REPORT FROM THE LABORATORY: THE INFLUENCE OF INSTITUTIONS ON POLITICAL ELITES' DEMOCRATIC VALUES IN GERMANY

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The unification of Germany revives several questions about the future of Germany's democracy. Given the socialist–authoritarian background, how supportive are East Germany's elites of liberal democratic rights? Has the socialist–democratic experience instilled into elites a social egalitarian conception of democracies? In what ways, if at all, do elites support direct democracy procedures? I examine political elites' conceptions of democracies in the united Germany in 1991, using a survey of 168 parliamentarians from the united parliament in Berlin. I find that the socialist and parliamentary institutions in the East and the West, respectively, have substantially influenced elites' conceptions of democracies in Germany, leading to a value divergence across the East–West boundary. Yet the findings also suggest that a partial value convergence in terms of liberal democratic rights among postwar elites has taken place. The results support an institutional learning theory, but they also suggest that support for liberal democratic values has been diffused into East Germany.

I think entirely in dialectical terms.
—an East Berlin CDU parliamentarian
on evaluating political issues

The unification of Germany revives several questions about the future of Germany's democracy, most of which analysts of the West German political system had thought were resolved. Especially throughout the 1980s, a consensus evolved among scholars that the West German mass public and elites had developed a democratic political culture (Baker, Dalton, and Hildebrandt 1981; Hoffmann-Lange 1985; Roth 1976; Weidenfeld and Korte 1991). However, the socialist East German system in many ways represented a continuation of Germany's antidemocratic past—one-party-controlled, with few opportunities for elites and the public alike to express their opinions freely (Childs, Baylis, and Rueschemeyer 1989; Krisch 1985; Ludz 1972; Schweigler 1975). Hence, given the importance of political elites in the political reconstruction of the unified Germany, I shall analyze the democratic values of the German political elite at the end of 1991.

There is no agreement on one fixed blend of democratic values necessary to make a political elite democratic. But the extent of elites' commitment to basic democratic rights, their views on social egalitarian principles, and the extent to which plebiscitarian procedures are favored by elites partly define the character that a democratic system develops (Dahl 1989; Pennock 1979). These three core values (also referred to as *elites' conceptions of democracies*)[1] constitute important elements in elites' ideology (Collier and Mahon 1993; Putnam 1973). Thus, given the 50-year history of experience in an authoritarian regime, how supportive are East German elites of liberal democratic rights (e.g., free elections, freedom of discussion)? Has the socialist experience instilled into East German elites a social egalitarian conception of democracy? Given the extensive involvement of ordinary citizens in the 1989 revolution and the emphasis of socialist ideology on direct democracy, how do East German elites view plebiscitarian procedures? Using a survey of East and West German parliamentarians from the united parliament in Berlin, I shall attempt to address these questions.

Although my focus is on legislative elites' conceptions of democracies in Berlin shortly after unification, the theoretical significance reaches beyond Berlin and, indeed, beyond Germany; for it addresses the perennial question of whether political institutions can reshape elites' core values. Previous elite studies remain inconclusive on this issue because they focus *either* on individual-level *or* systemic source of elites' political values. For example, individual-level studies highlight elites' professional norms as sources of parliamentary behavior (Herzog et al. 1990; Searing 1982, 1985) and elite attitudes (Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman 1981; Roth 1976); or else they document the influence of elites' generational experience on elite polarization over such New Politics issues as environmentalism (Dalton 1987).[2] Systemic studies, in contrast, assume that the unique regime experience of elites within a given polity (e.g., political institutions, level of economic development) contributes to a similar outlook on core political values (Di Palma 1990; Higley and Burton 1989; Higley and Gunther 1992).[3]

Despite the recognition that both individual-level and systemic factors are important sources of elite values, these two perspectives have not been combined into a single study. Individual-level studies generally do not incorporate national-level factors into their empirical analyses of elites' values and frequently treat core values as an "uncaused first cause" (Putnam 1973, 149). In contrast, systemic approaches cannot generate the detailed empirical data of survey studies about elites' values because

such information for longer time periods (frequently centuries) is not available.[4] The main reason for this gap is undoubtedly the absence of proper cases where both types of factors can systematically be varied, measured, and controlled for. I suggest that the conditions created by Germany's division and unification offer the opportunity for a synthesis by examining the influence of political institutions (controlling for individual-level East–West differences) on elites' conceptions of democracies.

Thus one of my theoretical objectives is to analyze the diverging impact of socialist and parliamentary institutions on elites' democratic values. But a second is to consider the possibility that democratic ideals have spread to East Germany. In fact, there are good reasons to argue that East and West Germans have not merely drifted apart during the past four decades. Analysts of democratic transitions in Southern and East–Central Europe have argued that support for liberal democratic values may develop even within authoritarian states (Di Palma 1990; McDonough, Barnes, and Lopez-Pina 1986; Weil 1989). While these studies point to a broad range of potential sources of value diffusion (e.g., mass media, economic development, education), the diffusion argument predicts that democratic values have developed in East Germany despite the authoritarian political environment. I will therefore also examine the possibility of a value convergence in terms of elites' conceptions of democracies.

In seeking to address these issues, I interviewed 168 parliamentarians from the united Berlin parliament (79 from East Berlin, 89 from West Berlin) between September 1991 and June 1992. I view Berlin's division and unification as a quasi laboratory, where the effect of socialist and parliamentary-democratic systems on elites' conceptions of democracies can be studied. Although a focus on the Berlin parliament lacks the external validity of a national elite study, it has the advantage of maximizing the range of background factors that are being kept constant (e.g., regional differences in political traditions within Germany between South–West and North–East). Further, where available, I will present evidence that the Berlin results are generalizable to the national legislative elite. I therefore believe that the Berlin study provides a first important step toward assessing systematically the influence of political institutions on elites' understanding of a democracy.

First, I argue that a process of institutional learning may have substantially shaped elites' democratic ideals in East and West Germany. Based on this discussion, I shall propose a series of testable hypothesis. Next, I shall present evidence that corroborates several (though not all) institutional-learning hypotheses. Finally, I shall examine the extent to which democratic values have been diffused into East Germany and highlight the main implications of this study.

