

# The Default Effect: A closer look at reactance through environmental choice architectures

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#### Abstract

Choice architecture is a powerful influence on consumer decisions. One such influence, default architecture, results in disproportionately choosing options that are pre-selected for the decision-maker, even when the default option is made salient and the choice is counterattitudinal.

An experiment tests whether transparency about the *reasons* for defaults alters default effects on consumers' selection of renewable vs. nonrenewable energy supply for their home electricity.


Making reasons transparent appeared to provide a justification for using the default for all but those most alarmed by climate change.

# Introduction

- The default effect has promoted sustainable behavior (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008).
  - However, default effects could promote unsustainable behavior such as supporting nonrenewable energy.
- The default effect is stronger than individual attitudes about sustainable behavior (Vetter & Kutzner, 2016).
- Making the presence of defaults transparent has not altered the default effect (Steffel et al., 2016).
  - Making reasons for the defaults may be important, especially when they counter attitudes.

# Hypotheses: Overcoming default effects via transparency

- Transparency will diminish the default effect on choices and increase the effect of attitudes on choices.
- Transparency will increase feelings of manipulation and anger, especially when the default is counterattitudinal.



# Methods and Experimental Design

#### **Participants:**

Psychology students (N= 252) participated for extra credit

#### **Experimental Design:**

2 (default) x 2 (transparency) x 3 (climate change concern)

#### **Procedure and measures:**

- Cover story: Imagine choosing energy contract when moving into a new leased apartment
- Default: Half the final contract had renewable energy preselected and half had nonrenewable energy
- Transparency: Half given reason justifying default energy type and half given no reason
  - Pro-renewable energy transparency: "The renewable energy option was selected as the default choice because it helps these companies develop and supports energy that does not pollute the environment or contribute to climate change."
  - Pro-fossil fuel transparency manipulation:
  - "The nonrenewable energy option was selected as the default choice because it helps these companies continue to remain profitable and employ Pennsylvanians while meeting the energy needs of the region."
- Dependent measures:
  - Strength of choice (choice x confidence), Feeling manipulated (four items); Anger (four items)

#### Results

A 2 x 2 x 3 ANOVA revealed a three-way interaction on:

- Strength of choice, F(2,211) = 3.08, p = .05,  $\eta^2 = .03$
- Anger, F(2,211) = 2.61, p = .08,  $\eta^2 = .02$
- But not feeling manipulated, F(2,211) = .18, p = .84,  $\eta^2 = .001$





Figure 3. Effects of transparency, default, and climate change concern on anger.



## Discussion

#### **Summary:**

- Providing a reason for either default increased the strength of effects for all except those alarmed about climate change.
- Those who are alarmed about climate change appeared to resist the default effect.
- That participants did not feel manipulated may be the result of a choice architecture where individuals may choose a contract.
- Anger was strongest for those given attitudinally inconsistent defaults, for those in the cautious to dismissive group, for those given a non-transparent default, and for those in the alarmed group when the default was transparent.

#### **Limitations:**

- Cannot differentiate among those with cautious, disengaged, doubtful, and dismissive climate change concerns.
- This situation presents with high external validity, but in real life other variables may influence the energy decision-making process.

#### Conclusions

- Rather than diminishing the default effect, transparent reasons appear to provide a justification for using the default for all but those most alarmed by climate change.
- Those alarmed by climate change resist the default effect when it is counterattitudinal; they appear to react against the nonrenewable default not because they feel personally manipulated but because they are angered by the default.
- Further research is needed to test whether those dismissive of climate change would have similar results if tested in isolation.

## Contact

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