
Power in Modern Societies

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here used in its most comprehensive significance) may be formulated in the following terms: "It is organization which gives birth to the dominion of the elected over the electors, of the mandataries over the mandators, of the delegates over the delegators. Who says organization, says oligarchy."

Every party organization represents an oligarchical power grounded upon a democratic basis. We find everywhere that the power of the elected leaders over the electing masses is almost unlimited. The oligarchical structure of the building suffocates the basic democratic principle. ...

From this chain of reasoning and from these scientific convictions it would be erroneous to conclude that we should renounce all endeavors to ascertain the limits which may be imposed upon the powers exercised over the individual by oligarchies (state, dominant class, party, etc.). It would be an error to abandon the desperate enterprise of endeavoring to discover a social order which will render possible the complete realization of the idea of popular sovereignty. In the present work, as the writer said at the outset, it has not been his aim to indicate new paths. But it seemed necessary to lay considerable stress upon the pessimist aspect of democracy which is forced on us by historical study. We had to inquire whether, and within what limits, democracy must remain purely ideal, possessing no other value than that of a moral criterion which renders it possible to appreciate the varying degrees of that oligarchy which is immanent in every social regime. In other words, we have had to inquire if, and in what degree, democracy is an ideal which we can never hope to realize in practice. ...

Democracy is a treasure which no one will ever discover by deliberate search. But in continuing our search, in laboring indefatigably to discover the undiscoverable, we shall perform a work which will have fertile results in the democratic sense. We have seen, indeed, that within the bosom of the democratic working-class party are born the very tendencies to counteract which that party came into existence. Thanks to the diversity and to the unequal worth of the elements of the party, these tendencies often give rise to manifestations which border on tyranny. ...

The democratic currents of history resemble successive waves. They break ever on the same shoal. They are ever renewed. This enduring spectacle is simultaneously encouraging and depressing. When democracies have gained a certain stage of development, they undergo a gradual transformation, adopting the aristocratic spirit, and in many cases also the aristocratic forms, against which at the outset they struggled so fiercely. Now new accusers arise to denounce the traitors; after an era of glorious combats and of inglorious power, they end by fusing with the old dominant class, whereupon once more they are in their turn attacked by fresh opponents who appeal to the name of democracy. It is probable that this cruel game will continue without end.

The Ruling Elites

KENNETH PREWITT & ALAN STONE

In all societies—from societies that are very meagerly developed and have barely attained the dawns of civilization, down to the most advanced and powerful societies—two classes of people appear—a class that rules and a class that is ruled. The first class, always the less numerous, performs all political functions, monopolizes power and enjoys the advantages that power brings, whereas the second, the more numerous class, is directed and controlled by the first.¹

In this passage, the Italian political sociologist Gaetano Mosca dispelled the previously unchallenged Aristotelian classification of political systems. Aristotle had held that rule was one of three types: rule by the one (monarchy), by the few (aristocracy), or by the many (democracy), each of which a degenerate form—tyranny, oligarchy, mobocracy. For centuries, political theorists had largely accepted this classification and considered it to be accurate and useful.

The Aristotelian concept, however, was not accepted by the elite theorists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, who denied that there could be rule by the one or by the many. One person could never rule without the active support and involvement of a governing class, whether made up of party bureaucrats, militarists, administrators, or priests. And certainly the people were too disorganized and too incompetent ever to manage themselves and the collective affairs of society. In denying the Aristotelian classification, the elite theorists liberated political sociology from one of its most ancient assumptions. ...

THE ELITE PERSPECTIVE

The history of politics is the history of elites. The character of a society—whether it is just or unjust, dynamic or stagnant, pacifistic or militaristic—is determined by the character of its elite. The goals of society are established by the elite and accomplished under their direction.

The elite perspective does not deny social change; even radical transformations of society are possible. The elitists only point out that most change comes

about as the composition and structure of the elite is transformed. History is the interminable struggle among elites to control the society. This struggle results in the circulation of elites, with established elites giving way to new ideas and new interests. Thus is social change wrought.