INSTITUTIONAL LEARNING AND DEMOCRACY IN GERMANY

The establishment of a parliamentary democracy in West Germany and a socialist system in East Germany in 1949 marks the beginning of a monumental social experiment; for in both systems, the political culture had to be reconstructed to conform to the new regimes. In West Germany, public opinion and elite studies documented that the undemocratic forces during the 1950s had to be reckoned with (Almond and Verba 1963; Edinger 1960; Meritt and Meritt 1970). But the longevity of democratic institutions and the economic success during the 1950s and 1960s also began to transform, slowly but steadily, mass and elite political values. By the mid-1970s, analysts of public opinion and political elites alike began to document the growing acceptance of democratic values, especially among citizens born during the postwar years (Baker, Dalton, and Hildebrandt 1981; Boynton and Loewenberg 1973, 1974; Hoffmann-Lange 1985; Kaase 1971; Kuechler 1992). In East Germany, while Communist party elites could partly benefit from the authoritarian traditions in German society (Dahrendorf 1967), the task was to imbue East Germans with socialist ideals (Glaessner 1989). Although the developments in East Germany are less well documented than those in West Germany, initial analyses seem to indicate that the East German system was at least partially successful in achieving this goal (Bauer 1991; Friedrich 1990; Noelle-Neumann 1991).[5]

Theoretically, the division-and-unification of Germany allows analysts to examine whether a political system, if established for a sufficient time period, can reshape a nation's political culture. Almond and Verba's (1963) seminal *Civic Culture* analyzes the culture–institution nexus by primarily examining the value prerequisites of democratic systems. But Verba, in an important essay, explicitly suggests that institutions may also have a significant influence on individuals' values because "what an individual believes about the political process is learned from observation of that process" (1965, 533). The central supposition is that elites' (and publics') exposure to a particular institutional configuration substantially influences the basic political values of individuals, a theme that became increasingly important in the wake of the success of West German democratic institutions (Almond and Verba 1980; Conradt 1974; Rogowski 1974). From this perspective, individuals' regime experience may be viewed as a combination of elites' exposure to the regime ideology (the official values and norms) and regime practices (the operating norms). At the center of this perspective, then, is the premise that the process of institutional learning molds individuals' democratic values.[6]

The effect of newly established institutions on elites' political values is an especially important issue in contexts where abrupt and fundamental changes in political systems occur, such as the ones in Central

Europe after World War II or in 1989. Are new institutional arrangements able to imbue citizens with those ideological values that institutions need to endure? Political culture theory predicts that under these conditions individuals' existing value predispositions will initially delay the impact of new institutional learning (Almond and Verba 1963).[7] Yet, one would also expect that individuals will slowly but steadily incorporate the new institutional values and norms into individuals' preexisting values. In particular, generational experience may become a "major basis for subcultural differentiation" (Eckstein 1988, 798). That is, cohorts born after a regime transition are only exposed to the new institutional configuration and should provide less resistance to the new institutional values and norms than generations that were also shaped by pretransition institutions (Sigel 1989). This perspective therefore anticipates that elites' core values in West *and* East Germany should be influenced by the democratic and socialist regime experience because at least two elite generations have been socialized under two fundamentally different systems since about 1949. In short, the institutional learning perspective, combined with the notion of generational change, predicts that the East German socialist system, *despite* its collapse, shaped elites' ideological predispositions.[8]

Democratic Ideals in East and West Germany

Based on these considerations, the division of Germany after World War II and the 1989 unification can be used to study the effect of parliamentary-democratic and socialist institutions on elites' political values under quasi experimental conditions. Since a diverse range of factors (e.g., social culture, historical traditions) that usually varies across nations remains constant, these systemic factors can be largely ruled out as sources of East–West variations in elites' democratic values. Further, all parliamentarians represent constituencies within the city of Berlin, which means that variations of regional interests (e.g., between cities and more rural areas) are unlikely to enter parliamentarians' views on the topics discussed with them (a "most–most" similar systems design).[9]

Undoubtedly, there are other national-level variations between East and West Germany that our study design cannot adjust. For example, the West German economy has clearly outperformed East Germany's command economy. However, although this East–West difference may influence elites' views on specific economic decisions (e.g., where to invest resources for a particular project), it is less plausible to view differences in economic capacity as sources of ideological differences across the East–West boundary. Recognizing that the design only approximates—but does not duplicate—experimental conditions, I submit that variations of elites' ideological values, if they exist, must be attributed to the different institutional configuration that elites from East and West Berlin were exposed to.

Following the work of political theorists (e.g., Dahl 1989; Held 1987; Pennock 1979), I examine elites' democratic values from three different angles and propose six hypotheses about the expected East–West and generational differences. Briefly, liberal parliamentary democracies emphasize individual political rights in their conceptions of democracies, such as the right to participate in politics and the right to form an opposition (what Dahl terms *polyarchy*). Second, socialist democracies emphasize the egalitarian distribution of economic goods and link the ideal-typical democracy to the egalitarian provision of economic goods (Held 1987). Finally, a direct democracy model stresses the development of plebiscitarian procedures to expand the direct involvement of citizens (Barber 1984; Dahl 1989). These three different conceptions are not mutually exclusive, but the particular emphasis on these values defines elites' ideal-typical democracy.

Based on these variants and the institutional learning argument, the first expectation concerns elites' support for liberal democratic rights. While the ideological and institutional foundations of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) differed from previous authoritarian regimes, several analysts maintain that the authoritarian structures of the socialist East German state resemble past authoritarian institutions (Dahrendorf 1967; McCauley 1983). For example, East German elites were socialized in a political environment that penalized the open and regime-critical exchange of political ideas. In addition, the official rhetoric of the GDR regime did not nurture political competition or independent mass involvement in politics. In contrast, West German elites have been socialized into a political system that encourages political competition and citizens' participation in politics. Thus, the first proposition focuses on elites' support for liberal democratic rights:

HYPOTHESIS 1. *East German elites are less supportive of liberal democratic rights than West German elites.*

Furthermore, postwar elites in West Germany were socialized under democratic conditions, whereas prewar elites also experienced the authoritarian influence of the Third Reich. In contrast, prewar and postwar elites in East Germany were primarily exposed to authoritarian systems. Therefore, the effect of institutional learning should reflect generational differences within West Germany but not in East Germany (Eckstein 1988):

HYPOTHESIS 2. *Postwar elites are more committed to democratic rights than prewar elites in West Germany, but not in East Germany.*

The socialist system in East Germany permanently exposed East German citizens to an ideology that closely linked a democracy to the egalitarian distribution of economic goods. This ideological message was reinforced in schools or through the minimal opportunity to own private property (Glaessner 1989; Rueschemeyer and Lemke 1989):

HYPOTHESIS 3. *East, but not West, elites' conceptions of democracies stress social egalitarian elements.*

The logic of generational experience implies a further proposition about the anticipated cohort differences regarding the understanding of democracy by members of parliament (MPs):

HYPOTHESIS 4. *Postwar elites in East Germany, but not in West Germany, are more likely than prewar elites to emphasize the social egalitarian conception of democracies.*

Hypotheses 5 and 6 concern East elites' views on direct democracy procedures. There are two reasons to believe that East Germans are more likely than West Germans to support plebiscitarian procedures. First, the extensive involvement of citizens during the 1989 revolution undoubtedly sensitized East elites to the importance of citizens' involvement in politics. Had it not been for the so-called Monday demonstrations of the East German public, the upheavals in East Germany during 1989 would likely have taken a different course. Second, while socialist systems did not endorse independent involvement of masses in politics, socialist ideology did endorse the direct mobilization of masses for socialist goals (Held 1987). While I will not be able to disentangle the relative importance of these processes, the logic of these arguments provides the basis for the fifth hypothesis:

HYPOTHESIS 5. *East German elites are more supportive of plebiscitarian components than West Germans.*

Finally, while all citizens in East Germany experienced the collapse of their political regime, postwar elites should be particularly affected by this experience because younger citizens were disproportionately involved in bringing down the socialist system. In addition, the postwar cohort in East Germany was exclusively exposed to the mobilization tactics of the socialist regime. In West Germany, the New Politics literature suggests that postwar elites in West Germany should be more supportive than prewar elites of plebiscitarian procedures (Dalton 1992; Inglehart 1990):

HYPOTHESIS 6. *Postwar elites in East and West Germany are more likely than prewar elites to endorse procedures that increase the direct involvement of citizens in politics.*

These six hypotheses make the institutional-learning argument testable, but they also define the benchmark expectations to uncover value domains shaped by converging forces. That is, if I do not find differences where, on the basis of institutional learning, I expect them, I must explain their absence.

