability as a measure of ingroup bias, this result suggests that an ingroup endorsement may help voters to see their relationship with outgroup candidates in qualitatively different terms. In support of this interpretation, we also find that a cleavage-bridging endorsement significantly increases a respondent's belief that the non-coethnic candidate will "care about me" (ATE = 0.355, p<0.05). Again, we find no comparable movement on the evaluations for the coethnic candidate.

4.3 The Mediating Role of Ingroup Trust

While the analysis thus far demonstrates that cleavage-bridging endorsements can affect voter perceptions of outgroup candidates, it does not allow us to formally assess the degree to which ingroup trust mediates the relationship between the treatment and the outcomes. We therefore implement a mediation analysis using the methodology proposed by Imai and Yamamoto (2013). Causal mediation analysis requires the specification of an intermediate variable that mediates the causal relationship between the treatment and outcome variables (Imai et al., 2010). If one accepts strong assumptions regarding sequential ignorability, the method allows for the identification of the Average Causal Mediation Effect (ACME). The results of these analyses are presented graphically in Figure 4. Each of the subfigures in Figure 4 presents the causal effect of the hypothesized mechanism on an outcome along with the average direct effect (ADE), the causal effect of the treatment on the outcome not transmitted through the hypothesized mediator, and the average total effect (ATE), which is the sum of ACME and ADE.[21]

Figure 4 provides a test of the mediating role of ingroup trust. If a cleavage-bridging endorsement can induce voters to transfer a degree of ingroup trust to a non-coethnic candidate, then we should be able to find that trust in the coethnic endorser consistently mediates the instrumental and affective perceptions described in the previous section. In subfigures (a) and (b), we examine the mediating role of ingroup trust on our main outcomes, namely, voting for a non-coethnic candidate and trust

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[21]The analysis from which these plots are generated are presented in Appendix Table A5. The table presents the ACME, ADE, and ATE, as well as the proportion of the ATE mediated by the specified mediator. The results do not include any covariates in the analysis, but results remain substantively similar when covariates are included.

Figure 4: Mediation Analysis on Trust

(a) Trust in coethnic endorser
mediates vote for noncoethnic candidate

Mediator: Trust for coethnic endorser
Outcome: Vote for noncoethnic candidate

(b) Trust in coethnic endorser
mediates trust in noncoethnic candidate

Mediator: Trust for coethnic endorser
Outcome: Trust for noncoethnic candidate

(c) Trust in coethnic endorser
mediates expecation that candidate will serve whole county

Mediator: Trust in coethnic endorser
Outcome: Noncoethnic candidate will serve whole county

(d) Trust in coethnic endorser
mediates expecation that candidate will take care of my group

Mediator: Trust in coethnic endorser
Outcome: Noncoethnic candidate will take care of my group

(e) Trust in coethnic endorser
mediates likability of candidate

Mediator: Trust in coethnic endorser
Outcome: Noncoethnic candidate is likable

(f) Trust in coethnic endorser
mediates expecation that candidate cares about me

Mediator: Trust in coethnic endorser
Outcome: Noncoethnic candidate cares about me

Notes: Each of the subfigures plots the estimated average treatment effect (ATE), average causal mediation effect (ACME), and average direct effect (ADE) of a hypothesized mediator. The dot represents the estimated effect of interest, and the lines 95% confidence intervals for the effect.

in a non-coethnic candidate. Subfigure (a) shows that trust in the coethnic endorser mediates more than 60% of the endorsement effect on reported willingness to vote for the non-coethnic. Subfigure (b) further shows that trust in the coethnic endorser accounts for more than 90% of the endorsement effect on reported trust in the non-coethnic candidate. After accounting for the mediating effect, the ADE of the endorsement on both the voting intention and trust towards the non-coethnic candidate is no longer distinguishable from zero. These results are consistent with the idea that ingroup trust is a critical mediator of cleavage-bridging endorsements.

Subfigures (c) and (d) corroborate our expectations for the instrumental perceptions associated with cleavage-bridging endorsements. Trust in the coethnic endorser mediates the two distribution-related outcomes: the expectation that the non-coethnic candidate will serve the whole county and the expectation that she will take care of the respondent's ethnic group. More than 40% of the endorsement effect on perceptions of candidate loyalty towards the county, irrespective of group membership, is mediated by trust in the coethnic endorser. The mediating effect of coethnic endorser trust is even larger for the notion that the non-coethnic candidate will take care of the respondent's group, accounting for almost the entirety (96%) of the total treatment effect.