Elite theory is in conflict with the marxian idea of class struggle. Where the *Communist Manifesto* claims that "The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles," the elitist manifesto claims that "The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of elite struggles." Moreover, the elitist would add, so matters will remain. The non-elite are passive observers of this struggle, or at best, are pawns to be mobilized for the temporary advantage of a counter-elite battling against the entrenched elite. In the following statement, Pareto summarizes the argument, and dismisses the masses from serious consideration:

Let A be the elite in power, B the social element seeking to drive it from power and to replace it, and C the rest of the population, comprising the incompetent, those lacking energy, character and intelligence: in short, the section of society which remains when the elites are subtracted. A and B are the leaders, counting on C to provide them with partisans, with instruments. The C on their own would be impotent: an army without commanders. They become important only if guided by the A or B. Very often—in fact, almost always—it is the B who put themselves at the head of C, the A reposing in a false security or despising the C.² ...

Although we shall wish to qualify, modify, and criticize features of the elite theory as we proceed, for the present we can summarize the theory in terms of two principles:

First, no matter what the dominant political ideology or the manner of organizing the State, every society can be divided into the small number who rule and the larger number who are ruled.

Second, the character of society and the direction it is taking can be understood in terms of the composition, structure, and conflicts of the ruling group.

A DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITHIN THE ELITE PERSPECTIVE

If today many observers of society accept the two principles of the elitist perspective, not all observers draw the same conclusions. Some see the power and privileges of the ruling class and conclude that the rulers exploit and manipulate the ruled for personal benefit. The rulers monopolize power and enjoy advantages by demanding deference and tribute. They live—and live well—from the efforts of others.

There is a contrary view that rulers perform necessary and socially beneficial tasks. If rulers monopolize power, they do so to serve better all the members of so-

ciety. The general welfare can be provided and protected only if the rulers can give uniform direction to society and have the force necessary to withstand attacks from enemies within or enemies without. And if the rulers enjoy many special advantages, these are only the just rewards for the special skills they bring to the task of governing and for the effort they expend on behalf of the entire society.

We can provide a simple diagram of these two viewpoints [see Figure 12.1]. Both viewpoints accept the fruitfulness of distinguishing between the rulers and ruled, and both recognize that power and privilege are heavily concentrated in the ruling group. They differ sharply, however, in describing the type of relationship that exists between the rulers and the ruled. In these differing views is one of the enduring paradoxes of politics: that these two views can be so divergent and at the same time correct. ...

THE STATE IS A SOCIAL CONTRACT BETWEEN UNEQUALS

Because the State in the most general sense benefits those who are ruled as well as those who rule, there is good reason for men to enter the social contract and to submit to some central direction. Because the social contract tends always to benefit some men (usually the rulers) more than other men, coercion and conquest are often necessary to establish and maintain the State.


Here, then, is a perspective that allows for the generalized benefits of the social contract and at the same time underscores the fact that these benefits are not equitably distributed. It is appropriate to insist that the social contract is between unequals because societies are arranged so that some men command and others obey. But it can also be insisted that the very fact that society exists is an indication that it is of general benefit. Men flounder and suffer outside society, and their lot can only improve when they join in collective action.

The axiom that titles this section, however, does not answer all of the questions about the function of the ruling class. It only poses in a fresh guise the paradoxical questions with which we began: Do elites exploit or do they serve? Are we to emphasize their privileges or their responsibilities? It is by now evident that contrasting interpretations of politics derive from how one chooses to answer these questions. Let us consider them in greater detail.