THE DATA

The data stem from a survey conducted between September 1991 and June 1992 with 168 (about 70%) parliamentarians of the united Berlin parliament. West MPs have been socialized under the West German system,[10] and they have spent an average of about seven years in the Berlin parliament. In addition, there is no reason to believe that West MPs are unrepresentative in terms of their democratic conceptions of the general political elite in West Berlin. However, I suspect that the nature of the selection process of East Berlin MPs may have biased the composition of East Berlin MPs. Most importantly, one criterion in selecting candidates for the Berlin parliament was the absence of close ties to the old GDR regime. Individuals who were politically active in the GDR system were unlikely to be nominated for a legislative seat within the new political system. Even within the reformed communist party (PDS), it furthered a candidate's career after the transition not to hold visible political or social positions in the GDR. Undoubtedly, several lower-level functionaries of the GDR have joined the West German parties. Still, the contemporary elite in East Germany, on average, probably overrepresents the most democratic forces within the East. Although this bias suggests caution in generalizing my findings to East Germany's old political elite, it actually stacks the case against confirming the hypotheses because old GDR elites were most intensely exposed to the socialist learning process. Thus any East–West difference that this study produces might actually be larger if old GDR elites were represented in adequate proportions in the Berlin parliament.

The interviews are based on a structured questionnaire containing a combination of open-ended and closed-ended questions. The Appendix contains detailed information on the data collection process and discusses evidence that the interviewed MPs closely mirror key characteristics of the entire Berlin parliament.

RESULTS

I employed several measures in order to investigate elites' support for liberal democratic, egalitarian, and plebiscitarian principles. To measure MPs' support for liberal democratic rights, I asked MPs to indicate their agreement or disagreement with items reflecting basic principles of liberal democracies (Table 1). I first present the bivariate results, followed by multivariate analyses, because the bivariate results convey a detailed profile of East and West elites' democratic values which the multivariate analyses does not convey. The first three items (A, B, C) measure individuals' commitment to general democratic procedures, while the next three indicators present respondents with a trade-off between conflict and order (D, E, F) (Kaase 1971; Putnam 1973). There is virtually unanimous support for the most basic democratic rights (A, B, C). Yet the level of support for democratic rights is significantly reduced when they conflict with another goal—for example, moral or ethical considerations (D) or the stability of the political order (E). Furthermore, there is some evidence that elites in the East are somewhat more willing to curtail individuals'

TABLE 1

MPs' Support for Democratic Rights

MEASURES		EAST	WEST	GAMMA
A.	Every democracy requires a political opposition.	100.0	100.0	[a]
B.	It is the primary duty of the political opposition to support the government, and not to criticize it.	8.9	13.5	.16
C.	Every citizen has the right to demonstrate.	100.0	97.8	[a]
D.	Freedom of opinion and discussion must be limited by moral and ethical consideration.	57.0	42.7	−.27
E.	A citizen forfeits the right to demonstrate and to strike when he or she threatens the political order.	31.6	30.3	−.09
F.	The freedom of political propaganda is not an absolute freedom, and the state should carefully regulate its use.	29.1	23.6	−.22

Note: Entries are percentages of respondents who agree with statements. See the Appendix for question wording and recodes. N = 79 for East Berlin, 87 for West Berlin.
[a]Too little variation to compute gamma.

rights when order-related objectives conflict with liberal democratic rights. On the whole, while East German MPs are somewhat less supportive of these rights than West German MPs, both elite sectors evidence similar levels of support for liberal democratic rights.

Despite the agreement among East and West elites over basic political rights, it would be premature to conclude that East and West German elites are essentially alike. One shortcoming of closed-ended items is that they may mask considerable differences in elites' conception of an ideal-typical democracy. Accordingly, I asked respondents to define the core elements in their own words: "The term democracy is frequently used without further specifications these days. What seem to you personally the essentials of a democracy?"

This open-ended question elicited a wide range of responses, but the basic patterns can be summarized as indicated in Table 2. (The Appendix contains the original code categories and recodes used for this table). Since the later multivariate analyses use this question only to measure egalitarian ideals, this table also displays cohort differences within the East and West.

A large number of MPs mention at least one civil right (e.g., liberty, freedom of expression) as an important component of a democratic system, both in the East (64.6%) and the West (73.0%). Within the East, prewar generations are more likely to mention civil rights (77.1%) than postwar generations (55.9%), whereas there are no clear generational differences among MPs from West Berlin. Similarly, a quarter of East and West MPs mention at least one "government-by-the-people" item (e.g., popular control). Consistent with the results from the analysis of closed-ended indicators, both East and West MPs evidently value basic civil rights and popular control as important ingredients of a democracy.

Yet differences between East and West MPs emerge in regard to the social equality component. East MPs are substantially more likely than West MPs to mention the necessity for governments to provide social security to individuals. Over a third of East Berlin MPs argue that guaranteeing a just standard of living

TABLE 2

MPs' Conceptions of Democracy, by Generation

DEMOCRATIC COMPONENT	EAST	WEST
Government by the people	26.6	25.8
Prewar	24.4	26.1
Postwar	29.4	25.6
Active participation	17.7	12.4
Prewar	13.3	13.0
Postwar	23.5	11.0
Direct democracy	25.3	2.2
Prewar	13.3	.0
Postwar	41.2	4.7
Social equality	35.4	7.9
Prewar	28.9	10.9
Postwar	44.1	4.7
Equality of opportunity	3.8	7.9
Prewar	2.2	4.3
Postwar	5.9	11.6
Civil rights/limited government	64.6	73.0
Prewar	77.1	69.6
Postwar	55.9	76.7
Institutions	40.5	60.7
Prewar	51.1	58.7
Postwar	26.5	62.8
Political competition	20.3	30.3
Prewar	22.2	32.6
Postwar	17.6	27.9
Societal competition	17.7	19.1
Prewar	17.8	15.2
Postwar	17.6	23.3
Citizens' responsibility	8.9	7.9
Prewar	6.2	13.0
Postwar	11.8	2.3
N, both generations	79	87
Prewar	45	44
Postwar	34	43

Note: Entries are percentages mentioning one or more democratic component. Multiple responses were allowed. See the Appendix for details on the question wording and recodes.