Subfigures (e) and (f) provide further confirmation of the affective evaluations generated by endorsements. Trust in the coethnic endorser mediates the two candidate evaluations we categorize as affective in nature: candidate likability and candidate cares about me. The ACMEs for coethnic endorser trust account for 65% and 84% of the endorsement treatment effect on two outcomes, respectively. After accounting for the ACME, the direct effect of the endorsement is statistically indistinguishable from zero at p<0.05, indicating once again that ingroup trust plays a central role in mediating the impact of endorsements on voters in divided societies.

4.4   Subgroup Analysis: Urban vs. Rural Samples

One concern that may arise from the preceding analysis is the possibility that heterogeneous treatment effects across subgroups may be driving our main findings. Endorser effects could, for example, only emerge among respondents in the urban sample from Nakuru Town, since urban environments create contexts where individuals of various ethnicities mix and interact with each other on a day-to-day basis. Prolonged contact to other groups may mitigate any tendencies for ingroup favoritism and outgroup hostility. Ethnic groups in rural areas are often geographically clustered with little opportunity for sustained intergroup contact.

Despite the potential for heterogeneous treatment effects, we find that the main endorsement effects largely hold when we disaggregate the full sample to urban and rural samples. These results are reported in Table 3 and Figures A5 and A6. While we do find differences in effect sizes, the main

Table 3: Endorser ethnicity effects: support for a non-coethnic candidate, disaggregated by urban-rural respondents

	Urban sample (N = 710)	Rural sample (N = 508)
(1) Coethnic endorser	4.66 (0.12)	4.40 (0.12)
(2) Non-coethnic endorser	4.11 (0.12)	4.00 (0.13)
Difference in means : (1)–(2)	0.56** (0.16)	0.40* (0.18)
Wilcoxon Test (P-value)	p < 0.001	p = 0.028
KS Test (P-value)	p = 0.006	p = 0.275

Notes: Cells report average answers to the question, "On a scale from 1 to 7... how likely are you to vote for the candidate?" Differences-in-means are assessed using a standard two-tailed t-test with estimated standard errors reported in parentheses. ***$p<0.001$, **$p<0.01$, *$p<0.05$.

findings are replicated in the disaggregated samples: coethnic endorsements alter evaluations of non-coethnic candidates, but not coethnic candidates. In line with expectations, the difference in mean evaluations for a non-coethnic candidate across the two endorsement conditions (coethnic versus non-coethnic endorser) is much larger in the urban sample (0.56, p<0.001) than in the rural sample (0.39, p<0.05). In the urban sample, the effect of a coethnic endorsement is large enough to make respondents indifferent between a non-coethnic candidate and a coethnic candidate. It may be the case that greater intergroup contact within urban settings allows cleavage-bridging endorsements to serve as a stronger persuasive tool in mobilizing voters on behalf of non-coethnic candidates. However, the same does not hold in the rural sample. The effect of a coethnic endorsement for a non-coethnic candidate is still statistically significant at the p<0.05 within the rural sample, but the endorsement does not come close to making respondents indifferent between a coethnic candidate and a non-coethnic candidate.

Prior exposure to political violence may have weakened the treatment effects among rural respondents. Residents of Nakuru Town witnessed sporadic episodes of street fighting between Kalenjin and Kikuyu ethnic groups during the 2007-2008 postelection crisis, but the intensity and forms of violence were less severe when compared to the violence that erupted in some rural areas (Klaus, 2020). Rural

areas in our sample, including Molo/Elburgon, Njoro, and the outskirts of Gilgil, were reported to have been hotspots of ethnic clashes during the postelection violence (Anderson and Lochery, 2008). Prior exposure to violence may thus be dampening the willingness of voters to trust non-coethnic candidates even when they have been endorsed by coethnic politicians.[22]

5 Conclusion

This study provides a baseline for understanding the role of cleavage-bridging endorsements in facilitating political cooperation in divided societies. Endorsements are a regular feature of competitive elections around the world, but our knowledge of their effects remains limited in contexts where social identities condition how citizens engage with government and partisan cues are insufficient to convey programmatic information. Such dynamics characterize many of the countries that transitioned to electoral democracy since the late 1980s. Yet, without a larger body of scholarship that explicitly examines whether and how endorsements persuade voters to cross politicized social cleavages – possibly an essential requirement for the long-term survival of democracy – we cannot draw reliable conclusions about their effects on voter behavior. Even if aggregate voting patterns appear to be correlated with the endorsements issued by politicians, we cannot confidently claim that it is the voter who follows the politician or the other way around.