Unequal Privileges: The Radical's Emphasis

That the State is a contract between unequals is readily admitted by the radical, and deplored as well. The rulers not only have greater powers than the ruled, which is true by definition, they also enjoy greater privileges. This is because a disproportionately large share of the social surplus produced in the society remains in the hands of the ruling class for their personal enjoyment and benefit. If craftsmen produce artifacts and ornaments, these status symbols become the possessions of the ruling class. If warriors venture forth to conquer and return

[Figure 12.1]



with slaves and women, the slaves will serve in the fields and kitchens of the rulers and the women will be placed in their harems. If the productive labor of society is used to build palaces, temples, and monuments, these edifices will be inhabited by or dedicated to the members of the ruling class. It has been a constant fact of history that much more than an equal share of the social surplus is retained by the rulers for private pleasure.

To the radical, the distinguishing trait of rulers is their inclination to exploit. Having been granted (or having usurped) certain powers, the rulers seem unable to refrain from accumulating privileges. They do so through force, fraud, and a legitimizing ideology. ... For ... [persons] in the radical tradition, the State and its laws are the instruments of oppression. In the *Communist Manifesto*, Marx called the executive of the modern State nothing "but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie. ..." From the radical viewpoint, rulers rule for their own benefit. ...

The radical perspective contains within it a theory of social change. The two unequal actors on the political stage stand in an antagonistic relationship to each other. Social change results from the conflict between them, especially from the energy released as the oppressed unite and challenge the exploiting rulers. Marxian theories of class conflict typify this point of view, as do the theories of other political analysts who view the conflict more in terms of authority relationships than in terms of economic ones.

There are actually two very different results which might derive from the conflict between exploiters and the exploited. And these differences are very important to our analysis. We can use Marx to illustrate one point of view and the American Declaration of Independence to illustrate the other.

The conflict between the oppressive bourgeoisie and the oppressed proletariat would, according to Marx, ultimately result in a classless society. The inequality between rulers and ruled stemmed from economic arrangements. Terminate these economic arrangements—specifically private ownership of the means of production—and the structural division between rulers and ruled would end. It would probably take a violent revolution to accomplish this, because everywhere the rulers tenaciously cling to their powers and privileges, but the aftermath would be well worth the struggle. History would move toward radical egalitarianism, a social community in which none would be more privileged than others. The long evolution of the State would end, ironically, in the State's demise.

Let us label this viewpoint the attack on the "structure of rule." This is the kernel of truth in the radical perspective: If rulers gain power and enjoy advantages by exploiting, the object of the exploited should be to eliminate all rulers, not just a particular set of rulers. Society must be restructured; it must be classless.

Contrast this doctrine with the Unanimous Declaration of Independence of the Thirteen United States of America, 4 July 1776.

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness. ...

That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government. ...

But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future security.

Thus was proclaimed the "right of revolution," but the practical consequences of the words penned by Thomas Jefferson differ sharply from those of Karl Marx. The American Revolution was aimed at particular rulers and not the structure of rule. It was not to be followed by the "withering away of the State" but by new Guards.

We might label this view the attack on the "composition of the ruling class." This view as well as the Marxist view holds that rulers exploit and oppress, but the differences are more important than the similarities. For Jefferson and his colleagues it was not the "ruling class" in the abstract which was the villain, it was simply those obnoxious Englishmen, especially George III, who would not play by the rules of the game. It was not necessary to change these rules, only to change the rulers. This viewpoint has had a profound significance for American politics, because it effectively isolates American political thought from the more radical tradition which calls into question the very necessity of rulers. As we shall see, it allows for a drift toward the elitist viewpoint that social change is not the product of class tensions but rather results from differing opinions and ambitions within the ruling circles.

Unequal Responsibilities:

The Conservative's Emphasis

The conservative does not deny that the State is a contract between unequals, but he emphasizes not the inequality of privileges but the inequality of responsibilities. The rulers and the ruled make an unequal contribution to the general social order, with the former making much the greater contribution.

This is an old idea, frequently expressed in creation myths. It is the elect who lead the people from darkness, chaos, or slavery into a new and better social order. This elect is then entrusted with the responsibility of preserving the moral and material gains thereby acquired. ...

