


# Preparing For Cyber Attack

‘Risk’ is defined as the likelihood of loss. Assessing cyber risk entails estimating the likelihood of an organization experiencing different levels and types of loss.

These can be broken down into a number of key loss processes, for example:

- Data exfiltration
- Contagious malware attacks
- Denial of service attacks
- Financial transaction theft
- Failures of counterparties or suppliers



**FIGURE 2.1** Costs of US data breaches by size of breach (2012–2017).

# DATA EXFILTRATION

Target Corporation: the loss of confidential data from companies that breach the privacy of their customers, employees, clients, or counterparties. If these fall into the wrong hands, they may reveal sensitive financial information about the business, intellectual property that provides competitive advantages to rivals, or information that can be publicized to damage the reputation of the company. wrong hands can be used for identity theft, to conduct fraudulent transactions, to steal money from bank accounts, to blackmail or demand ransom from the individual, or for other activities that are harmful to the data owner.

# Protecting your Data


Many companies now operate procedures to protect their data, and it is common in larger companies to use a sensitive data management system to identify internal data, track its usage, and control the access to it.

The regulatory requirement for organizations to notify the loss of personal confidential data has been in place longest in the United States, where it has been a requirement in most states since 2002. Since then there have been many thousands of notified events. The number of reported events grew very rapidly after 2009, but peaked in the years 2013 to 2016, and has been at a similar level or less in subsequent years.

- Data exfiltration occurs through accidental loss, insider exfiltration, or malicious external action. Before around 2010, two-thirds of incidents where data was compromised was through accidents – typically unsecured laptops or unencrypted data media being lost.
- There has been a rapid increase in malicious external attacks to steal data, until it has become the cause of three-quarters of data exfiltration incidents.
- Insider threat – or whistle-blowing – became more common for a few years after 2010, accounting for around 20% of leaks in 2012, but reducing back to around the previous rate of 10% of events from around 2014 onwards.

**TABLE 2.5** Examples of ransom payments reported to have been paid by large organizations hit by **cyber extortion attacks**.

| Organization Affected  | Date | Ransom Amount Allegedly Paid                                | US\$        |
|--|------|---|-------------|
| Nokia  | 2014 | 'Several millions'  | \$?,000,000 |
| Three Greek banks  | 2015 | €7 million each   | \$7,507,500 |
| Two Indian conglomerates                                     | 2015 | \$5 million each  | \$5,000,000 |
| UAE Bank   | 2015 | \$3 million   | \$3,000,000 |
| Nayana, ISP provider, South Korea                            | 2017 | \$1 million   | \$1,000,000 |
| Rubber Estate Nigeria Limited                                | 2015 | N35 million   | \$176,000   |
| TalkTalk   | 2015 | £80,000   | \$117,000   |
| CD Universe  | 2000 | \$100,000   | \$100,000   |
| Domino's Pizza   | 2014 | £24,000   | \$35,167    |
| VIP Management Services                                      | 2003 | \$30,000  | \$30,000    |
| Hollywood Presbyterian Medical Center and other US hospitals | 2016 | \$17,000 for HPMC; undisclosed amounts from other hospitals | \$17,000+   |
| Banque Cantonale de Genève                                   | 2015 | \$12,000  | \$12,000    |
| ProtonMail   | 2015 | \$6,000   | \$6,000     |
| Three Indian banks   | 2015 | At least 15 machines at one bitcoin each                    | \$3,500+    |
| Sony   | 2015 | N/A   | Unknown     |



**FIGURE 2.3** Examples of losses caused to businesses by NotPetya malware, June 2017.



# Costs of Data Exfiltration

- The company may need to handle large numbers of enquiries from concerned people who want to know if they have been affected. Individuals who have had their personal data compromised are entitled to credit monitoring services for a period of time in case they suffer identity theft.
- Regulators typically impose fines on the company for its failure in the duty of trust. The organization also faces internal costs from dealing with the breach, including a forensic investigation to identify and rectify any IT system vulnerability that was the cause of the breach, installation of higher levels of security, and disruption to its business practice while it deals with the immediate aftermath of the event.