In building on well-established insights from instrumentalist theories of voting, we have sought to extend our understanding of how ingroup trust is leveraged to influence voters' cognitive and affective perceptions of outgroup candidates. Our findings confirm expectations associated with the instrumentalist framework: cleavage-bridging endorsements seem to persuade voters to believe that outgroup candidates will be fairer in the distribution of state resources. Importantly, we also corroborate our claims about the potential psychological or affective effects associated with the activation of ingroup trust through endorsements. We not only show that voters who hear cleavage-bridging endorsements are more likely to perceive outgroup candidates in affective terms, but we also pro-

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[22]We also manipulated the type of appeal included in the endorsement. The analyses of appeal effects are reported in Table A6 and Figures A4 in the Appendix. We find no discernible effect of the appeal type in shaping voting intentions for the candidate.

vide suggestive evidence that it is specifically ingroup trust that mediates the cognitive and affective effects of endorsements. These are new contributions that go beyond the existing instrumentalist framework conventionally used to model voter behavior in divided societies.

But, again, the results presented here should be considered baseline findings. It is important to note that our findings need to be corroborated using other research designs and methodological approaches. More experimental work is required to precisely assess the trust mechanism as well to identify its impact on the voter-candidate relationship. Similarly, more qualitative research is needed to deepen our knowledge of how voters themselves learn from endorsements, gauge their credibility, and use them to calibrate instrumental and affective perceptions of outgroup politicians. Researchers also need to consider how voters process contradictory claims often made through endorsements. In our study, voters were not presented with the kind of negative information typically heard during election campaigns. It remains unknown to what extent a positive endorsement can offset negative critiques about a candidate, particularly when those critiques relate to social cleavages.

Additional research should also address the real world conditions associated with a range of politicized social identities. Future work needs to consider, for instance, whether the impact of endorsements vary across different types of cleavages such as race, religion, language, or gender. We cannot assume that an endorsement works equally well in bridging the linguistic divides of Belgium as the racial divides of Mauritius. Beyond cleavage type, demographic factors such as the relative size of groups may influence whether endorsements matter more for members of smaller groups rather than those who belong to larger groups. An endorsement's efficacy may also depend on the past success or failure of intergroup cooperation. Historical animosity or rivalry between groups could certainly dampen the endorsement's credibility.

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Online Appendix for

Increasing Intergroup Trust:
Endorsements and Voting in Divided Societies

A Treatment Script

News Presenter: This is the news in brief. I am Beatrice Kisima. Today, aspiring candidate for County Governor in Nakuru County, **[Steven Koech/Steven Mwangi]**, addressed a large rally in preparation for upcoming elections. During the rally, he spoke of his political qualifications and his plans for the county.

Candidate: I am a proud member of this community, but I have had enough of our elected politicians not doing enough. Our current leaders have repeatedly failed to deliver on their promises. This is why, today, we must take action together. If you elect me as governor, I will bring the change this community needs. [Background noise of rally crowd clapping and cheering]

News Presenter: We listened to reactions from **[William Korir/William Njoroge]**, who attended the rally.

Endorser: My name is **[William Korir/William Njoroge]**, and I am an MCA of the Nakuru County Assembly. I am very happy that the candidate came to speak about issues that affect us all deeply in this county. I especially like **[Steven Koech/Steven Mwangi]**'s **[promise to bring development like new roads, better schools, and better access to water because these things will help our community to live better / promise to help you and me with our children's school fees, our medical bills, and our expenses for weddings and funerals because these things will help our families]**. I hope this county will come together and vote for **[Steven Koech/Steven Mwangi]** because he is a true leader. We do not want any other candidate. [Background noise of rally crowd.]

News Presenter: The early announcement of **[Steven Koech/Steven Mwangi]** for the governor's race highlights how competitive the next elections are expected to be.

* A sample of the audio file for the simulated news segments can be accessed here.