The conservative is not dismayed that rulers have many special privileges and enjoy advantages denied lesser men. These are the rewards for shouldering responsibilities on behalf of the entire society.

The ruler has two main types of responsibility: moral and material. ... Emile Durkheim ... developed the theme that man cannot do without community and cannot do without the rules implied by community. The quest for company, for community, for social integration is part of human nature. Deny man these things and he loses a sense of direction and meaning. As succinctly stated by one scholar, "The disorder of the community means the disorder of the individual."³ It is a short step from this comment to observing that man needs rulers: "Those who formulate and apply rules are the leaders of society, not merely because they rule it in a juridical sense, but because they preside over the inner order of man."⁴ In short, if there must be rules, there must be rule inventors; if there must be guidance, there must be guidance givers. Thus do leaders provide a moral framework for society, a framework increasingly critical as society grows in complexity and scale. Those who provide this framework merit the powers and privileges they enjoy.

The responsibility for the moral integration of society is particularly evident in the public ceremonies which reaffirm the political beliefs by which men swear. Founding charters, creation myths, constitutions, sacred traditions, and the feats of past rulers express the origin, the growth, and the purpose of the political community. Political elites have responsibility for preserving these beliefs, and for teaching the community their significance. In this way, the solidarity and moral purpose of the society is continually affirmed. ...

In all of these rituals, the rulers are claiming to preserve those hard-earned values and victories of the past, and pledging to apply them to new conditions. They are protecting the political beliefs which men live by. For their willingness to assume such responsibilities, they are entitled to the powers and advantages of office. The pomp and circumstance that surround the rulers are necessary to symbolize to the people the integrity and dignity of the State. To strip the rulers of their eminent status would be to strip them of their significance, and society would be the sorrier for it.

Just as the moral well-being of the society depends on its rulers, so also does the material well-being. The rulers and the ruled are unequals in the sense that the elite have the responsibility for managing the society: They are the ones who get the trains to run on time! The conservative emphasizes that the rulers are indispensable in a complex society. Managing factories and transport systems, providing schools and hospitals, organizing armies and police forces require coordination and regulation, hence there must be coordinators and regulators. Be-

cause the material well-being of the populace depends on economic growth, social services, and social protection, the rulers who organize and direct their provision should be given the necessary powers to make things work and should be rewarded for their efforts.

The thesis that elites are necessary for the material well-being of the society can be substantiated by either of two different viewpoints about the masses. Most common is the assertion that the masses are incompetent and thus incapable of "acting in default of an initiative from without and from above." Elite theorist Robert Michels continues, "striking proof of the organic weakness of the mass is furnished by the way in which, when deprived of their leaders in time of action, they abandon the field of battle in disordered flight; they seem to have no power of instinctive reorganization, and are useless until new captains arise capable of replacing those that have been lost."⁵ The conception that leaderless people are incompetent receives support with the radical tradition. It was Lenin in *What Is to Be Done* who claimed that "without the 'dozen' tried and talented leaders (and talented men are not born by the hundred), professionally trained, schooled by long experience, and working in perfect harmony, no class in modern society is capable of conducting a determined struggle."⁶ Lenin's influential political tract is still used today by communist parties as the justification for the vanguard role, a leadership concept which echoes Michels's pessimism.

In contrast to the view that the masses are incompetent is the proposition that men are rational *and therefore* organize themselves into hierarchies. The people are well aware that their material well-being is furthered by the actions and talents of the rulers, and thus they willingly defer to the judgments of those who command the society. The opportunity costs of an alternative arrangement would be prohibitive, although it is theoretically possible for social action to be organized on the basis of every member of society negotiating with every other member until agreement is reached. But rational men will not pay the costs of such an elaborate negotiating machinery, and prefer to delegate authority to a smaller group of talented and trusted leaders.

Whether you start from the premise that masses are incompetent or that men are rational, you arrive at the same conclusion. It takes leaders to make things go. Thus, there is a very pragmatic reason for a social contract between unequals: Differential responsibilities are assigned and it follows that there will be differential powers and privileges. Those powers must be unequal so that the society can be run efficiently while privileges must be unequal so that the most able will be attracted to the responsible positions.