- The type of data stolen is important: for a breach of 10,000 records, it will cost a company 1.5 times as much for PCI records than for personally identifiable information (PII), and 5.5 times as much for protected health information (PHI) records.
- The average cost per record of a data loss of more than 100,000 records more than doubled from 2010 to 2016.<sup>2</sup> This reflects increasing regulatory fines and procedures, growing costs of compensation, and escalation of legal complexities in dealing with identity loss

**TABLE 2.3** Examples of contagious malware outbreaks ranked by global impact, past 30 years.

| Name               | Global Impact | Year | Type  | Propagation Vector         | Infection Rate | Payload Type           | Destructiveness |
|--------------------|---------------|------|-------|----------------------------|----------------|------------------------|-----------------|
| <i>Conficker</i>   | 1: Very high  | 2008 | Worm  | IP block scanning          | 1: Very high   | Botnet                 | 1: Very high    |
| <i>ILOVEYOU</i>    | 1: Very high  | 2000 | Worm  | Email                      | 1: Very high   | Overwriting files      | 1: Very high    |
| <i>MyDoom</i>      | 1: Very high  | 2004 | Worm  | Email                      | 2: High        | DDoS                   | 1: Very high    |
| <i>Netsky</i>      | 1: Very high  | 2004 | Worm  | Email                      | 3: Moderate    | Beeping                | 1: Very high    |
| <i>Sasser</i>      | 1: Very high  | 2004 | Worm  | Buffer overflow            | 3: Moderate    | DDoS                   | 1: Very high    |
| <i>NotPetya</i>    | 2: High       | 2017 | Virus | Software update            | 3: Moderate    | Wiper                  | 2: High         |
| <i>WannaCry</i>    | 2: High       | 2017 | Worm  | Random scanning            | 2: High        | Ransomware             | 2: High         |
| <i>Stuxnet</i>     | 2: High       | 2010 | Worm  | Search (Siemens software)  | 4: Significant | SCADA control          | 1: Very high    |
| <i>SQL Slammer</i> | 2: High       | 2003 | Worm  | Buffer overflow            | 1: Very high   | DDoS                   | 2: High         |
| <i>Mirai</i>       | 2: High       | 2016 | Worm  | WAN scanning               | 1: Very high   | Botnet                 | 3: Moderate     |
| <i>Klez</i>        | 2: High       | 2001 | Worm  | Email                      | 3: Moderate    | HTML message           | 1: Very high    |
| <i>Code Red</i>    | 2: High       | 2001 | Worm  | Buffer overflow            | 3: Moderate    | Website defacing, DDoS | 2: High         |
| <i>Melissa</i>     | 2: High       | 1999 | Virus | Email                      | 3: Moderate    | Spam generator         | 4: Significant  |
| <i>Nimda</i>       | 2: High       | 2001 | Worm  | Email + web browser        | 4: Significant | Ransomware             | 2: High         |
| <i>Salinity</i>    | 3: Moderate   | 2003 | Virus | Email                      | 1: Very high   | Keystroke logging      | 2: High         |
| <i>Chernobyl</i>   | 3: Moderate   | 1998 | Virus | Pirated software           | 2: High        | Overwriting files      | 3: Moderate     |
| <i>Morris</i>      | 3: Moderate   | 1988 | Worm  | Multiplatform (inc. email) | 2: High        | Botnet                 | 5: Material     |
| <i>Shamoon</i>     | 3: Moderate   | 2012 | Virus | Spear phishing             | 2: High        | Wiper                  | 2: High         |
| <i>Blaster</i>     | 3: Moderate   | 2003 | Worm  | Random scanning            | 3: Moderate    | Botnet                 | 2: High         |
| <i>Bad Rabbit</i>  | 3: Moderate   | 2017 | Worm  | Corrupted software         | 3: Moderate    | Ransomware             | 2: High         |