B   Study Sites

Figure A1: Map of study sites in Nakuru County

C   Descriptive Statistics on Experimental Outcomes

Table A1: Descriptive statistics on outcomes

| Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
General Evaluations					
Voting Intention	1,805	4.575	1.510	1.000	7.000
Trustworthiness	1,805	4.455	1.471	1.000	7.000
Anticipated Job Performance					
Cares About people Like Me	1,805	4.248	1.663	1.000	7.000
Will Do a Good Job	1,805	4.493	1.537	1.000	7.000
Solve My Personal Problem	1,805	3.417	1.732	1.000	7.000
Assessment of Politics					
Assessment of Leaders	1,805	5.233	1.405	1.000	7.000
Assessment of County's Problems	1,805	5.350	1.395	1.000	7.000
Ethnic Favoritism					
Take Care of My Tribe	1,805	4.045	1.606	1.000	7.000
Favor His Own Tribe	1,805	4.457	1.536	1.000	7.000
Serve the Whole County	1,805	4.611	1.382	1.000	7.000
Serve his Own Tribe	1,805	4.363	1.516	1.000	7.000
Endorser Evaluations					
Trustworthiness	1,504	4.558	1.391	1.000	7.000
Qualified to Make an Assessment of Candidate	1,518	4.134	1.606	1.000	7.000
Daily Life Experience Similar	1,523	3.382	1.819	1.000	7.000
Economic Situation Similar	1,518	2.599	1.664	1.000	7.000

D   Manipulation Checks

Table A2: Manipulation check: Rate of correct ethnicity and name identification

	Correctly identified ethnicity	Correctly identified name
Candidate	97% (1758/1806)	97% (1751/1806)
Endorser	95% (1159/1219)	94% (1149/1219)

We take two approaches to conduct the manipulation checks to assess whether the respondents were successfully treated through our simulated radio news segments. Following the treatment, we asked respondent to identify the ethnicity of both the candidate and the endorser, and 2) identify their names from a list of five names. We present the proportion of individuals who correctly identified the ethnicity and the name in Table A2. As is clear, the radio news segments are likely to have successfully manipulated respondent's perception of coethnicity between them, the candidate, and the endorser. 97% of respondents correctly identified the ethnicity and name of the candidate in the vignette, and close to 95% of respondents correctly identified the ethnicity and name of the endorser. Given the high rate of compliance, it should be unsurprising that the complier average causal effects (CACE)—estimated using a two stage least squares regression regressing the treatment conditions against the endogenous compliance variable—do not substantively differ any of the results reported in the main text of the paper.

E   Additional Endorsement Effects

Figure A2: Trust transference causes changes to instrumental assessments of candidates

(a)   (b)

Notes: The bar graphs represent the proportion of respondents who replied "somewhat," "very," or "completely" for each outcome. The left panel's outcome is the extent to which a respondent finds the *endorser* trustworthy. The right panel's outcome is the extent to which respondents believe the *non-coethnic* candidate will serve the whole county rather than just his own group. The error bars are 95% confidence intervals for the means. The difference in means is derived from a standard two-tailed t-test. ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05.

Figure A3: Trust transference causes changes to affective assessments of candidates

(a)   (b)

Notes: The bar graphs represent the proportion of respondents who replied "somewhat," "very," or "completely" for each outcome. The left panel's outcome is the extent to which a respondent finds the *endorser* trustworthy. The right panel's outcome is the extent to which respondents find the *non-coethnic* candidate likable. The error bars are 95% confidence intervals for the means. The difference in means is derived from a standard two-tailed t-test. ***$p<0.001$, **$p<0.01$, *$p<0.05$.

F Offsetting Effects of Endorsements

Table A3: Comparison of other treatment conditions to the non-coethnic candidate, coethnic endorser condition

Comparison Condition	Diff.in.means	Survives FDR	Wilcoxon Test	KS Test
1. Coethnic candidate, coethnic endorser	0.37**	Yes	p < 0.001	p = 0.008
2. Coethnic candidate, non-coethnic endorser	0.34**	Yes	p = 0.006	p = 0.114
3. Coethnic candidate, no endorsement	0.12	-	p = 0.290	p = 0.837
4. Coethnic candidate, no endorser ethnicity	0.25	No	p = 0.053	p = 0.147

Notes: Differences-in-means are assessed using a standard two-tailed t test with estimated standard errors reported in parentheses. ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05. For the multiple testing adjustment, we use the Benjamini-Hochberg correction at an FDR of 0.05. We also report p-values from the non-parametric Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank sum test and the two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. All tests in this table are specified in the pre-analysis plan registered with EGAP under ID 20151116AA.