The conservative sees the relationship between the rulers and ruled in terms not of privilege but of responsibility. The moral significance and material well-being of society rests on the shoulders of the elite. This view is part of a larger perspective which sees society as an "organism" in which each part is mutually interdependent with all other parts. ...

For the conservative, society is not primarily the result of coercion and fraud. It is the result of reciprocity and mutual benefit. The rulers stand at the center of society and provide it with unification, coherence, and direction. Their powers and privileges should not be begrudged. High positions are not gained through force but by superior talent and hard work. Privileges are not stolen but are freely given as fair rewards for the responsibilities assumed. It would be an injustice to deny these rewards, and it would be impractical because how else would men of talent be attracted to positions of responsibility.

ELITE THEORY AND SOCIAL CHANGE

Elitists are sometimes criticized for having no theory of social change. It is true that in their view the interests of the status quo and the established elite are overwhelmingly advantaged in any struggle with new interests or a counter-elite. The clearest statement of this thesis is found in the classic study by Michels of pre-World War I Socialist Parties in Western Europe.⁷ He observed the gradual drift of these parties, particularly the German Socialist Party, into the hands of conservative leaders. These leaders were skilled at thwarting any challenge to their powers. The powerful political machines they created virtually precluded their being ousted from office. Moreover, the leaderships had developed life styles and interest different from those of their followers. Generalizing from his investigation, Michels set forth one of the most famous theories of social science—the iron law of oligarchy. In its essentials, the “law” holds that all organizations come to be ruled by self-perpetuating elites with mass participation limited to ritualistically ratifying the actions of the oligarchy. ... Few exceptions to this theory can be found.

Why is this so? A cataloging of the advantages enjoyed within organizations by elites as compared to the advantages of the masses and prospective counter-elites will soon show why the “iron law” describes so many organizations. Those in control of an organization, for example, make use of such resources as its technical staff, publicity and communications machinery, financial resources, and manpower. They also have in their favor a superior knowledge of organization affairs and the opportunity to wrap themselves in the aura of the organization so that criticism of the leadership can be interpreted as an unpatriotic attack on the organization. Additional advantages of elites leading an organization are the important psychological advantages over rivals and potential counter-elites. Custom, the need felt by masses for tried-and-true leadership; the socialized reverence of the masses for extant leadership; and the appeals to experience, indispensibility, and accomplishments are frequently employed by such elites. The element of fear can also be employed by the incumbent elite. This includes both the appeal that dismissal of the leadership would discredit the organization to the outside world and undermine its bargaining position and also the appeal that counter-elites are insufficiently deferential to the accomplishments

of the incumbents, and thus perhaps are “unpatriotic” or “traitorous.” Intimidation and repression as tactics available to the established elite make the removal of the elite quite difficult.

Michels denies the political significance of any element outside of the ruling minorities. No political initiative comes from the public. The public is best understood as an atomized and fragmented mass, capable only of responding to the leadership of superior elements in society. Only the elite can transcend their own milieu and evolve a vision of a different society. The masses are trapped in their milieu, depending on the visions provided them by an elite.

From this it might be thought that elite theory cannot account for social and political change, and indeed this criticism has often been voiced. But it is misplaced criticism, because elite theorists have a definite explanation of change. ... Because the important conflicts in society are not between classes but within the elite, the dynamic that accounts for social change is the constant struggle between a minority that holds power and another minority seeking power. It is in the process of elite circulation, or rather in blocked circulation, that we must seek one explanation for social change. Thus, Pareto has argued that when elites do not recruit the most able elements in society from outside their ranks and instead restrict entry to their ranks, they eventually become decadent and unable to cope with the tasks they must undertake. At the same time, the excluded talented elements from a counter-elite, organize the masses injured by the incompetence of the elite, and lead a revolution overthrowing the elite. Once this is done the new elite consolidates its power over the masses. ...