|                      |                |      |        |                            |                |                           |                |
|----------------------|----------------|------|--------|----------------------------|----------------|---------------------------|----------------|
| <i>Neverquest</i>    | 3: Moderate    | 2013 | Trojan | Email, web injection       | 3: Moderate    | Botnet                    | 3: Moderate    |
| <i>Zeus</i>          | 3: Moderate    | 2007 | Trojan | Software download          | 3: Moderate    | Keyloggers/HTML injectors | 4: Significant |
| <i>CoinMiner</i>     | 3: Moderate    | 2018 | Virus  | Random scanning            | 3: Moderate    | Cryptocurrency miner      | 5: Material    |
| <i>Locky</i>         | 3: Moderate    | 2016 | Virus  | Email                      | 4: Significant | Ransomware                | 3: Moderate    |
| <i>Tiny Banker</i>   | 4: Significant | 2012 | Trojan | Email                      | 4: Significant | Packet sniffing           | 1: Very high   |
| <i>KOVTER</i>        | 4: Significant | 2017 | Virus  | Email                      | 4: Significant | Click fraud               | 2: High        |
| <i>ONI/MBR-ONI</i>   | 4: Significant | 2017 | Virus  | Email                      | 4: Significant | Wiper                     | 2: High        |
| <i>Dukakis</i>       | 4: Significant | 1988 | Virus  | Floppy disk                | 5: Material    | Displays a message        | 5: Material    |
| <i>SevenDust</i>     | 4: Significant | 1998 | Virus  | Email                      | 5: Material    | Wiper                     | 2: High        |
| <i>FakeAV</i>        | 5: Material    | 2007 | Trojan | Corrupting software, email | 3: Moderate    | Scareware                 | 4: Significant |
| <i>Storm</i>         | 5: Material    | 2007 | Trojan | Email                      | 3: Moderate    | Botnet                    | 4: Significant |
| <i>Magic Lantern</i> | 5: Material    | 2001 | Trojan | Email                      | 5: Material    | Keystroke logging         | 5: Material    |
| <i>Michelangelo</i>  | 5: Material    | 1991 | Trojan | Driver disks               | 5: Material    | Data destruction          | 3: Moderate    |

# Virus


‘virus’ –computer code inside a host program; ‘worm’ – a stand-alone piece of compiled software as a program that can replicate itself; and ‘Trojan horse’ – a program that appears to do one thing but actually does something different.

# Wanna Cry

- May 12, 2017 when an aggressive ransomware attack via file-sharing network protocols on computers using outdated Windows XP and v8 OS resulted in 300,000 infections of computers across 150 countries. The WannaCryptor used a National Security Agency (NSA) exploit code-named EternalBlue.
- Of the roughly 400 million actively used Windows computers running version 8 or an earlier operating system, approximately 0.1% were infected.
- The event highlighted the issue of equipment software latency, i.e. that machines and subnetworks within organizations may rely on specific versions of an operating system that render them vulnerable.

- Machines such as medical magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scanners and X-ray machines that were certified only on XP and v8, and maintained on those operating systems, were among those that were crippled by the attack.
- Estimates of the losses caused by WannaCry vary substantially, from tens of millions of dollars to \$4 billion.
- Our counterfactual analysis suggests that if the kill switch had not been triggered, and if the attack had occurred prior to the issuing of the MS17-010 patch for Windows 8, the infection rates and losses could have been an order of magnitude higher, perhaps reaching \$20 billion to \$40 billion.





**FIGURE 2.2** WannaCry infections across the world and business impacts, May 2017.



# Not Petya, 2017

- Ukrainian tax preparation program that is an industry standard for tax filing in Ukraine. As a result, 80% of the infections occurred in Russia and Ukraine, where more than 80 organizations initially reported being affected, including the National Bank of Ukraine, Kiev's Boryspil International Airport, and the radiation monitoring system at Ukraine's Chernobyl nuclear power plant.
- NotPetya utilized the exploit of EternalBlue, similarly to WannaCry, but enhanced it with multiple techniques to propagate throughout internal networks, including harvesting passwords and running PSEXEC code on other local computers.

- Maersk, one of the largest shipping operations, reported that infections of the NotPetya virus had caused it to suspend operations in parts of its organization, causing congestion in the 76 ports it operates worldwide, and resulting in business losses of up to \$300 million in the initial quarter after the attack.

# Antivirus Software Industry

- It contains a dictionary of templates of known malware characteristics, and compares software that it finds with these definitions. If it finds a match, it stops the code executing, quarantines it, and eradicates it safely. Typically antivirus software will also do 'heuristic checking' or 'anomaly detection' – monitoring programs for unexpected behavior that might indicate a new type of virus that isn't in its library of known malware.
- Hackers writing malware that they don't want to be detected have to use a new template that is not already included in the antivirus dictionaries. New forms of malware are being generated every day. And every day new forms of malware are being detected, codified, and added to the dictionary of antivirus definitions.

- The speed at which new malware can be identified and added to the antivirus dictionaries – and disseminated to all the users of the antivirus software – is a vital part of defending users.

