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Data handling in space missions

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Outline

- Data handling in space missions
 - on-board and ground segments
- Computer architecture
 - generic system architecture
 - hardware and software architecture
- Requirements, limitations and design process


Data handling in space missions

- Data handling is crucial in space missions
- Most aspects of the mission are controlled by computers & software
 - ▶ launch trajectory & orbit acquisition
 - ▶ attitude control
 - ▶ platform control
 - ▶ telecommunications
- Missions may fail because of hardware/software faults
 - ▶ data handling is a *mission critical* component

Some notorious software failures

- **Ariane 5 launcher (1996)**
 - ▶ self-destroyed because of a failure in flight control software
 - ▶ incorrect reuse of previous (Ariane 4) software
 - ▶ correct data misinterpreted as erroneous
 - **Mars Pathfinder (1997)**
 - ▶ repeated timing failures led to frequent resets
 - ▶ bad design of real-time parameters
 - ▶ fixed by uploading a software patch
 - **Mars Climate Orbiter (1999)**
 - ▶ persistent navigation errors resulted in entering Mars atmosphere at an improperly low altitude and probably burning up
 - ▶ mixing SI and imperial units went undetected
- ... and a few more ones in
- ▶ <http://www.itworld.com/article/2823083/88716-8-famous-software-bugs-in-space>
 - ▶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_software_bugs#Space

Space system segments



Source: ECSS-E-00A


NOTE GSE = Ground Support Equipment
AIV = Assembly, Integration, Verification

- The **launch** and **space** segments have the most demanding requirements for
 - ▶ reliability,
 - ▶ safety
 - ▶ integrity
- ▶ **On-board** computers are subject to harsh environmental conditions
- ▶ **On-board** hardware/software cannot be replaced if defective

On-board Data Handling (OBDH)

- The **OBDH** subsystem is in charge of exchanging data between the spacecraft functional units and the ground segment
 - data storage and distribution within the spacecraft as well
- It is highly integrated with the **TT&C** subsystem
 - telemetry, tracking and telecommand
- It is based on one or more **on-board computers (OBC)**

OBDH architecture




On-board computers

- Computation support to spacecraft functions
- Specific requirements
 - ▶ embedded in spacecraft
 - specific I/O devices, limited power, size and weight
 - ▶ real-time operation
 - functions have to be performed on time
 - ▶ high reliability requirements
 - repair is not possible in space
 - ▶ harsh environment
 - radiation, temperature, vibration, acceleration
- Applicable technology may be restricted
 - often resulting in less powerful technology being used


OBC hardware

- LEON processors are common in ESA systems
 - ▶ open-source μ P core from which chips can be built
- The current version is LEON4
 - ▶ SPARC v8 compliant RISC architecture
 - ▶ radiation-hard implementations
 - ▶ speed ≈ 100 MHz
 - ▶ power $\approx 0,5$ W

<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LEON>



Example: UPMSat2 on-board computer




Computer board based on LEON3



EBOX hosting the computer board


http://www.esa.int/Our_Activities/Space_Engineering_Technology/Onboard_Computer_and_Data_Handling/Onboard_Computer_and_Data_Handling2

EBOX




Computador de Von Neumann

- Modelo de computador propuesto en 1947
 - ▶ El más empleado.
 - ▶ Hay otras alternativas (procesadores de gráficos, FPU)
- Características
 - ▶ Datos e instrucciones almacenados en memoria
 - ▶ Contenido de la memoria accesible por direcciones
 - ▶ Ejecución implícitamente en secuencia




UPMSat2 OBC hardware




OBC software

- Many critical functions depend on software
 - high-integrity requirements
- Most software functions have real-time requirements
 - do things in time
- Verification & validation process is crucial
 - safety management
- Technology choice driven by high-integrity requirements
 - e.g. Ada, RTOS, static analysis, temporal analysis


UPMSat2 software



Software development cycle




ECSS standard disciplines



Source: ECSS-S-ST-00C


(as of 6 May 2014)

ECSS handbooks



Source: ECSS-S-ST-00C

ECSS software processes



Source: ECSS-E-ST-40C

ECSS software criticality categories

Category	Definition
A	Software that if not executed, or if not correctly executed, or whose anomalous behaviour can cause or contribute to a system failure resulting in: Catastrophic consequences.
B	Software that if not executed, or if not correctly executed, or whose anomalous behaviour can cause or contribute to a system failure resulting in: Critical consequences.
C	Software that if not executed, or if not correctly executed, or whose anomalous behaviour can cause or contribute to a system failure resulting in: Major consequences.
D	Software that if not executed, or if not correctly executed, or whose anomalous behaviour can cause or contribute to a system failure resulting in: Minor or Negligible consequences.

Summary

- Data handling is a critical component of space systems
- On-board computer systems are most critical
- OBC hardware design is driven by reliability requirements in a harsh environment
- OBC software design is driven by high-integrity requirements
- ECSS standards for software define processes for developing high-integrity software
 - ▶ ECSS-E-40C
 - ▶ ECSS-Q-80C