TABLE 3

Support for Direct Democracy Procedures

REFERENDUM INITIATED	EAST BERLIN	EAST VOLKSKAMMER	WEST BERLIN	WEST BUNDESTAG	GAMMA (BERLIN)
A. By the parliament and legally nonbinding	35.4	35.0	18.0	12.0	.41
B. By the executive and legally nonbinding	19.0	22.0	10.1	5.0	.31
C. By a minority in parliament	49.4	26.0	24.7	10.0	.45
D. By a majority in parliament	60.8	67.0	33.7	16.0	.46
E. By the executive	45.6	35.0	19.1	6.0	.51
F. By the people	78.5	71.0	64.0	40.0	.34
Support C–F	32.0	[a]	9.0	[a]	.66

Sources: Berlin data is from the Berlin survey; Bundestag data is from Herzog et al. 1990, 130; Volkskammer data is from Werner 1991, 431.
[a]Entries are not available.
Note: Entries are percentages viewing each procedure as meaningful. See the Appendix for question wording and exact response categories. N = 79 for East Berlin, 87 for West Berlin.

or providing social security for everybody ought to be an important obligation of a democracy. In contrast, only 7.9% in the West mention this component. Again, the substantial generational differences within the East attest to the fact that while all East German elites were exposed to socialist regime messages, postwar elites were particularly receptive to them (hypothesis 4).

Differences between East and West MPs also emerge over the degree to which they support the use of plebiscitarian procedures. About a quarter (25.3%) of MPs from the East mention at least one direct-democracy procedure (e.g., referenda for all important decisions) whereas only 2.2% in the West mention such element. Within the East, the generational differences attest to the cumulative learning of individuals: both pre- and postwar generations are influenced by the people's revolution and the socialist emphasis on direct democracy, but younger elites who are less resistant to new experiences than older ones, are more strongly influenced by these factors (hypothesis 6).

Within the West, the weak generational differences regarding the plebiscitarian procedures are surprising, especially in light of the postmaterialism literature (Inglehart 1990). One possible explanation for the absence of generational effects may be seen in the powerful socialization effect on MPs of representative institutions, which leads even those MPs who initially favor plebiscitarian procedures to abandon these views as a result of their parliamentary work. As one Green parliamentarian put it when direct democratic procedures were discussed during the interview: "If you had asked me this ten years earlier, I would have been for it." This MP then discussed how his/her initial enthusiasm for plebiscitarian procedures faded as (s)he became confronted with "unreasonable" demands from the constituency. Although this must remain a tentative attempt to explain this unexpected finding, it is also consistent with the result that more West Germans (60.7%) than East Germans (40.5%), including the postwar cohort, mention the existent (representative) institutions of the West German constitution (elections, majority rule, etc.). Combined, the Green MP's conversion and the general focus of West elites on representative institutions point to the ability of these institutions to imbue all MPs with representative-democratic values.

East MPs' support for plebiscitarian procedures is equally pronounced when MPs evaluate a series of closed-ended questions about citizens' direct involvement in politics. Since these items were also asked in two surveys of the West German Bundestag and the East German Volkskammer, I may also compare Berlin MPs with national-level MPs (Table 3). The first two procedures are nonbinding referenda, whereas procedures C–F would oblige legislators to act in accordance with the outcome of a referendum. East MPs on the national level and in Berlin are considerably more likely to support plebiscitarian procedures, especially when the procedures obtain legally binding status. In fact, East Berlin elites frequently accompanied their rejection of the first two options with comments indicating their disagreement with the non-binding nature of these procedures. The proportion of elites supporting all four procedures (32.9% in East Berlin, 9.0% in West Berlin) reflects the different democratic visions that exist across the East–West boundary: in the West, plebiscitarian procedures are frequently seen as undermining democratic systems, whereas in the East, they are often viewed as a potential corrective to a detached political elite.[11]

The similarity of the Berlin and national results in terms of the plebiscitarian procedures also provides partial evidence that the Berlin results tend to be generalizable to the national political elite. For the East–West differences are, if anything, even larger on the national level, at least for these indicators. No doubt, one would need a national survey, paralleling the Berlin study, in order to establish with full confidence the generalizability of the Berlin-based results. But in the absence of such a study, the similarities presented are persuasive.

Taken together, the analysis of East and West MPs' conceptions of democratic values reveals a different mix of democratic components. While all MPs fre-

quently mention civil rights and political competition, a substantial proportion of East MPs primarily value direct democracy and social equality elements, whereas West MPs predominately specify (representative) institutions and competition among political and social groups. The differences emerge particularly between postwar elites, suggesting that both East and West German institutions and the peoples' revolution of 1989 molded elites' values. Thus both East and West elites support liberal democratic rights, but this commitment, while similar on the surface, is embedded in different democratic ideals.

SOURCES OF VALUE PREDISPOSITIONS: A MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS

How well does the influence of institutional learning perform as a predictor in a multivariate analysis when other individual-level East– West differences are considered simultaneously? Three dependent variables are analyzed: a democratic-rights index based on the indicators from Table 1, an egalitarian democracy indicator based on an additive index of responses to the open-ended democracy question, and a direct-democracy indicator based on the items from Table 3. (The Appendix contains details on the construction of the indicators.) I use these three different measures in order to show that the results converge regardless of the indicator used. Further, the democratic rights and plebiscitarian indicators have been employed in previous studies so that I am able to compare previous results with the ones presented here.

An East–West indicator measures the direct effect of institutional learning on elites' democratic values. If this variable is a significant predictor of MPs' conceptions of democracy, it would signify the importance of regime experience independent of other East–West differences on the individual-level. Communist party membership is also employed to measure the influence of institutional learning on elites' democratic values. Presumably, communist party members were exposed more intensely to the institutional norms of the socialist system than other MPs (Dalton 1994).[12]

It is also well-documented that individuals' religiosity tends to generate center-conservative political orientations, such as conservative economic or cultural issue positions (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, intro). Since religion is considerably more important in West than in East Germany, one must include this characteristic in the model. Further, elites' material–postmaterial value priorities are included because postmaterialists are more likely than materialists to support an increase of citizens' involvement in politics, favor broad citizen participation in politics, and (though to a lesser extent) sympathize with an egalitarian distribution of economic goods. Since East Germans are less postmaterialist than West Germans, one must control for these value orientations in examining the influence of institutional learning on democratic values.

In addition to MPs' cohort membership, MPs' education must be included because education, like generation, reflects elites' regime experience (Weil 1985). Further, individuals with lower incomes may endorse egalitarian democratic ideals in order to improve their personal situation. Thus East German elites may support an egalitarian democracy because of their economic difficulties, not necessarily because of their regime experience. Finally, I analyze the potential impact of respondents' gender on their ideological predispositions because the East German state facilitated womens' efforts to join the workforce by providing, for example, access to day-care centers (Rueschemeyer and Lemke 1989). Therefore, female MPs from East Germany may endorse egalitarian democratic principles because of the perceived difficulties in pursuing a career path under the West German system, not because they have learned to endorse principally a broad range of egalitarian ideals.

Table 4 displays the results from an ordinary least squares analysis. For each dependent variable, I analyzed the equations separately for the East and the West in order to uncover potential differences of the impact of predictor variables. Then I applied the equation to the combined data in order to assess the impact of the systemic variable (controlling for individual-level variables) on elites' conceptions of democracies.

