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SNA ASSIGNMENT

Exercis Chapter-16

- Ans 71.a -> for first person, there is no prior signal. So, his private signal will be responsible for telking decision whereas, herson two have two option, first if his private signal is same as person 1 action, then it easy for him to take decision, and if it have diff squal than 1st one than ferson 2 will be indifferent between 1 & 2, than 2 will follow it own private signal.
- Ans 1.6 > Person 3 have the knowledge of per 2 action & his order private signal, So, here its condition is same as Person 2 in practicus question, Like, if 2's action and 3's Private signal and same them Per 3 will go for to it early, And if look it's diff them also he will go for his own private signal.
 - Ans > 1.0 > Here in this word P3' can't inter anything from fer-1 signed, as P3 only have sees the action of n-1 i.e, P2, which thous is independent choosing decision barded on his own signal. 20; A
- Ans > 1. d > This is same case as P2 and P1. So, here if P3 sees high signal and P2 is accepted, So, he'll accept. And if P3 is diff than P2 action, then he'll choose action independly.
- Ans > 1. e > 100 for this given condition, cascade will never form as diff of two signal will never be > 2, which is a cond or for cascade to occur. Also, each time we only have access to the previous one's only. So, each time same condition as PILP2 will be there.

Ans > 2 .> a) Take the situation for 3 Pensons - So, conditions for 1st Person.

- He will have no Prior into, object therefore he will accept or reject bound on his private signal.

- Or reject bound on his private signal. And for Second Person, he have two eignor are his private and other is the PL payoff. So, we have term previously the there will be two condition and for both resolution P2 will accept or reject independely. The Port Person 3, if he have 3 signal, his turn private signal and Pi's & Po'r payoffs. So, if PI UP: have the payoffs than cascading will occur as n (Positive settle) > n (re payoff) and P3 will there accept or reject without thereting about if the Product is actually bod or good.

wheras if PI have -ve Payoff and P2 occupted and he have the payoff, So, average payoff = c, so, P3 will accept or reject the product independly of P14.P2 1.1, by his own private signal. b) Yes, for this condition also, caucading of rejudious com occur as, hets take PI accept it but give - ve payoff, and P2 also acapts it and gives we payoff (its decision will be independent as un've seen previously). So after this P3's decision will depend on Pishes's decision and P3 go for scascading and seject the Product. Ams>3>a) So, here given Prob. are. Pa (nood/Acape) = 1/2 (8(H/G) - Pa(L/B)=3/4 Pr (Accept) = Pr(H) and given G is true So, if G is true So, Person will accept only when sg not in high so, Po[H/6] = 3/4 Similarly for sejetim also, sjut when good is true will

be 1- Pr (H/h) = 4.

So, Liven, Good is true. Pr[A,A) = Pa[H/G] + Da(H/G) = 3/4 = 3/4 = 1/16 as , both an accepting. k Pora, R] = 3/4. 1/4 = 36 Po[Rin] = 3/16 & Po[RiR] = (1-3/4) (1-3/4) +11. c) (ascade will occur when summer of diff of no. of oxister and rej in > 2 then acceptence cascade a word browjest and accep is >, 2 then siged coscade so, if we observe (A, A) or (P,R) then cascading will occur. Pr((ascading) - P(A,A) + P(P,R) = 3,34+ /4/4 - 10 - 10 - 8 Ans = 4 = a) (Nivem, P(G) = 1/2 P(H/G) = 2/3, P(\$4/B) = 2/3 For 101th Person, to occur all previous Recascades con rappin when P_1kP_2 have Rejected. or Low sgnl. So, $P(G/L,L) = \frac{P_1[L,L]GP(G)}{School} \cdot P(G)$ $\frac{\sqrt{3 \cdot 1_3 \cdot 1_2}}{\frac{1}{3} \cdot 1_3 \cdot 1_2 + \frac{2}{3} \cdot \frac{2}{3} \cdot \frac{1}{2}} \Rightarrow \frac{\frac{1}{18}}{\frac{5}{18}} \Rightarrow \frac{1}{5}$ b) held take & people observed Low signal & 9th Person observes high signal, So, hart 3 Person's sgralwill be LL Hisgh Person. So, now lett say 10th Person rucives H Signal 650, n(L) - n(H) =0, So, Person 10 will choos action depend on his own Private Sgnal, i.e., Horaccift. I if 10th Person takes L Signal, then n(1) - n(H) => 3-1= 2 then cos(ading will occur and loth lesson will reject the Product independent of this own Private a signal

Ans = 4.c = Af 1 choose R A. i.e, Plo chooser So, Now, PH knows all PI-PIOchoosen Righton Sgrat. So, he will follow the cascade and the sichery R, irrespective of his our private signal. And if PIO choose A, So, Now PII knows P9 Sgn of

So, if PII chass H signal, thou (n(H)-n(L) = 1 62

so, cascadi will broke and P-11 chook A as the signal observed by his private square. Que P-11 Choose L

| n(H) - n(L) |= 1 52 then also cascadies booken and PII will Choose R by obsciving his own sgnal.

Ans-> 5-> a) I can tell this was happened becoursed cascading as first two member of committee choosen A, then after that Rest member also choose A irrsespective of

thinking about their own choices.

b) The other procedure could be to not ask each member one by one, which may leads to cascading. So, instead of that, we can choose some method so, that any member dopot have any information about which candidate his college have choosen, As we can ask them to write on a paper or Press some kind of button was without telling/showing anyother one. Ans. 56.0) Since majority of expert sucommended A, 05°, we can say that n(A) - n(other) > 2, that means coscading might have occured.

But we can't be confident about this choice as we don't know the exactly when coscading occur, As we don't know the exactly when coscading occur, As we don't know the order of secommendation too, so, tune can't be sure with going for A or any such decision as coscading may be correct or morrect.

b) for Procedure I, when bringing all experts in a room and sequentially asking each opinion.

So, In this case passibility of cascading is there as if expert 1 & 2 have similar opinion, than rush 3 will also have similar opinions,

for Procedure 2, when asking separately each of one, than, to their private opinion won't be affected by any others and each expert will give personal true opinion based on their own expertise.

So, procedure 2 will provide us the maximum Dinformation.

Theoram: A complete cascade com't occur on a network having cluster of density greater than 1-q, where q is the threshold of adoption.

If the density of the cluster is d>1-q, then mare in fraction of connection of any node outside the cluster outside

the cluster with that of node instituted < q.

As, the fraction of connections outside the cluster for

As, the fraction of connections outstart to the fraction of any node in cluster is Eq. even if every neighbours of node outside it's cluster are all part of cascade won't adopt the cascade as the threshold word be met i.e.,). I he cascade as the threshold word be met i.e.,). I