# Malware Payloads

The Types of harm the payload can cause to the host system are broadly classified into the following categories:-

1. Deletion
2. Extortion
3. Theft
4. Fraud
5. Hijacking

# Risk of Malware Infection

- Bypass the protection provided by standard anti-malware security systems, how many companies the malware manages to infect, and whether your organization is among the susceptible population for the vector it uses.
- A large number of malware entry plays exploit older and unpatched versions of common commercial software. Companies that take longer to update their software systems tend to be more susceptible to malware infection. 'Patching latency' – the average age and versioning of software running in an organization, relative to the latest version available – is a measure of a company's security diligence and susceptibility to malware infection

- When Maersk was infected by the NotPetya virus, this required the reinstallation of 45,000 machines, more than 50% of the machines on the company's internal network, taking 10 days and inflicting business losses of at least \$300 million. Other organizations infected with NotPetya were luckier and had only a small number of infected machines. The lateral propagation of malware within an organization determines the likely severity of impact on the business. Lateral propagation is mainly driven by the malware programming and its ability to replicate within a network without detection and prevention by network traffic monitoring systems.

# Ransomware

- Ransomware has been a common method of extorting individuals using personal computers and small businesses for some years. There are many examples of ransomware that have been developed since the first generation came into circulation around 2005, from early programs in 1989.
- Ransom demands range from \$25 to \$500, averaging around \$300. Only a small proportion of victims pay the ransom (around 3%), but this is enough to generate significant incomes for the perpetrators.
- CryptoWall, is reported to have earned \$18 million from US citizens between April 2014 and June 2015.



# Cyber Extortion Attacks on Larger Organizations

- Cyber extortion has become increasingly more ambitious, targeting organizations that can afford higher payoffs or that are likely to pay for large numbers of devices to be unlocked.

Ransomware incidents are reported more commonly in certain industries, namely healthcare, telecommunications, computer system design, and chemical and drug manufacturing sectors, while some sectors, such as manufacturing, food, and agriculture, have reported a comparably low number of incidents.

- Public-sector organizations and government departments are not immune: local administrations in Italy are reported to have paid ransoms of about €400 (US\$440) to recover corrupted files. Even a US police department in Tewksbury, Massachusetts, near Boston, notoriously paid \$750 in bitcoin to prevent its files from being lost. Examples include the Hollywood Presbyterian Medical Center in California, which paid a \$17,000 bitcoin ransom in February 2016 for the decryption key for patient data.
- A ransomware attack that froze the payment system of the San Francisco municipal railway system, accompanied by a demand for \$73,000 in November 2016, was dealt with by allowing customers to ride for free while the system was rebuilt instead of paying the ransom.<sup>15</sup> The moral hazard of paying ransoms is that it encourages the extortionists to repeat the crime on other victims, and the money paid provides them with the resources to sustain and expand their operations.

# The Business of Extortion

The extortionists have become professional at the process, including setting up call centers in third-party countries to assist the individuals that they are blackmailing with the necessary payment steps and providing technical support for the unlocking of their data, providing decryption codes for the software. Support extends to helping their victims set up bitcoin bank accounts to make untraceable payments. To avoid being traced, the call centers are quickly disbanded after a certain number of payments are extracted.

# Ransomware Attacks on the Rise

- The use of ransomware, where particular malware is infiltrated into the networks of a company and disables servers or locks up data until a ransom is paid, has become more of a concern of cyber security specialists. Both WannaCry and NotPetya appeared to be ransomware when they first infected a system. This demonstrated that with the right vector and ability to exploit a susceptible population, malware can penetrate the defenses of even quite sophisticated and well protected companies.
- There are tools such as polymorphic malware generators being more commonly used, enabling large numbers of more sophisticated ransomware to be created to order. Variants of ransomware being offered for sale on the black market can demand ransom payments as high as \$1 million.

- As regulatory penalties for data breaches become increasingly severe, criminals who steal data may decide that extorting the company against the threat of openly publishing the data is more profitable than selling it on the black market. Companies may be tempted to pay a ransom rather than pay severe regulatory fines.

# DENIAL OF SERVICE ATTACKS

- Half of all major US companies experience a denial of service attack on their websites each year, and one in eight of those attacks overwhelms their resilience and renders their internet services unavailable.
- Traffic volumes can be generated by botnets – a network of remotely controlled zombie computers, which are personal computers infected by malicious software that sends out messages without the owner even noticing.