Several results are noteworthy. First, the regime membership coefficient is highly significant for the democratic rights index (beta = .17). Independent of East–West variations in sociodemographics, postmaterialist values, or religiosity, institutional learning influences moderately, though not dramatically, elites' support for general democratic norms (hypothesis 1). Second, the Communist party coefficient (beta = −.12), while statistically insignificant, still suggests that Communist party MPs (PDS) are slightly less likely than other MPs to endorse general democratic rights, a result that parallels the findings from a public opinion study in East and West Germany (Dalton 1994). Finally, elites' postmaterialist values also generate support for democratic rights, both in the East and the West. Unexpectedly (contra hypothesis 2), the postwar generation among East German elites is substantially more, not less, likely to support democratic rights than the prewar generation (beta = .24). The strength of the coefficient is particularly impressive in light of the fact that sociodemographic variables have in the past failed to predict elites' core values. (An explanation will be provided shortly). Moreover, the generational variable is also insignificant for West elites. Apparently, prewar elites in the West have been sufficiently socialized by democratic institutions so that any cohort differences over democratic rights that initially might have existed disappeared.

Parliament members' egalitarian democratic conceptions are strongly influenced by the process of institutional learning. The strength of the regime

TABLE 4

Predicting MPs' Democratic Values

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS			EGALITARIAN DEMOCRACY			DIRECT DEMOCRACY		
	EAST	WEST	COM-BINED	EAST	WEST	COM-BINED	EAST	WEST	COM-BINED
Regime experience[a]	—	—	.17** (1.8)	—	—	−.30*** (−.41)	—	—	−.28*** (−1.5)
Communist party	−.12 (−1.4)	—	−.01 (−.21)	.25* (.53)	—	.21*** (.47)	.21 (1.4)	—	.13 (1.2)
Postwar generation	.26** (2.6)	.04 (.46)	.13* (1.4)	.08 (.15)	−.13 (−.07)	.04 (.05)	.05 (.25)	.08 (.38)	.06 (.34)
Postmaterialism	.41*** (2.4)	.30*** (1.8)	.35*** (1.9)	.01 (.01)	.17 (.04)	.07 (.05)	.18 (.56)	.06 (.14)	.11 (.32)
Religiosity	−.18 (−.60)	−.03 (−.11)	−.05 (−.16)	−.12 (−.07)	−.01 (−.01)	−.06 (−.03)	−.01 (−.01)	−.20* (−.32)	−.14 (−.19)
Education	.13 (.77)	.32*** (1.4)	.24*** (1.2)	−.12 (−.13)	.05 (.03)	.06 (.04)	−.08 (−.29)	−.08 (−.17)	−.10 (−.25)
Income	.08 (.45)	−.12 (−.62)	−.02 (−.10)	−.01 (−.01)	.06 (.01)	−.01 (−.01)	−.02 (−.07)	−.02 (−.04)	−.01 (−.01)
Gender[b]	.10 (1.0)	−.04 (−.51)	.02 (.26)	−.17 (−.34)	−.12 (−.07)	−.14 (−.21)	−.15 (−.87)	−.11 (−.56)	−.11 (−.68)
Adj. R^2	.19	.18	.20	.03	.01	.17	.09	.04	.17
N	76	85	161	76	85	161	76	85	161

Note: Entries are standardized regression coefficients (OLS); unstandardized coefficients appear in parenthesis. The democratic rights index is an additive index based on items presented in Table 1. (The Appendix contains details about the construction of the indicators.) The egalitarian indicator is an additive indicator of the number of egalitarian responses to the open-ended democracy question. The direct-democracy index is an additive index based on items presented in Table 3.

[a]High = west.

[b] High = male.

*$p \leq .10$.

**$p \leq .05$.

***$p \leq .01$.

membership indicator (beta = −.30) is remarkable, considering that several individual-level characteristics are included in this analysis. Further, as expected, communist party MPs are more likely than other MPs to support egalitarian democratic conceptions. And while the generational coefficient is insignificant within the East, the total effect of the postwar generation (r = .21) still suggests that postwar MPs are more likely than prewar MPs to endorse egalitarian democratic ideals.

The analyses of elites' evaluations of direct-democracy procedures confirm that East elites are more likely than West elites to endorse direct-democracy conceptions (beta = −.28). This unequivocal result is particularly noteworthy because the model includes a number of predictors typically considered to be important individual-level sources of favorable views on plebiscitarian views, especially postmaterialism. Furthermore, although the cohort coefficient is insignificant, substantial cohort effects appear within the East when I use a direct-democracy indicator based on the open-ended question[13] (beta = .26) but still not within the West (beta = .03). Within the East, this suggests that prewar and, especially, postwar cohorts are supportive of plebiscitarian procedures. Within the West, this finding is consistent with the account given by the MP quoted earlier: MPs' initial support for direct democracy procedures, which is typically concentrated among postwar cohorts, may weaken as a results of MPs' involvement in parliamentary work. Finally, there is no ready explanation for the weak effect of postmaterialism (beta = .11), especially in light of the large number of studies establishing the link between postmaterialism and direct-democracy procedures (Inglehart 1990).[14]

On the whole, these analyses attest to the importance of regime experience as an important source of elites' conceptualization of an ideal-typical democracy. Substantial East–West differences exist over the social egalitarian and plebiscitarian dimension, corroborating the institutional-learning argument. In addition, several (although not all) cohort differences within the East and the West are consistent with the notion of cohort-based culture change, particularly for the social egalitarian and plebiscitarian dimension.

Value Divergence Versus Value Convergence

However, the East–West gap is less pronounced in terms of elites' commitment to liberal democratic rights, especially in the context of the open-ended question. In addition, the fact that within the East,

the postwar generation is substantially more supportive of general democratic rights than the prewar generation cannot be explained with the institutional learning argument. The substantial support for liberal democratic rights among East elites converges with findings from studies of recent regime transitions in Europe, namely, that support for liberal democratic rights is surprisingly strong in light of these nations' lack of democratic experience. In order to account for this finding, several analysts of democratic transitions have resorted to a value diffusion model in explaining the evolution of democratic norms in Southern and East-Central Europe (Di Palma 1990; Fuchs, Klingemann, and Schoebel 1991; McDonough, Barnes, and Lopez-Pina 1986; Pye 1990; Starr 1991). The central premise of this perspective is that a variety of domestic and international factors (e.g., the mass media, economic development, education) enables citizens to compare their authoritarian system with the alternative offered by a democratic political system (Weil 1993, chap. 9). Since liberal democracy prospered economically and politically in the postwar era in Western Europe, many citizens in Southern and East–Central Europe endorse the liberal democratic principles that are associated with the promise and prestige offered by a democracy. Since East German citizens could receive West German television, which undoubtedly helped to erode the legitimacy of the East German economic and political system, this process may have contributed to the evolution of support for liberal democratic rights among East elites.