It would, however, be foolhardy to assert that all social and political change can be described in this manner, and neither Mosca nor Pareto attempted to. Joseph Schumpeter, the great Austrian economist, has offered an alternative—or rather, a supplementary theory.⁸ Although this theory, developed in his important essay *Social Classes*, is discussed in terms of classes, it is best conceived in terms of elites. According to Schumpeter—as adapted—elites’ powers and positions in a national structure depend on the significance accorded their function. Thus, under feudalism, manorial lords were pre-eminent in national structure because of the importance of their military, agricultural, and other functions. But, as their decline shows, the continuing influence of an elite depends upon two factors: (1) the continuing significance of their special functions, and (2) the degree to which they successfully perform that function. Thus, changing economic conditions reduced the importance of the manorial lords, causing their relative decline, while capitalist elites gained power because of their enhanced function. Again, a political elite’s failure to maintain economic prosperity when it is their announced or implicit task to do so will enable a counter-elite to mobilize and lead masses against them.

The preoccupation of Mosca and Pareto, in particular, with elite circulation reveals a further aspect of elite theory’s conservatism. The basic challenge to society is not to reform itself but to keep from disintegrating. The social order is

fragile indeed, and must continually be protected from the untutored passions of the masses. To unleash social energies, as the marxist revolutionaries have threatened to do, is sheer folly, because no one can know where this will lead. Indeed, a mob can destroy institutions and accomplishments painfully and slowly evolved over history. The elite theorists wished then for a moderate and paced circulation of elites, sufficient circulation to dampen the tendencies toward mass mobilization by frustrated counter-elites but not so much as to destroy the continuity and stability of society.

Perhaps elite theory's greatest value is that it provides an explanation for why political and social structures change so gradually, if at all. Most of history is not revolutions, but rather the day-in, day-out performance of important tasks by elites and the modest but significant changes in the composition of the ruling groups. When masses are occasionally aroused from their torpor, they are placated by elites granting symbolic benefits or moderate reforms. It is the extremely rare occasion in history that masses cannot be satisfied in this way. Then they are available for the mobilization by counter-elites, and severe breaks in historical continuity can occur. The Communist revolutions of this century are a case in point, as were the democratic revolutions of the eighteenth century.

DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT AND ELITE THEORY

The theory and the practice of democracy can be interpreted as a substantial modification of elite theory. Democratic thought, at least as shaped by two centuries of politics in the United States, accepts the elite thesis that there is always a division of political labor:

There are some whose task it is to control the actions of others and issue commands, and others who have to allow themselves to be controlled and have to obey. Today as a hundred years ago there are governments, parliaments, and courts the members of which are entitled to make decisions that affect the lives of many citizens, and there are citizens who can protest or shift their vote but who have to abide by the law. Insofar as either of these relations can be described as one of authority, I would claim that relations of domination and subordination have persisted throughout the changes of the past century.⁹

Accepting the inevitability of a division of political labor has not for the democratic theorist meant accepting the many consequences seen by the elitist. Democratic politics is the gradual but certain chipping away of elitist implications of the division of society into rulers and ruled. ...

Stripped of flowery rhetoric, democratic theory reduces to the simple principle that *rulers are on probation*. This fact dramatically rearranges the power relationship between those who rule and those who are ruled. ...

The composition of the ruling group is determined by a voting public, and this leads to an equalization of the power differences between rulers and ruled.

Under the conditions of universal suffrage and competitive elections, the balance of power shifts to the electorate, if only periodically. Because of this, what the rulers decide reflects a wider set of preferences than just those of the (temporary) rulers. Men in power are but transitory representatives of those who put them there. Thus the most fascinating aspect of the democratic revolution concerns the methods and implications of changing leaders, because this becomes the key to an entirely new theory of the "ruling class."

