# When Policies Undo Themselves: Self-Undermining Feedback as a Source of Policy Change

Jacobs, A. M. & Weaver, R. K. (2014). When policies undo themselves: Self-undermining feedback as a source of policy change. *Governance*, 28(4), 441–457. https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12101

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# **Agenda**

- 1. Existing approaches
- 2. Theory building, through the introduction of three new mechanisms
- 3. Case Study: US healthcare reform
- 4. Limitation/critiques
- 5. Discussion questions

# **Icebreaker**

Can you think of a time a **long lasting policy** is **abandoned** or **majorly reformed**?

Why?

# **Existing Approaches to Feedback Effects**

#### Alternative Approaches to Policy Feedback

	Punctuated Equilibrium Approach	Historical Institutionalist Approach
Positive feedback	Disturbances quickly reinforced → <i>policy change</i>	Long-term self-reinforcing effects → policy stability or expansion
Negative feedback	Disturbances quickly counterbalanced → <i>policy</i> stability	Long-term self-undermining effects → policy rollback or reorientation

# Punctuated equilibrium a strategic aspect approach

- Political stability as a consequence of negative feedback
- Positive feedback as a self-reinforcing variable for the momentum of change

# Historical Institutionalism, mechanism focused approach and time influence

- Long term self reinforcement feedback
- Long Term as an self-undermining feedback

# **Mechanism 1: Emergent Losses**

Policy feedback as a cost and benefit distribution over time

Two aspects: Increasing returns (self-reinforcing) or unanticipated losses (self-undermining)

Reasons might lead policy making to create UL:

- Collective activity: Complexity and incoherence instead of black and white policies
- Policy layering: Policies build upon each other and create friction and unforeseen interactions
- Electoral incentives: Re-election concerns prioritize short-term over long-term outcomes

With a particular institutional setting needed: compromised-based policies/Short term electoral pressure/ambitious social engineering

# **Mechanism 2: Mass cognition**

How do policies undermine their support base, leading voters to support a need for policy change?

- Negativity bias: How does the fact that people weigh negative information as more important than positive information, influence the political situation
- Loss/gain framing: How do voters' cost benefit calculation influence their perception of policies
- Informal conditions: Influence of policy framing by the elite

#### **Policy losses conditions:**

- 1. Concentration
- 2. Temporality
- 3. Cross-sectionality

# **Mechanism 3: Expansion of the Menu of Alternatives**

Policy feedback as expanded policy options

Self-reinforcement: **Options narrowing** → Path dependency limits

Self-undermining: **Options expansion** → Evolution of political sphere

#### **Institutional setting needed:**

- 1. Diffusion
- 2. Penetration
- Coherence

# Recap self-reinforcement vs. self-undermining

#### Self-reinforcement in HI

Traditional Historical Institutionalist mechanism

Status quo policy regime...

- creates support for itself
- creates support for expansion
- creates support for policy choices complementary with the status quo
- → Only explains policy stability

#### **Self-undermining**

Aims to explain...

- endogenous policy change
- policy rollback
- policy reform

... from a Historical Institutionalist perspective

# Case study: US healthcare reform

#### **Affordable Care and Patient Protection Act**

**Before ACA**: "Public-private patchwork" (p. 451)

- Medicaid (poverty)
- Medicare (old age)
- Private employer provided HC
- No federal regulation until 1974 (Pestaina et al., 2024)

#### **ACA**

- Expansion of Medicaid and subsidies
- Regulation on pre-existing conditions,
  price-discrimination (Ortaliza & Cox, 2024)
- → RQ: Why did the US deviate from its historic path, at the time it did?

#### **Mechanism 1: Emergent costs**

**Layering:** "Fragmented system of financing led total health expenditures to rise far higher than in any other country" (p. 451).

#### **Employers and individuals:**

- Employer costs rise 50%
- Uninsured rises from 10% (70s) to 16.7%
- Benefits are cut

#### **Government:**

State budgets strained

#### **Healthcare providers:**

- Hospitals face patients who cannot pay
- Doctors' incomes fall

# Case study: US healthcare reform

#### **Mechanism 2: Mass cognition**

"Increasingly salient losses also expand the electoral coalition" (p. 452).

#### Public opinion is favorable...

- Majority view HC as dysfunctional
- Indiv. ACA provisions very popular
- Healthcare reform among voters' top priorities

#### ... due to consistent loss aversion framing

- Loss due to unaffordable premiums & out-of-pocket costs
- Loss due to employer cutting benefits
- Loss due to job loss (Financial Crisis)
- → Dems frame ACA as **protection** from loss
- → Dems win POTUS, House, Senate supermajority

#### **Mechanism 3: Menu effects**

"High social costs of the status quo led to decades-long search for new reform alternatives" (p.453)

#### Major hurdles to reform:

- Avoid tax hikes
- Maintain role of private insurers

Emerging credible menu options 1990s:

- Employer mandate
- Managed competition

Emerging credible menu options 2009/2010:

 Individual mandate: Successfully trialed in Massachusetts

# **Critical review**

#### **Theoretical part**

- Argument only based on western examples
- Mechanism working only under specific institutional conditions/case dependent
- Overemphasizing of the endogenous factors

### **Case study**

- Major empirical claims are not substantiated, especially regarding differences in conditions under Clinton vs. Obama:
  - Significant difference framing
  - Significant difference in costs

# **Discussion**

Could this mechanism theorized survive institutional variations?

Why was Donald Trump elected twice, despite promising to abolish the ACA?

# **References**

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