I would like to stress that I limit the diffusion argument to the evolution of general democratic rights. I do not wish to argue that East Germans have become complete democrats who, in addition to supporting liberal democratic rights, possess the ability to act democratically. For example, opinion research has frequently documented that while general rights are easily endorsed, these rights are frequently not applied to specific minority groups (Duch and Gibson 1992; Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 1982).[15] Still, if East Germans express an abstract preference for general democratic rights, it would indicate that the initial conditions for reconstructing a democratic system are more favorable in contemporary Germany than they were in West Germany in the immediate postwar years (Merritt and Merritt 1970; Weil 1989).

In order to conduct an indirect test for the presence of diffusion effects, consider that the diffusion perspective, combined with the notion of generational change, suggests that the democratic values of East and West elites are "pushed" toward convergence. Since the onset of the diffusion process falls into the postwar era (Pye 1990), its force should be primarily felt among the postwar generation of East MPs. Therefore, one indication for the influence of value diffusion would be if East–West differences over democratic rights are smaller within the *postwar* than within the prewar cohort. In contrast, the institutional learning perspective, combined with the notion of generational change, predicts that East and West institutions produced differences *especially* among the postwar cohort. These predictions cannot be tested directly by the analyses in Table 4 because the regime experience variable is absent (columns 1–2) or the analyses do not distinguish directly between prewar and postwar generation (the combined analyses). Instead, I reanalyzed the sources of elites' values within the prewar and postwar generation, paying special attention to the strength of the East–West indicator across cohorts.

The results indicate that postwar elites' support for liberal democratic rights is partly influenced by converging forces (Table 5). For example, the regime membership indicator is insignificant for postwar elites' (b = .49). Instead, elites' education and, especially, postmaterialist values are the best predictors of elites' democratic values. Hence, postwar elites in East and West Germany are primarily divided by postmaterial values and educational background but not by their regime experience—at least as far as their commitment to liberal democratic values is concerned. In contrast, the regime experience variable is highly significant within the prewar cohort (b = 3.2), suggesting that the effects of value diffusion are smaller among prewar than postwar elites.

Yet the results for the egalitarian ideals equation also document the limits of the diffusion argument. In particular, the regime variable is especially strong among postwar cohorts (b = −.56), producing substantial East–West differences over social egalitarian ideals among the postwar elites. In contrast, the regime experience variable is only weakly related to prewar elites' egalitarian values (b = −.22). On this dimension, then, East and West elites have drifted apart during the time of division.

Finally, the results for the direct-democracy indicator provide the strongest evidence yet of the support for plebiscitarian procedures among all East elites. The most important predictor is elites' regime membership, for both prewar (b = −1.4) and postwar (beta = −1.5) elites. Individual-level traits, such as postmaterial values, are relatively unimportant in explaining elites' support for citizens' direct involvement in politics—undoubtedly a result of the significant role that East German citizens played in the overthrow of the East German regime and the socialist emphasis on direct democracy.

On the whole, these results support the interpretation that support for liberal democratic rights has been diffused into East Germany. At the same time, the diffusion of ideal-typical conceptions of democracies has not occurred to the same extent. Unlike their West German counterparts, East German postwar elites especially value liberal democratic rights in combination with social egalitarian and plebiscitarian ideals.

CONCLUSION

The unique historical situation of Germany's division and unification enables analysts to examine the insti-

TABLE 5

Predicting MPs' Democratic Values, by Generation

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS			EGALITARIAN DEMOCRACY			DIRECT DEMOCRACY		
	PRE-WAR	POST-WAR	COM-BINED	PRE-WAR	POST-WAR	COM-BINED	PRE-WAR	POST-WAR	COM-BINED
Regime experience[a]	.30*** (3.2)	.05 (.49)	.17** (1.8)	−.19 (−.22)	−.35*** (−.56)	−.30*** (−.41)	−.29*** (−1.4)	−.25* (−1.5)	−.28*** (−1.5)
Communist party	−.03 (−.80)	−.10 (−1.4)	−.01 (−.21)	.10 (.10)	.25* (.54)	.21*** (.47)	.17 (2.0)	.14 (1.1)	.13 (1.2)
Postwar generation	—	—	.13* (1.4)	—	—	.04 (.05)	—	—	.06 (.34)
Postmaterialism	.26*** (1.5)	.49*** (3.2)	.35*** (1.9)	.09 (.05)	.08 (.07)	.07 (.05)	.17 (.45)	.07 (.23)	.11 (.32)
Religiosity	.04 (.13)	−.15 (−.53)	−.05 (−.16)	−.05 (−.02)	−.17 (−.09)	−.06 (−.03)	−.19* (−.31)	−.01 (−.01)	−.14 (−.19)
Education	.18* (.93)	.32*** (1.4)	.24*** (1.2)	−.01 (−.01)	−.10 (−.07)	.06 (.04)	−.14* (−.32)	−.09 (−.22)	−.10 (−.25)
Income	.10 (.47)	−.07 (−.30)	−.02 (−.10)	−.16 (−.08)	.10 (.08)	−.01 (−.01)	−.05 (−.11)	−.03 (−.08)	−.01 (−.01)
Gender[b]	.16 (2.1)	−.03 (−.07)	.02 (.26)	−.14 (−.19)	−.16 (−.27)	−.14 (−.21)	−.11 (−.67)	−.16 (−.97)	−.11 (−.68)
Adj. R^2	.08	.31	.20	.08	.21	.17	.20	.10	.17
N	87	75	161	86	75	161	86	75	161

Note: Entries are standardized regression coefficients (OLS); unstandardized coefficients appear in parenthesis. The democratic rights index is an additive index based on items presented in Table 1. (The Appendix contains details about the construction of the indicators.) The egalitarian indicator is an additive indicator of the number of egalitarian responses to the open-ended democracy question. The direct-democracy index is an additive index based on items presented in Table 3.

[a]High = west.

[b]High = male.

*$p \leq .10$.

**$p \leq .05$.

***$p \leq .01$.

tution–culture linkage under quasi-experimental conditions. Consistent with systemic political culture studies that stress institutional learning as a source of elites' values, East and West elites' democratic conceptions are substantially shaped by individuals' exposure to a socialist or liberal democratic political system. The strength of regime experience as a predictor of elites' ideological values is remarkable because the empirical models include a number of individual-level variables (esp. cohort membership) that partially absorb the influence of elites' regime experience on their ideological values. Thus both East and West German systems were partially successful in reshaping the political culture. But the convergence of postwar cohorts over general democratic rights also attests to the diffusion of these rights into East Germany.

The partial success of the East German state's efforts to imbue its citizens with social egalitarian and plebiscitarian ideals suggests that the collapse of a specific set of institutions does not necessarily indicate the absence of institutional learning. The East German state collapsed, but a substantial number of East MPs continues to value socialist–democratic ideals. More generally, whether or not the collapsed institutions in East-Central Europe have imbued citizens with regime-conforming values must be examined in empirical studies and cannot be inferred from the collapse of socialist institutions itself.