The eliteist points out that even though rulers are elected, they still have all the advantages of the ruling class. For one thing, they are organized and the masses are disorganized. As Mosca puts it, "The domination of an organized minority, obeying a single impulse, over the unorganized majority is inevitable. ... A hundred men acting uniformly in concert, with a common understanding, will triumph over a thousand men who are not in accord, and can therefore be dealt with one by one." Later Mosca explicitly challenges whether elections make much difference:

The truth is that the representative *has himself elected* by the voters, and if that phrase should seem too inflexible and too harsh to fit some cases, we might qualify it by saying that *his friends have him elected*. In elections, as in all other manifestations of social life, those who have the will and, especially, the moral, intellectual and material *means* to force their will upon others take the lead over the others and command them.¹⁰

Michels extends this analysis: Not only does organizational ability grant power, the structure of complex society inevitably gives rise to an organized and oligarchical minority.

The ruling class then retains its advantages despite the advances of democratic thinking. The rulers continue to siphon off an undue amount of the social surplus for personal benefit; they continue to make laws which reflect their own world views and which serve their special interests; and they continue to control the selection of the persons who will inherit their positions. ...

Constitutional democracy has not been designed to eliminate the division of political labor between rulers and ruled. It has been designed to provide an instrumentality whereby the public could select its own rulers and whereby the few with immense powers are accountable to the citizens whose lives they affect. ...

NOTES

1. Gaetano Mosca, *The Ruling Class* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939), p. 50. This work was initially published as *Elementi di Scienza Politica*, 1896. The version here cited was edited by Arthur Livingston and translated by Hanna D. Kahn.

2. This quotation is taken from *Les Systemes Socialistes*, initially published in 1902, and reproduced in Vilfredo Pareto, *Sociological Writings*, ed. S. E. Finer (London: Pall Mall Press, 1966), p. 134.

3. Renzo Sereno, *The Rulers: The Theory of the Ruling Class* (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), p. 117.
4. Sereno, *The Rulers*, p. 131.
5. Robert Michels, *Political Parties*, trans. Eden and Cedar Paul (New York: Free Press, 1966), p. 90.
6. V. Lenin, *What Is to Be Done*; reprinted in *Essential Works of Lenin*, Henry M. Christman, ed. (New York: Bantam, 1966), p. 145. *What Is to Be Done* was first published in 1902.
7. Michels, *Political Parties*, *passim*.
8. Joseph Schumpeter, "Social Classes," in *Imperialism, Social Classes* (New York: Meridian, 1951).
9. Ralf Dahrendorf, *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1959), p. 71.
10. Mosca, *The Ruling Class*, pp. 53, 154.

Influence of Democracy on the Feelings of the Americans

ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE

WHY DEMOCRATIC NATIONS SHOW A MORE ARDENT AND ENDURING LOVE OF EQUALITY THAN OF LIBERTY

The first and most intense passion which is engendered by the equality of condition is, I need hardly say, the love of that same equality. My readers will therefore not be surprised that I speak of it before all others. ...

The principle of equality may be established in civil society, without prevailing in the political world. Equal rights may exist of indulging in the same pleasures, of entering the same professions, of frequenting the same places—in a word, of living in the same manner and seeking wealth by the same means, although all men do not take an equal share in the government.

A kind of equality may even be established in the political world, though there should be no political freedom there. A man may be the equal of all his countrymen save one, who is the master of all without distinction, and who selects equality from among them all the agents of his power.

Several other combinations might be easily imagined, by which very great equality would be united to institutions more or less free, or even to institutions wholly without freedom.

Although men cannot become absolutely equal unless they be entirely free, and consequently equality, pushed to its furthest extent, may be confounded with freedom, yet there is good reason for distinguishing the one from the other. The taste which men have for liberty, and that which they feel for equality, are, in fact, two different things; and I am not afraid to add, that, amongst democratic nations, they are two unequal things. ...

Freedom has appeared in the world at different times and under various forms; it has not been exclusively bound to any social condition, and it is not