G   Candidate Ethnicity Effects

Table A4: Candidate ethnicity effects

	Pure control	Endorser unknown	Coethnic endorser	Non-coethnic endorser	Endorser pooled
(1) Coethnic candidate	4.67 (0.14)	4.84 (0.12)	4.92 (0.08)	4.89 (0.07)	4.90 (0.06)
(2) Non-coethnic candidate	4.02 (0.14)	4.38 (0.11)	4.55 (0.08)	4.06 (0.09)	4.31 (0.06)
Difference in means : (1)–(2)	0.65*** (0.19)	0.46*** (0.16)	0.37*** (0.12)	0.82*** (0.12)	0.60*** (0.08)
Wilcoxon test	p < 0.001	p < 0.001	p < 0.001	p < 0.001	p < 0.001
KS test	p = 0.007	p = 0.004	p = 0.008	p < 0.001	p < 0.001

Notes: Cells report average answers to the question, "On a scale from 1 to 7 ... how likely are you to vote for the candidate?" Differences-in-means are assessed using a standard two-tailed t test with estimated standard errors reported in parentheses. ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05. We also report p-values from the non-parametric Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank sum test and the two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. Shaded columns denote statistical tests specified in the pre-analysis plan registered with EGAP under ID 20151116AA.

H   Mediation Analysis

Table A5: Mediation analysis of mechanisms: non-coethnic candidate

			Causal Mechanisms			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Outcome	Vote intention	Candidate trust	Loyalty to county	Take care of my group	Candidate Likability	Cares about me
Mediator	Endorser trust	Endorser trust	Endorser trust	Endorser trust	Endorser trust	Endorser trust
ACME	0.305	0.304	0.205	0.263	0.279	0.309
	(0.173, 0.450)	(0.174, 0.440)	(0.114, 0.310)	(0.148, 0.390)	(0.159, 0.410)	(0.176, 0.450)
ADE	0.182	0.030	0.300	0.003	0.149	0.057
	(-0.041, 0.400)	(-0.178, 0.240)	(0.080, 0.510)	(-0.240, 0.240)	(-0.055, 0.350)	(-0.199, 0.310)
Total Effect	0.487	0.334	0.505	0.266	0.428	0.365
	(0.239, 0.730)	(0.097, 0.570)	(0.280, 0.730)	(0.005, 0.520)	(0.200, 0.650)	(0.090, 0.630)
Proportion Mediated	0.627	0.908	0.406	0.965	0.652	0.844

Notes: Cells report the average causal mediation effect (ACME), average direct effect (ADE), and average treatment effect (ATE) from causal mediation analysis, as presented by Imai, Tingley, and Yamamoto (2010). The first row of each cell corresponds to the point estimate, while the second row of each cell reports the 95% confidence interval for the point estimate.

I Appeal Effects

Table A6: Appeal effects on candidate evaluations, disaggregated by candidate ethnicity

	Coethnic candidate (N=608)	Non-coethnic candidate (N=610)
(1) Public goods appeal	4.87 (0.09)	4.36 (0.08)
(2) Private goods appeal	4.94 (0.08)	4.24 (0.09)
Difference in means : (1)–(2)	-0.06 (0.11)	0.12 (0.12)
Wilcoxon Test (P-value)	p = 0.490	p = 0.345
KS Test (P-value)	p = 0.965	p = 0.621

Notes: Cells report average answers to the question, "On a scale from 1 to 7... how likely are you to vote for the candidate?" Differences-in-means are assessed using a standard two-tailed t-test with estimated standard errors reported in parentheses. ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05. We report p-values from the non-parametric Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank sum test and the two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.

Figure A4: Appeal effects on candidate evaluations, disaggregated by candidate ethnicity

(a) Vote for Coethnic Candidate   (b) Vote for Non-coethnic

Notes: The bar graphs represent the proportion of respondents who replied that they were "somewhat," "very," or "completely" likely to vote for a candidate for each treatment condition. The error bars are 95% confidence intervals for the means. The difference in means is derived from a standard two-tailed t-test. ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05.

J   Heterogeneous effects: Urban vs rural

Figure A5: Endorsement effects on coethnic candidate: Urban/rural sample

(a) Vote for Coethnic Candidate: Urban Sample (b) Vote for Coethnic Candidate: Rural Sample

Figure A6: Endorsement effects on non-coethnic candidate: Urban/rural sample

(a) Vote for Non-coethnic Candidate: Urban Sample (b) Vote for Non-coethnic Candidate: Rural Sample

Notes: The bar graphs represent the proportion of respondents who replied that they were "somewhat," "very," or "completely" likely to vote for a candidate for each treatment condition. The error bars are 95% confidence intervals for the means. The difference in means is derived from a standard two-tailed t-test. ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05.

Figure A7: Trust towards Kikuyu Presidents: Afrobarometer Rounds 3–7

Notes: Plots the mean values of the "Trust in the President" items across Rounds 3–7 of the Afrobarometer, disaggregated by ethnic group. The dark blue, blue, dark red, and red lines denote the means for Kikuyus, Kikuyus who are Nakuru residents, Kalenjins, and Kalenjins who are Nakuru residents respectively.