Furthermore, the existence of partially different conceptions of democracies in East and West Germany also underlines the need to be cautious in applying Western (liberal–representative) democratic principles to the newly emerging democracies in East-Central Europe (Collier and Mahon 1993). Before analysts are able to specify the notion of democracy properly in the context of democratic transitions, they must know elites' conceptions of democracy in East-Central Europe. These considerations then call for further analyses of political elites' ideal-typical democratic conceptions in East-Central Europe.

The results also indicate the difficulty of merging Germany into a truly united country. While the power distribution among the East and West undoubtedly ensures that East elites have less influence on major political decisions than West elites, the value differences nevertheless suggest that East elites' preferences will differ from West elites' preferences on a number of policy domains as well as on more fundamental issues (e.g., plebiscitarian proce-

dures). Hence, the legal unification and the value differences between East and West German elites raises once again the possibility of severe political and social tensions in Germany.

On a more optimistic note, the onset of a value convergence in terms of liberal democratic rights also suggests that the issues facing Germany today are partially different from those which West Germany faced in the immediate World War II years. At that time, the major task was to convince the non- or antidemocratic citizens of the virtues of a democratic political system. But the presence of a general commitment to democratic rights in East Germany suggests that at least in principle (if not in practice), East German elites do not need to be persuaded of the virtues of a democratic system—they already are. Rather, one new task is to convince a significant portion of East German elites of the virtues of a *parliamentary–representative* democracy. What is new, then, is that a debate may take place over which democratic system is the most appropriate for the united Germany. In this sense, the unification of Germany not only revives old, troubling, issues but may also add a new, perhaps less destructive, dimension to the vexing course of Germany's history.

APPENDIX: COLLECTING THE DATA AND MEASUREMENT ISSUES

Several steps were undertaken to maximize the cooperation of Berlin MPs. Before the actual interviewing started in October 1991, an introductory letter was sent to all MPs in the summer of 1991. The letter introduced the project and announced the intention to meet personally with all legislators. I also met all party leaders who agreed to support the study. For example, party leaders agreed to make an announcement in a parliamentary group meeting asking MPs of their respective party to participate in the project. Simultaneously with the announcements, a second letter was sent to MPs, this time requesting a specific interview time. Although relatively few MPs responded to this request promptly, all MPs at this time had become familiar with the project. Most of the interviews were actually scheduled during the biweekly parliamentary session, which enabled me to contact personally those MPs who had not responded to the previous requests.

A total of 168 MPs was interviewed. The cooperation of MPs was excellent. Smaller parties are somewhat overrepresented because the almost intimate atmosphere among a small parliamentary group of, say, 15 to 20 MPs substantially increased the visibility of the project. (A table comparing the partisanship of interviewed MPs with the entire parliament is available upon request.) Extensive comparisons of the data with the entire parliament suggest that the data closely mirrors the parliament on important characteristics, such as age, education, gender, occupation of parliamentary leadership positions, and seniority.

A first draft of the questionnaire underwent close scrutiny before the field work actually began. In October 1991, two party leaders from local district parliaments from East and West Berlin participated in a formal pretest of the questionnaire. Both leaders also discussed the questionnaire at length.

Measurement and Coding Schemes. The responses to the open-ended democracy question were coded based on detailed notes taken during the interview. I used a slightly modified coding scheme developed by Putnam (1973, 270–73).

1–8. The term democracy is frequently used without further specifications these days. What seem to you personally the essentials of a democracy? {CODE UP TO FIVE MENTIONS}.

Government by the People

11. Government by the people; popular control; control by the people
12. Popular interest in and awareness of politics
13. Responsibility or answerability of the government to the people; government by consent; government based on electoral mandate
14. Popular participation; an active role of the people; popular involvement in decision making; direct democracy within the framework of parliamentary democracy
15. Direct democracy; referenda for important decisions; public should be able to recall ministers at any time;
19. Other

Equality and Social Democracy

21. Equality in general
22. Political equality; one man, one vote
23. Equality of opportunity; each person has the possibility of developing him/herself as far as possible; participation of citizens in all areas of society
24. Just standard of living; freedom from want; social and economic security for all
25. Classless society; less social distance; fewer rich and poor; less social privilege
26. Social ownership/control over the economy; industrial democracy
27. Provide minimum social security/right to a job
28. Gender equality
29. Other

Liberty

31. Liberty; freedom in general
32. Political or civic liberties in general
33. Freedom of expression (speech, free press)
34. Minority rights; consideration of the minority
35. Limited government; checks and balances; no arbitrary power
36. Laissez-faire, socially and economically. Freedom from government interference in socioeconomic affairs
37. Religious liberty
39. Other

Institutions and Procedures

41. Elections
42. Majority rule
43. Representative or parliamentary government in general
44. Parliamentary or legislative control over the executive
45. Rule of law; legal due process (*Rechtsstaat)*
46. Defendable democracy
49. Other

Political Competition and Choice

51. Possibility of government changes; minority can become majority
52. Party competition; more than one party
53. Strong, critical opposition
54. Elite competition; ruling oligarchy
59. Other

Societal Conditions

61. Pluralism, variety of private associations and institutions
62. Consultation by the government with groups and organizations
63. Parties as centers of participation and agents of representation
64. Absence of party discipline
65. Decentralized institutions; federalism
66. Ecologically sound politics
69. Other

Characteristics of Citizens

71. Mature, educated, intelligent citizens
72. Freedom to do what is right; individual self-control
73. Assumption of responsibility and duties
74. Action in the interest of collective, not only of individual
75. Reciprocal respect and tolerance
79. Other

Other

81.
98. Don't know
99. Not answered

The recodes for the data presented in Table 2 are as follows: government by the people (11–13), active participation (14), direct democracy (15), social equality (24–27), Equality of opportunity (21–23), civil rights/limited government (31–36), institutions (41–45), political competition (52–54), societal competition (61–62), citizens' responsibility (71–75).

Democratic Rights. Members of parliament were shown a card containing the indicators from Table 1 and asked, "Would you tell me for each of the statements, whether you agree or disagree?" The card also displays a seven-point scale, defining the polar ends of *agree completely* (7) and *disagree completely* (1). Percenfages in Table 1 are based upon MPs who agree with a statement (7–5). The indicator used in the multivariate analyses is additive after all items have been recoded such that agreement with a statement reflects democratic attitudes. Cronbach's alpha for the East, West, and combined data is .61, .63, and .62, respectively. The variable's minimum equals 20, maximum 42, mean 32.6, and standard deviation 5.4.

Equalitarian Democracy. I created an additive index of all the egalitarian responses to the open-ended democracy question (24–27 in Table A-1). The variable's minimum equals 0, maximum 4, mean .32, and standard deviation .69. Given the skewed distribution of this variable, particularly in the West, I also analyzed this model using probit, but the results generally lead to the same substantive conclusions, with two exceptions. Within the East, the Communist party coefficient misses statistical significance by a small margin ($p = .11$) and the gender coefficient is significant: female MPs are somewhat more likely to mention egalitarian democratic components.