There are the following types of the DDos attacks

- Volumetric attacks: flood a target network with data packets that completely saturate the available network bandwidth. These attacks cause very high volumes of traffic congestion, overloading the targeted network or server and causing extensive service disruption for legitimate users trying to gain access.
- Application-based attacks, also known as 'layer 7' attacks, target the application layer of the operating system (open systems interconnection model). The attack does not use brute force, but is a disguised instruction that forces functions or particular features of a website into overload to disable them. It is sometimes used to distract IT personnel from other potential security breaches. Application-based attacks are reported to constitute around 20% of DDoS attacks.

- Protocol-based or Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) connection attacks involve sending numerous requests for data as synchronized (SYN) packets to the victim server – typically a firewall server – which opens a new session for each SYN packet, overwhelming the control tables of the server. These TCP SYN floods are one of the oldest types of DDoS attack, but are still used successfully.
- Fragmentation attacks use internet protocols for data re-aggregation as an attack vector to overload the processing power of a server. The fragmentation protocol manages the transmission of volumes of data by breaking the data down into smaller packets and then reassembling them at their destination. Sending confusing or conflicting protocols floods the server with incomplete data fragments.



During the DDos attacks following things occur

1. Users experience much slower page load time in their browsers.
2. Transactions fail
3. Services are unavailable

# Intensity of Attack

An attack of 10 Gbps (significant intensity) is likely to overwhelm the capability of a website with the infrastructure to support around one million visitors a month, and cause it to become unavailable, if it does not have specific anti-DDoS measures in place. A website with more infrastructure and capacity is less vulnerable, and it takes more attack intensity – higher Gbps volumes – to take it down.

# Duration of DDoS Attack

- The duration of attacks and the time that servers can be interrupted is a key component of potential business disruption loss. If an attack is intense enough to degrade or stop a server from functioning, the key issue for managers is the length of time that the attack can be sustained to disrupt business activities.
- The most severe DDoS attack recorded in recent years lasted for a total of three hours at 1,200 Gbps. 16 Long-duration attacks of low intensity and multiple repeat attacks are more common. The potential is evidently growing for high intensity attacks to be sustained for long durations, potentially for days at a time, but this is not yet a common characteristic of DDoS attacks.

# Magnitude of DDos Attack Activity

- The number of annual DDoS attacks fluctuates significantly, but analysis of recent trends suggests that the overall number of individual attacks may not be increasing substantially. However, attacks are getting more intense, with a greater proportion of attacks being of higher intensity and sustained for longer durations.
- However, the large majority of attacks are destructive, with only indirect or no monetary benefit to the perpetrator. Some DDoS attacks mask other criminal activities, such as a simultaneous breach of a network to steal data. Some may even be accidental or collateral damage from attacks.

# The Big Cannons

- External agents, or as a method of augmenting military actions in a conflict. A number of countries are known to have military or state-sponsored units with powerful DDoS capability, such as the Chinese 'Great Cannon' and the US National Security Agency QUANTUM internet attack tool.
- Over a half of all recent attacks are multi vectored, making them more difficult to mitigate. Attacks most commonly originate from, or are routed through, servers in China, although attacks are directed via servers in many countries, including the United States, Turkey, Brazil, South Korea, and other territories.
- An HP Fortify study found that as many as 70% of IoT devices are vulnerable to attacks due to weak passwords, insecure web interfaces, and poor authorizations, and new vulnerabilities are being discovered each year.

- There have been high-profile cyber attacks that have succeeded in penetrating the volume wholesale financial transaction systems operated by financial institutions. Sophisticated threat actors have penetrated the SWIFT banking system, the Polish financial regulator, and individual bank-to-bank trading systems.
- The attacks compromised more than 100 financial institutions, with loss estimates as high as \$1 billion. The criminals exploited vulnerabilities in Microsoft Office via spear phishing emails (targeted fraudulent emails) to gain access to money processing services, ATMs, financial accounts, and the SWIFT network, giving the cyber criminals a means to move and transfer money.