Direct Democracy. For the direct-democracy indicators (Table 3), I used a dichotomous response format in order to keep the results comparable to the study of national-level East and West German MPs (Herzog et al. 1990; Werner 1991). The question reads, "Would you please indicate your opinion on the plebiscitarian involvement of citizens by indicating whether you find each of these procedures involving citizens directly meaningful or not meaningful?" Responses in Table 3 are respondents who find the procedure meaningful. For the plebiscitarian index used in multivariate analyses, I first included the small number of missing values as a neutral middle category and then created an additive index. Cronbach's alpha in the East, West, and combined data is .71, .65, and .71, respectively. The variable's minimum equals 4, maximum 12, mean 7.9, and standard deviation 2.7.

Regime Membership. This dichotomous variable is coded 0 for East Berlin MPs and 1 for West Berlin MPs.

Communist Party. This dichotomous variable is coded 1 if the MP is a member of the reformed Communist party (PDS) and 0 if not.

Postwar Generation. In this dichotomous variable, 1 represents MPs born in 1945 or later, and 0 represents MPs born in 1944 and earlier. I chose this cutting point for generations because it is theoretically meaningful *and* because it leaves enough cases within each cohort to conduct the cohort analyses. The decision to divide MPs into two groups—those born in 1944 or before and those born later—means that MPs reaching the age of 15 before 1960 are coded as a prewar cohort. This cutting point parallels the degree to which the quasi-laboratory conditions had been established in Germany because the Berlin Wall was not built until 1961. Before that time, East and West Germany were less insulated from each other. I have conducted a sensitivity analysis using 11 different

cutting points for the cohort definition. For example, I first defined a prewar cohort by combining MPs born in 1938 and before into the prewar category. A second prewar variable includes those born in 1939 and before, a third contains MPs born in 1940 and before, and so on. I then conducted the analyses from Table 4 and 5, using these different cohort variables in separate analyses. The results parallel the historical reality in Germany: the largest cohort differences within the East emerge when the postwar cohort predominately contains MPs who grew up after the construction of the Berlin Wall. While a more refined breakdown of cohorts would undoubtedly be desirable, these analyses suggest that the cohort analyses presented here are robust and do not depend on an arbitrary birth date cutting point.

Postmaterialism. I used a slightly modified coding procedure of the original items Inglehart developed. While materialists and postmaterialists are coded as Inglehart suggests, I distinguish between mixed–materialists and mixed–postmaterialists, depending on whether respondents first mention the materialist or the postmaterialist item. This coding procedure uses more information than the three-point indicator. (The results are almost identical when the mixed categories are combined.) The variable's minimum equals 1, maximum 4, mean 3.2, and standard deviation .94.

Religiosity. "How often do you attend church? Would you say: At least every Sunday; almost every Sunday; sometimes; once a year; less than once a year; never." High values represent religious responses. The variable's minimum equals 1, maximum 6, mean 4.3, standard deviation 1.5.

Education. Higher values reflect higher educational attainment. (1) Volkschule/8. Klasse, (2) Mittlere Reife/10. Klasse/Mittel Schule, (3) Abitur/EOS, (4) Fachhochschule/Fachschule, (5) Universitaet. The variable's minimum equals 1, maximum 5, mean 4.3, standard deviation 1.1.

Income. (1) Below 4,000DM, (2) 4,000–5,999DM, (3) 6,000–7,999DM, (4) 8,000–9,999DM, (5) above 10,000DM. The variable's minimum equals 1, maximum 7, mean 2.7, standard deviation 1.1.

Gender. This is coded 1 for male MPs and 0 for female MPs.

Notes

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1. In order to avoid the repetitive use of one term, I use the terms *conceptions of democracy, core values,* and *ideological values* interchangeably.

2. Other elite studies document the relatively weak influence of sociodemographics on elites' attitudes (Beyme 1971; Crewe 1974; Edinger and Searing 1967; Herzog 1975).

3. Additional systemic factors mentioned are the socioeconomic composition of elite sectors when modern political systems formed and the outcome of political competitions between social groups.

4. Empirical studies of mass political culture try to circumvent the case problem by collecting institutional data and information about political cultures from public opinion surveys of a large number of countries (Bollen and Jackman 1989; Inglehart 1988; Weil 1989). Although valuable, these studies must rely on relatively few indicators of mass political culture. Other studies, in turn, examine the evolving democratic attitudes of mass publics in Spain (McDonough, Barnes, and Lopez-Pina 1986) or Germany (Baker, Dalton, and Hildebrandt 1981); or else they examine the link between regional institutions and regional cultures (Putnam 1993). But none of the cases examined offers the opportunity to compare directly the influence of two fundamentally opposed systems on elites' values.

5. Analyses of mass political cultures in other Central Europe nations also appear to corroborate this argument. For example, Almond (1983) notes that the Polish mass public began to endorse egalitarian values, like the Czech public (McGregor 1991). Similarly, a recent study of mass publics in the "republics" of the former Soviet Union notes that there has not been a "wholesale abandonment of socialist principles" (Finifter and Mickiewicz 1992, 861).

6. Indeed, previous studies of mass publics attest to the importance of institutional arrangements (Powell 1986) and individuals' group membership (Klingemann 1979) as sources of political orientations and behavior.

7. In this discussion, I assume that the new political system is as alien to the preexisting political culture as the respective socialist and democratic systems were in Central Europe and West Germany after World War II and as democratic systems are now in contemporary Central Europe and in East Germany. Consequently, a different argument would have to be constructed for cases like the United States or Great Britain, where the gradual evolution of democratic political institutions over centuries makes it virtually impossible to disentangle discrete variables representing the effect of institutions on culture and vice versa.

8. Consistent with this perspective, cohort studies in West Germany find that elites' historical experiences during their formative socialization years markedly affects the predominant values of each generation (Baker, Dalton, and Hildebrandt 1981). Analogously, postwar elites in Central Europe, who only experienced the socialist systems, should be shaped more by socialist values and practices than prewar elites, whose cohort experience also includes nonsocialist systems.

9. These variations are largely controlled for because many, although not all, MPs grew up in Berlin.

10. A question about MPs' background revealed that two West Berlin MPs escaped from the GDR after they passed adolescence. I excluded them from the study.

11. This interpretation about the reasoning of MPs is based on a preliminary analysis of an open-ended question asking whether MPs would support solving the asylum issue through a referendum. A detailed discussion cannot be pursued here.

12. Throughout the field work, I tried to obtain additional information about East MPs' involvement in various GDR organizations. It turned out to be extraordinarily difficult to find this information in archives. In addition, the published biographies of East MPs frequently do not mention membership in GDR organizations. Although a more complete mea-

sure of the extent of regime involvement would undoubtedly be desirable, this information could not be found.

13. This alternative indicator is an additive indicator of the number of mentions of categories 14 and 15 in the Appendix.

14. It should be studied in future elite surveys whether this finding is unique to the Berlin study or whether institutional learning mitigates the predispositional linkages between post-materialism and direct democracy on the level of elites. In the absence of comparable elite surveys, this issue must remain unresolved here.

15. I have presented evidence elsewhere showing East MPs are substantially less tolerant than West MPs, despite the strong support for liberal democratic rights among East MPs (Rohrschneider 1993).

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