**TABLE 2.6** Intensity of distributed denial of service attacks that will disable servers of given volumes, if unprotected.

| Intensity Scale<br>for DDoS<br>Attack                          | Significant<br>Intensity<br>DDoS | Moderately<br>High Intensity<br>DDoS | High<br>Intensity<br>DDoS | Very<br>High Intensity<br>DDoS | Ultra-High<br>Intensity<br>DDoS |
|--|----------------------------------|--------------------------------------|---------------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Volume (gigabits per second)                                   | 1–10 Gbps                        | 10–50 Gbps                           | 50–100 Gbps               | 100–109 Gbps                   | ≥1 Tbps                         |
| Website vulnerability threshold (number of visitors per month) | 1 million                        | 10 million                           | 100 million               | 1 billion                      | 10 billion                      |
| Approximate global website ranking for vulnerability threshold | Top 100,000                      | Top 10,000                           | Top 1,000                 | Top 100                        | Top 10                          |
| Daily attack rate (worldwide)                                  | 962                              | 101                                  | 3.53                      | 0.40                           | –                               |

# Risk in the IT Supply Chain

- Modern system design increasingly integrates software components and outsourced or third-party services into offerings. There are many potential counterparties of an organization that could cause the organization a loss. Any counterparty that has access to the company's data, particularly those that may be using, generating, or processing the type of data.
- Third-party software products provide their own vulnerabilities and present a risk of triggering a loss to an organization if failures occur. There are many examples of failures in commercial and third-party software that have caused large-scale losses. Examples include flaws in scanning algorithms that randomly alter numbers in the digitization capture of printed documents,<sup>34</sup> banks having to write down large losses resulting from errors in software calculations of interest rates,<sup>35</sup> and errors in software parameters of industrial control systems resulting in substandard product manufacturing and major product recall.



- The trend towards systems integration from multiple third-party components make these issues of dependency and supply chain risk even more acute. As businesses pull data streams from other people's application programming interfaces (APIs) and apply multiple algorithms from different providers, even diagnosing malfunctions will become highly complex: when two different artificial intelligence algorithms combine and produce unexpected outcomes, whose responsibility is it?

# The Risk of CSP Failures

Cloud computing has seen very rapid uptake to become a major driver of the digital economy, with expenditures on public cloud computing having doubled every four years and now being used in some capacity by more than 90% of companies <sup>37</sup> to generate up to \$246 billion in revenue worldwide.

Most adoption is currently piecemeal, with many managers concerned about governance of the use of CSPs internally, combating this 'shadow IT culture', and developing an integrated strategy for cloud adoption. Many organizations may be more exposed to cloud outages than they realize. Experienced managers advocate a structured approach to cloud adoption that follows six stages of putting business activities onto the cloud:

1. Data storage (low value)
2. Delivery of scalable SaaS (non-revenue)
3. Data storage (higher value)
4. Migration of existing apps
5. Building (new) revenue streams
6. Tackling legacy systems and replacing them with cloud equivalents


Industry analysts grade the levels of cloud adoption of organizations into five levels:

1. No plans
2. Cloud watchers (planning for cloud activities)
3. Cloud beginners (carrying out their first cloud projects)
4. Cloud explorers (having apps running in the cloud)
5. Cloud focused (making heavy use of multiple apps)

Surveys suggest that around a third of companies currently may be 'cloud focused' and making heavy use of the cloud. This proportion is higher in small and medium-size businesses (38%) than large enterprises (28%).

There are a number of ways that CSPs could suffer an outage that affects their customers. These include:

- Mechanical failure of equipment, fires, or physical damage of server sites
- Power failure or other essential utility provision, including failure of the backup generators or cooling systems
- Cyber attack by malicious external actors seeking to disrupt services or steal data
- Internal software system failure by accident or from a malicious insider



**FIGURE 2.7** Duration of cloud service outages reported in a single year (2017 statistics for 100,000 events) extrapolated for likelihood of longer outage events per year.

Nevertheless, system failures do occur and customers suffer outages. On February 28, 2017 Amazon's Simple Storage Service (S3) saw 'high error rates' in multiple AWS services in the US eastern region, which escalated to cause a four-hour outage, and quickly cascaded to other regions and services, including CloudWatch, EC2, Storage Gateway, and AWS Web Application Firewall (WAF). The outage was triggered by an AWS S3 team user error, providing incorrect commands while debugging. This outage affected the websites of around 148,000 AWS customers – initially losing graphics and slowing up performance, but cascading to other services and causing complete website failure.

Hypervisors are also susceptible to other attack vectors such as through network services and denial of service attacks.

It is rare that a failure causes the entire cloud service to suffer an outage. More typically a failure occurs in a single service or a single geographical region. Because of the interconnected architecture of the CSP services, if the failure cascades, it can affect other applications and spread to other geographical regions.

A typical hierarchy of outages is:

- Individual application failures for users of a particular cloud service in a specific region
- Failure of a specific application across multiple regions
- General service failure (multiple applications) for all customers of a particular region
- General service failure (multiple applications) for all customers of multiple regions